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MAXIMS OF EQUITY.
SOUTHERN OALIPORNIA RY.
RUTHERFORD et al.
(62

Fed.

CO.

v.

796.)

Circuit Court, S. D. California.

June

30, 1894.

Suit by the Southern California RailwayCompany, a corporation of the state of California, against C. C. Rutherford and others
for injunction.
W.

J.

Hunsaker, for complainant.

ROSS, District Judge. Time does not admit of an extended statement of the facts of
the case or of the reasons for awarding the
injunction
applied
for.
The bill shows,
among other things, that the complainant
railway company is one link in a through line
of road extending from National City, San
Diego county, Cal., to the city of Chicago, in
the state of Illinois, engaged in the transportation, among other things, of interstate
commerce
and the mails of the United
States;
its connecting roads being the Atlantic & Pacific and the Atchison, Topeka &
That there
Santa F6 Railroad Companies.
is a valid existing contract between the complainant company and its connecting companies and the Pullman Palace Oar Company by which all regular passenger trains
running over the said through line of road,
carrying
including that of the complainant,
the mail and passengers, shall carry Pullman
are in the emcars.
That the defendants
ploy of the complainant company, and were
by it to, among other things,
employed
handle and operate its trains so engaged in
carrying the United States mail and passengers and freight between National City, Cal.,
and Chicago, 111., and to and from intermediate points, and from the time of their employment up to the time of the commission
of the acts complained of by the complainto handle and
ant were duly accustomed
operate such trains, including Pullman cars.
That subsequently the defendants, although
remaining in the employment of the complainant company, refused, and still refuse,
to handle or operate any train of cars of the
complainant company to which a Pullman
car Is attached; and because of the disand
in possession
charge by the receivers
control of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa F6
Railroad Company of certain employes of
theirs for refusing to handle or operate any
train of that road to which a Pullman car
is attached, the defendants to the present
bill, while remaining in the employment of
the complainant company, refused, and still
refuse, to handle or operate any of the trains
of the complainant company engaged in carrying the mail of the United States and In
which
the aforesaid interstate commerce,
their, regular and accustomed duties as such
emplbygs required, and still require, them to
Undoubtedly, in the
operate
and
handle.
absence of a valid existing contract obligating the defendants to remain in the employof the complainant company, they
ment

would ordinarily have the legal right to quit
the employment and cease work at any time.
But the bill alleges that the defendants conof the complainant
tinue in the employment
company, and yet refuse lO perform their
regular and accustomed duties as such emand it further shows that such reployes;
fusal subjects and will continue to subject
the complainant to a multiplicity of suits
and to great and irreparable damage, in that
there is an existing valid contract requiring
complainant to attach a Pullman car or cars
on all of its through trains for the carriage
of passengers and the mail, and also retards
and interrupts the complainant in the transmission of the United States mail and the interstate

It

commerce

aforesaid.

is manifest that for this state of affairs
the law — neither civil or criminal — affords an
But the proud boast of
adequate remedy.
equity is, "Ubi jus, ibi remedium." It is the
maxim which forms the root of all equitable
Why should not men who redecisions.
main in the employment of another perform
they contract and engage to peris certainly just and right that
they should do so, or else quit the employAnd where the direct result of such
ment.
refusal works irreparable damage to the employer, and at the same time interferes with
the transmission of the mail and with comthink,
merce between the states, equity,
will compel them to perform the duties pertaining to the employment so long as they
c:ntinue in It. If I unlawfully obstruct by
a dam a stream of flowing water, equity, at
the suit of the party injured, will compel me
by Injunction, mandatory in character, to remove the dam, and, prohibitory in character, from further interfering with the flow
of the stream; and If I unlawfully erect a
wall shutting out the light from another,
equity will compel me to tear it down, and to
refrain from further interference
with the
other's rights.
It is true that such cases are
not precisely like the present one, yet the
principle upon which the court proceeds In
such cases is not substantially different.
And if it be said that there Is no exact
precedent for the awarding of an injunction
in the present case,
respond, In the language of the court in the case of Toledo,
etc., Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed.
751: "Every just order or rule known to
equity courts was born of some emergency,
to meet some new conditions, and was therefore, in its time, without
precedent.
If
based on sound principles, and beneficent
afCording
results follow their enforcement,
necessary relief to the one party without imillegal burdens on the other, new
posing
remedies and unprecedented
orders are not
unwelcome
aids to the chancellor to meet
the constant and varying demands for equithe duties

form?

It

I

I

table relief."

Moreover,
the rights of the public in a
case of this sort should
be considered.
"Railroads," said the supreme court in the

MAXIMS

OF EQUITY.

case of Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U. S. 50, 11 Sup.
Ct. 243, "are common carriers, and owe duties to the public.
The rights of the public
in respect to these great highways of communication should be fostered by the courts;
and it is one of the most useful functions of
a court of equity that its methods of procedure are capable of being made such as
to accommodate
themselves to the development of the interests of the public, in the

progress of trade and traffic, by new methods
of intercourse and transportation."
For the reasons thus hastily and briefly
stated, I shall award an injunction requiring the defendants
to perform all of their
regular and accustomed duties so long as
they remain in the employment of the complainant company, which injunction. It may
be as well to state, will be strictly and rigidly
enforced.
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V.

OITT OF WATBRTOWN.
(19

Wall.

107.)

Supreme Court of the United

States.

1873.

Mr. Justice HUNT delivered the opinion

of tiie court.
Tliis case is free from the objections usually made to a recovery upon municipal bonds.
It ia beyond doubt that the bonds were
Issued by the authority of an act of the legislature of the State of Wisconsin, and in the
manner prescribed by the statute. It is not
denied that the railroad, in aid of the construction of which they were issued, has
been built, and was put in operation.
Upon a class of the defences interposed in
the answer and in the argument it is not
The theories
necessary to spend much time.
They
upon which they proceed are vicious.
are based upon the idea that a refusal to pay
because
it
an honest debt is justifiable
would distress the debtor to pay it. A voluntary refusal to pay an honest debt is
in a commercial commua high offence
nity and is just cause of war between nations. So far as the defence rests upon these
principles we find no diflSculty in overruling it.
There is, however, a grave question of the
power of the court to grant the relief asked
tor.
We are of the opinion that this court has
not the power to direct a tax to be levied
for the payment of these judgments.
This
power to impose burdens and raise money is
the highest attribute of sovereignty, and is
first, to raise money for public
exercised,
purposes only; and, second, by the power of
legislative authority only. It is a power
that has not been extended to the judiciary.
Especially is it beyond the power of the Federal judiciary to assume the place of a State
in the exercise of this authority at once so
The question is
delicate and so important.
not entirely new in this court.
In the case of Supervisors v. Rogers,* an
order was made by this court appointing the
marshal a commissioner, with power to levy
a tax upon the taxable property of the
county, to pay the principal and interest of
certain bonds issued by the county, the payThat case
ment of which had been refused.
was like the present, except that it occurred
in the State of Iowa, and the proceeding was
taken by the express authority of a statute
The court say: "The next
of that State.
question is as to the appointment of the
marsl)al as a commissioner to levy the tax
in satisfaction of the judgment.
This depends upon a provision of the code of the
State of Iowa. This proceeding is found in
a chapter regulating proceedings in the writ
of mandamus, and the power is given to the
court to appoint a person to discharge the
duty enjoined by the peremptory writ which
the defendant had refused to perform, and
for which refusal he was liable to an at•7 Wallace,

175.

tachment, and is express and unqualified.
The duty of levying the tax upon the taxable property of the county to pay the principal and interest of these bonds was specially
enjoined upon the board of supervisors by
the act of the legislature that authorized
their issue, and the appointment of the marshal as a commissioner in pursuance of the
is to provide for the performI above section
ance of this duty where the board has disobeyed or evaded the law of the State and
the peremptory mandate of the court."
The State of Wisconsin, of which the city
of Watertown is a municipal corporation, has
The case of Supervisors
passed no such act.
V. Rogers is, therefore, of no authority in
the case before us. The appropriate remedy
of the plaintiff was and is a writ of mandamus.f This may be repeated as often as
the occasion requires. It is a judicial writ,
a part of a recognized course of legal proIn the present case it has been
ceedings.
thus far unavailing, and the prospect of its
future success is, perhaps, not flattering.
However this may be, we are aware of no
authority in this court to appoint its own
officer to execute the duty thus neglected by
the city in a case like the present.
In Welch v. St. Genevieve * at a Circuit Court
for the district of Missouri, a tax was ordered
to be levied by the marshal under similar
circumstances. We are not able to recognize
the authority of the case. No counsel appeared for the city (Mr. Reynolds as amiaus
curice only) ; no authorities are cited which
sustain the position taken by the court;
the power of the court to make the order is
disposed of in a single paragraph, and the
execution of the order suspended for three
months to give the corporation an opportunity to select officers and itself to levy and
collect the tax, with the reservation of a
longer suspension if it should appear advisable.
The judge, in delivering the opinion
of the court, states that the case is without
and cites in support of its deprecedent,
cision no other cases than that of Riggs v.
Johnson County,** and Lansing v. Treasurer-X The first case cited does not touch
the present point.
The question in that
case was whether a mandamus having been
issued by a United States court in the regular courae of proceedings, its operation could
be stayed by an injunction from the State
court, and it was held that it could not be.
It is probable that the case of Supervisors y.
Rogers^ was the one intended to be cited.
This case has already been considered.
The case of Lansing v. Treasurer (also
It
cited), arose within the State of Iowa.
fell within the case of Supervisors v. Rogers,
tRiggs
*10 Am.
372.

V. Johnson

County, 6 Wallace, 193.
512, Fed. Gas. No. 17,-

Law Reg. (N. S.)

**6 Wallace, 166.
t9 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 415, Fed. Gas. No. 16,588.
S7 Wallace, 175.

6

MAXIMS

OF EQTTITY.

and was rightly decided because authnrized
by the express statute of the State of Iowa.
It offered no precedent for the decision of a
case arising ia a Stale where such a statute
does not exist.
These are the only authorities upon the
power of this court to direct the levy of a tax
under the circumstances existing.in this case
to which our attention has been called.
The plaintiff insists that the court may
accomplish the same result under a different name, that it has jurisdiction of the persons and of the property, and may subject
the property of the citizens to the payment
of the plaintiff's debt without the intervention
of State taxing ofiBcers, and without regard
His theory is that the court
to tax laws.
should make a decree subjecting the individual property of the citizens of Watertown
to the payment of the plaintiff's judgment;
direct the marshal to make a list thereof
from the assessment rolls or from such other
sources of information as he may obtain; report the same to the court, where any objections should be heard; that the amount of
the debt should be apportioned upon the several pieces of property owned by individual
citizens; that the marshal should be directed
apportioned amount from
to collect such
such persons, or in default thereof to sell
the property.
As a" part of this theory, the plaintiff
argues that the court has authority to direct
the amount of the judgment to be wholly
made from the property belonging to any inhabitant of the city, leaving the citizens to
settle the equities between themselves.
This theory has many difliculties to encounter. In seeking to obtain for the plain- j
tiff his just rights we must be careful not to j
invade the rights of others. If an inhabitant of the city of Watertown should own i
a block of buildings of the value of $20,000, upon no principle of law could the
whole of the plaintiff's debt be collected |
from that property. Upon the assumption
that individual property is liable for the payment of the corporate debts of the municipality, it is only so liable for its proportion
'The inhabitants are not joint
ate amount.
and several debtors with the corporation, nor
does their property stand in that relation to
This is
the corporation or to the creditor.
not the theory of law, even in regard to taxation. The block of buildings we have supposed is liable to taxation only upon its
value in proportion to the value of the entire
property, to be ascertained by assessment,
and when the proportion is ascertained and
paid, it is no longer or further liable. It
The residue of the tax is to
is discharged.
There may
be obtained from other sources.
be repeated taxes and assessments to make
up delinquencies, but the principle and the
general rule of law are as we have stated.
In relation to the corporation before us,
this objection to the liability of individual
property for the payment of a corporate debt

is presented in a specific form.
It is of a
statutory character.
The remedies for the collection of a debt
are essential parts of the contract of indebtedness, and those in existence
at the time
it is incurred must be substantially preserved to the creditor.
Thus a statute prohibiting the exercise of its taxing power by
the city to raise money for the payment of
But it is
these bonds would be void.*
otherwise of statutes which are in existence
Of
at the time the debt is contracted.
these the creditor must take notice, and if
all the remedies are preserved to him which
were in existence when his debt was contracted he has no cause of complaint.f
By section nine of the defendant's charter
"Nor shall any
it is enacted as follows:
real or personal property of any inhabitant
of said city, or any individual or corporation,
be levied upon or sold by virtue of any execution issued to satisfy or collect any debt,
obligation, or contract of said city."
If the power of taxation is conceded not
to be applicable, and the power of the court
is invoked to collect the money as upon an
execution to satisfy a contract or obligation
of the city, this section is directly applicable
The process or
and forbids the proceeding.
order asked for is in the nature of an execution ; the property proposed to be sold is that
of an inhabitant; of the city; the purpose to
which it is to be applied is the satisfaction
The proposed remedy
of a debt of the city.
is in direct violation of a statute in existence
when the debt was incurred, and made known
to the creditor with the same solemnity as
the statute which gave power to contract
the debt.
All laws in existence when the
contract is made are necessarily referred to
in it and form a part of the measure of the
obligation of the one party, and of the right
acquired by the other.|
But independently of this statute, upon
the general principles of law and of equity
jurisprudence, we are of opinion that we cannot grant the relief asked for. The plaintifE
invokes the aid of the principle that all legal
remedies having failed, the court of chancery
must give him a remedy; that there is a
wrong which cannot be righted elsewhere,
and hence the right must be sustained in
The diflSeulty arises from too
chancery.
broad an application of a general principle.
The great advantage possessed by the court
of chancery is not so much in its enlarged
jurisdiction as in the extent and adaptability of its remedial powers. Generally its
jurisdiction is as well defined and limited as
is that of a court of law. It cannot exercise
jurisdiction when there is an adequate and
complete remedy at law.
It cannot assume
control over that large class of obligations
called imperfect obligations, resting upon
•Van HofEman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wallace, 535.
tCooley, Constitutional Limitations, 235, 337.
tCooley, Constitutional Limitations, 285.
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The diflBculty and the embarrassment arising from an apportionment or contribution
among those bound to make the payment we
do not regard as
serious objection. Contribution and apportionment are recognized
heads of equity jurisdiction, and
be assumed
that process could issue directly
against the citizens to collect the debt of the
city, court of equity could make the apportionment more conveniently than could
court of law.f

a

•See the oases collected In Cooley's Constitu
tional Limitations, 340-245.
Russell V. Men of Devon, Term R. 667.
See Emeric v. Gilman, 10 California, 408, where
all the cases are collected.
{Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 340.
470 and ontl Story's Equity Jurisprudence,
wards.
§

a
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lib.
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61.
tl Equity Jurisprudence,
tHeard v. Stanford, Cases Tempore Talbot, 174.
•1 Story's Equity Jurisprudence,
60.
**Wastervelt v. Gregg, 13 New York, 309.

a

of.*

court of equity cannot, by avowing that
there is a right but no remedy known to the
law, create a remedy in violation of law, or
even without the authority of law.
It acts
upon established principles not only, but
channels. Thus, asthrough established
sume that the plaintiff ia entitled to the payment of bis judgment, and that the defendant neglects its duly in refusing to raise the
amount by taxation, it does not follow that
this court may order the amount to be made
from the private estate of one of its citizens.
This summary proceeding would involve a
violation of the rights of the latter. He has
never been heard in court. He has had no
opportunity to establish a defence to the
debt itself, or if the judgment is valid, to
show that his property is not liable to its
payment. It is well settled that legislative
exemptions from taxation are valid, that
such exemptions may be perpetual in their
duration, and that they are in some cases beThe proceedyond legislative interference.
would violate that fundaing supposed
mental principle contained in chapter twenty-ninth of Magna Charta, and embodied in
the Constitution of the United States, that
no man shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law — that is, hemust
be served with notice of the proceeding, and
have a day in court to make his defence.**
"Due process of law (it is said) undoubtedly means in the due course of legal proceedings, according to those rules and forms
which have been established for the protecIn the New Engtion of private rights.
judgment obheld that
land States
town may be levied upon
tained against
and made out of the property of any inhabThe suit in those States
itant of the town.
is brought in form against the inhabitants

a

A

a

disposed

a

Generally its jurisdiction depends upon
legal obligations, and its decrees can only enforce remedies to the extent and in the mode
With the subjects of
by law established.
fraud, trust, or accident, when properly before it, it can deal more completely than can
These subjects, however,
a court of law.
may arise in courts of law, and there be well

of the town, naming it; the individual Inhab.
itants,
is said, may and do appear and deheld that the
fend the suit, and hence it
inhabitants have their day in
individual
court, are each bound by the judgment, and
may be collected from the property of
that
any one of them.* This is local law peIt is not the law of
culiar to New England.
It
this country generally, or of England.||
has never been held to be the law in New
York, in New Jersey, in Pennsylvania, nor,
as stated by Mr. Cooley, in any of the Westrests upon the rule
So far as
ern States.*!
that these municipalities have no common
fund, and that no other mode exists by
which demands against them can be enforced,
he says that it cannot be considered as applicable to those States where provision is
made for compulsory taxation to satisfy
town or city.§
judgments against
The general principle of law to which wo.
not disturbed by these
have adverted
It is applicable to the case bereferences.
fore us. Whether, in fact, the individual
defence to the debt, or by way of exhas
not imemption, or is without defence,
portant. To assume that he has none, and
therefore, that he
entitled to no day in
court, is to assume against him the very
point he may wish to contest.
Again, in the case of Emerio v. Gilman,
is said: "The inhabitants of
before cited,
county are constantly changing; those who
contributed to the debt may be non-residents
upon the recovery of the judgment or the
levy of the execution. Those who opposed
the creation of the liability may be subjected to its payment, while those, by whose
fault the burden has been imposed, may be
.
.
entirely relieved of responsibility.
To enforce this right against the inhabitants
of county would lead to such multiplicity
of suits as to render the right valueless."
the doctrine conWe do not perceive,
tended for is correct, why the money might
not be entirely made from property owned by
the creditor himself, if he should happen to
own property within the limits of the corporation, of sufficient value for that pur-

H I

and moral duty only, unconnected
with legal obligations.
Judge Story says,f
"There are cases of fraud, of accident, and
of trust which neither courts of law nor of
equity presume to relieve or to mitigate," of
which he cites many instances. Lord Talbot says:J "There are cases, indeed, in which
a court of equity gives remedy where the
law gives none', but where a particular
remedy is given by law, and that remedy
bounded and circumscribed by particular
rules, it would be very improper for this
court to take it up where the law leaves it,
and extend it further than the law allows. "

conscience
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Wt apprehend, also, that there Is some
confusion in the plnintiH's
proposition,
is
upon which the present jurisdiction
claimed. It is conceded, and the autliorities are too abundant to adiriit a question,
that thero is no chancery jurisdictioa where
The
there is an adequate remedy at law.
writ of mandamus is, no doubt, the regular
remedy in a case like the present, and ordinai'iiy it is adequate and its results are
satisfactory.
The plaintiff alleges, however,
in the present case, tliat he has issued such
a writ on three different occasions; that,
by means of the aid afforded by the legislature and by the devices and contrivances set
forth in the bill, the writs have been fruitless ; that, in fact, they afford him no remedy.
The remedy is in law and in theory adeThe difficulty is in its
([uate and perfect.
execution only. The want of a remedy and
the inability to obtain the fruits of a remedy
are quite distinct, and yet they are conTo ilfounded in the present proceeding.
lustrate: the writ of habere facias possessionem is the established
remedy to obtain
the fruits of a judgment for the plaintifl in
ejectment. It is a full, adequate, and comNot many years since there
plete remedy.
existed in Central New Yorlccombinatious of

tenants disguised as Indians,
audi, who resisted
themselves
the execution of this process in their counties,
and so effectually that for some years no
landlord could gain possession of his land.
There was a perfect remedy at law, but
through fraud, violence, or crime its execution was prevented.
It will hardly be argued
that this state of things gave authority to involie the extraordinary aid of a court of
chancery. The enforcement of the legal
remedies
was temporarily
suspended
by
means of illegal violence, but the remedies
It was the case of a
remained as before.
settlers

and

and calling

miniature revolution.
The courts of law
lost no power, the court of chancery gained
none.
The present case stands upon the
The legal remedy is adesame principle.
quate and complete, and time and the law
must perfect its execution.
Entertaining the opinion that the plaintiff
has been unreasonably obstructed in the pursuit of bis legal remedies, we should be quite
willing to give him the aid requested if the
law permitted it. We cannot, however. And
authority for so doing, and we acquiesce in
the conclusion of the court below that the
bill must be dismissed.

Judgment affirmed.
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Appeal from) chancery court, Oliickasaw
county; Bradford, Chancellor.
The coraplainant in the com-t below,
Charles C. Dibrell, filed his bill to the April
term, 1868, alleging that on the 4th December, 1866, William F. Walker, then largely
indebted in a sum exceeding $60,000 to his
wife, Eliza R. Walker, on account of her
separate estate, executed and delivered a
deed of conveyance to one Thomas J. Denton,
a citizen of said county, and his successors
in office, as trustee for said Eliza, and the
heirs of her body, by which he granted, bargained, and sold to said trustee certain real
and personal property particularly described
in the bill, and states its value at $29,942,
and that it was intended to be, and was
received by the parties as, a payment to that
extent on the Indebtedness of Walker to his
wife. The deed is filed as an exhibit to the
bill.
It is further stated in the bill that Denton,
the trustee, accepted the trust, entered immediately upon the discharge of his duties,
residing within a few miles of the property
transferred to him, ready at all times to do
in the
and perform all acts contemplated
deed, until the 4th March, 1868; that on the
6th of March, 1868, under the provisions of
said deed, the complainant was duly and
legally appointed as successor to said Denton by the probate judge of said county;
that on the 20th March, 1867, the said William F. Walker, confederating with Henry
G. Humphries and E. K. Carlisle, commission merchants and citizens of Mobile, Ala.,,
to divest the said Eliza of her equitable interest in said lands, induced her to execute
jointly, with her husband, a mortgage on
said lands, to secm-e the payment of an asserted debt of $7,337.64, which the said William F. had contracted with said Humphries
& Carlisle, maturing on the 10th December,
1867;
that said deed of mortgage authorized
Carlisle & Humphries, in default of payment of said debt, upon giving 30 days' notice, to sell said lands at auction and divest
the title from the trustee and the said Eliza,
and forever bar her equity of redemption.
The mortgage is filed as an exhibit to the
bill.
It is further charged that said Humphries
& Carlisle were fully apprised of the true
condition of the title to the land when they
affected the negotiation; that they were ex^
pressly notified of the deed of trust first
mentioned, and knew that the property they
were seeking to Incumber was trust property, settled upon the said Eliza and the
heirs of her body; that she was ignorant of
the legal effect to be given to the deed of
mortgage by the draftsman; that but a small
portion of the debt daimed was for her
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family supplies and necessaries, wearing apparel of herself or children, or their education, or household furniture, or carriages and
horses, buildings on her land and premises,
or repairs thereof, or materials, work, and
labor for the benefit and improvement of her
separate

estate.

The bill "protests against another clause
of the said deed of mortgage, as being not
only manifestly against his rights, but in
direct violation of the deed from said Walkalleges that
er to complainant's predecessor";
the land in the deed is estimated at $20,750;
that indebtedness in the mortgage is $7,337.64, far less than the value of the land;
of the
that, since the execution
charges
mortgage, said William F. has i lid $1,800
or $2,000 to Carlisle & Humphries, which
should have been credited on said Indebtedness, and that the mortgage provides that
the surplus from the land sale shall be paid
to Walker and wife, and not to the trustee,
the complainant.
The bill further states that said Humphries & Carlisle, by their agent and attorney,
J. N. Carlisle, Esq., have advertised the lands
for sale under the mortgage, and also about
6,000 bushels of corn, on the second Monday
in March, 1868.
A copy of the advertisement is filed as an exhibit.
II. G. Humphries, E. K. Carlisle, J. N.
Carlisle, and William F. Walker are made
defendants,
and injimction, etc., prayed for
to restrain the sale.
There is also a prayer
for discovery, by Humphries & Carlisle, of
the amount due them, and that on final hearing the injunction be made perpetual, that
the mortgage be canceled.
On the 6th March, 1868, the chancellor Indorsed on the bill his fiat for injunction, upon the complainant entering into bond with
sureties in the sum of $2,000. The bond was
given, and writs of injunction and subpoena
Issued.
Exhibit No. 1, referred to in the bill, is
as follows:
"The State of Mississippi, Chickasaw County.
This indenture, made and entered Into
this 4th day of December, 1866, between

William' F. Walker, of the first part, Eliza
R. Walker, his wife, of the second part,
each of the county and state aforesaid, and
Thomas J. Denton, of the same county and
state, of the third part, witnesseth: That the
said party of the second part, having been
the owner In her own right at the time of
her marriage. In the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and fifty-three, with
the said party of the first part, of a large
personal estate, which was received by, controlled, possessed, used, and enjoyed by him,
as hereinafter set forth, that is to say, thirtythree negro slaves, which went into his possession on the first day of January, 18-54,
and were worked and controlled in raising
cotton, etc., and whose hire was worth as
stated," etc. The deed then proceeds to give
the names and value of the hire of each
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negro for eleven years, the aggregate hire
valued at $31,250, and continues:
"And the
said party of the second part having received
large sums of money from the separate estate of the said Eliza, as foUovfs:
The sum
of fifteen thousand dollars on the first day
of January, 1854; seven thousand dollars on
the 1st July, 1855, and six thousand dollars
on the 1st July, 1866, amounting to twentyeight thousand dollars; and the said William F. having assumed the entire management and control of the separate estate of
the said Eliza, and vi^ith the funds realized
from the proceeds raised by her negro slaves
as aforesaid, and with the cash received by
him as above set forth, he purchased real
and personal property as hereinafter described and valued,
that is to say," etc. The
deed here describes the tract of land in controversy, and a number of mules, horses,
■wagons, carriage and harness, farming utensils, carpenters' and blacksmiths' tools, household and 'kitchen furniture, jewelry, plate,
stock hogs, etc., valued at $8,192, and proceeds:
"And the said William F. being
anxious to secure, so far as he has the ability to do so, the payment of this debt he
owes to his wife, amounting to the sum of
sixty-two thousand two hundred and fifty
dollars, takiug the hire of the negro property as the basis of his liability for their
Now, in consideration
use and employment.
of the premises, and for and in consideration of the sum of ten dollars, paid by the
said party of the third part, the receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged, the said party of the first part hath granted, bargained,
and sold, and by these presents doth grant,
bargain, and sell, unto the said party of the
third part, all the real and personal property

above

described,

to

wit"

(giving

de-

scription of land and personal property before referred to) : "In trust, nevertheless, for
the use, benefit and behoof of the said party
of the second part and the heirs of her body
forever, who are to retain the possession,
direction, and control of the
management,
property conveyed.
The said trustee or his
successor, to be designated by the judge of
the probate court of the county and state
aforesaid,
in term time or in vacation, to
take such possession or direction as may
then be necessary for faithfully carrying out
this trust according to its true intent and
such as bringiag and defending
meaning,
suits, executing bonds, signing papers, or appointing an attorney in fact to do and perform whatever may be necessary and proper
to be done in protecting and defending the
said estate to the party of the second part
and the heirs of her body." The deed then
states that the propert.v conveyed, valued at
"is intended to be to that extent in
$29,942,
part payment of the sum of $62,250, the
amount admitted to be due," etc., and concludes with warranty of title, etc.
Exhibit No. 2 of the bill is in the words
and figures following:

"The State
of Mississippi, Chickasaw
Coimty. This deed of mortgage, made the
this 20th day of March, 18G7, between W. F.
Walker, with E. R. Walker, his wife, both
of the county of Chickasaw and state of
Mississippi, of the first part, and E. K. Oarlisle,
with H. G. Humphries, commission
merchants, of Mobile and state of Alabama,
of the other, witnesseth: That whereas the
said W. F. Walker, with B. R. Walker, his
wife, are indebted to the said E. K. Carlisle
and H. G. Humphries in the sum of seventythree hundred and thirty-seven dollars and
sixty-four cents, said sum of money being
advanced to said W. F. Walker and E. R.
Walker on their crop of cotton, to be raised
in and during the year. Anno Domini, 1867,
on the plantation under tlie superintendence
of W. F. Walker, Jno. D. Poyner, and Thos.
McCarthy.
Said sum of money is further
secured by their certain promissory notes,
bearing date the nineteenth day of January,
A. D. 1867, for the said sum of seventythree hundred and thirty-seven dollars and
sixty-four cents, subscribed with their hands
and delivered to the said E. K. Carlisle and
H. G. Humphries, whereby the said W. F.
Walker and E. R. Walker promised to pay the
said Carlisle & Humphries, or order, seventythree hundred and thirty-seven dollars and
sixty-four cents, on or before the nineteenth
day of December,
1867, for value received.
And whereas, the said W. F. Walker and E.
R. Walker, his wife, are willing to give this
deed for satisfaction of what may be due
and unpaid to the said Carlisle & Humphries
on the nineteenth
1867,
day of December,
next:
Therefore the said W. B\ Walker and
E. R. Walker bargain, sell, alien, and convey
to the said Carlisle & Humphries all those
tracts or parcels of land situated and lying
in the county of Chickasaw and state of
Mississippi, known and described as the west
half of section twelve, in township thirteen,
range five east, and the west half of section
thirteen, township thirteen, range five east,
containing six hundred and seventy acres,
more or less; also convey all the cotton crop
that is raised on said lands or plantation under the direction or superintendence
of W. F.
^Yalker, John D. Poyner, and Thomas McCarthy, which said cotton is to be shipped to
said Carlisle & Humphries aforesaid as soon
as is practicable after ginning and baling the
same; to have and to liold the same with all
the rights and appurtenances
to the said Carlisle & Humphries, their heirs, executors, and
administrators. But this conveyance is upon
condition, if the said W. P. Walker and E. R.
Walker shall, on or before the nineteenth
day of December, 1867, well and fully pay
the said sum of money, then this deed is to
cease and to be void; but if after that day
said sum, with any part thereof, be unpaid,
then It shall be lawful for the said Carlisle
& Humphries, or their legal representative,
after giving thirty days' notice by advertisement in some newspaper in Chickasaw coun-
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ty of the cause, day, and place of sale, to
proceed to sell at puMic auction at Okolona
the mortgaged property, or a sufflclency
thereof, for cash to the highest and best bidder, and out of the proceeds, after defraying
the cost of advertisenient and sale, they may
retain the full amount of mortgage money
due, and if there be a surplus they are presently to pay it to W. F. Walker and E. K.
Walker, or their legal representatives,
and to
make to the vendee or vendees a deed of
conveyance, transmitting the quit of purchase
of all right, title, or interest of the parties
and their heirs, or of all claiming under
them, and thereupon all the right and title
of the W. F. Walker, -with E. R. Walker, his
wife, to redeem, shall be as effectually barred and foreclosed as if upon a decree in
equity; and the said W. F. Walker, with B.
R. Walker, his wife, hereto put their names
and seals, the day and date aforewritten.
"[Signed]
W. F. Walker.
[Seal.]
"E. R. Walker.
[Seal.]"
Carlisle & Humphries filed their answer,
averring that they knew nothing of the existence of the debt alleged to be due Eliza
R. Walker by W. F. Walker, her husband,
except what they learn from the said exhibit
No. 1 in the bill, and that they believe the
debt fictitious; that there was no valid con.fideration in law or equity passing from said
Eliza to said W. F. Walker for the conveyance; that said conveyance is fraudulent and
made with the Intent to defraud the creditors of said W. F.: that ttie appointment of
T. J. Denton as trustee was merely nominal,
and for the better serving to cloak and conceal the said property and more effectually
defrauding the creditors of the said W. F.;
that said Denton, under a provision in the
deed of trust, appointed the said W. F. his
attorney in fact, clothing him with full power to act in all things pertaining to said
trusteeship,
as if he, the said W. F., had
been trustee;
that the said W. F. executed
the said mortgage in the bill mentioned
as
such attorney in fact; that the complainant,
C. 0. Dibrell, ignoring the action of his predecessor, Denton, filed his bill with the intent to deprive respondents
of their rights
and powers vested in them as mortgagees;
that said T. J. Denton, being aware of the
execution of said attorneyship to W. F. Walker, refused to join in said bill of complaint,
but, actuated by the dictates of honor and
honesty, declined entering into such fraudulent interference with respondents' rights;
all confederating by Carlisle
denies
&
Humphries to defeat Mrs. Walker's interest
in said lands; denies inducing her to Join
her husband in executing the mortgage;
alleges that the mortgage was made by W. F.
Walker, as attorney in fact for the trustee
and by Mrs. Walker, freely and voluntarily,
without any persuasion, and by her so acknowledged In a private examination by an
officer authorized to take such acknowledgment; denies all knowledge of the trust un-
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der which Mrs. Walker held the lands, and
to
supposed W. F. Walker fully empowered
convey or incumber them.
Respondents
assert that the $7,337.64 was
money actually advanced to the said W. F.
Walker and his wife during the year 1867,
for the necessary supplies of the plantation
of said Walker and wife, and believe that it
was used for them and their children; denies
that the property mortgaged is and was
worth $20,750, but insists that its value at
the date of the mortgage and now does not
debt;
exceed respondents'
denies that the
execution of the mortgage was against the
rights of the trustee, Dibrell; alleges that
W. F. Walker was notoriously acting as the
agent of his wife, and with the knowledge
that, if the
and consent of Denton, trustee;
allegations in complainant's bill be true, said
Walker, under false and fraudulent premoney; that
tenses, obtained
respondents'
said Walker and wife have never paid but
and this amount was duly credited
$873.20,
on the debt.
Respondents
say that they are
led to believe
that Dibrell, complainant,
through the solicitation and procurement of
W. F. Walker, accepted the appointment of
trustee, and, without a knowledge of what
his predecessor had done, has filed this bill
and made the representations and allegations
therein from false representations
of W. F.

Walker; that Dibrell's action is in direct
contravention of the action of his pj-edecessor, Denton; that W. F. Walker's interest is
not with respondents as defendants in this
suit, but identified with the complainant;
and that he cunningly devised his joinder
with respondents as defendant for fraudulent purposes.
Respondents insist that the advances made
by them were solely on the credit of Mrs.
Walker and her children, the beneficiaries of
the pretended deed of trust, and for their
benefit and use, and not on the credit of W.
F. Walker; that he was insolvent and unable
to obtain credit at the time; that the writ
of injunction was illegally issued because of
the want of good sureties on the bond; that
said bond has no date and bears no evidence
of having been duly executed as the law directs; that the flat only requires a bond for
$2,000, whilst the amount of indebtedness
enjoined is $6,464.36,
and the bond is not
in double the sum so enjoined.
The mortgage referred to in the bill as
Exhibit No. 2 is made an exhibit in the answer also. Another exhibit to the answer
consists of an account of the debts due by
W. F. and Eliza Walker to Carlisle & Humphries, showing balance of $7,337.64. Exhibit
C is as follows:
"The State of Mississippi, Chickasaw County.
To whom these presents may come,
greeting:
Know ye that I, Thos. J. Denton,
reposing entire confidence in the probity and
integrity of W. F. Walker, a citizen of the
county of Chickasaw and state of Mississippi,
do by these presents constitute him my true
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and lawful attorney in fact for me as trustee, appointed under a deed executed by the
said Walker in favor of Eliza R. Walker
and the heirs of her body as cestui que trust,
on the 4th day of December, 1866, conveying
real and personal property valued at $29,and in my name to sign all papers,
942,
bonds, affidavits, contracts, and to make, do,
and perform all and every act necessary or
proper to be made, done, or performed for the
protection of said trust estate, or for carrying
out the true intent and meaning of said trust
deed, and to every act in the premises which
I could do if personally present, and hereby
ratify and confirm whatever he may lawfully
Given under my hand
do in the premises.
and seal this the 4th day of December, 1866.
"[Signed]
T. J. Denton.
[Seal.]"
This power of attorney was acknowledged
and recorded in Chickasaw county.

I

J.

A. Orr and Harris & Withers, for appelGholson & Hooper, James T. Harrison,
and George L. Potter, for appellees.

lant.

PEYTON, J. This was an injunction bill
brought by the appellant in the chancery
court of Chickasaw county to restrain the
appellees, B. K. Carlisle and H. G. Humphries, from executing a power of sale contained in a mortgage given to them by William
P. Walker and Eliza R. Walker, his wife.
The material facts of the case are these:
William F. Walker, being indebted to his
wife, Eliza R., in a large amount of money,
on the 4th day of December, 1806, conveyed
to one Thomas J. Denton certain real and
personal estate situated in the said county
of Chickasaw, in this state, in trust for the
use of the said Eliza R. Walker and the
heirs of her body forever, which deed of conand recordveyance was duly acknowledged
ed.

on the 20th day of March, A. D.
the said William P. Walker and EHiza
R., his wife, made and executed their deed
of mortgage of six hundred and seventy acres
of the land, covered by the said deed of trust,
to said Carlisle & Humphries, to secure the
note for $7,337.64,
payment of a promissory
made by said Walker and vs^ife, dated the
19th day of .January, 1807, and payable to
said Carlisle & Humphries on the 19th day of
December,
The said mortgage deed,
1807.
which was duly acknowledged and recorded,
gives to the mortgagees a power of sale of
the mortgaged property in default of payment
of the note at maturity.
The note not having been paid, the mortgagees were proceeding to sell the property,
when they were enjoined from so doing by
the appellee, who was appointed trustee, under a power in the deed creating the trust
estate, to succeed the original trustee, who
had resigned the trust.
The appellees, Carlisle & Humphries, in
their answer, admit the conveyance in trust
as set forth in the bill of complaint, but deny
that there was any valid consideration there-

That

1867,

for, and insist that it was made to hinder,
They admit
delay, and defraud creditors.
the execution of the mortgage stated in the
bill, and Insist that they had a right to sell
the mortgaged property to pay the amount
They aver
due on the debt therein specified.
that the amount specified in the said note
and mortgage
was actually advanced by
them to the said W. P. and E. R. Walker for
the necessary supplies of the plantation of
the said Walker and wife, and that they believe that the said money was used by the
said Walker and wife for the use and benefit
of the said E. R. Walker and her children,
and that the advances were made solely on
the credit of Mrs. E. R. Walker, and not on
that of her husband, who was insolvent and
unable to obtain credit at the time the advances

were made.

The appellees, Carlisle & Humphries, moved the court below to dissolve the injunction
exhibits, and proofs.
TTie
on bill, answer,
motion was sustained and the injunction dissolved.
And from this decree the cause Is
brought to this court by appeal on the part
of the appellee.
This record presents three important questions for our consideration:
(1) What interest does Mrs. Walker take
under the conveyance to a trustee for the
use of herself and the heirs of her body forever?

{2) Where the wife has joined with her
husband in a mortgage of her separate estate
to pay the debt of her husband, can the corpus of that estate, under the existing laws,
be subjected in a court of equity to the payment of such debt?
(3) Is the separate estate of Mrs. Walker
liable in equity to the payment of the debt
specified in the mortgage or any part thereof?
The first question involves the construction
of the limitations in the deed creating the
trust estate. It is a common maxim that
equity follows the law: Bquitas sequitur
legem.
Where a rule of the common or statute law is direct and governs the case with
all its circumstances or the particular point,
a court of equity is as much bound by it as
a court of law, and can as little justify a departure from it. A court of equity cannot
disregard the canons of descent.
In general,
in courts of equity, the same construction
and effect are given to perfect trust estates
as are given by courts of law to legal estates.
The Incidents, properties, and consequences of the estates are the same.
The
same restrictions are applied as to cresfting
estates and bounding perpetuities and giving
absolute dominion over property.
The same
modes of construing the language and limitations of the trusts are adopted.
1 Story, Eq.

(Redf. Ed.) pp. 53-55, § 64.
The words "heirs of the body," in the coniveyance of a legal estate, are words of limitation of the estate to the donee, and not
words of purchase for the heirs of the body.
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v. Haley, Smedes & M. Oh. (U7.
words create an estate in fee tail,
which, by our statute, is converted into an
estate in fee simple.
Rev. Code, p. 307, art.
And, if it be true that the same modes of
3.
construing the language and limitations of
trust estates are adopted as apply to legal
estates, we cannot resist the conclusion that
Mrs. Walker takes, under the terms of the
deed, the entire trust estate absolutely.
With regard to the second question it may
be remarked that it is a familiar rule of equity jurisprudence that general debts or general personal engagements of a married woman, contracted during coverture,
are not
chargeable upon her separate estate; and, unless a feme covert who contracts a debt or
enters into an engagement designs that such
engagement or debt shall constitute a charge
upon her separate estate, a court of equity
will not entertain jurisdiction to enforce
payment thereof out of such separate estate.
When real property is conveyed absolutely
to the separate use of a married woman, she
can dispose of the trust estate only in the
mode and manner prescribed by the instrument creating the trust estate, and, if none be
prescribed and limited therein, then in accordance 'With the provisions of the statute.
Prior to the adoption of our present Code,
in 1857, it has been repeatedly decided by
this court that the wife may bind the corpus
of her separate estate, by deed in trust or
mortgage, as a security for the debts of her
James v. Fisk, 9 Smedes & M.
husband.
144; Sessions v. Bacon, 23 Miss. 272; Armstrong V. Stovall, 26 Miss. 280; Kuss v. Wingate, 30 Miss. 445; Stone v. Montgomery, 35
Prewett v. Land, 36 Miss.
Miss. 83-105;
These

495.

Since the adoption of the Code, a married
woman has no power to incumber the corpus
of her separate estate by deed of trust, mortgage, or otherwise, for the debt of her husband, but only the Income thereof.
The statute expressly provides that no conveyance or
incumbrance for the separate debts of the
husband shall be binding on the wife beyond
the amount of her income.
Rev. Code, p.
This is a wise provision intend336, art. 23.
ed to secure to the wife the enjoyment of
her separate estate against any possible contingency of loss through the fraud, force, or
undue influence of her husband.
The solution of the third question depends
upon the facts of the case as they may be
by the evidence.
developed and established
With a view to the more beneficial enjoyment and productiveness
of the separate estate of a married woman, the law has provided that all contracts made by the husba.nd
and wife, or by either of them, for supplies
for the plantation of the wife, or for the
employment
of an agent to superintend the
may be enforced, and
planting operations,
satisfaction had out of her separate estate.
And all contracts made by the wife, or by
the husband with her consent, for family
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wearing apparel of
supplies or necessaries,
herself and children, or for their education,
furniture, or for carriage
or for household
and horses, or for buildings on her land or
premises, and the materials therefor, or for
work and labor done for the nse, benefit, or
of her separate estate, shall be
improvement
binding on her, and satisfaction may be had
Rev. Code, p.
out of her separate property.
And it has been decided that a
336, art. 25.
married woman is liable on a promissory
note given by her for a horse purchased by
her for the supply and use of her plantation.
Robertson v. Ward, 12 Smedes & M. 490.
This adjudication was made under the act
of 1846, which made the income only of her
separate estate liable to the payment of the
debt. And, under the act of 1857, this court
has decided that the wife is liable out of the
corpus of her separate estate to the payment
of a note given by herself and husband for
money advanced for the purpose of purchasing supplies for her plantation, and which
was actually applied to that purpose.
Bowman V. Thomas E. Helm. These cases are
regarded as coming within the equity of the
respective
statutes
under which the debts
were contracted.
It results, therefore,

from this view of the
law, that Mrs. Walker is liable to payment
out of her separate estate for the amount of
supplies furnished by Carlisle & Humphries
for her plantation, and for the amount of
the money advanced by them to Walker, or
Walker and wife, for the purchase of supplies for her plantation, or the improvement
of her separate estate, and which were actually applied to that use and purpose.
And
for that portion of the debt secured by the
mortgage,
which was not applied to these
purposes, she is liable to payment out of the
income only of her separate
estate.
The
record contains no evidence as to what portion of the debt secured by the mortgage
was for supplies actually furnished by Carlisle & Humphries for the plantation of Mrs.
Walker, or which was applied to the purchase of such supplies.
Nor is there any
proof as to what amount of the money advanced by Carlisle & Humphries was applied
by Walker to his own use.
The most appropriate remedy of Carlisle
& Humphries will be found in a court of
equity, in which an account can be taken of
what portion of the note secured by the
mortgage
was for supplies for Mrs. Walker's plantation, and what part of the money
was advanced by them for the purchase of
such suppUes, and which was actually so
applied, and what part of the same was used
by Walker for his own pui-poses.
When
these facts are ascertained,
the court will
made a decree in accordance with the principles above laid down, subjecting the separate estate of Mrs. Walker to sale to pay
for the supplies for her plantation, and decreeing that the trustee of the estate and
Mrs. Walker pay to Carlisle & Humphries
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the amount of the debt, secured by the mortgage, found due them by "V^'illiam F. Walker, out of the income of her separate estate.
It is insisted by some of the counsel of the
appellees that the mortgage was void because
the trustee did not join in the mortgage deed.
This was not necessary.
In a case free from
fraud or undue influence, a married woman
can bind her separate property without the
trustees, imless their assent be made necessary by the instrument which gave that
property.
And in the case at bar the charge
made upon the separate estate by the wife
by the deed creating
is totally unrestrained
the trust estate, and is valid and binding,
and a court of equity is bound to enforce it,
so far as to subject the separate estate to
the payment for supplies for carrying on the
wife's plantation, and so far as she was
surety for her husband, and had mortgaged
her property to pay his debt, to subject the
rents, issues, and profits of her separate estate to the payment of that debt.
With respect to the duty of trustees in
relation to real property, it is still held, in
conformity to the old law of uses, that pernancy of the profits, execution of estates, and
defense of the land, are the three great properties of the trust.
Therefore a court of
chancery will compel trustees (1) to permit
the cestui que trust to receive the rents and
profits of the land; (2) to execute such conveyances as the cestui que trust shall direct;
the title of the land in any
(3) to defend
court of law or equity.
Tiff. & B. Trusts,
815.

A cestui que trust may lawfully dispose of
his trust estate, notwithstanding his title is
contested by the trustee, for the latter can
never disseize the former of the trust estate;
but, so long as it continues, the possession of
the trustee is treated, at least in a court of
equity, as the possession of the cestui que
trust.
Balser v. Whiting, 3 Sumn. 475, Fed.
Cas. No. 787.
It is insisted that the power of sale contained in a mortgage deprives the mortgagor
of his equity of redemption, and therefore
cannot rightfully be exercised.
The principle
seems to be now well established,
though

after great doubt and discussion,
that a
clause may legally he inserted in the mortgage deed empowering
the mortgagee, upon
breach of condition,
to make sale of the
mortgaged premises, to pay his debt from the
proceeds, and account with the mortgagor
for the balance.
The power of sale is to
apply solely to the remedy, and not to Impair
any right of the mortgagor.
The power of
sale does not bar the mortgagee's right to
foreclose by judicial proceedings.
The remedy is cumulative merely, and in no respects
affects the jurisdiction or proceedings
of a
court of chancery.
1 Hil. Mortg. 128, 129.
And such sale, made after the law day or
breach of condition, and in pursuance of the
terms of the mortgage,
vests in the purchaser all the title conveyed by the mortgage, free from the right of redemption.
There Is nothing in the record tending in
any way to impeach
the validity of the
mortgage.
There Is no evidence of any undue influence
or improper
conduct or control on the part of the husband to obtain
the wife's assent and signature to the mortgage deed.
And the debt in question was
not incurred for the husband alone, or for
unworthy purposes.
It was for money advanced and articles supplied, partly for the
family, partly for the use of Mrs. Walker,
and partly for the beneflt of the trust estate.
We can, therefore, perceive no good
reason why the mortgage should not be enforced against the separate estate or its income, according to the nature, extent, and
character of the liability, when ascertained
by proof.
It is objected that the mortgagees had no
right to sell the corn advertised, under the
in the mortgage
power of sale contained
deed, for the reason that there was no corn
mortgaged.
This objection is well taken, for
it is very clear that the mortgagees can sell
under the power only the property covered
by the mortgage.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion,
we think the court below erred in dissolving
the injunction.
The decree must therefore be reversed and
cause remanded.
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United States for the Western District of
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Colston,
for appellants.
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GRAY, J.

This bill was filed against the
of the Harmony Society, an unincorporated association of persons living together as a community, by a former member
of the society, claiming a share in property
in the hands of the trustees.
The bill is
sought to be maintained on the ground that
the trust vs^as not a charity. In the legal
sense, and the members of the society were
equitable tenants in common of the property
held In trust.
The learned counsel for the
appellants differ in their views of the trust;
the one insisting that It was unlawful, because founded in fraud and against public
policy,
and should therefore be dissolved;
and the other contending that It was a lawful and continuing trust.
We have not
to consider
which of
found it necessary
these is the sound view, because we are of
opinion that the plaintiff did not show himself to be entitled to invoke the interposition of a court of equity.
As a general rule, doubtless, length of
time is no bar to a trust clearly established,
and express trusts are not within the statute of limitations, because the possession of
the trustee is presumed to be the possession
of his cestui que trust. Prevost v. Gratz, 6
Wheat. 481, 497; Lewis v. Hawkins, 23
Wall. 119, 126; Railroad Co. v. Durant, 95
U. S. 576.
Bnt this rule is. In accordance
with the reason on which It is founded, and
as has been clearly pointed out by Chancellor Kent and Mr. Justice Story, subject
to this qualification: that time begins to run
against a trust as soon as it is openly disavowed by the trustee Insisting upon an adverse right and interest which is clearly and
unequivocally made known to the cestui que
trust; as when, for instance, such transactions take place between the trustee and the
cestui que trust as would, in case of tenants
in common, amount to an ouster of one of
Kane v. Bloodgood, 7
them by the other.
Johns. Ch. 90, 124; Robinson v. Hook, 4
Mason, 139, 152, Fed. Cas. No. 11,956; Baker
V. Whiting, 3 Sum. 475, 486; Oliver v. Piatt,
3 How. 333, 411. This qualification has been
often recognized In the opinions of this court,
and distinctly aflBrmed by its latest judgv. Watment upon the subject. Willlson
kins, 3 Pet. 43, 52; Boone v. Chiles, 10 Pet.
177, 223; Seymour v. Freer, 8 Wall. 202, 218;
Bacon v. Rives, 106 U. S. 99, 107, 1 Sup. Ct.
3; Phllippi v. Philippe, 115 U. S. 151, 5 Sup.
In the case of an implied or conCt. 1181.
trustees

;
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structive trust, unless there has been a
fraudulent concealment of the cause of action, lapse of time is as complete a bar in
equity as at law. Hovenden v. Annesley,
2 Schoales & L. 607, 634; Beckford v. Wade,
In such a case. Chief Justice
17 Ves. 87.
Marshall repeated and approved the statement of Sir Thomas Plumer, M. R., In a
most Important case In which his decision
was affirmed by the house of lords, that,
"both on principle and authority, the laches
and non-claim of the rightful owner of an
equitable estate, for a period of 20 years,
(supposing It the case of one who must within that period have made his claim in a court
of law, had It been a legal estate,) under no
disability, and where there has been no
fraud, will constitute a bar to equitable relief, by analogy to the statute of limitations,
if, during all that period, the possession lias
been under a claim unequivocally adverse,
and without anything having been done or
said, directly or Indirectly, to recognize the
title of such rightful owner by the adverse
possessor."
Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat.
Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 2 Jac. &
152, 174;
W. 1, 175, and 4 Bligh, 1. Independently of
any statute of limitations, courts of equity
uniformly decline to assist a person who has
slept upon his rights, and shows no excuse
for his laches in asserting them.
"A court
of equity," said Lord Camden, "has always
refused Its aid to stale demands, where the
party slept upon his rights, and acquiesced
Nothing can call
for a great length of time.
forth this court into activity but conscience,
good faith, and reasonable diligence; where
these are wanting, the court is passive, and
does nothing.
Laches and neglect are always discountenanced,
and therefore, from
the beginning of this jurisdiction, there was
always a limitation to suits In this court."
Smith V. Clay, 2 Amb. 645, 3 Brown, Ch.
640, note.
This doctrine has been repeatedly recognized and acted on here. Piatt v.
Vattier, 9 Pet. 405; McKnight v. Taylor, 1
How. 161;
Bowman v. Wathen, 1 How.
189; Wagner v. Baird, 7 How. 234; Badger
V. Badger, 2 Wall. 87;
Hume v. Beale, 17
Wall. 336; Marsh v. Whitmore, 21 Wall. 178;
Sullivan v. Railroad, 94 U. S. 806; Godden v.
Klmmell, 99 U. S. 201. In Hume v. Beale,
the court, in dismissing, because of unexplained delay in suing, a bill by cestuls que
trust against a trustee under a deed, observed that It was not important to determine whether he was the trustee of a mere
dry legal estate, or whether his duties and
responsibilities extended further. 17 Wall.
348.
See, also. Bright v. Legerton, 29 Beav.
60, and 2 De Gex, F. & J. 606.
When the
bill shows ui>on its face that the plaintiff,
by reason of lapse of time and of his own
laches, is not entitled to relief, the objection may be taken by demurrer. Maxwell
V. Kennedy, 8 How. 210; National Bank v.
Carpenter, 101 U. S. 567; Lansdale v. Smith,
106

U. S. 391, 1 Sup. Ct. 350.
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The allegations of this bill, so far as they
are material to the defense of laches, are in
substance
as follows:
The Harmony Society is a voluntary association,
formed in
1805
by the plaintiff's parents and other
heads of families, who had emigrated from
Germany under the leadership of one Rapp,
and become subject to his control in both
spiritual and temporal affairs. In that year,
Rapp, for the purpose of acquiring absolute
dominion over their means and mode of living, falsely and fraudulently represented to
them that they could not be saved from
eternal damnation except by renouncing the
plan of a separate home for each family,
j'ielding up all their possessions, as had been
and laying
done by the early Ohristians,
them at the feet of Rapp as their apostle, to
be put into a common fund of the society, and
thenceforth living as a community under his
control, receiving in return only the necessaries of life; and they. Induced by and relying on his false and fraudulent representations, immediately yielded up all their possessions to the common fund of the society,
and placed the fund in his lieeping as their
trustee, and thenceforth lived as a community or common household, submitted themselves and their families to do for the community such worli as he directed, allowed
the avails thereof to form part of the common fund, and relinquished to him and his
of the commusuccessors in the leadership
nity the management of the trust fund and
the control of their own persons and those
of their wives and children, and received
only the necessaries of life in return. Rapp
received and accepted the trust fund, and all
the accretions to it by the work of the inhabitants of the community or otherwise,
not as his own, but in trust for the members
of those families and the contributors to the
fund, and for their common benefit; and always, up to his death in 1847, recognized
and aclinowledged said trust, and disclaimed
any greater interest in the fund than that of
any other contributor, and any other right
and control than by virto its management
tue of his leadership of the community. In
his followers to abjure
1807 Rapp obliged
matrimony, and thenceforth did not permit
them to marry in the community, and compelled any one about to marry to leave it.
The plaintiff was born in the community in
1S07, and was reared in and as a part of it,
and control,
and
xmder Eapp's teachings
faithfully worked for it from the age of 12
to the age of 24 years, and allowed the avails
of his work to become part of the common
fund, and received in return nothing but the
necessaries of life, which were of far less
value than the avails of his work; and in
1831, being about to marry, had to leave and
did leave the community. The trust fund
so received and accepted by Rapp, with its
profits, interest, and accretions, now amounts
to $8,000,000, and yields an annual income
of $200,000, and is held by the defendants
on the same trust on which Rapp held it in

his life-time; and neither Rapp nor the defendants ever rendered any account to the
plaintiff or to the beneficiaries of the fund,
although the plaintiff, before bringing this
suit in May, 1882, demanded of the defendants an account
of his
and a settlement
share.
The trust on which Rapp, and the
defendants as his successors, held the common fund of the Harmony Society, is described in one place in the bill as "for the
members of said families and the contributors of said fund, and for their common benefit;" that is to say, as is clearly explained
by what goes before, in trust for their comliving together
mon benefit as a community,
in the community, working for the community, subject to the regulations of the
community, and supported by the cpmmunity. This was the "said trust," which, as
the bill afterwards alleges, Rapp, up to his
death, and his successors, until the bringing
of this suit, "always recognized
and aclinowledged." The constant avowal of the
trustees that they held the trust fund upon
such a trust is wholly inconsistent with and
adverse to the claim of the plaintiff that
they held the fund in trust for the benefit
of the same persons as individuals, though
withdrawn from the community, living by
themselves, and taking no part in its work.
The plaintiff, upon his own showing, withdrew from the community in 1831, and
never returned to it, and, for more than 50
years, took no step to demand an account
of the trustees, or to follow up the rights
which he claimed in this bill. If he ever
had any rights, he could not assert them
after such a delay,— not on the ground of
an express and lawful trust, because the express trust stated in the bill, and constantly
avowed by the trustees during this long period, was wholly inconsistent with any trust
which would sustain his claim; not on the
ground that the express tx'ust stated in the
bin was unlawful and void, and therefore
the trustees held the trust fund for the benefit of all the contributors in proportion to
the amounts of their contributions, because
that would be an implied or resulting trust,
and barred by lapse of time.
In any aspect of the case, therefore,
if it was not
strictly within the statute of limitations,
yet the plaintiff showed so little vigilance
and so great laches, that the circuit court
rightly held that he was not entitled to relief in equity.
It is proper to add that this decision does
not rest in any degree upon the judgments
of the supreme court of Pennsylvania and
of this court, in the cases cited at the bar,
in favor of the trustees of the Harmony
Society in suits brought against them by
other members, because each of those cases
differed in its facts, and especially in showing that the society had written articles of
association,
which are not disclosed by this
bill. Schriber v. Rapp, 5 Watts, 361; Baker
v. Nachtrieb, 19 How. 126.
Decree

affirmed.
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Appeal from circuit court, Harrison county.
Bill by Owen Hawker against Wilson
Moore and others.
From a decree for plaintiff, defendant Moore appeals.
Affirmed.

J. Philip

Clifford, for appellant

sel, for appellee.

HOLT, J.

John

Bas-

In this

case the circuit court of
decree entered on the
27th day of January, 1893, set aside as fraudulent the deed made by appellant, Wilson
Moore, on the 1st day of September, 1880,
to Elam F. Piggatt, for the 2.5 acres of land
mentioned,
and decreed the sale thereof to
pay plaintiff's judgment, from which defendant Moore obtained this appeal.
The facts are as follows:
On the 15th day
of October, 1880, the Merchants' National
Bank of West Virginia, at Clai-ksburg, was
the holder of a promissory note given to the
bank by James Hawker, the principal therein, and the defendant Wilson Moore, and
plaintiff, Owen Hawker, as his sureties, and
the bank on that day obtained a judgment
against the three parties named.
thereon
James Hawker, the principal, was insolvent,
and plaintiff, Owen Hawker, was compelled
to satisfy and pay the judgment.
Therefore
plaintiff was entitled to contribution from his
cosurety,
defendant Moore, of one-half tha
amount of the judgment thus paid, and to
that extent to be substituted to the judgment
lien of the bank against his real estate.
Where one has been compelled to pay the
debt of another, equity, as far as it can be
done without just ground of complaint on
the part of others, substitutes him to all the
rights and remedies of the creditor against
This doctrine of subrogation
such debtor.
has been applied freely in this state, and to
its full extent, upon the general principles of
equity, without the aid of any statute; and,
having taken this correct view in the beginning, there has so far never been any need of
any statute to correct any misstep in improper restraint of its application upon the supposition that a debt once paid must thereafter be treated as nonexistent under all cir.
cnmstances,
and to all Intents and for all
The doctrine, as it has been expurposes.
pounded and applied in our courts, has noth-

Harrison

county,

by

ing of form, nothing of technicality, about
it; and he who, in administering it, would
stick in the letter, forgets the end of Its creation, and perverts the spirit which gave it
birth. It is the creature of equity, and real
Enders v.
justice is its object.
essential
Brune (1826) 4 Rand. (Va.) 438, 447; McNiel
V. Miller (1887) 29 W. Va. 480, 2 S. B. 335;
Robinson v. Sherman (1845) 2 Grat. 178; 2
The doctrine is emBart. Suit in Eq. 1051.
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Inently calculated to do exact Justice between
persons who are bound for the performance
of the same duty or obligation, and is one,
and
therefore,
which is much encouraged
"Equality is equity" is on this
protected.
branch its maxim. It springs naturally out
of the two equities of contribution and exoneration, and is in fact one of the means by
Bisp. Pr.
which those equities are enforced.
Eq. (4th Ed.) § 335; Dering v. Earl of Winch elsea, 1 Cox, 318; Pendlebury v. Walker,
4 Younge & C. Exch. 441; Steel v. Dixon, 17
Ch. Div. 825; Brett, Lead. Cas. in Mod. Eq.
See Ferguson v. Gibson,
(2d Ed.) 285, notes.
L. R. 14 Eq. 379; Forbes v. Jackson, 19 Ch.
Div. 615, under the mercantile law amendment, Act 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, § 5; 2 Beach,
Here the plaintiff has
Mod. Eq. Jur. § 809.
paid off the judgment, and asks the court to
give him the benefit of the creditor's lien.
Who can object to this? Who is injured by
it? Not the bank, for they have received
their debt from the plaintiff, and justice
binds them to give the plaintiff their vantage
ground.
Not the principal debtor, for he is
insolvent, and has no interest in the matter.
Not the cosurety, for it is by his fault that
plaintiff had to bear, in the first instance, the
If he had paid his half, and
whole burden.
equality is equity, there would have been no
occasion to ask the court to compel him to
pay; and it does not lie with him to say that
plaintiff shall not occupy a vantage ground
that enables him, by process of law, to enThe othforce the performance of this duty.
er creditors cannot complain, for the debt has
in truth not been paid, because not paid by
the one ultimately bound, but by others, who
became his unwilling creditors in due course
of law. But if there should be any one who,
by any rule of strict law, or in equity and
good conscience, stands on higher ground, or
for any reason has a better right, he will not
be displaced, or his right disturbed; for that
is' the essence of the doctrine.
See Pott v. Nathans (1841) 1 Watts & S. 155; Eddy v. Traver (1837) 6 Paige, 521; Gross v. Davis, 87
Tenn. 226, 11 S. W. 92, and 10 Am. St. R.
Sheld. Subr. (2d Ed.) § 137; Id.,
635, notes;
p. 209, § 140; 24 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p.
189; Thomas v. Stewart (1888) 117 Ind. 50,
18 N. E. 505;
Crumllsh's Adm'r v. Improvement Co., 38 W. Va. 390, 18 S. B. 456, and 23
L. R. A. 120, note 7; Dugger y. Wright
(1888) 51 Ark. 232, 11 S. W. 213.
It would answer no useful purpose to take
up the testimony and show that it justifies
The fair concluthe decree complained of.
sion to be drawn is that the deed of September 1, 1880, from defendant Moore to E.
P. Piggatt, conveying the tract of land of
mention25 acres in the bill and proceedings
ed, was made by Moore to hinder and delay
his creditors; and that Piggatt took it, was
holding it for him, on some sort of secret
trust, the full terms of which do not appear.
But Moore continued to occupy and use the
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land as his own, as he had always done,
without the payment of any rent; and after
B. F. Piggatt's death this tract of 25 acres
was, by reason thereof, treated as not be.

longing to his estate, and was omitted when
partition came to be made of his lands among
his heirs.
Therefore the decree complained
of is affirmed.
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ECONOMY SAV. BANK
(45

Atl.

Court of Appeals

176,

v.

GORDON

et

al.

90 Md, 486.)

of Maryland.

Jan.

10,

1900.

Appeal from circuit court of Baltimore
city; Henry Stockbridge, Judge.
Suit by Douglas H. Gordon and others
against the Economy Savings Bank and others.
Decree for complainants.
Defendant
bank appeals. Reversed.
Argued before McSHERRY, C. J., and

PAGE,

FOWLER,

and BRISCOE,

JJ.

BOYD, SCHMUCKER,

Daniel L. Brinton, for appellant. Arch.
H. Taylor, E. P. Keech, Jr., and Foster &
Foster, for appellees.

SCHMUCKER, J.

On July 30, 1897, Cecil
Atkinson executed a mortgage upon a
warehouse owned by him, on South Howard
street, in Baltimore city, to Alonzo J. Steers,
which recited that he was indebted to Steers
"in the full sum of fifteen thousand dollars,
payable February 10th, 1898," and that it
was executed to secure the; payment of this
debt, with interest thereon.
The mortgage
was in due form, was regularly acknowledged, and had attached to it a proper affidavit
as to the bona fides of the consideration
therein stated, and it was recorded on the
day after its date.
No note accompanied
the mortgage,
but it contained a covenant
R.

to

pay

the

mortgage

debt

and

interest.

About the same time Steers, the mortgagee,
applied to the American National Bank to
lend him $6,000, offering to assign the mortSchott, the
gage as security for the loan.
cashier of the bank, explained to him that
a national bank could not lend money upon
real-estate security, but informed him that
the appellant savings bank, of which he
(Schott) was treasurer, had some money on
hand, and would lend him $5,000 upon the

mortgage, if the security proved to be ample, but the matter must first be referred
by the appellant to a committee, who would
investigate and report upon the security.
Steers assented to the terms suggested by
Schott, and a committee from the appellant
went upon the mortgaged premises and examined them, and reported favorably upon
the loan, provided there were no incumbrances upon the property prior to the mortgage. The matter was then referred by the
appellant to its attorney to examine the title. Steers placing the mortgage in Its hands
for that purpose.
The attorney examined
favorably upon it,
the title, and reported
whereupon the appellant, on August 6, 1897,
lent the $5,000 to Steers, and at the same
time took from him an assignment of the
mortgage as security for the loan.
The $5,000 so loaned
was given to Steers in the
check of the appellant to his order upon the
American National Bank, in which the appellant had on deposit at that time more than
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Steers indorsed
the. amount of the check.
the check to the Eastern Electric Company,
which at once deposited it to its own credit
In the bank upon which it was drawn, and
the $5,000 was passed to the credit of the
electric company, and charged to the appellant upon the books of the bank. The money
was then used by the electric company, to
the extent of $2,000, in the payment of a
loan which had been made by one Myerdlck
upon a previous unrecorded assignment of
the Atkinson mortgage, and the remaining
$3,000 was almost entirely paid to the Amer-

ican National Bank in satisfaction of obligations due to it by the Eastern Electric Company or by George H. Atkinson, a brother of Cecil
R. Atkinson, the mortgagor.
Steers subse-

quently assigned his equity in the $15,000 mortgage to one C. S. Hlnchman as collateral security for a loan of $2,000.
It appears from
the record that Cecil R. Atkinson, the mortgagor, and his four brothers,
William J.,
George H., Harry, and Richard P., were promoters by profession, and together operated
and controlled the Eastern Electric Company
and other kindred corporations, all of which
and
proved to be speculative enterprises,
soon became insolvent and passed into the
Steers, who was put upon
hands of receivers.
the stand by the appellees, testified that the
consideration for the $15,000 mortgage from
Atkinson to him consisted of $10,000 of Best
of
Telephone
Company
bonds and $5,000
Best Telephone Company stock, which he had
let Atkinson have prior to the execution of
the mortgage;
but his testimony was so inconsistent and contradictory in its different
portions that It cannot be accepted as reliable. The whole testimony touching the
consideration for the mortgage leads to the
conclusion that there was no substantial consideration for It, but that it was executed to
provide a means of raising money to assist
the Atkinson brothers in staving off the impending insolvency of the Eastern Electric
and Best Telephone Companies, and the other enterprises which they were then attempting to keep afioat.
On December 29, 1897,
nearly five months after the loan of the $5,OOO to Steers by the appellant, and the assignment to the latter of the mortgage,
Douglas H. Gordon, one of the appellees, obtained a judgment for $5,442.30 against the
mortgagor, Cecil R. Atkinson, and his brother William J. Atkinson, on a note given by
them to him on November 13, 1896, for a
loan which he then made to them upon Best
Telephone Company bonds and stock as collateral. Gordon testified that at the time he
made this loan William J. Atkinson stated
that his brother Cecil R. owned the Howard
street warehouse, and he (Gordon) suggested
that he be given a mortgage on the warehouse as security for the loan about to be
made by him.
W. J. Atkinson declined to
procure the mortgage, saying that it would
injure his brother's credit, but stated that
Gordon would have the benefit of the proper-
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Oecil R. Atliinspn,
upon the note.
Gordon testified that he relied on this statement of William J. Atlvinson
in making the loan.
Harry W. Boureau, the
other appellee, obtained a judgment for $503.80 against William J. Atliinson and Cecil R.
Atlsinson on September 29, 1897. On December 18, 1897, after Boureau had obtained his
judgment, and after Gordon had sued the Atkinsons, but before he had gotten his judgment, the appellees instituted
the present
case, which is a creditors'
suit in eqaity
against the appellant,
Cecil R. Atkinson,
Steers, and Hinchman.
The bill of complaint
alleged that the mortgage from Atkinson to
Steers, and the successive assignments of it
by him to the appellant and Hinchman, were
all without consideration and fraudulent, and
prayed to have them declared void.
The appellant answered the bill, denying its material allegations, and setting up its title to the
mortgage to the extent of the $5,000 loaned
on it, and interest, as a bona fide purchaser
for value, without notice of any infirmity in
it.
Neither Hinchman nor Steers answered,
and a decree pro confesso was entered against
them.
The case against the appellant camt
regularly to a hearing, and the court below
at first filed an opinion sustaining the appellant's claim; but upon a rehearing of the
case the learned judge changed his views of
the case, and filed another opinion, of a contrary tenor, and signed the decree appealed
from, denying the appellant's claim to a lien
on the property, and directed it to be sold for
the benefit of the creditors of the mortgagor.
In his second opinion the learned judge held,
upon the authority of the Cumberland Coal &
Iron Co. Case, 42 Md. 598, that tlie appellant, although he found it to be a bona fide
purchaser for value of the mortgage, without
notice, was not entitled to a lien for its loan
to Steers, and interest, made upon the faith
of the mortgage, because the latter, not being
accompanied by a negotiable obligation, was
a mere chose in action, which the appellant
must be treated as having taken subject to all
equities that might have been urged against
it in the hands of Steers, the mortgagee.
Under the facts of the case, the appellant
must be regarded as a bona fide purchaser for
value of the mortgage, without notice. It advanced its $5,000 upon the mortgage in the
ordinary course of business, after a careful
inquiry into the value of the property, and an
investigation of the title upon the public records. It was not concerned in the disposition
made by Steers of the borrowed money, not
one dollar of which went baclf into its hands,
or was expended for its benefit. It was not
put upon inquiry as to the bona fides of the
mortgage by the fact that Schott, its treasurer, was also cashier of the American National
Bank, where Steers and the Eastern Electric
Company and one or more of the Atkinson
brothers kept their accounts, and that he~
of the
might have seen by an examination
books of the bank what disposition was made

of the borrowed money. There was in fact
nothing in the use made of the money to suggest any infirmity in the mortgage.
The next question to be determined is,
what are the rights of the appellant, as such
bona fide purchaser, against the claims of the
appellees? As there was no attempt by Steers
debt to one person, and
the mortgage to another, we are not called
upon to consider the relative equities of one
who claims as assignee of the debt, and another who claims as assignee of the mortgage,
as the court were in the cases of Clark v.
Levering, 1 Md. Ch. 178, and Byles v. Tome.
39 Md. 461, which were in part relied on by
the appellees.
What we have to consider is
the attitude of the appellant, as the bona fide
purchaser of both debt and mortgage, towards
the creditors of the mortgagor, who were such
at the time the mortgage was made.
The
mortgage was not given to secure an actual
indebtedness of $15,000, as It professes on its
face to have been.
Its execution was evidently a means adopted by the parties to it
to clothe Steers, the mortgagee, with the appearance of a good title to a large debt secured
by a valid mortgage, in order to enable him
to raise money upon it.
It was not fraudulent, in the sense that its execution had been
procured by fraud, misrepresentation,
or constraint practiced on the owner of the land
who executed it, as was the case in Bank v.
Copeland, 18 Md. 305, and Cumberland Coal
& Iron Co. V. Parish, 42 Md. 598, in each of
which the defrauded mortgagor was protected
in equity against the assignee of the fraudulent mortgage.
In the present case the execution of the mortgage was the voluntary and
deliberate act of the mortgagor, from which
he had no equity to be relieved, even as against
the mortgagee.
Snyder v. Snyder, 51 Md. 77;
Cushwa V. Cushwa's Lessee, 5 Md. 44. We
have therefore no question before us of subjecting the rights of the appellant, as assignee
of the mortgage, to any equities to which the
assignor would have been liable in favor of
the mortgagor;
for here it is plain that there
were no such equities.
The present mortgage
is to be regarded as fraudulent only in the
sense that, having been made to secure a
simulated,
and not a real, indebtedness, it
operated to hinder, delay, or defraud the creditors of the mortgagor, and was therefore obnoxious to the provisions of the statute of
13 Eliz. c. 5.
The real question in the case i^
thus narrowed down to a comparison of the
relative strength of the claims on the mortgaged property of the appellant, as assignee
of the specific lien of the mortgage, and the
appellees, as subsisting general creditors of
the mortgagor, having reduced their debts to
judgments after the assignment of the mortgage had been made.
If the conveyance under consideration had been a fraudulent deed,
instead of a mortgage, the right of the appellant, as a bona fide purchaser, to a lien on
the property for the $5,000 advanced, and interest, could not seriously
be
questioned.
to assign the mortgage
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Cone V. Cross, 72 Md. 102, 19 Atl. 391; Hull
William Deering & Co., 80 Md. 432, 31
Atl. 416; Hinlile v. Wilson, 53 Md. 293;
Worthington v. Bullitt, 6 Md. 198. The broader and more general proposition that a bona
fide purchaser, without notice, uuder a deed
from a fraudulent grantee, talies a good title,
which is not impaired by the fact that judgments were obtained against the fraudulent
grantor prior to the conveyance by the fraudulent grantee, is well sustained by authority.
4 Kent, Comm. 464; Sleeper v. Chapman, 121
Mass. 404; Phelps v. Morrison, 24 N. J. Eq.
195;
Totten v. Brady, 54 Md. 170; Swan v.
Dent, 2 Md. Ch.
(note 9, Brantly's Ed.);
Wait, Fraud. Conv. § 369.
In the case of
Banli V. Brooke, 40 Md. 257, the title of a
bona fide purchaser of a mortgage note to the
lien of the mortgage securing it was upheld
against the suit of the creditors of the mortgagor, although It was admitted that the note
and mortgage had been given in prejudice of
the rights of his creditors, and would have
been void as against t*iem in the hands of the
mortgagee.
The fact that the mortgage in
that case was accompanied by a promissory
note distinguishes
it from the case at bar,
but the circumstance of the negotiability
of
the mortgage debt was not expressly mentioned or dwelt upon in the court's opinion.
See, also, Danbury v. Robinson,
14 N. J. Eq.
V.

Ill

218, 219.

A bona flde mortgagee from a fraudulent
grantee has in a number of cases been held
to be entitled to protection, to the extent of
the debt due him, against the creditors of the
fraudulent grantor, upon the ground that a
mortgagee is to be treated as a purchaser, to
the extent of his Interest, within the meaning of the term "purchaser" as used in statutes such as that of .13 EJiz. c. 5; and this
where the mortgage was not accompanied by
a negotiable instrument.
Ledyard v. Butler,
9 Paige, 186, 137; Murphy v. Briggs, 89 N. Y.
451; Shorten v. Dralie, 38 Ohio St. 70; Moore
v. Bank, 55 N. Y. 41.
If the mortgage in the
present case had been made directly from
Cecil R. Atkinson to the appellant, no question could be made by Atkinson's creditors as
to the appellant's
lien upon the mortgaged
property to the extent of the money advanced
bona fide upon the faith of the property at
the time the mortgage was made.
When,
therefore, Atkinson clothed Steers with the
appearance of a good mortgage title of record to the property, for the purpose of enabling him to raise money upon the mortgage,
and the appellant, relying upon this appearance of good title in Steers, after a careful
examination of the public records, and a failure to find any prior incumbrances
upon the
property, parted with its money in good faith,
it is entitled to the favor of a court of equity
in the consideration of the relative equities of
the parties to the controversy.
This court, in
Seldner v. McCreery, 75 Md. 296, 23 Atl. 643.
said, "Where title Is perfect on its face, and
no known circumstances
exist to impeach it
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or put a purchaser on Inquiry, one who buys
bona fide and for value occupies one of the
in the law."
most highly favored positions
The appellant did not trust to the personal
responsibility of the mortgagor, but lent its
money upon the faith of the particular property covered by the mortgage, and required
an assignment of the mortgage at the time
of so doing. On the contrary, the appellees
trusted to the mortgagor, or to such other collaterals as he lodged with them; and the appellee Gordon, although he knew when he
lent his money that Cecil R. Atkinson owned
the Howard street warehouse, did not insist
upon having a lien on it for his loan, but
deliberately relied, so far as the warehouse
was concerned, upon his rights as an ordinary
creditor of its owner.
The equities of the appellant are at least equal to those of the appellees, and, having the' legal title to the
warehouse, it has the stronger claim thereon,
under the familiar principle that where equities are equal the legal title must prevail.
Pom. Eq. Jur. § 417; Wait, Fraud. Conv. § 370;
Townsend v. Little, 109 U. S. 512, 3 Sup. Ct.
357, 27 L. Ed. 1012;
Black v. Cord, 2 Har. &
G. 103; Bassett v. Noteworthy,
2 Lead. Cas.
Eq. (4th Am. Ed.) 1. In Dyson v. Simmons,
48 Md. 214, it was held, upon the authority
of many cases there cited, tha: If a party
makes, or affects to make, a mortgage which
proves to be defective by reason of some informality or omission, even on the part of the
mortgagee
himself,
the conscience
of the
mortgagor is bound, and equity will recognize
and enforce the lien of the defective mortgage, and give it precedence over the subsisting creditors of the mortgagor, and also
over judgments
obtained against him after
the date of the mortgage.
General creditors
have no lien on the property of the debtor,
and a judgment is only a general lien, and is
for that reason subordinate to the prior specific equitable lien of such a defective mortgage. The case at bar does not come directly within the principle asserted in the lastmentioned case, but it is certainly one in
which, by reason of its peculiar facts, the
conscience of the mortgagor
was especially
bound to the appellant;
and we think that
the same course of reasoning might well be
applied, within proper limits, to the appellant's protection.
This court has frequently been called upon
to assert and define the rights of the creditors of a grantor, as against a conveyance
made by him which, by reason of inadequacy
or want of consideration, or even by design,
operated to hinder, delay, or defraud them.
The court has not hesitated to strike down
such conveyances at the suit of the creditor,
holding that one cannot make a voluntary conveyance of his property, as against the rights
of subsisting creditors, nor can he, as against
such creditors, sell It for a consideration
that
bears no adequate relation to its real value.
When, however, in such cases, the rights of
parties, evea if they were the Immediate
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grantees under the conveyance, who had in
good faith parted with value in reliance upon
the conveyance, have had to be measured
against those of the creditors, it has uniformly been held that, in order to do full justice
to all the parties in such cases, a court of
equity, in setting aside the deed, will allow it
to stand as security for the consideration
actually paid, and apply the balance to the payment of the vendor's debts. These propositions were distinctly upheld in the cases already cited of Cone v. Cross, Hull v. William
Deering & Co., Hinkle v. Wilson, and Worthington V. Bullitt. We regard the principle of
the last-mentioned
in none of which
cases,
was the position of the party claiming under
the conveyance strengthened by any element
of negotiability in the subject-matter of the
thing assigned to him, as properly applicable
to the one at bar.
The mortgaged property
should be sold, and the proceeds of sale, after
deducting proper expenses, applied first to the
payment of the $5,000 lent by the appellant to
Steers, with interest thereon, and then to the
payment of the creditors of Cecil R. Atkinson,
the mortgngor, who have come or may cnrae
into the case, according to their legal priorities.
We do not mean by this decision to disturb
the authority of the Cumberland Coal & Iron
Co. Case, upon which the learned judge below mainly relied in changing his opinion, nor
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*hat of the Copeland Case. In each of those
cases the issue on trial was between the owner of property, who had been fraudulently induced to execute a mortgage upon it, and an
assignee of the fraudulent mortgage, and they
were both cases of flagrant fraud in fact.
The rights of the creditors of the grantor
were not in issue in either case. In the
Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. Case the court
asserted the proposition that the transfer of
a mortgage is so far within the rule which
applies to choses in action, that when the assignment Is made without the concurrence of
the mortgagor, as in that case, the assignee
takes subject to the same equities and defenses to which the assignor was liable.
We
do not, however, understand
the court, by
what was said in that opinion, to intimate
that, when the equities in behalf of the creditors of the mortgagor in such a case came
to be asserted, their claims would be enforced, without regard to the proposition,
so
upheld by this court in setting
frequently
aside fraudulent conveyances at the suit of
the creditors of the grantor, that, in order to
do justice to all parties in such cases, the conveyances will be allowed to stand as security
actually
paid on the
for the consideration
faith of it by the party holding the legal title
reversed, and cause reDecree
under it.
manded for further proceedings in accordance
with this opinion.
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Elmsley

and

The VIGE-CHANcaEJLLOR took time to
consider, and on the 12tli January delivered
the following judgment:
The question to be decided In this case is
whether the equitable interest of the plaintiffs in respect of the vendor's lien for unpaid
purchase
money is to be preferred
to the
equitable Interest of the defendant
Ede as
equitable mortgagee.
What is the rule of a court of equity for
determining the preference as between persons having adverse .equitable interests? The
rule is sometimes expressed in this form,
"As between persons having only equitable
Interests,
qui prior est tempore potior est
jure." This is an incorrect statement of the
rule, for that proposition Is far from being
universally true. In fact not only is it not
universally true as between persons having
only equitable Interests, but It is not universally true even where their equitable Interests are of precisely the same nature, and
in that respect precisely equal, as in the common case of two successive assignments
for
valuable consideration
of a reversionary inin the names of
terest In stock standing
trustees, where the second assignee has given
notice and the first has omitted It.
Another form of stating the rule is this,
"As between persons having only equitable
interests, if their equities are equal, qui prior
This form of
est tempore potior est jure."
stating the rule is not so obviously incorrect
as the former; and yet even this enunciation

the rule (when accurately considered)
for,
seems to me to involve a contradiction,
when we talk of two persons having equal
or unequal equities, in what sense do we use
For example, when we
the term "equity?"
say that A. has a better equity than B.,
what is meant by that? It means only that,
according
to those principles of right and
justice which a court of equity recognizes
and acts upon, it will prefer A. to B., and
will interfere to enforce the rights of A. as
against B., and therefore it is impossible,
(strictly speaking) that two persons should
except in a case in
have equal equities,
which a court of equity would altogether refuse to lend its assistance to either party as
against the other. If the Court will interfere to enforce the right of one against the
other on any ground whatever,— say on the
ground of priority of time,— how can it be
said that the equities of the two are equal?
1. e., in other words, how can it be said that
the one has no better right to call for the inof a court of equity than the
terference
To lay down the rule therefore with
other?
think it should be stated
perfect accuracy,
of

I
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"As between persons having only equitable interests, if their
equities are in all other respects equal, priority of time gives the better equity, or qui
prior est tempore potior est jure."
I have made these observations, not of
course for the purpose of a mere verbal critiof a rule, but in orcism on the enunciation
der to ascertain and illustrate the real meanthink the meaning of the rule itself, and
ing is this, that, in a contest between persons having only equitable interests, priority
of time is the ground of preference last resorted to, i. e., that a court of equity will
not prefer the one to the other, on the mere
ground of priority of time, until It finds upon
of their relative merits that
an examination
there is no other sufficient ground of preference between them, or, in other words, that
their equities are in all other respects equal,
and that, if the one has on other grounds a
better equity than the other, priority of time

I

is immaterial.

In examining into the relative merits (or
having adverse
equities)
of two parties
equitable interests, the points to which the
court must direct its attention are obviously
these, the nature and condition of their respective equitable interests, the circumstances and manner of their acquisition, and the
whole conduct of each party with respect
thereto.
And in examining into these points
it must apply the test, not of any technical
rule or any rule of partial application, but the
same broad principles
of right and justice
which a court of equity applies universally in
deciding upon contested rights.
Now in the present case each of the parties in controversy has nothing but an equitable interest;
the plaintiffs' interest being a
vendor's lien for unpaid purchase money, and
the defendant Ede having an equitable mortLooking at these two species of
gage.
equitable interests abstractedly,
and without
reference to priority of time, or possession of
the title deeds, or any other special circumstances, is there anything in their respective
natures or qualities which would lead to the
conclusion that in natural justice the one is
better, or more worthy, or more entitlPd to
protection than the other?
Each of the two equitable interests arises
out of the forbearance by the party of money
due to him. There is, however, this difference between them, that the vendor's lien for
unpaid purchase money is a right created by
a rule of equity, without any special contract. The right of the equitable mortgagee
is created by the special contract of the parties.
I cannot say that in my opinion this
any sufiicient ground of preferconstitutes
ence, though, if it makes any difference at
all,
should say it is rather in favor of the
equitable mortgagee, inasmuch as there is no
constat of the right of the vendor to his lien
for unpaid purchase money uutil it has been
declared by a decree of a court of equity,
whereas there is a clear constat of the equi-

I
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table mortgagee's
title immediately on the
contract being made;
but I do not see in
this any sufficient ground for holding that
the equitable mortgagee has the better equity.
So far, then, as relates to the nature
and quality of the two equitable interests abstractedly considered, tliey seem to me to
stand on an equal footing; and this I conceive to have been the ground of Lord Eldon's decision in Mackreth v. Symmons, 15
Ves. 329, where, in a contest between the
vendor's lien for unpaid purchase money and
the right of a person who had subsequently
obtained from the purchasers
a mere contract for a mortgage, and nothing more, he
decided in favour of the former, as being
prior in point of time.
If, then, the vendor's lien for unpaid purchase money, and the right of an equitable
mortgagee by mere contract for a mortgage,
are equitable interests of equal worth in respect of their abstract nature and quality,
is there anything
special circumin the
stances of the present case to give to the one
a better equity than the other?
One special circumstance
that occurs is
this, that the equitable mortgagee has the
possession of the title deeds. The question
therefore arises, between two persons having
equitable interests of equal worth, does the
possession of the title deeds by one of them
give him the better equity? In Foster v.
Blackstone, 1 Myl. & K. 307, Sir John Leach,
M. R., says, "A declaration of trust of an
outstanding term, accompanied by n delivery
of the deeds creating and continuing the
term, gives a better equity than a mere
declaration of trust to a prior Incumbrancer."
That is a case in which the two parties have
equitable interests in the term of precisely
the same nature, viz., a declaration of ti'ust
of the term without an actual assignment;
and there the delivery of the deeds to the
subsequent incumbrancer
gives him the better equity.
To the same effect is the decision in Stanhope v. Lord Verney, according
to Lord St. Leonards' view of it, as reported
in Butl. Co. Lift. p. 290, 1 Mylne & K. note 1,
§ 15 (which seems a more satisfactory report than that in 2 Eden, 81). Lord St.
Leonards, 3 Sugd. Vend. 218, ' states it thus,
"In Stanhope v. Earl Verney, Lord Xorthington held that a declaration of trust of a
term In favour of a person was tantamount
unless a subseto an actual assignment,
quent incumbrancer,
bona flde and without
notice, procured
an assignment,
and that
custody
the
of the deeds respecting
the
term, with the declaration of the trust of it
in favour of a second incumbrancer, was
equivalent to an actual assignment of it, and
gave him an advantage over the
therefore
first incumbrancer, which equity could not
take from him." The same doctrine appears
to be recognized by Lord Eldon in Maundrell v. Maundrell, 10 Ves. 271, where he
says, "It is clear, with regard to mortgagees
and incumbrancers, that If they do not get

in the satisfied term in some sense, either
taking an assignment, makuig the trustee a
party to the instrument, or taking possession
of the deed creating the term, that term cannot be used to protect them against any person having mesne charges or incumbrances,"
implying that taking possession of the deed
creating the term would confer on a subsequent incumbrancer such right of protection
by means of the term.
We have here, then,
ample authority for the proposition,
or rule
of equity, that as between
two persons
whose equitable interests are of precisely the
same nature and quality, and in that respect
precisely equal, the possession of the deeds
gives the better equity;
and, applying this
rule to the present case, it appears to me
that, the equitable interests of the two parties being In their nature and quality of
equal worth, the defendant
having possession of the deeds has the better equity, and
that there is, therefore, In this case, no room
for the application of the maxim, "Qui prior
est tempore potior est jure," which is only
applicable where the equities of the two parties are in all other respects equal.
I feel
all the more confidence in arriving at this
conclusion
inasmuch as it is in accordance
with the opinion
expressed
by Lord St.
Leonards in his work on vendors and purchasers; and I have no doubt that in Mackreth V. Symmons, if the equitable mortgagee
had, in addition to his contract for a mortgage, obtained the title deeds from his mortgagor. Lord Eldon would have decided in his
favour.
I must, however, guard against the supposition that I mean to express an opinion
that the possession of title deeds will in all
cases and under all circumstances
give the
better equity.
The deeds may be in the
possession of a party in such a manner and
under such circumstances
as that such pos-

session will confer no advantage
whatever.
For example, in Allen v. Knight, 5 Hare, 272
(affirmed by the Lord Chancellor and reported on appeal in 11 Jur. 527), the deeds had
been delivered to the first equitable mortgagee, and by some unexplained means they
had got back into the possession of the mortgagor who delivered them to a subsequent
equitable mortgagee.
It was insisted by the
latter that it must be presumed that it was
by the fault or neglect of the first mortgagee
that the deeds had got out of his possession,
or that at all events the court should direct
an inquiry as to the circumstances.
But the
court held that the onus lay on the second
mortgagee of proving such alleged fault or
neglect of the first mortgagee;
and, as he
had failed to prove it, the court could not
presume it, nor direct an Inquiry on the subject, and decreed in favour of the first mortgagee.
think it may be clearly inferred
from this case that if the first mortgagee had
never had the deeds delivered to him, or if
it had been proved that the deeds had got
back to the mortgagor through his fault or
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the decision would have been in favour of the second mortgagee who had the
deeds.
So the deeds may have come into the
hands of a subsequent equitable mortgagee
by means of an act committed by another
person which constituted a breach of an express trust as against the person having the
prior equitable interest.
In such a case it
would be contrary to the principles of a court
of equity to allow the subsequent mortgagee
to avail himself of the injury which had been
thus done to the party having the prior equitable estate or interest.
Indeed it appears to me that in all cases of
contest between persons having equitable interests the conduct of the parties and all the
circumstances must be talien into consideration, in order to determine which has the better equity; and, if we take that course in
the present case, everything seems in favour
of the defendant, the equitable mortgagee.
The vendors, when they sold the estate,
chose to leave part of the purchase money
unpaid, and yet executed and delivered to
a conveyance, by which they
the purchaser
declared In the most solemn and deliberate
manner, both in the body and by a receipt
indorsed, that the whole purchase money had
They might still have rebeen duly paid.
quired that the title deeds should remain in
their custody, with a memorandum by way of
equitable mortgage as a security for the unpaid purchase money, and, if they had done
so, they would have been secure against any
but that
subsequent equitable Incumbrance;
they did not choose to do, and the deeds were
Thus they volundelivered to the purchaser.
tarily armed the purchaser with the means
of dealing with the estate as the absolute legal and equitable owner, free from every
shadow of incumbrance or adverse equity.
In truth it cannot be said that the purchaser in mortgaging the estate by the deposit
of the deeds has done the vendors any wrong,
for he has only done that which the vendors
and enabled him to do. The deauthorized
fendant, who afterwards tooli a mortgage,
was in efCect invited and encouraged by the
vendors
to rely on the purchaser's title.
They had, in effect, by their acts, assured the
mortgagee that, as far as they (the vendors)
were concerned, the mortgagor had an absolute indefeasible title both at law and in
equity.
Tlie mortgagee was guilty of no negligence.
He was perfectly justified in trusting to the

deglect,
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security of the equitable mortgage by deposit
of the deeds, without the slightest obligation
to go and inquire of the vendors whether
they had received all their purchase money,
when they had already given their solemn
assurance in writing that they had received
every shilling of it and had conveyed the

estate and delivered over the deeds; and I do
not think that the fact of the conveyance
bearing date only the day before the mortgage imposed on him any such obligation.
The defendant omitted nothing that was necessary to constitute a complete and effectual
and although the mortequitable mortgage;
gage was taken, not for money actually advanced at the time, but for an antecedent
debt, the forbearance of that debt constitutes
a full and sufficient valuable consideration.
Upon a comparison then of the conduct of
the two parties, and a consideration of all
of the case, and especially
the circumstances
the fact of the possession of the deeds, which
with perfect bona
acquired
the mortgagee
fides, and without any wrong done to the
vendors, I am of opinion that the equity of
the mortgagee is far better than that of the
vendor, and ought to prevail.
I may, in conclusion, venture to make the
suggestion that the point now under consideration is often put by text-writers in a form
calculated to mislead, when it is propounded
as a question
whether the vendor, in respect of his lien for unpaid purchase money,
or an equitable mortgagee, ought to be prefeiTed, or when an opinion is expressed that
the one or the other has the better equity.
If I am right in my view of the matter, neither the one nor the other has necessarily
the better eqand under all circumstances
uity. Their equitable Interests, abstractedly
considered, are of equal value In respect of
their nature and quality; but whether their
equities are in other respects equal, or whether the one or the other has acquired the better equity, must depend upon all the circumstances of each particular case, and especially the conduct of the respective parties. And
which may give
among the circumstances
to the one the better equity the possession
of the title deeds is a very material one.
But if, after a close examination of all these
matters, there appears nothing to give to the
one a better equity than the other, then, and
then only, resort must be had to the maxim,
"Qui prior est tempore potior est jure," and
priority of time then gives the better equity.
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COMSTOCK

V.

JOHNSON.

(46 N. Y. 615.)
Court of Appeals of New York.

1871.

The principal question
C. J.
in this case, involving the construction of the
grant of water, was correctly decided in the
court below. It is well settled in this State
that the terms used in this grant are to be
taken as a measure of the quantity of water
granted, and not a limitation of the use to
the particular machinery specified.
( Wakely
V. Davidson, 26 N. Y., 387; Cromwell v.
SeMen, 3id., 253.) It was found by the court
that, at the time the defendant shut the water
off, he asserted that the plaintiff had forfeited
his right to the water, and claimed a right to
shut it off. In this he was mistaken. In depriving the plaintiff of the use of the water
under an assertion of forfeiture, he rendered
himself amenable to the process of the court
for the protection of the plaintiff's rights.
The judgment enjoining the defendants from
depriving the plaintiff of the quantity of water to which he was entitled under his deed,
cannot be disturbed. The only serious question in the case relates to the use of the buzz
saw in front of the mill.
Tlie plaintiff did
not, by his deed, acquire the title to the land
in front of the mill, because the description
is limited to the land upon which the mill
stands; but he did acquire an easement in
such land for the purpose of ingress and
egress, and also for the purpose of piling and
sawing wood for the use of the mill, as it had
been used and enjoyed for forty years.
Everything necessary for the full and free enjoyment of the mill passed as an incident, appurtenant to the land conveyed.
(2 Kent's
Com., 467; Blaine's Lessee v. Chambers, 1
But this would not auSerg. & Kawle, 174.)
thorize the plaintiff to erect and use machinery upon this land not necessa-ry to the
use of the mill, as it bad been used, and would
not authorize the use of the buzz saw upon
that land. The objection is not that the
plaintiff propelled the buzz saw with the water from the dam, as be had the right to use
the water for any machinery and in any place
which he was entitled to occupy; but he could
not occupy the space in front of the mill for
that purpose.
At the time the water was
shut off by the defendants, it was being used
only to propel this saw ; and it is claimed that
the defendants were justified in shutting off
the water from that machinery; and for that
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reason the judgment should be reversed, or,
at least, that it should be modified so as to
restrain the plaintiff from using his buzz saw
As we have
on the defendants'
premises.
seen, the judgment against the defendants is
fully warranted by the findings; and the question is, whether any modification should be
It is a rule of
made against the plaintiff.
equity that he who asks equity must do equity. The plaintiff was In fault in using the
It ia
buzz saw on the defendants' premises.
said that this was an independent transaction, for which the defendants might have
an action; and this was the view of the court
below. The rule referred to will be applied
when the adverse equity grows out of the
very controversy before the court, or of such
circumstances as the record shows to be a part
of its liistory, or is so connected with the
cause in litigation as to be presented in the

pleadings and proofs, with full opportunity
afforded to the party thus recriminated to ex(Tripp v. Cook,
plain or refute the charges.
26 Wend., 143; McDonald v. Neilson, 2 Cow.,
190; easier v. Shipman, 35 N. Y., 533.)
All the facts connected with the right of
the plaintiff to use the buzz saw were not
only spread out upon the record, but were in
fact litigated upon the trial, and, as to his
strict legal rights, are undisputed; and we
cannot say that, but for his use of the saw on
the defendants'
premises, the water would
not have been shut off. Whether this was
so or not, the controversy in relation to his
right to use the saw was involved in the litigation, and was intimately connected with
the wrongful act of the defendants; and, being so, it is proper to apply the equitable
rule. It is not indispensable to the application of this rule that the fault of the plaintiff
should be of such a character as to authorize
an independent action for an injunction
against him. The plaintiff, in strictness,
was in the wrong in placing his buzz saw in
front of the mill.
The defendants were in
the wrong in shutting off the water, and especially in asserting a forfeiture; and, as both
parties are in court to insist upon their strict
legal rights, we think substantial justice will
be done by modifying the judgment so as to
enjoin the plaintiff from using the buzz saw
on the land in front of his mill, and, as modified, judgment affirmed, without costs to
either party against the other in this court.
All concur.
Judgment accordingly.
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BROWN, BONNELL & 00.
RIOR IRON CO.
(10

v.

LAKE SUPE-

et al.

Sup. Ot. 604, 134 U. S. 530.)

Supreme Court of the United States.

April

7,

1890.

Appeal from the circui tcourtofthe Unitea
States for the northern district of Ohio.
Henry Crawfoid, iov appellant.
Francis
Wing, C. C. Baldwin, S. Sbellabarger, and
M. Wilson, for appellees.

J.

Brewer, J. On February 20, 1883, two
of the appellees, the Lake Superior Iron
Company and the Jackson Iron Company,
together with the Negaunee Concentrating
Company, filed their bill against the appellant, in the circuit court of the United
States for the northern district of Ohio.
The appellant was a corporation, created
under the laws of the state of Ohio, and
each of the complainants was a creditor;
two holding claims evidenced by notes
not then due, and the other, the Negaunee
Concentrating Company, holding a judgment. The prayer of the bill was for tlie
appointment
of a receiver to take charge
of theproperty and assets of the defendant,
and for such other and further relief as
was proper. On the same day the defendant entered its appearance, and accepted
service of notice of a motion for the appointment
of a receiver; and Fayette
Brown was thereupon immediately appointed receiver. On the next day subpcBna was served on the defendant.
On
March i!8th a supplemental bill was filed
making other parties defendants, and on
June 14th an order pro confesso was entered against all of the defendants in the
original and supplemental bills. On April
23d an order was entered directing all creditors to file their claims by petition, and
on October 20th nearly every creditor had
appeared and filed his petition.
On July
17th an order was entered appointing a
special master to report on the claims of
creditors, and marshal the liens thereof.
Up to the 23d of November the appellant
made noopposition to the proceeding, and
apparently assented to the action which
was being taken by the creditors, looking
to the appropriation of its property to the
payment of their claims.
On that day a
change took place in Its attitude towards
this suit. It went into the state courts,
and confessed judgment in behalf of several of its creditors ; and on the 24th deposited in the registry of the circuit court money enough topayoff thejudgment in favor
of the concentrating company, and filed
two pleas,— one setting forth the fact of
payment, and the other that the original
and supplemental bills disclosed that the
complainants had a plain, adequate, and
complete remedy at law, and that therefore the court, sitting as a court of equity,
had no jurisdiction ; and praying a dismissal of the bills. Subsequently, on December 18th, it filed a motion to discharge
the receiver. This motion was overruled,
the pleas seem to have been ignored, the
master reported upon the claims presented, and on February 28, 1886, the court en-
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tered a decree which, finding the indebtedness to be as stated by the master, also
what property was in possession of the receiver, decreed that upon default in the
payment of those debts the property be
From this
sold in satisfaction thereof.
decree the defendant has brought this appeal, and its principal contention is that
the circuit court had no jurisdiction whatever over the subject-matter of the suit,
because it appeared upon the face of the
bills, original and supplemental, that the
had a plain, adequate, and
complainants
complete remedy at law.
As heretofore stated, the bill showed
that two of the complainants held claims
not yet due, and the third onlya judgment,
with no execution. The supplemental bill
alleged that execution had, since the filing
of the original bill, been issued on that
judgment, and returned nulla bona. The
original bill, besides disclosing the nature
claims, set forth that
of complainants'
they were proceeding not alone in their
own behalf, but in that of all other creditors, whose number was so great as to
make it impossibleto join them as parties.
It then averred the insolvenc.v ot the defendant ; that it was engaged in large and
various business, manufacturing, and mining; that its plant and good- will w^as of
great extent and value; and that it employed oi)eratives to the number of at
least 4,000; and then alleged as follows:
"And your orators further say that vexatious litigation has been commenced
against the said defendaut, and many
more such are threatened, and that such
litigations are accompanied by attachments and seizures of property, and such
threatened litigations will also be accompanied by attachments and seizures, and
that such attachments and seizures will
give to those creditors who are pursuing
them undue and unfair advantage
and
priority over your complainants,
whose
claims are not yet due, and make them irreparable injury and damage; that if such
litigations be further instituted and its
property seized in attachment, as it already has been, there is great danger that
the valuable property of the defendant will
be irreparably injured, and to a great extent destroyed; and your orators say that
such seizures and interference with the
business and the property of the defendant
would wholly destroy the value of the
good-will of the company as an asset, and
wholly break up its long-established business, and thereby cause detriment and irreparable injury to your orators and all
other creditors.
And your orators further
say that, unless this court shall interfere
and protect and preserve the property and
assets of said defendant by putting it into
the hands of a receiver, the said property
will be in great danger of destruction and
dissipation by the large number of operatives who would necessarily be discharged
and left without work or means of obtaining it ; and such operatives, by reason of
the great distrust they already have, and
on account of a fear that they will not in
fuljure receive remuneration, will abandon
their employment, and thereby cause a
stoppage of the extensive business of said
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defendant, to the extent that the creditors
of said defendant would not be able to
realize one-half of the amount upon the
several claims that they would if the said
"
business of the defendant were continued.
The appellees, while admitting the general rule to be that creditors must show
that they have exhausted legal remedies
before coming into a court of equity, insist
that the bill disclosed a case in equity on
two grounds : First, that upon the insolvency of acorporation its properties become
a trust fund for the benefit of its creditors,
which can be seized and disposed of by a
receiver, and in equitable proceedings ; and,
second, that the vast interests and properties of thiscorporation, with their threatened disintegration through several attachment suits, justified the interference of
a court of equity to preserve, for the benefit of creditors, that large value which resulted from the unity of the properties. In
support of these propositions counsel cite,
as especially applicable, Terrj' v. Anderson,
95 U. S. 628; Union Trust Co. v. Illinois M.
Ry. Co., 117 U. S. 434, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 809;
Sage V. Railroad Co., 125 U. S. 361, 8 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 887; Mellen v. Iron-Works, 131 U.
S. 352, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 781; Barbour v Bank,
45 Ohio St. 133, 12 N. E. Rep. 5; Rouse v.
Bank, 46 Ohio St. 493, -'-' N. E. Rep. 293.
Tit were it conceded that the bill was
defective; that a demurrer must have been
sustained ; and that the appellant, if it had
so chosen to act in the first instance, could
have defended its possessitm, and defeated
the action, — still the decree of the circuit
court must be sustained. Whateverrights
of objection and defense the appellant had,
Obit lost by inaction and acquiescence.
viously the proceedings had were with its
consent. Immediately on filing the bill it
entered its appearance; and the same daj'
ft receiver was appointed, without objection on its part. It suffered the bills to be
taken pro confesso. It permitted the receiver to go on in the possession of these
properties for nine months, transacting
large business, entering into many contracts, and assuming large obligations,
without any intimationof a lack of authority, or any objection to the proceedings.
After a lapse of nine months, suddenly its
policy changed; itcon tested where theretofore it had acquiesced. And this, not because of any restored solvency or purpose
to resume business, but with the evident
intent to prevent the equality among creditors which the existing equitable proceedings would secure, and to give preference
to certain creditors ; for clearly it was the
thought of the president of the corporation, himself the owner of a large majority
had
of its stock, whose management
vsrrought its financial ruin, that after the
setting aside of the equitable proceedings
the lien of the confessed judgments would
attach, and thus those favored creditors
would be preferred.
So the case stands in this attitude : The
Its extensive
corporation was insolvent.
and scattered properties had been brought
into single ownership, and so operated together that large benefit resulted in preserving the unity of ownership and opDisintegration was threatened
eration.

through separate attacks, by different
creditors, on scattered properties.
The
preservation of this unity, with its consequent value, and the appropriation of the
properties for the benefit of all the creditors
equally, were matters deserving large conCertain
sideration in any proper suit.
creditors, acting for all, initiated proceedings looking towards this end. In such
Droceedings the corporation acquiesced.
Substantially all of the creditors came inAfter months had
to the proceedings.
passed, much business had been transactassumed, the
ed and large responsibilities
corporation, for the benefit of a few creditors and to destroy the equality between
all, comes in with the technical objection
that the creditors initiating the proceedings should have taken one step more at
law before coming into equity. But the
maxim, "He who seeks equity must do
equity," is as appropriate to the conduct
of the defendant as to that of the complainant; and it would be strange if a
debtor, to destroy equality and accomplish
partiality, could ignore its long acquiescence, and plead an unsubstantial technicality to overthrow protracted, extensive,
and costly proceedings carried on in reliance upon its consent. Surely no such imperfection attends the administration of a
court of equit.y.
Good faith and early assertion of rights are as essential on the
part of the defendant as of the complainant. This matter has recently been before
this court in Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U S.
354, 395, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 486, and was carefully considered, and the rule, with its limitations, thus stated : " The rule as stated
inl Danlell's Chancery Practice, (4th Amer.
Ed.) 555, is that if the objection of want of
jurisdiction in equity isnottaken in proper
time, namely, before the defendant enters
into his defense at large, the court, having
the general jurisdiction, will exercise it;
and, in a note on page 550, many casee
are cited to establish that, 'if a defendant
in a suit in equity answers and submits to
the jurisdiction of the court, it is too late
for him to object that the plaintiff has a
plain and adequate remedy at law. This
objection should be taken at the earliest
opportunity.
The above rule must be
taken with the qualification thatitis competent for the court to grant the relief
sought, and that it has jurisdiction of the
* * * It was held in
subject-matter.'
Lewis V. Cocks, 23 Wall. 466, that if the
court, upon looking at the proofs, found
none at all of the matters which would
make a proper case for equity, it would be
the duty of the court to recognize the fact,
and give it effect, though not raised by the
pleadings nor suggested by counsel. To
the same effect is Oelrichs v. Spain, 15 Wall.
211.
The doctrine of these and similar
cases is that the court, for its own protection, may prevent matters purely cognizable at law from being drawn into chancery
at the pleasure of the parties interested ;
but it by no means follows, where the subject-matter belongs to the class over which
a court of equity has jurisdiction, and the
objection that the complainant has an adequate remedy at law is not made until
the hearing- in the appellate tribunal, that
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the latter can exercise no discretion In the
disposition of such objection. Under the
circumstances of this case, it comes altogether too late, even though, if taken in
limine, it might have been worthy of attention. " See, also, Kilbourn v. Sunder-

land,

130

29

U. S.

505,

9Sup. Ct. Rep.

594 ; Uni<m

Illinois M. Ry. Co., 117 U. S.
434-468, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 809.
Further comment is unnecessary.
The ruling of the circuit court was correct, and its decree is
Trust Co.

V.

therefore affirmed.
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BLBAKLBY'S APPEAL.
(66

Pa. St.

187.)

.Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

AGNBW,

Oct. 27, 1870.

J.

The facts of this case are
few. Robert Lamberton was the owner of a
judgment for $31,000, entered against Samuel P. Irvin on the 8th day of June, 1865.
Irvin had purchased of F. D. Kinnear, Esq.,
lot No. 449 In Franklin at $2600, of which
$820 only remained unpaid, and would fall
due on the Cth of August, 1865, with a provision for forfeiture of the contract in case
of non-payment for thirty days after it fell
due. On the 19th of July, 1865, Irvin assigned
his contract to James Bleakley,
binding him to pay the $820 to save the forfeiture, and with the admitted understanding that Irvin should refund the $820 to
Bleakley, settle his indebtedness to the bank,
of which Bleakley was cashier,
and that
then Bleakley should
reconvey
to Irvin's
wife. But the assignment was antedated to
the 1st of May, 1865, thus overreaching Lamjudgment. The master finds that
berton's
this was done to defraud the plaintiff. The
finding is ably vindicated in the opinion of
Judge Trunkey. The absolute character of
the paper, though but a security, the agreement to reconvey to Irvin's wife instead of
himself, and the attempt of Bleakley to use
the paper to defeat the sheriff's sale of the
property by Lamberton on his judgment,
evince the true motive for antedating the
paper.

Bleakley paid the $820 to Kinnear, and
now claims a decree for this sum, before
specific performance shall be decreed to Lamberton, who purchased
Irvin's title at the
sheriff's sale. Kinnear does not resist specific performance,
but stands ready to convey to Lamberton, whenever
the covinous
assignment
to Bleakley is put out of his
way. It is Bleakley who resists the decree
until he is refunded the $820, paid upon the
footing of the fraudulent agreement with Irvin, to defeat Lamberton's judgment. Bleakley is made a party to the bill only for the
aspurpose of putting aside the covinous
signment to enable Kinnear to convey to
Lamberton. The question then is whether
a chancellor would require Lamberton to refund the $820 to Bleakley, as a condition to
setting aside the assignment and entitling
of KinLamberton to specific performance
near.
But clearly Bleakley cannot demand repayment of Lamberton either at law or equity.
And first he is not entitled to subrogation to
Kinnear's rights. Subrogation is not a mat-
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ter of contract but of pure equity and benevolence. Kyner v. Kyner, 6 Watts, 221; Wallace's Appeal, 5 Pa. St. 103. On what pretence. In foro consclentise, can a party attempting to carry out a scheme of fraud
against another, by a payment, claim compensation of the party he has attempted to
defraud? Conscience and benevolence revolt
at such an iniquity. Again Bleakley did not
recognise
Kinnear's title by the payment.
He did not profess to bargain for it, and
Kinnear did not profess to sell it to him.
His act was simp^ a payment and no more,
made by him because of Irvin's duty to pay,
and accepted by Kinnear because of his
right to receive from Irvin. Besides the payment was accepted by Kinnear in ignorance
of the attempted fraud. There can be no
legal intendment
therefore of a bargain on
Kinnear's part to vest his right to receive
the money in Bleakley. As to Lamberton
the payment by Bleakley was not only fraudulent and intended to displace his judgment,
but it was also voluntary. It was not paid
at Lamberton's request nor for his use and
benefit; but on the contrary was intended
to defeat his right, as a creditor by overlapping his judgment, by means of the covBleakley is therefore neiinous transfer.
ther a purchaser, nor a creditor of Lamberton, nor an object of benevolence,
but is
forced upon the record to compel him to put
out of the way the fraudulent barrier to
Kinnear's specific performance to Lamberton. He cannot, thus standing before a chancellor, ask him to make repayment
to him
a condition to a decree to remove the fraudulent obstruction he threw in the way. The
payment is one of the very steps he took to
consummate the fraud upon Lamberton. If
he have a legal right of recovery he must
resort to his action at law, and if he can
have none, it is a test of his want of equity.
And in addition to all this, it is a rule that
a chancellor will not assist a party to obtain
any benefit arising from a fraud. He must
come into a court of equity with clean hands.
It would be a singular exercise of equity,
which would assist a party, who had paid
money to enable him to perpetrate a fraud,
to recover his money, just when the chancellor was engaged In thrusting out of the
way of his doing equity to the injured party,
the very instrument of the fraud. Who does
iniquity shall not have equity.
Hershey v.
Weitlng, 50 Pa. St. 244, 245.
We are therefore of opinion the court committed
no error In refusing compensation,
and the decree of the court below is confirmed.
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(20

N. E.

V.

WALTON

203,

et al.

46 Ohio St. 195.)

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Jan.

8, 1889.

Error

to circuit court, Greene county.
On the 15th day of February, 188*2, Moses
A. Walton commenced his action in the court
of common pleas of Greene county against
the plaintiff In error, Charles Kahn, Jr., and
the Citizens' National Banli of Xenia, to enjoin the bank from paying two checks, one
for $1,500 and the other for $500, dra-wn by
him upon the bank in favor of Kahn. The
petition alleges "that on the 14th day of February, A. D. 1882, the defendant,
Charles
Kahn, Jr., by fraud and misrepresentation,

obtained from the plaintifC his two certain
checks of that date for the sums of $1,500
and $500, respectively, drawn by him upon
the Citizens' National Bank of Xenia, a corporation duly incorporated under th© laws of
the United States;
that said checks were
given and are wholly without consideration,
and the plaintifC received no value therefor
whatever; that defendant, Kahn, is about to
present the same for collection, and the bank
is about to, and will, unless restrained by the
order of the court, pay the checlis, which
will be an irreparable injury to the plaintiff,
and for which he has no adequate remedy
at law; that Kahn is not a resident of said
county,
and has no property therein,
and
who is, as plaintifC is informed and believes,
wholly insolvent." The petition prays "that
the bank be restrained and enjoined from
paying said checks, and that they may be
ordered to be canceled and delivered up to
and for all other and further
the plaintiff;
relief to which in equity he may be enti-

tled."

At the

of the action, the
commencement
obtained a temporary injunction as
prayed for, and on the 6th day of March
amended his petition by adding to its aver"That no consideraments the following:
tion exists for said checli in said petition
mentioned
other than certain gaming contracts entered into by said plaintifC on or
plaintifC

day of February, 1882, in
about the
the city of Cincinnati, Ohio, with the said
Kahn, a broker and commission merchant of
said city, for the purpose of speculating in
the price of wheat, pork, and lard, and which
said contracts made by said Kahn were in
violation of the statute of gaming, and
against public policy, and were false and
feigned, and by which he undertook in form
to buy and sell wheat, pork, and lard for
without intending
and with this plaintifC,
thereby either to receive or deliver said
wheat, pork, or lard, but solely to wager in
the market price thereof, and to pay or receive the difference between the price in the
contracts and the market rates at any time
during the month of March, 1882, at the option of said Kahn, whichever the same
would be; that said contracts were made as
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a cover for gambling in the prices of wheat,
pork, and lard; that no wheat, pork, or lard
was actually to be delivered or received, but
the difference in price only was to be paid
on the one side or received on the other at
any time during the said month of March,
at the option of said Kahn; that in pursuand in
ance of the said gaming contracts,
addition to the execution and delivery of
said checks, this plaintifC delivered and paid
to said Kahn the sum of $500; that no consideration for the payment of said sum of
other than that
$500 passed to the plaintifC
set forth aforesaid; that the said Kahn received to the plaintiff's use said sum of $500
so lost and paid to said defendant, and said
defendant, Charles Kahn, Jr., is indebted to
plaintiff in thef said sum of $500, with inday of February, 1882.
terest from the
Wherefore plaintiff prays as in his original
petition, and for judgment against said de-

fendant Kahn, for said sum of $500, with
interest from February — , 1882." The temporary injunction was, on motion of the defendant, Kahn, dissolved, and the plaintiff
appealed to the district court, where, on the
28th of April, 1882, the plaintiff, by leave of
that court, filed another amendment to his
averments:
petition, adding the following
"That at the time of the execution and delivery of the said checks the plaintifC had on
deposit with said bank sufficient money to
pay said checks; that prior to the presentation thereof said Kahn, who is insolvent, by
his agent, made inquiry of said other defendant as to whether said checks were good
and ■n'ould be paid on presentation; to wliich
inquiry said banli made answer that said
checlvs were good, and would be paid, and
said bank claims to have certified to said
checks, and bound itself thereby to pay the
same; that prior to the filing of the petition
herein, and the allowance of said restraining order, this plaintifC requested and notified said bank not to pay said checks; but
said bank refused said request, and threatened to, and will, unless restrained, pay said
checks."

The defendant, Kahn, then answered, admitting "the corporate character of said
bank; that said Kahn was about to present
said cheeks for collection;
his non-residence;
that plaintifC had said money on deposit in
said bank; said inquiries whether said
checks would be honored, and the response
of said bank that they would; that said
bank claims to have certified the same, and
bound itself to pay the same, and said notification to said bank not to pay the same,
and the refusal of said bank; that a contract was made between said Kahn and
plaintiff for the sale of property; that sales
were made, and $500.00 cash and said checks
But said Kahn denies
were paid thereon.
each and every other allegation of said petition."
The record shows that at the April term,
1884, of the district court the cause was by
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consent of the parties submitted to the court
upon the pleadings and evidence, and the
court found the equities of the case in favor
of the plaintiff and against said defendant,
Kahn, made the injunction perpetual, and
adjudged the costs against Kahn. A motion
for a new trial, filed hy Kahn, was overI'uled, and a bill of exceptions was duly taken, containing all the testimony given on the
trial of the cause. It also appears in the bill
of exceptions that at the close of the testiKahn, requested the
mony the defendant,
court to find the facts, and state its conclusions of law and of fact separately, and also
of fact:
to find "the following conclusions
be(1) Whether there was any agreement
tween the plaintiff and Charles Kahn, Jr.,
that the property purchased should not be
delivered; but that simplj- the difference, if
any, between the price at which the property
was purchased and the price at which it
should rule in March, 1882, should be paid.
(2) Whether Charles Kahn, Jr., N. B. Ream
& Co., or the persons of whom the property
was purchased in January, 1882, intended
that it should not be delivered, and that
simply the difference, if any, between the
price at which it should rule in March, 1882,
and the price at which it was purchased
should he paid, and who so intended.
(3)
Whether the court finds that simply the
difference was to be paid, and no property
delivered,
from the circumstances of the
transaction, and, if so, what are the circumstances upon which said finding is predicated?
(4) Whether the price of said property on the Cliicago Board of Trade, in March,
1882, was more or less than the purchase
price in January, 1882, and, if less, how
much less. (5) Whether, by the terms of the
contract between the plaintiff and Kahn, or
by reason of notice to plaintiff, Kahn was
justified in selling said property on March 1,
1882.
(6) Whether the persons of whom the
property Was purchased in January, 1882, or
their brokers, N. B. Ream & Co., had the
property on hand ready to deliver on March
1, 1882. and wliether they gave Kahn notice,
and whether Kahn gave plaintiff notice of
their readiness to deliver tlie property, and
that it would be sold March 1, 1882, if plaintiff \\ould not take it. (7) Upon whom the
court finds the burden of proof rests to establish the character of the transaction;
whether it was or was not a gambling transaction.
(8) Whether Charles Kahn, Jr., was
simply a broker, agent, and employe of plaintiff in causing the purchase and sale of said
property on commission, without any interest in the profit or loss in the transaction."
And it further appears from the bill of exceptions that the court, in response to the
foregoing request, found as follows:
"Answer to Requests 1 and 2. We find
that the transactions in which the parties
were engaged were mere speculations or ventures on the future prices of the products
named in the pleadings, without any inten-

tion on the part of Walton, Kahn, or Ream
& Co. that the property would be either paid
for or delivered, but that the intention wa.s
that settlements between buyer and seller
would be made on the differences between
the market prices at the date named for de-

livery and the prices named in the contracts;
that this was understood by all parties interested in the deals; that the same were gambling transactions, and illegal.
"Answer to Request 3. We find the foregoing facts from all the circumstan,ces in the
case and sun-ounding the transactions, and
particulai-ly from the fact that if any inquiry had been made it would have developed the fact that Walton was wholly unable to pay one-fourth the amount of the
price of the property ostensibly purchased,
and that in fact said Wal(being $43,000,)
ton was not worth over $3,000 or $4,000 at
the time.

"Answer to Requests 4 and 5. We find
that in March, 1882, the price of property
had deembraced in tlie deals mentioned
clined to an extent that absorbed the margins put up, and that, under the rules of
the Board of Trade of Chicago, Kahn was
justified in selling whatever interest Walton
had in any property under his (Kahn's) control; but we have not regarded this as an
Important fact in the case.
"Answer to Request 6. We find it probable
that Ream & Co. had control of an amount
of property equal in bulk and quality to that
named in the several contracts, and could
have delivered it on demand March 1, 1882;
but we further find that in said deals they
had no intention of so delivering it, nor had
Kahn any intention of receiving it. Ream
& Co. gave Kahn notice, and Kahn gave
Walton notice, of tlieir readiness to deliver
the property,
and that it would be sold
March 1st if plaintiff did not take it; but
this was done after the commencement
of
this suit, and with, knowledge that it would
not be so taken by plaintiff.
"Answer to Request 7. Upon the plaintitt'.
"Answer to Request 8. Kahn was, as between plaintiff and defendant,
a
broker
agent, interested only to the amount of his
commissions.

"We

further find that after the checks
the pleadings were delivered to
Kahn, a bank in Cincinnati telegraphed the
Citizens' National Bank of Xenia as follows:
'Are M. A. Walton's checks for $2,000 good?'
To which said Citizens' Bank sent an answer
as follows:
'Yes, sir.'
We find that this
does not amount to 'certifying' the checks,
and the Citizens' Bank did not thereby become bound to the holders of the checks for
the amounts.
We find that the contract was
not executed by the giving of the checks,
and that by enjoining the payment of the
checks we simply stop the carrying out of a
gambling contract, and thereby leave the
parties where we find them."
Judgment having been rendered against

named

in
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Kahn, as before stated, he prosecutes error
to this court to reverse the same, upon the
grounds that the conclusions of law are not
supported by the facts found, and the evidence does not sustain the finding of facts.
Jordan

&

Jordan,

for

plaintiff

in error.

John Little, for defendants in error.

WILLIAMS, J. The evidence tends to
prove the facts found by the district court,
and as this court is not required to determine the weight of the evidence, the facts
so found will, In the disposition of the case,
be regarded as established by the evidence.
The case shown by these facts, and those
admitted by the pleadings, is that Kahn was
a commission broker in Cincinnati, doing
business with and for Ream & Co., brokers
and commission merchants in Chicago, and
bought of or through them wheat and pork
for future delivery, so called, on Walton's
account.
The transactions were mere speculations or ventures on the prices ot the
named, without any intention
commodities
on the part of the parties concerned that the
property should either be delivered or paid
for; but all the parties understood and intended that settlements should be made between them, on the difCerences between the
market prices, at the dates fixed for delivery, and those named in the contracts.
Kahn was to have a commission for his
services, and he advanced
margins on the
deals.
Walton was loser, and drew his two
checks, amounting to $2,000,
on the bank
where he had funds, payable to Kahn, for
moneys paid by him on the deals and losses.
Walton also paid Kahn $500 in money on

the same account.
Kahn telegraphed to the
bank, inquiring if Walton's checks for the
amount of those drawn to him were good,
and received an affirmative answer.
Walton notified the bank not to pay the checks,
and before their presentation brought his
action to enjoin their payment.
1. Upon this state of the case, the first inquiry naturally is, were the speculative transactions in which the parties engaged in the
nature of wagers, and, for that reason, illegal? In the determination of this question
it is not deemed material whether they fall
within the provisions of our statutes against
gaming and wagering, or do not; for it is
generally held in this country that wagering contracts, though not prohibited by statute, are illegal, and void as against public
and the great weight of authority
policy,
is to the effect that contracts of the kind
the district court found those involved in
this case to be are void as wagering agreements.
This has been held by the courts
of last resort in every state where the question has been presented, and by the supreme court of the United States.
The rule
generally accepted is that contracts for the
sale of personal property to be delivered In
the future are valid if the parties really in-
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tend and agree that the property is to be delivered by the seller, and the price is to be
paid by the purchaser, though the seller has
not the goods, nor any other means of getting them, than to go into the market and
buy them.
But if the real intent be merely to speculate on the rise and fall of prices,
but
and the goods are not to be delivered,
one party is to pay to the other the difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods at the date fixed for
executing the contract, then the contract
partakes
of the nature of a wager, and is
void.
Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 499, 4 Sup.
Ct. 160; Higgius v. McCrea, 116 U. S. 671,
6 Sup. Ct. 557;
Mann v. Bishop, 136 Mass.
495;
Gregory v. Wendell, -10 Mich. 432; Cole
Kingsbury v. KirV. Milmine, 88 111. 349;
wan, 77 N. Y. 612; Lowry v. Dillman, 59
Wis. 197, 18 N. W. 4.
2. The facts
found by the district court
plainly define Kahn's relation to the unlawful agreements.
He was directly connected
with them, and, with full knowledge of their
character, performed services and expended
money to promote
and forward them.
It
was his intention, as well as the intention
of the other parties, that the property should
not be delivered
or paid for, but that the
differences in the prices should be adjusted
in money.
It is true, Kahn was the broker,
'
and had no pecuniary interest in the business except his commissions,
and the repayment of whatever sums he might advance
for margins, and to pay losses as the busiHe, nevertheless,
ness progressed.
negotiated the wagering contracts, and was party
to them.
The legal effect of such relation
to contracts of that nature was determined
in the case of Irwin v. Williar, supra.
The
conclusion of the court is thus stated:
"In
Rounti-ee v. Smith, 108 U. S. 269, 2 Sup. Ct.
630, it was said that brokers who had negotiated such contracts, suing, not on the conthemselves,
tracts
but for services
performed, and money advanced for defendant,
at his request, though they might, under
some circumstances,
be so connected with
the immorality of the contract as to be affected by it, they are not In the same position as a party sued for the enforcement of
the original agreement.
It is certainly true
that a broker might negotiate suc.h a contract without being privy to the illegal intent of the principal parties to it, which renders it void; and in such case, being innocent of any violation of law, and not suing
to enforce an unlawful contract, has a meritorious ground for the recovery of compensation for services and advances.
But we
are also of the opinion that when the broker
is privy to the unlawful design of the parties, and brings them together for the very
purpose of entering into an illegal agreecriminis, and cannot
ment, he is particeps
recover for services rendered or losses incurred by himself on behalf of either iji

\
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forwarding the transaction."

We accept tliis
as a sound and wholesome rule, and under
its operation the checks given by Walton to
Kahn for services rendered and losses paid
by him in the unlawful enterprise are tainted with the vice of their origin, and are subject to all the infirmities of securities given
for illegal considerations.
3. It is contended that the drawing of the
checks by Walton on the bank, where he
had sufficient funds to pay them, and the
bank's response to the inquiry of Kahn's
agent that checks to their amount were
good, was a specific appropriation of the
funds, and amounted to payment of the debt
for which they were drawn, whereby the
A check,
contract became fully executed.
being simply a written order of a depositor
to his banker to make a certain payment out
of his funds, is executory, and, of course,
revocable at any time before the bank bas
paid it or committed Itself to its payment.
It operates, it is true, as an assignment of
the fund on which it is drawn pro tanto, and
binds the bank to its payment out of the
fund when presented, unless revoked; but
it is not Itself payment of the debt for
which it is drawn, unless it be so agreed
Ordinarily it is only
between the parties.
and the debt is not
a means of payment,
extinguished unless and until the check be
paid, or the holder be guilty of laches, which
may operate as a discharge of the drawer.
The bank is the agent of the drawer. Its
It
duty is to pay his money as he directs.
owes no duty to the holder except under the
drawer's directions, until, by virtue of those
directions, it assumes some obligation to the
Up to that time the latest order
holder.
But after the
from the drawer governs.
bank has paid the check, or placed itself
under an obligation to pay it, the drawer's
This obliis ended.
power of revocation
It
gation may be incurred by acceptance.
is sometimes said that the legal effect of the
of the
is to place the holder
acceptance
By the
check in the position of a depositor.
acceptance a new and specific engagement
is entered into by the bank; which is to unconditionally pay the sum named to the legal
The acceptance or cerholder of the check.
tification Is sometimes evidenced by writing
the word "good" on the check by the authorized officer or agent of the bank; but
no particular mode or form is necessary, and
it is generally held that a verbal acceptance
But whatever the word or
is sufficient.
form employed, there must be enough to
of the particular
the acceptance
indicate
check.
It is manifest there was no acceptance or
certification of the checks In question in this
correspondence
beThe telegraphic
case.
tween the bank and Kahn's agent amounted
that valid
to no more than an assurance
checks to the amount stated, drawn by Walton, or that might be drawn by him, were
then good. No particular checks were men-

tioned in the inquiry, nor any intimation
given that the inqtlrer had received, or was
about to receive, such checks; nor had the
bank any means of identifying the checks
to which the inquiry related.
Its telegram,
therefore, did not commit the bank to the
payment of any particular check. At most
It was Information that Walton had, at its
date, money on deposit to the amount stated,
subject to cheek. Espy v. Bank, 18 Wall.
were
(504. If, therefore, before the checks
presented
for payment,
and before they
were certified or accepted by the bank, or
it otherwise became committed to their paythem, and notified
ment, Walton revoked
the bank not to pay them, as he claims, and
as the district court found he did, his defensive remedy at law would appear to be
adequate.

But what standing has the plaintifE in
court of equity? The transactions upon
which he founds his claim for relief were
unlawful, and the remedy he seeks is protection against the consequences of his own
participation in them. In such cases equity
keeps its hands off, and leaves the parties
where it finds them. It is a fundamental
rule of equity that parties wanting its aid
must come with clean hands.
Courts of
equity require honesty, good faith, and legality in transactions between men, and if
a party would pursue his remedy therein,
his demand must not rest on a violation of
law for its foundation, or arise from his own
illegal acts, or conduct contra bonos morals.
1 Wait, Act. & Def. 153; 3 Wait, Act. &
Def. 685. It was said by Lord Mansfield, in
Holman v. Johnson, Cowp. 341, that "no
court will lend its aid to a man who founds
his cause of action upon an Immoral or illegal act. If, from the plaintiff's own stating,
or otherwise, the cause of action appears to
arise ex turpi causa, or the transgression of
law of this country, there the
a positive
court says he has no right to be assisted.
It is upon that ground the court goes, not
for the sake of the defendant, but because
they will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff. So, if the plaintiff and defendant were
to change sides, and the defendant was to
bring his action against the plaintiff, the
latter would then have the advantage of It;
for where both are equally in fault, potior
In Atwood v.
est conditio
defendentis."
Fisk, 101 Mass. 363, which was a bill in
equity to compel the surrender and cancellation of a note, and mortgage given to secure its payment,
on the ground that the
consideration for them was illegal, the court,
in denying the relief sought by the bill, declares it to have long been settled "that the
law will not aid either party to an illegal
contract to enforce it against the other;
neither will it relieve a party to such a contract who has actually fulfilled it, and who
seeks to reclaim his money or whatever articles of property he may have applied to such
The meaning of the familial
a purpose.
4.

a
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maxim In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis is simply tliat the law leaves the
parties exactly where they stand; not that
it prefers the defendant to the plaintiff, but
that it will not recognize a right of action
founded on the illegal contract in favor of
either party against the other. They must
settle their own questions
in such cases
without the aid of the courts." The stateWalworth,
ment of the rule by Ohancellor
in Harrington
v. Bigelow, 11 Paige, 349,
may be applied directly to this case. He
says:
"Where both parties have been engaged in an illegal transaction, the court
will not lend its active aid to the one party
to get rid of the securities talien upon the
Illegal transaction, nor will it aid the other
party in retaining them, but will leave both
to their strict technical rights."
In Weakley v. Watliins, 7 Humph. 356, it
is held that "no court of chancery will entertain a bill to cancel an obligation,
the
consideration
of which was a violation of
compounding a felonj-, smuggling
chastity,
of goods, gaming, false swearing,
or the
commission of any crime, or a breach of
good morals."
This was a bill in chancery
filed by Weakley against Watltins and Ferguson to obtain the cancellation of a note
under seal executed upon a gaming considA demurrer was filed to the bill,
eration.
"It is
and the court in the opinion says:
upon the
true that a court of chancery,
principle of quia timet, will order said instruments to be delivered up and canceled.
But this is when the complainant has been
Imposed upon, alid executed an instrument
void for fraud, accident, mistake, or other
cause, which renders it iniquitous and unjust that it should be enforced against him,
and when, in the execution of it, he has himself been guilty of no violation of law or
good morals. But this principle has never
been held applicable to instruments knowingly executed in violation of good morals
or express prohibition, either by common or
statute law. For instance, no court of chancery will entertain a bill to cancel an obliof which was a
gation, the consideration
violation of chastity, compounding a felony,
the smuggling of goods in violation of the
revenue law, gaming, false swearing, etc.;
reasons.
The
and this for very obvious
complainant shall not be permitted to charge
himself with crime, and obtain relief out of
it; and because public policy requires that
the execution of all such contracts shall be
which cannot be more effectdiscouraged,
ually done than by repelling all actions upon
In contracts of
them in courts of justice.
the kind now nnder consideration we have
and void, as
held that they are inoperative,
contrary to good morals and positive enactment, and that, as such, they are not fit
It Is
subjects for the action of a court.
true that in the cases we have heretofore
had the attempt has been to enforce them,
but we can see no difference in the position

of the winner and loser, so far as to their
right in becoming active movers upon such
contracts in the courts; the one seeking to
enforce them by the judgment of a court of
law, the other seeking by the aid of a court
of chancery to have them delivered up and
They are equally repelled upon
canceled.
reason and authority."
It was said by this- court, In Roll v.
Raguet, 4 Ohio, 400, that "whenever an agreeimmoral, or
to be illegal,
ment appears
against public policy, a court of justice leaves

If the agreethe parties as it finds them.
ment be executed, the court will not rescind
it; if executory, the court will not aid in its
execution."
This was again held in Raguet
And see Raguet
V. Roll, 7 Ohio, pt. 1, p. 77.
The doctrine of
V. Roll, 7 Ohio, pt. 2, p. 70.
these cases has recently been approved and
enforced by this court.
McQuade v. Rosecrans, 36 Ohio St. 442; Williams v. EngleAnd in Thomas v.
brecht, 37 Ohio St. 383.
Cronise, 16 Ohio, 54, It is laid down as "a
universal principle both in law and equity
that where an agreement is founded upon a
consideration illegal. Immoral, or against public policy, a court will leave the parties where
it finds them."
In Hooker v. De Palos, 28
Ohio St. 251, the same doctrine is announced
in the following language:
"The maxim 'Ex
tm-pi causa non oritur actio' is an old and
familiar one, resting on the clearest principles of public policy, and never to be IgIn accordance with this maxim nothnored.
ing is better settled than that, in regard to
contracts, which are entered into for fraudulent or Illegal- purposes, the law will aid neither party to enforce them while they remain
executory,
either in whole or in part, nor,
when executed, will It aid either party to
place himself in statu quo by a rescission,
but will in both cases leave the parties where
it finds them. It is true that particular statutes have been from time to time enacted in
this state as well as in many of our sister
states, which are to some extent in contravention
of this common-law
doctrine.
The
statutes of this state which allow money won
by gaming or betting to be recovered back by
the loser, furnish an example of this kind.
But such statutes are a recognition of the
established
rule that no recovery could be
had In such cases at, common law. They are
exceptional in their character, are in derogation of the common law, and therefore are to
be construed strictly, and not extended by
implication beyond the particular cases of
illegality for which they provide." The statutes adverted to change the common law so
far as to give the loser the right to recover
back what he has lost, and provide a remedy therefor, but no further.
In all other
respects the common law governs.
Whether
the statutes have any application to contracts
like those under discussion need not now be
decided, for If it be granted that they have,
yet, since they make no provision for equitable actions for Injunctions, the right to such
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must be determined by consideraindependent
of the statutory regulations.
Veach v. Elliott,
1 Ohio St. 139;
Thomas v. Cronise, 16 Ohio, 54.
The legislature, apparently recognizing the
inapplicability of the statutes theretofore in
enforce to such contracts and transactions,
acted that of May 4, 1885, (82 Ohio Laws, p.
254,) which declares all contracts for the sale
of grain, provisions,
and other specified articles, when there is no intention to deliver
or pay for the articles sold, to be void, and
This
makes them gambling and criminal acts.
statute, having been passed after the contracts
between the parties were made, of course
cannot affect the decision of the case, and,
if it were otherwise, they do not confer upon
the plaintiff the right to maintain the action
Precisely what effect
prosecuted
by him.
has been given the English statutes in the
decisions of the courts of that country upon
this subject is not very clear. It is, nevertheless, true that parties to gaming securities
by statute to go
were expressly authorized
into chancery for discovery,
which gave
ground for the application
of the familiar
rule that courts of chancery, having jurisdiction for one purpose, will retain the case for
final relief.
In the case of Rawden v. Shadwell, 1 Amb. 268, which was a bill for discovery and cancellation,
the report states:
"Lord Hardwicke decreed with great clearness, and said that by St. 9 Anne all securities for money won at play are made void.
Consequently the payment under any such security caimot be supported."
And Baker v.
Williams is referred to in the report as an
authority for the decree. In the note to the
case it is said that the statute of 9 Anne
"gives leave to come into a court of chancery for discovery;" and Sir J. Jekyll, M. R.,
in the note, citing Baker v. Williams, said:
"And if it [the note] was put in suit at law,
no doubt but the party might make a defense against it under the act; but that is no
abjection
against
coming
into this court,
[chancery,] for the person giving the note is
entitled to a discovery here.
It could not be
of the legislature that, after
the intention
the discovery, he should be sent to another
court for relief.
So it is that upon the discovery of assets the court grants relief withAnd it may
out sending the party to law."
be noticed that In Woodson v. Barrett, 2 Hen.
& M. 88, the supreme court of Virginia followed Rawden v. Shadwell, under a statute
which was an exact copy of 9 Anne, except
that the word "contract" was inserted in it,
which was omitted in the statute of Anne.
And the case is followed by the same court
in Skipwith v. Strother, 3 Rand. (Va.) 216.
In this respect the statute of Anne differs essentially from ours. The only actions provided for by our statute are the purely legal ones
to recover back the money lost, and for the
conversion of the goods won of the plaintiff.
No suit in equity is authorized or contemplated. The provision of the statute that the
remedy

tions

plaintiff

may annex to his petition In the
legal actions it permits
interrogatories for
discovery
the necessity
at once removes
and cause for recourse to equity, and the
statute which created the right having especially prescribed the legal remedies mentioned, and none other, they must be deemed
exclusive.
It cannot be denied, however, the
of
courts have differed in the application
these kindred maxims, "ex turpi causa non
oritur actio," and "in pari delicto potior est
conditio defendentis;" especially to gaming sewhich, it has been held by some
curities,
courts, are so far excepted from the operation of the maxims that equity will decree
and canceled.
The
them to be surrendered
reasons given for so holding are that "the
circulation of gaming bonds is no less to be
discountenanced than the giving of them, and
no means are more likely to prevent the giving of them than to put an effectual stop to
their circulation;" and that because the losers
securities
are permitted
to defend against
given by them, on the ground that they were
courts of
given for a gaming consideration,
equity should entertain suits for their cancellation.
These appear to be arguments not so much
in favor of the asserted exception as against
the maxims themselves, for it is apparent
that the same reasoning would, in the same
measure, exclude from their operation every
contract and security founded upon any other
illegal consideration.
The circulation of all
bonds and securities given for any illegal or
immoral consideration is quite as much to be
discountenanced as the giving of them, — gaming bonds and securities, no more than others; and if putting a stop to the circulation
of gaming bonds, by a resort to a court of
and canequity to compel their surrender
cellation, be the most effective means of preventing the giving of them, then the same
means should be permitted and adopted, and
for the same reason, to accomplish the same
end, with regard to bonds and securities
given for any other illegal consideration.
And
if because parties may defend against securities given by them, on the ground that they
were given for a gaming consideration,
is a
valid reason why a court of equity should entertain a suit for the cancellation- of such securities, it is an equally valid reason why
that court should entertain suits for the cancellation
of instruments
founded upon any
other Illegal consideration;
for such consideration may also be made a ground of defense to them.
Such is the logical result of
the argument in favor of the exception contended for; and some English eases have
gone to that extent.
In Neville v. Wilkinson, 1 Brown, Ch. 547, Lord Chancellor Thurlow is reported to have said "that in all cases
where money was paid for an unlawful purpose, the party, though particeps
criminis,
might recover at law, and that the reason
was that if courts of justice mean to prevent
the perpetration of crimes it must be not by
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allowing a man who has got possession to remam in possession, but by putting the parties back to the state in which they were before."
But Mr. Justice Story, referring to
the words of the lord chancellor, says: "This
is pushing the doctrine to an extravagant extent, and effectually
subverting the maxim
'in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis.'
The ground of reasoning upon which
his lordship proceeded is exceedingly
questionable in itself, and the suppression of illegal contracts is far more likely in general to
be accomplished by leaving the parties without remedy

against

each other,

and by thus

introducing a preventive check naturally connected with a want of confidence, and a sole
And so, acreliance upon personal honor.
cordingly,
the modern doctrine is established."
1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 298.
The difference
between the earlier cases and the current autliorities on the subject is pointed out in the
"I say at
following note to this section:
present, for there has been considerable fluctuation of opinion, both in courts of law and
equity, on this subject.
The old cases often
gave relief, both at law and in equity, where
the party would otherwise derive an advantage from his iniquity.
But the modern doctrine has adopted a more severely just, and,
probably, politic, moral rule, which is to leave
the parties where it finds them, giving no
relief and no countenance to claims of this
sort." Mr. Bispham, in his Principles of
Eqnity, (section 223,) says: "The rule, both
at law and in equity, in regard to gambling
transactions, now seems to be that the courts
will not only refuse to lend their aid for the
purpose of enforcing such contracts, but they
will not assist the losing party in setting the
contract aside, or recovering back the money paid.
The maxim applicable to such cases
The
possidentis."
is potior est conditio
opinion
of the supreme court of Massachusetts, in the case of Atwood v. Fisk, before cited, is to the same effect. It is there
stated as the prevailing docti'ine that "the
of illegal contracts is far more
suppression
likely in general to be accomplished by leaving the parties without remedy against each
other; and so the modern doctrine is established that relief is not granted where the
A review of all
parties are in pari delicto."
the authorities would occupy much space and
be of little practical value.
The test for determining when the objection that the parties are in pari delicto can
is whether the plaintiff can
be sustained
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make out his case otherwise than through
the medium and by the aid of the illegal
transaction' to which he was himself a party,
and, when applied to this case, is conclusive
against
the plaintiff.
He asserts that he
knowingly entered into an unlawful engageand
ment;
one contrary to good morals
against public policy.
He entered into it
with knowledge that either he or the other
party must lose, and vrith the intention of
reaping the fruits of his unlawful venture, if
he should prove to be the winner. His exHe lost, paid
pectations were disappointed.
part of the loss, and, for the purpose of making further payment, drew his check on a
bank in which he had sufficient funds on deposit to pay them.
These checks he delivered to the winner, or his agent, and, having
gone thus far, he appeals to a court of equity
to interfere in his behalf, and interpose its
extraordinary aid by injunction to stop their
payment.
After he lost, he might have refused further to act, and still be safe, and if,
by giving the checks, the other party has acquired an advantage over him, it results from
his voluntary act on the executor of his illegal enterprise.
We fail to perceive how to
relieve parties in cases like this from the
consequences in which their own wrongful
conduct has involved them would tend to disgood
adventures,
promote
courage
such
morals, increase respect for the law, or accord with a sound public policy.
In reaching this conclusion, we have not
overlooked
the rule that a party who advances money upon an undertaking or agreement to do an act that is illegal, immoral, or
against public policy, may, at any time before
the wrongful act is done, and while the agreement or undertaking remains wholly unexHe may wholly
ecuted, repent and retract.
rescind the contract, prevent the act from being done, and recover back.
The law encourages such repentance and abandonment
of the unlawful undertaking, and will aid the
party, because it tends to prevent wrongdoing.
But to be efficacious the repentance
must be timely, and it comes too late after
the unlawful act has been done, and the undertaking in whole or in part performed.
Then the law will assist neither party in its
further execution, nor to undo what has been
Hooker v. De Palos,
done in its execution.
28

Ohio St. 251.
Judgment reversed

MINSHALL

and

and petition

SPEAR.

JJ.,

dismissed.
dissent.
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V.

(3 Wheat.

the rolls refers, as well as by many others.
See Doughty v. Bull, 2 P. Wms. 320; Yates
V. Compton,
Id. 308; Trelawney v. Booth,

LESLIE.
563-576.)

Supreme Court of the United States.

1818.

Robert Craig's will contained the following clause: "I give and bequeath to my
brother, Thomas Craig, of Baith parish, Ayrshire, Scotland, all the proceeds of my estate, both real and personal, which I have
herein directed to be sold, to be remitted to
him, according as the payments are made."
Thomas Craig being an alien, the question
was, could he take the proceeds of this land,
which had been devised to one Leslie, in
trust, the proceeds from the sale of which
were to be paid to him?
Mr. Justice WASHINGTON delivered the
opinion of the court. The incapacity of an
alien to take, and to hold beneficially, a legal or equitable estate in real property, is
not disputed by the counsel for the plaintiff; and it is admitted by the counsel for
the state of Virginia, that this incapacity
does not extend to personal estate. The only inquiry, then, which this court has to
make is, whether the above clause in the
will of Robert Craig is to be construed, under all the circumstances of this case, as a
bequest to Thomas Craig of personal property, or as a devise of the land Itself.
Were this a new question, it would seem
extremely difficult to raise a doubt respecting it. The common sense of mankind would
determine, that a devise of money, the proceeds of land directed to be sold, is a devise
of money, notwithstanding it is to arise out
of land; and that a devise of land, which a
testator by his will directs to be purchased,
will pass an Interest in the land itself, without r^ard to the character of the fund out
of which the purchase is to be made.
1 The settled doctrine of the courts of equity corresponds with this obvious construction of wills, as well as of other instruments,
whereby land is directed to be turned into
money, or money into land, for the benefit of
is inthose for whose use the conversion
tended to be made. In the case of Fletcher
V. Ashburner, 1 Brown, Ch. 497, the master
of the rolls says, that "nothing is better esthan this principle, that money
tablished
directed to be .employed in the purchase of
land, and land directed to be sold and turnas that
ed into money, are to be considered
species of property into which they are diand this, in whatrected to be converted,
He
ever manner the direction is given."
adds, "the owner of the fund, or the contracting parties, may make land money or
The cases establish this rule
money land.
universally." This declaration is well warranted by the cases to which the master of
1 Equity considers land, directed to be sold
and converted into money, as money; and money ds-ected to be employed in the purchase of
land as land.

Atk. 307.
The principle upon which the whole of
this doctrine is founded is, that a court of
equity, regarding the substance, and not the
of agreements
mere forms and circumstances
and other instruments, considers things directed or agreed to be done, as having been
actually performed,
where nothing has intervened which ought to prevent a performance. This qualification of the more concise and general rule, that equity considers
that to be done which is agreed to be done,
will comprehend the cases which come under this head of equity.
2 Thus, where the whole beneficial
interest
in the money in the one case, or in the land
in the other, belongs to the person for whose
use it is given, a court of equity will not
the trust
compel
the trustee
to execute
against the wishes of the cestui que trust,
but will permit him to take the money or

2

if

he elect to do so before the conand this
been made;
election he may make, as well by acts or
clearly indicating a determinadeclarations,
tion to that effect, as by application to a
court of equity. It is this election, and not
the mere right to make It, which changes
the character of the estate so as to make it
real or personal, at the will of the party entitled to the beneficial interest.
If this election be not made In time to
difstamp the property with a character
ferent from that which the will or other instrument gives it, the latter accompanies it,
into the
with all Its legal consequences,
hands of those entitled to it in that char8 So that in case of the death of the
acter.
cestui que trust, without having determined
his election, the property will pass to his
heirs or personal representatives, in the same
manner as it would have done had the trust
been executed, and the conversion actually
made in his lifetime.
In the case of Kirkman v. Milles, 13 Ves.
of real estate to
338, which was a devise
trustees upon trust to sell, and the moneys
arising as well as the rents and profits till
the sale, to be equally divided between the
testator's three daughters, A. B. and C. The
estate was, upon the death of A. B. and C,
considered and treated as personal property,
notwithstanding the cestui que trusts, after
the death of the testator, had entered upon,

the land,

version has actually

2 Where the whole beneficial interest in the
land in one case, or in the money in the other,
belongs to the person for whose use it is given,
a court of equity will permit the cestui que
trust to take the money or land at his election,
if he elect before the conversion is made.
8 But if the cestui que trust die, without having determined his election, the property will
pass to his heirs or personal representatives, in
the same manner as it would have done if the
conversion had been made, and the trust executed in his lifetime.
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and occupied the land for about two years
prior to their deaths; but no steps had been
taken by them, or by the trustees, to sell,
nor had any requisition to that effect been
made by the former to the latter. The master of the rolls was of opinion, that the occupation of the land for two years was too
short to presume
an election.
He adds:
"The opinion of Lord Rosslyn, that property was to be taken as it happened to be at
the death of the party from whom the representative claims, had been much doubted
by Ijord Eldon, who held that without some
act, it must be considered
as being in the
state in which it ought to be; and that Lord
Rosslyn's rule was new, and not according
to the prior cases."
The same doctrine is laid down and maintained in the case of Edwards v. Countess
of Warwick, 2 P. Wms. 171, which was a
covenant on marriage to invest £10,000, part
of the lady's fortune, in the purchase of land
in fee, to be settled on the husband for life,
remainder to his first and every other son
in tail male, remainder to the husband in
fee. The only son of this marriage having
died without issue, and intestate,
and the
investment of the money not having been
made during his life, the chancellor decided
that the money passed to the heir at law;
that it was in the election of the son to
have made this money, or to have disjKJsed
of It as such, and that, therefore, even his
parol disposition of it would have been regarded;
but that something to determine
the election must be done.
* This doctrine,
so well established by the
cases which have been referred to, and by
many others which it is unnecessary to mention, seems to be conclusive upon the question which this court Is called upon to decide, and would render any farther Investigation of it useless, were it not for the case
of Eoper v. Radcliffe, which was cited, and
mainly relied upon, by the counsel for the
state of Virginia.
The short statement of that case Is as follows: John Roper conveyed all his lands to
trustees and their heirs, in trust, to sell the
same, and out of the proceeds, and of the
rents and profits till sale, to pay certain
debts, and the overplus or the money to be
paid as he, the said John Roper, by his will
or otherwise, should appoint, and for want
for the benefit of the
of such appointment,
By his will
said John Roper, and his heirs.
reciting the said deed, and the power reserved to him in the surplus of the said real
several pecuniary legestate, he bequeathed
acies, and then gave the residue of his
estate to William Conreal and personal
stable and Thomas RadclifCe, and two others,
By a codicil to this will,
and to their heirs.
he bequeathed other pecuniary legacies; and
the remainder, whether in lands or personal
* The case of Roper t. Radcliffe,
examined.

9 Mod.

167,
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estate, he gave to the said W. C. and T. R.
Upon a bill filed by W. C. and T. R. against
the heir at law of John Roper, and the other trustees, praying to have the trust executed, and the residue of the money arising
from the sale of the lands to be paid over
to them; the heir at law opposed the execution of the trust, and claimed the land as
a resulting trust, upon the ground of the incapacity of Constable and Radcliffe to take,
they being papists. The decree of the court
of chancery, which was in favour of the
papists, was, upon appeal to the house of
lords, reversed, and the title of the heir at
law sustained; six judges against five, be-

ing in his favour.
Without stating at large the opinion upon
which the reversal took place, this court will
proceed, 1st. To examine the general principles laid down in that opinion; and then,
2d. The case itself, so far as it has been
pressed upon us as an authority to rule the
question

before

the court.

In performing the first part of this undertaking, it will not be necessary to question

any one of the premises laid down in that
opinion.
They are, 1. That land devised to
trustees, to sell for payment of debts and
This Is
legacies, is to be deemed as money.
by all the
the general doctrine
established
part of
cases referred to in the preceding
o 2. That the heir at law has
this opinion,
a resulting trust In such land, so far as it is
of value, after the debts and legacies are
paid, and that he may come into equity and
restrain the trustee from selling more than
is necessary to pay the debt and legacies; or
he may offer to pay them himself, and pray
to have a conveyance
of the part of the
land not sold in the first case, and the whole
in the latter, which property will, in either
case, be land, and not money.
This right
to call for a conveyance
Is very correctly
styled a privilege, and it is one which a
court of equity will never refuse, unless
there are strong reasons for refusing it. The
whole of this doctrine proceeds upon a prln.ciple which Is Incontrovertible, that where
the testator merely directs the real estate to
be converted
into money, for the purposes
directed in his will, so much of the estate,
or the money arising from it, as is not effectually disposed of by the will, (whether
it arise from some omission or defect in the
will Itself, or from any subsequent accident,
which prevents the devise from taking effect,) results to the heir at law, as the old
B Land, devised to trustees, to sell for payment of debts and legacies, is to be deemed as
money.
The heir at law has a resulting trust in such
lands, after the debts and legacies are paid, and
may come into equity and restrain the trustee
from selling more than sufficient to pay them,
or may offer to pay them himself, and pray a
conveyance of the part of the land not sold in
the first case, and the whole in the latter, which
property in either case will be land, and not
money.
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use not disposed of. Such was the case of
Cruse V. Barley, 3 P. Wms. 20, where the
testator having two sons, A. and B., and
three daughters, devised his lands to be sold
to pay his debts, &c., and as to the moneys
arising by the sale, after debts paid, gave
£200 to A. the eldest son, at the age of 21,
and the residue to his four younger children.
A. died before the age of 21, in consequence
of which the bequest to him failed to take
effect. The court decided
that the £200
should be considered as land to descend to
the heir at law of the testator, because it
was in effect the same as if so much land
as was of the value of £200 was not directed
to be sold, but was suffered to descend. The
case of Ackroyd v. Smithson,
1 Brown, Ch.
503, is one of the same kind, and establishes the same principle. So, likewise, a
money provision under a marriage contract,
to arise out of land, which did not take effect, on account of the death of the pai'ty for
before the
whose benefit it was intended,
resulted as money to the
prescribed,
a residuary
so as to pass under
in his will. Hewitt v. Wright, 1
clause
Brown, Ch. Cas. 86.
8 But even
in cases of resulting trusts,
for the benefit of the heir at law, it is settled that if the intent of the testator appears to have been to stamp upon the proceeds of the land described to be sold, the
quality of personalty, not only to subserve
the particular purposes of the will, but to
all intents, the claim of the heir at law to
a resulting trust is defeated, and the estate
is considered to be personal. This was decided in the case of Yates v. Compton, 2 P.
Wms. 308, in which the chancellor says, that
the intention of the will was to give away
all from the heir, and to turn the land into
personal
estate, and that that was to be
taken as it was at the testator's death, and
ought not to be altered by any subsequent
accident, and decreed the heir to join in the
sale of the land, and the money arising therefrom to be paid over as personal estate to
the representatives
of the annuitant, and to
those of the residuary legatee. In the case
of Fletcher v. Ashburner, before referred to,
the suit was brought by the heir at law of
the testator, against the personal representatives and the trustees claiming the estate
upon the ground of a resulting trust. But
the court decreed the property, as money, to
of him to whom
the personal representatives
the beneficial interest in the money was bequeathed, and the master of the rolls observes, that the case of Emblyn v. Freeman,
and Cruse v. Barley, are those where real
estate being directed to be sold, some part
time

grantor,

e But if the intent of the testator appears to
have been to stamp upon the proceeds of the
land directed to be sold, the quality of personalty, not only for the particular purposes of the
will, but to all intents, the claim of the heir at
law to a resulting trust is defeated, and the estate is considered to be personal.

of the disposition has failed, and the thing
devised

has

not accrued

to

the

representa-

tive, or devisee, by which something has resulted to the heir at law.
It is evident, therefore, from a view of the
above cases, that the title of the heir to a
resulting trust can never arise, except when
something
is left undisposed of, either by
some defect in the will, or by some subsequent lapse, which prevents the devise from
taking effect; and not even then, if it appears that the intention of the testator was
to change the nature of the estate from land
to money, absolutely and entirely, and not
merely to serve the purposes of the will.
But the ground upon which the title of the
heir rests is, that whatever is not disposed
remains to him, and partakes of the old use,
as if it had not been directed to be sold.
The third proposition laid down in the
case of Roper v. Radcliffe, 9 Mod. 167, is,
that equity will extend the same privilege
to the residuary legatee which is allowed
to the heir, to pay the debts and legacies,
and call for a conveyance of the real estate,
or to restrain the trustees from selling more
than is necessary to pay the debts and legacies.
T This
has, in effect,
been admitted in
the preceding part of this opinion; because.
If the cestui que trust of the whole beneficial interest in the money to arise from the
sale of the land, may claim this privilege,
it follows, necessarily, that the residuary
legatee may, because he is, in effect, the
beneficial owner of the whole, charged with
the debts and legacies, from which he will
be permitted to discharge it, by paying the
debts and legacies, or may claim so much of
the real estate as may not be neqessary for
that purpose.
8 But the court cannot accede to the conclusion, which, in Roper v. Radcliffe, is deduced from the establishment of the above
principles. That conclusion is, that in respect to the residuary legatee, such a devise
shall be deemed as land in equity, though in
respect to the creditors and specific legatees
it is deemed as money. It is admitted, with
this qualification, that if the residuary legatee thinks proper to avail himself of the
privilege of taking it as land, by making an
election in his life time, the property will
then assume the character of land. But if
he does not make this election, the property

retains the character of personalty to every
intent and purpose.
The cases before cited
7 Equity will extend the
same privilege to
the residuary legatee which is allowed to the
heir, to pay the debts and legacies, and call for
a conveyance of the real estate, or to restrain
the trustees from selling more than is necessary
to pay the debts and legacies.
8 The conclusion— which,
in Eoper v. Radcliffe, is deduced from the above prmciples, that
in respect to the residuary legatee such a devise
shall be considered as land in equity, though in
respect to the creditors and specific legatees, it
is deemed as money — denied.
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tinue personal against her heir claiming it as
ineffectually disposed of for want of her examination. This case is peculiarly strong,
sanction the conclusion made in the unqualifrom the circumstance, that the election is
fied terms used in the case of Roper v. Radembodied in the devise itself; but this was
clifCe.
not enough, because the crown had no equity
As to the idea that the character of the es- to force an election to be made for the purtate is affected by this right of election,
pose of producing an escheat.
Equity would surely proceed contrary to
whether the right be claimed or not, it appears to be as repugnant to reason, as we its regular course, and the principles which
think it has been shown to be, to principle
universally govern it, to allow the right of
and authorities. Before any thing can be election where it is desired, and can be lawfully made, and yet refuse to decree the
made of the proposition, it should be shown
that this right of privilege of election is so money upon the application of the alien,
indissolubly united with the devise, as to
upon no other reason, but because, by law,
constitute a part of It, and that it may be he is incapable to hold the land: In short, to
exercised in all cases, and under all circum- consider him in the same situation as if he
stances.
This was, indeed, contended for had made an election, which would have
with great ingenuity and abilities by the been refused had he asked for a conveyance.
counsel for the state of Virginia, but it was The more just and correct rule would seem
not proved to the satisfaction of the court. to be, that where the cestui que trust is inIt certainly is not true, that equity will capable to take or to hold the land beneficially, the right of election does not exist, and
ecstend this privilege in all cases to the cestui
que trust. It will be refused if he be an inconsequently, that the property is to be confant. In the case of Seeley v. Jago, 1 P.
sidered as being of that species Into which
Wms. 389, where money was devised to be it is directed to be converted.
Having made these observations upon the
laid out in land in fee, to be settled on A.
B. and C, and their heirs, equally to be di- principles laid down in the case of Roper v.
vided: On the death A., his infant heir, BadclifCe, and upon the arguments urged at
together with B. and C, filed their bill,
the bar in support of them, very few words
claiming to have the money, which was de- will suffice to show that, as an authority, it is
inapplicable to this case.
creed accordingly as to B. and C; but the
share of the Infant was ordered to be put
The incapacities of a papist under the
English statute of 11 & 12 Wm. III., c. 4, and
out for his benefit, and the reason assigned
was, that he was incapable of making an
of an alien at common law, are extremely
election, ajid that such election, if permitted,
dissimilar. The former Is incapable to take
would, in case of his death, be prejudicial
any lands, or profits out of
by purchase,
lands; and all estates, terms, and any other
to his heir.
In the case of Foone v. Blount, Oowp.
interests or profits whatsoever out of lands,
Lord Mansfield, who is compelled to to be made, suffered, or done, to, or for the
467,
acknowledge the authority of Roper v. Raduse of such person, or upon any trust for
cliffe in parallel cases, combats the reasoning
him, or to, or for the benefit, or relief of any
of Chief Justice Parker upon this doctrine
such person, are declared by the statute to
of election, with irresistible force. He sug- be utterly void.
gests, as the true answer to It, that though
Thus, it appears that he cannot even take.
in a variety of cases this right exists, yet it His incapacity is not confined to land, but to
was inapplicable to the case of a person any profit, interest, benefit, or relief, in or
who was disabled by law from taking land, out of it. He is not only disabled from taking or having the benefit of any such interand that therefore a court of equity would,
in such a case, decree that he should take est, but the will or deed itself, which atthe property as money.
tempts to pass it, is void. In Roper v. Radcliffe, it was strongly insisted, that the money
This ease of Walker v. Denne, 2 Ves. Jr
170, seems to apply with great force to this
given to the papist, which was to be the propart of our subject. The testator directed
ceeds of the land, was a profit or interest
money to be laid out in lands, tenements, and
out of the land. If this be so, (and it is not
hereditaments, or on long terms, with limitamaterial in this case to affirm or deny that
tions applicable to real estate. The money
position,) then the will of John Roper in
not having been laid out, the crown, on failrelation to the be'quest to the two papists,
ure of heirs, claimed the money as land. It was void under the statute; and if so, the
was decided that the crown had no equity right of the heir at law of the testator, to
against the next of kin to have the money
the residue, as a resulting trust, was inconlaid out in real estate in order to claim it by testable.
The cases above cited have fully
It was added that the devisees, on established that principle. In that case, too,
escheat.
absolutely entitled, have the opbecoming
the rents and profits, till the sale, would have
tion given by the will; and a deed of apbelonged to the papists, if they were capable
pointment by one of the cestui que trusts,
though a feme covert, was held a sufficient in» The case of Roper v. Radcliffe distinguished
from the present case.
djiation of her intention that It should con-

seem to the court to be conclusive upon this
point; and none wei'e referred to, or have
come under the view of the court, vyhich
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of taking, which brought the case still more
strongly within the statute; and this was
much relied on, not only in reasoning upon
the words, but the policy of the statute.
10 Now, what is the situation of an alien?
He cannot only take an interest in land, but
a freehold interest in the land itself, and
may hold it against all the world but the
king, and even against him until office found,
and he is not accountable for the rents and
profits previously received." In this case
the will being valid, and the alien capable
of taking under it, there can be no resulting
trust to the b-^ir, and the claim of the state
is founded solely upon a supposed equity, to
have the land by escheat as if the alien had,
or could upon the principles of a court of
equity, have elected to take the land instead
of the money. The points of difference between the two cases are so striking that it
would be a waste of time to notice them in
detail.
It may be further observed, that the case
of Roper v. Radcliffe has never, in England,
been applied to the case of aliens; that its
authority has been submitted to with reluctance,
and is strictly confined in its application to cases precisely parallel to it.
Lord Mansfield in the case of Foone v.
Blount, speaks of it with marked disapprobation; and we know, that had Lord Trevor
10 An alien may take, by purchase, a freehold,
or other interest in land, and may hold it
against all the world except the king; and even
against him until office found; and is not accountable for the rents and profits previously
received.
11 Vide 3 Wheat. 12.
Jackson ex dem. State
of New York v. Clarke, note c.

been present, and declared the opinion he
had before entertained, the judges wwild
have been equally divided.
The case of the Attorney General and Lord
Weymouth, Amb. 20, was also pressed upon
the court, as strongly supporting that of
Roper v. Radcliffe, and as bearing upon th©
present case.
The first of these propositions might be
admitted; although it is certain that the
mortmain act, upon which that case was
decided, is even stronger in its expression
than the statute against papists, and the
chancellor so considers it; for he says,
whether the surplus be considered as money
or land, it is just the same thing, the statute
making void all charges and encumbrances
on land, for the benefit of a charity.
But if this case were. In all respects, the
same as Roper v. Radcliffe, the observations
which have been made upon the latter
would all apply to it It may be remarked,
that in this case, the chancellor
however,
avoids expressing any opinion upon the question, whether the money to arise from the
sale of the land, was to be taken as personalt.v or land; and, although he mentions the
case of Roper v. Radcliffe, he adds, that he
does not depend upon it, as it is immaterial
whether the surplus was to be considered as
land or money under the mortmain act.
Upon the whole we are unanimously of
opinion, that the legacy given to Thomas
Craig, in the will of Robert Craig, is to be
considered
as a bequest of personal estate,
which he is capable of taking for his own
benefit.

Certificate accordingly.
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Appeal from appellate court, First district.
Bill by Walter Wyman against . the Ft.
Dearborn National Bank and others.
From
a decree of the superior court of Cook county,
in favor of complainants,
defendants
sued
out a writ of error to the appellate court,
where the decree was reversed.
80 111. App.
150.

Plaintiff

appealed.

Reversed.

1, 1896, the First National
Bank of Helena, Mont., drew its check upon
the Ft. Dearborn National Bank of Chicago
for $10,000, in favor of appellant.
At the
time this check was given, the Ft. Dearborn
National Bank had in its possession, on deposit to the credit of the First National Bank
of Helena, $20,523.67.
The Ft. Dearbonn
National Bank at the same time held a cei-tificate of deposit of date May 15, 1895, from
the First National Bank of Helena, in the
sum of $25,000, which latter was secured by
collateral for the face amount of $30,000 of
notes taken by the First National Bank of
Helena and indorsed to the Ft. Dearborn
National Bank. The Helena bank was indebted to the Ft. Dearborn National Bank,
on account, $649.89.
On the 4th day of September, 1896, the Helena bank was placed
in the hands of a receiver, and on the same
day the Ft. Dearborn National Bank transferred the account on deposit with it to the
amount of $20,523.67 to itself, and credited
its certificate of deposit with that amount,
debiting the Helena bank with the same sum,
and leaving a balance due the Ft. Dearborn
National Bank of $2,321.39,
with interest
thereon.
On the 5th day of September the
check drawn in favor of appellant was presented for payment to the Ft. Dearborn National Bank, which was refused.
On the
21st day of January, 1897, the appellant filed
in the superior court of Cook county his bill,
making the Ft. Dearborn National Bank and
the receiver of the Helena bank defendants,
and sought to marshal assets.
To this bill
of complaint a demurrer was interposed and

On

September

Subsequently
overruled.
the defendants
to
the bill filed an answer, and the cause was
submitted upon bill and answer, and a decree was entered in accordance
with the
prayer of the bill, to reverse which the defendants sued out a writ of error to the appellate court for the First district, where the
decree was reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to dismiss the bill, whereupon the appellee
in the appellate
court
prosecuted this appeal.

Peckham, Brown & Packard, for appellant.
Gilbert & Fell, for appellees.

It

PHILLIPS, J.
is insisted

(after stating the facts).
by the appellant that by the
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execution and delivery of its check for $10,000 against the deposit account of the Ft.
Dearborn National Bank the First National
Bank of Helena assigned and transfeiTed
to the appellant,
from that deposit account,
an amount sufficient
to pay the check on
September 1, 1896, the time at which it was
drawn; and as sustaining this contention
appellant cites National Bank of America v.
Indiana Banking Co., 114 111. 483, 2 N. E.
401; Abt v. Bank, 159 111. 467, 42 N. E. 856;
and Gage Hotel Co. v. Union Nat. Bank,
The principle is
171 111. 531, 49 N. E. 420.
clearly established
by the foregoing and
other authorities in this state that the check
of a depositor upon his banker, delivered
to another for value, transfers to that other
the title to so much of the deposit as the
check calls for, and the banker becomes
the holder of the money for the use of the
holder of the check, and is bound to account
to him for the amount thereof, provided
the
party drawing the check has funds to that
amount on deposit, subject to his check, at
the time the same is presented.
Munn v.
Burch, 25 111. 21.
The check operates as an
absolute assignment
of the fund on which
it is drawn from the time it is delivered,
as between the drawer and the payee, and
the bank is bound as soon as the check is
presented, and whatever sum stands upon
the books to the credit of the depositor at
the time of such presentation
is absolutely
assigned to the holder of the check.
Bickford V. Bank, 42 111. 238; Brown v. Leckie,
43 111. 497; Fourth Nat. Bank v. City Nat.
Bank, 68 111. 398; Union Nat. Bank v. Oceana Co. Bank, 80 III. 212; Bank v. Jones, 137
111. 634, 27 N. E. 533;
Niblack v. Bank, 169
111. 517, 48 N. E. 438.
And the relation existing between the drawer, the check holder,
and the banker becomes such, when there
are sufiicient funds on deposit to meet the
check at the time of presentation,
that, because such funds were appropriated
at the
time of the drawing of the check, the contract to be implied between the depositor,
the banker, and the check holder is that the
check holder, whoever he may be, may have
his action, and recover against the bank the
amount, pro tanto, of the check.
Gage Hotel Co. V. Union Nat. Bank, supra.
In the
latter case it was said (page 536, 171 111.,
and page 422, 49 N. E.):
"If the funds are
In the bank when the check is drawn, the
drawing is an appropriation, as between the
drawer and the payee, of the sum of money
named in the check, which is to lie in the
bank until called for by a presentation
of
the check.
It is true that in such a case
there is no privity between the bank and the
check holder until presentment,
and that
priority in drawing a check does not give
priority of right to the fund as against the
banker, but that such priority of right is determined
It
by the order of presentation."
was held in Niblack v. Bank, supra (page
521, 169 111., and page 439, 48 N. E.):
"It

u

JIAXIMS

is also the law,

where a bank holds a denote, or a note past due, it has the
right to charge such obligation up against
the maker's deposit account;
and, if it does
so before a check drawn by the depositor
is presented for payment, it will be entitled
to hold the deposit against any check afterwards presented."
In this case, on the 4th
of September— at least one day before the
presentment of the check for payment— the
Chicago bank trausfen'ed
the account, and
by proper entries on its books credited the
Helena bank with all the money held by it
to the credit of the latter bank, which credit was made on a certificate of deposit, which
was, in effect, a demand
note.
Hunt v.
Divine, 37 111. 137; Tripp v. Curtenius, 36
Mich. 494. Appropriating the deposit fund
in good faith, in pursuance
of strict legal
rights, for the purpose of protecting its own
interests, and without notice of the appropriation of the money by drawing the check
in favor of appellant,
was not a wrongful
act, but one authorized by law, and absolutely transferred the legal and equitable right
to the fund so deposited to the Ft. Dearborn
National Bank, the checlt not having been
presented to it, nor it having any notice of
the same, until the day after the transfer
of the account.
Under the recognized rule
in this state there was between the Helena
bank and the payee of the check an absolute assignment of $10,000, then on deposit
with the Ft. Dearborn National Bank, and
no right existed in the Helena bank to change
that deposit in any way, or to so draw
against it as to prevent the assignment pro
It is clear that
tanto from being carried out.
the holder of the check had an interest in
the fund so assigned, while it is equally clear
that until the bank had notice it could pay
subsequently
drawn checks, or credit the
amount of the deposit on any overdue paper
of its own. The equitable interest of the
checlt holder, however, remained the same.
It is a principle controlling the marshaling
of securities that where one creditor can
resort to two funds, and another to one of
them only, the former must seek satisfaction
out of that fund which the latter cannot
In Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1414, it is said:
touch.
"If, therefore, the prior creditor resorts to
the doubly-charged fund, the subsequent
creditor will be substituted, as far as possible, to his rights. These rules must be taken with the modifications and exceptions
that in their application the paramount incumbrancer shall not be delayed or inconin the collection of his debt,
venienced
*
*
*
that the rights of third parties
shall not be prejudiced, and that the parties
themselves are creditors of the same debtor." Numerous authorities are there cited
The prinas sustaining these propositions.
ciple of marshaling securities has been frequently applied to cases where there is an
equitable interest or lien on collateral secumand

rities. In Colebrooke on Collateral Securities

OF EQUITY.
it is said (section 98): "By this rule, a creditor having a lien upon two funds for the
payment of his debt, and a subsequent creditor a lien upon one only of such funds, the
former is required to exhaust his remedy
against the fund which is especially for his
security before resorting to that in which
the subsequent
creditor is interested.
The
rule, however,
in cases
is never enforced
where it would cause an injury or damage
to the creditor holding such liens upon separate funds, or would work Injustice to
other parties.
The rule was applied where a
merchant had forwarded his note to a broker
for sale, and the proceeds, less commissions,
remitted.
The broker fraudulently pledged
the note, with other collaterals,
to a bank,
to secure a loan to himself, of which the
merchant received nothing. The merchant,
learning of the misappropriation, gave notice to the bank, and claimed to be subrogated to any surplus arising from other
securities held by it after the payment of
Subsequently,
the loan.
and before the maturity of the loan, the note fell due, and was
Upon realizing the other
paid without suit.
securities,
the banlt held a surplus in its
hands.
The merchant was entitled to be
paid from such surplus, his voluntary payment not affecting his right of recovery."
This principle is sustained by Parwell v.
Bank, 90 N. Y. 483. In that case the merchant had an equitable interest in collaterals, which, with his note, were put up to
secure the loan to the broker by reason of
the broker's misappropriation of the note,
and it is not, equitably, a stronger case for
the marshaling of assets than where, as in
this case, the bank had as security for its
certificate of deposit and for its account
due notes aggregating about $30,000, and a
deposit of over $20,000.
Here, $10,000 of the
amount deposited having been equitably assigned to the complainant, by reason of its
appropriation by the bank before receiving
notice of the drawing of the check the complainant was deprived of all interest in the
deposit, and the Helena bank, or its receiver
(who could have no greater interest than
the bank Itself), received the benefit of the
application of the deposit by the Ft. Dearborn National Bank on its certificate of deposit, and the complainant, as holder of the
check, had such an interest in the sum deposited that he should be subrogated,
as
against the Helena bank or its receiver, to
the notes held by the Ft. Dearborn National
Bank after the payment of the residue due
the latter bank; and this principle of subrogation Is applicable because, by reason of
the appropriation of the fund by the bank
with which the deposit was made to the
payment of a debt for which it held two distinct characters of securities, one of those
securities is, to an extent sufficient to pay
the complainant, released from liability so
far as the Ft. Dearborn National Bank was
concerned, and the latter bank had lawfully
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used $10,000 of a deposit theretofore assigned to the complainant by the Helena banli.
2 Beach, Mod. Bq. Jur. § 784; 1 Story, Eq.

Jur.

It

§§ 635,

636.

is a maxim of equity that "equity re
gards and treats that as done which in good
conscience ought to be done," and in writing
of this maxim Mr. Pomeroy, In his worli on

Equity
Jurisprudence (section 865),
says:
"The principle involves the notion ot an equitable obligation existing from some cause; of
a present relation of equitable right and duty
subsisting between two parties;
a right held
by one party, from whatever cause arising,
that the other should do some act, anri the
corresponding
duty— the 'ought'— resting upon
the latter to do such act. Equity does not regard and treat as done what might be. done
or what could be done, but only what ought
to be done. Nor does the principle operate in
favor of every person, no matter what may
be his situation and relations, but only in favor of him who holds the equitable right to
have the act performed,
as against the one
upon whom the duty of such performance has
A court of equity, acting upon
devolved."
principle,
this fundamental
may go beneath
the appearance of things, and deal with the
real facts, where the interest is a purely equitable one, recognized by courts of equity alone.
When, therefore, a prior Incumbrancer
of two
funds, by his election of remedies, deprives a
junior incumbrancer, who has a lien upon one
of the funds only, from reaching the particular fund on which he has a lien, the junior
incumbrancer, to the extent of his lien, should
be substituted to the lien of the paramount inupon the other fund bound, as
cumbrancer
against the debtor and all claiming under him
Gibson
by lien or title subsequent in time.
v. Seagrim, 20 Beav. 614; James v. Hubbard,
5 Johns.
1 Paige, 228; Clowes v. Dickenson,
Under a bill for marshaling securiCh. 235.
ties relief may be had in that character of
case. The Ft. Dearborn National Bank had
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a right to apply the deposit in payment of the
Indebtedness pro tanto to the extent of the
deposit, and deprive the check holder of any
part of that deposit as a fund assigned to him;
but he had such an equitable interest in that
by the
fund, by reason of its assignment
check, that he is entitled to be subrogated to
the extent of his check, with interest thereon
from the time it was presented, to the fund to
be derived from the collection or sale of the
collateral securities held by the Ft. Dearborn
National Bank as security on its certificate of
deposit and bank account, after the residue Is
paid to it. The superior court erred in decreeing that the Ft. Dearborn National Bank
should deliver to the receiver of the First
National Bank of Helena the collateral notes,
but did not err in decreeing that from the proceeds of the same there should first be paid
National Bank the
to the Ft. Dearborn
amount, including interest, due it, and to pay
to Wyman the amount due on said check and
interest, and to retain the balance as part of
Bank of
the assets of the First National
Helena.
Nor was there error in the decree of
the superior court in directing, if there was
not enough to pay Wyman in full, the amount
unpaid should be allowed as a claim against
said First National Bank of Helena, to be
paid in due course of administration of its
assets, and that the receiver pay the costs.
It was error in the appellate court for the
First district to reverse the entire decree of
the superior court, and remand the cause with
directions to dismiss the bill. So far as the
superior court decreed that the Ft. Dearborn
National Bank deliver to the receiver of the
First National Bank of Helena the collateral
notes, its decree is reversed, but in all other
respects the decree of said court is affirmed.
For the error of the appellate court for the
First district In reversing the entire case, and
remanding with directions to dismiss the bill,
its decree is reversed, and the cause Is reReversed and remanded.
manded.
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STINCH FIELD

v.

MILLEKEN.

(71 Me. 567.)

Supreme Judicial

Court

of Maine.

December,

1880.

J.

PETEES,
The following facts are deducible from the evidence in this case: The
complainant purchased of the defendants,
certain steam-mill machinery, for removal
from Hallowell to Danforth, in this State.
There was at the time a verbal agreement,
that the complainant should build a mill, and
put the machinery into it, on a lot of land in
Danforth, bought by him of one Russell, who
was to deed the lot directly to the defendants.
The complainant was also to procure a deed
of his home (another) lot to the defendants
from the heirs of H. E. Prentiss, who held
an absolute title thereof as security for the
to them, there
complainant's indebtedness
being a small balance only unpaid, which the
defendants were to pay for him. The defendants were to give an agreement, to convey to the complainant if he paid his indebtedness to them according to the tenor of certain notes to be given.
On June 15, 1875, the compliiinantgave to
the defendants a mortgage on the mnehinery
as personal property to secure the notes hereafter named, in order to protect a lien thereon until the machinery sliould be put into the
mill to be built, and become a part of the
And there was embodied in this
real estate.
mortgage, an agreement of the complainant
to build the mill and put the machinery into
it. On June 16, 1875, Kussell conveyed the
mill lot to the defendants. On August 2,
1875, Prentiss conveyed the home lot to them,
they paying the balance of the Prentiss claim.
On August 4, 1875, the defendants gave a
writing to the complainant, agreeing to convey the property to him upon the condition
that he would pay to them his notes on one,
two, three, and five years, respectively, with
interest. The notes were given for the
amount payable for the machinery, the sum
paid to Prentiss, and for otlier loans and adThe complainant went on and
vances.
erected and completed a mill on the Russell
lot, and the steam-mill macliinery became a
part of it.
The complainant seeks to redeem the property, claiming the transaction to be a mortThe defendants contend that the
gage.
transaction was not a mortgage, that it was
« conditional sale.
It was not a legal mortgage: Because the
Warren v. Lovis,
defeasance has no seal.
And because the papers
53 Maine, 463.
At law,
were not between the same parties.
the conveyance must be made by the mortgager and the defeasance by the mortgagee.
Shaw V. Brskine, 43 Maine, 371.
But the transaction was in equity a mortThe criterion
gage — an equitable mortgage.
In equity,
is the intention of the parties.
this intention may be ascertained from all
pertinent facts either within or without the

written parts of the transaction.
Where the
intention is clear that an absolute conveyance is taken as a security for a debt, it is in
equity a mortgage. No'matter how much
the real transaction may be covered up and
disguised.
governs.
The real intention
"If a transaction resolve itself into a security, whatever may be its form, and whatever
name the parties may choose to give it, it is
in equity a mortgage." Flagg v. Mann, 2
Sumn. 533, Fed. Gas. No. 4,847.
The existence of a debt is well nigh an inThe infallible evidence of the intention.
The defendants
tention here is transparent.
have a debt and held the property as a security for its collection. A legal mortgage
was avoided; an equitable mortgage was
made.

Although different at lavr, in equity a
mortgage is not prevented because the conveyance does not come from the equitable
mortgager. It is suflicient that the debtor
has an interest in the property conveyed,
either legal or equitable. Having such an
interest, if he procures a conveyance to one
wlio advances money upon it for him, taking
the property as security for the money adThe
vanced, he has a right to redeem.
grantee in such case, acquiring the title by
Jones on
his act, holds it as his mortgagee.
Mort. 2d ed. § 331. Stoddard T. Whiting,
46 N. T. 627; Carr v. Carr, 52 N. Y. 251.
It is denied that this court lias the power
to declare that an absolute deed shall be
deemed to be a mortgage, allowing an equitable mortgager tlie right to redeem. At law,
it has no such power. Nor, when the court
had a limited jurisdiction in equity, was the
It was always underdoctrine admitted.
stood, however, that, in a case like the present, if, instead of a demurrer, an answer
was filed admitting the facts alleged, the
court had the power to apply the remedy.

Thomaston Bank v. Stimpson, 21 Maine,
196; Whitney v. Bachelder, 32 Maine, 313;
Howe v. Russell, 36 Maine, 115; Richardson
V. Woodbury, 43 Maine, 206. But since the
act of 1874 conferred general chancery powers upon the court, it has full and complete
jurisdiction in such cases. Rowell v. Jewett,
69 Maine, 293-303; Jones, Mort. (2d ed.)
§ 282.
Courts of equity generally exercise such
power. While the grounds upon which the
doctrine is admitted vary with different
courts, there is a great concurrence of opinIn our
ion as far as the result is concerned.
judgment, it is a sound policy as well as
principle to declare that, to take an absolute
conveyance as a mortgage without any defeasance, is in equity a fraud.
Experience
shows that endless frauds and oppressions
would be perpetrated under such modes, if
equity could not grant relief. It is taking
an agreement,

in

one sense, exceeding

and

Instead
differing from the true agreement.
of setting it wholly aside, equity is worked
out by adapting it to the purpose originally
intended. Eauity allows renaration to be
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made by admitting a verbal defeasnnce to be
proved. The cases which support this view
are too numerous to cite.
The American
cases are collected in Jones, Mort. 2d ed.
§ 241, et seq. See Campbell v. Dearborn,
109 Mass. 130; and Hassam v. Barrett, 115
Mass. 256.
The complainant seeks to separate the articles originally mortgaged as personal property, and, being allowed the value of them,
redeem the balance of the estate only.
That
would not be equitable. The personal became a part of the real as originally designed
to be. It was affixed and solidly bolted thereto.
The mortgage was evidently only to
serve a temporary purpose.
It was not just
to either party that there should be two mortgages instead of one.
It is urged that the
defendants foreclosed the personal mortgage.
It could not be done. The personal mortgage was extinguished when attempted to be
done.
That was but a ruse to get the possession which the defendants were entitled
to.
No severance was ever made or attempted to be made.
It is intimated that the mill has burned
down, pendente lite, under an insurance obtained by the defendants, and a question
may arise, before the master, whether the
complainant should liave a credit of the net
If the insurance was obtained on
proceeds.
I lie mortgagees' own account only, they
should not be allowed. Cushing v. Thompson, 34 Maine, 496; Pierce v. Faunae, 63
Maine, 351. The head note in Larrabee v.
Lumbert, 32 Maine, 97, is erroneous in that
It was allowed in that case by conrespect.
sent. Insurance Co. \. Woodbury, 45 Maine,
447.
But where a mortgagee insures the property by the authority of the mortgager, and
charges him with the expense, then any insurance recovered shoulii be accounted for.
And if a mortgager covenants to insure, and
fails to do so, the mortgagee can himself insure at the mortgager's expense.
One of the defendants testifies that "Stinch-
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field agreed to pay all taxes and Insurance.
He also says, "We have had the house,
stable and mill insured, and have paid

the insurance, $108."
We think this is evidence of an insurance obtained by the mortgagees at the expense of the mortgager on
account of his failure to keep his verbal covenant to insure, and renders it proper that
the net proceeds of any insurjince obtained
should be allowed in the settlement between
them.

be, if the insurance was
under a policy in which it is agreed
the insured and insurer that the
company in case of loss should be subrogated
to the right of the mortgagee.
For in such
case the insurance is not in fact on the mortgager's account, nor is it such an insurance
Jones,
as could be made available to him.
Mort. (2d ed.) § 420, and cases in note.
The complainant may redeem the whole
property upon payment of whatever may be
due upon the whole debt.
Inasmuch as the
complainant sets up a claim exceeding the
equitable right, neither party to recover costs
up to the entry of this order; and whether
future costs shall be recovered by either side,
to be reserved for decision when theprocjBedings are to be finally terminated. Another
reason why complai mint should not recover
costs is, that when his bill was commenced
the mortgage debt was not due.
The mortThe
gage could not be redeemed until 1880.
bill was commenced long before that time.
But as the mortgage is now due, and no
point is taken that the proceeding was premature, it will probably be for the interest
of all the parties that their matters may be
adjusted under this bill. For which purpose
a master must be appointed, unless the parties can best determine the accounts between
themselves.
Decree accordingly.

But this cannot

collected
between

APPLETON, C. J., WALTON, DANFORTH, VIRGIN, and LIBBEY, JJ., concurred.
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McLARREN

v.

BREWER,

(51 Me. 402.)

Supreme Judicial

Bill in equity.
B. Bradbury,

Court of Maine.

1863.

Heard on demurrer.
for

den, for defendants.

complainant.

A.

Hay-

KENT, J. The case, as stated In the bill,
to which a general demurrer has been filed,
is in substance this: I. N. M. Brewer, the
intestate, on the 25th of October, 1851, gave
to the complainant a mortgage
of a ship,
then on the stocks, to secure all sums of
money then due, and such further sums as
the complainant might furnish and advance
to said Brewer, for the purpose of finishing
said ship and fitting her for sea. The vessel
was completed, and was registered in the
name of said Brewer as owner of seveneighths, and of Nathaniel Y. B^-ench of oneeightli. The said Brewer, on the back of
said mortgage, acknowledged in writing that
the ship thus registered was the vessel named in the mortgage.
The mortgage was duly
recorded, on the day of registry, in the custom house, and afterwards
in the town
clerk's office. Soon afterwards the ship proceeded to sea, and has never since been In
this state, except in June, IS.dS, and the
complainant has not exercised control over
any possession
her or received
under his
mortgage.
In February, 18.58. the ship being
in New Orleans, the said Brewer sold to said
French the seven-eighths of the ship, which
then stood in his name, for their full value,
inn king no reservation
of the rights of the
complainant under his mortgage, but giving
an absolute bill of sale, with warranty, of
Upon the sale. Brewer
said seven-eighths.
received from French, as part of the consideration, his three negotiable notes, amounting in all to $12,240, in nearly equal sums,
and payable at different dates, the latest
being the fii'st day of March, 1859; the said
notes being secured by a mortgage of said
given
by French
vessel
to Brewer.
In
March, 1858, a few weeks after the sale.
Brewer died, and the respondent has been
appointed
as administratrix on his estate,
and said notes and mortgage to Brewer have
come into her hands as such administratrix.
One of the notes has been paid to her, and
she still holds the other notes and mortgage.
Brewer's estate is represented as insolvent,
have been appointed, and
and commissioners
have reported that the claim of the complainant is $3,654.85; and, at the time of the decease of Brewer, a large part of the debt
to
intended to be secured by the mortgage
him was due and unpaid, and has not since
been paid.
The prayer of the bill is that the proceeds
of the sale of the ship, thus existing in the
notes, should be applied by the . administratrix to the payment of the complainant's
debt secured by the mortgage, and for such

relief as the nature of the case may require.
The principal question which arises is
whether a mortgagee of a vessel which has
been sold in another and a distant state, by
the mortgagor in possession, by an absolute
bill of sale of the entire vessel or interest,
and with warranty, without any prior authority from the mortgagee, can follow the
proceeds of the sale, existing in the notes
given for the purchase, and in the possession
of the mortgagor, or his representative.
It Is a well-settled doctrine, both in law
and In equity, that a mere change of property from one form to another cannot, in
itself, divest the owner, or those who have
distinct and immediate rights in the thing
in its original shape, of their property in it.
As a general rule, that right attaches to the
new form, so long as such new property is
capable of being identified and distinguished
from all other property, and no rights of any
bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice, intervene.
It makes
no difference, in law, into what other form
the change may have been made, whether
into promissory notes received as the consideration of the transfer, or into other merchandise.
The product is substituted for the
original thing, and so remains, as long as it
can be clearly shown to be such substitute.
It ceases when the means of distinguishing
and identifying fail. Scott v. Surman, Willes,
400; Whitcomb v. Jacobs, Salk. IGO; Taylor
V. Plumer (a leading case) 3 Maule & S. 562;
Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 1258, 1259.
Money itself may be followed if it can be
thus identified.
The difficulty in relation to
money usually is that, as it has "no ear
mark," it cannot be thus distinguished; but
this is simply a failure of proof, but does
not alter or disprove the principle. Taylor
V. Plumer, above cited.
This doctrine has been often applied to
agents, factors, and trustees, where the sale
has been rightfully made, and the proceeds
are existing in notes or other property, and
the agent dies or becomes insolvent.
Thompson V. Perkins, 3 Mason, 232, Fed. Oas. No.
Story's Equity, before cited.
13,972;
This class of cases is where the sale was
made by a person intrusted with the property with a power to sell, or where the sale
has
been subsequently
ratified and confirmed.

But the same principle applies to cases
where the property of a party has been misapplied, or a trust fund has been wrongfully
converted.
"An abuse of trust can confer
no rights upon the party abusing it, or on
those who are in privity with him."
Story,
Bq. Jur. § 1258.
The case of Taylor v.
Plumer, before cited, was one of fraudulent
transfer. Mr. Justice Story, in Conrad v.
Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 448, says that this
general principle "has been extended to cases
where there has been a fraudulent or tor-

tious misapplication of property."
It may be admitted that the relation of
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mortgagor and mortgagee does not of Itself,
and unconnected with other facts, create the
relation of principal and agent, or give any
right to the mortgagor to sell the whole
property by an absolute bill of sale, with
warranty of a perfect title. The mortgagor
in possession may sell his interest, 1. e., his
right to redeem, but he is a wrongdoer if he
sells and delivers the entire property to a
purchaser without the knowledge or assent
of the mortgagee.
Such sale, if the existence
of the mortgage Is not disclosed, is now made
a criminal offense.
St. 1860, c. 150.
It may
also be granted that, as to the mortgagee and
his title and interest, such sale does not convey, nor impair his title, and that he may
pursue and enforce his right to the thing,
wherever he may find It.
But we thinli that, under the circumstances
stated in this bill, he has an election to do
so, or to follow the proceeds existing in the
new form of negotiable notes in the hands
of the mortgagor or the representative of his
estate.
He may do this on the ground that
he assents to and alfirms the sale, and to the
change of the property mortgaged
to him
from a vessel to the notes taken. A subsequent ratification is equivalent to a prior
authority. We have seen that, if he had had
prior authority, he would have come under
the rule so often applied to agents and factors.

He may do this, also, on the other ground,
that it was a wrongful, if not a fraudulent,
conversion of his property by the mortgagor
in possession, and he may so far waive the
tort as to, pursue the proceeds in the new
He must
form, whilst they can be identified.
He cannot have
elect which course to pursue.
Murray v. Libbern, 2 Johns.
both remedies.
Ch. 441; Murray v. Ballon, 1 Johns. Ch. 566.
The bill sufficiently sets out an indebtedThe comness covered by the mortgage.
plainant must, of course, establish such indebtedness, i. e., for money advanced for the
purpose of finishing the ship and fitting her
for sea. No other debt or claim is covered
by the mortgage.
But as to this debt, under the circumstances of this case, the law imputes a trust in
the mortgagor during his life, and that trust
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the notes in the hands of his perThe proceeds of the
sonal representative.
sale of the ship. In her hands, stand in place
of the thing sold, and should be applied as
we have a right to presume Mr. Brewer, If
he had lived, would have applied them, so far
as needed, to the discharge of the debt secm'ed by the mortgage.
In this case there is not a plain and adequate remedy at law. The estate is insolvent, and, to say the least, it would require
a peculiar action and judgment in law to
take these proceeds out of the general mass
of the estate, which by law should be distributed pro rata among all the creditors,
and appropriate
it specifically to the complainant's debt. Such appropriation is peculiarly the proper province of a court of equity.
According to the statement in the bill, the
claim of the complainant is not equal to any
one of the notes, and it would be diiflcult to
find any principle of law by which an action
of trover could be maintained for them. The
estate is entitled to the notes and the proceeds after the mortgage debt is paid, and
the claim set up is based on an imputed trust,
and not on a legal title to the notes.
It is worthy of observation that the words
limiting the equity powers of this court to
cases, "where the parties have not a plain
and adequate remedy at law," which are
found in Kev. St. 1841, c. 96, are omitted in
the present Revised Statutes.
We are not
called upon, in this case, to determine whether the omission of these words does in fact
enlarge or alter the equity powers of this
It seems to leave them under the gencourt.
eral rules of equity in all cases where the
subject-matter is made by statute cognizable
in equity.
It was declared by this court, in Tappan
V. Deblois, 45 Me. 131, that "by the Revised
Statutes of this state (1857) we have jurisdiction of all cases of trust, whether arising by
implication of law or created by deed or

follows

will."

Demurrer overruled.

APPLETON,
DICKERSON,
red.

C.
and

J., CUTTING, DAVIS,
BARROWS, JJ., concur-
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CLEMENTS
(5 S.

E.

v.
194,

TILLMAN

et al.

79 Ga. 451.)

Supreme Court of Georgia.

February

13, 1888.

Error from superior court, Muscogee county; Smith, Judge.
Suit by Hattie E. Tillman and William L.
Tillman, plaintiffs and defendants in error,
against John W. Clements, def<?ndant and
plaintiff in error, for an account and settlement of a legacy due said Hattie E. Tillman imder the will of one Jacob A. Clements, John W. Clements being an executor
of the same.
The following is the oflBcial report:
Hattie E. Tillman, a legatee under the will
of Jacob A. Clements, deceased, with her
husband and trustee, William L. Tillman,
filed their bill for account and settlement
against John W. Clements, executor, and Sarah B. Clements, executrix, of said will.
The bill contained charges of mismanagement of the estate, violations of the provisions of said bill, and non-payment by the
executors of the Interest of complainant as
legatee.
The defendants answered the bill;
but as their answers are not material or necessary to an understanding of the errors complained of, they are not set forth. The jury
"We, the
returned
the following verdict:
jury, find that Sarah B. Clements has no
property or effects of the estate of Jacob A.
Clements, deceased, in her hands, as execuWe, the jury, further find
trix or otherwise.
that John W. Clements, as executor of the
will of Jacob A. Clements, deceased, has now
in his bands the sum of eight hundred and ten
dollars principal and five hundred dollars interest, belonging to Hattie E. Tillman, as legatee under the will of Jacob A. Clements."
Upon this verdict the following decree was
"Whereupon, the
by the court:
rendered
premises considered, it is ordered, adjudged,
and decreed by the court that the complainant
do recover the same sum of eight hundred and
ten dollars principal and the further sum of
five hundred dollars interest to this date,
dollars, costs
and the further sum of
of suit in this behalf laid out and expended,
for which said several sums let execution issue, to be levied in the first place of the
goods and chattels, lands and tenements, of
said Jacob A. Clements, deceased, in the
hands of John W. Clements, executor of the
will of said Jacob A. Clements, if to be
found; and if not to be found, then to be
levied of the personal goods and chattels,
lands and tenements, of said John W. ClemIt is further ordered and decreed by
ents.
said court that the said John W. Clements
do satisfy and pay the aforesaid amounts,
principal, interest, and costs, to the said
complainant, on or before the first day of
January next; and, in default thereof, that
he be held and deemed to be in contempt of
the order and decree of this court" Plaintiff
ia error excepts to the portion of the decree

embodied by the last sentence, and says the
court erred in rendering a decree to be enforced by attachment for contempt— "First,
because the verdict was a money verdict,
and the same could only be enforced by execution; second, because the verdict of the
jury was a money verdict, and could not be
enforced by an attachment for contempt,
and could only be enforced by execution;
third, because the verdict of the jury was a
money verdict, and was a debt, and to enforce the decree by an attachment for contempt would be to imprison the defendant
for debt, which is prohibited by the constitution of the state; fourth, because the decree
sought and moved for provides both for the
enforcement of it by execution, and an attachment for contempt; and the complainant should be required to elect whether she
would proceed to enforce it by execution or
attachment for contempt if the court determined that it could be enforced by attachment for contempt."
C. J. Thornton, for plaintiff in error.
F. Garrard, for defendants in error.

L.

KIBBBE, J.i Originally, in the absence
of statutes providing otherwise, decrees of
courts of equity, of whatever kind or nature,
operated
strictly and exclusively in personam.
The only remedy for their enforcement was by what is termed "process of
contempt," under which the party failing
to obey them was arrested and imprisoned
until he yielded obedience, or purged the
contempt by showing that disobedience was
not wilful, but the result of inability not
produced
by his own fault or contumacy.
The writ of assistance to deliver possession,
and even the sequestration to compel the
performance of a decree, are comparatively
of recent origin. Our statutes expressly provide that "all orders and decrees of the court
may be enforced by attachment against the
person; decrees for money may be enforced
by execution against the property." Code,
"A decree in favor of any party, for
§ 3099.
a specific sum of money, or for regular Installments of money, shall be enforced by
execution against property as at law." Code,
"Every decree or order of a court of
§ 4215.
equity may be enforced by attachment against
the person for contempt;
and if a decree be
partly for money and partly for the performance of a duty, the former may be enforced by execution, and the latter by attachment or other process."
Code, § 4216.
The
clear legislative intent is manifest to enlarge and render more efficacious equitable
remedies, while preserving the remedies the
courts had previously employed in the absence of statutes providing others.
Under
our statutes, when a party is decreed to perform a duty, or to do any act other than the
J., being disqualified. Judge Kibof the Oconee circuit, was designated to
preside in his stead.
1 Blandford,

bee,
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mere payment of money, which the court
has jurisdiction to adjudge he shall do, if he
disobeys, the authority of the court is defied;
he is guilty of contempt, and the arrest and
imprisonment of his person is not imprisonment for debt in any appropriate sense of
the term. But if a court of equity should
'
render a simple decree for money on a
simple money verdict,— a decree which it
may now enforce by the ordinary commonlaw process against property,— the failure to
pay the decree would not be contempt, nor
could compulsory process against the person of the party in default be resorted to to
enforce payment. In Coughlin v. Ehlert, 39
Mo. 285, the court uses the following language: "We do not mean to say that a
party may not be put in contempt for disobeying a decree for the performance of acts
which are within his power, and which the
court may properly order to be done. If it
were shown, for instance, that the party
had in his possession a certain specific sum
of money or other thing which he refused
to deliver up, under the order of the court,
for any purpose, it may very well be that
his disobedience would be a contempt for
which he might lawfully be imprisoned."
In Carlton v. Carlton, 44 Ga. 220, Judge McCay, delivering the opinion, says: "We do
not intend to say that simply because a debt
is adjudged by a decree in chancery, instead of by a judgment at law, it may therefore be enforced by imprisonment. The imprisonment must be clearly for the contempt
of the process of the court, and be of one
who is able and unwilling to obey the order
of the court. * * * It ought never to be
resorted to except as a penal process, founded on the unwillingness of the party to obey.
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The moment it appears that there Is Inability, it would clearly be the duty of the judge
The court furto discharge the party," etc.
ther held that, "ordinarily, it would be improper to include in the order the alternative
order for imprisonment on failure, since it is
not to be presumed that a contempt will ensue."
The constitutional provision, "there
shall be no imprisonment for debt," was not
intended to interfere with the traditional
power of chancery courts to punish for contempt all refusals to obey their lawful deThis proposition may be
crees and orders.
conceded to be sound without affecting the
"The power in
case at bar in any respect.
question was never exercised by chancery
courts except in those cases where a trust in
the property or fund arose between the parties litigant, or some specific Interest in it
was claimed, or the chattel had some peculiar value and importance that a recovery
of damages at law for its detention or conversion was inadequate.
Such interference
was in the nature of a bill quia timet, and
was asserted only on a proper showing that
the fund or property was in danger of loss
or destruction." 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 708710.
"No jurisdiction to compel the payment of an ordinary money demand unconnected with such peculiar equities ever existed in chancery courts, nor had they the
power to compel such payment by punishing
the refusal to pay under the guise of contempt."
In the case at bar the decree was right in
awarding an execution against the executor
as set forth in said decree, but the facts did
not authorize an alternative order imprisoning the defendant on failure to pay. Judgment reversed-
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HART

V.

SAXSOM

et al.

(3 Sup. Ct. 5S(J, 110 U. S. 151.)

Supreme Court of the United

States.

January

21, 1884.

Error to the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Northern District of Texas.
Henry J. Leovy and W. Hallett Phillips,
for plaintiff in error. A. S. Lathrop, for defendants in enor.

GRAY, J. This is a writ of error sued out
by Edmoud J. Hurt, a citizen of Louisiana,
to reverse a judgment rendered against him
in the circuit court of the United States for
the Northern district of Texas, in an action
brought by him against Marion Sansom and
the heirs at law of Thomas JI. League, citizens of Texas, to recover a tract of land in
.Johnson county, in that state, of which they
had dispossessed
him.
At the trial. Hart
proved his title under a patent from the republic of Texas to League, and a deed with
general covenants of warranty from League,
dated August 19, 1846, and both recorded on
December 9, 1879, and it appeared that the
defendant Sansom held possession of the land
under a lease from the other defendants and
as their tenant.
The defendants offered in
evidence the record of a judgment rendered
by the district court of Johnson county, on
August 24, 1875, upon a petition filed June
11, 1873, by the heirs at law of League, (who
died intestate November
against
5, 1865,)
Virgil Wilkerson, Orlando Dorsey, and several other persons, and Hart, alleging that
Wilkerson ejected the plaintiffs from this
land, and unlawfully
withheld possession
thereof from them; that on October 29, 1870,
the defendant Dorsey, by deed duly recorded,
conveyed to some of the other defendants
than Wilkerson and Hart three-fourths of
the land, reserving in that deed the remaining fourth to himself, and that other deeds
(particularly set forth) of parts of the land
were afterwards made to the rest of such
other defendants and recorded;
that the defendant Hart "sets up some pretended claim
and title to said land;" and that "the defendant Wilkerson is a naked trespasser upon tlie land of the plaintiffs, and that the
defendants'
several
deeds,
several
other
which appear upon the record of deeds of
Johnson county as aforesaid, are fraudulent
and void, and that the said pretended claims
and deeds, and each and all of them, cast a
and
cloud upon the title of the plaintiffs;"
praying "that they have judgment, that the
cloud upon the title of the plaintiffs, created
by the several deeds aforesaid, be removed,
and that the said deeds, and each and all
of them, be declared null and void, and be
canceled and discharged of record, and that
the title of the plaintiffs in and to said premises and every part thereof, may be confirmed
as against said defendants
and established
and each and every of them, and all per-

sons claiming through or under them," and
for a writ of possession, damages, and costs.
That record also showed the issue and due
service of citations to all the defendants except Dorsey and Hart; the issue of a citation directing the sheriff to serve Hart, being
a citizen of Louisiana, by publication, and
the sheriff's return showing the execution of
the citation by such publication in a newspaper of the county four successive weeks
before the return day, and a like service by
publication on Dorsey, a citizen of New
York. That record further showed a default
of all the defendants;
and that upon a writ
of inquiry the jury assessed damages against
Dorsey and Hart; found as facts the issue
of the patent to League and the title of the
plaintiffs as his heirs; that Hart "claimed
said land;" and that a deed was made by
Dorsey and recorded, as alleged in the petition, but that Hart and Dorsey respectively
had no title of record or otherwise; and returned a verdict "for the plaintiffs; and that
they recover the land described in the petition." That record finally showed a judgment "that the plaintiffs recover of the defendants the premises described," and "that
the several deeds in the plaintiff's petition
mentioned be and the same are hereby annulled and canceled, and for naught held,
and the cloud tliereby removed,"
and for
costs, and that execution issue for the costs.
The circuit court, against the plaintiff's objection, admitted the judgment in evidence,
instructed the jury that it divested the plaintiff of his title to the land, and directed a
verdict for the defendants.
The plaintiff, deriving his title under a
deed with covenants
of general warranty
from League, is entitled to maintain this
action against League's heirs, who are estopped by those covenants, unless the former
judgment in the action brought by them in
the state court has adjudicated the title as
between them and the present plaintiff.
It
is therefore necessary to consider the nature
and effect of that judgment.
The petition
combined, in accordance
with the practice
prevailing in that state, an action in the nature of ejectment to recover possession of the
land, and a suit in equity to remove a cloud
upon the plaintiffs' title; and the service by
publication was in the form authorized by
the local statutes against non-residents.
1
Pasch. Dig. Laws Tex. (4th Ed.) art. 25.
The petition alleges that Wilkerson was in
possession;
and that the other defendants,
except Hart, held recorded
deeds, which
were fraudulent and void, and cast a cloud
upon the plaintiffs' title.
But as to Hart,
it did not allege that he was in possession,
or was in privity with the other defendants,
or that he held any deed, but only that he
set up some pretended claim and title. And
the verdict finds that he claimed the land,
but had no title of record or othervsdse therein.
The judgment is that the plaintiffs recover the land of the defendants,
and that
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the deeds mentioned in the petition be and
are annulled and canceled,
and the cloud
thereby removed, and for costs; and execution is awarded for costs only, and not for
any writ or process in the nature of a writ
of possession or habere facias.
It is difficult to see how any part of that
judgment (except for costs) is applicable to
Hart; for that part which is for recovery
of possession certainly cannot apply to Hart,
who was not in possession;
and that part
which removes the cloud upon the plaintiff's
title appears to be limited to the cloud created by the deeds mentioned in the petition;
and tlie petition does not allege, and the verdict negatives, that Hart held any deed. But
if there is any judgment (except for costs)
against Hart, it Is, upon the most liberal
construction, only a decree removing
the
cloud created by his pretended claim of title,
Genand is no bar to the present action.
erally, if not universally, equity jurisdiction
and not in rem,
is exercised in personam,
and depends upon the control of the court
over the parties, by reason of their presence
or residence, and not upon the place where
the land lies in regard to which relief is
Upon a bill for the removal of a
sought.
cloud upon titie, as upon a bill for the specific performance of an agreement to convey,
the decree, imless otherwise expressly provided by statute, is clearly not a judgment in
rem, establishing a title in land, but operates in personam only, by restraining the defendant from asserting his claim, and directing him to deliver up his deed to be canceled, or to execute a relief to the plaintiff.
Langd. Eq. PI. (2d Ed.) §§ 43, 184; Massie
Ortoh v. Smith,
V. Watts, 6 Cranoh, 148;
18 How. 263; Vandever v. Freeman, 20 Tex.
334.
It would doubtless be within the power
of the state in which the land lies to provide
by statute that if the defendant Is not found
within the jurisdiction, or refuses to make
or to cancel a deed, this should be done in
his behalf by a trustee appointed by the
Felch v. Hooper,
court for that purpose.

53

52; Ager v. Murray, 105 U. S.
But in such a case, as in the ordinary exercise of its jurisdiction, a court of
by compelling a
equity acts In personam,
deed to be executed or canceled by or in behalf of the party. It has no inherent power,
by the mere force of its decree, to annul a
deed or to establish a title.
In the judgment in question, no trustee to
act in behalx of the defendant was appointed
by the court, nor have we been referred to
any statute authorizing such an appointment
to be made. The utmost effect which can be
attributed to the judgment, as against Hart,
is that of an ordinary decree for the removal
by him, as well as by the other defendants,
of a cloud upon the plaintiff's titie. Such
a decree, being in personam merely, can only
be supported against a person who is not a
citizen or resident of the state in which it is
rendered, by actual service upon him within
its jurisdiction; and constructive service by
publication in a newspaper is not sufficient.
The courts of the state might perhaps feel
119

Mass.

126,

132.

bound to give effect to the service made as
directed by its statutes.
But no court deriving its authority from another government
will recognize a merely constructive service
as bringing the person within the jurisdiction of the court.
The judgment would be
allowed no force in the courts of any other
state;
force, as
and it is of no greater
against a citizen of another state, in a court
of the United States, though held within the
state in which the judgment was rendered.
Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 4 Pet. 466, 475;
Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 9 How. 336; Bischoff V. Wethered, 9 Wall. 812; Knowles v.
Gaslight Co., 19 Wall. 58; Pennoyer v. Neff,
See, also, Schibsby
95 U. S. 714.
v. Westenholz, L. E. 6 Q. B. 155; The City of
Mecca, 6 Prob. Div. 106.
The circuit court having ruled and inthe jury otherwise,
structed
its judgment
must be reversed, and the cause remanded
with directions to set aside the verdict, and
to order a new trial.
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ADAMS
(17 N.

Supreme

V.

E.

MESSENGER.

491,

Judicial
Middlesex.

147

Mass. 185.)

Court of Massachusetts.
June 19, 1888.

Appeal from supreme
dlesex

OF EQUITY.

judicial

court,

Mid-

county.

Bill in equity, by George B. Adams against
William T. Messenger, to compel the performance of an agreement to furnish the
plaintiCC with certain perfect working injectors for steam-boilers,
and to apply for
and assign to plaintiff certain letters patent
Hearing in the
in the dominion of Canada.
supreme judicial court upon defendant's demurrer, which was sustained, and the plainThe facts are stated in the
tiff appealed.
opinion.

Wm. B. Durant, for plaintiff.
Knowles, for defendant.

DEVENS, J.

It

Charles S.

is the contention of the
defendant that the plaintiff has a full, complete, and adequate remedy at common law
by a suit for damages, and that the court,
sitting in equity, cannot grant the relief
sought by the prayers of the bill. The controversy arises from the failm-e to perform
an executory
written contract.
So far as
this relates to personal property, the objections arising from the statute of frauds,
which have sometimes been found to exist
when oral contracts were sought to be enforced, have, of course, no application. The
general rule that contracts as to the purchase of personal property are not specifically enforced, as are those which relate to real
property, does not rest on the ground of any
distinction between the two classes of property other than that which arises from their
Contracts which relate to real
character.
property can necessarily only be satisfied by
a conveyance of the particular estate or parcel contracted for, while those which relate
to personal property are often fully satisfied
by damages which enable the party injured
to obtain elsewhere in the market precisely
similar property to that which he had agreed
The distinction between real
to purchase.
and personal property is entirely subordinate
to the question whether an adequate remedy
If, from the nature
can thus be afforded.
of the personal property, it cannot, a court
of equity will entertain jurisdiction to en1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 717;
force the contract.
Clark V. Flint, 22 Pick. 231. A contract for
bank, railway, or other corporation stock,
freely sold in the market, might not be thus
enforced, but it would be otherwise where
the stock was limited in amount, held in a
few hands, and not ordinarily to be obtained. White V. Schuyler, 1 Abb. Prac. (N. S.)
300; Treasurer v. Mining Co., 23 Cal. 390;
Poole V. Middleton, 29 Beav. 646; Doloret
Where artiV. Kothschild, 1 Sim. & S. 590.
cles of personal property, also, are peculiar

and individual in their character, or have an
especial value on account of the associations
connected with them, as pictures, curiosities,
family furniture, or heirlooms, specific performance of a contract in relation to them
will be decreed. Lloyd v. Loaring, 6 Ves.
773; Fells v. Read, 3 "Ves. 70; Lowther v.
Lowther, 13 Ves. 95; Williams v. Howard, 3
Murph. 74. An agreement to assign a patBinney v.
ent will be specifically enforced.
Annan, 107 Mass. 94. Nor do we perceive
any reason why an agreement to furnish articles which the vendor alone can supply,
whether because their manufacture is guarded by a patent or for any other reason,
Hapgood
should not also be thus enforced.
As the value of
V. Rosenstock,
23 Fed. 86.
a patent-riglit cannot be ascertained by computation, so it is impossible,
with any approach to accuracy, to ascertain how much
a vendee would suffer from not being able
to obtain such articles for use in his business.

The contract of the defendant was twofold: to furnish and deliver certain describwithin a specied working steam-injectors,
and also that if
fied time, to the plaintifC;
the defendant shall make improvements in
injectors for steamboilers,
and shall take
out patents therefor in the United States, he
will apply for letters patent in Canada, and,
on obtaining them, will assign and convey
the same to the plaintifC, and that he will
not do any act prejudicial to these letters
patent of Canada, or the monopoly thus secured.
It is said that the court will not
enforce a contract for personal services when
such services require the exercise of peculiar
skill, intellectual abiUty, and judgment, and
that, therefore, the defendant cannot be ordered to make and deliver the injectors contracted for. But the principle on which it
is held that a court of equity cannot decree
one to perform a personal service involving
peculiar talent or skill, because it cannot
so mould its order and so supervise the individual executing it that it can determine
whether he has honestly obeyed it or not,
has no application here.
The defendant has
agreed to furnish and deliver certain injectors, which the contract shows to be patented
articles.
There is nothing in the bill from
which it is to be inferred that they were yet
to be made when the contract was executed;
but. If it be assumed that they were, there
is nothing from which it can be inferred
that any skill peculiar to the defendant was
required to construct them.
For aught that
appears, they could be made by any intelligent artificer in the metals of which they
were composed.
The details of their manufacture are given by reference to the patents, which are referred to in the agreement;
so that no diflSculty, such as has sometimes
been experienced, could have been found in
describing accurately and even minutely the
articles to be furnished. Nor are there
found in the case at bar any continuous du-
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to be done, or work to be performed,
requiring any permanent supervision, which,
as it could not be concluded within a definite
and reasonable time, has sometimes
been
held an obstacle to the enforcement
of a contract by the court. Agreements to make an
archway under a railway, or to erect a siding at a particular point for the convenience
of the land-owner, have been ordered to be
specifically enforced.
Although the party aggrieved might have obtained damages which
would have been sufficient to have enabled
him to pay for constructing them, and although the work to be done necessarily involved engineering skill as well as labor, he
was not bound to assume the responsibility
or the labor of doing that which the defendant had agreed to do. Storer v. Railway Co.,
2 Youuge & C. Ch. 48;
Greene v. Railway
Co., L. R. 13 Eq. 44.
The case at bar Is
readily distinguishable from that of WoUensak V. Briggs, 20 Bradw. 50, on which the
defendant much relies.
In that case the defendant was to construct for the plaintiff
certain improved machinery for a particular
purpose, but no details were given as to the
form, structure, principle, or mode of operating the proposed machine.
It was obviously a contract too indefinite to enable the
court to order its specific enforcement.
It is urged that specific performance of a
part only of a contract will not be ordered
when it is not in the power of the court to
order the enforcement of the whole, and that
it would not be possible to enforce that portion of the contract which relates to the application for letters patent in Canada, and the
subsequent assignment of them.
But where
two parts of a contract are distinctly separable, as in the case at bar, there is no reason
why one should not be enforced, and the
plaintiff compensated
in damages for the
breach of the other. When a contract relates
to but a single subject, and it is impossible
for the defendant to perform it except partially, the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of
such partial performance,
and to compensation, if it be possible to compute what is just,
so far as it is unperformed. It was therefore
held in Davis v. Parker, 14 Allen, 94, that
where one had agreed to convey land, with
release of dower, and was unable to procure
a release of dower, the purchaser was entitled to a conveyance without such release,
with an abatement from the purchase money
of the value of the wife's interest at the
See, also, Milkman
time of the conveyance.
V. Ordway, 106 Mass. 253; Ourran v. WaterPower Co., 116 Mass. 90.
We have assumed, in favor of the defendant's contention, that the only relief that the
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plaintiff could obtain for the breach of thai
portion of the agreement which relates to
the application for a patent in Canada for
the improvements which defendant had
We have not
made, would be In damages.
That equity, by
intended thus to decide.
virtue of its control over the persons before
the court, takes cognizance of many things
which they may do or be able to do abroad,
while they are themselves personally here,
One may be enjoinwill not be controverted.
He may
ed from prosecuting a suit abroad.
be compelled to convey land situated abroad,
although the conveyance must be according
to the laws of the foreign country, and must
Pingree v. Coffin,
be sent there for record.
12 Gray, 288; Dehon v. Poster, 4 Allen, 545;
Cunningham v. Butler, 142 JIass. 47, 6 N.
E. 782; Bailey v. Ryder, 10 N. Y. 363; Newton V. Bronson, 13 N. Y. 587. There is nothing to show that the plaintiff, in making his
application in Canada for the patent, is compelled to leave the state, any more than he
would be compelled to do so if he was an
applicant at Washington. The grant of such
a patent is an act of administration only.
If it were to be granted here, the party
would be ordered to make application. It
was held in Runstetler v. Atkinson, 4 MacArthur, 382, that where a formal assignment
of an invention had not been made, but a
valid agreement had been made so to assign,
equity would order the party to make the
formal assignment, and also to make application for the patent, which, in such case,
The laws of
would issue to the assignee.
Canada, which we can know only as facts,
are not before us by any allegations as to
If all that is required by them is a
them.
formal application in writing by the inventor, there would seem to be, from the allegations of the bill, sufficient reason why the
defendant should be required to make and
forward it, or place it in the hands of the
plaintiff to be forwarded, to the Canadian
authorities. In any event, as the application
is preliminary only to obtaining letters patent for the purpose of assigning them to the
plaintiff, the averments of the biU, taken in
connection with the terms of the agreement,
set forth a good reason why the plaintiff may
ask an assignment of his title to the improvements in question from the defendant,
so far as the dominion of Canada is concerned, and also why the defendant should
be restrained from alienating or in any way
incumbering any right he may have to letters patent from Canada if plaintiff should
decide to seek his remedy in this form, rather
than in damages for breach of this part of
Demurrer overruled.
the contract.
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EWING

V.

(212 S.

Supreme

E.

LITCHFIELD
362,

91 Va. 575.)

Court of Appeals
27,

et al.

of Virginia.

June

1805.

Appeal from circuit court, Washington
county; ShefCey, Judge.
Bill by one Litchfield and cthei-s against
Thomas Ewlng.
Decree for complainants,
and defendant

appeals.

Reversed.

White & Penn, for appellant.
for appellees.

Daniel Trigg,

KEITH, P. This bill was filed in the circuit
court of Washington county by Litchfield
and others, and sets forth the following facts:
In January, 1890, the plaintiffs entered into
a contract with J. D. Imboden, by which the
plaintiffs and the said Imboden agreed to procure $100,000 of the stock of the Virginia &
Tennessee Coal & Iron Company at the price
of $10 or less per share of $100 each. These
shares, together with 15,000 shares owned by
the plaintiffs, were to be voted in a stockholders' meeting, to be held within a period
named, and upon a notice prescribed in the
contract, so as to acquire the control of $1,in the
950,000 of the stock which remained
treasury of the Virginia & Tennessee Coal &
Iron Company.
This block of 19,500 shares
of stock was to be sold to Imboden at $10 per
share, and In consideration
of his purchase
of the said treasury stock at this reduced rate
he undertook to secure and cause to be submitted to the said meeting of stockholders,
for their ratification, a contract, by and on
behalf of the Danville & East Tennessee
Railroad Company and the Atlantic cfe Danville Railroad Company with the Virginia &
Tennessee Coal & Iron Company, binding the
railroad companies to extend their roads into
the lands and coal fields of the coal and iron
company, or to make connections therewith
satisfactory to the said parties by means of
other railroads, by the 1st of January, 1893,
and to complete and have in operation the
line of said I'ailroad companies from Abingdon to Damascus on or before the 1st day of
January, 1891, and to complete and have in
all that part of the line of said
operation
railroads and their connections, so as to connect Abingdon and the coal fields, by the 1st
of January, 1898, and then binding the said
certain terms
under
railroad companies,
therein named, for the transportation of the
product of the coal fields, owned by the VirIt
ginia & Tennessee Coal & Iron Company.
is further provided that, unless the party of
the first part, J. D. Imboden, or his assignees,
shall, at the meeting of the stockholders provided in the contract, purchase the treasury
stock and deliver or cause to be delivered the
contract of the railroad companies, as hereinbefore provided, or in the event of the failure of the first party to notify the parties of
the second part of his readiness to conform
to and to comply with the provisions of this

agreement, then the contract entered Into was
to be null and void, except that the parties of
the second part "shall be entitled to demand
and receive from the party of the first part
the amount of $50,000 of the stock of the Virginia & Tennessee Coal & Iron Company, or
$5,000 in lieu thereof by way of ascertained
and liquidated damages on account of the
There are details of
breach of this contract."
the contract entered into between the parties
have thought it unnecessary to set
Which
out but have contented myself with reciting
what I conceived to be the features of the
this controversy deupon which
contract
pends. The $50,000 of stock was to be deposited with the Exchange National Bank of
Lynchburg by the party of the first part, to
of
be held in accordance with the provisions
the contract, and it was also provided that
the party of the first port should have the
right to elect to pay either the stock or the
money in cash as damages, in the event of
Subhis failure to comply with his contract.
sequently
an amended bill was filed, and
Thomas Ewing was made a party defendant,
it appearing that J. D. Imboden, in executing the contract set out in the original bill,
was acting as the agent of Swing, and that
Imboden had no personal interest In It. To
this bill there was a demurrer, which the
circuit court overruled, and such proceedings
were had that a final decree was entered in
the cause, from which Thomas Ewing, has
appealed, and his appeal presents for our
consideration
at the outset the propriety of
the decree of the circuit court upon the demuiTer to the bill.
It will be observed that this suit Is not
brought to enforce the specific performance
of that which the defendant contracted to do,
—that is, to procure contracts from certain
railroad coi-porations to build a line of railway into the coal fields controlled by the
plaintiffs within a stipulated period; in other
words. It is not a suit for the specific performance of the principal contract entered into between the parties.
Stated broadly, that
was a contract upon the part of Ewing to construct, or for him to procure others to conBtruct, certain lines of road to certain points
named In the conti-act, the object being to deFelop the coal fields owned by the Virginia &
Tennessee Coal & Iron Company,
In which
company the plaintiffs were large stockholdUpon the part of the plaintiffs. In coners.
sideration of Ewing procuring this road to be
built, or procuring a satisfactory contract upon the part of others to build it, they were
to unite with him, who. In the meantime,
with their aid, was to secure $100,000 of the
stock of the Virginia & Tennessee Coal &
Iron Company, thus constituting a controlling
interest in the company, and thereby give to
the appellant the control of 19,500 shares of
stock, at $10 per share. In a proper case a
court of equity delights specifically to enforce contracts where the parties have no
other remedy, or the remedy afforded elsewhere Is less complete or satisfactory; but
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here the undertaking of the defendant is to
■build a, railroad, or to procure others to build
It, and courts of equity will not enforce contracts for that purpose. This seems to be
well settled.
The object, and the only object, of this bill
is to recover what the parties have agreed upon, either as a penalty or forfeiture, or as
liquidated damages.
The breach of the contract is recognized as the foundation of the
relief sought, and the plaintiffs have resorted
to this court, and invoked its aid to enable
them to gather in the form of damages the
There
fruits of a mere breach of contract.
are cases in which courts of equity will
award damages, but they are cases where,
having obtained Jurisdiction over the subject
and of the parties, under some of the wellrecognized sources of equity jurisdiction, it
is found necessary to award damages in or<ier to do full and complete justice by way
of compensation, as when, in the enforcement of a contract for the sale of land, the
court finds itself unable to give the party
seeking and entitled to its aid all that, under

In such a
his contract, he should recover.
case the court will, as far as possible, specifically execute the contract, and then ascertain the damages accruing by reason of its
inability in the particular case thus to afford
complete relief. The giving of the damages
is ancillai-y or auxiliary to the jurisdiction
specifically to enforce the performance of the
contract.
See Nagle v. Newton, 22 Grat. 814.
The case before us being in its essence for the
recovery of damages for a breach of contract,
a. court of equity is not to be beguiled into
granting the relief sought because it is ingeniously and artfully concealed under cover
of cer<if a prayer to compel the assignment
tain shares of stock. The great weight of authority in this countriy is that a court of equity will not entertain a bill for such a purpose,
though in England it seems to be otherwise.
Had the subject and object of the principal
contract between the parties in this case been
the sale and purchase of the $50,000 of the
stock in question, a court of equity would
have left them to their remedy at law, and
will certainly not barken to their prayer when
it appears that the stock, the assignment of
which is sought, is itself but one form of the
penalty or liquidated damages agreed upon
as the measure of the injury sustained by the
Much of
breach of the contract entered into.
the argument addressed to us had for its object to enable us to determine whether or not
the stock, or in lieu thereof the $5,000 in
money, agreed to .be transferred or paid by
the appellant in case of a failure to perform
the contract, was to be considered as a penThis is a
alty or as liquidated damages.
feature of the controversy which it is not
for us to determine, because in
necessary
neither aspect of it are the plaintiffs entitled

A court of equity will
to the relief sought
neither enforce a penalty or forfeiture, nor
permit it to be enforced in a court of law.
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It will go even further than this. It will not
permit a party, by the voluntary payment of
the agreed penalty, to defeat the enforcement
It will not enof the alternative contract.
tertain a suit for the recovery of damages
merely, nor will it undertake to give damages
save, as before observed, as ancillary or auxiliary to some one of its recognized subjects
of jurisdiction; and so far from liquidated
damages constituting an exception to the rule
that courts of equity will not entertain suits
for damages for breach of contract, it seems
that, if the damages for the breach of a contract have been liquidated by the parties to
and agreed
the contract (that is, ascertained
upon), that fact, so far from inviting the
assistance of a court of equity, is sufficient to
Indeed, this must of necessity be
repel it.
so, for, as the jurisdiction of the court to enforce contracts specifically rests upon the insufficiency of damages as a redress or remedy
for failure to comply with a contract, the
very foundation of jurisdiction seems wanting
in those cases where the parties themselves
have otherwise determined, and have fixed a
money value in the form of liquidated damages upon the injury sustained by its breach.
In this view is found an explanation of the
leaning shown by courts of equity, in doubtful cases, to construe such agreements as we
are here considering as creating a penalty or
forfeiture rather than liquidated damages.
For, if it be determined that it is but liquidated damages, the jurisdiction of a court of
equity is at an end, but if it be construed as
a forfeiture or penalty, then it affords no obstruction to the interpretation of the court
of equity, because it will prohibit either the
enforcement or the voluntary payment of the
penalty
or forfeiture, and will compel the
performance
of the alternative contract if a
proper case be made. Courts of equity, therefore, always strongly incline to that construction which declares it to be a forfeiture or
penalty rather than liquidated damages.
In
this case, however, a court of equity is without motive to prefer the one to the other construction.
The alternative for which the penalty is given, if it be a penalty, is the securing
of a contract for the building of a railroad.
It is obviously impossible to compel the defendant either to build it himself or to procure others to build it. It will leave the parties, in the forum appropriate for that relief,
to recover damages for its breach,— liquidated
damages, if a court of law shall be of opinion
that the parties so intended ihe stipulation in
the contract, or damages in ordinary cases,
if a court of law shall be of opinion that the
stock or money stipulated to be paid was a
penalty.
We have not referred to cases.
Cases upon the subject of the specific perfoi-mance of contracts and other subjects discussed are too numerous
even for citation.
The whole subject has been treated with
gi'eat fullness and ability in Pomeroy's Equity, and we shall content ourselves with referring to the appropriate chapters in that
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work, and especially to sections 446, 447,
1401-1403, and to Lawson, Rights, Rem. &
Prac. pp. 2588, 2590, 2591, as sustaining the
views here presented.
We are of opinion that the demurrer to the

and the bill
dismissed, and therefore enter a decree reversing the decree of the circuit couit.

bill should have been sustained,

BUCHANAN, J.,

absent.
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CRAIG
(16

V.

HUKILL

et al.

S. E. 363, 37 W. Va. 520.)

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Dec. 22, 1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Monongalia county.
Bill by Joseph W. Craig against E. M.
Hul^ill & Co. and others for partition of
lanil. There was a decree for partition. Defendant E. M. Hukill appeals.
Reversed.
Okey Johnson, W. P. Hubbard, and Keck,
& Fast, for appellant. Cox & Baker,
for appellee.
Son

BBANNON, J.

W. M. Davis executed to
David Kennedy a lease of a tract of land for
a term of years, for the purpose of drilling
for petroleum oil, which lease has come by
assignment
to B. M. Hukill. The deed of
lease contains a covenant on the part of the
lessee to commence operations for oil development within nine months, or for payment of a
certain sum of money per month until commencement of work, with a provision that
a failure to do one or the other should work
an absolute forfeiture of the lease.
Afterwards Davis executed an instrument by
which he agreed to sell to H. P. Griffith all
the oil and gas under the said tract, and
Griffith transferred all his right in said tract
to Joseph W. Craig. Davis had a life estate
in said tract, with remainder in fee to his
children; and, by the death of one of them, he
inherited an undivided one-fifth share therein.
Hukill, claiming under the first-mentioned
lease, as also under a lease from the guardian of the surviving children, bored for and
produced oil on the premises.
Craig brought
a suit in equity In the circuit court of Monongalia county against Hukill, Davis, and others, praying that the tract be partitioned,
and one-fifth assigned as the share of Davis
in fee, and that all the oil and gas under
it be assigned to the plaintiff, Craig. The
theory of Craig for relief is that by reason
of failure to commence operations, or to pay
money in lieu thereof, as provided in the lease
to Kennedy, it had become forfeited, and he
had, by the said agreement between Davis
and Griffith, become entitled, in exclusion of
all rights under the Kennedy lease, to all
Obviously,
oil which Davis could convey.
Craig can get relief only through an enforcement of the forfeiture of the Kennedy lease.
Thus, at the threshold of the case, we are
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met with the question whether a court of
equity will enforce this alleged forfeiture.
Affirmative relief against penalties and forfeitures was one of the springs or fountains
of equity jurisdiction, and the jurisdiction
was very early exercised; and it would be
going in the very opposite direction, and acting contrary to its essential principles, to affirmatively enforce a forfeiture. The elementary books on equity jurisprudence state
the rule as almost an axiom, that equity nev2 Story,
er enforces a penalty or forfeiture.
Eq. Jur. § 1319; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 459; Bisp.
Eq. § 181; Beach, Mod. Eq. Jur. § 1013.
Mr. Pomeroy, in 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 460, says
and I conthat rule is without exception;
fess my search has led me to the same conclusion.
This doctrine is supported in America by decisions of the highest authority, coming from jurists of the most eminent name,
—among them, Kent and Marshall; and there
seems to be no change or qualification in
Livingston v. Tompkins, 4
later decisions.
Johns. Ch. 415; Hbrsblirg v. Baker, 1 Pet.
232; Marshall v. Vicksburg, 15 Wall. 146.
The estate under the Kennedy lease certainly
vested; and the plaintiff seeks, by a suit In
equity, to divest it, which he can only do by
declaring and enforcing the forfeiture of that
lease, for the plaintiff's right must depend
for its birth and existence on that forfeiture.
In Livingston v. Tompkins, supra, it
was held that "equity will not assist the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture, or anything
in the nature of a forfeiture," and "will not
lend its aid to divest an estate for the
breach of a condition subsequent."
McKim
V. Mason, 2 Md. Oh. 510; Warner v. Bennett,
31 Conn. 468;
Smith v. Jewett, 40 N. H.
530.
In Oil Creek R. Co. v. Atlantic & G.
W. R. Co., 57 Pa. 65, a bill was filed to enforce a forfeiture of a lease because of failure
to build a road according to the express provisions of the lease; and the court refused,
on the ground that equity never lends its
aid in enforcement of a forfeiture, but will
leave the parties
to their legal remedies.
Many cases cited in the text-books above cited sustain this principle. Though equity has
jurisdiction in partition, yet it will not exercise it when it can be done only by enforcing
a forfeiture, when the plaintiff's right grows
only out of a forfeiture. As equity has no
jurisdiction, we cannot decide the merits of
the case, and therefore reverse the decree
and dismiss the bill, without prejudice to the
plaintiff to seek to assert his rights by any
appropriate legal remedy.
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KUNKLE
(42

Atl.

et al. v.

WHERRY.

112,

Pa. 198.)

189

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Jan. 2,

1899.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Allegheny county.
Action by H. H. Kunkle and Conrad Jordan, partners doing business as Kunkle &
Jordan, against James Wherry, to recover a
balance alleged to be due on a contract for
granite construction.
Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.
Reversed.

R. A. & Jas. Balph, for appellant.
E. G. Ferguson, for appellees.

J.

S.

&

FELL, J. The defendant was the contractor
for the construction of a large, 10-stoiy building, which he was required to complete in 11
By the terms of his contract with
months.
the owner, he was to receive $100 for each
day less than the time limit, and to pay
$1,000
for each day that he should exceed
it, in the completion of the work.
He entered Into a contract with the plaintiffs for
They agreed to
the stone and granite work.
furnish the materials, and to finish the work
to the top of the second story, ready for the
bricklayers, in six weeks' time after three
stories of ironwork had been erected, and
bound themselves "to pay the sum of $150
per day as a penalty for each and every day
thereafter that the said work remains unfinThe
ished, as and for liquidated damages."
learned judge held that this stipulation should
and not as liquibe regarded as a penalty,
dated damages, and that the defendant could
set off against the plaintiffs' claim such damages only as he proved to have been actually
sustained by him because of the delay of the
plaintiffs In completing the work.
The rule that in actions ex contractu, where
the breach of an agreement admits of comthe recovery may be limited to
pensation,
the loss actually sustained, notwithstanding
a stipulation for a penalty, is founded upon
the principle that one party should not be
allowed to profit by the default of the other,
and that compensation, and not forfeiture, is
Equity will regard a penthe equitable rule.
alty or forfeiture as Intended to secure the
fulfillment of a contract, and It may preclude
the injured party from recovering more than
a just compensation, or from obtaining a colNotes to Peachy v. Duke
lateral advantage.
of Somerset, 2 White & T. Lead. Cas. Eq.
Whether a sum named
2044; Bisp. Eq. 178.

as compensation for the breach of a contract
is to be considered as a penalty to secure Its
fulfillment, from which equity will relieve,
or as damages liquidated by the parties themselves, is a question which cannot be answered by the application of any general rule.
The question is always ohe ot construction,
and any rule upon the subject is a mere guide
to the totention of the parties.
The grounds
on which each case is to be considered and
determined are clearly stated by our Brother
Mitchell In Keck v. Bieber, 148 Pa. St. 645,
24 Atl. 170:
"The general principle upon
which the law awards damages is compensation for the loss suffered.
The amount may
be fixed by the parties in advance, but, where
a lump sum is named by them, the court will
always look into the question whether this
is really liquidated damages, or only a penalty; the presumption being that it is the latter. The name by which it is called is of but
slight weight; the controlling elements being
the intent of the parties, and the special circumstances
of the case."
And he quotes
with approval March v. AUabough, 103 Pa.
* ♦ * is to be deSt. 335: "The question
by the intention of the parties,
termined
drawn from the words of the whole contract,
examined in the light of its subject-matter
and its surroundings; and in this examination we must consider the relation which the
sum stipulated
bears to the < injury which
may be caused by the several breaches provided against, the ease or difilculty of measuring a breach in damages, and such other
matters as are legally or necessarily inherent
In the transaction." From the nature of this
case, the actual damages which would result
from a breach of the contract would not readily be susceptible of ascertainment,
and it
seems to us that it was the manifest Intention
of the parties not to leave them to the uncertain estimate of a jury, but to fix them by
express agreement.
"Uncertainty as to the
extent of the injuries which may ensue" was
said in Powell v. Burroughs, 54 Pa. St. 329,
and Coal Co. v. Schultz, 71 Pa. St. 180, "to
be a criterion by which to determine whether
it is a case of liquidated damages ot a penalty."
The damages named were for the
breach of a single stipulation, and were not
disproportionate to the loss which would
probably result to the defendant from the
failure of the plaintiffs to complete their
work in time. The fifth, and seventh assignments of error are sustained, and the judgment is reversed, with a venire facias de
novo.
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JAQUITH
(5

Supreme

V.

HUDSON.

Mich.

May Term,

1858.

Error to circuit court, Wayne county.
The action was by Jaqultli against Hudson, upon a promissory note for one thousand dollars, given by the latter to the former, April 15th, 1855, and payable twelve
months after date.
Defendant pleaded the
general Issue, and gave notice that on the
trial he would prove that, previous to said
] 5th day of April, 1^5, plaintiff and defendant had been and were partners In trade, at
Trenton, in said county of Wayne, under
the name of Hudson & Jaquith; that, on
that day the copartnership was dissolved,
and the parties then entered into an agreement, of which the following is a copy:
"This article of

agreement,

made

against all claims, debts, or liabilities
of the firm of Hudson & Jaquith.
"Trenton, April, 1855.
"Austin E. Jaquith.
[L. S.]
"Jonathan Hudson.
[L. S.]
Arthur Ed"Witness: Arthur Edwards.
wards, Jr."
cation

123.)

Court of Jlichigan.
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and en-

into between Austin B. Jaquith, of
Trenton, Wayne county, and state of Michigan, of the first part, and Jonathan Hudson,
of Ti-enton, county of Wayne, and state of
Michigan, of the second part, witnesseth,
that the said Austin E. Jaquith agrees to
tered

sell, and by these presents does sell and conHudson, his
vey unto the said Jonathan
heirs and assigns, all his right, title, and interest in the stociv of goods now owned by
the firm of Hudson and Jaquith, together
with all the notes, books, boolc accounts,
moneys, deposits, debts, dues, and demands,
as well as all assets that in anywise belong
to the said firm of Hudson & Jaquith; and
that the copartnership that has existed between the said firm of Hudson & Jaquith is
hereby dissolved; and that the said Austin
E. Jaquith, by these presents, agrees that he
will not engage in the mercantile business, in
Trenton, for himself, or in connection with
any other one, for the space of three years
from this date, upon the forfeiture of the
sum of one thousand dollars, to be collected
In conby the said Hudson as his damages.
sideration whereof, the said Jonathan Hudson, of the second part, agrees for himself,
his heirs and administrators, to pay unto the
said Austin E. Jaquith the sum of nine hundred dollars, for his services in the firm of
Hudson & Jaquith, together with all the
money that he (the said Austin E. Jaquith)
paid into said firm, deducting therefrom the
amount which he (the said Austin B. Jaquith) has drawn from said firm; the remainder the said Hudson agrees to pay to the
said .Taquith, his heirs or assigns, at a time
and in a' manner as shall be specified in a
note bearing even date with these presents.

And the said Hudson, for himself, his heirs

agrees to pay all the debts,
and assigns,
notes and liabilities of the firm of Hudson &
Jaquith, and to execute unto the said Jaquith a good and sufficient bond of Indemnifi-

And defendant further gave notice, among
things, that he would show, on the
trial, tliat, after the execution of said agreement In writing, and the giving of said note
In pursuance thereof, and on or about ,th^
15th day of July, 1855, plaintiff, In violation
of said agreement, entered into the mercantile business at Trenton, and had continued
to cari-y on the same ever since; by means
whereof the consideration of said note had
failed. And he further gave notice, that he
continued to carry on the
(the defendant)
mercantile business at Trenton, after the dissolution of said copartnership; and by means
of the breach of said articles by plaintiff,
defendant had sustained damages to the sum
of one thousand dollars, liquidated by said
articles for a breach thereof, which sum he
would claim to have deducted
from the
amount of said note, on the ti-ial.
On the trial, the plalntiflE, having introduced the note in evidence, rested his case.
Defendant then proved by Arthur Edwards
the due execution
of said agreement.
The
defendant
also proved by the said witness
that the plaintiff resumed mercantile business in July, 18.55, in the village of Trenton,
within eighty rods of the old stand of Hudson & Jaquith, and had ever since contlniied
in such business.
On cros.s-examination,
Capt. Edwards testified that the above agreement was made in
duplicate, and signed by the parties about
the middle of April, 1855, which duplicates
were placed In his hands, to be kept till the
bond of indemnity and note mentioned In the
agreement
were executed;
that the duplicates were not to be delivered till both parties came and demanded them.
Hudson at
once took exclusive possession of tlie store,
goods, books, and papers of the old firm of
Hudson & Jaquith, where the duplicate
agreements were signed, and they were left
In witness' hands until the other papers mentioned in them were executed.
Witness did
not recollect whether it was said by the parties that the agreement was not to take effect till both parties came for the duplicates.
Witness never delivered to the defendant the
agreement now produced by him, and cannot
tell how, it came into his possession.
The
plaintiff and defendant never came and jointly demanded the duplicates of him. He has
no recollection that either of tlie parties ever
notified him not to deliver over the papers.
On re-examination, witness said he lived
at Trenton in 1855, and his papers were for
the most part kept there.
Witness cannot
delivering this duplicate to deremember
other
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fendant
It might have been delivered by
him to defendant, but witness has no recollection of it.
Tlie defendant then, by another witness,
gave evidence tending to show that, not long
after the date of said agreement, tlie bond
of Indemnity mentioned in the agreement
was executed by defendant and delivered to
the plaintiff.
No evidence was given to show any damage sustained by the defendant by reason of
plaintiff's again engaging in business in Trenton.

The plaintiff then called as a witness Arthur Edwards, .Jr., who testified that he was
one of the subscribing witnesses
to said
agreement.
The duplicate agreements were
to go into Capt. Edwards' hands, and to be
delivered only when plaintiff and defendant
came together
for and demanded
them.
When they were ready for signing, plaintiff
hesitated about signing the duplicates,
but
witness thinks that Capt. Edwards then said
that plaintiff could sign them safely, as he
(the said Capt. Edwards) would hold them
until they were jointly demanded;
cannot
remember
whether Hudson or Edwards
made the remark, but one of them made
some remark- which gave witness the impression that these duplicate papers were to
be null until they should be both simultaneously delivei'ed to the parties.
Witness was
in and out of the room, and did not hear
the whole conversation,
and cannot say positively whether Hudson was there when this
remark was made.
There was something
said about some other papers, but witness
could not recollect it distinctly.
The court was then asked by plaintiff's
counsel to charge the jury as follows:
"(1) That a delivery to both parties, at the
same time, of the agreement in duplicate,
by Capt. Arthur Edwards, was essential to
give it effect, and render it operative
beand,
tween the said plaintiff and defendant;
before the defendant can claim the full benefit of it, he must show either such a delivery as was agreed upon, or a willful refusal, on the part of the plaintiff, that such
delivery should be made.
"(2) That, even if the agreement set up
was, in the opinion of the jury, properly delivered, as between the parties, the defendant
against the
can not recoup any damages
plaintiff, except upon evidence showing that
by
damage was actually sustained
some
him; that the clause in the agreement as to
cannot, of itself, and In the abdamages
sence of evidence, operate to the reduction
of the claim of the plaintiff, as the sum fixed
in the agreement Is In the nature of a penand no
alty, and not liquidated damages;
damages can be recovered under it except
such as are proven."
The court refused so to charge; and plaintiff excepted.
The court then charged the jury in substance as follows:

That, if the jury were satisfied that the
agreements were placed in Capt.
Edwards' hands under the agreement between the parties that the same were not to
become operative until both parties called on
him to deliver them, that then they must be
satisfied
that such a delivery
had taken
place, or the agreement
had never taken
effect; but if, on the other hand, they should
be satisfied that the real nature of the transaction was that the said duplicate agreements were to be placed in Oapt. Edwards'
hands solely to await the future execution
and delivery of the bond, note, etc., mentioned in the agreement,
and were thereupon to
become operative,
that then no formal delivery of said duplicates
was necessary.
The agreement in such case would take efduplicate

fect as soon as the bond, note, etc., mentioned, were made and delivered to plaintiff.
The court further charged the jury, that it
was not necessary for the defendant to prove
any actual
plaintiff's
damage
under
the
breach of the said agreement, as the damages therein fixed were liquidated damages,
and not a penalty.
The issue was then submitted to the jury
on the evidence, who found a verdict for the
plaintiff, In the sum of eighteen dollars and
eight cents, allowing the defendant the sum
of one thousand dollars mentioned In the
agreement.
Plaintiff brought the case to this court, by
writ of error, accompanied by bill of exceptions.

D. Bethune Dufiield, for plaintiff in error.
G. V. N. Lothrop, for defendant in error.

J. The first point upon
the court below was requested
to
charge, and for the refusal of which the first
exception Is taken, assumed that, by the arrangement between the parties, the contract
was not to become operative, or to have any
force or effect, until the duplicates should be
delivered by Capt. Edwards to both parties
at the same time.
Whether such was the effect of the arrangement, or whether the agreements were
placed in the hands of Capt. Edwards solely
to await the execution and delivery of the
bond and note mentioned
In the contract,
and thereupon
to become operative,
was a
question which depended upon the intention
of the parties, to be gathered from the whole
transaction, their acts and declarations, and.
In some measure, upon the nature and provisions of the contract itself. It was a question of fact Involved in the issue. The couit
had no right to assume the truth or falsehood of either side of the question.
The evidence bearing upon the point was conflicting.
It was as clearly a question of fact for
the jury as any other fact in issue in the
cause.
To have charged the jury as requested would have been an encroachment
by the court upon the province of the jury.
CHRISTIANCY,

which
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The question was, therefore, properly submitted to the jury. The charge of the court
In this particular was in all respects fair and
correct, and the verdict of the jury is conclusive upon this point.
The first exception,
therefore, is not well taken.
The second exception
raises the single
question, whether the sum of $1,000, mentioned in the covenant of Jaquith not to go
into business in Trenton, is to be construed
as a penalty, or as stipulated damages— the
plaintiff in error insisting it should be construed as the former, the defendant as the
latter.
We shall not attempt here to analyze all
the decided cases upon the subject, which
were read and cited upon the argument, and
which, with others, have been examined.
It
is not to be denied that there is some conflict, and more confusion. In the cases; judges
have been long and constantly complaining
of the confusion and want of harmony in
But, while
the decisions upon this subject.
a very great
no one can fall to discover
amount of apparent conflict, still it will be
found, on examination, that most of the cases,
however conflicting in appearance, have yet
been decided according to the justice and
equity of the particular case. And while
there are some Isolated cases (and they are
but few), which seem to rest upon no very
intelligible principle, it will be found, we
think, that the following general principles
may be confidently said to result from, and
to reconcile, the great majority of the cases,
both in England and in this country:
First. The law, following the dictates of
equity and natural justice, in cases of this
kind, adopts the principle of just compensation for the loss or injury actually sustained;
considering It no greater violation of this
principle to confine the injured party to the
recovery of less, than to enable him by the
aid of the court to extort more. It is the
application, In a court of law, of that principle long recognized
in courts of equity,
which, disregarding the penalty of the bond,
gives only the damages actually sustained.
This principle may be stated, in other words,
to be, that courts of justice will not recognize or enforce a contract, or any stipulation
of a contract, clearly unjust and unconscionable; a principle of common sense and common honesty so obviously in accordance with
the dictates of justice and sound policy as
to make it rather matter of surprise that
courts of law had not always, and in all
cases, adopted it to the same extent as courts
of equity. And, happily for the purposes of
justice, the tendency of courts of law seems
now to be towards the full recognition of the
principle, in all cases.
This principle of natural justice, the courts
of law, following courts of equity, have, in
this class of cases, adopted as the law of
the contract; and they will not permit the
parties by express stipulation, or any form
of language, however clear the intent, to set
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It aside; on the familiar ground, "conventus
privatorum non potest publico juri derogare."
But the court will apply this principle,
and disregard the express stipulation of parties, only in those cases where it is obvious
from the contract before them, and the whole
subject-matter, that the principle of compensation has been disregarded, and that to
carry out the express stipulation of the parties, would violate this principle, which alone
the co^urt recognizes as the law of the contract.
The violation, or disregard, of this prinmay appear to the
ciple of compensation,
court in various ways,—from the contract,
the sum mentioned, and the subject-matter.
Thus, where a large sum (say one thousand
dollars) is made payable solely in consequence of the non-payment of a much smaller sum (say one hundred dollars), at a certain day; or where the contract is for the
performance of several stipulations of very
different degrees of importance, and one
large sum is made payable on the breach
of any one of them, even the most trivial,
the damages for which can, in no reasonable probability, amount to that sum; In
the first case, the court must see that the
real damage is readily computed, and that
the principle of compensation
has been overor purposely disregarded;
looked,
in the
second case, though there may be more difficulty in ascertaining the precise amoimt of
damage, yet, as the contract exacts the same
large sum for the breach of a trivial or comparatively unimportant stipulation, as for
that of the most important, or of all of them
together. It Is equally clear that the parties
have wholly departed from the idea of just
compensation,
and attempted
to fix a rule
of damages which the law will not recognize
or enforce.
We do not mean to say that the principle
above stated as deducible from the cases. Is
to be found generally announced In express
terms, in the language of the courts; but it
will be found, we think, to be necessarily
Implied In, and to form the only rational
foundation for, all that large class of cases
which have held the sum to be in the nature
of a penalty, notwithstanding the strongest
and most explicit declarations of the parties
that it was intended as stipulated and ascertained damages.
It Is true, the courts In nearly all these
cases profess to be construing the contract
with reference to the intention of the parties, as if for the purpose of ascertaining and
giving effect to that intention; yet It Is obvious, from .these cases, that wherever it has
appeared to the com-t, from the face of the
contract and the subject-matter, that the sum
was clearly too large for just compensation,
here, while they will allow any form of
words, even those expressing the direct contrary, to indicate the Intent to make it a
penalty, yet no form of words, no force of
language, is competent to the expression ot
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opposite intent. Here, tlien, Is an intention incapable of expression
in words;
and as all written contracts must be expressed in words, it would seem to be a
mere waste of time and effort to look for
such an intention in such a contract.
And
as the question is between two opposite intents only, and the negation
of the one
necessarily implies the existence of the other,
there would seem to be no room' left for
construction with reference to the intent. It
must, then, be manifest that the Intention
of the parties in such cases is not the governing consideration.
But some of the cases attempt to justify
this mode of construing the contract with
reference to the intent, by declaring, in substance,
that though the language is the
strongest which could be used to evince the
intention in favor of stipulated damages,
still, if it appear clearly, by reference to the
subject-matter, that the parties have. made
the stipulation without reference to the principle of just compensation, and so excessive
as to be out of all proportion to the actual
damage, the court must hold that they could
not have intended it as stipulated damages,
though they have so expressly
declared.
See, as an example of this class of cases,
Kemble v. Farren, 6 Bing. 141.
Now this, it is true, may lead to the same
result in the particular case, as to have
placed the decision upon the true ground,
viz., that though the parties actually intendthe

ed the sum to be paid, as the damages agreed
upon between them, yet it being clearly unconscionable,
the court would disregard the
intention, and refuse to enforce the stipulaBut, as a rule of construction, or intion.
terpretation of contracts, it is radically vicious, and tends to a confusion of ideas in
It
generally.
the construction of contracts
is this, more than anything else, which has
produced so much apparent conflict in the
decisions upon this whole subject of penalty
It sets at defiance
and stipulated damages.
all rules of interpretation, by denying the
Intention of the parties to be what they, in
the most unambiguous terms, have declared
it to be, and finds an intention directly opposite to that which is clearly expressed —

"divinatlo, non interpretatio est, quEe omnino
recedit a litera."
Again, the attempt to place this question
and to
upon the intention of the parties,
make this the governing consideration,
necessarily implies that, if the intention to make
the sum stipulated damages should clearly
appear, the court would enforce the contract
according to that intention. To test this, let
it be asked, whether, in such a case, if it
were admitted that the parties actually intended the sum to be considered as stipulated damages, and not as a penalty, would a
court of law enforce It for the amount stipuClearly, they could not, without golated?
ing back to the technical and long exploded
doctrine which gave the whole penalty of

the bond, without
actually sustained.
ply changing the
forcing, under the
ages, what in its

to the damages
They would thus be simnames of things, and enname of stipulated damown nature is but a penreference

alty.
The real question in this class of cases
will be found to be, not what the parties
intended, but whether the sum Is, in fact,
in the nature of a penalty; and this is to be
determined by the magnitude of the sum', in
connection with the subject-matter, and not
at all by the words or the understanding of
the parties.
The intention of the parties can
not alter it.
While courts of law gave the
penalty of the bond, the parties intended the
payment of the penalty as much as they
now intend the payment of stipulated damages; it must, therefore, we think, be very
obvious that the actual intention of the parties, in this class of cases, and relating to
this point, is wholly immaterial; and though
the courts have very generally professed to
base their decisions upon the intention of the
parties, that intention is not, and can not
be made, the real basis of these decisions.
In endeavoring to reconcile their decisions
with the actual intention of the parties, the
courts have sometimes
been compelled
to
use language wholly at war with any idea
of interpretation, and to say "that the parties mu.st be considered as not meaning exactly what they say." Homer v. Flintoff,
May it not be
9 Mees. & W., per Park, B.
said, with at least equal propriety, that the
courts have sometimes said what they did
not exactly mean?
The foregoing remarks are all to be confined to that class of cases where it was
clear, from the sum mentioned and the subject-matter, that the principle of compensation had been disregarded.
But, secondly, there are great numbers of
cases, where, from the nature of the contract and the subject-matter of the stipulation, for the breach of which the simi is
provided,
it is apparent to the court that
the actual damages for a breach are uncertain in their nature, diffleult to be ascertained, or impossible to be estimated
with
certainty, by reference
to any pecuniary
standard, and where the parties themselves
are more intimately acquainted with all the
peculiar circumstances, and therefore better
able to compute the actual or probable damages, than courts or juries, from any evidence which can be brought before them.
In all such cases, the law permits the parties to ascertain for themselves, and to provide in the contract itself, the amount of
the damages which shall be paid for the
In permitting this, the law does
breach.
not lose sight of the principle of compensation, which is the law of the contract, but
merely adopts the computation or estimate
of the damages made by the parties, as being the best and most certain mode of ascertaining the actual damage, or what sum
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will amount

The
to a just compensation.
therefore, for allowing the parties to
ascertain for themselves the damages in this
class of cases. Is the same which denies the
right in the former class of cases; viz., the
courts adopt the best and most practicable
mode of ascertaining the sum which will
produce just compensation.
In this class of cases where the law permits the parties to ascertain and fix the
amount of damages in the contract, the first
inquiry obviously is, whether they have done
so in fact?
And here, the intention of the
parties is the governing consideration; and
in ascertaining this intention, no merely
technical effect will be given to the particular words relating to the sum, but the entire contract, the subject-matter, and often
the situation of the parties with respect to
each other and to the subject-matter, will be
Thus though the word "penalconsidered.
ty" be used (Salnter v. Fergason, 7 Man., G.
Jones v. Green, 3 Younge & J.
& S. 716;
299; Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass. 223), or "forfeit" (Noble V. Noble, 7 Cow. 307), or "forfeit and pay" (Fletcher v. Dycke, 2 Term R.
32), it will still be held to be stipulated damages, if, from the whole contract, the subject-matter, and situation of the parties, it
can be gathered tliat such was their intention.
And in proportion as the difBculty of
ascertaining the actual damage by proof is
greater or less, where this difficulty grows
out of the nature of such damages, in the
lilce proportion is the presumption more or
less strong that the parties intended to fix

reason,

the amount.

It

remains only to apply these principles
It is contended by
case before us.
the plaintiff in error, that the payment of
the one thousand dollars mentioned in the
covenant of Jaqulth is not made dependent
solely upon the breach of the stipulation not
to go into business In Trenton, but that it
applies equally — First, to the agreement to
sell to Hudson his interest in the goods;
second, to sell his Interest In the books,
notes, accounts, etc.; and, third, to the agreement to dissolve the partnership.
But we
can perceive no ground for such a construction.
The language in reference to the sale
of the interest in the goods, books, notes,
accounts, etc., and that in reference to the
dissolution. Is not that of a sale in futuro,
nor for the dissolution of the partnership at
a future period, but it Is that of a present
sale and a present dissolution — "does hereby
sell," and "the copartnership is hereby dissolved," Is the language of the instrument.
It Is plain, from this language, from the
subject-matter,
and from all the acts of the
parties, that these provisions were to take,
and did take. Immediate effect.
There could
be no possible occasion to provide any penalty or stipulated damages for the non-performance of these stipulations, because this
sale and dissolution would already have been
accomplished
the moment the contract took
to the
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and, until It took
effect for any purpose;
effect, the stipulation for the one thousand
dollars could not take effect or afford any
security, nor would Hudson be bound or
need the security. But it remained to proIf Jaqulth were to be
vide for the future.
at liberty to set up a rival store in the same
village, it might seriously affect the success
of Hudson's business; and we are bound to
infer, from the whole scope of this contract,
that Hudson would never have agreed to
pay the consideration mentioned In it, nor
to have entered Into the contract at all, but
for the stipulation of Jaqulth "that he will
In
not engage in the mercantile business
Trenton, for himself or In connection with
any other one, for the space of three years
from: this date, upon the forfeiture of the
sum of one thousand dollars, to be collected
This
by said Hudson as his damages."
stipulation of Jaqulth not to go Into business, is the only one on his part which looks>
to the future; and it Is to this, alone, that
to the one thouthe language in reference
Any other construction
sand dollars applies.
would do violence to the language, and be
at war with the whole subject matter.
The damages to arise from the breach of
this covenant, from the nature of the case,
must be not only uncertain in their nature,
but impossible to be exhibited in proof, with
any reasonable degree of accuracy, by any
evidence which could possibly be adduced.
It Is easy to see that while the damages
might be very heavy, it would be very difficult clearly to prove any. Their nature and
by tfie
could be better estimated
amount
parties themselves, than by witnesses, courts,
or juries. It is, then, precisely one of thai
class of cases In which It has always been
recognized as peculiarly appropriate for the
parties to fix and agree upon the damages
In such a case, the lanfor themselves.
guage must be very clear to the contrary, to
overcome the inference of intent (so to fix
them), to be drawn from the subject-matter
and the situation of the parties; because, it
Is difficult to suppose, in such a case, that
the party taking the stipulation intended it
only to cover the amount of damages actually to be proved, as he would be entitled to
the latter without the mention of any sum
■
In the contract, and he must also be supposed to know that his actual damages, from
the nature of the case, are not susceptible
of legal proof to anything approaching their
That the parties actually inactual extent.
tended, in this case, to fix the amount to be
recovered. Is clear from the language itself,,
without the aid of a reference to the subject-matter, "upon the forfeiture of the sum
of one thousand dollars, to be collected by
It is
the said Hudson as his damages."
manifest from this language that it was intended Hudson should "collect," or, in other
words, receive this amount,
and that it
should be for his damages for the breach
of the stipulation. This language is stronger
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than "forfeit and pay," or "under tlie penalty of," as these might be supposed to have
reference to the form of the penal part of a
bond, or to the form of action upon it, and
not to the actual "collection" of the money.
It is, therefore, very clear, from every
view we have been able to take of this case,
that it ^vas competent and proper for the
parties to ascertain and fix for themselves
the amount of damages for the breach complained of, and equally clear that they have
done so in fact. From the uncertain nature
of the damages, we cannot say that the sum
in this case exceeds the actual damages, or
that the principle of compensation has been
Indeed, it would have been perviolated.
haps difficult to discover a violation of this

principle had the sum in this case been
more than It now is, though, doubtless, even
in such cases as the present, if the sum
stated were so excessive as clearly to exceed
all reasonable apprehension of actual loss or
injtu'y for the breach, we should be compelled to disregard the intention of the parties, and treat the sum' only as a penalty to
cover the actual damages to be exhibited in
proof. In this case the party must be held
to the amount stipulated in his contract.
The second exception, therefore, is not well
taken; the court properly refused to charge
as requested, and no error appearing in the
record, the judgment of the circuit court for
the county of Wayne must be affirmed.
The other justices concurred.

PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES.
KEEBLE
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Supreme Court

V.

149,

KEEBLE.
85

Ala.

of Alabama.

552.)

Dec. 8, 1888.

Appeal from city court, Dallas county; John
Haralson, Judge.
This was an action brought by the appellant, Henry C. Keeble, against the appellee,
Julia P. Keeble, as the executrix of E. 0.
Keeble, deceased, for the recovery of money
alleged to be due the plaintiff by the depleaded
fendant's testator.
The defendant
the general issue, payment, accord and satisfaction, and set-off.
The only question in the
case arose on the instruction given the jury
by the court, founded on the facts set out
in the seventh plea. The demurrer to this
It -wsls, in
plea vras overruled by the court.
substance, that plaintiff and defendant's testator had been in partnership in the merdanPlaintiff sold out to defendtile business.
ant's testator, but was employed by the latter as business manager.
The terms of the
employment
imposed on plaintiff the obligation to wholly abstain from the use of intoxicating liquors, and, in the event he should
that "he should pay, "as
become intoxicated,
liquidated damages," the sum of $1,000.
The
plea alleged that plaintiff violated his promise
to keep sober, and thereby became bound to
pay to defendant's testator said sum of $1,000,
which sum was offered as a set-off to plaintiff's demand.

Mr. Roy and White & White, for appellant.
Pettus & Pettus, for appellee.

SOMERVILLE, J. The only question in
this case is whether the sum of $1,000, agreed
to be paid by the appellant, Henry C. Keeble,
to Richard C. Keeble, the testator of the appellee, as mentioned in the written contract
of employment between the parties, is to be
regarded by the court as a penalty or as
liquidated damages.
The city court held it,
in effect, to be liquidated damages, by charging the jury to find for the defendant, if
the facts set out in the seventh plea were
satisfactorily proved.
The solution of this
question is one which the courts have often
in determining.
No
confessed embarrassment
one rule can be announced which will furnish a single test or criterion for all cases,
but, in most cases, a multitude of considerations are to be regarded in seeking to reach
The followthe real intention of the parties.
ing general rules may be deduced from the
authorities, each having more or less weight,
of
according to the peculiar circumstances
each case, and the nature of the contract
sought to be construed:
(1) The court will
always seek to ascertain the true and real intention of the contracting parties, giving due
weight to the language or words used in the
contract, but not always being absolutely conof
trolled by them, when the enforcement
such contract operates with unconscionable
or otherwise worlds an injustice.
hardship,

67

of the sum to be
(2) The mere denomination
paid as "liquidated damages," or as "a penalty," Is not conclusive on the court as to
Although designated as
its real character.
"liquidated damages" it may be construed as
a penalty, and often when called a "penalty"
it may be held to be liquidated damages,
where the intention to the contrary is plain.
to lean against
(3) The courts are disposed
any interpretation of a contract which will
make it liquidated damages; and, in all cases
of doubtful intention, will pronounce the stipulated sum a penalty.
(4) Where the payment of a smaller sum is secured by an obligation to pay a larger sum, it will be held
a penalty, and not liquidated damages.
(5)
Where the agreement Is for the performance
or non-performance
of a single act, or of several acts, or of several things which are but
minor parts of a single complex act, and the
precise damage resulting from the violation
of each covenant is wholly uncertain or incapable of being ascertained
save by conjecture, the parties may agree on a fixed sum
as liquidated damages, and the courts will
so construe it, unless it is clear on other
grounds that a penalty was really intended.
(6) When the contract provides for the performance of several acts of different degrees
resulting
of importance,
and the damages
from the violation of some, although not all,
of the provisions are of easy ascertainment,
and one large gross sum is stipulated to be
paid for the breach of any, it will be construed a penalty, and not as liquidated damages.
provides for
(7) When the agreement
the performance of one or more acts, and the
stipulation is to pay the same gross sum for
a partial as for a total or complete breach of
performance,
the sum will be construed to
be a penalty.
(8) Whether the sum agreed
to be paid is out of proportion to the actual
damages, which will probably be sustained
by a breach, is a fact into which the court
will not enter on inquiry, if the intent is otherwise made clear that liquidated damages, and
not a penalty, are in contemplation.
(9) Where
the agreement is in the alternative, to do one
of two acts, but is to pay a larger sum of
money in the one event than in the other,
the obligor having his election to do either,
the amount thus agreed to be paid will be
held liquidated damages, and not a penalty.
(10) In applying these rules, the controlling
purpose of which is to ascertain the real intention of the parties, the court will consider
the nature of the contract, the terms of the
whole Instrument, the consequences naturally
resulting from a breach of its stipulations,
surrounding
and the peculiar circumstances
the transaction; thus permitting each case to
stand, as far as possible, on its own merits
and peculiarities.
These rules are believed
to be sustained by the preponderance
of judicial decisions.
Graham v. Bickham, 1 Am.
Dec. 328, and note, pp. 331-340; Williams v.
Vance. 30 Am. Rep. 26, and note, pp. 28-36;
1 Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 440-446;
McPherson v.
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82 Ala. 459, 2 South. 333; Hooper
Railroad Co., 69 Ala. 529; Watts v. Sheppard, 2 Ala. 425; Bish. Cont. § 1452; Curry
V. Larer, 7 Pa. St. 470; Foley v. McKeegan,
4 Iowa, 1; Nash v. Hermosilla, 9 Cal. 584;
Muse V. Swayne, 2 Lea, 251; 2 Greenl. Ev.

Robertson,

V.

§ 258.

of the
testator as a business manager, at
very liberal wages, having been a partner
with him In the mercantile business, under
Althe firm name of R. C. Keeble & Go.
though he was but an employe, having sold
to R. C. Keeble his entire interest in the parta
ostensibly
nership business, he remained
The terms of the employment, repartner.
duced to writing, imposed on the appellant,
Henry Keeble, the obligation, among other
duties, "to wholly abstain from the use of
intoxicating liquors," and "to continue and remain sober," giving his diligent attention to
the business of his employer, and promising,
in the event he should become intoxicated,
that he would pay, "as liquidated damages,"
the sum of $1,000, which the testator, Richard Keeble, was authorized to retain out of
The
a certain debt he owed the appellant.
appellant violated his promise by becoming
intoxicated, and remained so for a long time,
and acted rudely and insultingly towards the
customers and employes of the testator, and
otherwise deported himself, by reason of intoxication, in such manner as to do injury to
It is not denied by appellant's
the business.
counsel that this is a total breach of the promise to keep sober; nor is it argued that the
damage resulting from the violation of such a
promise can be ascertained with any degree of
certainty; nor even that the amount agreed
to be paid as liquidated damages, in the event
to the damof a breach, is disproportionate
ages which may have been actually sustained
in this case. But the contention seems to be
that, inasmuch as it was possible for a breach
to ocfcur with no actual damages other than
nominal, the amount agreed to be paid should
Unless this
be construed to be a penalty.
view is correct, the application of the foregoing rules to the construction of the agreement manifestly stamps it as a stipulation
for liquidated damages, and not a penalty.
It is argued, in other words, that becoming
intoxicated in private, while off duty, would
be a violation of the contract, but would be
attended with no actual damage to the busiThis fact would,
ness of R. C. Keeble & Co.
in our opinion, except the case from the operation of the rules above enunciated.
There
are but few agreements of this liind where
the stipulation is to do or not do a particular
act, in which the damages may not, according to circumstances, vary, on a sliding scale,
from nominal damages to a considerable sum.
One may sell out the good-will of his business in a given locality, and agree to abstain
from its further prosecution, or, in the event
of his breach of his agreement, to pay a cerThe appellant was in the employment

appellee's

tain sum as liquidated damages;

as, for exnot to practice one's profession as a
physician or lawyer, not to run a steam-boat
on a certain river or to carry on the hotel
business in a particular town, not to re-establish a newspaper for a given period, or to
carry on a particular branch of business within a certain distance from a named city.
In
all such cases, as often decided, it is competent for the parties to stipulate for the payment of a gross sum by way of liquidated
damages for the violation of the agreement,
and for the very reason that such damages
are uncertain,
and incapable of
fluctuating,
easy ascertainment.
Williams v. Vance, 30
Am. Rep. 29-31, note; Graham v. Bickham, 1
Am. Dec. 336-338, note; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur.
It is clear that each of these
§ 442, note 1.
various agreements may be violated by a substantial breach, and yet no damages might
accrue except such as are nominal.
The
obligor may practice medicine, and possibly
never interfere with the practice of the other
contracting party; or law, without having a
paying client; or he may run a steam-boat
without a passenger; or an hotel without a
guest; or carry on a newspaper without the
least injury to any competitor.
But the law
will not enter upon an investigation as to the
quantum of damages in such cases.
This is
the very matter settled by the agreement of
the parties.
If the act agreed not to be done
is one from which, in the ordinary course of
events, damages, incapable of ascertainment
save by conjecture, are liable naturally to follow, sometimes more and sometimes less, according to the aggravation of the act, the
court will not stop to investigate the extent of
the grievance complained of as a total breach,
but will accept the sum agreed on as a proper
and just measurement, by way of liquidated
damages, unless the real intention of the parties, under the rules above announced,
designed it as a penalty.
We may add, moreover, that no one can accurately estimate the
physiological relation between private and
public drunkenness,
nor the causal connection between Intoxication one time and a score
of times.
The latter, in each instance, may
follow from the former, and the one may
naturally lead to the other.
There would
seem to be nothing harsh or unreasonable
in
stipulating against the very source and beginning of the more aggravated evil sought to
be avoided.
The duty resting on the court.
In all these cases, is to so apply the settled
rules of construction as to ascertain the legally expressed and real intention of the parties.
Courts are under no obligations, nor have they
the power, to make a wiser or better contract
for either of the parties than he may be supposed to have made for himself.
The court
below, in our judgment, did not err in holding, as it did, by its rulings, that the sum
agreed to be paid the appellee's testator was
liquidated damages, and not a penalty. Af»
firmed.
ample,
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et al. v.

EXCELSIOR BUILDING

LOAN ASS'N NO. 2 OF CITY
OF NEWARK.
(8 Atl. 310, 42 N.

J.

Eq. 408.)

Court of Errors and Appeals of New .Jersey.
March 5, 1887.
C. T. Glen, for appellants.
for respondents.

Guild & Lum,

KNAPP, J. The learned master who decided this cause reached the conclusion on
the evidence that the purchaser of the premises, and not the mortgagee, should bear the
loss incident to the fraudulent cancellation of
the mortgage made upon the record prior to
the purchase, on the faith of which cancellation the buyer parted with the whole purchase money believing the property to be unincumbered.
After a careful review of the
am
case,
am led to an opposite result.
fully impressed with the importance of securing due protection to the holders of mortgage securities, where, in pursuit of the provisions of the registry laws, the lien has been
The security
made apparent on the record.
afforded by registry should remain undisturbed by a cancellation effected through mistalie, accident, or fraud of third persons, even
if by such cancellation subsequent mortgagees or purchasers are made to suffer loss.
Such after-acquired rights ought not to prevail against the just claims of an innocent
incumbrancer, because the recnon-negligent
ord has been wrongly effaced.
Cancellation
of a mortgage on the record is only prima
facie evidence of its discharge, and it is left
to the owner making the allegation to prove
the canceling to have been done by fraud,
accident, or mistake.
Such proof being made,
mortgage
will be established,
even
the
against subsequent purchasers or mortgagees
Banking Co. v. Woodruff,
without notice.
2 N. J. Eq. 117; Harrison v. Railroad Co.,

I

I

N. J. Eq. 488.
Between a mortgagee whose mortgage has
been discharged of record solely through the
unauthorized act of another party, and a
purchaser who buys the title in the belief,
induced by such cancellation, that the mort19

the equities
gage is satisfied and discharged,
are balanced, and the rights in the order of
The lien of the mortgage
time must prevail.
must remain despite the apparent discharge.

But this

13

apart from any default attributa-

If through his
ble to the holder of the lien.
the record is permitted to give
negligence
notice to the world that his claim is satisfied,
he cannot, in the face of his own carelessness, have his mortgage enforced against a
bona fide purchaser taking his title on the
faith that the registrj' is discharged.
Where
one gives to another the power to practice a
fraud upon innocent parties, the court will
not interfere in his protection at the expense
of those who have been deceived and misled
by such fraud. What circumstance shall be
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such as
to establish negligence,
sufficient
shall preclude a mortgagee from a decree
establishing his canceled paper, must be determined as a question of fact in each particular case, tested by those rules of conduct
which men of common prudence usually obof such
serve in the care and management
That it is negligence in the ownsecurities.
er of a mortgage to permit it to be in the
custody and control of the mortgagor or owner of the mortgaged premises, in view of the

of our statute of registry, will not
Such an occurrence is so
admit of denial.
unusual, so Imperils the owner, and therefore so unlikely to happen in business dealings, that it was regarded in Harrisop v. Railroad Co. as ground for the gravest suspicion
of the truthfulness of a witness who had testified to such custody by the assent of the
owner of the security.
The minute of discharge of this mortgage
made upon the record by the register expressed, in general form, the fact of cancellaThe entry was made upon evidence
tion.
presented to the register such as the statute
has declared to be sufficient authority for so
The mortgage was produced by the
doing.
canceled, and there is no doubt
mortgagor,
that upon the faith of this cancellation the
purchaser took title to the property, and paid
But it clearly appears
the consideration.
that the mortgage was unpaid, and that the
act of tbe mortgagor in procuring the entry
of the discharge was fraudulent, and without
the knowledge or assent of the mortgagee.
If this were all of the case, and no default
appeared on the part of the mortgagee, notwithstanding the forcible language of the
act which declares such minute to be a full
and absolute bar to and discharge of the said
entry, registry, and mortgage, the riglit of
the respondent
to the lien of its security
should be maintained; and it is solely upon
provisions

the ground that the respondent is chargeable
with negligence which tended to and actually did produce the injury that
think the
decree should be reversed.
The mortgage
was in the possession and under the control
of the mortgagor at the time when it was
produced for cancellation on the record. How
long he had such custody does not positively appear, but the strong inference from the
testimony is that it was during the whole
time between the registry of the mortgage
and its cancellation. Neither the president
of the association, nor its treasurer, who had
charge of its securities, were able to say that
they ever had the actual custody of this mortand they further declare
that the
gage;
although an officer of the commortgagor,
pany, had no access whatever to the securiIt is
ties in the possession of the treasurer.
therefore impossible that he should have obtained its possession by means resembling
think, be attheft. His possession must,
tributed either to the assent or to the negligence of the officers of the association responIf we regard the thesible for its securities.

I

I
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ory that the mortgagor, at the conclusion of
his transaction of the loan, fraudulently substituted a copy of the mortgage for the original paper, and delivered that to the association, I am still forced to the conclusion that
the officers were culpably negligent in permitting themselves to be thus imposed upon.
The fact that he was the law officer of this
body would not justify so implicit a trust
in him in the matter of a loan to himself.
We must assume that these officers were men
of business capacity and sliill. The ti'ansaetion was in the line of their ordinary duIndeed, they did not trust to him, but
ties.
employed
other counsel to make searches
against his property. In their ordinary transactions their habit was to submit to counsel
the securities received for loans for inspecThe slightest examination and approval.
tion of the paper received by them would
They subhave shown it to be but a copy.
mitted it to no legal adviser; they gave It
If it were not intended to
no examination.
be, as was its purport a mere copy, leaving
the original in other hands, any degree of
care, exceeding the blindest confidence, must
have revealed the deception.
The theory fails
I do not
to lead us out of the difficulty.

think that any circumstance presented in this
case made it the appellant's duty, in order to
avail himself of the rights of a bona fide
inquiry of
purchaser,
to institute personal
Any rule placing him under
the mortgagee.
this exaction would embrace every case of
a purchase of lands that had ever been subject to mortgage which the record showed to
be canceled.
Such a rule, it is needless to
say, would render this provision of the registry act entirely nugatory. A purchaser could
then only buy with safety when the registry
had been discharged,
and an admission
of
payment obtained
from the mortgagee.
Doubtless circumstances may, and frequently
do, arise to put the purchaser
upon Inquiry,
and charge him with notice.
It seems to me
that nothing appears in this transaction
which should have put tliis purchaser upon
further inquiry. He was permitted to rely
upon the record.
He did so, purchasing
upon the belief that it spoke the fact truly.
It was false, but the deception was directly
traceable to the culpable negligence of the
mortgage owner, and the loss should fall upon the party chargeable with the fault.
The decree below should be reversed, and
the bill of complainants
be dismissed.
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(4 De Gex,

Court of Appeal

PHILLIPS.
F. & J. 208.)

in Chancery.

Jan.

I do not mean to rest my decision
that particular ground because I have
permitted the argument to proceed with reference to the general proposition, which was
maintained before me with great energy
and learning, viz., that the doctrine of a
court of equity was this, that it would give
no relief whatever to any claimant against
a purchaser for valuable consideration withIt was urged upon me that auout notice.
thority to this effect was to be foun^ in
of this court, and
decisions
some recent
particularly in the case decided at the rolls
of Attorney General v. Wilkins, 17 Beav.
But

V.

F. O. Haynes, for plaintiff. Mr.
and John Pearson, for defendants.
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upon

11,

1862.

Malins

Tile LORD CHANCELLOR.
When I reserved my judgment at the conclusion of the argument in this case, it was
rather out of respect to that argument than
from a feeling of any difBculty with regard
to the question that had been so strenuously contested before me.
The case is a very simple one. The plaintiff claims as the grantee of an annuity
granted by a deed dated In the month of
February, 1820, to issue out of certain lands
by
in the county of Monmouth, secured
The annuity
powers of distress and entry.
or rent charge was not to arise until the
death of one Rebecca Phillips, who died in
the month of December, 1839, and the first
payment of the annuity became due on the
8th March, 1840.
The case was argued on both sides on the
admitted basis that the legal estate was outand is
standing in certain incumbrancers,
still outstanding. Subject to the annuity
the grantor was entitled in fee simple in
In February, 1821, the grantor inequity.
On the
termarried with one Mary Phillips.
occasion of that marriage a settlement, dated
in February, 1821, was executed, and unclaim,
and
der this deed the defendants
as purchasers
for a valuclaim, therefore,
No payment has ever
able consideration.
been made in respect of the annuity.
The bill was filed within twenty years,
and seelis the ordinary relief applicable to
the case. The defendants by their answer
insist that the deed was voluntary, and
therefore void, under the statute of Elizabeth, as against them in their character of
and
purchasers for valuable consideration,
they also Insist upon the statute of limitaBut in the answer the defense of
tions.
for valuable consideration withpurchase
out notice is not attempted to be raised.
At the hearing an affidavit of Mary Phillips and another person was produced, denying the fact of notice of the annuity at
the time of the grant and at the time of the
creation of the marriage settlement, and the
at the bar was that the defense
contention
of purchase for valuable consideration without notice was available for the defendants
under these circumstances, and ought to be
allowed as a bar to the claim by the court.
The vice chancellor in his judgment refused
to admit the defense of purchase for valuable consideration without notice, and I entirely agree with him in the conclusion that
such a defense requires to be pleaded by
the answer,
more especially where an answer has been put in.

285.

I undoubtedly was struck with the novelty and extent of the doeti-ine that was
thus advanced, and in order to deal with
to rethe argument it becomes necessary
principles. I take it to
vert to elementary
be a clear proposition that every conveyance of an equitable interest is an innocent
conveyance, that is to say, the grant of a
person entitled merely in equity passes only
that which he is justly entitled to and no
If, therefore, a person seised of an
more.
equitable estate (the legal estate being outby way of
standing)
makes an assurance
mortgage
or grants an annuity, and afterwards conveys the whole estate to a purchaser, he can grant to the purchaser that
which he has, viz., the estate subject to the
The
mortgage
or annuity, and no more.
subsequent
grantee takes only that which
is left in the grantor. Hence grantees and
incumbrancers claiming in equity take and
are ranked according to the dates of their
securities; and the maxim applies,
"Qui
prior est tempore potior est jure." The first
He has
grantee is potior, that is potentior.
a better and superior, because a prior, equity. The first gi-antee has a right to be
paid first, and it is quite immaterial whethincumbrancers, at the
er the subsequent
time when they took their securities and
paid their money, had notice of the first incumbrance or not. These elementary rules
in the case of Brace v.
are recognized
Duchess of Marlborough, 2 P. Wms. 491,
and they are further illustrated by the familiar doctrine of the court as to tacking
It is well known that if there
securities.
are three incumbrancers, and the third 'incumbrancer,
at the time of his incumbrance
and payment of his money, had no notice
of the second incumbrance, then, if the first
or incumbrancer has the legal
mortgagee
estate, and the third pays him off, and
takes an assignment of his securities and a
of the legal estate, he is enticonveyance
tled to tack his third mortgage to the first
mortgage which he has acquired, and to exclude the intermediate incumbrancer; but
this doctrine is limited to the ease where the
first mortgagee has the legal title, for, if
has not the legal title,
the first moitgagee
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the third does not, by the transfer, obtain
the legal title, and the third mortgagee, by
payment off of the first, acquires no priority over the second. Now the defense of
a purchaser for valuable consideration
is the
creature of a court of equity, and it can
never be used in a manner at variance with
the elementary
rules which have already
been stated.
It seems at first to have been
used as a shield against the claim in equity
Bassett v.
of persons ha^•ing a legal title.
Nosworthy, Finch, Hr-'. 2 White & T. Lead.
Cas. Eq. 1, is, if not the earliest, the best
There
early reported case on the subject.
the plaintiff claimed under a legal title, and
this circumstance, together with the maxim
which I have referred to, probably gave rise
to the notion that this defense was good
only against the legal title; but there appear to be three cases in which the use of
this defense is most familiar:
First, where an application is made to an
auxiliary jurisdiction of the court by the
possessor of a legal title, as by an heir at
law (which was the case in Bassett v. Xosworthy. Finch, 102. 2 White & T. Lead. Cas.
Eq. 1), or by a tenant for life for the delivery of title deeds (which was the case of
Wallwyn v. Lee, 9 Ves. 24), and the defendant pleads that he is a bona fide purwithout
consideration
chaser
for valuable
notice.
In such a case the defense is good,
and the reason given is that, as against a
withpurchaser for valuable consideration
out notice, the court gives no assistance,
that is, no assistance to the legal title. But
this rule does not apply where the court exercises a legal jurisdiction concurrently with
Thus it was decided by Lord
courts of law.
Thurlow in Williams v. Lambe, 3 Brown
Ch. 264, that the defense could not be pleaded to a bill for dower, and by Sir J. Leach
in Colluis V. Archer, 1 Russ. & M. 284, that
it was no answer to a bill for fines. In

cases the court of equity was not
to give the plaintiff any equitable, as
distinguished from legal, relief.
The second class of cases Is the ordinary
or incumbrancers,
one of several purchasers
each claiming in equity, and one who is later
and last in time succeeds in obtaining an
outstanding legal estate not held upon existing' trusts or a judgment, or any other legal
advantage the possession of which may be
a protection to himself or an embarrassment
He will not be deprived
to other claimants.
To
of this advantage by a court of equity.
a bill filed against him' for this purpose, by
or incumbrancer, the dea prior purchaser
fendant may maintain the plea of pm'chase
for valuable consideration without notice, for
the principle is that a court of equity will
not disarm a purchaser, that is, will not take
from him the shield of any legal advantage.
This is the common doctrine of the tabula in
those
asked

naufragio.
Thirdly,

where

there

are

circumstances

that give rise to an equity as distinguished
from an equitable estate,— as, for example,
an equity to set aside a deed for fraud, or
to correct it for mistake,— and the purchaser
under the instrument maintains the plea of
without
purchase for valuable consideration
notice, the court will not interfere.
Now these are the three cases in which the
defense in question Is most commonly found.
None of them involve the case that is now
me.
indeed said at the bar that the defendants,
being in possession, had a legal
in respect of the possession, of
advantage
but
which they ought not to be deprived;
that is to confound the subject of adjudication with the means of determining it.
The possession is the thing which is the subject of controversy, and is to be awarded by
but the
the court to one or to the other;
subject of controversy and tlie means of determining the right to that subject are perin fact,
fectly different.
The argument,
amounts to this, "I ought not to be deprived
of possession, because I have possession."
The purchaser will not be deprived of anything that gives him a legal right to the possession, but the possession itself must not be
confounded
with the right to it.
have to decide is
The case therefore that
the ordinary case of a person claiming, unthat
der an innocent equitable conveyance,
interest which existed in the grantor at the
time when that conveyance was made; but,
as I have already said, that interest was diminished by the estate that had been previously granted to the annuitant, and, as
there was no ground for pretending that the
deed creating the annuity was a voluntary
deed, so there is no ground whatever for contending that the estate of the person taking
under the subsequent marriage settlement is
not to be treated by this court, being an
equitable estate, as subject to the antecedent
annuity, just as effectually as if the annuity
itself had been noticed and excepted out of
the operation of the subsequent instrument.
I have no difficulty, therefore, in holding
that the plea of purchase for valuable conis upon principle not at all apsideration
plicable to the case before me, even if I
could take notice of it as having been rightly
and regularly raised.
We next come to examine the authorities
Now, unupon which the defense relies.
doubtedly, I cannot assent to some observations which
find attributed to the master of
the rolls in the report of the case of Attorney
General v. Wilkins, 17 Beav. 285, but to the
decision of that case, as explained
by his
honor in the subsequent
case of Colyer v.
Finch, 19 Beav. 5CI0, I see no reasonable objection, and the principles that I have here
been referring to are fully explained
and
acted on by the master of the rolls In the
case of Colyer v. Finch, 19 Beav. 500.
It is
impossible, therefore, to suppose that he inbefore

It was

I

I
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to lay down anything in ttie case of
Attorney General v. Wilkins, 17 Beav. 285,
which is at variance with the ordinary rules
of the court as I have already explained
them, or which could give countenance to the
argument that has been raised before me at
the bar.
I have consequently no difficulty in holding
that the decree of his honor the vice chancellor Is right upon the grounds on which be
placed it in the court below, and that also it
would have been right if he had considered
the grounds which have been urged before
me in support of this petition of rehearing.
I therefore affirm the decree and dismiss the
petition of rehearing; but, inasmuch as the

tended
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plaintiff sues In forma pauperis, of course
it must be dismissed without costs.
Mr. Pearson, for appellant,
turn of the deposit.

asked

for a re-

The LORD CHANOEILLOR.
I think that the respondent should have the
You purchase the libbenefit of the deposit.
I do not
erty of coming here by the deposit.
think that I can give the appellant any further costs against you, but I can give him the
benefit of the deposit which, according to the
rules of the court, you have made. Therefore the deposit will be given to him, unless
it exceeds the costs of the appeal.
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KNAPP
(9

Supreme

Atl.

.Tudicial

V.

BAILEY.

122, 79 Me. 195.)

Court of Maine.

March

1,

1887.

On appeal from decision of single justice
at nisi prius, Penobscot county.
Bill in equity brought to remove a cloud
from the complainant's title, and to redeem
The
the land from an equitable mortgage.
judge at nisi prius rendered a decision in favor of the complainant, and the respondent
appealed to the law court.

A. W. Paine and 0. P. Stetson, for comDavis & Bailey, for respondent.

plainant.

PETERS, C. J. This bill seeks to remove
a cloud overhanging the complainant's title
to an undivided parcel of land,— in effect, to
redeem the land from an equitable mortgage,
the allegation being that the debt has been
paid.
We can have no reasonable doubt of
The defendant's
the facts thus far alleged.
grantor was called as a witness by the complainant. The defendant contends that his
testimony was inadmissible, and cites cases
which sustain the ordinary principle that a
grantor cannot dispute with his grantee the
title which he has assumed to convey. The
objection goes to the testimony, and not to
The principle of esthe witness personally.
not
toppel, which is involied, is aimed,
against the witness because he is a grantor,
but against any oral testimony to contradict
the terms of a deed. As said by .Judge Curtis in answer to the same objection: "The
facts to be proved were dehors the record,
and one witness was as competent, in point
of law, [to prove them,] as another." 'Where
a grantor is allowed to prove a fact by another, he may do so by himself. Holbrook v.
Bank, 2 Curt. 246.
It is true, as a general rule, that the effect
of a deed cannot be controlled by oral evidence. But among the exceptions to the rule
is that in equity, where the proof is clear
and convincing, a deed absolute on its face
may be construed to be an equitable mortgage. In Rowell v. Jewett, 69 Me. 293, this
exceptional doctrine was first allowed to
It was fuUy
have operation in this state.
accepted in Stinchfield v. Milliken, 71 Me.
"But the trans567, where the opinion says:
action was In equity a mortgage,— an equltaThe criterion is the intention
able mortgage.
In equity this intention may
of the parties.
be ascertained from all pertinent facts, ei-

ther within or without the written parts of

the transaction. Where the Intention is clear
that an absolute conveyance is taken as a
security for a debt, it is in equity a mortIn Iiewgage. The real intention governs."
is V. Small, 71 Me. 552, the same doctrine
is admitted. It has since been affirmed in
other cases, receiving an able discussion in
the late case of Reed v. Reed, 75 Me. 264.

The effect of many of the older cases In this
state has been swept away by this new principle in our legal system,— a product of the
growth of the law, very greatly promoted by
legislative stimulation.
The present case
must be governed by the equitable rule declared in the later decisions.
Another question presented by the case is
whether the statutory provision (Rev. St. c.
73, § 12) which declares that a title of a purchaser for a valuable consideration cannot
be defeated by a trust, unless the purchaser
means actual or conhad notice thereof,
structive notice. Section 8 of the same chapter requires "actual notice" of an unrecorded
deed to defeat a subsequent purchaser's title
from the same grantor. The two sections
were incorporated in our statutory system at
the same time,— in the Revision of 1841.
One requires "notice," the other "actual notice."
We think the difference In phraseology may be accounted for partly on the
idea that section 8 would be applicable more
to law cases, and section 12 more to questions in equity. We can have no doubt that
there may be cases of constructive trusts
At the same
where section 12 would apply.
where
the
facts present questions
time,
analogous to those ordinarily arising under
we think actual notice
the other section,
would be required; that under either section, in cases generally, actual notice, as we
understand the meaning of the term, would
be the rule; and that actual notice applies in
the present case.
There is a conflict in the cases and among
Much
writers as to what is actual notice.
of the difference is said to be verbal only, —
Certain proposimore apparent than real.
tions, however, are quite well agreed upon by
a majority of the authorities. Notice does not
mean knowledge; actual knowledge Is not
required. Mr. Wade describes the modes of
proving actual notice as of two kinds. One
he denominates express notice, and the other
implied.
"Implied, which imputes knowledge to the party because he is shown to be
anxious of having the means of knowledge,
though he does not use them; in other
words, where he chooses to remain voluntarily ignorant of the fact, or is grossly negligent in not following up the inquiry which
Wade, Notice (2d
the known facts suggest."
Ed.) § 5. Some writers use the word "implied" as meaning constructive, and would
regard what is here described to be implied
actual notice as constructive notice merely.
As applicable to actual notice, such as is required by the sections of the statute under
consideration, we think the classification of
the author whom we quote is satisfactory.
The author further explains the distinction
by adding that "notice by implication dilfers
from constructive notice, with which it is
frequently confounded, and which it greatly
resembles, with respect to the character of
the inference upon which it rests; constructive notice being the creature of positive-
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law, or resting upon strictly legal Inference,
while implied notice arises from inference
of fact." It amounts substantially to this:
that actual notice may be proved by direct
evidence, or it may be inferred or implied
(that Is, proved) as a fact from indirect evidence,— by circumstantial evidence.
A man
may have notice or its legal equivalent. He
may be so situated as to be estopped to deny
that he had actual notice.
We are speaking
of the statutory notice required under the
conveyances act. A higher grade of evidence
may be necessary to prove actual notice appertaining to commercial paper. ICellogg v.
Curtis, 69 Me. 212.
The same facts may
spmetimes be such as to prove both constructive and actual notice; that is, a court might
infer constructive notice, and a jury infer
actual notice, from the facts.
Tliere may
be cases where the facts show actual, when
they do not warrant the inference of constructive, notice; as where a deed is not
regularly recorded, and not giving constructive notice, but a second purchaser sees it on
the records, thereby receiving actual notice.
Hastings v. Cutler, 24 N. H. 481.
Mr. Pomeroy (2 Eq. Jur. 596, note) summarizes the effect of the American cases on
the point under discussion in the following
words: "In a few of the states the courts
have interpreted the intention of the legislature as demanding that the personal information of the unrecorded instrument should
be proved by the direct evidence, and as excluding all instances of actual notice establislied by circumstantial evidence.
In most
of the states, however, where this statutory
clause is found, the courts have defined the
'actual notice' required by the legislature as
embracing all instances of that species in
contradistinction from constructive notice;
that is, all kinds of actual notice, whether
proved by direct evidence or inferred as a
legitimate conclusion from circumstances."
The doctrine of actual notice implied by
circumstances (actual notice in the second
degree) necessarily involves the rule that a
purchaser, before buying, should clear up the
doubts which apparently hang upon the title,
by making due inquiry and investigation.
If a party has knowledge of such facts as
would lead a fair and prudent man, using
ordinary caution, to make further Inquiries,
and he avoids the inquiry, he is chargeable
with notice of the facts which by ordinary
He
diligence he would have ascertained.
has no right to shut his eyes against the
light before him.
He does a wrong not to
heed the "signs and signals" seen by him.
It may be well concluded that he is avoiding notice of that which he in reality beActual notice of facts
lieves or knows.
which to the mind of a prudent man indi3 Washb.
cate notice is proof of notice.
Real Prop. (3d Ed.) 335.
It must be admitted that our present views
are not fully supported by the case of Spofford V. Weston, 29 Me. 140, a decision made
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But the doctrine has grown
years ago.
liberally since that day, and the correctness
of some things pronounced in that opinion is
Porvirtually denied in subsequent cases.
ter V. Sevey, 43 Me. 519; Hull v. Noble, 40
Me. 459; Jones v. McNan-in, 68 Me. 334.
Many cases which affirm the doctrine contended for by the complainant, as well as
many opposing cases, are cited by the text
writers. Wade, Notice, §§ 10, 11, et seq., and
cases in notes; 2 Pom. p:!q. Jur. § 603, and
of authornotes. The decided preponderance
ity supports the position that the statutory
"actual notice" is a conclusion of fact capable of being established by all grades of
legitimate evidence.
As to what would be a sufficiency of facts
to excite inquiry no rule can very well estabhsh.
Each case depends upon its own facts.
There is a great inconsistency in the cases
But we are satisfied that
upon this point.
in the case before us the defendant must be
charged with notice that his grantor held
title by what equity must declare to be an
invalid deed. He saw the grantor was out of
possession.
He could have easily ascertained
He. knew that
that he never had possession.
others had controlled the property in many
ways for many years.
He examined the
registry when he discovered the deed in

40

question,

and there

must have seen evidence

of other conveyances inconsistent with its
full validity. He purchased the property for
$40, while worth, had the title been perfect,
nearer $1,000.
He took a quitclaim deed;
and it is held by some courts that such an
instrument of conveyance
does not make
him a bona fide purchaser without notice
(Baker v. Humphrey, 101 U. S. 494), although in our system it is a circumstance
only bearing on the question (Mansfield v.
Dyer, 181 Mass. 200).
More than all else,
perhaps, the defendant made no inquiry of
the grantor whether he had any real title or
not, asking no explanations, but insisting to
him that he had no valuable title. It is impossible for us to say, in the light of these
impressive illuminating proofs, that the defendant purchased without notice.
He purchased on the basis of a merely nominal title.
We would not say that he did not believe
he could legally purchase, encouraged, as he
was, by the doctrine of the earlier cases, now
abrogated;
nor do we impute more than a
want of caution and of diligence.
Men's interests spur their judgments to one-sided
conclusions oftentimes. The great dramatist
makes a character reluctant to acknowledge
the situation say, "I cannot dare to know
that which I know;" while another, more
quick-sighted, because anxious to believe, exclaims, "Seems, Madam! Nay, it is. I know
One rejects proof on the clearnot seems."
est facts; the other accepts it on the slightest. Judgment affirmed.

WALTON, DANFORTH, EMERY,
TER, and HASKELL, JJ., concurred.
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KIRSCH
(38 N.

et al. v.

E.

375,

143

TOZIEK

et

al.

N. Y. 390.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 23, 1S94.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,
fifth department.
Action brought by Theodore Klrsch and
another against Orange L. Tozier, the Buffalo Savings Bank, and others, to reinstate
a mortgage executed by defendant Lester H.
Tozier and wife to defendant Orange L.
Tozier, in trust for plaintiffs, to set aside its
discharge, and for its foreclosure.
The bank
held a subsequent mortgage.
From a judgment of the general term (18 N. Y. Supp.
•j.'U) aiflrming a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
This action was brought to reinstate a
mortgage executed by the defendant Lester
H. Tozier and his wife to the defendant Orange L. Tozier, which was made in trust for
the plaintiffs, Michael Kirsch and Theodore
Kirsch, and for Peter Kirsch, now deceased,
minor children of John Kirsch, to set aside
a discharge
of such mortgage executed by
Orange L. Tozier, and for foreclosure of the
mortgage and sale of the mortgaged premises
for the benefit of the persons named, as cestuis que ti'ustent.
The lands in question consist of 102 acres, situate in the town of Sheldon, Wyoming comity, N. Y., of which John
Kirsch died seised in the year 1872. On the
8th day of January, 1873, the defendant Orange L. Toziei- was appointed general guardian of the infant children, Michael J., Theodore and Peter Kirsch.
At the time of his
death John Kirsch owed debts which, with
upon his real estate, ex
the Incumbrances
ceeded the value of both his personal and
Orange L. Tozier and Elizareal property.
beth Kirsch, the latter the widow of the deceased, were appointed
administrators of
Subsequently
the estate of John Kirsch.
to
this it was agreed between them and Lester H. Tozier, a son of Orange L. Tozier, that
they should purchase the mortgages then existing on the farm, foreclose them, and procm-e a title to the land, and convey the same
to Elizabeth Kirsch, who should, in turn, by
mortgage thereon, secm-e to Lester H. Tozier
the amoimt paid by him, and give a mortgage upon the farm of $1,000 to these three
was carried
This arrangement
children.
out, except that upon a sale of the lands,
either by direct purchase at the sale or by
deed coming immediately from the purchaser, Lester H. Tozier became the owner for
in all, of $1,131.56.
the consideration,
Thereupon It was further arranged between Orange L. Tozier and the widow, Elizabeth
Kirsch, that the widow should convey to the
then holder of the title, Lester H. Tozier,
all her interest in the lands to which she was
entitled as widow, and that a mortgage
should be executed by Lester H. Tozier to
Orange L. Tozier, in trust for the three children, in the sum of $1,000, one-third thereof
payable to each of the three children when

AND NOTICE.
he should arrive at age, with interest in tha
Having received the deed from
meantiine.
Mrs. Elizabeth Kirsch, Lester H. Tozier and
his wife executed to Orange L. Tozier, in
trust for Michael Kirsch, Peter Kirsch, and

Theodore Kirsch, "minor children of John JI,
Kirsch, deceased," the mortgage in question,
dated the loth day of October,
1875,
ex
pressing a consideration of $1,000 payable
The sum of $333.33 November
as follows:
13, 1887; the sum of $333.33 March 18, 1891,
and the sum of $333.33 October 6, 1892,— with
interest, payable annually, from the 1st day
of April, 1876.
This instrument was delivered to Orange L. Tozier, who caused the
same to be recorded in the proper clerk'a
office on the 23d day of October, 1875.
Tha
mortgagee and trustee paid the interest upon this mortgage to Elizabeth Kirsch, tha
mother of the children, in pm-suance of a
previous arrangement,
until the spring of
1880, since which time no pai't of the principal or interest has been paid thereon by the
ti'ustee for the benefit of either of the children. On the 3d day of September,
1883,
Lester H. Tozier and his wife executed and
delivered a deed of the farm to Orange L.
Tozier, at a consideration, as expressed in
the deed, of $4,000, and the record title of
such farm has since been in Orange L. Tozier.
After acquiring this title, and on the
19th day of Pebmary, 1886, Orange L. Tozier executed and acknowledged a discharge
of the mortgage, and caused the same to be
recorded in the proper clerk's office on the
0th day of Jlarch, 1886.
On the 27th day of
January, 1886, before the execution of such
discharge,
Orange L. Tozier applied to the
defendant
the Buffalo Savings Bank for a
loan of $2,000 upon his fai'm, which application was granted on the 1st day of February, 1886; and on an examination of the
title of such farm, submitted to the officers
of the bank, there was an abstract certified
by the proper clerk of Wyoming county to
the effect that Orange L. Tozier appeared
to be the owner of the farm.
On such absti-act a memorandum of the mortgage sought
by this action to be reinstated described the
mortgage simply as being given for $1,000
and interest, "in ti'ust for Michael Kirsch,

Theodore Kirsch, and Peter Kirsch, minor
children of John M. Kirsch, deceased," having written across the face of the memorandum as follows:
"Discharged March 9,
1886.
E. M. Jennings, Clerk." The defendant the Buffalo Savings Bank, at the time of
taking its mortgage
and advancing the
money thereon, had not, either through any
of its officers or attorneys, any knowledge or
notice of the existence of this mortgage now
sotight to be reinstated in this action, except
the memorandum
on the abstract of title of
its discharge,
and the constructive notice
given by the record of such mortgage.
Adolph Rebadow, for
Peck, for respondents.

appellants.
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C. J. (after stating the facts).
TIio ouly serious question presented on the
record ai'ises on tlie claim of the Buffalo Savwith
iufis! Bank that it was not chargeable
notice nor put upon inquiry to ascertain that
the defendant Tozier had no authority to disThe savcharge the mortgage in question.
ings hank, when it took its mortgage, had constructive notice of every fact which could
have been ascertained by an inspection of the
deeds or mortgages or record in the chain of
title. An inspection of the records of the
title Co the land upon which Its mortgage was
taken would have disclosed the mortgage given by Lester H. Tozier in October, 1875, and
that it was given "in trust" for the three minor children of John M, Ku'sch, deceased;
that the lands covered by the mortgage were
subsequently,
in 1883, conveyed by Lester H.
Tozier to Orange L. Tozier, the mortgagee
named in the mortgage given in trust for the
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minor children of John M. Kirsch; that after
such conveyance, and in March, 1886, Orange
L. Tozier, then being the owner of the lands,
and also the mortgagee "in ti-ust" in that
mortujge, himself executed and caused to be
recorded a satisfaction of the mortgage, and
that this occurred before any part of the sum
secured by the mortgage had become due.
There can be no doubt that the satisfaction of
the mortgage was, as to the defendant Orange
L. Tozier, a breach of trust. The satisfaction was without consideration.
The question whether Tozier held the mortgage as tnistee impressed with a trust in favor of the
three children of John M. Kirsch admits of
no doubt.
The implication from the nature
of the instrument, the character of the beneliciaries, and the division of the payments into ttoee equal parts, payable at specified, but
different, dates in the futm'e, is that the instrument was intended to secm-e to the several beneficiaries as they became of age an
equal share of the sum for which the mortThe acceptance by Orange
gage was given.
L. Tozier of the mortgage containing the declaration of the ti'ust was an acknowledgment
of the trust on his part and bomid him to
perform it. The trust was expressed in the
instniment, although not fully set out in
words, and anj' act thereafter done by him
In conti-aventiou of the trust was by the comStatute of
mon law and by the statute void.
The
Uses and Trusts (1 Rev. St. 730, § 63).
dischaige of the mortgage was not iut.'uded
for the benefit of the infants, but to deprive
them of the benefit of the secm'ity, and, as
we have said, was a plain breach of trust.
The bank knew, or must be presumed to have
known, when it took its mortgage, because
an examination of the records would have
disclosed the facts, (1) tliat the mortgage was
taken by Tozier in ti-ust for Infants; (2) that
he satisfied it before it became due; (3) that
his relation to the property had changed, so
that when he executed the satisfaction he
was himself the owner of the land, having
an adverse interest to those beneficially inter-
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ested in the security; and (4) that in satisfying the mortgage he was dealing with himPersons dealing with a trustee must
self.
An
take notice of the scope of his authority.
act within his authority will bind the trust
estate or the beneficiaries as to third persons
acting in good faith and without notice, although the trustee intended to defraud the estate, and actually 'did accomplish his purpose
It has freby means of the act in question.

quently been held that a peison dealing with
an executor, administrator, or trustee, who,
from the nature of his office, or by the terms
of the trust, has power to satisfy or transfer
the securities of the estate, or to vary the instrument from time to time, is not bound to go
further, and ascertain whether in fact the act
of the executor or ti-ustee is justified, and that
It is suffino breach of tnist was intended.
cient for his protection that he acts in good
faith, and. If the act of the executor or trustee is justified by the terms of the power, the
Field
party dealing with him is protected.
But circumT. SchlefCelin, 7 Johns. Ch. 153.
stances were disclosed by the record when
the bank took its mortgage which precluded
the bank from relying upon the recorded satThere was
isfaction of the prior mortgage.
no indication in the mortgage that any power
was vested in the trustee, Tozier, to accept
payment of the mortgage before it became
due, or to vary the trust secm'ity.
There was
no such aflirmative power conferred upon him
in fact, and the case of McPherson v. Rollins,
107 N. Y. 316, 14 N. E. 411, seems to be a decisive authority that tliere is no implication of
such a power in case of a tmstee of a specified security for the benefit of minors, and no
other evidence of his actual authority exists
than may be implied from the fact that he is
The rule declared in
trustee of the securit;)'.
that case operated with great severitj^ upon
one who, without any actual notice, bought
the property upon an official certificate that
no lien existed on the premises, paying full
There the mortgage was givvalue therefor.
en to secm'e the payment of an annuity to the
mortgagee, and also annuities to two minors
until they should become of age. TTie mortgagee afterwards, and before the expiration
of the minority of the two children, without
consideration,
assumed to discharge the mortgage, and the satisfaction was duly recorded.
It was held that the ti-ustee had no power to
satisfy the mortgage before the termination
of the trust, and that the purchaser was not
It is difficult to perceive any solid
protected.
distinction between that case and the present.
In McPherson v. Rollins there was no exsecurity
press direction that the mortgage
should remain unchanged dm'ing the term of
It was given to secure annuities,
the tnist.
Here the mortpresumably for maintenance.
gage was given to secm'e a gross sum, for the
benefit of infants, the shares being payable,
as was to be infeiTed, on their severally attaining full a; ^ There is a very pregnant
circumstance in the present case bearing up-
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on the point of constructive notice. Tlie bank
relied upon a discharge by Tozier of a Hen
'leld by him as trustee on his own land.
The
transaction as disclosed by the record showed
that in executing the satisfaction Tozier was
dealing with himself, and that the act was in
his own interest; and not only so, but that
the mortgage was not due.
Tozier was acting in the double capacity of owner of the
land and trustee of a lien thereon for other
persons.
The transaction was unusual and
special, and the savings bank, with knowledge of Tozier's relation to the land as owner
and trustee, was, we think, bound to inquire
by what authority he acted, and, if inquiry
had been made, the invalidltj' of the transaction would or might have been disclosed.
What circumstances will amount to constructive notice, or will put a party upon inquiry,
is in many cases a question of much difficulty.

A

purchaser is not required to use the utmost
circumspection.
He Is bound to act as an
ordinarily prudent and careful man would
do imder the circumstances.
He cannot act
in contravention to the dictates of reasonable
prudence, or refuse to inquire when the propriety of inquiry Is naturally suggested by
circumstances
known to him.
The circumstances of this case made it, we think, the
duty of the bank to inquire in respect to the
authority of Tozier to discharge the prior
mortgage, and, having failed to do so, it is not
entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser.
Baker v. Bliss, 39 N. Y. 70, and cases
cited; Story, Eq. Jur. § 400 et seq. The other
questions are satisfactorily disposed of in the
opinions of the referee and at general term,
and do not require further elaboration.
The
judgment should be affirmed, with costs. All
Judgment affirmed.
concur.
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KNOBLOCH
(17

Supreme

V.

MUBLER.

N. E. 696, 123 111. 554.)

Court of Illinois.

Jan.

20,

1888.

Appeal from circuit court, St. Clair county;
A. Watts, Judge.
George Christian Mueler died March 27,
By his will, dated Mra-ch 14, 1870,
1870.
his real estate was devised to his sons,
George and Solomon. Mueler.
The will was
admitted to probate, but afterwards, at the
January term, 1871, in the circuit court of
St. Clair <;ounty,
this instrument was, on
bill filed for that pm'pose, set aside, and declared not to be the will of said deceased.
This decree was affirmed by this court.
Mueller v. Eebhan, 94 111. 142. On the 27th
day of March, 1879, Catharine Rebhau, one
of the heirs at law of said George C. Mueler,
deceased, filed in the circuit court of St.
Clair county her bill for partition of the W.
% N. W., and the N. E. N. W. %, of section
7 W., — alleging the
28, town 1 N., range
death of said George C. Mueler intestate;
that at his death he left him surviving
George Mueler and Solomon Mueler, Margarite Ehinehardt, and complainant, Catharine Rebhau, his children and only heirs at
law, to whom descended in equal parts the
said lands; that on the death of said ancestor, George and Solomon had taken possession of the land jointly, and received the

rents thereof until February 29, 1875, when
George died, leaving all his property to Solomon by his will duly probated, etc., since
when said Solomon has received the rents
and profits of said land.
The bill alleged
that Solomon was the owner in fee of the
undivided one-half of said lands, and the
complainant and Mrs. Rhinehardt were each
the owner in fee of the undivided one-fourth
part thereof, as tenants in common, and
prayed for partition of the land, and that
Solomon be required to account for the rents
and profits, etc. At the February term, 1880,
of said court, said bill was taken as confessed as to Mrs. Rhinehardt, and Solomon
Mueler and his wife, who was also made a
party, filed their answer, admitting the material allegations of the bill, and consenting
to partition of said premises according to the
Subsequently
prayer thereof.
an amended
answer and cross-bill was filed, setting up
that said Solomon had made lasting and
valuable improvements on the land, etc. On
hearing, said defendant Solomon admitted in
open court the allegations of the bill in respect of the interest of the parties as tenants
in common, the death and intestacy of the
ancestor, and consented to a decree of partition; and a decree declaring the several interests of the parties as set up in the bill
as heirs at law of said George C. Mueler,
deceased, in and to said land, was entered
by the court by consent, and commissioners were appointed to make partition accordingly. At the May term, 1880, of said court,
Solomon had puron proof that defendant
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Marchased the interest of his co-defendant,
garite Rhinehardt, the decree was, on his motion, so changed as to require the commisto set off to
sioners theretofore appointed
the said Solomon three-fourths, and to the
of said land. The
complainant one-fourth,
issue as to rents and profits and improvements was referred to the master for proofs.
At the same term the commissioners filed
their report, setting o£E to the complainant,
Mrs. Rebhau, as and for her one-fourth interest in said land, lot 10, as shown in their
report, containing 48 acres of the land; and
set off the residue of said tracts of land to
Exceptions to the report
the said Solomon.
were filed, which were, at the May term,
overruled by the court, and the report
No writ
approved by decree duly entered.
of error was prosecuted or appeal taken from
At the February
the decree of partition.
term, 1883, of said court, on hearing of the
issues as to rents and profits, a decree was
rendered in favor of complainant Rebhau
from which an appeal was
for $1,638.97,
On the
court.
prosecuted to the appellate
of
8th day of March, 1881, in consideration
$5,050, Mrs. Rebhau, and Emil, her husband,
by their warranty deed, conveyed the undipart of the premises of
vided one-fourth
which her father died seized, and all their
right, title, and interest in the whole of said
land, to appellant,
Thomas Knobloch; reher rights to rents and
serving, however,
This deed was
accrued.
profits theretofore
At the Febfiled for record March 10, 1881.
ruary term, 1882, appellant brought an action
of trespass against said Solomon for alleged
trespasses upon said 48 acres of land set off
and afterwards brought
to Mrs. Rebhau,
In March
ejectment
to recover the same.
or April, 1883, appellee found a paper dated
March 9, 1855, purporting to be the last will
and testament of George Christian Mueler,
deceased, in and by which the testator devised all his land to his two sons, George
subject to the payment of
and Solomon,
This will was
$1,500 to Catharine Rebhau.
duly admitted to probate.
On July 6, 1883,
Solomon Mueler, appellee here, filed in the
St. Clair circuit court the present bill against
appellant,
Catharine Rebhau, Emil Rebhau,
Margarite Rhinehardt, and Edward Abend,
who, prior to the probate of the last will,
had been appointed administrator of the estate of said George C. Mueler, deceased,

1881,

substantially setting up the foregoing facts,
and praying that said will (1855) stand as the
last will and testament of the said George
Christian Mueler; that the deed from Catharine and Emil Rebhau to said Knobloch be
set aside as being a cloud upon complainant's
title; that all proceedings in partition regarding said land, and the stating of an account of rents and profits now pending in the
appellate court, and all actions commenced
by said Edward Abend as aforesaid, and by
said Knobloch, be no further prosecuted;
their attorneys,
and that the defendants,
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etc., be perpetually enjoined from
taking any furtlier steps in regard to said
action.
An injunction was granted as prayed in the bill of August 2.d. 1883.
Appellant
answered, setting up that he had purchased
in good faith and paid $5,050 for the interest
of Mrs. Rebhau in said land, without any
notice of any adverse claim or title, and also
setting up that complainant, Solomon, is estopped, by the decree of partition rendered
by his consent In open court, from disputing
complainant's title.
At the September term,
1885, of said circuit court, a decree was entered perpetually enjoining the pi'osecution
of said suits, and setting aside the deed from
Mrs. Rebhau and her husband to appellant
as a cloud on. complainant's title.
From this
Knobloch, alone appealed.
decree appellant,
agents,

W. C.
appellant.

Kueffner and James M. Dill,
A. R. Halbert, for appellee.

for

SHOPIfl, J., (after stating the facts as
The bill in this case seeks to reabove.)
move, as a cloud upon the title of appellee,
Solomon Mueler, derived under the will of
1855, the deed of Catharine and Emil Rebhau to appellant;
and restrain by injunction
of an action of ejectment
the prosecution
brought by appellant to recover the land partitioned to Catharine Rebhau in the proceedings Instituted by her for partition of the
lands of which her father died seized, and to
enjoin a certain trespass suit brought for alleged trespasses upon said land by appellee,
and to restrain Mrs. Rebhau from collecting
.*1,638.97,
decreed as rents and profits in said
partition proceeding.
Jlrs. Rebhau not having appealed from the decree against her,
the latter branch of the case made by the bill
is not before us. When the instrmnent dated March 14, 1870, purporting to be the last
will and testament of George C. Mueler, who
died March 20, 1870, was set aside upon bill
filed for that purpose, it was supposed by all
the parties in interest that his estate had descended to his heirs at law as intestate estate, and letters
of administration were
All the parties acgranted accordingly.
quiesced in this condition of affairs, and resthad so
ed in the belief that the property
descended until the discovery, in March or
April, 188.3, 18 years after the death of the
ancestor, of the will of the 9th of March,
was
1855, by which the estate in question
The
devised to George and Solomon Mueler.
good faith of the parties is not questioned,
no fraud or misconduct is alleged, or laches
imputed or imputable to any one, on account
of the delay in the production of this will,
or in any of the proceedings had in respect
to the real or personal estate prior to its discovery.
When Catharine Rebhau, daughter
and one of the heirs at law of said George
C. Mueler, deceased, on the 22d day of
March, 1879, filed her bill for partition of the
real estate of which said George C. had
died seized; and when Solomon Mueler flled
his answer, admitting the intestacy of his

father and consenting to the partition to
Mrs. Rebhau and Mrs. Rhinehardt, his sisters, each a one-fourth part or interest in the
land of which their common ancestor died
seized, and consented to the decree therefor,
the several parties in good faith believed the
facts alleged in her bill to be true, and that
the land had descended to the four children
deceased, in equal
of George C. Mueler,
parts in fee. It is also equally clear that
when api>ellant, Thomas Knobloch, purchased the interest of Catharine Rebhau In said
land, and paid her therefor $5,050, that he
did so in good faith, relying upon the title
of said Catharine as found and declared by
the circuit court of St. Clair county in said
partition proceeding by the consent of appellee.
Upon the production and probate of the
will of 1855, in April, 1883, it became manifest that the title to said land had not in
fact so descended to the heirs at law of said
George Christian Mueler; but by virtue of
that will the legal title thereto, at the death
of the testator, vested in the devisees, George
and Solomon Mueler, and that by the last
will of said George Mueler, who died February 29, 1875, the legal title to the whole
of said land became vested in appellee, Solomon JIueler.
It is apparent that all parties,
while acting in good faith, were mistaken,
and that the decree of the circuit court, finding one-fourth interest of said land in fee in
Catharine Rebhau, would not have been entered had the court or parties been aware of
the true condition of the title to the land.
It is said by counsel for appellee that this
bill may be maintained,
if upon no other
ground than as a bill in the nature of a bill
of review. This is manifestly a misapprehension.
In neither the frame of the bill, or
in the prayer, has the pleader attempted a
review of the decree rendered in the partition
proceeding of Rebhau against Mueler et al.
The bill sets out the tiling of that bill, the
decree of partition, and for rents and profits;
but it nowhere seeks to reopen that decree,
or reverse, impeach, or alter it, or to procure a rehearing of that cause upon the alleged newly-discovered
matter.
The prayer
is to remove appellant's title, derived thereunder, as a cloud upon appellee's title, and to
under that decree without reopening
it or setting it aside. The
whole scope of the bill is to procure the reliel!
sought upon the equitable ground of mistake
of fact, as to the title at the time of the
enti-y of that decree, without in any way interfering with it by seeking to enjoin proceedings imder it.
The two grounds upon
which a bill of review, or bill in the nature
of a bill of review, will lie, are: Errors of
law, appearing on the face of the decree,
without further examination of facts; and
new fact or facts, discovered since the decree, which are material, and which it was
impossible
for the party to produce at the
time the decree passed.
2 Daniell, Ch. Prac.
1576; 2 Smith, Ch. Prac. 50.
Bills contain-

restrain proceedings

PRIORITIES AND NOTICE.
ing newly-discovered matter are in the nature of original bills, in so far as such new
matter presents an issuable fact, and therefore admits an answer and the formation of
an issue; but only so far as it relates to the
truth and sufficiency of the alleged new matter, and its admissibility for the purpose of
affecting and opening the original decree.
Authorities supra; Buffiugton v. Harvey, 95
U. S. 99. The purpose of a bill of the character named is to procure a reversal, alteration, or explanation of the former decree.
The bill should state the former bill, the proceedings thereon, and the decree rendered by
the court, the grievance under the decree of
the party presenting the bill, and the error
of law or new matter discovered upon which
it is sought to reverse, reopen, or impeach it.
In bills of review, if the former decree has
not been carried into execution, the prayer
may simply be that the same may be reversed
and set aside; if the former decree has been
executed, that the decree be reversed, and
the complainant be restored to his former con-

or status, as if it had not been renIn bills in the nature of bills of redered.
view, Instead of praying the reversal of the
former decree, the prayer should be that the
cause be reheard in respect to and considering the new matter at the same time it is
reheard upon the original bill, etc. 2 Daniell,
Ch. Prac. 1581, 1582.
The decree of partition rendered at the
February term, 1880, and the subsequent decree approving the report of the commissioners rendered at the May term, 1881, of said
court, remain unreversed
and in full force
The court had jurisdiction of the
and effect.
subject-matter and of the parties, and rendered its decree determining the several interests of the complainant Catharine Rebhau
and appellee, by the consent of appellee, as
appears by his answer filed in said cause, and
by the recitals in said decree of partition.
Decrees of courts of chancery, in respect of
matters within their jurisdiction, are as binding and conclusive upon the parties and their
privies as are judgments at law; and a decree by consent in an amicable suit has been
held to have an additional claim to be considered final. Allason v. Starli, 9 Adol. &
E. 255. Decree so entered by consent cannot
be reversed, set aside, or impeached by bill
of review or bill in the nature of a bill of review, except for fraud, unless it be shown
that the consent was not in fact given, or
something was inserted, as by consent, that
was not consented to. 2 Daniell, Ch. Prac.
1576; Webb v. Webb, 3 Swanst. 658; Thompson V. Maxwell, 95 U. S. 391; Armstrong v.
Cooper, 11 111. 540; Cronli v. Trumble, 66 111.
432; Haas v. Society, 80 111. 248; Atkinson
V. Manlis, 1 Cow. 693; Winchester v. Winchester, 121 Mass. 127;
Allason v. Stark,
9 Adol. & B. 255; Earl of Hopetoun v. RamSee, also, note to
say, 5 Bell, App. Cas. 69.
Duchess of Kington's Case, 2 Smith, I^ead.
Cas. *826 et seq. It is the general doctrine
dition,
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that such a decree is not reversible upon appeal or writ of error, or by bill of review for
Armstrong v. Cooper, 11 111. 540. No
error.
exceptions were taken to the decree of partition, or attempt made in the cause in which
it is rendered to vacate or modify it. It is
undoubtedly true that, as between the parties
and those chargeable with notice, courts of
equity will entertain jurisdiction and grant
relief, on proper bill filed, from the injurious
of maeffects of admissions and confessions
terial facts, made in course of judicial proceedings, in ignorance of the rights of the
party making them, where he has been guilty
of no negligence, either in the discovery of
the fact, or in applying to the proper forum
for relief; but such relief can only be granted
upon such grounds and for such reasons as
would authorize the court to set aside agreements or contracts entered into by the parAttorney General v,. Tomline, 7 Ch.
ties.
Div. 388; Millspaugh v. McBride, 7 Paige,
The
509; Furnival v. Bogle, 4 Kuss. 142;
Hiram, 1 Wheat. 440. But it is apparent
that the decree in the partition proceedings
can only be attacked, reversed, annulled, or
set aside by direct proceedings in that case,
or upon bill of review, or bill in the nature of
a bill of review.
If this were not so, however, there is another ground upon which the decree must be
reversed.
It is the well-settled doctrine of
this court that no relief will be granted in
equity, in cases of this sort, injuriously affecting intervening rights acquired in good
faith, after the rendition of a judgment or
So it has
decree, and in reliance thereon.
been held that amendments may be made in
judicial proceedings, but not so as to affect
the intervening rights of third persons accruShirley v.
ing prior to such amendment.
Phillips, 17 111. 473; Coughran v. Gutcheus,

111. 390; Sickmon
v. Wood, 69 III. 329;
Relief will not be
Story, Eq. Jur. 166.
granted to the prejudice of appellant, if he
has an equal equity with appellee, and is
equally entitled to the protection of the court.
1 Story, Eq. Jur. 165.
As already seen, all
the parties to the partition proceedings supposed in good faith that ilrs. Rebhau was
the owner in fee of the undivided one-fourth
of the lands of which her father died seized,
and that on the 8th day of March, 1881, appellant purchased her interest in such lands
for a full and adequate consideration, without notice, actual or constructive, of any defect in her title, and in good faith. All the
elements to constitute him a bona fide purchaser are present;
that is, a valuable consideration paid, absence of notice, and presence of good faith. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 745.
His grantor had, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, in a proceeding
instituted' to
find and declare her interests in these lands,
been adjudged, by the consent and admission
of appellee, to be the owner in fee of the unpart thereof, and there
divided one-fourth
was nothing in the record or elsewhere ap18
1
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parent to disclose that she, who was thus
clothed with apparent legal title, was not the
owner in fact of that interest in the land.
Nor is it shown or claimed that further inquiry would then have disclosed anything to
cast suspicion upon her title. The defense
of a bona fide purchaser had its rise in equity, upon the doctrine that a court of equity acts upon the conscience of Mm against
whom relief is sought; and if he has done no
wrong, or it would be unconscientious or inequitable to grant the relief, the court will
If, in
refuse
to exercise its jurisdiction.
equity and good conscience, the complainant
should not obtain what he seeks, or the defendant ought not to suffer what is demanded, then the court will withhold its power.
In theory, it is said, the defense of a bona
some defect in
presupposes
fide purchaser
title; but the court refuses to
purchaser's
the validity of the title of either
investigate
party, upon the ground that good conscience
does not dictate that he who has dealt hon>estly,
in good faith, and without notice,
should be deprived of the legal right he has
Id. § 739. There was forthereby gained.
merly much apparent conflict in the adjudged cases as to when the defense of a bona fide
In Phillips v.
purchaser would be availing.
Phillips, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 208, Lord Westbury grouped the cases in which a bona fide
purchaser will be protected into three general
classes, and reduced the doctrine to a formula, which it is said by Pomeroy (2 Eq.
Jur. § 742) has been accepted, by subsequent
The docjudges almost without exception.
trine thus formulated, so far as appli^ ible
here, is: "Thirdly, when there are circumstances which give rise to an equity, as distinguished from an equitable estate,— as, for
example, an equity to set aside a deed for
fraud, or to correct it for mistake,— and the
under the instrument maintains
purchaser
the plea of purchase for valuable consideration without notice, the court will not interfere."

Without extended discussion, it is apparent
that the bill here filed seeks relief ancillary
The purpose
to the legal estate of appellee.
of the bill is to remove the deed to appellant
as a cloud upon appellee's legal title, and to
enjoin the assertion of rights by appellant
The right to the relief sought
thereunder.
exists, if at all, upon the equity arising out
of the alleged mistake as to the title to said
This brings
land in the grantor of appellant.
the case directly within the rule above given, which is sustained by the weight of modern authority; and, if appellant has made out
his defense as bona fide purchaser, he should
The dehave prevailed in the court below.
cree of partition, as seen, was rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction, having jurisdiction of the person and of the subject-matAppellant
consent.
ter, and by appellee's
without notice, for full value, and in perfect
good faith, acquired the title, sought to be
removed as a cloud upon appellee's title, from

the party found and declared by that decree
to be the owner, and we can perceive no
principle upon which a court of conscience
can hold that appellant shall lose in consequence of the mutual mistake, rather than
appellee.
It cannot be said that the equities of appellee are superior to those of appellant in respect of the title thus acquired,
and, the equities being equal, the court will
give no assistance to the legal title, (2 Pom.
Eq. Jur. § 742, and cases cited,) but will remit the complainant to his remedy at law.
It is said, however, that, at the time appellant purchased,
the report of the comhad not been confirmed by the
missioners
court, and that he purchased subject to having the interest of his grantor, as found by
set aside.
It is true that
the commissioners,
exceptions to the report of the commissioners
were then pending, but none of the exceptions questioned the right or title of Catharine Rebhau to the undivided one-fourth part
of the real estate of which her father died
Such exception related simply to the
seized.
manner of partition, and the conduct of the
in making the same. There
commissioners
was nothing therein to put appellant upon
notice or inquiry as to the title of Mrs. Rebhau.
He bought subject, as a matter of
course, to having the amount set off to Mrs.
by subseRebhau changed or diminished
quent action of the commissioners, or to have
their report set aside by the court; but his
was of her interest in the land,
purchase
which was conceded by appellant and declared by the court to be a one-fourth interest therein.
It is also said by counsel for appellee that
of
may rely upon the covenants
appellant
warranty in his deed from the Rebhaus, and
It
therefore the equities are with appellee.
is not shown whether Mrs. Rebhau, and her
husband, who joined in the execution of said
and we perdeed, are solvent or insolvent,
ceive no principle, nor is any suggested by
counsel,
upon which appellant should be
driven to resort to his legal remedy against
his gi'antor for indemnity from loss, especially in view of the fact that it is not shown
that such remedy would be availing. It will
not be proper for us to here discuss or determine the right of appellee to the money paid
by appellant for the land in question, or as
to whether he has any remedy in respect of
the same.
We are of opinion that the defense of a
bona fide purchaser
has been maintained,
and, upon both of the grounds indicated, the
right of appellee to the relief sought should
have
been denied,
as against appellant,
Knobloch, and the bill dismissed as to him.
For the error of the court in this regard,
the decree, in so far as it affects the appellant, Knobloch, will be reversed, and the
cause remanded to the circuit court of St.
Clair county, with instructions to enter a decree in conformity with this opinion, dismissing the bill as to said appellant.
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MATOR, ETC., OF CITY OF BALTIMORE
et al. V. WHITTINGTON.
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Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 16, 1893.

Appeal from circuit court of Baltimore
city.
Suit by Jacob Craft Whittington against
the mayor and city council of Baltimore and
Clarence M. EUinger for injunction.
From a
decree for complainant, defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Argued before ROBINSON, 0. J., and
BRISCOE, BRYAN, FOWLER, and Mc-

SHERRY,

J J.

Thos. G. Hayes, Jas. P. Gorter, Wm. S.
Bryaa, Jr., and F. W. Story, for appellants.
F. O. SlingluCE and T. Wallis Blakiston, for
appellee.

McSHERRY, J. By section 47, art. 49, of
the Municipal Code of Baltimore City, it is
enacted, in substajice,
that when any lots
of ground are chargeable with the payment
of taxes, and are subject to ground rents
or leases for terms of years, renewable forever, the collector shall, in the sale of such
lots for nonpayment of taxes, first sell only
the leasehold interest, If it should sell for
an amount sufficient to pay the taxes, but,
if it should not, then that he shall sell the
whole fee-simple estate, provided these provisions "shall not apply to cases where the
books of the city do not disclose the fact
that the lot or lots are on lease as aforesaid,
or unless the collector shall have actual notice of such lease prior to the sale thereof."
The city tax collector of Baltimore sold in
March, 1891, for the nonpayment
of state
estate in a
and city taxes, the fee-simple
lot of ground on Druid HiU avenue, and the
mayor and city council became the purchaser. The sale was reported to the rarcuit
court of Baltimore city, and was ratified in
May. 1892. lu October following, the city,
through and by its comptroller, sold the lot
M. Ellinger, to whom it was
to Clarence
thereafter conveyed. When the sale was
made by the collector, the lot was subject
to a lease for 99 years, renewable forever,
which was owned by J. Hem-y Weber, and
the reversion or fee was owned by the apThe unpaid taxes were
pellee, Whittington.
due by the owner of the leasehold estate, but
the collector sold the whole fee, without having first offered, or having attempted to sell,
the leasehold, as rectuired by the section of
the City Code to which reference has been
made. There was no entry on the books of
the collector showing that the lot was subject to a lease, and the single question Involved in the case is whether, when the collector made the sale, he had "actual notice"
of the existence of the lease. If he hael, the
sale was irregular. If it was irresrular, the
decree of the circuit court of Baltimore city,
restraining by Injtmction the mayor and city
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and its grantee, Ellinger, from disturbing the possession of the owner of the
council,

reversion, must be affirmed.
It appears by the record that In 1883 proceedings were instituted In the circuit court
of Baltimore city by Rebecca and Mary McKaen against J. Henry Weber for a sale of
this same leasehold estate under a mortgage

by Weber in 1881. Mr.
Blackiston was appointed trustee
to make the sale. He took possession of the
property, and collected the rents and profits,
in its value,
but, owing to a depreciation
the
made no sale of it. In the meantime
gi-oimd rent was regularly paid to the appeUee, up to July, 1892, but the state and
city taxes for the eight years beginning with
On the 1st day of
unpaid.
1882 remained
December, 1890, Lewis N. Hopkins, city collector, filed a petition in the foreclosiu-e prorepresenting that taxes for the
ceedings
years just mentioned were in arrear upon
the property "decreed to be sold." The petition further stated that the collector was unable to enforce the collection of those taxes
by reason of the pendency of the foreclosure
proceedings, and it prayed that the trustee
might be required to pay the taxes out of
the rents theretofore collected from the property, or that the collector might "be allowed
to proceed to coUect said taxes by sale of
the property in the ordinary way." This petition was signed by the late Mr. W. A. Hammond, "city solicitor, attorney for petitioner,"
and was sworn to by the deputy city colan order was passed,
Subsequently,
lector.
requiring the trustee to pay the taxes within
five days out of the funds previously collected
by him "as rents from the property decreed
to be sold," and directing, upon his failure to
do so, that the property be sold in the ordiThe trustee did
nary way by the collector.
faU to pay the taxes, and the collector made,
under authority of this order, the sale of
March, 1891, already mentioned.
It is upon
these facts that the appellee relies to show
that the collector had "actual notice" oi the
existence of the leasehold estate.
Notice is of two kinds, — actual and constructive. Actual notice may be either (■
press or implied. If the one, it is established by direct evidence; If the other, by
the proof of circumstances
from which it is
inferable as a fact. Constructive notice is,
on the other hand, alvsnays a presumption of
Express notice embraces, not only
law.
knowledge, but also that which is communicated by direct information, either writtei*
or oral, from those who are cognizant of the
Wade, Notice, § 6. Imfact communicated.
plied notice, which is equally actual notice.,
arises where the party to be charged
is
shown to have had knowledge of such facts
and circumstances
as would lead him, by th6
exercise of due diligence, to a knowledge of
the principal fact.
16 Amer. & Eng. Enc.
Law, 790.
Or, as defined by the supreme
court of Missouri in Rhodes v. Outcalt, 48
thereon

T. Wallis

executed
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Mo. 370, "a notice is regarded in law as actual when the party sought to be affected
by it knows of the particular fact, or is conscious of having the means of knowing it,
although he may not employ the means in
his possession for the purpose of gaining further information."
It is simply circumstantial evidence from which notice may be la
ferred.
It differs from constructive notice,
with which it is frequently confotmded, and
which it greatly resembles, in respect to the
character of the inference upon which It
rests; constructive notice being the creature
of positive law, resting upon strictly legal
presumptions,
which are not allowed to be
controverted,
(1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 399; Tovrasend V. Little, 109 U. S. 504, 3 Sup. Ct. 357,)
while implied notice arises from Inference of
fact, (Williamson v. Brown, 15 N. Y. 354;
Wade, Notice, § 3.)
With constructive notice we are not now concerned, and it is not
pretended that the city collector had express
notice, or knowledge personally, of the existence of the leasehold estate.
But he became a party to the equity proceeding, wherein a decree had been passed directing a sale
of the leasehold interest
He did more. Ho
asked, notwithstanding the decree had been
long before signed and enrolled, that be be
of
permitted
to sell for the nonpayment
taxes, imder the summary process of distraint, the identical property previously docreed to be sold, and no other or different
Interest; and the property which had been
thus previously decreed to be sold was not
the fee simple, but only the leasehold interest
He obviously knew
in the lot In question.
there was a proceeding pending in the circuit court of Baltimore city, having for Its
object the sale of some interest in the property.
He knew, further, the equity proceeding interfered with the execution of his distraints, and he applied to the court for leave
to proceed, in spite of the decree, to sell the
same property which had been decreed to
We say he knew these things, and
be sold.
we say so, not because the record shows that
aware of them, as mathe was pereonally
but because the
ters of actual knowledge,
deputy city collector and the collector's attorney, both of whom were his agents In this
transaction,
did have such knowledge; the
one having sworn to the facts stated In the
petition, and the other having signed the petition itself. So both the attorney and the
deputy collector knew, or at least were in
possession of facts which would necessarily
lead, upon the exercise of the slightest diligence, to a knowledge or notice, of the existThey must therefore be
ence of the lease.
regarded as knowing that which, with ordi-

nary diligence, they might have known, or
that which they were conscious of having the
means of knowing.
This result is not a
legal presumption,
but an Inference of fact,
It
I and it seems to us an Irresistible inference.
1 would be idle to say that the collector was
; ignorant of facts relating to the title to property which he was about to sell for the nonpayment of taxes, when his deputy, acting
for him and In his name, was In full possession of them, or that he did not know the
things which his attorney was aware of in
that particular proceeding
respecting
the
state of the title; and it would be equally idle
to say that the deputy, when he swore to the
petition, and the attorney, when he signed it,
filed it, and procured a court's order upon It,
were not apprised of the character of the estate previously decreed to be sold, or were
not in a position where they were conscious
of having the means of knowing precisely
what property the decree affected.
At ail
events, the exercise of ordinary diligence
would most assuredly have informed both of
these agents of the collector of every fact
which the records in the equity case disclosed, and among those facts was the material and Important one that the lot was subject to a lease for 99 years, renewable forever.
It Is consequently a legitimate inference of fact that both of these representatives of the collector knew what the record in
the foreclosure case disclosed as to tliere being a leasehold estate in Weber, and not a
fee, and this was implied actual notice.
Notice to the attorney, as well as notice to the
deputy, was notice to the collector, and was
actual, and not merely constructive,
notice
to him, for the principal is bound by and
affected with notice to his agent, and he is
equally bound by notice received by his attorney in the same transaction.
Astor v. Wells,
4 Wheat 466; Reed's Appeal, 34 Pa. St 209;
Houseman v. Association, 81 Pa. St 256;
Smith V. Ayer, 101 tJ. S. 320.
If this were
not so, then. In every case where notice is
necessary, it might be avoided by simply employing an agent. We are, for the reasons
we have given, of opinion that the collector
had, through the means we have Indicated,
such actual notice of the existence of the
lease as to bring him within the proviso
quoted from the City Code, and that he w.is
therefore not authorized to sell the fee-simple
estate until he had first offered the leasehold for sala
It results, then, that the sale
made by him was Irregular, and the decree
granting the injunction applied for by the appellee must be afllrmed.
Decree affirmed,
with costs in this court and In the court below.
[
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acts was that of 7 Anne, chapter
That act differed from our general regisIt did not,
try act in one important respect.
in terms, require that the party to be pro20.

York.

1857.

The plaintiff was the grantee of fifty acres
of land on which there was no recorded incumbrance.
His grantor purchased the land
of the defendant, giving back a mortgage for
a part of the purchase price.
The defendant commenced to foreclose his
mortgage by advertisement,
whereupon this
action was brought to restrain the foreclosure.
The other material facts appear in the
opinion.

D. H. Marsh, for appellant.

rence, for respondent.
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R. Law-

SELDEN, J. The referee's report. is conclusive as to the facts.
It states, in substance, that the plaintiff had sufficient
information to put him upon inquiry as to %he
mortgage;
defendant's
but that, after making all the inquiry which upon such information it became his duty to make, he failed to
discover
that any such mortgage existed.
This being, as I think, what the referee intended to state, is to be assumed as the true
interpretation of his report.
The question in the case, therefore, is, as
to the nature and effect of that kind of notice so frequently mentioned as notice suffiinquiry.
cient to put a party upon
The
counsel for the plaintiff contends that while
such a notice may be all that is required in
some cases of equitable cognizance, it is not
sufficient, in cases arising under the registry
acts, to charge the party claiming under a
recorded title with knowledge of a prior unregistered conveyance.
He cites several authorities in support of this position.
In the case of Dey v. Dunham, 2 Johns.
Ch. 182, Chancellor Kent says, in regard to
notice under the registry act:
"If notice
that is to put a party upon inquiry be sufficient to break in upon the policy and the
express provisions of the act, then indeed the
conclusion would be different; but I do not
apprehend that the decisions go that length."
Again, in his Commentaries, speaking on the
"Implied notice may
same subject, he says:
be equally effectual with direct and positive
notice;
but then it must not be that notice
which is barely sufficient to put a party upon Inquiry."
So in Jackson v. Van Valkenburgh, 8 Cow.
"If these rules
260, Woodworth, J., says:
be applied to the present case, the notice
was defective.
It may have answered to
put a person on inquiry, in a case where that
species of notice is sufficient;
but we have
seen that to supply the place of registry, the
law proceeds a step further."
A reference to some of the earlier decisions
under the registry acts of England will tend,
I think, to explain these remarks, which were
probably suggested by those decisions.
One
of the earliest, if not the first of the English

tected by the act should be a bona fide pur"And
that
was:
language
Its
chaser.
every such deed or conveyance, that shall at
any time after, etc., be made and executed,
shall be adjudged fraudulent and void,
against any subsequent purchaser or mortunless,"
gagee for valuable consideration,
etc.
The English judges found some difficulty
at first in allowing any equity, however
strong, to control the explicit terms of the
statute.
It was soon seen, however, that adhering to the strict letter of the act would
open the door to the grossest frauds. Courts
of equit.v, therefore, began, but with great
caution, to give relief when the fraud was
palpable.
Hine v. Dodd, 2 Atk. 275, was a
case in which the complainant sought relief
against a mortgage having a preference under the registry act, on the ground that the
Lord Hardwicke
mortgagee
had
notice.
dismissed
the bill, but admitted
that "apparent fraud, or clear and undoubted notice
would be a proper ground of relief." Again,
he said:
"There may possibly have been
cases of relief upon notice, divested of fraud,
but then the proof must be extremely clear."
3 Ves. 478, is anJolland V. Stainbridge,
other case in which relief was denied.
Tlie
master
of the rolls, however, there says:
"I must admit now that the registry is not
conclusive evidence, but it Is equally clear
that it must be satisfactorily proved, that
the person who registers the subsequent deed
must have known exactly the situation of
the persons having the prior deed, and knowing that, registered in order to defraud them

of that title."
Chancellor Kent refers to these cases in
Dey V. Dunham (supra) and his remarks in
that case, as to the effect, under the registry
acts, of notice sufficient to put a party upon
inquiry, were evidently made under the influence of the language of Lord Hardwicke
and the master of the rolls, above quoted.
But the English courts have since seen,
that if they recognized any equity founded
upon notice to the subsequent purchaser of
prior unregistered
the
conveyance,
it became necessarily a mere question of good
faith on the part of such purchaser.
They
now apply, therefore, the same rules in regard to notice, to cases arising under the
registry acts, as to all other cases.
It will be sufficient to refer to one only
among the modern English cases on this subject, viz.: Whitbread v. Jordan, 1 Younge
& C. 303. The plaintiff was a London brewer, and supplied Jordan, who was a publican,
with beer. It was the common practice with
brewers in London to lend money to publicans whom they supplied with beer, upon a
deposit of their title deeds. Jordan had deposited certain deeds with the plaintiff, pur-
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suant to this custom.
He aftei-ward gave to
ODe Boulnois, a wine mercliant,
a mortgage
upon the property covered by the deeds deBoulnois
posited, which was duly recorded.
had notice of Jordan's debt to the plaintiff,
and of the existing customs between brewers
and publicans, but he made no inquiry of the
brewers.
The suit was brought to enforce
the equitable mortgage arising from the deposit.
Baron Alderson held that the notice
to Boulnois was sufHcient to make it his duty
to inquire as to the existence of the deposit;
that his not doing so was evidence of bad
faith; and the plaintiff's right, under his
No case
equitable mortgage, was sustained.
could show more strongly that notice which
puts the party upon inquiry is sufficient even
under the registry act.
The cases in our own courts, since Dey v.
Dunham and Jackson v. Van Valkenburgh
(supra), hold substantially the same doctrine.
(Tuttle V. Jackson, 6 Wend. 213; Jackson v.
Post, 15 Wend. 588; Grimstone v. Carter, 3
Paige, 421.)
I can see no foundation in reason for a distinction between the evidence requisite to establish a want of good faith, in a case arising under the recording act, and in any other
case, and the authorities here referred to are
sufficient to show that no such distinction is
recognized, at the present day, by the courts.
The question, however, remains, whether this
species of notice is absolutely conclusive upon the rights of the parties.
The plaintiff's
sufficient
counsel contends, that knowledge
ujwn Inquiry is only
to put the purchaser
presumptive
evidence of actual notice, and
may be repelled by shovring that the party
diligence,
did inquire with reasonable
but
failed to ascertain the existence of the unwhile, on the other
registered conveyance;
hand, it is Insisted that notice which makes
it the duty of the party to inquire, amounts
to constructive notice of the prior conveyance,
the law presuming that due inquiry will necessarily lead to its discovery.
The counsel for the defendant cites several
authorities in support of his position, and
among others the cases of Tuttle v. Jackson
In the
and Grimstone v. Carter (supra).
first of these cases, Walworth, chancellor,
"If the subsequent purchaser knows
says:
of the unregistered conveyance at the time
of his purchase, he cannot protect himself
and whatever is
against that conveyance;
sufficient to make it his duty to inquire as
to the rights of others is considered legal
notice to him of those rights;" and in Grimstone V. Carter, the same judge says: "And
if the person claiming the prior equity is in
the actual possession of the estate, and the
purchaser has notice of that fact, it is sufficient to put him on inquiry as to the actual
rights of such possessor, and is good constructive notice of those rights."
It must be conceded that the language
used by the learned chancellor in these cases,
if strictly accurate, would go to sustain the

doctrine
contended for by the defendant's
counsel.
Notice is of two kinds: actual and
constructive.
Actual notice embraces all degrees and grades of evidence, from the most
direct and positive proof to the slightest cii'cumstance from which a jury would be warranted in inferring notice. It is a mere
question of fact, and is open to every species of legitimate evidence which may tend
to strengthen or Impair the conclusion.
Constructive notice, on the other hand, is a legal
facts; and like
inference from established
other legal presumptions,
does not admit of
dispute.
"Constructive notice," says Judge
Story, "is in its nature no more than evidence of notice, the presumption
of which is
so violent that the court will not even allow
of its being controverted."
(Story, Eq. Jur.

§399.)

A

recorded deed is an instance of construcIt is of no consequence whether
has actual notice of
the second purchaser
the prior deed or not. He is bound to take,
and is presumed to have, the requisite notice. So, too, notice to an agent is constructive notice to the principal; and it would not
in the least avail the latter to show that the
agent had neglected to communicate the fact.
In such cases, the law imputes notice to the
party whether he has it or not. Legal or imphed notice, therefore, is the same as constructive notice, and cannot be controverted
by proof.
But it will be found, on looking into the
cases, that there is much want of precision
They have been
in the use of these terms.
not unfrequently applied to degrees of evidence barely sufficient to warrant a jury in
inferring actual notice and which the slightest opposing proof would repel, instead of being confined to those legal presumptions of
notice which no proof can overthrow. The
use of these terms by the chancellor, therefore, in Tuttle v. Jackson, and Grimstone v.
Carter, is by no means conclusive.
uniformly used, as deThe phraseology
scriptive of the kind of notice in question,
"sufficient to put the party upon inquiry,"
would seem to imply that if the party is
faithful in making inquiries, but fails to
discover the conveyance, he will be protected.
The import of the terms is, that it becomes the duty of the party to inquire. If,
then, he performs that duty is he still to be
bound, without any actual notice?
The presumption of notice which arises from proof
of that degree of knowledge which will put
apprehend, not a
a party upon inquiry is,
presumption
of law, but of fact, and may,
therefore, be controverted
by evidence.
In Whitbread v. Jordan (supra). Baron
Alderson laid down the rule as follows:
"When a party having knowledge of such
facts as would lead any honest man, using
ordinary caution, to make further inquiries,
does not make, but on the contrary studiously avoids making, such obvious inquiries, he
must be taken to have notice of those facts,

tive notice.
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which, If he had used such ordinary diligence,
would readily have ascertained." This
very plainly implies tliat proof that the party
has used due diligence,
but without effect,
would repel the presumption.
In this case it
is true the decision was against the party
having the notice.
But in Jones v. Smith,
1 Hare, 43, we have a case in which a party,
who had linowledge sufficient to put him on
inquiry, was nevertheless held not bound by

he

the notice.
The defendant had loaned money upon the
security of the estate of David Jones, the
father of the plaintiff. At the time of the
loan he was informed by David Jones and
his wife, that a settlement was made previous to the marriage, but was at the same
time assured that it only affected the property of the wife. He insisted upon seeing
the settlement, but was told that it was in
the hands of a relative, and that it could not
be seen without giving offense to an aged
aunt of the wife, from whom they had expectations.
David Jones, however,
after
promised that he
some further conversation,
would try to procure it for exhibition to the
This promise he failed to perdefendant.
form.
It turned out that the settlement included the lands upon which the money was
Here was certainly knowledge
loaned.
enough to put the party upon inquiry; for he
was apprised of the existence of the very
document which was the foundation of the
complainant's claim.
He did inquire, however, and made every reasonable effort to see
the settlement itself, but was baffled by the
plausible pretenses of David Smith.
The
vice-chancellor held the notice insufficient.
He said: "The affairs of mankind cannot be
carried on with ordinary security, if a doctrine like that of constructive notice is to be
refined upon until it is extended to cases like
the present."
Possession by a third person, under some
previous title, has frequently but inaccurately been said to amount to constructive
notice to a purchaser, of the nature and extent of such prior right. Such a possession
puts the purchaser upon inquiry, and makes
it his duty to pursue his inquiries with diligence, but is not absolutely conclusive upon
In Hanbury v. Litchfield, 2 Mylne &
him.
K. 020, when the question arose, the master
of the rolls said: "It is true that when a tenant is in possession of the premises, a purchaser has implied notice of the nature of his
title; but, if, at the time of his purchase,
the tenant in possession is not the original
lessee, but merely holds under a derivative
lease, and has no knowledge of the covenants contained in the original lease, it has
never been considered that it was want of
which is to
due diligence in the purchaser,
fix him with implied notice, if he does not
pursue his inquiries through every derivative
lessee until he arrives at the person entitled
to the original lease, which can alone convey
to him information of the covenants."
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This doctrine is confirmed by the language
of Judge Story in Flagg v. Mann, 2 Sumu.
He says: "I admit
554, Fed. Cas. No. 4,847.
that the rule in equity seems to be, that
where a tenant or other person is in possession of the estate at the time of the pupchase, the purchaser is put upon inquiry as
to the title; and if he does not inquh-e, he
is bound in the same manner as if he had
inquired and had positive notice of the title
of the party in possession."
It is still further confirmed by the case of
The language
Rogers v. Jones, 8 X. H. 264.
of Parker, J., In that case is very emphatic.
He says: "To say that he (the purchaser)
was put upon inquiry, and that having made
all due investigation without obtaining any
knowledge of title, he was still chargeable
with notice of a deed, if one did really exist,
would be absurd."
If these authorities are to be relied upon,
and I see no reason to doubt their correcton this subject is,
ness, the true doctrine
that where a purcliaser has knowledge of any
fact sufficient to put him on inquiry as to
the existence of some right or title in conflict with that he is about to purchase, he is
presumed either to have made the inquiry
of such prior
and ascertained
the extent
right, or to have been guilty of a degree of
negligence equally fatal to his claim to be
This
considered
as a bona fide purchaser.
however, is a mere inference of
presumption,
fact, and may be repelled by proof that the
purchaser failed to discover the prior right,
notwithstanding the exercise of proper diligence on his part.

The judgment should be reversed, and
there should be a new trial, vnth costs to
abide the event.

PAIGE, J. The question to be decided is,
whether,
under the finding of the referee,
the plaintiff is to be deemed to have had at
the time of his purchase legal notice of the
prior unrecorded mortgage of the defendant.
The referee finds that the plaintiff had sufficient information or belief of the existence
of such mortgage to put him upon inquiry,
but that upon pursuing such inquiry to the
extent of such information and belief, he did
not find that such mortgage existed or had
been given.
It seems to me that the two
findings are inconsistent with each other.
If the plaintiff, on pursuing an inquiry to
the full extent of his information and behef
as to the existence of the jiefendant's mortgage, was unable to find that it either then
existed or had been given, the highest evidence is furnished that the information reby the plaintiff
ceived or belief entertained
was not sufficient to put him on inquiry as
The last
to the existence of such mortgage.
part of this finding effectually disproves the
fact previously found of the sufficiency of
The
notice to put the plaintiff on inquiry.
two facts are utterly inconsistent with each
other, and cannot possibly co-exist
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remarks of Parker, J., in Rogers v.
H. 264, 269, are directly apposite
to the facts found by ttie referee.
Judge
Parker says: "To say that he (demandant)
was put upon inquiry, and that having made
all due investigation without obtaining any
knowledge of title, he was still chargeable
with notice of a deed, if one did really exist,
would be absurd." The sound sense of these
observations
is clearly shown by the principle of the rule that information sufBcient to
put a party upon inquiry is equivalent to evidence of actual notice or to direct and positive notice. That principle is that such information will, if followed by an inquiry prosecuted with due diligence, lead to a knowledge of the fact with notice of which the
Hence, in all
party is sougjat to be charged.
cases where the question of implied notice
of a prior unrecorded mortgage or conveyance arises as a question of fact to be detei^
mined, the court must decide whether the information possessed by the party would, if
it had been followed up by proper examination, have led to a discovery of such mortIf the determination is
gage or conveyance.
that such an examination would have resulted in a discovery of the mortgage or conveyreof law necessarily
ance, the conclusion
sults that the information possessed by the
party amounted to Implied notice of such inis the
strument.
But if the determination
converse of the one stated, the information of
the party cannot be held to be an implied
These propnotice of the deed or mortgage.
ositions will be found to be fully sustained
(Kennedy v. Green, 3 Mylne
by authority.
& K. 699; 2 Sugd. Vend. 5.j2 [Am. Ed. 1851]
Insur4 Kent, Comm. 172;
marg. p. 1052;
ance Co. V. Halsey, 4 Sandf. 577, 578: Id., 8
X. Y. 274, 275; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 398-400,
400a; Jackson v. Burgott, 10 Johns. 461;
Dunham v. Dey, ]5 Johns. .568. 569, in error;
Jackson v. Given, 8 Johns. 137; JoUand v.
3 Ves. 478; Pendleton v. Pay,
Stainbridge,
2 Paige, 205.)
Where the information is sufficient to lead a party to a knowledge of a
prior unrecorded conveyance, a neglect to
make the necessary inquiry to acquir.. .«iuch
knowledge will not excuse him, but he will be
chargeable with a knowledge of its existence;
the rule being that a party in possession of
certain information will be chargeable with
a knowledge of all facts which an inquiry,
■J'he

Jones,

8 X.

suggested by such information, prosecuted
with due diligence, would have disclosed to
him.
In
(4 Sandf. 578; 3 Mylne & K. 699.)
this case the fact being found by the referee
that the plaintiff, after pursuing an inquiry
to the extent of his information, failed to discover the existence of the defendant's
mortgage, it seems to me that neither law nor
justice will justify us in holding the plaintiff
chargeable with implied notice of such mortgage.
The doctrine of notice and its operation in favor of a prior unrecorded deed or
mortgage rests upon a question of fraud, and
on the evidence necessary
to infer It. (4
Kent, Comm. 172.) Actual notice affects the
conscience, and convicts the junior purchaser
of a fraudulent intent to defeat the prior conveyance.
His knowledge of facts and circumstances
at the time of the second purchase sufficient to enable him, on due inquiry,
to discover the existence of the prior conveyance, is evidence from which a fraudulent in2
569;
tent may be inferred.
(15 Johns.
Johns. Oh. 190; Jackson v. Burgott, 10 Johns.
Now, if it is ascertained and found as
4(:2.)
a fact,
that the facts and circumstances
within the knowledge of the second purchaser, at the thue of his purchase, were insufficient to lead him, on a diligent examination,
to a discovery of the prior conveyance, how
upon this finding can a fraudulent intent be
inferred, and if not, how can he be charged
with notice which implies a fraudulent intent? It is not in the nature of things, that
a knowledge of the same facts and circumstances shall, at one and the same time, be
I
held evidence of both innocence and guilt.
thinli the rule well established, that an inference of a fraudulent intent on the part
of a junior purchaser or mortgagee must,
in the absence of actual notice, be founded on
and that
clear and strong circumstances,
such inference must be necessary and unquestionable.
(McMechan v. Griffing, 3 Pick. 149,
154, 155;
Hine v. Dodd, 2 Atk. 275; Jack509;
2 Mass.
son V. Given, 8 Johns. 137;
2 Johns. Ch. 189; 15 Johns. 569; 8 Oow. 264,
266.)

For the above reasons, both the judgment
rendered on the report of the referee and the
judgment of the general term aflirming the
same, should be reversed, and a new trial
should be granted.
Judgment reversed.
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THOMAS

et

al. v.

(21 N. B. 352,

BURNETT.

128 111. 37.)

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April

5, 1889.

Error to circuit court, Randolph county;
George W. Wall, Judge.
Charles W. Thomas, pro se. James A.
Watts, for defendant in error.

Shope, J. This was a bill filed by Martha
Burnett against Charles W. Thomas and
the sheriff of Randolph county, to set aside
a certiflcate of purchase held by Thomas upon a 40-acre tract of land owned by the complainant, as a cloud on her title, and to enjoin the sheriff from making a deed under
such certiflcate. Both parties claimed title
under .James Burnett, a son of the complainant. It is conceded that on the 29th day of
March, 1882, Jame:_ Burnett was the owner
of the tract of land in controversy, which
was inclosed and in cultivation, but upon
On that day the
which there was no house.
complainant, as it is shown, bought the land
in good faith from her son for the sum of
$1,600.
No deed was made until in the
month of April following, when James Burnett conveyed the land to complainant.
No
question arises in respect to the payment of
the purchase money at the date of the purchase. The land had been fenced, and under
David C.
cultivation for over 20 years.
Thompson had for some years acted as the
agent of James Burnett, while he was owner,
and had rented the land from year to year.
The deed to complainant was not recorded
until October 22, 188i, and the land stood on
the assessment books in the name of James
Burnett, until 1885. The complainant, after
her purchase, retained Thompson as her
agent in respect of this land, who, in August,
1882, rented the land as the complainant's to
one Jordan for one year, who raised a crop
thereon, and retained possession of the same
until in August, 1883, when he surrendered
In March, 1884,
possession to Thompson.
At
the agent rented the lands to Yagle.
each renting the agent informed the tenants
that complainant was the owner of the
premises, and that he was renting it for her.
A crop was raised on the land each year after 1882 by the tenants of complainant, and
the fences were kept in repair by her agent,
who collected the rent, and paid the same to
her. On the 10th day of October, 1883,
Margaret Gilflllen sued out an attachment
against James Burnett in the Randolph circuit court returnable to the March term
thereof, then following, and this land was
levied upon on that day as the property of
James Burnett, and a certiflcate of levy duly
filed. At the September term, 1884, of said
court, said plaintiff in attachment recovered
judgment for $2,500 against said Burnett.
Special execution was issued thereon, under
which, on October 22, 1884, the tract in controversy was sold to defendant Thomas, attorney of the plaintiff in question, for $1,900,
and the sheriff delivered to Thomas a certifi-
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cate of purchase, which is the certiflcate now
sought to be set aside.
Section 31 of the conveyance act declares
that all deeds, etc., authorized bylaw to be
recorded, "shall take effect and be in force
from and after the time of flling the same for
record, and not before, as to all creditors and
without notice; and
purchasers
subsequent
all such deeds and title papers shall be adjudged void as to all Such creditors and subsequent purchasers without notice, until the
An attachsame shall be filed for record."
ing creditor, who levies his attachment without notice of a prior unrecorded deed of his
debtor, either actual or constructive, acquires
a lien, which, if perfected by judgment, execution, sale, and deed, will hold the legal
estate as against the grantee in a prior unrecorded deed.
Having acquired a lien as an
innocent creditor without notice, he will have
a right to enforce the same, notwithstanding
he may have, subsequently to the levying of
his attachment, received notice of the deed.
Martin v. Dryden, 1 Gilman, 187; Stribling
V. Ross, 16 111. 122; Jones v. Jones, Id. 117;
Henderson v. Downing, 24 Miss. 106. Unless, therefore, the plaintiff in attachment
had notice, either actual or constructive, of
the unrecorded deed from James Burnett to
Mrs. Burnett, the lienthereby acquired must
prevail over the rights of the complainant
under that deed. The statute makes her
deed void as against the attaching creditor if
a lien on the property was thereby secured in
good faith, and without notice of her rights.
Complainant's right to the relief sought depends, therefore, upon the fact whether the
plaintiff in attachment, at the time of the levy
of the writ, had notice of her rights.
There
is no pretense that she had actual notice of
the unrecorded deed, but it is claimed that
she had constructive notice, arising from the
possession of the land by complainant. Complainant took possession after her purchase
by her agent and tenants, as we have seen,
long prior to the levy of the attachment, and
which possession she has ever since retained.
It is well settled that actual possession of
land by a party under an unrecorded deed is
constructive notice of the legal and equitable
right of the party in possession.
The possession by tenant is the same in all respects as
if by the party himself. Franz v. Orton, 75
111. 100; Whitaker
v. Miller, 83 111. 381;
Coari v. Olsen, 91 HI. 273. It is claimed by
plaintiff in error that possession, to have the
effect of notice, must be of that character
which will arrest attention, and the case ot
Lougliridge v. Bowland, 52 Miss. 546, is referred to as sustaining that position. In that
case the grantor of the land at the time of the
con^yance was in possession of the same by
his tenant. After the sale the same tenant
continued to hold possession under an agreeThere was
ment to pay rent to the grantees.
then nothing more than a technical attornment by the tenant to the purchaser. And
the court held that the mere attornment of
the tenant, without any visible change in the
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character of the holding, was not sufBcient to
put a creditor or subsequent purchaser on inquiry. It is not necessary to the decision of
tliia case to express any opinion in respect of
the doctrine there announced, for the reason
that after the complainant's purchase she
through her agent made a lease of the property to Jordan.
This was in August, 1882,
and for one year, and under it a crop was
raised.
The tenant was informed that his
landlord was Mrs. Burnett, the complainant.
The agent, as before stated, kept the place in
repair as her agent, collected the rents, and
Here were open, notorious
paid them to her.
acts of ownership asserted in an unequivocal
manner by the complainant. Thompson, the
agent, was not himself in possession of the
property, but the tenants of complainant were,
and it was their possession which constituted
It is, however, said that there was
notice.
no tenant in actual possession at the time of
the levy of the attachment, and therefore the
plaintiff in error was not chargeable with
notice of the unrecorded deed.
The tenant's
possession of land is that of his landlord.
The Jordans occupied the land up to August,
1883, and this was notice to the world of Mrs.
Burnett's title, to all intents as if she had ocActual residence is not essential
cupied it.
to continuous possession.
If the party is in
actual possession of the land, and there are
continuous acts of ownership, it is sufficient.
Coleman
v. Billings, 89 111. 183; Ford v.
Marcall, 107 111. 136. The land here in con-

troversy was improved, and under fence. In
such case, the owner will not lose his possession by failing to be continuously in the
actual occupancy or use of the land by himself or tenant. The fact that a short time
may have elapsed between the actual occupancy by one tenant, before another tenant
takes possession, will not be a loss of possession by the owner. The improvements, the
fact that a crop had been raised the previous
season, will clearly indicate the possession,
and will be sufficient to put others dealing
with the property upon inquiry.
The attachment here was levied October 10, 1883, a short
time after the tenants had surrendered possession, to Thompson, complainant's agent,
who still continued to act as such agent in
taking care of the property, and the plaintiff
should have made inquiry before levying her
It is apparent this could
writ of attachment.
have been done, either of the outgoing tenants
or of the agent.
Any reasonable, prudent
man, contemplating a purchase of the property, would have made such inquiry; and it
is clear that an inquiry of the Jordans or of
Thompson would have led to notice of the
claim of complainant, and of the existence
of the unrecorded deed. We think the circumstances

are such as to charge the attach-

ing creditor with notii-e of the deed from
This beJaines Burnett lo the complainant.
ing so, the circuit court committed no error
in granting the relief prayed, and its decree

will

be affirmed.
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PRINGLE
(37

V.

DUNN

Wis.

et al.

449.)

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Jan. Term,

1875.

Appeal from circuit court, Milwaukee county.

Action by one Pringle against Andrew
Dunn and wife and others to foreclose a
given to the La Crosse & Milmortgage
waukee Railroad Company to secure a bond
of said company for $5,000, payable January 1, 1864, said mortgage bearing date
April 11, 1854, and alleged to have been recorded on such date, and afterwards assigned
to plaintiff, as a bona fide purchaser for
value.
There was no record of the assignment. The court found that the witnesses
to the mortgage did not subscribe it at the
time of its execution, but after it had been
recorded;
that, after such subscription, it
was not again recorded;
that the plaintiff
was the bona fide holder of the bond and
mortgage;
that the defendants other than
Andrew Dunn and wife had no actual knowledge of the mortgage, and the recording of
the mortgage before it was subscribed was
not constructive notice;
and dismissed the
complaint.
Plaintiff appeals. Modified.
Mariner, Smith & Ordway, for appellant.
Guy C. Prentiss, J. P. C. Cottrill, and John
W. Gary, for respondents.

COLE, J. Before approaching
the legal
questions involved In this case, it is necessary to determine a question of fact; and
that is, does the evidence show that the
mortgage sought to be foreclosed was properly attested when first left at the otfice of
the register, so as to entitle it to record?
There is considerable testimony in the case
which tends strongly to prove that the mortgage had no witnesses when it was recorded. And the court found as a fact that the
mortgage
was not subscribed by the witnesses Baker and McFarlane at the time
of its execution, and before it was transcribed upon the records and entered in the
general index, but was subscribed by these
witnesses after it was recorded, and that
it was not again recorded. This finding affirms one important fact, which is much
contested by the defendants,
which is the
genuineness of the signature of the witness
A. J. McFarlane to the instrument. An attempt is made to prove, and it is argued
that the evidence shows, that McFarlane
as a witness,
never signed the mortgage
and that his signature thereto is a forgery.
On this point we will only make the remark that we are satisfied from the evidence, and especially by an inspection of
the writings themselves,
of the authenticity
of the signature. Whether the mortgage was
subscribed by the witnesses at the time of
its execution and before it was left at the
office for registry is a question of more doubt
upon the evidence.
The testimony is quite

01

had
strong and positive that the mortgage
no subscribing witnesses when it was reBut this testimony is contradicted;
corded.
and, considering the circumstances attending the execution and delivery of the mortgage, we think the probabilities favor the
inference that the instrument was witnessed
when it was left for record. According to

this view, there was a mistake in transcribing the mortgage upon the record by omitting the names of the witnesses. The weight
of the evidence, to our minds, supports this
It is to be observed
inference or conclusion.
that the mortgage is perfect and fair on its
A strong preface, showing two witnesses.
sumption fairly arises from the insti'ument
itself that it was witnessed at the time of
its execution. This presumption is not overcome nor repelled by the testimony offered
to show that it was not witnessed at that
time. In respect to the degree or quantity
of evidence necessary to justify a finding
signed the
that the subscribing witnesses
instrument after it was executed and recorded, the case would seem to come within
the rule laid down in Kercheval v. Doty,
31 Wis. 478, where it is said: "The proposition being to set aside or Invalidate a
written contract by evidence of a far less
certain and reliable character than the writing itself, the greatest clearness and certainty
of proof should be required.
It is like the
cases where the object is to correct or reform a deed or other instrument on the
ground of mistake, or to set aside or rescind
it on the same ground; where the rule is
that tlie fact must be ti.tablished by clear
and satisfactory evidence."
The testimony
offered to show that the mortgage was not
witnessed when executed and before it was
recorded falls short of this rule.
The fact
is not established
by clear and conclusive
proof that it was not witnessed when executed. It would serve no useful purpose
to go into a detailed discussion of the evidence upon this point, and we shall not do
so.
It is sufficient to say that, giving to
the testimony offered to show that the mortgage was not witnessed
before it was received for record all the weight to which
it is entitled, it fails to establish that fact
in a clear, satisfactory manner.
Assuming, then, that the mortgage was
witnessed when it was left at the office of
the register to be recorded, the further important inquiry arises as to what effect must
be given to the record as constructive notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers for
value.
This record was in this state. The
entry of the mortgage was made in the general index book, but the full record of the
instrument had no subscribing witnesses;
and therefore the question is, would such
a record operate as constructive notice to
subsequent purchasers for value, independent
of any actual notice? It Is claimed by the
counsel for the plaintiff that the record does
and should so operate, notwithstanding the
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mistake in tlie registration or recording of
the instrument in extenso.
Tliis presents a
question of no little difficulty, which must
be solved by the application of general principles of law to the provisions of our statute.
It is a familiar rule that an instrument
must be properly executed and acknowledged
so as to entitle it to record, in order to
make the registry tliereof operate as constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser.
Says Mr. Justice Story: "The doctrine
as
to the registration of deeds being consti-uctive notice to aU subsequent purchasers is
not to be understood of all deeds and conveyances which may be de facto registered,
but of such only as are authorized or required by law to be registered, and are duly
registered in compliance
with law. If they
are not authorized or required to be registered, or the registry itself is not in compliance with the law, the act of registration
is treated as a mere nullity; and then the
only by
subsequent
purchaser
is affected
such actual notice as would amount to a
fraud." 1 Bq. Jur. § 404. See, also Ely v.
Wilcox, 20 Wis. 528; Fallass v. Pierce, 30
Wis. 444; X,essee of Heister v. Fortner, 2
Bin. 40; Shove v. Larsen, 22 Wis. 142. and
cases cited on page 146. Under our statute,
among other requisites,
two witnesses are
essential to a conveyance, to entitle it to
record.
The statute requires every register
to keep a general index, each page of which
shall be divided into eight columns, with
heads to the respective
columns
as prescribed; and the duty is imposed upon the
register to make correct entries in said index of every instrument received by him
for record, under the respective and appropriate heads, and immediately to enter in
the appropriate column, and in the order of
time in which it was received, the day and
hour of reception;
and it is declared that
the instrument "shall be considered
as recorded at the time so noted."
Rev. St. 1858,
In Shove v. Larsen, supra,
c. 13, §§ 142, 143.
the effect of this index containing correct
entries of matters required to be made therein was considered, and it was held that by
force of the statute it operated as constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser.
In
that case the index contained an accurate
description of the land mortgaged, but in
transcribing the mortgage at large upon the
records a mistake was made in the description; and it was claimed in behalf of the
subsequent purchaser that it was the registration of the instrument at large which alone
amounted
to constructive notice.
But this
construction of the statute was not adopted,
the court holding that a subsequent purchaser
was bound to take notice of the entries in
the index, which the law required the register to make. This result seemed to follow
necessarily from the language of the statute,
which declared that the instrument should

be considered

as recorded

at the time noted.

Time might elapse before the instrument
was transcribed at large on the record, or
it might be lost, and not transcribed at all,
leaving the index the only record of its contents.
And the manifest Intention of the
statute seemed to be to make the index notice of all proper entries from its date, and
also of the instrument Itself until It was
registered in full. The further consequence
would seem necessarily to result from this
view of the statute that the registration of
the conveyance
in extenso relates back to
the registration in the index, and from thence
there is constructive notice of the contents
of the instrument. The doctrine of Shove
V. Larsen was approved
in Hay v. Hill, 24
Wis. 235i but the court refused to make the
entry in the index in that case operate as
constructive notice, because upon its very
face it bore conclusive evidence that it was
not made at its date;
in other words, the
rectitude and integrity of the index were
successfully impeached by the index itself.
See, also. Insurance Co. v. Scales, 27 Wis.
640.
Where there is nothing upon the face
of the index to impeach or throw suspicion
upon its accuracy,
there it would affect a
purchaser with notice of those
subsequent
facts which the law required to appear therein. Doubtless, a still further consequence follows from this construction of the statute,
namely, that where, by some mistake, there
is a discrepancy
between the proper index
entries
and the instrument as registered,
there each supplies the defects of the other
in the constructive notice thereby given; that
is, it appears to be the intention of the statute to charge the subsequent purchaser consti-uctively with such knowledge as the proper index entries afford,
as well as with
notice of those facts derived from the registration itself. He is presumed to have examined the whole record, and is affected with
notice of what it contains.
But when the
instrument,
as registered in full, appears
defective
in some material and essential
parts, which are not supplied by the index
entries, what effect, then, must be given the
record as constructive notice? This is really the difficult question in this case. From
j
I the entries in the index it would not appear
whether the mortgage was witnessed or not.
The presumption from the mere entries themselves would be that it was witnessed and
acknowledged,
so as to entitle it to record;
but when the mortgage, as registered in full,
was examined, it would be found that it
had no witnesses, and had no business on
the records.
As the record itself is only
constructive notice of its contents, it is difficult to perceive how it can go beyond the
facts appearing upon it, and charge a purchaser constructively with knowledge of a
fact not in the record.
One of the counsel for the defendants states
the argument on this point as follows: He
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insists and claims that the entries in the
index books, so fax as they indicated that
the mortgage had been filed fox- record, indicated also that the mortgage was so executed as to entitle these entries of it to
be made;
but that, when the full record
was looked at for all the particulars of the
mortgage, and perhaps for the express purpose of verifying the entries in the index,
it is found that the apparent assertion by
was
the index entries that the mortgage
properly executed was wholly unti-ue, and
that the mortgage in fact was no incumbrance.
The fact, as truly shown to exist
by the full record, overcomes and destroys
the false assertion as to the fact in the
And, it appearing by the insti'ument
index.
registered that it was not entitled to record,
both the registration and index itself cease
to affect the purchaser with constructive notice.

It is not readily perceived wherein this argument as to the effect of our various provisions upon the subject of registration is
unsound.
The question mainly depends upSo
on the construction of our own statutes.
far as we are aware, this is the first time the
point lias been presented in this court for
adjudication. We have derived but little
aid from the decisions in other states, for
the reason that few of them have similar
statutory provisions. We have been referred
by the counsel for the plaintiff to two cases
in Michigan,— Brown v. McCormick, 28 Mich.
v. Martin, Id. 472.
215, and Starkweather
In Brown v. McCormick the effect of the regpurchasers,
istry, as notice to subsequent
was made to turn upon the curative act of
In Stark1861, mentioned in the opinion.
weather V. Martin the question was, how far
the absence, on the registry of a deed, of
any mark or device indicating a seal, or of
any statement of the register that the original was sealed, affected the validity of the
record entry as evidence of title.
The record entry of the deed was made more than
forty years before the cause was decided,
and in the approby the proper oflicer,
priate place for the registry of deeds, under
the law permitting the registry of only sealed instruments; and the instrument was in
the form of a warranty deed, purporting to
be acknowledged and dated at a time when
it was the common and lawful course to
and contrary to official
seal conveyances,
duty to take the acknowledgment unless the
conveyance was sealed, and where the conclusion, attestation clause, and certificate of
acknowledgment of the instrument all spoke
of it as under seal. The court said that
these facts and incidents, taken together,
afforded a very strong presumption that the
original was sealed.
The doctrine of this case does not seem
to have a very strong bearing upon the question under consideration. It may be said
that it was contrary to the duty of the reg-
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ister to record the mortgage unless It was
properly acknowledged and witnessed, and
that a presumption arises that he would not
have done so. But in answer to this it may
also be said that the law made it the duty
of the register to record the mortgage unless
it was properly acknowledged and witnessed, and that a presumption arises that he
would not" have done so. But in answer to
this it may also be said that the law made
it the duty of the register to record, or cause
to be recorded correctly, all instruments auSection 140,
thorized by law to be recorded.
And the presumption
c. 13, Rev. St. 1858.
that he performed his duty in recording the
mortgage correctly is as strong as the presumption that he would not have recorded it
unless it was entitled to registry.
Ill Shove V. Larsen, a number of cases are
referred to which hold that a mistake in recording a deed, or recording it out of its
order, renders the registration ineffectual as
notice to subsequent incumbrancers and purchasers.
The doctrine of those cases would
seem to be applicable to the case before us.
The registration and index entries being incomplete, because showing that the mortgage had no subscribing witnesses, constructive notice could not be presumed of such
a record; for the principle "that the registry
is notice of the tenor and effect of the instrument recorded only as it appears upon that
record" fully applies.
Shepherd v. Burkhalter, 13 Ga. 443. See, in addition to the cases
cited in Shove v. Larsen, Brown v. Kirkman,
1 Ohio St. 116;
Stevens v. Hampton, 46 Mo.
404;
Bishop v. Schneider, Id. 472; Terrell v.
Andrew Co., 44 Mo. 309; Frost v. Beekman,
1 Johns. Ch. 288.
The question, then, arises whether the evidence shows that any of the defendants were
affected with actual notice of the mortgage.
This question, we think, must be answered
in the affirmative, so far as the defendants
Thomas Maloy and Stanislaus Bartosz are
concerned.

In the deposition taken on his own behalf,
but read as a part of the plaintiff's case.
Thomas Maloy distinctly admits that he had
heard, when he purchased his lots, that there
was a defective railroad mortgage upon
them, but that he did not look for it, because
his abstract did not show it. It is claimed
by one of the counsel for the defendants that
this related to the Aiken mortgage, and not
to the one upon which this action is brought
It seems to us, however, that this is a totally inadmissible construction of the testimony.
He most certainly refers to the mortgage in suit. And what he had heard about
there being a defective railroad mortgage
upon the property was sufficient to put him
upon inquiry.
Parker v. Kane, 4 Wis. 1.
"What is sufficient to put a purchaser upon
an inquiry is good notice; that is, where a
man has sufficient information to lead him
to a fact, he shall be deemed conusant of it."
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Sugd. Veod. (9th London Ed.) p. 335. "In regard to the inquiry required of a party, it
should be such as a prudent and careful man
would exercise in his own business of equal
importance. Accordingly, where the mortgagee is informed that there are charges affecting the estate, and is cognizant of two only,
he cannot claim to be a purchaser without
notice of other charges, because lie believes
that the two, which satisfy the word "charHe is
ges," are all the charges upon it.
bound to inquire whether there are any others. The rule with respect to the consequences of a purchaser abstaining from making
inquiries does not depend exclusively upon a
fraudulent motive. A man may abstain from
mere heedlessness or stupidity, and be none
the less responsible for the consequences;
but, if he make reasonable inquiry, and is
deterred by a false answer, he is excusable,
if it be of a character to delude a prudent
man." 1 Story, Bq. Jur. § 400b; Jackson v.
Van Valkenburgh, 8 Cow. 260. Independently of the record, llaloj- had notice of the existence of the mortgage, or had a knowledge
of such facts as to call for further inquiry.
He cannot, therefore, be protected as an innocent purchaser for value.
The defendant Bartosz must be charged
with notice of the mortgage by the recitals
in the deed from Tenney and wife to his immediate grantor. He was present when that
deed was executed and delivered to his uncle.
He testifies that he did not know whether
anything was said about the railroad mortgage at that time or not; that he did not understand English very well. The purchase
was really made by his uncle for him. And,
whether he fully understood the conversation at the time about incumbrances, he
must be chargeable with notice of what appears in his chain of title. This clause was
in the deed to his uncle; "Said premises are
free and clear from all incumbrances except
a mortgage to the La Crosse Railroad Co.,
which
am to save said Bartosz harmless
from." The general rule upon this subject
is "that, where a purchaser cannot make out
a title but by a deed which leads him to an-

I

other

fact,

he

will

be

presumed

to

have

knowledge of that fact." The following authorities are very clear and decisive upon
that point: Pitzhugh v. Barnard, 12 Mich.
105;
Case v. Erwin, 18 Mich. 434; Baker v.
Mather, 25 Mich. 51; Insurance Co. v. Halsey, 8 N. Y. 271; Frost v. Beekman, 1 Johns.
Ch. 298; Gibert v. Peteler, 38 N. Y. 105; Acer
V. Westcott, 40 N. Y. 384;
Coles v. Sims, 5
De Gex, M. & G. 1. The clause in the deed
referred to the mortgage as an existing incumbrance, and he cannot now, in good faith,
claim that it is not a lien upon his property.
The counsel for the plaintiff claims that
tlie defendant McLindon had actual knowledge of the existence of the mortgage.
It
is true, he testified that when he purchased
he knew by report that there was a railroad
mortgage upon the property, but he says

AND NOTICE.
that the report stated that the mortgage was
void,
\yere he not protected by another principal, he could not certainly be regarded as a
bona fide purchaser. But he purchased from
S. S. Johnson, or claims through Johnson, in
whom the title stood free from any taint.
For the rule is well settled that a purchaser
affected with notice may protect himself by
purchasing of another who is a bona fide
purchaser for a valuable consideration. For
a similar reason, if a person who has notice
sells to another who has no notice, and is a
bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration, the latter may protect his title, although it was affected with the equity arising from notice in the hands of the person
from whom he derived it. Mr. Justice Story
says this doctrine, in both of its branches,
has been settled for nearly a century and a
half in England. 1 Eq. Jur. § 410. He states
an exception to the rule, which was recognized and enforced in Ely v. Wilcox, 26 Wis.
91, where the estate became revested in the
original fraudulent grantee, when the original equity was held to reattach to it. There
is no pretense that McLindon comes within
the exception; and, as a bona fide purchase
of an estate for a valuable consideration
purges away the equity from the estate in
the hands of all persons who derive title
under it, he is protected.
It is said that it
does not appear that Johnson's title was derived from the common source. As we understand the bill of exceptions, an abstract
was offered in evidence to show title from
Bunn, by various intermediate conveyances,
to the defendant,
which was ruled out on
the plaintiff's objection. But perhaps it is a
better answer to the objection to say that
the plaintiff has made the defendants parties
under the general allegation that they claim
some interest in or title to the mortgaged
premises,
which was subject to the mortgage. This allegation implies that this interest was not adverse, but was derived
from Dunn, though subsequent in date, and
inferior in right, to the plaintiff's mortgage.
It was further insisted that the evidence
showed that the defendant Mary Maloy had
actual notice of the mortgage.
We do not
think this position is sustained by the testimony. It is attempted to charge her with
the same actual knowledge her husband had,
because he aided her when she made her purchase of Martin Maloy. It does not appear that
anything was said at this time about the railroad mortgage, or that she ever had any notice
of it. It does not appear, even, that he was
acting as her agent in any legal sense; and,
besides, if he were, his knowledge, acquired
at another time, when not engaged in her
business, ought not to be imputed to her.
Notice, to bind the principal, should be
brought home to the agent while engaged
in the business or negotiation of the principal, and when it would be a breach of trust
in the former not to communicate the knowledge to the latter. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 408,
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and cases cited in note 1. The evidence fails
to bring her within that rule.
A numher of other questions were discussed upon the argument; but we believe these
observations dispose of all the more important ones.
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The judgment of the circuit court as to the
defendants Thomas Maloy and Stanislaus
Bartosz must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.
It is so ordered.
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Supreme Court of Jlississippi.

Oct., 1876.

Appeal from chancery court, Lincoln county; Thomas Y. Berry, Chancellor.
Bill in equity by Bentonville ' Taylor
against J. B. Deason, M. W. Hoskins, and
G. W. Hoskins, her husband, Ellen McClendon and A. D. McClendon, her husband, to
recover the balance of the purchase money
of certain land, and to subject land to the
payment of the same.
The bill showed that on February 16, 1872,
the complainant sold and conveyed the land
in question to J. B. Deason; the deed, which
was duly recorded on February 19, 1872, reciting a consideration of "the sum of $700,
to be paid to the party of the first part on
or before the first day of July, 1872, by the
party of the second part." For the purchase
money Deason gave his note, of even date
with the deed, as follows: "On or before
the first day of July next, I promise to pay
Bentonville Taylor, or bearer, the sum of
$700, for town lots conveyed by him to me
this day.
This sum is to be paid in Mississippi state certificates
of indebtedness
at
par." After maturity of the note, Deason
sold and conveyed the lots to the defendant
M. W. Hoskins, and the latter and her husband sold and conveyed
the same to the
defendant Ellen McClendon. When Deason
sold and conveyed the lots to the defendant
Hoskins, he informed her agent that he had
paid Taylor all the purchase money.
The defendants demurred to the bill, on
the ground that the complainant had no
vendor's lien, it appearing on the face of
the bill that the consideration for the sale of
the lands was not money or United States
currency; and because the recital in the
deed was not notice to the defendants Hoskins and McClendon of the complainant's
equity.
The demurrer was overruled, and an answer filed, and upon final hearing a decree
was rendered for the complainant for the
balance of the purchase money due him, and
foreclosing his vendor's lien on the land.
The defendants appeal.
Sessions & Cassedy, for appellants.
Chrisman & Thompson, for appellee.
Bentonville
Taylor, pro se.

cuted to Deason was this recital: "The party of the first part (the vendor), for and In
consideration of the sum of $700, to be paid
on or before the first day of July, 1872, by
the party of the second part" (the vendee i.
&c.
For this sum of $700, Deason, the vendee, executed his note to Taylor, due 1st of
July, 1872. The deed was recorded at once,,
and Deason took possession of the premises.
Without having completed payment in full
of the note, Deason sold the premises in
1874 to Hoskins, who subsequently sold to
Mrs. McClendon. Both Hoskins and Mrs.
ilcOlendon deny actual knowledge, at and
before their purchases, that any thing remained due to Taylor.
Did the law give them constructive notice
Nothing is better setof Taylor's rights?
tled than that the purchaser of real estate
is bound to take notice of all recitals in the

chain of title through which his own title
is derived.
Not only is he bound by everything stated in the several conveyances constituting that chain, but he is bound fully
to investigate and explore everything to
which his attention is thereby directed.
Where, therefore, he is informed by any of
the preceding conveyances,
upon which his
own deed rests, that the land has been sold
on a credit, he is bound to inform himself
as to whether the purchase money has been
paid since the execution of the deed. Wiseman V. Hutchinson, 20 Ind. 40; Croskey v.
Chapman, 26 Ind. 333; Johnston v. Gwathmey, 4 Lift. (Ky.) 317.'
It is argued, however, that this principle
only applies before the maturity of the notes.
as shown by the recitals of the deed, and
that it will not apply where, as in the case
purchasers have bought
at bar, subsequent
after the notes were past due. It is said
that, in such case, the subsequent
purchasers may rely upon a presumption that the
original debt has been paid.
We know of
no principle which would justify a reliance
upon such a presumption, and it is expressly
negatived by the cases of Honore v. Bakewell, 6 B. Mon. 67, and Thornton v. Knox,
Id. 74. They may rely upon such presumption after sufficient time has elapsed to bar
the notes, although, in fact, they may have
been renewed.
Avent v. McCorkle, 45 Miss.
221.

It appears In the case at bar that the subsequent purchasers knew that Deason had
bought the realty on a credit, because they
asked him at the time of their purchase if
he had paid all the money due Taylor.
It
was their own folly if they relied upon his
assurances. Instead of applying for information to Taylor, who lived in an adjoining
county, and is shown by the bill to be a

CHALMERS, J. We are content with the
finding of the chancellor on the facts. If
any injustice was done in fixing the amount
due, it was to the appellee, and not to the
appellants. The fact that the note was dischargeable in Mississippi certificates of indebtedness (known as Alcorn money) did not
practising lawyer, well known in Brookdeprive it of the protection of the vendor's
Hai-vey v. Kelly, 41 Miss. haven, where the lots were situated and all
equitable lien.
the defendants resided.
490.
Decree affirmed.
In the face of the deed which Taylor exe-

LIS PENDENS.
HOUSTON
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TIMatERMAN.i

Pac.

1037, Vf Or. 499.)
of Oregon. May 3, 1889.
Appeal from circuit court, Liinn county.
Hewitt <& Bry,ant and Tilman Fojrd, for
appellant. /. K. Weatlierford and D. R. N.
Blackburn, for respondent.
(21

Supreme Court

LORD, J. This was a suit to partition certain lands described herein. The defendant
denied tliat the respondent had any interest
in said lands, and alleged that she was (»he
owner in fee-simple, and entitled to the possession of the whole of said premises.
The
plaintiff, in reply, denied tiiis, and alleged
afflrmatively that some time in July, 1S84,
she commenced a suit against A. J. Houston
for a divorce and alimony, and for an equal
undivided one-third of the real property then
owned by said Houston, and that he was the
owner in fee of said real property, which
was duly described therein.
That the summons in said divorce suit was served on
■
, 1884, and that prior to that time and
prior to tlie 26th day of September, 1884, the
defendant Timmerman had notice that the
complamt for divorce and one-third of said
real property had been filed by the plaintiff
against her husband. That on the 5th day
of February, 1886, a decree was entered,
granting a divorce in favor of the plaintiff,
and adjudging her to be the owner of the undivided one-third of said real property, etc.
The court below, after a trial of said cause,
rendered
a decree therein, granting the
prayer of plaintiff for partition, except as to
the 160 acres of land mentioned therein, and
partition was ordered and made on June 26,
1888, and confirmed by the court.
The defendant Timmerman derived her title to the
premises in dispute in this wise: On the
15th day of March, 1880, the plaintiff's husband, A. J. Houston, for value, made and
delivered his promissory note to the defendant Timmerman for the sum of $3,400, with
interest at the rate of 10 per cent, per annum from date; that, the said A. J. Houston failing to pay said note, the defendant
Timmerman commenced suit on the 26th
day of September, 1884, and caused service
of summons to be made upon him on that
day, and that on October 27, 1884, the defendant Timmermau recovered judgment
against the said A. J. Houston for tlie sum
oJE $5,463.87, which, on the same day, was
duly docketed in the judgment lien doclcet,
and thereupon became a lien upon all the
real property mentioned in the complaint in
this suit. It further appears that on March
19, 1883, said A. J. Houston made and delivered his promissory note to J. T. Williams
for $1,000, with interest from date at the
rate of 10 per cent, per annum, payable six
months after date, and to secure the payment of the same executed a mortgage, which
was duly recorded, upon the 160 acres of land
set out in the complaint.
The said Houston

' Upon the subject ot lis pendens generally,
see
note to Newman v. Chapman, 14 Am. Dec. 774-779.
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failing to pay said note, the mortgage was
foreclosed against the said Houston and the

plaintiff herein. The defendant Timmerman, however, answered, setting up her
judgment, and asked, if the property be sold
to foreclose said mortgage, that the overplus, if any, should be applied in payment of
her judgment, and a decree was accordingly
so entered, etc.; that execution was issued
upon said decree, and said 160 acres was sold
to the defendant Timmerman for $2,500;
that thereafter, on May 13, 1885,, execution
was issued upon said judgment, and the remainder of the premises described herein
was sold to the defendant Timmerman, and
said sale confirmed, and deeds were duly executed by the sheriff to said defendant.
It will be noticed that the suit of the defendant Timmerman to recover the amount
due on the note against A. J. Houston,
who was then the husband of the plaintiff
herein, was commenced after the suit of the
plaintiff for divorce against her husband, and
that a judgment was recovered and docketed
before a decree in the divorce suit was rendered, and in which one-third of the real estate then owned by the liusband was decreed
It is true, there wiis no direct
the plaintiff.
proof of the date of the service of the summons in the divorce suit; but, as this will
not affect the result reached, it is immaterial .
The contention is that the defendant Timmerman
was a purchaser pendente lite.
There is, however, a preliminary question to
be first disposed of, namely, that the appeal
was not taken within six months as allowed
The answer to this is that the obby law.
jection relates to the inteilocutory or first decree, and not to the final decree, and that, as
our own Code does not authorize an appeal
from interlocutory judgments or decrees, but
only from such as are final, and, the appeal
from the final decree being within six
months, there was a right of appeal, and the
objection, therefore, is unavailing.
An examination of the statutes of the two
states from which the authorities were read,
to the effect that an apjieal might be taken
before a final judgment or decree was entered
shows that appeals in those states may be
taken from interlocutory judgments or decrees, which, not being the case under our
Code, they fail on application.
See Freem.
Co-tenancy, §§ 519, 527. But to return.
Among the ordinances or rules adopted by
Lord Chancellor Bacon "for the better and
more regular administration of justice" was
that, where a person
one which provided
"comes in pendente lite, and while the suit
is in full prosecution, and without any color
of allowance, or privity of the court there
regularly, the decree bindeth."
Chancellor
Kent said that a "Us pendens duly prosecuted and not conclusive is notice to a purchaser so as to affeitaud bind his interest by
the decree."
Strictly speaking, however, the
doctrine of lis pendens is not founded upon
notice, but upon reasons of public policy,
founded upon necessity.
"It affects him,"
said Lord Chancellor Cranwoktii, "not be-
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cause it amounts to notice, but because the
law does not allow litigant parties to give to
others, pending the litigation, rights to the
property in dispute, so as to prejudice the
* * * The necessities of
opposite party.
mankind require that the decision of the
court shall be binding, not only on the litigant parties, but also on those who derive
title under them by alienation made pending
the suit, whether such alienees had or had
If this
not notice pending proceedings.
were not so, there could be no certainty that
"
Bellitigation would ever come to an end.
Sabine,
The
1 De Gex &
566.
lamy V.
main purpose of the rule is to keep the subject-matter of the litigation within the power
of the court until the judgment or decree
shall be entered; otherwise, by successive
alienations, its judgment or decree could be
rendered abortive, and thus make it impossible for the court to execute its judgments or
Hence the general proposition that
decree.
one who purchases of either party to the suit
the subject-matter of the litigation, after the
court has acquired jurisdiction, is bound by
the judgment or decree, whether he purchased
for a valuable consideration or not, and without any express or implied notice in point of
fact, is sustiiined by many authorities, and
disputed by none.
E^'ster v. Gaff, 91 U. S.
521; Grant v. Bennett, 96 111. 513; Randall
V. Lower, 98 Ind. 261; Daniels v. Henderson,
49 Cal. 242; Blanchard v. Ware, 43 Iowa, 530;
Carr v. Lewis, 15 Mo. App. 551; Currie v.
Fowler, 5
Marsh. 145; Ilinrn v. Mill,
The
13 Ves. 120; 1 Story, Eq. .Jiu-. § 405.
doctrine of lis pendens was introduced in
analogy to the rule at common law in a real
action "where if the defendant aliens after
pendency of the writ, the judgment in the
Soraction will overreach such alienation."
rell V. Carpenter, 2 P. Wms. 482. And this
may account for the leaning in some of the
courts to restrict the application of the rule
■of Us pendens to actions or suits affecting
title to real property. McLaurine v. Monroe, 30 Mo. 469; Winston v. Westfeldt, 22
Marsh.
Ala. 760; Baldwin v. Love, 2
489; Murray v. Lylburn, 2 Johns. Ch. 441.
But it is hardly considered well settled that
it may not witli equal propriety be applied to
Two things, liowever,
the sales of chattels.
seem indispensable to give it effect: (1) That
the litigation must be about some specific
thing, which must necessarily be affected by
the termination of the suit; and (2) that the
particular property involved in the suit
" must be so pointed out by the proceeding as
to warn the whole world that they intermedFreem. Judgm. §§ 196,
dle at their peril."
Now, the divorce suit of the plain197.
tiff was not brought specifically to recover
the one-third of the real estate of her husband, as was decreed in the divorce proceeding. The land was not the subject-matter of
the litigation, and the subject of the suit was
not to recover title that belonged to the
It was incidental and collateral to
plaintiff.
The court has no
the divorce proceeding.

J.

J. J.

J. J.

jurisdiction to affect the title of the husband
to his lands, or decree that one-third of them
shall be set apart for her in her own right
and title, independent of a decree for divorce.
Nor has the plaintiff any title on which to
base a suit to recover any portion of the same,
except as it comes by force of the statute
A proceeding in
upon a decree for divorce.
divorce is partly in personam and partly in
rem, and, in so far as it is to affect the mara thing
riage status, it is to change
independent of the parties, and is a proceeding not against the parties in personam, but
against their status in rem. 5 Amer. & Eng.
Cyclop. Law, "Divorce," 751. The matter
upon which the jurisdiction acts is the staThe marriage is the thing which the
tus.
It is the subject
suit is brought to dissolve.
of the litigation; but, as incidental to it, the
court may grant temporary nWmony pendente
lite, or permanent alimony, when a decree
And the general
for divorce is rendered.
rule is that bills tor alimony do not bind the
property of the defendant with lis pendens.
1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 196; Brightman v. Brightman, 1 R. I. 112; Isler v. Brown, 66 N. C.
556; Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand.(Va.) 662.
But the court cannot affect the title of the
real property of the defendant in a divorce
proceeding until the point is reached that a
Tempodecree of divorce is to be rendei-ed.
rary alimony may be granted pendente lite,
but the title of the real estate of the defendant remains intact, and cannot be affected
during the pendency of the proceeding, but
only when the proceeding for a divorce has
terminated, and a decree rendered that the
marriage is dissolved, and then only by force
of the statute.
Our statute provides: "Whenever a marriage shall be declared void or dissolved the
party at whose prayer such decree shall be
made shall in all cases be entitled to the undivided one-third part in his or her undivided
right in 'fee of the whole of the rfal estate
owned by the other at the time of such
*
*
*
shall be the
decree;
and it
duty of the court to enter a decree in
Code
with
this provision."
accordance
Or. § 499. It is " whenever a marriage shall
be declared dissolved" that the statute operates, not before, or pendente lite; and the
court then becomes authorized, and it is its
"duty, " " to enter a decree" for the undivided
one-third part in fee of the whole of the real
estate "owned by the defendant at the time
of such decree" for a divorce. It must be
manifest, then, that the primary object of the
suit is to affect the marriage relation, — its
status; that it is the specific matter in controversy to be affected; and that it is only
when the status is changed by a decree of divorce that the statute operates to divest title
"owned" by the defendants, and that it then
becomes the duty of the court to enter a decree in accordance with its provisions. Nor
do the cases cited by counsel sustain his contention. In Tolerton v. Williard, 30 Ohio St.
586, the suit was of "double aspect," as said
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by the court, and was brought to protect her
equitable right in property which was the
subject of dispute. This property was bought
with the wife's money, and she sought a resThe court says: "It
toration of lier riglits.
is evident that the court in coming to its conclusion did take these equities into consideration, so that the decree may fairly be considered an equitable one in her favor." And
again: "In a proceeding like the one under
consideration where the wife claims rights in
her husband's property other than those arising from the marital relation, and insists upon them in connection with her claim for alimony, the court is fully authorized to pass
In Daniel v. Hodges, 87 N.
upon them."
C. 97, the proceeding was for alimony, and
the only property which the husband owned
was a lot that the wife sought to have subjected to her claim, and was in actual possession of it by order of the court when her
husband, pending the litigation, conveyed it
to another, and the court held, under the exceptional circumstances of the case, that the
There the
doctrine of Us pendens applied.
proceeding was to subject the specific thing
to her claim, which the husband attempted
to defeat by conveying away the property,
and tlie court, while admitting the general
doctrine that a lis pendens was not applicable
in such cases, said: "We are of the opinion
the petition for alimony under the particular
circumstances of the case constituted such a
lis pendens as affected the purchaser with
notice, independent of the actual notice had,
and rendered the deeds void."
But this has
no relevancy to the case at bar.
There she
sought to subject tlie property to her claim
for alimony, and the suit was directed specifically against it, and she was put in actual
possession by order of the court, and then it
was only "under the peculiar circumstances
of the case" that the court thought the
purchaser from the husband pending the litigation was affected with the rule of lis penHere there was no alienation of the
dens.
property, which was only incidentally involved, or any charge of any act on the part
of the defendant Houston to defeat any right
whatever which might accrue to the plaintiff,
if the marriage should be dissolved. If the
defendant Houston had conveyed away the
property to another with the object of defeating her right, upon a decree for divorce, to
any interest in his lands, such purchaser may
be affected with the rule of lis pendtns in
such case; but that is not the question here,
and which it will be time enough to decide
when properly presented for our consideration. The debt which the defendant Houston owed the defendant Timmerman was
contracted long before the suit for divorce
was commenced, or the cause or ground of
the divorce existed, and doubtless the credit
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was given on the faith of the property, a part
of which included the property in dispute,
There is no prethen owned by Houston.
tense of any fraud or collusion, or that the
debt is not an honest obligation which Houston ought to have paid long before the diAlthough
vorce proceeding was instituted.
of the divorce suit
the commencement
might result in a decree which would affect
the property of the defendant, the property
was not the subject specifically of the litigation, and by reason thereof was not withdrawn from such burdens as might be legally
imposed upon it for just claims upon judgments recovered and docketed against its
owner, prior to divesting him of his title by
The
force of the statute under the decree.
defendant Timmerman had the legal right to
commence her action to recover the money
due on the note of Houston, and the fact that
the wife of Houston had instituted proceedings for a divorce did not affect that right,
but when judgment was recovered thereon,
and docketed, by force of law, the lands then
owned by him in that county, including the
land in dispute, became subject to the lien of
such judgment; and, as the facts show that
this was before any decree was rendered in
the divorce whereby title to such lands could
be divested, it follows that whoever took title
from him subsequently, either by contract or
by operation of law, took said title «tm onere,
It
or subject to the lien of such judgment.
results, as a purchaser of said lands at an execuLion sale upon such judgment, the defendant Timmerman was not affected by or subject to the rule of lis pendens, and her deed
It is true, in the
thereby rendered invalid.
divorce suit the property was described in
the complaint and decree, which, since the
decision in Bamford v. Bamford, 4 Or. 30,
has been deemed essential to reach the property of the guilty party, but it is apprehended
that neither allegation or proof concerning
the lands is necessary, but that it is enough
and a sufiicient compliance with the latter
clause of section 499, Code Or., to say in effect that the party obtaining the divorce is
hereby entitled to one-third of the real property owned by the other, whatever it may be.
In this view, if any question arises as to
what property was so owned by him, it can
be determined by appropriate proceedings for
that purpose between the parties interested,
much better than in a divorce suit, in which
it is neither proper nor convenient that third
parties, in order to protect their rights, should
be compelled to intervene and become parties
to a controversy between husband and wife
in a divorce proceeding.
Barrett v. Failing,
6 Sawy. 475, 3 Fed. Rep. 471.
So that, however we look at the facts of this record, our
conclusion is that the decree of the lower
court must be reversed, and it is so ordered.
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PEllLEy, C. J. There is no complaint
tliat the rulings and instructions of the court
im the trial were erroneous or improper, provided the evidence warranted the jury in returning a verdict for the defendants; and the
verdict must stand, if the evidence was competent to prove such representations by the
plaintiff as would estop him to set up his
title to the goods attached to the property of
Charles E. Horn.
The evidence reported in the ca.se was competent to prove that the plaintiff made the
representations on the occasion and in the
r-ircumstances
testified to by Cole; that the
plaintiff, though not indebted to Cole, was
in debt to others;
that Cole, believing the
representations to be true, and relying on
them as true, caused the goods to be attached as the property of Charles E. Horn;
and, also, that the plaintiff made these representations knowing them to be false, with
the intention that all persons who were Interested in the subject should take them to
be true, and act on them as such, and with
the intention to mislead and deceive all to
whom the representations were communicated, and induce them to act on them as
true; that his intention was to deceive his
own creditors, and prevent them from taking
the goods as his for the debts which he owed
to them.
These facts must be taken to have
been established by the verdict.
But, as there was no evidence that the
plaintiff knew Cole had any demand against
Charles E. Horn, we cannot infer that the
plaintiff had Cole in his mind as an individual whom he meant to deceive by his false
representations, or that he had an intent to
prevent Cole from taking the goods for a
debt which he owed to Cole, as he owed no
such debt; and, on the evidence reported,
the jury were not at liberty to find that the
plaintiff had Cole In his mind as an individual whom he meant to deceive and defraud
by inducing him to take the goods for his
This raisdemand against Charles E. Horn.
es the point, which the counsel for the plaintiff takes, whether, to estop a party from
showing that his representations were false,
it is necessary that the false representations
should have been intended to deceive and defraud tlie individual party who trusted to
them and acted on them, provided there was
a general iijtention to deceive and defraud all
persons who were interested in the subjectmatter of the false representations.
The ground on which a party is precluded
from proving that his representations on
which another has acted were false is, that

to permit it would be contrary to equity and
good conscience.
This has been sometimes
called an "equitable estoppel," because the
jurisdiction of enforcing this equity belonged originally and peculiarly to courts of equity, and does not appear to have been familiarly exercised at law until within a comparatively recent date; and, so far as relates
to suits at law affecting the title to land,
I understand that in England and in some
of the United States the jurisdiction is still
Storrs v. Barconfined to courts of equity.
ker, (i Johns. Oh. 166, 168; Evans v. Bicknell,
6 Ves. 174, 178; Pickard v. Sears, 6 Adol. &
E. 469.
The doctrine, however, is a vei-y
and
old head of equity, and is recognized
applied in a great number of the early cases.
Dyer v. Dyer, 2 Ch. Cas. 108; Teasdale v.
Teasdale, 13 Vin. Abr. 539; Hobbs v. Norton,
1 Vern. 136; Gale v. Lindo, Id. 475; HunsLamlee v.
den v. Oheyney,
2 Vern. 150;
Hanman, Id. 499; Raw v. Pote, Id. 239;
Blanchet v. Foster, 2 Ves. Sr. 2(!4; East India Co. V. Vincent, 2 Atk. 83; Stiles v. Cowper, 3 Atk. (593; Webber v. Farmer, 13 Vin.
Abr. .-)25; 2 Brown, Pari. Cas. 88; 2 Eq.
1
Cas.
Abr. 481; Neville v. Wilkinson,
Brown, Ch. 543; Storrs v. Barker, 6 Johns.
Gh. 160; Strong v. Ellsworth, 26 Vt. 366.
JIany of these cases related to underhand
agreements in fraud of marriage settlements;
but the principle is of general application.
1 Fonbl. Eq. 267, note x.
Relief was given
according to the circumstances of the case,
— sometimes
by enjoining suits at law, in
which the legal title was set up, and sometimes by decreeing conveyances and the cancelling of deeds and other instrtmients; but
in all these cases relief was given in equity
contraiy to the strict legal rights of the de-

fendants.
Thus, in the case of an equitable estoppel,
a party is not allowed to assert his strict legal right because, in the circumstances of
the individual case, it would be contraiy to
equity and good conscience.
Take the present case for an Illustration.
In trover, following the legal definition of the action, if
the plaintiff proves property in himself and
a conversion by the defendant, he has maintained his action, and is entitled to a verdict and judgment. It is conceded that the
plaintiff owned the goods, and that the defendants converted them.
The defense here
set up appeals from the strict rule at law
to the equitable doctrine that a party shall
not be allowed to exercise his legal right of
proving the facts, if, on account of his previous declarations or conduct, it would be
contrary to equity and good conscience.
So
in a vvrit of entry; by the technical rules
at law, if the demandant proves seisin In
himself and a disseisin by the tenant within
the time of limitation, he is entitled to judgment; but if the demandant,
having a dormant title to the land demanded, concealed
his title, and encouraged the tenant to purchase from another, he is not allowed, in our
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practice, to set up his legal title, because it continued to be, acts of notoriety no less solwould be contrary to equity and good con- emn than the execution of a deed, such as
livery, acceptance of an estate, and the like.
science.
It thus appears that what has been called Whether a party had or had not concurred
an "equitable estoppel," and sometimes, with in an act of this sort was deemed a matter
less propriety, an "estoppel in pais," is prop- which there eould be no difficulty in ascererly and peculiarly a doctrine of equity, orig- taining, and then the legal consequences folinally introduced there to prevent a party low."
In the authorities which contain the most
from taking a dishonest and unconscientious
advantage of his strict legal rights,— though complete enumeration of the different kinds of
now with us, like many other doctrines of legal estoppels and the fullest discussion of
equity, habitually administered at law. But the law on the subject, I find no allusion to
formerly the practice was different, and suits the equitable estoppel which we are now con^
All legal estoppels, whether by recat law, the courts being Incapable of giving sidering.
effect to this equity, were often enjoined ord, by deed, or by matter in pais, depended
where the party insisted on his rights at law on strict legal rules, and shut out proof of the
Vincontrary to the equitable doctrine,
as in truth and justice of the individual case.
Raw V. Pote, Stiles v. Cowper, and Webber er, Abr., "Estoppel," passim; Lyon v. Reed,
13 Mees. & W. 809; Freeman v. Cooke, 2
V. Farmer, qua supra.
It would have a tendency to mislead us in Exch. 658.
For this reason, because legal estoppels,
the present inquiry, as there is reason to suspect that it has sometimes misled others, if whether by record, deed, or matter in pais,
we should confound this doctrine of equi- shut out proof of the truth and justice of indity with the legal estoppel by matter in pais. vidual cases, they have been called odious, and
The equitable estoppel and legal estoppel have been construed with much strictness
They were
agree indeed in this, that they both preclude against parties that set them up.
from showing the truth in the individual formerly required, like other defences regardcase.
The grounds, however, on which they ed as inequitable, to be pleaded with certainty
do it are not only different, but directly op- to a certain intent in every particular.
If
posite.
The legal estoppel shuts out the they were relied on by way of averment, and
truth, and also the equity and justice of the tried by the jury, the jury might find, and
individual case on account of the suppos- according to some authorities were bound by
ed paramount importance of rigorously en- their oath veritatem dicere to find, according
forcing a certain and unvarying maxim to the truth of the case, regardless of the esof the law. For reasons of general policy, toppel. Trials Per Pais, 284; Co. Litt 227a;
a record is held to import incontrovertible Com. Dig. "Estoppel," E, 10. The practice is
verity, and for the same reason a party is now different, and legal estoppels may be renot permitted to contradict his solemn ad- lied on, when given in evidence, without being
Legal estoppels exclude
mission by deed. And the same is equally specially pleaded.
true of legal estoppels by matter in pais. evidence of the truth and the equity of the
Certain acts done out of court and without particular case to support a strict rule of law,
deed were, by a technical and unyielding rule on grounds of public policy.
Equitable estoppels are admitted on the exof law, upheld on like grounds of public policy, and followed always by certain legal actly opposite ground of promoting the equity
consequences.
The legal effect of such acts and justice of the individual case by preventwas not permitted to be controverted by ing a party from asserting his rights under a
general technical rule of law, when he has so
proof.
Thus, if one accepts a lease and enters conducted himself that it would be contrary
under it, he Is estopped to claim any other to equity and good conscience for him to alestate in the land during the term; he can- lege and prove the truth.
The facts upon
not show that he owned the land when the which equitable estoppels depend are usually
Estoppels by matter in proved by oral evidence; and the evidence
lease was made.
pais were few in number, and all of this should doubtless be carefully scrutinized, and
character; and be full and satisfactory, before it should be
general
and well defined
they all enforced some technical rule of the admitted to estop the party from showing the
law against the truth, and also against the truth, especially in cases affecting the title to
justice and equity of the individual case. land.
But where the facts are clearly proved,
Coke, in his examination of the different the maxim that estoppels are odious — which
kinds of estoppel by matter in pais, enumer- was used in reference to legal estoppels, be"By livery, by entiy, by cause they shut out the truth and justice of
ates the following:
acceptance of rent, by partition, and by ac- the case — ought not to be applied to these
In equitable estoppels, as it has sometimes been,
ceptance of an estate."
Co. Litt. 352a.
Lyon v. Reed, 13 Mees. & W. 309, Parke, B., inadvertently, as think, from a supposed anspeaking of legal estoppels by matter in alogy with the legal estoppel by matter in pais,
pais, says: "They are but few, and are point- to which they have, in this respect, no resemLord Campbell, in Howard
They blance whatever.
ed out by Lord Coke, Co. Litt. 352a.
are all cases which anciently really were, V. Hudson, 2 El. & Bl. 10; Andrews v. Lyons,
In other cases, where
and in contemplation of law have always 11 Allen, 349, 351.
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more attention has been paid to the real nature
of this equitable doctrine, it has been held
that such estoppels are not odious, and to be
construed strictly, but are entitled to a fair
like other equitable
and liberal application,
which are admitted to suppress
doctrines
fraud and promote honesty and fair dealing,
ilellor and Compton, JJ., in Ashpitel v. Bryan,
3 Best & S. 474; Cowen, J., in Dezell v. Odell,
3 Hill, 220; Com. v. Moltz, 10 Pa. St. 530, 531;
Buckingham v. Hanna, 2 Ohio St. 557; VanEensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 326; Preston
V.

Mann,

25 Conn.

118, 128.

equitable estoppel, the party is forbidden to set up his legal title because he has
so conducted himself that to do it would be
As
contrary to equity and good conscience.
in other cases of fraud and dishonesty, the
circumstances out of which the question may
arise are of Infinite variety; and, unless courts
at law are willing to abdicate the duty of administering the equitable doctrine effectually
in suppression of fraud and dishonesty, the application of it cannot be confined within the
limit of any narrow technical definition, such
as will relieve courts from looking, as in other
cases depending on fraud and dishonesty, to
of each individual case.
the circumstances
Certain general rules will doubtless apply, as
in other cases where relief is sought on such
But I find myself unable to agree
grounds.
with the authorities where the old maxim that
legal estoppels are odious has been applied to
this equitable estoppel, and where attempts
have been made to lay down strict definitions,
such as would defeat the remedy in a large
proportion of the cases that fall within the
principle on which the doctrine is founded.
The doctrine having been borrowed from
equity, courts at law that have adopted it
should obviously look to the practice in equity
for their guide in the application of it; and in
equity, the doctrine has been liberally applied
to suppress fraud and enforce honesty and
fair dealing, without any attempt to confine
the docti'ine within the limits of a strict definiFor Instance, the doctrine has not in
tion.
equity been limited to cases where there was
The cases are
an actual intention to deceive.
numerous where the party who was estopped
by his declarations or his conduct to set up
his legal title, was ignorant of it at the time,

In this

and of course could have had no actual intenYet,
tion to deceive by concealing his title.
if the cu'cumstances were such that he ought
to have informed himself, it has been held to
be contrary to equity and good conscience to
set up his title, though he was in fact ignorant
of it when he made the representations.
Hobbs V. Norton, Hunsden v. Cheyney, Teasdale V. Teasdale, qua supra; and Burro wes v.
So, if the party knew the
Lock, 10 Ves. 470.
Storrs v. Barker,
facts, but mistook the law.
Nor is it necessary in
6 Johns. Ch. 166.
equity that the intention should be to deceive
any particular individual or individuals. If
the representations are such, and made in such
circumstances,
that all persons interested in

the subject have the right to rely on them as
true, their truth cannot be denied by the party
that has made them against any one who has
trusted to them and acted on them.
Gale v.
Lindo, Webber v. Farmer, qua supra.
In the much and well considered case of
Preston v. Mann, 25 Conn. 118, 128, Storrs, J.,
delivering the opinion of the court, says:
"The doctrine of estoppel in pais, notwithstanding the great number of cases which
have turned upon it and are reported in the
books, cannot be said even yet to rest upon
any determinate legal test which will reconcile
the decisions, or will embrace all transactions
of equitable
to which the general principles
necessity wherein it originated demand that it
In fact, it is because it is
should be applied.
so peculiarly a doctrine of practical equity,
tha,t its technical application is so dilHcult, and
its reduction to the form of abstract formulas
is still unaccomplished."
This was said in
185(i, and little has since been done towards
extricating the doctrine from the confusion
and conflict of authority with which it was
This, as I think, has been
then embai'rassed.
caused by the fact that courts have continued
to exercise their ingenuity in the vain attempt
to compress a broad doctrine of equity within
the narrow limits of a technical definition.
The case of Pickard v. Sears, 6 Adol. & H.
469, decided as late as 1837, appears to have
been regarded, both in England and in this
country, as the leading case at law on this
subject.
It was trover by the mortgagee of
who
personal goods against the defendants,
were purchasers at a sheriff's sale on execuThe facts set up
tion against the mortgagor.
in defence were, that the plaintiff was present at the sale, did not disclose his title as
mortgagee, and encouraged the defendants to
purchase.
The question on trial was as to
the property of the plaintiff in the goods, and
Lord Denman directed a verdict for the plaintiff. A rule to show cause why the verdict
should not be set aside was made absolute.
In delivering the judgment of the court.
Lord Denman said:
"His [the plaintiff's] title having been established, the property could
only be devested by gift or bale, of which no
specific act was even surmised.
But the rule
of law is clear that where one, by his words
or conduct, willfully causes another to believe
the existence of a certain state of things, and
induces him to act on that belief so as to alter
his own previous position, the former is concluded
from averring a different state of
things as existing at the same time; and the
plaintiff might have parted with his interest
in the property by a verbal gift or sale, without any other formalities that threw technical
difliculties in the way of legal evidence. And
we think his conduct in standing by and giving a kind of sanction to the proceedings under the execution was a fact of such a nature
that the opinion of the jury ought to have
been taken whether he had not, in point of
fact, ceased to be the owner."
It is worthy of note that in this suit at law
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the court, so late as 1837, after stating the
general equitable doctrine, did not venture to
put the defence directly on the ground that
the plaintiff was estopped by his conduct to
prove the truth of the case, but allowed the
facts to go to the jury as evidence that the
plaintiff, in some undefined and mysterious
way, had parted with his property in the
goods.
So late and so reluctant were the
courts to admit in suits at law this defence,
which depended on fraud and dishonesty, and
which belonged, originally and appropriately,
to the jurisdiction in equity.
It can hardly be supposed that Lord Denman, in the statement which he made of this
equitable doctrine in reference to the facts of
that case, understood that he was laying down
a technical definition fixing the limits of the
doctrine, and excluding all cases that did not
come clearly within the terms which he used
Nevertheless, the remarks
on that occasion.
of Lord Denman have often been treated aa
a sort of authoritative text covering the whole
ground, which it was the business of courts
in later cases to expound and exijlain. And it
is curious to observe what different and contradictory interpretations have been put on his
It has
statement of the equitable doctrine.
as authority for
been cited in Massachusetts
decisions in which it has been held that the
representations, to estop the party from showing they were not true, must have been made
with the intent to deceive, and the intent to
deceive the party who sets up the defence.
Plumer v. Lord, 9 Allen, 455; Andrews v. Lyons, 11 Allen, 349. And in California the same
case has been relied on for the rule that where
a representation comes in any way to the ears
of a party, who acts on it, the party making
to deny its
is estopped
the representation
truth, unless it had the character of a confiMitchell v. Keed, 9
dential communication.
In England it has been treated as a
Cal. 204.
statement of the equitable doctrine made in
of that case,
reference to the circumstances
and not intended as a formal and complete
Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Exch. 654;
definition.
Gregg V. Wells, 10 Adol. & E. 90; Jorden v.
Money, 5 H. L. Oas. 212.
It would be a laborious and not a profitable
task to attempt an analysis of all the recent
will briefly advert
decisions on this subject.
to some of those which appear to be the most
important.
In Plumer v. Lord, 9 Allen, 455, it was
held that to create an estoppel in pais, the
declarations or acts must have been accompanied with a design to mislead; and Langdon V. Doud, 10 Allen, 433, is to the same
point.
In Andrews v. Lyons, 11 Allen, 349,
the court went one step further, and decided
that the declarations or acts must have been
accompanied
with a design to deceive the
pai'ty who sets up the estoppel, and induce
him to act on them; and in this last case
it is said that such an estoppel shuts out the
truth, and is odious, and must be strictly
proved.
In Hawes v. Marchant, 1 Cmt. 144,
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Fed. Cas. No. 6,240, the rule is laid down
that to be estopped the party must have designedly made admissions inconsistent with
the defense or claim which he proposes to
set up, and another, with his knowledge and
consent, so acted on this admission, that he
will be injured by allowing the admission
and this mle is cited and
to be disputed;
apparently approved in Audenried v. Betteley, 5 Allen, 382.
In these cases. It is to be observed, the
court have not been content with saying, in
reference to the facts before them, that, if
certain things concurred in the case, it would
fall within the equitable doctrine, and the
party would be estopped, but they have undertaken to lay down a strict legal definition of general application, excluding from
the operation of the doctrine all cases that
do not fall within the terms of the definition.
Applying the rule as laid down in Hawes v.
Marchant to the present case, if Horn had
known that Cole had a demand against
Charles E. Horn, had falsely represented to
Cole that the goods belonged to Charles,
with the design to deceive him and induce
him to attach the goods as the property of
Charles, and Cole, relying on the representation, had taken the goods as the property of
Charles, and as Horn intended, yet if, after
he had made the false representation,
he did
not know that the goods were taken as the
property of Charles, and assent that they
should be so taken, he would not be estopped to set up his own title in the goods. The
statement that another party must have acted on the false statement with his knowledge and assent must mean this, or it can
mean nothing; for he could not know that
he had acted on it at all until the act was
done and accomplished.
The remark of Lord Campbell in Howard
V. Hudson, qua supra, though not called for
by the case, is to the effect that the representation must have been intended to deceive.

These authorities would seem to sustain
the plaintiff's counsel fully in his position
that the false representation must not only
be intended
to deceive but also to deceive
the identical party that acted on them.
There are, however, authorities of equal
respectability, and in greater numbers, which
maintain a different doctrine.
In England, the case of Pickard v. Sears
does not appear to have been understood as
intended to lay down a complete definition
of the equitable doctrine excluding all cases
that could not be brought within the terms
of the remarks made by Lord Denman. In
Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Exch. 654, it was held
that the term "willfully," used in Pickard v.
Sears, was not to be understood in the sense

of "maliciously"; and that, whatever a
man's real meaning may be, if he so conducts himself that a reasonable man would
take the representation to be true, and believe it was meant he should act on it, and
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he did act on it as true, the party mailing
the representation would be equally precluded from contesting its tmth.
This is wholly
inconsistent with the notion that an intention to deceive is an essential ingredient of
the representation,
which precludes the par-

ty making it from showing that it was false.
So in Jorden v. Jloney, 5 H. L. Cas. 212, it
was held not to be necessary that the party
making the representations should know
that they were false; that no fraud need
have been intended at the time; but, if the
party unwittingly misled another, you must
add that he has misled him under such cirground
cumstances that he had reasonable
for supposing that the pei-son whom he was
misleading would act upon what he was saying.

In Gregg v. Wells, 10 Adol. & B. 90, Lord
Denman says: "Pickard v. Sears was in my
mind at the time of the trial, and the principle of that case may be stated even more
A party
broadly than it is there laid down.
who negligently or culpably stands by and
allows another to contract on the faith and
understanding of a fact which he can contradict, cannot afterwards dispute that fact
In the action against the person whom he
This
has himself assisted in deceiving."
shows that Lord Denman did not himself
understand that his remarks in Pickard v.
Sears were to be talien as a definition and
limitation of the equitable doctrine, for he
says the principle of the case might be stated more broadly than it is laid down there,
and may include the case of a culpable negSo Hobbs V. Norton, 1 A'ern. 136;
ligence.
Hunsden v. Gheyney, 2 Vern. 150; Teasdale
Burrow es v.
13 Vin. Abr. 539;
V. Teasdale,
Lock, 10 Ves. 475,— before cited, show that the
practice in equity does not require that there
should in all cases be an intention to deceive, or even a knowledge that the representation was false.
We come now to the decisions in this country, which give a broader application to this
doctrine than those before cited.
In Dezell v. Odell, 3 Hill, 221, the general
doctrine is said to be that when a party, either by his declarations or his conduct, has
influenced a third lierson to act in a particular manner, he will not be afterwards permitted to deny the trath of the admission if
the consequence would be to work an injui-y
to such third person, and that in such case
it must appear— First, that he made an admission which is clearly inconsistent with
he proposes to give, or the
the evidence
claim which he proposes to set up; second,
that the party has acted on the admission;
third, that he will be injured by allowing
the truth of the admission to be disputed.
According to this interpretation of the equitable doctrine, it would seem not to be necessary that the representation should be intended to deceive, or that the party making
it should know it to be false, or ihat il
should be intended the i-arty should act on

it. who does so in fact, and is deceived by It.
The rule of this case has been adopted and
followed in Newman v. Hook. 37 Mo. 207;
Cai-penter
v. Stillwell, 32 Barb. 135; and
Eldred v. Hazlett, 33 Pa. St. 310.
In Roe V. Jerome, 18 Conn. 138, the general doctrine is stated to be that where one
person, by his words or conduct causes another to believe in a certain state of things,
and thus induces him to act on that belief,
so as injuriously to affect his previous position, he is concluded from averring a different state of things as existing at the time;
and this rule was followed in the later cases
of Gowles V. Bacon, 21 Conn. 451, and Dyer
563; and in Preston v.
V. Cady, 20 Conn.
Mann, 25 Conn. 118, before cited, it is said
that the doctrine did not then rest on any
determinate,
legal test which will embrace
all transactions to which the general principles of equity, in which it originated, demand that it should be applied.
Buchanan v. Moore, 13 Serg. & R. 304, 30(1.
is to the point that, though the party believed his representation to be true, and
made it under a mistake, he is estopped to
show that he made the representation innocently believing it to be true, provided the
other party acted on it, and had reason to
act on it, as true.
So in Strong v. Ellsworth, 26 Vt. 366, it is said by Redfield, C.
or
.T., that he who by his woi-ds or actions,
his silence even, intentionally or carelessly
induces
another to do an act which he
would not otheiTvise have done, and which
will prove injurious to him if he is not allowed to insist on the fulfillment, may insist
on such fulfillment; and that the doctrine
of equitable estoppels lies at the foundation
of morals. In Mitchell v. Reed, 9 Gal. 204,
it was held that where a statement made to
a third person is not confidential,
but general, and is acted on by others, the party
making the declaration is estopped to deny
Its truth; that the intention with which the
declaration is made is not material, except,
perhaps, where it is confidential.
This case
and Quirk v. Thomas, 6 Mich. 76, are authorities that to work the estoppel it is not
necessary the declaration should be made to
the party who acts on it, nor in his presence,
nor that the declaration should be intended
to come to the knowledge of any particular
person.
In a suit at law to recover damages for a
false affirmation that the signer of a note
was of age. it was decided, in Lobdell v.
Baker, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 193, that it was not
necessai-y to allege or prove (hat the defeadant knew the sign-r was an infaot. Wiide,
.T., in delivering the opinion of the comt, said:
"A party may render himself ii.nble in an action lor damages to a I'^arty prejudiced by
a false aflirmation, thuugii not made with
any fraudulent iureulion."
This, it may be
sakl, is not directly in point, but the only difference is in the form of the reineily.
The
principle involved is the same, whether the
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question Is raised in a suit to recover damfor the false representation,
or redress
is souglit by estopping tlie party to prove the
falsehood of the representation. Both cases
go on the same genei-al ground that the party
is responsible
for the consequences of his
false representation.
There are numerous autliorities thai it is
not necessary to the estoppel that the declarations or conduct should be intended to deceive any particular person or persons; that,
if they were intended to deceive generally, or
vyere of such a character, and made in such
circumstances, that it must have been understood they were likely to deceive, and any
person using due diligence was in fact deceived by them, it is enough. Gregg v. Wells,
10 Adol. & E. 90; Wendell v. Van Rensselaer,
1 Johns. Ch. 353; Adams v. Brown, 16 Ohio
St. 78; Dezell v. Odell, 3 Hill, 221; Quirk
V. Thomas, 6 Mich. Tii; Mitchell v. Reed, 9

ages

Cal. 204.
It has been declared in many cases that
this equitable estoppel involves a question of
legal ethics, and applies wherever a party
has made a representation, by words or conduct, which he cannot in equity and good
conscience prove to be false; and that this
kind of estoppel, being a broad doctrine of
equity, cannot be limited in application by
In
the tenns of any narrow legal definition.
Canal Co. v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. 483, it
J., that the party
is said by Sutherland,
is estopped when in good conscience and
equity he ought not to be permitted to gainsay his admission; and in the same case, by
Nelson, J.: "From the means in which the
party must avail himself of these estoppels,
it is obvious there can be no fixed and settled
And in Derules of universal application."
zell V. Odell, 3 Hill, 22.j. Bronson, J., adopting
the language of Nelson, J., in Canal Co.
V. Hathaway, adds, "It is a question of ethIn Strong v. Ellsworth, 26 Vt. 366,
ics."
J., says the doctrine lies at the
Redfield,
In Lucas v. Hart, 5
foundation of morals.
Iowa, 415, the court holds that: "In these
estoppels there can be no fixed and settled
rules of universal application to regulate
them as in technical legal estoppels;
that in
many,
and probably in most, instances,
whether the act or admission shall operate as
an estoppel or not must depend on the circumstances
of the case, though there are
some general rules which may materially asIn
sist in the examination of such cases."
the application of these general rules to that
case the court decided that the acts and admissions of the respondent estopped him from
asserting his title to the property in question;
that to permit him to do it would be "unconscionable,
and conti'ary to that fairness
and honest dealing which courts of equ;:.7
seek ever to promote and encourage."
In Frost v. Saratoga Ins. Co., 5 Denio, 154,
it is said by Beardsley, C. J., that such an
estoppel is a question of ethics, and is allowed to prevent fraud and injustice, and
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exists wherever a party cannot in good conscience gainsay his own acts or assertions.
The case of Preston v. Mann, 25 Conn. 118,
is strong to the point that this estoppel, depending on a broad doctrine of equity, cannot
be governed in application by narrow and
strict rules of constniction, such as have prevailed in legal estoppels
In some, if not in most, of the cases, In
which it is said that if a party makes representations intending to deceive the party that
acts on them, the equitable estoppel applies,
not intended, as I think, to lay down
a rule excluding all cases that did not fall
within the statement made in reference to
the facts of the case then under consideration; that what is said is not to be taken as
a rule to limit and define the doctrine and
They say, if such
exclude all other cases.
and such things concur, "this case will fall
within the doctrine"; but they do not intend
to say no other cases are within it. For example, in Kinney v. Famsworth, 17 Conn.
361, Storrs, J., says that "admissions which
have been the means, designedly, of leading
others to a particular course of conduct, cannot afterwards be conscientiously retracted
by one who has made them."
He could not
have intended to lay down the rule that one
would in no case be estopped by a representation not designed to deceive, because
the same judge, in Preston v. Mann, says:
"The doctrine is not reduced to the limits of
any formula," and, "whatever the motive
may be, if one so acts or speaks that the
natural consequence of his words or conduct
will be to influence another to change his condition, he is legally charged with the intent
to induce the other to believe and to act on
that belief, if such proves to be the result."
So Lord
Denman,
speaking,
in Gregg v.

it was

Wells, 10 Adol. & E. 90, of his judgment in
Pickard v. Sears, says: "The principle of
that case may be stated even more broadly
than it is there laid down."
In this state we have several cases where
the general question has been more or less
considered.
In Wells v. Pierce, 27 N. H. 503,
the doctrine of equitable estoppel was traced
to its origin in equity, and it was held that
if the owner actively encourages the purchase of his property from another, he will
be precluded
from claiming it, though he
was not aware of his interest at the time;
which is clearly in conflict with the notion
that the representation must be accompanied
with an intention to deceive.
In Davis v.
Handy, 37 N. H. 65, the doctrine of Wells v.
Pierce was approved and applied.
In the
recent case of Drew v. Kimball, 43 N. H.
285, one point directly involved was whether
it was necessary that the party to be estopped should intend to deceive and defraud the
individual to whom the representation
was
made, and who set up the defence;
and it
was held that it was not necessary.
Indeed
it seems to me that it would be trifling with
a doctrine depending on equity and good con-
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science

to

hold

otherwise.

So,

if

a repre-

sentation was intended to deceive one man,
and it In fact deceived and defrauded another.
Then,
if the representation
again,
were intended to have one operation, and, as
it turned out, deceived and defrauded by
by the
another method not contemplated
party at the time, but still the natural consequence of the representation,
it would be
quibbling with a doctrine depending for its
aijplication on the morality of the act to hold
that the party would not be answerable for
the consequences of his false and fraudulent
representation as much as if it had taken
effect on the party and in the manner intended.
In a case depending on a question of
"legal ethics," it would bring down the morality of the law to a very low standard to
hold that a party was not liable for the
wrong caused by his fraud to one man, because the fraud was contrived against another man.
In Drew v. Kimball the case did not raise
the precise point taken in this case. But, on
a full discussion of the general doctrine, and
a review of the authorities, the court, adopting the hypothetical case put by Tarke, B.,
in Freeman v. Cooke, say: "If, whatever a
man's intentions may be, he so conducts himself that a reasonable man would take the
representation to be true, and believe it was
meant he should act upon it, and he did act
upon it, as tnie, the party making the representation would be equally precluded from
contesting its truth.
In short, the representations are to be regarded as willful when
the person making them means them to be
acted on, or if, without regard to intention,
he so conducts himself that a reasonable man
to be true,
would take the representation
and believe it was meant he should act
on it."
There have been several other cases in this
state where this equitable doctrine has been
Thompson v. Sanand applied.
considered
born, 11 N. H. 201; Simons v. Steele, 36 N.

H. 73; McMahon v. Portsmouth Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 22 X. H. 15; Odlin v. Gove, -il N.
H. 473; Corbett v. Norcross, 35 N. H. 99,
115; Richardson v. Chickering, 41 N. H. 380,
Though I do not find that the precise
385.
point taken here for the plaintiff has been
directly decided in any of our cases, yet the
genera^ current of our decisions on the subject tends to a liberal application of the doctrine for the suppression of fraud and dishonesty, and the promotion
of justice and
fair dealing. No disposition has been shown
In the courts of this state to treat this equitable estoppel as odious, and embarrass its application by attempts to confine it within the
We
limits of a narrow technical definition.
are content to follow where the spirit and
general tone of these decisions lead; and they
lead plainly to the conclusion that, where a
man makes a statement disclaiming his title
to property, in a manner and under circumstances such as he must understand those
who heard the statement would believe to be
true, and, if they had an interest in the subject, would act on as true, and one, using
his own means of knowledge with due diligence,

acts

on the

statement

as

true,

the

party who makes the statement cannot show
that his representation
was false, to the injury of the party who believed it to be true,
and acted on it as such; that he will be liable for the natural consequences of his representation, and cannot be heard to say that
the party actually injured was not the one
he meant to deceive, or that his fraud did
not take effect in the manner he intended.
Our conclusion is that, on the facts which
the verdict has established, the plaintiff was
estopped to show his representation
that the
goods belonged to Charles B. Horn to be
false, though he did not know that the deagainst
fendant Cole had any demand
Charles E. Horn, and though he had not Cole
in his mind as the party whom he meant to
deceive.

Judgment on the verdict.
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Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered
of the court.
This is an action of ejectment
Dlckerson and Wheeler.
The
during the progress of the suit.
agreed in writing to submit the
court without the intervention
So
The court found the facts.
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the opinion
brought

by

latter died
The parties

case to the
of a jury.
far as it is
necessary to state them, they may be thus
Micajah Chauncey owned the
summarized:
He died on the
land in controversy.
day of February, 1853, leaving two children,
Edmund Chauncey and Sarah Kline. They
were his only heirs at law. He is the common source of title of all the parties in this
litigation. On the 3d of March, 1858, John
Kline and Sarah, his wife, conveyed by warranty deed the entire premises to Lowell
Morton. The deed was duly recorded on the
6th of March, 1854, and on the 1st of April,
1854, Lowell Morton entered into possession
of the premises.
He and the defendants have
ever since been in actual possession, claiming
to own and hold the property as tenants in
common.
The latter were in possession at
the commencement of this suit, claiming title
from Lowell Morton.
through conveyances
Prior to the 1st of April, 1856, Lowell Morton learned that Edmund Chauncey was one
of the children of Mica] ah Chauncey, and
that he lived in California. Whereupon Lowell Morton procured Eleazer Morton to write
to Edmund Chauncey to learn whether he
On the 1st
made any claim to the premises.
of April, 1856, Edmund Chauncey, still living
in California, addressed a letter to his sister,
Sarah Kline, then living In Michigan, wherein
he disavowed, in strong terms, the intention
ever to assert such a claim.
The contents of this letter subsequently
of Lowell Morton,
came to the knowledge
who thereafter conveyed to the defendants
by warranty deeds.
Under these deeds they
have since held and claimed title, and have
On the
occupied and improved the property.
9th of July, 1865, Edmund Chauncey conveyed the undivided half of the premises, by
quitclaim deed, to Orlando B. Dlckerson and
James Witherell. On the 1st of May, 1868,
Witherell conveyed all his right, title, and inone of the
terest to William W. Wheeler,

original plaintiffs. The suit was Instituted
Lowell Morton
on the 6th of March, 1873.
and the defendants had then been In possesThe
sion eighteen years and eleven months.
court below held as conclusions of law that
the action was barred by the statute of lim-

writ

of error.

Both the conclusions of law are relied upon
as errors for the reversal of the judgment.
Our remarks will be confined to the point of
estoppel.
This defence Is founded upon the letter of
Edmund Chauncey.
The contents of the letter of Morton,
to which it refers, are not
given In the finding of facts, but the subject of that letter and the Inquiry which it
made appear clearly in the letter of ChaunHe said: "Mr. Morton wrote me a letcey.
intended
to
ter. He wanted to know If
claim any of the Conger farm" (meaning the
"You can tell Mr.
premises in controversy).
Morton for me, he need not fear any thing
from me. Thank God, I am well off here,
This letter will
and you can claim all there.
be enough for him.
intended to give you
and yours all my property there, and more
if you need it." The phrase, "I Intended to
give," etc., implies that he knew his half of
the farm had already been sold to Morton, and
that he could not, therefore, give his sister,
to whom the letter was addressed, any part
of that property.
It does not appear that
there was any other property held by them as
coparceners.
He says further, that he intended to give her more if she needed it.
AU this was communicated to Lowell Morton.
What was the effect upon him? He was
lulled into security.
He took no measures to
perfect his title, nor to procure any redress
from the Klines, who had conveyed and been
paid for the whole of the property while they
owned but the half.
On the contrary,
he
gave thereafter deeds of warranty to all the
defendants, — who are sixty-two in number, —

I

I

and he and they occupied and Improved the
premises down to the commencement of this
suit.
Between that time and the date of the
letter was a period of nearly seventeen years.
What improvements were made and how far
the property had risen in value are not disclosed, nor does It appear what stimulated
Chauncey
to violate his promise
and commence this attack on the defendants.
The estoppel here relied upon is known as
an equitable
estoppel, or estoppel in pais.
The law upon the subject is well settled.
The vital principle Is that he who by his language or conduct leads another to do what
he would not otherwise have done, shall not
subject such person to loss or Injm'y by disappointing thfe expectations upon which he
acted.
Such a change of position is sternly
forbidden.
It Involves fraud and falsehood,
and the law abhors both.
This remedy Is always so applied as to promote the ends of
justice. It is available only for protection,
and cannot be used as a weapon of assault.
It accomplishes that which ought to be done
between man and man, and Is not permitted
to go beyond this limit.
It is akin to the
principle involved in the limitation of ac-
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and does its work of justice and rewhere the statute cannot be invoked.
Here, according to the finding of the court,
the time of adverse possession lacked but a
year and a month of being twenty years,—
when it is conceded the statutory bar would
have been complete.
In Faxton v. Faxon, 28 Jlich. 159, a mortgagee holding several mortgages prevailed on
a son of the deceased mortgagor,
then intending to remove to a distance, to remain on the
premises and support the family, by assuring
him that the mortgages should never be enforced.
The son supported the family, and
the property grew in value under his tillage.
After the hiiisf of several years the mortHe was held
gagee proceeded to foreclose.
to be estopped by his assurances upon which
"The
The court said:
the son had acted.
complainant may have estopped himself without any positive agreement, if he intentionally led the defendants to do or abstain from
doing any thing involving labor or expenditure to any considerable amount, by giving
them to understand they should be relieved
In Harkfrom the burden of the mortgages.
ness V. Toulmin, 25 Mich. SO, and Truesdale
V. Ward, 24 Mich. 117, this principle was applied, in the former case, to the extent of destroying a chattel mortgage, and in the latter, of forfeiting rights under a land contract, where parties were led to believe they
were abandoned.
There is no rule more necessary to enforce good faith than that which
compels a person to abstain from asserting
claims which he has induced others to suppose he would not rely on.
The rule does
not rest on the assumption that he has obtained any personal gain or advantage, but
on the fact that he has induced others to act
in such a manner that they will be seriously prejudiced if he is allowed to fall in carrying out what he has encouraged them to expect."
Cooley, J., was inclined to doubt the
sufficiency
of the proof, but said, finally:
"His" (the mortgagee's) "assurances have undoubtedly been relied upon and acted upon by
and, considering
the defendants,
the great
lapse of time without any claim under the
mortgages on the part of the complainant,
am not disposed to dissent from the concluThe case before us
sion of my Brethren."
arose also in Michigan. In Evans v. Snyder,
04 Mo. 516, the heirs assailed
an administrator's sale. No order of sale could be
This was held to be a fatal defect.
J'ound.
But the supreme court of the state held that
where they stood silently by for years, while
the occupant was making valuable and laston the property, and reing improvements
deeming it trom the lien of the ancestor's
debts, they would be estopped from afterHere, as by
wards asserting their claim.
Judge Cooley, stress is laid upon the lapse of
This is also a feature of the case in
time.

tious,
)iosp

I

hand.
Other authorities to the same effect are
They may be readily found.
very numerous.

It is unnecessary to extend this opinion by referring to them.
We think the facts disclosed in the record
make a complete case of estoppel in pais.
But it is said this objection to the plaintiff's claim is not available at law, and must
be set up in equity.
"This is certainly not the common law.
Littleton says: 'And so a man can see one
thing in this case, that a man shall be estopped by matter of fact, though there be no
Lord Coke,
writing, by deed or otherwise.'
commenting hereon, gives an instance of estoppel by matter in fact,— this very case of
partition. Co. Litt. 356, § 667. And such an
award has been held sufficient to estop a
party against whom ejectment was brought.
Morris v. Rosser, 3 Bast, 15." Brown v.
Wheeler,

In City

17 Conn.

345,

353.

of Cincinnati v. White's Lessee, 6
of the city plat, in
Pet. 431, the proprietors
1789,
dedicated
the ground between Fi'ont
street and the Ohio river to the public for
The legal
and other purposes.
commercial
title had not then emanated from the governIn this state of
ment of the United States.
things the statute of limitations does not run.
White long subsequently acquired the legal
title and brought ejectment for the premises.
This court said (page 441): "This is a possessory action, and the plaintiff, to entitle
himself to recover, must have the right of
and whatever takes away this
possession;
right of possession will deprive him of the
Ej. 32;
Adams,
by
ejectment.
remedy
Starkie, part 4, 505-507."
This Is the rule
laid down by Lord Mansfield, in Atkyns v.
"Ejectment," says he,
Hoarde, 1 Burr. 119.
"is a possessory remedy, and only competent
where the lessor of the plaintiff may enter,
and every plaintiff in ejectment must show a
right of possession as well as of property."
If the plaintiff in the present case was not
entitled to possession, how, according to this
authority,
could he recover?
If he had recovered, and a court of equity would have enjoined him from executing the judgment by a
writ of possession, we ask, again, how could
he recover in this action?
Is not the concession that relief could be had In equity fatal to
In Stodthe proposition we are considering?
dard V. Chambers, 2 How. 284, it was said by
"On a title by estoppel, an action
this court:
of ejectment can be maintained." We do not
overlook the fact that a land claim had been
conveyed before it was confirmed by an act
of congress to the assignor and his legal representatives.
It was held that on such confirmation the legal title became vested in the
former, "and inured, by way of estoppel, to
his grantee and those who claimed by deed
under him.''
In that case, as in this, there
The
was no formal transfer of the title.
transfer was made, as under a statute of limitations, when the bar is complete, by operation of law. Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black,
Why may not a like transfer be held to
599.
The reason
have been made in this case?
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given for the rule of inurement and estoppel
by virtue of conveyances
is, that it avoids
circuity of action.
Does not the same consideration apply, with equal force, in cases
of estoppel in pais?
Why is it necessary to
go into equity in one case and not in the
other?
It has never been held that the statute of
frauds applies to cases of Inurement, and it
has been conceded that It does not affect
cases of dedication.
Where is the difference
in principle in this respect between those
cases and the one before us?
But here this
point cannot arise, because the promise relied
upon was In writing.
In City of Cincinnati v.
White's Lessee, supra, this court, speaking of
the dedication there in question, said, "The
law considers it in the nature of an estoppel
in pais, which precludes the original owner
from revoking such dedication," and that a
grant might have been presumed,
"if that
had been necessary, and the fee might be
considered in abeyance until a competent grantee appeared to receive it; which was as early as the year 1802, when the city was incorporated."
Here there was a grantee capable
of taking the fee all the time from the date
of tlie letter.
The common law is reason
dealing by the light of experience with hu-
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man affairs.
One of its merits is that it has
the capacity to reach the ends of justice by
the shortest paths.
The passage of a title by inurement and estoppel is its work without the help of legislation. We think no sound rensou can be
given why the same thing should not follow
in cases of estoppel in pais where land is concerned.

This subject has been carefully examined
in Bigelow, Estop, pp. 533, 537. The learned author comes to no final conclusion whether in cases like this the defence may be made
at law, or whether a resort to equity is necessary.
Whether the
The former is our view.
title passed or not, the fact that the plaintiff
was not entitled to possession of the premises was fatal to the action.
Chauncey conveyed to the plaintiff in error
by deed of quitclaim. He is not, therefore,
a bona fide purchaser.
Piatt v. Oliver, 3
How. 333; May v. Le Claire, 11 Wall. 217.
Morton and the defendants were in possession.
For both these reasons, he took whatever title he acquired subject to all the rights,
legal and equitable, of Morton and of the defendants, who deraigned their titles from the
latter.
Judgment atfirmed.
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J. S. Cronise & Co. The headnote states the
Judgment for plaintifC.
facts.
-ift' upon
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James

FOLGER, J. The jury have found to be
a forgery, the veriting on the check, which
purports to be a certification thereof by the
plaintiff's teller. They have also found that
the teller, when resorted to, in effect pronounced it genuine.
That the plaintiff would be bound by the
act of its teller, had he in fact certified the
check, is settled.
Farmers' & Mechanics'
Bank v. Butchers' & Drovers' Bank, 16 N.
Y. 125, 69 Am. Dec. 678; 14 N. Y. 623. Nor
do we doubt that an admission by him that
it was genuine, made on the presentation to
him of the counterfeited certification and Inquiry put, also binds the plaintiff. We can
in result, and effect upon
see no difference
others dealing with the check on the strength
of that admission,
between writing "Timpson, teller," signifying good, upon a worthless check, and declaring
that the words
"Timpson, teller," already there, were written there by him.
In the one case they are
his own, and signify good. In the other he
adopts them as his own, and so malies them
his own, and tlie.y signify good. This was the
And see 53 Me. 103,
effect of his admission.
and Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen, 447.
There seems to be no dispute but that the
defendant takes the place of Cronise & Co.,
and may avail itself of any defense to the
action of the plaintiff which that firm of
brokers could have made.
The question then arises, is the plaintiff,
by the other facts presented, estopped from
maintaining that in truth the certification
was a forgery, and the admission of its teller an innocent mistake?
There is no disagreement as to the general definition of an estoppel in pais.
It is
agreed that tliere must have been some act
or declaration of the plaintiff or of its agent
assignors,
which so afto the defendant's
fected the conduct of the latter to their
injury, as that it would be unjust now to
permit the plaintiff to set up the truth of
the case to the contrary of its mistaken act
or declaration.
But the plaintiff insists that there are certain limitations to be put upon this generality.
1st The plaintiff claims that it is necessary that its act or declaration must have
been made to mislead.

To this proposition the plaintiff cites Plckard V. Sears, 6 Adol. & E. 469; 33 Eng. Com.
Law, 115, where the court say:
"Where one
by his words or conduct willfully causes another," etc.
But this word "willfully," used
in the decision in that case, has subsequently received judicial comment and limitation.
Thus in Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Exch. 654, the
"By the term 'willfully,' howcourt say:
ever, in that rule, we must understand,
if,
whatever a man's real Intentions may be,
he so conducts
himself that a reasonable
man would take the representation to be
true, and believe that it was meant that he
should act upon it, and he did act upon It
as true, the party making the representation would be equally precluded from contesting its truth; and conduct by negligence
or omission, where there is a duty cast upon
any person by usage of trade or otherwise
to disclose the truth, may often have the
same effect."
So in Cornish v. Abington, 4 Hurl. & N.
549, Pollock, C. B., says:
"The jury having
found that the defendant,
whether intentionally or not, led the plaintiff to form an
opinion that he was dealing with the defendant and induced him to furnish goods to the
defendant, the defendant must pay him for
them."
And referring to Freeman v. Cooke,
and Pickard v. Sears, supra, the learned
chief baron remarks to the effect that the
word "willfully" means nothing more than
"voluntarily," and he holds that if the representation
was made voluntarily, though
the effect upon the hearer was produced unintentionally, the same result would follow;
and that if a party uses language which, in
the ordinary course of business and the general sense in which words are understood,
conveys a certain meaning, he cannot afterward say that he is not bound, if another
so understanding it has acted upon it. Of
course, this general language here extractecJ
should be read in connection with the fact"
of that case to prevent carrying the force o'
these words too far. But it is shown that
"willfully" and "voluntarily," as used in the
definition of an estoppel, are convertible.
In Manufacturers' & Traders' Bank v.
Hazard, 30 N. Y. 226, it is said that it is aot
necessary to an equitable estoppel that the
party should design to mislead.
Be this dictum or rule, we do not find that it has been
in this state disputed or questioned.
In In re Bahia & S. P. Ry. Co., L. R., 3
Q. B. 584, it is held that if a representation
is made with the intention that it shall be
acted upon by another, and he does so, there
is an estoppel from denying the truth of
what was represented to be the fact, and
that the case is within the principle of Pickard V. Sears, as explained by Freeman v.
Cooke, both supra.
The word "willful" does not mean malo
animo, but so far willfully that the party,
making the representation acted upon, means
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that it shall be acted upon in that way. Per
J., in Howard v. Hudson, 2 Ell.
Compton,
& Bl. 1.
And we hold that there need not be, upon
the part of the person making a declaration
or doing an act, an intention to mislead the
one who is induced to rely upon it. There
are cases in which parties have been estopped where their acts or declarations have
been done or made in ignorance of their own
rights, not knowing that the law of the land
gave them such rights. Here, certainly, there
could be no purpose to mislead others, for
there was not the knowledge to inform the
purpose, and both parties were equally and
innocently misled.
Storrs v. Barker, 6
Johns. Ch. 166, 10 Am. Dec. 316. Indeed,
it would limit the rule much within the reason of it, if it were restricted to cases where
there was an element of fraudulent purpose.
In very many of the cases in which the rule
has been ai^plied,
there was no more than
negligence on the part of him who was es
topped.
And it has long been held, that
where it is a breach of good faith to allow
the truth to be shown, there an admission
will estop. Gaylor v. Van Loan, 15 Wend.
308.
There are decisions where the rule has
been stated as the plaintiff claims it. We
have looked at those cited by it. It was not
necessary to the conclusions
of the court in
those, that such restriction should be put
upon the rule, and we do not think tliat the
language employed was used with the intention of making such a limitation, for the
facts of the case did not require it.
2d. The plaintiff further claims that Cronise & Oo. parted with the gold and took the
check before the declaration of the teller
was made known to them, and that before
an estoppel can be insisted upon, it must appear that they acted in reliance thereupon,
or altered their position In consequence
thereof, or parted with some value on the
faith therein.
The fair result of the testimony is, that
Ross left the office of Cronise & Co. before
the return of their messenger to it from the
bank, and Cronise & Co. had then delivered
They did not act, after his
the gold checks.
return, relying upon the declaration of the
teller which the messenger brought to them.
Assuming, for the present, that they did
in reliance upon that declaration refrain
from action and left untaken any measures
for the aiTest of Ross or the stoppage of
aspayment on the checks he had received;
suming that it is reasonably probable, that
if they had been told by the plaintiff the
reverse of what they were told, they would
have acted and would have taken those
assuming that it is reasonably
measures;
probable
that action and such measures
would have prevented the whole or some
part of the damage which befell, can it be
held that the conduct of Cronise & Co. was
so affected to their injury by the declaration of the plaintiff as that the defendant

Ill

may set up the declaration in estoppel of the
plaintiff? The proposition contained in this
query we understand the plaintiff to resist.
And this, because the act, the affirmative
act, had been done which changed the position of Cronise & Oo. toward Boss and the
transaction before the declaration was made
known to them, and had not been done in
And this is a denial, that
reliance upon it.
after a declaration is made and is relied
to act
upon, an omission thereby induced
and to take such measures as will arrest an
impending evil, and an injury resulting from
such omission, can be made available as an
estoppel.

In Howard
Ch. J.,

v. Hudson, supra, Lord Camprecognizes the existence of the
principle, that doing an act and omission to
And see Helme v. Insuract are the same.
In
ance Co., 61 Pa. 107, 100 Am. Dec. 621.
Knights V. Wiffln, L. R., 5 Q. B. 660, the person who relied upon the declaration had before it was made and not in reliance upon it,
paid his money for property not delivered,
but after it was made, relying upon it, took
no active course of conduct, remaining content and passive.
Had the declaration been
the reverse of what it was, which would
then have been true, he might have taken
active measures tending to retrieve his position.
He rested satisfied in the belief, as
man, that the property had
a reasonable
been passed to him as agreed.
And he was
The right of estoppel was there
damaged.
upheld,
and it was maintained upon the
ground of the plaintiff relying upon the
statement and taking no steps further, and
of his abstaining from active measures of recovery in consequence of the statement.
It
was there held, that acquiescent
reliance
upon the defendant's statement was an alteration of the plaintiff's position.
In Bank v. Keene, 53 ^Me. 103, the question was presented.
The plaintiff there held
a note purporting to have been signed by
Hearing that the same was
the defendant.
forged,
the plaintiff asked the defendant,
who, looking at the note, admitted the signature to be genuine.
The plaintiff, in reliance on that admission, refrained from taking any proceedings against him who passed
the note to it, so as to secure payment from
him.
The insti'uctions to the jury were:
That if the plaintiff, relying upon the defendant's admission, was induced to refrain
from obtaining security by arrest of the one
passing the note upon it, or by attachment
of his property, and thereby sustained an
injury, the defendant would be estopped from
denying his signature.
This instruction was
declared by the court on review to be in
harmony with the principles applicable to esAnd see 15 Wend. 308. and
toppels in pais.
Brown v. Sprague, 5 Denio, 545.
These cases appear to us to lay down a
sound rule.
It must be that the conduct of
men. which may be influenced by the declarations of those with whom they deal, is
bell,
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not ((iiiliLied
to that which is shown by
iithrmative and positive acts following upon
and induced by those declarations.
Conduct
is not alone that which is active, positive
and affirmative.
Conduct, as limited to this
inquiry, is the reserve of one's own powers
of person and property, and of those means
of help which can be summoned from friendly or accommodating
sources and from the
tribunals and officers of justice, and is as
often forbearance of their use and quiescence and contentment
^\'ith affairs as they
ure, as action designed
to change affairs.
And such quiescence and content, induced
by false or erroneous
statement,
may be
quite as damaging as any result from action.
It is as bad to fail to recover property
gone, when with the knowledge of an existing fact it might have been retrieved, as it
is to lose it.
And so it is as damaging to
rely in quiet upon an untrue statement, to
the neglect of using the means of recovery,
as it is to rely upon an untrue statement,
and by action thereon meet with loss irreparable.
To hold otherwise, would be to assert that the law makes a difference between
damage received by action and omission to
act, in circumstances
precisely similar, save
in these elements.
When an act produces
conduct from which flows injury, it cannot
matter whether that conduct be affirmative
or negative, active or quiescent.
Vi'e assumed, for the purpose of the previous consideration of one branch of the subject, that Cronise & Co. did, in reliance upon
the declaration of the plaintiff, refrain from
any measures.
action
and leave untaken
The jury have so found the fact, and the
finding is sust.-iined by the testimony.
We
probalso assumed that it was reasonably
able that if they had been told the truth by
the plaintiff they would have acted, and have
taken measures which would have prevented
the whole or some of the injury which befell. The jury have found that this assumption is well founded.
Tliough, as is conceded herein, Ross left
the office of the brokers before their messenger returned, he had left but a very short
time; a time so short that had the plaintiff
a forgery and the
declared the cei'tiflcation
check worthless, there was ground for the
jury to find that there was time for the
broker's clerk, with his speed of foot, to have
gone from the bank of plaintiff to the office
of Speyers, there have learned the falsity of
Ross' assertion of a delivery of gold to Speyer, and thence to the office of Cronise & Co.,
and have delivered his message soon enough
for measures to have been decided upon and
taken for the stoppage of the payment of
We
the checks at the Bank of New York.
leave out of view for the present the checks
iqoon the sub-ti'easury.
Nor was it a strained, unnatural nor unjustified inference for the jury to make that the
clerk would so have done, and that Cronise

& Co. would have taken such measures and
made stoppage of payment.
It was but applying to the facts of the case and to the
position of the parties in this transaction, the
common knowledge of human nature and its
workings under powerful incentives, and at
a particular spot in the state and a particular hour of the day when those incentives
are pressed in their greatest strength.
And from these findings thus authorized,
it was a legitimate conclusion that Cronise
& Co. suffered injury by the declaration to
them of the plaintiff.
And if there is nothing else in the case
the verdict and judgment are to be sustained.
The plaintiff insists however that the
learned judge at circuit made several errors
in his refusals to charge as requested, and
in the charge which he delivered to the jury.
y\'e will notice all of these instances which
upon the points handed up,
are indicated
alluding to the requests by the numbers
given to them in the points.
The second, third and fifth requests are
already covered by what we have said.
The seventh request is: "That the jury
cannot speculate upon what might have been
done or attempted by Cronise & Co. after the
delivery by them of the gold certificates or
gold checks to the person calling himself
.John Ross, had they been apprised that the
was a forgery after such delivcertificate

ery."

If by the word "speculate," which is the
word of controlling meaning in the request,
was meant to guess, or to reason to practical
results from unproven prem.ises, doubtless
the juiy had no right so to do. And there
would have been no error in the learned
judge if he had so told the jury. But it
would have been in the nature of an abstract
involved in not
proposition
not necessarily
growing out of the particular case. Hence
it was not error for him to decline to charge,
He did
except as he did thereafter charge.
charge them that Cronise & Co. to set up an
estoppel must have had time to stop payment of the gold; that the circumstances
must have been such as that they could have
done it; that they must have occupied such
a relation to the transaction as that they
could with reasonable diligence have arrested the crime in its consummation and have
secured the gold; that they must have still
stood in a position where they could have
corrected any act and could have saved the
gold.
This put the jui-y upon the proper inquiry. Nor can we concede that at the close
of the trial the question of estoppel had become one of law only and for the court, as
is claimed by the learned counsel for the
plaintiff. He admits that there were two
questions yet for the jury; whether the certification was forged or not, and whether its
genuineness
was admitted. And surely it
was still a question of fact how much rela-
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tlve time had been spent by the respective
actors from the moment Ross left the office
of Cronise & Co. until the payment of the
checks at the Bank of New York, and considering the relative positions of the different business places, whether in that lapse of
time Cronise & Co. under all the circumstances could have made effectual interposition to stop payment of the checks delivered to him, or have made any successful
effort at recaption of the gold if he had received it.
It is claimed that the learned judge erred
in charging the jury that the delivery of the
gold checks was not in law a delivery of the
gold.
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And this is true, whether the gold be dollars, in which to make payment of a debt
payable, or a commodity
to be ti'ansferred
in satisfaction of a contract for the sale and
delivery of a chattel.
The scope of the remarks of the court to the jury was that notwithstanding Cronise & Co. had put these
checks into the hands of Ross, still they
could stop payment of them at the place of
payment.
And, so considered, it did not mislead the jury from the question at issue, or
give them an erroneous rule of law by which
to dispose of it.
The plaintiff claims that even if it should
be held that it is estopped to show the truth,
as to so much of the gold as was paid to
Ross over the counter of the Bank of New
York, it should not be as to so much of it
as was represented by the checks on the subtreasury. And if these checks were alone
concerned
In the transaction, it might be
said with force that Ross could have as soon

The points call our attention to that part
of the charge in which the language of the
judge is: "The delivery of these gold checks
on the part of Mr. Cronise, it Is insisted
upon, is in law a delivery of the gold.
think that it was not."
It is proper to see in what connection this got payment on them and clear escaped, as
was said. For standing alone or applied to
Harmon, the clerk, could have made his erany and every case of a delivery of checks,
rand and returned.
But these checks are
it might be in some of them erroneous.
connected with those on the Bank of New
What was the practical application of it for
York; and Ross did not depart with the
the minds of the jm-y? The topic then unavails of the one until he had got the avails
der the learned judge's and the jury's attenof the othei'. If Ross first went to the subtion was whether Cronise & Co. could, untreasury and obtained payment, then he aftder the facts of the case, in any proper view
erward went to the Bank of New York;
of them, be considered as injured by the
and he was there, or to and from there,
plaintiff's declaration; and the judge prefrom ten to fifteen minutes; and this opcedes the remark excepted to by saying:
"If portunity for stopping payment of the checks
Cronise, in point of fact, had done all that
at the Bank of New York was also opporcould be done on his part at that time, and
tunity for arrest of his person, and obtaining
had put himself in such a position that this
from him the gold got at the sub-treasury.
admission could not affect his action to his
And if it be said that he may have passed
prejudice, then the principle of estoppel
away the checks on the sub-treasury in the
would have no application to the case so
street to a confederate,
still he was at the
far as he is concerned."
Then he tells them,
Bank of New York to be seized, and the
in the remark excepted to, in effect: It is
coercion of arrest to be used upon him.
In
insisted that the delivery of these checks
53 Me. 103, arrest is named as one of the
was a delivery of the gold, in law, so that
means of obtaining security which the plainhe could not reclaim it; and if he could not
tiff had let slip; and in L. R., 5 Q. B. 660,
injured
by the
reclaim it then he was not
Blackburn, J., goes so far as to say that it
declaration,
for there was nothing he could
needs not that it should appear that any
do after such delivery. We may infer, propbenefit would result from the attempt to seerly, from the words "it is insisted," that all
cure payment,
but that the injured party
this had passed before the jury in the arguright
had
the
to
make that attempt; and
ment of counsel, either to the jury or to the
court, and was a reference
If it losing the exercise of the right by his relithereto.
ance on the declaration,
the declarant was
should be admitted to be technically inaccuestopped.
We need not go so far here. Arrate as a statement of law, applicable to all
rest and detention of the swindler is a powcases, it did not tend to mislead on this occasion; and for the purpose
for which it erful means in coercing restoration; and arrest and detention were as probably in the
was uttered, it was correct.
Doubtless the
power of Cronise & Co. as the stoppage of
handing over of the checks was a delivery
the payment of the checks at the Bank of
of the gold to fulfill the contract for the sale
New
York.
of it, in accordance with the rules of the
The judgment appealed from should be
brokers' board under which the original parBut it was affirmed, with costs to the respondent.
ties to the transaction acted.
not such a delivery as prevented Cronise &
at the
Co. from Intercepting the checks
All concur except RAPALLO, J., who concounter of the Bank of New York, and there
curs as to all but the sub-treasury gold.
forbidding and stopping payment of them.
Judgment affirmed.
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GALBRAITH
(9 S.

Supreme

W.

et

al.

365,

v.

LUNSPORD.i

87 Tenn.

Court of Tennessee.

89.)

Oct. 18,

1888.

Appeal from chancery court, ECnox county;
Henry R. Gibson, Chancellor.
Ejectment by J. P. Galbraith and others
against B. F. Lunsford; the controversy being as to the location of a division line. In
the plot referred to by the arbitrator the line
from F to E represents the original boundary, and the one which complainant now
seeks to have established
as the true one.
The line from O to P represents the boundary as recognized for many years, and alleged by defendants
to have become the
boundary by estoppel.
Defendant had judgment and complainant appealed.
Lnckey & Yoe and Pickle & Turner, for
Jesse L. Rogers, for respond-

complainants.
ent.

FOLKES, J. This is an ejectment bill,
the disposition of which was dependent upon
a question of boundary.
After answer and
proof, the cause was submitted
to Mr. Jerome Templeton, a solicitor of this court, as
an arbitrator, who was "to hear and decide
the same according to the law and the evidence."
The award was to be in writing,
and was to be made the decree of the court.
The arbitrator presented his award, wherein
was stated his findings of fact and of law,
adjudging that the bill should be dismissed.
Complainants excepted to the award, upon
the ground that the arbiti'ator manifestly
undertook,
as he was required by the submission, to decide the case according to law;
but that he had misconceived the law, and
determined
the case contrary thereto, upon
the facts as found by him.
The chancellor
overruled the exceptions, and entered a final
decree, making the award the judgment of
Complainants have appealed, asthe court.
signing as error the action of the court in
refusing to set aside the award, and in entering decree thereon. Under the submission
the arbitrator was judge of the facts and
the law, and was not required to give the
grounds of his decision; in which event it
would have been presumed that he had decided according to law. But, having stated
his findings of fact, it was proper for the
on the exceptions pre•eoui't to determine,
sented, whether the conclusions
of law announced by the arbitrator were warranted by
the facts as found in a case where, by the
the award was to
terms of the submission,
Powell v. Riley,
be in accord with the law.
The proof is not in the record,
15 Lea, 153.
having properly been omitted, inasmuch as
no question was made — if, indeed, any could
have been made — as to the correctness of the
conclusions of fact reached by the arbitrator.
1 Upon the subject of equitable estoppel generally, see note to this case in 1 L. R. A. &22524.

We are therefore to consider only the question propounded
in the exception to the
award, to wit, that the deductions of law
upon the facts as found are contrary to law.
The complainants,
in support of their exceptions in the court below, now advance
the following propositions
in their assignments of error in this court:
(1) "A line
which could be easily ascertained by survey,
and which had been known, and was lost or
overlooked by mutual mistake, was and Is
not a doubtful line, that could be agreed
upon or fixed, or become the true line, and
binding by recognition, because void under
the statute of frauds."
(2) "Recognition of
a line under a mistake of fact, where it was
mutual, and either could have discovered the
mistake by survey or otherwise, is not binding on either party, and neither party can
set up the mistake against the other, by way
of estoppel or otherwise; as mistake is as
much that of one as the other, and fault, if
any, is equal; and, besides, one's admission,

made under mistake, will be relieved against
in equity, more especially when mistake is
mutual." (3) "Recognition of a line, not the
true one, will not divest title to land out of
a married woman nor minor, by estoppel or
otherwise,
as a married woman cannot be
divested or part with title to land in that
way; but more especially when it was by
mistake of fact, as well upon the part of her
adversary
as that of her own, and when
either could have easily discovered the mistake; nor is such married woman or descendant estopped to set up the truth, and
recover accordingly; and more especially in
a court of equity."
Robbed of their verbiage, the assignments
of error are to the effect (1) that the line or
boundary, under the facts as foimd by the
arbitrator,— there being, as assumed by the
assignments,
no bona fide doubt, as to the
by both parties,— was
true line, entertained
not such a doubtful boundary as could be
by parol or acquiescence.
established
(2)
That the doctrine of equitable estoppel does
not apply at all to the facts as found.
(3)
And, if applicable, it cannot be effectual, as
against married women.
Before disposing of these propositions, let
us see what are the findings of the arbitrator, as shown by the award itself.
We
quote:
"Without going into the details of the
proof, I find as follows:
"(1) The south boundary line of grant No.
18,417, to Wm. Cox, issued October 3, 1833,
Is the line from F to E in plot (Exhibit A)
to the deposition of F. W. Galbraith.
further find that, as an original proposition, the
north boundary line of the 250-acre tract—
Wm. Cox to Jacob Pate, September 22, 1814
—was the line from
to T, on same plot;
and in 1833, when said grant was issued, the
two tracts adjoined the lines here above described,— being the same as far as the latter
extended, and being the dividing line of the

I
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tracts. I add that, If I am mistaken as to
the true south boundary of said grant, the
result would be the same, because the deed—
Geo. M. Combs to Wm. Cox, February 10,
1814— covered both tracts, and both parties
to this suit derive title from Wm. Cox; and
I am convinced the north boundary line of
the 250-acre tract Is the line I to T; that is,
if not under said grant, certainly under the
Combs deed, so far as these parties are concerned, Wm. Cox ov^ned the land in controversy.

between Au"(2) I And that somewhere
gust 11, 1846, and March 28, 185T,— that is,
while Presley S. Chesher owned the 250acre tract, or prior to August 11, 1846,—
said dividing line was lost, or at least its
location became doubtful. As a consequence,
Chesher, between the point, I, and the New
Market road, on said plot, cleared and inclosed the land up to and along the line from
O to P on said plot, being the disputed line,
did this
as defendants
claim It.
Chesher
under a claim of right, which, I infer from
he thought that was his
the circumstances,
line. There is a marked line there, not as old
as the line from F to E, but still an old line.
Further, B. F. McFarland and wife, Sarah
M. L. McFarland, a daughter, and the vendee of Wm. Cox, made the same mistake.
They either forgot or never knew where the
true dividing line was, and they clearly recognized the line from O to P as the dividing

I

find no
line between them and Chesher.
ever recogevidence that Mrs. McFarland
nized said last-named
line before her marriage.
The deed to her from her father, containing the boundaries of said grant, is dated April 16, 1841, and conveys to her by her
Her marriage was subsemaiden
name.
On one
quent, but the date does not appear.
occasion, while John B. Hopkins owned the
82-acre tract, being the northern portion of
3,
the 250 acres,— that is, after November
1866, and prior to 1869, when Mrs. McFarland died,— she and John E. Hopkins went
along the Chesher fence, along the line from
O to P, talking about a trade as to Mrs.
She
McFarland's land north of said line.
then recognized said line as the dividing line
This is cited as
between her and Hopkins.
showing the recognition of said line, as de-

fendants claim it, was not by B. F. McThis
Farland only, but also by his wife.
recognition extends as far back as 40 years
In 1870 the heirs at law of
ago, or to 1848.
Sarah M. L. McFarland, deceased, recognized the same line, O to P, when they partitioned among themselves the lands Inherited
from their mother.
When John Neal bought
the 82-acra tract from B. F. McFarland, November 3, 1863, and when Hopkins bought
the same from Neal, In 1866, said line, O to
P, was the dividing line, being lived up to
and recognized by McFarland and wife; and
we may assume that both Hopkins and Neal
bought with that understanding, well justified by the conduct of McFarland and wife.
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In 1870 the commissioners making partition
did the locating of lines; but that only shows
the mistake about the division line had become the understanding of the neighborhood.
By accepting the partition, the heirs showed
themselves ignorant of any mistake, so long

In 1873,
been recognized.
to build a new
procured the division line to
dwelling-house,
be run by J. P. Galbraith, the husband of
heirs, who showed
one of the McFarland
Several other of the
him where to build.
McFarland heirs were then at home in the
and must have known of the
neighborhood,
building of the house, which was on their
land, as they claim it now; but was on Hopkins' land, and just south of the division
line, as they must have known Hopkins
claimed it. To say the least of It, they were
In
silent when they should have spoken.
1877,
R. M. Barton, Jr., and wife, Jennie
M. Barton, the latter being one of the McFarland heirs, by deed called for the HopIn July,
kins division line from O to P.
1877,
Barton and wife sold the residue of
the land partitioned to the latter to Wm.
Galbraith; and some time afterwards, and
prior to June, 1882, when Wm. Galbraith
filed his bill against John B. Hopkins, the
discovery was made that the line, so long
recognized and lived up to on both sides as
the true division line,— that is, the line from
O to P, — was a mistake, and that the true
line was from F to E or from 3 to
on said
plot.
The line from O to P never was consistent with the 2d call, 'thence north 10
poles to a stake,' or with the fourth call,
'thence north 44 poles to a stake,' in the deed
from McFarland to John Neal, made in 1863.
Nor was the same consistent with the calls
of the deed from Wm. Cox to Jacob Pate,
made September 22, 1814; nor was the same
consistent
with the oldest marked line on
the ground.
An accurate survey, at any
time, ought to have discovered the true line.
But so it was, the parties on both sides the
line made a mutual mistake, without taking
the trouble of a survey, on which they acted
from some time prior to 1848 to some time
after 1877.
After so long a public acquiescence, and so many public acts, some by
solemn deeds of record on the part of Sarah
M. L. McFarland, her husband,
and her
heirs,
under
the influence
and with the
knowledge
of which strangers have bought
the adjoining land,
and built a valuable
house thereon worth many more times the
value of land involved, can the McFarland
heirs now be heard to complain of said mistake, and be allowed to correct the same?
"Where the true locality of the line is doubtful, such acts are regarded as furnishing
evidence that the line so recognized is the
true line; nor are either of the parties at
liberty afterwards to abandon such line, although the line should afterwards be ascertained at a different place. Gilchrist v. McSee, also,
Gee, 9 Yerg. 458, 459, Green, J.
had it (the line)

John E. Hopkins, desiring

J
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SleiTiwetlier v. Larmon, 3 Sneed, 446, 448.
the application of the principle of equitable estoppel, there is no exception in the
case of married women.
2 Herm. Estop.
See, also, Howell v. Hale, 5 Lea, 405;
1232.
2 Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 814-818;
Crittenden v.
Posey, 1 Head, 320; Stephenson v. Walker,
8 Baxt. 289.
And the doctrine applies to
infants having such intelligence aa to enable
them to comprehend the import of their conduct.
Barham v. Turbeville, 1 Swan, 438.
If this authority is doubted, still the only
infant affected is llrs. Barton; who with her
husband, after her majority, ratified her former recognition
of the line so long lived up
I do not think the case of Wm. Galto.
braith v. John E. Hopkins, is res adjudicata,
because (1) complainants in this cause (except Barton's wife) were not parties to that
suit; (2) the land involved here was not involved in that suit.
The subject-matter
was
not the same. Being clear in my convictions
above expressed, without discussing the question of the statute of limitations, I decide,
having considered the ease as arbitrator, ac-

lu

cording to the submission made in the case,
that complainants'
bill be dismissed, with
costs.
LSigned]
Jerome Templeton."
We have given the entire award, so that
it may be seen what were the findings of
fact and of law. The award must be taken
as a whole, and not in detached sentences.
It will not do to cull out words here and
there, and from them argue that the parties
The mutual, knew where the true line was.
ity of the mistake, and the ease with which
the parties might have discovered the same,
had they taken the old deeds and procured
the services of a competent surveyor,
does
The
not render it any the less a mistake.
fact still remains that there was an honest
ignorance
of the whereabouts of the true
line, and a bona fide recognition of the line
indicated on the plot as O to P. If, with
full knowledge of the true line, another be
fixed by verbal agreement, such agi-eement
is within the statute of frauds, and conse
quently void; but, where there is doubt or
ignorance as to the true locality of the line,
a parol agreement, fixing the line between
adjoining owners, is not within the statute;
and, where satisfactorily established, will be
enforced by the courts, notwithstanding it
that the
may afterwards be demonstrated
And such
agreed line was erroneously fixed.
adjustment may be shown, as well by circumstances and recognition, as by direct evidence of a formal agreement, when parties
Houston v. Matthews,
have acted thereon.
Gilchrist v. McGee, 9 Yerg.
1 Yerg. 116;
458: Merri wether v. Larmon, 3 Sneed, 451;
Lewallen v. Overton, 9 Humph. 76; Rogers
Riggs v. Parker,
1 Sneed, 69;
V. White,
Meigs, 49; Yarborough v. Abernathy, Id. 420.
The cases on this subject are numerous
in this state, and citations might be multiplied; but they clearly make the distinction,
and establish the principles as stated above.

being so, It Is not difficult to apply
to the findings of fact made by the
arbitrator in the case at bar. We have admissions and declarations, we have conveyances made, and partitions had, calling for
the line O tq P. We have long acquiescence
on the part of complainants, and those under whom they claim', coupled with the expenditure of money by defendant in building
improvements
upon the property In dispute,
largely in excess of the value of the land
itself, induced not only by what had long
been the understanding of the parties as to
the location of the line, but by positive pointing out of the line, with knowledge that the
Improvements
were then about to be made.
And during all this time we have absolute
ignorance on the part of the adjoining owner
as to the true line; ignorance none the less
absolute by reason of the fact that, in the
opinion of the arbitrator, it might have easily
There was no
been removed by a survey.
survey, and the honest ignorance remained,
until shortly before the filing of the bill in
This is not a case of silence,
this cause.
but of numerous affirmative acts and admissions that were calculated to and did influence the conduct of defendants, and which
acts and admissions are inconsistent with
the claim of title now sought to be set up.
The facts as found would seem to make out
unless the disability of
a case of estoppel,
prevents the application of this
coverture
doctrine, as is strenuously
insisted upon by
the learned counsel for complainants. Let
The contention is that,
us see how this Is.
as a married woman cannot. In reference to
her lands, bind herself by title-bond, power
of attorney, contract of sale, or even a deed,

This

them

without privy examination, and certificate of
acknowledgment In a prescribed form showing that it was done freely, voluntarily, and
understandingly, it would be an anomaly in
the law to hold that she might part with
her title indirectly, when she had no purpose to do so, and when, instead of doing
so freely, voluntarily, and understandingly,
or laboring
she was actually in Ignorance,
under a mistake of fact. And cases are cited which seem to sustain the contention.
It
must be admitted that the cases on this
subject are to a certain extent conflicting.
But much of the difficulty and confusion Is
due to a failure to observe the distinction
between the cases which seek, by the doctrine of estoppel, to validate those contracts
of a married woman which by law are declared void, and the cases where, in the
absence of any contract, and independent of
any contract or agreement, her conduct has
been held to prevent her from asserting what
would otherwise be a right. To the former
class belongs the case of Dodd v. Benthal,
4 Helsk. 601.
And the language of the judge
delivering the opinion In that case, at page
607, where he says:
"The complainant being both an Infant and feme covert at tlfe
time of the execution of the deed in ques-
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tion, no act of affirmance or disaffirmance in
pais on her part during coverture could be
binding upon her," etc.,— is correct when confined to a contract of a person under disability, which by law is void in consequence
of such disability. To the latter class, above
referred to, belongs the case of Howell v.
Hale, 5 Lea, 405.
Here the conduct of the
married woman, independent of any contract, operates to estop her in the same manner and to the same extent as if she were a
feme sole.
So in the case at bar, while
there are facts and circumstances upon which
a contract might be implied that would be
binding upon a person sui juris, yet there
are also such admissions, statements,
and
conduct on the part of the complainants and
their ancestor as are amply sufficient to
of,
create an estoppel entirely independent
and altogether outside of, any idea or claim
of a contract.
Mr. tomeroy says "that
while, upon the question how far the doetrine of equitable estoppel by conduct applies
to married women, there is some conflict
among the decisions, the tendency of modern
authority, however, is strongly towards the
enforcement of the estoppel against married
women, as against persons sui juris, with
little or no limitation on account of their
disability;"
and that the decisions to the
contrary seem to be in opposition to the
general current of authority. Modern English cases, as vv^ell as American, are cited to
Section 814, and notes.
sustain the text.
The case of Morrison v. Wilson, 13 Cal. 495,
relied on so confidently by counsel for complainants, seems to not only deny the application of- an estoppel in pais to a married
woman, but goes so far as to hold that affirmative fraud on her part will not effect
that result. It is sufficient to say of this
case that it not only loses sight of the distinction referred to as to the defective execution of a contract, but is directly opposed
to our own adjudged cases, so far as the
The doctrine
element of fraud is concerned.
of estoppel has, by courts of this state, been
applied to married women and infants. Thus
in Howell v. Hale, 5 Lea, 405, she was held
She had by her
estopped by matter in pals.
conduct induced Thornhill to purchase the
mortgage debt on her land, leading him to
that the land should stand liable
believe
therefor. This court held her estopped by
her conduct to make defense to said mortgage, whether she might have done so or
In
not, as against the original mortgagee.
Cooley V. Steele, 2 Head, 606, we have a
clear case of estoppel in pais applied to a
married woman. She had, in a deposition,
as to title to certain
made a statement,
shares, contrary to what she there asserted
This court
in the case before the court.
"Complainant would be clearly entisaid:
tled, upon well-established principles, to the
relief sought, but for the estoppel created by
deposition."
her oath in the before-mentioned
To the same effect is Pilcher y. Smith, Id.
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where it Is said: "The legal disability
of coverture carries with it no license or
privilege to practice fraud or deception on
Estoppel in pais has also
other persons."
Barbeen applied to infants by this court.
ham V. Turbeville, 1 Swan, 437; Adams v.
In the latter case the
Fite, 3 Baxt. 69.
court, after finding the weight of the proof
in favor of the complainant having been of
age at time of the execution of the deed,
"Both on the ground of
continuing, said:
long acquiescence, and of the concealment of
the fact that he was not of age, when complainant had good reason to know that
Ewing was trading with him as sui juris,
complainant is repelled, even if he was in
fact only twenty years of age when he made
It is true that in the case of
the deed."
Barham v. Turbeville the infant was not
merely silent, but actively proclaimed his
father's title to the property he subsequently sued for; and the court puts the estoppel
of actual and purposed
upon the ground
fraud, which was right and proper, under
But, so far as the
the facts of that case.
opinion in this case undertakes to hold that
actual and positive fraud, at the time of the
act set up as constituting the estoppel, is
essential to the application of the doctrine of
as we
estoppel, it is obiter and unsound,
shall presently undertake to show.
It is also urged that actual fraud must
exist before an estoppel can be maintained
against one sui juris; and a fortiori before
it can be applied to a married woman, if
against the latter it can be invoked at all.
It is true that there is a theory which makes
the essence of equitable estoppel to consist
of fraud; but this theory is not sustained
by principle nor authority. There are many
well-settled cases of estoppel familiar to
courts of equity, which do not rest upon
fraud; and instances pre admitted, even by
the courts, which maintain this theory, which
cannot be said to involve any element of
fraud, iinless by a complete perversion of
The conlanguage and misuse of terms.
fusion to be found in some of the books on
this subject is due doubtless to the fact that
the fraud referred to has its origin in the
effort afterwards to set up rights contrary
to the conduct of the party, although at the
time of the act constituting the estoppel there
was the most perfect good faith. The term,
as used in such cases, is, as Mr. Pomeroy expresses it, virtually synonymous with "unconscientious" or "inequitable." It is in this
sense that it may be said that it is a fraud
or fraudulent to attempt to repudiate the
conduct which has induced the other party
to act, and upon which the estoppel is predicated; but it is entirely another thing to say
that the conduct itself— the acts, words, or
silence of the party — constituting the estoppel must be an actual fraud, done with the
It may therefore be
intention of deceiving.
safely said that although fraud may be, and
often is, an ingredient in the conduct of the
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party estopped, It Is not an essential element,
if the word is used in its commonly accepted
sense; and the use of the term is unnecessary, and often improper,
unless applied to
the efCort of the party estopped to repudiate
his conduct, and to assert a right or claim
in contravention thereof.
The best-considered cases are in accord with the views above
expressed.
Bank v. Bank, 50 N. Y. 575; Waring V. Sombom, 82 N. Y. 601. And although
the earlier Pennsylvania decisions generally
leaned strongly In favor of the theory that
an actual fraud is of the essence of every
such estoppel by conduct, it is worthy of
note that in the late case in that state of

Bidwell V. Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. 4:12, it is said:
"It is not necessary that the party against
whom an estoppel is alleged should have inIt is sufficient if he intended to deceive.
tended that his conduct should Induce another to act upon it, and the other, relying
2 Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 804,
on it, did so act."
805, et seq.
The case of Brant v. Coal Co.,
93 TJ. S. 326, pressed upon us by counsel for
complainant as establishing the contention
that fraud is an essential element in the application of the doctrine of estoppel, and that
it is essential that the party invoking the estoppel was himself not only destitute of the
knowledge of the true state of the title, but
also of any convenient or available means of
special
acquiring such knowledge, merits
mention.
In addition to what we have already said as to the first proposition, we will
be content to adopt Mr. Pomeroy's note upon
this case, where, after quoting freely of the
opinion, he says:
"With great deference to
the opinion of so able a judge, I think his
error in this passage is evident.
It consists
in taking a special rule, established
from
motives of policy for a particular condition
of fact, and raising it to the position of a
universal rule.
Where an estoppel by conduct is alleged to prevent a legal owner of
land from asserting his legal title, courts
of equity, in order to avoid the literal requirements of the statute of frauds, were
driven to the element of fraud in the conSee the text, sections SOSduct as essential.
The passage quoted from Judge Story
SOT.
rule of eqIs dealing with this long-settled
uity, and not with the subject of equitable
When this special rule
estoppel in general.
is made universal, its inconsistency vrith
many familiar instances of equitable estopand Judge Field is
pel becomes apparent,
by
forced to escape from the antagonism
denying that these instances do in fact beIf this conclusion be
long to the doctrine.

then some of the most Important and
well-settled species of the estoppel, uniformly
regarded as such by text writers and courts,
must be abandoned, and the beneficent doctrine Itself must be curtailed in its operation
to one particular class of cases. This result
is In direct opposition to the tendency of judicial decisions, and of the discussion of
text writers."
See note 1 to section 806,
Pom. Eq. Jur., and cases there cited. It is
worthy of notice, also, that, in the opinion
referred to. Judge Field quotes approvingly
from the Pennsylvania case of Hill v. Epley,
31 Pa. 334, language which is practically, to
all intents, an abandonment of the extreme
position supposed to be maintained in the
Brant Case.
The language referred to is:
"The primary ground of the doctrine is that
it would be a fraud in a party to assert
what his previous conduct had denied, when
on the faith of that denial others have acted." The element of fraud is essential either
in the Intention of the party estopped, or in
the effect of the evidence which he attempts
to set up; so that at last the difficulty seems
to be in the use of terms, rather than in the
true principles controlling the doctrine under
consideration.
As to the second proposition
for which the Brant Case is cited. It is sufficient to say that it does not sustain the position that the mutuality of the mistake, or
the possibility of having discovered It, prevents the application of the doctrine of estoppel.
It merely asserts the familiar rule
that where the party setting up the estoppel
knew the true condition of the title, either
in fact or in contemplation of law, the docti'ine will not avail him; the fact being in
that case, as shown in the opinion, that "he
knew he was obtaining only a life-estate by
his purchase."
This opinion is already too long to allow
further elaboration on the question of estoppel under the facts of this case.
It Will,
however, not be out of place to add that I
find nothing in the numerous reported cases
in this state, from Patton v. McOlure, Mart.
& Y. 339, down to Allen v. Westbrook, 16
Lea, 251, that makes willful fraud on the
part of the party sought to be estopped, in
the act constituting the grounds of the estoppel, essential
to the application of the
doctrine.
We hold, therefore, that there is.
In the case at bar, on the facts as found by
the arbitrator, every element of an equitable
estoppel, and complainants must be repelled.
The disability of coverture is not sufficient
to defeat this result. Let the decree of the
chancellor be affirmed, with costs.
correct,
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Tliis is an appeal from an order in a garnishment proceeding
discliarging the garnishee.
Plaintiff obtained judgment against
one Joseph Lustick, on which execution issued, and appellee was garnished as a supposed debtor of the defendant in execution.
At
the proper time he appeared, and answered
that he was not indebted to said Lustick in
any sum, and that he did not have any property in his possession belonging to him.
Plaintiff filed a pleading controverting this
answer, in which it is alleged that in a conplaintiff and garversation had between
nishee before the execution was issued, garnishee stated that he was indebted to Lustick
in a certain sum, and that he would not pay
the same to Lustick until plaintiff bad an
opportunity to procure the issuance of an
execution on said judgment and serve notice
of garnishment on him thereunder;
and that,
relying on this representation,
and believing
it to be true, plaintiff, at great expense and
trouble to himself, procured said execution
to issue, and caused the garnishee to be served with notice of garnishment thereunder,
and that the garnishee is now estopped by his
representation and conduct from denying that
he was indebted to Lusticls; at the time he
The garnishee
was served with the notice.
demurred to this pleading on the ground that
it did not show that he was in fact indebted
to Lustick when the notice of garnishment
was served, and the facts averred in the
pleading did not create an estoppel. The demurrer was sustained, and, plaintiff declining to plead further, judgment was entered
Plaintiff appeals.
discharging the garnishee.

Blake & Hormel, for appellant.
& Swisher, for appellee.

Bowman

REED, J. The purpose of the pleader was
undoubtedly to set up in the pleading controverting the answer of the garnishee what
The
is denominated an equitable estoppel.
effect of such estoppel is to preclude the party
from asserting a strict legal right, on the
ground that his assertion of such right, under
of the case, would be
the circumstances
The
against equity and good conscience.
pleading assumes that at the time the notice
of garnishment was served on the garnishee
to Lustick, and
he was not in fact indebted
that on strict legal grounds he was entitled
But the claim is that, havto be discharged.
ing induced plaintiff, by the representation
that he was indebted to Lustick, to institute
the garnishment proceeding and incur the expense and trouble incident thereto, it would
be manifestly unjust and inequitable in him
to assert his exemption from liability thereon. And the question presented by the record is whether, under the facts stated in the
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pleading, the garnishee is estopped to deny
that he is indebted to Lustick.
It will be' observed that the representation
on which plaintiff claims to have acted in
instituting the garnishment proceedings consisted (1) in the statement of a matter of fact,
viz., that the garnishee was at that time indebted to Lustick in a certain amount; and
(2) in a promise or agreement as to his conduct in the future, viz., that he would withhold the amount and not pay it over to Lustick until plaintiff would have an opportunity
to procure an execution to issue, and notice
of garnishment to be served upon him. But
it does not appear from the averments of the
pleading that the statement as to the matter
of fact was not true when it was made; that
is, it is not averred that the garnishee was
not indebted to Lustick at the time the repwas made. Some time elapsed
resentation
between the making of the representation
and the service of the garnishment notice,
and for anything that appears in the pleading
may have been ind,ebted to
the garnishee
Lustick at the time of the representation,
and have paid the amount to him before the
If those are
notice was served upon him.
which
the facts, the injury and damages
would result to plaintiff in case of the gai^
nishee's discharge would be occasioned, not
by his denial of the truth of his statement
that he was indebted to Lustick, but by his
failure to perform the agreement to retain in
his hands the amount of the indebtedness
until the notice of garnishment should be
But an estoppel does not
served upon him.
arise from the mere failure of a party to perform an executory agreement.
The doctrine of estoppel is applied to prevent the injustice which would result if one
who has once asserted the existence of a fact,
and thereby induced another to act in the belief of the truth of that statement so as to
change his previous position, were permitted
afterwards to deny its truth. Under such
circumstances,
and as against the one who
made the statement, the law is that it shall
be conclusively presumed to be true.
Pickard V. Sears, 6 Adol. & E. 469. But it is
difficult to conceive a case in which one who
is sued for the mere failure to perform an
executory agreement would be precluded by
the law from making any defense against the
claims. It may be that plaintiff has a cause
of action against the garnishee on the agreement; but if so he clearly cannot enforce it
in this proceeding.
His remedy in that case
must be sought in an original action against
the party as defendant.
In this proceeding,
if he can recover at all, he can do so only by
showing either tliat the garnishee was indebted to the defendant in execution when the
notice of garnishment was served on him,
or that such a state of facts existed as that
he is estopped to deny that he was so Indebted.
The pleading in question, in our opinion,
does not show either of these states of fact.

Affirmed.
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To his wife he bein bank stock.
queathed all his slaves, with the full confidence that she would make such disposition
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. Oct. 16, of them among his children as should be
1882.
just and equitable, after retaining such of
Appeal from circuit court, Botetourt county. them as she might desire for her own use
Bill by Jlax Gugsenlieimer and otliers during her lifetime. His other personal esagainst William J. Penn, as administrator tate he directed to be sold, and the balance
of Stuart B. Penn and in his own right, remaining, after the payment of his debts,
Ann S. Penn, and others, to ascertain the together with the proceeds of any real esinterest of William J. Penn in the estate of tate not specifically devised, he bequeathed
and to subject the to his wife, with the full confidence that she
S. B. Penn, deceased,
same to judgments of plaintiff against said would divide it among his children as she
AVilliam J. Penn. Under the will of Charles might deem just and proper.
B. Penn certain lands were given to his
The third clause of the will, which gives
children. He owned a third interest in cer- rise to this controversy, is as follows:
tain land on James river, known as the
"It is my will and desire that my wife
"Home Place," the other two-thirds of which shall retain the home place, and at her death
belonged to his wife by descent from her it shall be the property of my son Stuart B.
father. Under said will he expressed a wish Penn, which I hereby give to him, his heirs,
that his wife should retain the "home place," and assigns forever."
and at her death It should be the property
The home place, thus mentioned by the
of her son Stuart B. Penn. The widow, in testator, is a tract of about 820 acres, one1850, received the personal estate given to half of which, known as the "lower half,"
her under the will of her husband, and gave was the property of Mrs. Penn, devised to
a receipt reciting that she received it "agreeher by her father. She was also the owner
ably to the provisions of his said last will of one-third of the upper half of the tract,
and testament." At the same time the derived by descent from her sisters.
"home place" was put on the land book of
The testator was entitled to two undivided
the county and assessed for taxes in her thirds acquired by purchase in the upper
So that his Interest at the
name as tenant for life and devisee of her half of the tract.
husband. She never renounced the will, nor time of his "death did not exceed one-third
had dower assigned, but she filed an answer of the entire ti'act.
in 1867 to the plaintiff's bill, in which anThe first question arising under the clause
swer she denied that she had done anything already quoted is whether the testator inof the entire tract, or
to divest herself of her two-thirds in the tended to dispose
'
"home place.
The circuit court entered a whether the will is to be construed as disdecree that the widow had elected to accept posing merely of his undivided third.
the provision in the will of her husband, and
If the former interpretation be the true
that the remainder of the "home place" one, it is conceded that it was incumbent
passed on the death of the said Stuart B. upon Mrs. Penn, the widow, to make her
Penn, childless, among others, to the said election, and that she cannot claim both her
William J. Penn, who was entitled to an own estate and the provision made for her
interest of one-fourth, subject to his moth- by the will.
er's life estate, which Interest was liable to
Before entering into a discussion of that
be subjected by his creditors to the satis- question it will be proper briefly to advert
Prom this to some of the principles of law governing
faction of their judgment liens.
judgment Ann S. Penn appealed, and, pend- in such cases.
ing the appeal, died. Affirmed.
The doctrine of election Is said to rest upEdmund Pendleton, for Mrs. Ann S. Penn. on the equitable ground that no man can
J. H. H. Piggatt and John J. Allen, for Max be permitted to claim inconsistent rights
with regard to the same subject, and that
G. W. & L. C. Hansbrough,
Guggenheimer.
for George Skillen Penn and Mrs. Frances any one who asserts an interest under an
instrument is bound to give full effect, as
L. Mayo.
far as he can, to that instrument. Or, as it
STAPLES, J. The main question in this is sometimes expressed, he who accepts a
case turns upon the construction to be giv- benefit under a deed or will must adopt the
en to the will of Charles B. Penn which was contents of the whole instrument, conformadmitted to probate at the September term ing to all its provisions, and relinquishing
of the county court of Botetourt, in the year every right inconsistent with It.
In the terse language of Lord Rosslyn In
The testator, at the time of his death,
1849.
was possessed of a valuable real and person- Wilson V. Lord Townsend, 2 Ves. Jr. 697:
"You cannot act. You cannot come forth to
al estate, which he devised and bequeathed
to his wife, Mrs. Ann Penn, and to his four a court of justice claiming In repugnant
children. To his two sons George S. Penn rights. When you claim under a deed, you
and William Penn he gave severally a tract must claim under the whole deed together.
of land. To Mrs. Mayo, his married daugh- You cannot take one clause, and advise the
ter, he gave certain real estate and a sum of court to shut their eyes against the rest.
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ELECTION.
Suppose, in a will, a legacy is given to you
by one clause; by another, an estate of
which you are in the possession is given to
another.
While you hold that, you shall not
claim the legacy." 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. &§ 465,
466; 1 White & T. Lead. Cas. Eq. pt. 1, pp.
541, 547, 548; Kinnaird v. Williams, 8 Leigh,
400; Craig v. Walthall, 14 Grat. 518; Dixon
V. McCue, Id. 540.
In order, however, to
raise a case of election, it is well settled the
intention on the part of the testator to
give that which is not his own must be clear
and unmistakable. It must appear from language which is unequivocal, which leaves no
room for doubt as to the testator's design.
The necessity for an election can never arise
from an uncertain or dubious interpretation
of the clause of donation. 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. §
472; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 10.
It is not necessary, however, that this intention should be expressly declared.
The
dispositions of the instrument, fairly and
reasonably interpreted, may of themselves
show a clear design on the part of the testator to bestow upon the devisee property
wliich in fact belongs to another.
As in other cases, the intention may be
gathered from the whole and every part of
the instrument.
The difficulty of ascertaining the testator's intent, it is said, is always much greater where he has a partial
interest in the estate devised than where he
undertakes to dispose of an estate in which
he has no interest.
In the former case, the presumption is that
he intended to dispose of that which he might
properly dispose of, and nothing more; and
this presumption
will always prevail, unless
the intention is clearly manifested by demonstration plain, or necessary implication on the
part of the testator to dispose of the whole estate, including the interest of third parties.
Generally, when the testator has an undivided
interest in certain property, and he employs
general words in disposing of it, as "all my
lands," or "all my estate," no case of election
arises from it; for it does not plainly appear
that he meant to dispose of anything but what
was strictly his own. 2 Story, Bq. Jur. § 1087;
1 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 489.
A case of election does arise, however, when
the testator, having an undivided or partial
interest in an estate, devises it specifically,
thus indicating a purpose to bestow it as an
entirety.
This rule on this subject is thus
laid down in 1 Pom. Bq. Jur. § 489.
Where
the testator proposes to give the whole thing
itself, using language which, by reasonable in-

121

as authority for other views here announced.
Now, let us apply these principles to the case
in hand.
In the first place, there can be no
doubt that the tract of land or estate in question was universally known and described as
It is so spoken of by all
the "Home Place."
the witnesses, by the parties, and it was so deMrs. Penn,
nominated
in all the pleadings.
in her answer, describes it as the "Home
Place." She speaks of the "upper half of the
home place" and the "lower half of the home
place."
It is scarcely to be supposed that the
testator would term it differently from every
other person; that he referred only to his
partial interest of one-third when by universal
consent, usage, and habit, the entire tract was
known and recognized as the home place. His
language is:
"That my wife shall retain the
home place, and at her death it [the home
place] shall be the property of my son Stuart
B. Penn, which I hereby give him, his heirs
and assigns, forever."
What gives some significance, at least, to this language is that the
mansion house, occupied by the testator and
his family for many years, was located, not
upon the half in which the testator had an
interest of two-thirds, but upon that portion
exclusively owned by Mrs. Penn.
It was this
portion upon which the family resided that
might with some propriety be termed the
"Home Place," and not the two undivided
thirds of one-half, constituting merely a part
of the tract.
It was said in the argument before this
court that the language of the clause now under consideration
is different from the other
clauses of tlie will.
For example, that the
testator, when disposing of his own property,
invariably uses the words, "I give and bequeath," whereas in the present instance he
merely expresses the wish that his wife shall
retain the home place.
This difference of
phraseology grows out of the fact that the testator was .carefully defining and limiting an
estate to be enjoyed by his wife during her
life, and the language used by him was such
as he supposed would accomplish the object.
He then proceeds to say that it is his will and
desire at her death it (the home place) "shall
be the property of my son Stuart B. Penn,
which I hereby give him, his heirs and assigns, forever."
It is impossible by argument
or illustration to add to the force and perspicuity of this language.
Nothing can be plainer,
more direct and comprehensive.
The cases of
Padbury v. Clark, 2 ilacn. & G. 298; Howells
V. Jenkins, 2 Johns. & H. 706; Grosvenor v.
Durston, 25 Beav. 97; Grissell v. Swinhoe, L.
tention, must necessarily describe and define R. 7 Eq. 291, 295,— in which it was held that
the whole corpus of the thing in which his the devLsee was bound to elect,— are directly
particular interest exists as a distinct and in point and conclusive of the question.
The other dispositions made by the testator
identified piece of property, then an intention
to bestow the whole, and not merely the tes- confirm thoroughly this view of his intention.
tator's individual share, must be inferred, and He gave to his son George S. Penn an estate
a case for an election arises.
This rule is worth about $11,000, to his son William Penn
mentioned and commented on by Judge Chris- an estate of the value of $14,000, and to Mrs.
tian in delivering the opinion of this court in Mayo property worth $12,000 or $15,000.
Gregory v. Gates, 30 Grat. 83, to which refer
The provision made for his wife was more
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than sufficient for her support and maintenance during her life in the most comfortable
and abundant manner.
If, however, he designed that his son Stuart B. Penn should take
the one-thii-d of the home place, subject to the
of the life estate, the provision
incumbrance
for him was wholly inadequate, and disproportionate to the benefits conferred upon his
other children.
On the other hand, if the testator intended
that the entire home place
should be the property of his son Stuart B.
Penn, the period of his enjoyment would be
postponed until the death of Mrs. Penn, and
the value of the devise would be about equal
to the provision for the other children.
I am therefore of opinion that by the plain
terms of the will Mrs. Penn was put to her
election, and that she could not and cannot
choose both her own estate and the bequests
made in her favor.
The next inquiry is, whether Mrs. Penn did,
in fact, elect to claim under the will.
An election may be Implied as well as expressed.
Whether there has been an election
must be determined upon the circumstances
of each particular case, rather than upon any
genei-al principles.
1 White & T. Lead. Cas.
Eq. 539, 571, 572.
It may be inferred from
the conduct of the party, his acts, his omissions, and his mode of dealing with the propUnequivocal acts of ownership, with
erty.
knowledge of the right to elect, and not
through a mistake with respect to the condition and value of the estate, will generally be
1
deemed an election to take under the will.
Lapse of time, alPom. Eq. Jur. §§ 514, 515.
though not of itself conclusive, yet, when connected with circumstances of enjoyment, may
be decisive upon the question of election.
In Adsit V. Adsit, 2 Johns. Ch. 448, 451,
"Taking possession of
Chancellor Kent said:
property under a wiU or other Instrument, and
exercising unequivocal acts of ownership over
it for a long period of time, will amount to a
binding election."
"Positive acts of acceptance or renunciation," says Mr. Justice Story, "may arise from
long acquiescence, or from other circumstances
of a stringent nature, and are not indispensable."
"Again," he says, "it may be necessary to
consider whether he [the devisee] can restore
other persons affected by his claim to the same
situation as if the acts had not been performed, or the acquiescence had not existed, and
whether there has been such a lapse of time
as ought to preclude the court from entering
upon such inquiries upon its. general doctrine
of not entertaining suits upon stale demands
2 Story, Eq. Jur. §§
or after long delays."
1097-1098.
Where the election Is once made by the
party bound to elect, either expressly or impliedly, and with full knowledge of all the
facts, it binds not only himself, but also all
those parties who claim under him, his rep-

resentatives and heirs.

1

Pom. Eq. Jur.

§ 516.

Let

us apply these principles to the case beUpon the death of the testator, in
the year 1849, Mrs. Penn continued in the possession of the home place until the present
time, a period of 30 years.
It does not appear
that she ever expressed any dissatisfaction
with the provisions of the will till the filing
of her answer in the cause in the year 1807.
In the year 1850 the entire tract was entered
upon the commissioner's
books of the county
and assessed with taxes in her name, as tenant for life. Whether this was done by her
direction or not, it does not appear.
It can
scarcely be supposed she was ignorant of a
fact disclosed on every tax ticket paid by her.
It has been already stated that by the will
testator's slaves were given to Mrs. Penn, in
full confidence that she would make such disposition of them among his children as would
be just and equitable, after retaining such
proportion of them as she might desire for her
own use during her life.
The residue of the real and personal estate was also given to her in trust for the
benefit of the children.
In the year 1850,—
not long after the testator's death,— the executors tui'ued over to her the entire personal estate, including slaves, and took her receipt, stating that this was done in conformity with the provisions of the will. The
executors
must therefore have understood
that Mrs. Penn had accepted the provision
Upon no other ground
made for her benefit.
would they have been warranted in thus
dealing with the assets. The terms of the
receipt given by her show that she was perfectly apprised of the contents of the will,
that she knew the condition and value of the
property, and that she had united with the
executors
in fulfilling the intentions and
wishes of the testator. Had Mrs. Penn renounced the will, as she was bound to do,
in order to claim her own estate, she would
have been entitled only to one-third of the
slaves for life, and one-third of the personal
property absolutely. As it was, she received
from the executors under the will 49 slaves,
of the value of $18,370, and other property,

fore us.

worth between $5,000 and $6,000.
The testimony shows that Mrs. Penn never made any
formal division of the property; that she,
however,
distributed among her children
about 12 of the slaves, retaining the residue
in her own possession, for her own use and
benefit,
until their emancipation in 1865.
It is of no sort of consequence that during
his lifetime Stuart B. Penn resided at the
home place, and managed and controlled all
the operations of the estate.
This was, of
course, done by the authority of Mrs. Penn,
and doubtless for the reason that it was
more agreeable to her that one of her sons
should relieve her of the trouble and responsibility, to which, amid the Infirmities
of declining years, she was unequal.
She
certainly exercised a dominion and ownership of the property, to which she was en-
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titled only under her husband's will, and
could never have assumed unless
she intended to conform to its provisions.
After this long lapse of time, after this
long-continued enjoyment and possession of
the estate, and unequivocal recognition of
the provisions of the will by receiving the
property from the executors, it is too late
for Mrs. Penn, at this day, to disclaim the
testator's bounty, and assert title to her own

his just share or proportion of that estate,
and his creditors may not only subject it to
satisfaction of their debts, but they may resort to a court of equity for the purpose of
ascertaining that Interest, and of removing
every obstacle in the way of the just enWilliam J. Penn
forcement of their liens.
can no more defeat the claims of his creditors by a disclaimer of title than he could
do so by a voluntary deed, or gift or assign-

estate.

ment.

Tpyhich she

The slaves have long since been emancipated, the personal property exhausted, and
It is now impossible to place the children in
the condition they would have occupied had
Mrs. Penn in the outset declared her intention to hold her own property.
So far from it, It is very clear that she
made her election to claim under the will,
and that she did so with a deliberate and
intelligent choice, and with a full knowledge
of all the circumstances, and of her own
rights. No possible Injury can accrue to any
one from the conclusion thus reached, for
Mrs. Penn lived and died in the enjoyment
of the estate.
She never attempted any
other disposition of it.
Stuart B. Penn, the devisee, is dead, without children, and the estate has passed in
due course of law to Mrs. Penn's children.
A contrary decision can result only in disturbing a condition of things settled and
acquiesced In for many years by all parties.
I think, therefore, there is no error upon
this branch of the case in the decision of
the circuit court
The learned counsel for the appellant. In
his petition for an appeal, and in his argument before this court, has taken the ground
that the parties bringing this suit are neither
heirs nor purchasers nor beneficiaries under
the will of Charles Penn, but judgment creditors of William J. Penn, and, as such, intruders and volunteers, seeking to set aside
a family settlement, and to vest in William
J. Penn an Interest which he himself does
not claim, and to which he never asserted
any title. It will not be denied that complainants, by virtue of their judgments,
have a lien upon all the real estate of their
debtor,
and that under our statute they
may enforce that lien in a court of equity.
This right of the complainants, and. Indeed, of all judgment creditors, cannot be
affected by any omission of disclaimer on
According to repeatthe part of the debtor.
ed decisions of this court, when the freehold has once vested, the owner cannot divest himself of the title by any mere parol
disclaimer; but he can only do so by deed
or some other act sufficient to pass an estate.
Even had William J. Penn executed
such deed, voluntarily relinquishing his title,
his creditors would not be bound by it.
When the court has once settled that Stuart
B. Penn Is entitled to the home place under
the will of his father, William J. Penn, as
one of his heirs, has an absolute title to

In Dold V. Geiger's Adm'r, 2 Grat. 98, It
was held that choses in action, to which the
wife becomes entitled during coverture, are
liable to the claims of the husband's creditors, and a voluntary relinquishment of the
same by the husband, and a settlement upon
the wife, before being reduced into possession, will not protect such choses In action
from such creditors' claims.
Judge Stanard, in answer to an objection
similar to the one made here, said: "I think
it may safely be laid down as a just deduction from the elementary principles of our
law that the general rule is that the rights
of property of a debtor, whether in possession or In action, present or reversionary,
in law or in equity, and of value adequate
to pay his debts, and without which -he is
Insolvent, and the payment of his debts
must be frustrated, cannot by the mere volition of the debtor, in the form of assignment, surrender, or other modes of arrest,
pass to volunteers without valuable consideration, and be thereby placed In the hands
of such volunteers, beyond the reach and
secure from the claims of such creditors."
This opinion of Judge Stanard, and, Indeed,
the decision Itself, constitutes a complete
answer to the points made by counsel, and
render unnecessary any further discussion
of the subject.
The next question is whether the circuit
court erred In disallowing the account of
William J. Penn against the estate of Stuart
B. Penn, for money alleged to have been
paid by the former as administrator of
Stuart B. Penn. The latter died In the year
considerably indebted.
1857,
William B.
Penn qualified as his administrator, and removed to the home place, thereafter residing with his mother, the life tenant. There
Is no doubt that the net income derived
from the estate was appropriated by him to
the payment of his brother's debts. The
only question is whether this Income was
sufficient for that purpose, or whether any
part of the Indebtedness was discharged by
William J. Penn out of his private means.
William J. Penn, in one of his depositions,
states that from 1857 to 1860 he realized
from the home place an income of $6,196.15,
all of which, by the direction of his mother,
was applied to the payment of his brother's
debts.
He further states that Stuart B.
Penn had a note In bank of $4,600, for which
the witness, at the request of his mother,
substituted his own note. The larger por-
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tion of this latter note was paid off by him
The home place was regarded as one of
in February, 1804, and the balance in 1865, the most valuable estates on James river,
This, reduced to its yielding a large income annually to its ownin Confederate money.
actual value in sound money, amounts to a ers. A very small portion of its profits was
required for the support of Mrs. Penn; the
very insignificant sum.
In the concluding part of William J. Penn's balance passed into the hands of William J.
deposition he expresses the opinion that he Penn, and I am satisfied that he was fully
has been fully reimbursed for all moneys ex- reimbursed for every dollar appropriated by
pended by him in the payment of his him for the payment of his brother's debts.
Unfortunately for the parThe complainants, after the fullest opporbrothei-'s debts.
ties setting up this claim, William J. Peun tunity, have been unable to adduce any tesis their witness, and their only witness. timony to the contrary. They are clearly
They cannot ask the court to discard their not entitled to a reversal of the decree in the
own testimony, and enter a decree in their present state of the case, and it is most apfavor upon a case unsupported by proof. I parent that nothing is to be gained by furhave no doubt, however,
that William J. ther inquiry.
Upon the whole, I thiulv the decree of the
Penn has given an accurate and tnithful account of his transactions and dealings with circuit court should be affirmed.
the

estate.

Decree

affirmed.
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FITZHUGH
(41

V.

Ark.

HUBBARD.
64.)

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

May Term,

1883.

Appeal from circuit court, Phillips county;
J. N. Oypert, Judge.
M. T. Sanders and Tappan & Homor, for
appellant. Thweatt & Quarles, for appellee.

SMITH, J. William St. Jolin Hubbard
died in the year 1878.
Just before his death
he made his will, which was afterwards duly
proved, and which is in the words following:
"I bequeath and leave unto my brother,
Edward L. Hubbard, the full amount of his
indebtedness
to me, and the remainder of
my property, both personal and real, to my
sister, Mrs. Sarah L. Fitzhugh, after paying
all of my debts, and my sister to administer
without bond."
In point of fact Edward L. Hubbard was
He had
not then indebted to the testator.
formerly owed the testator a debt of $4,221.by note and secur61, which was evidenced
but
ed by deed of trust upon real estate;
this debt had been transferred, eight months,
before the execution of the will, to Mrs.
Sarah L. Fitzhugh. The deed of trust contained the usual power of foreclosure Tjy
advertisement and sale upon default in payment;
and, in case of the refusal of the
trustee to act, the sheriflE of Phillips county
was empowered to execute it.
Cage, the trustee, who was also the draftsman of the will, did refuse to sell the property, alleging as his reason that the debt had
been satisfied by the provisions of the will,
whereupon the services of the sheriff were
called into requisition. After due notice he
sold and conveyed the lands to Mrs. Fitzhugh, who brought ejectment.
The defendant set up as an equitable defense that the
deed of trust under which the plaintiff claimed title had been canceled, and the debt
which it was intended to secure had been
released to him by virtue of said will.
The
Testimony
cause was transferred to equity.
was taken on both sides, and at the hearing
the court required Mrs. Fitzhugh to elect
whether she would affirm the will and accept the devise to her, or renounce the same
and assert a right to the debt due by EdShe elected to take unward L. Hubbard.
der the will. The court thereupon dismissed
her complaint, set aside the trustee's sale
and canceled
Edward L.
and conveyance,
Hubbard's note and deed of trust. Mrs.
Fitzhugh has appealed, and the main question is whether this is a proper case for the
application of the doctrine of election.
"An election in equity is a choice which a
party is compelled to make between the acceptance of a benefit under an instrument
and the retention of some property, already

125

his own, which is attempted to be disposed
of in favor of a third party by virtue of the
The doctrine rests upon
same instrument.
the principle that a person claiming under an
instrument shall not interfere by title paramount to prevent another part of the same"
instrument from having effect according to
its construction. He cannot accept and reject the same instrument. It is a doctrine
which is principally exhibited in cases of
*
*
*
wills.
"The most common instance which is put
of a case of an election is where a testator
gives money or lands to A., and by the
same will gives something of A.'s to B.
Here A. must elect. He must either give
effect to the will by allowing B. to have the
property which the testator intended should
go to him, or, if he chooses to disregard the
will and retain his own property, he must
make good the value of the gift to the disappointed beneficiary." Bisp. Eq. § 295; see,
also, Story, Bq. Jur. § 1076 et seq.; 1 White
& T. Lead. Cas. Bq. 342.
Here the testator has undertaken to dispose of a debt which belonged to Mrs. Fitzhugh.
But he has given her the whole of
his own estate. Her conscience is therefore
affected by the implied condition annexed to
the testator's bounty that, while availing herself of the will in one direction, she shall
not defeat its operation in another.
The ultimate question in all such cases is
this: Did the testator intend that the devisee, upon accepting the benefit conferred upon him, should acquiesce in the donation of
own property to another?
the devisee's
Hence it becomes important to determine
how far parol evidence is receivable to maniCage and other witfest such intention.
nesses were sworn to prove declarations of
the testator that in using the language, "indebtedness to me," he referred to the debt
which had been assigned to Mrs. Fitzhugh.
In Robinson v. Bishop, 23 Ark. 378, this
court expressed its preference to construe
wills from their own terms, rather than to
take the deposition of the scrivener as to
what the testator meant by particular clauses.

Parol evidence is admissible, in this class
of causes, to the same extent as in other
cases, in aid of the construction of written
instruments, and no further. You may show
the condition of the subject-matter and the
surrounding circumstances,
so as to place
the court in the position of the testator;
but his purpose to put the devisee to his
election must appear from the wiU itself.
2 Redf. Wills, 745.
But as it was in proof that Edward L.
Hubbard owed the testator no other debt,
the will can have no reasonable construction
without including Mrs. Fitzhugh's debt.
The decree below is affirmed.
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WILBANKS

et al. v.

WILBANKS.

ond wife
cease.

(18 111. 17.)

Supreme

Court of Illinois.

Nov.

Term,

1856.

Error

to circuit court, JefEersoD county.
The defendant in error filed bis bill
against the plaintiffs, to enjoin the plaintiffs
from prosecuting an action of ejectment
against Walter S. Akin and David Rotramel,
for the recovery of forty acres of land vrhich
the defendant In error claims under the will
of his father, Robert A. D. Wllbanks, deceased.

The biU states that R. A. D. Wllbanks, the
father, entered the forty acres in the name
of his wife, Sarah V. Wilbanks; that she
died leaving the plaintiffs In error her heirs
at law by her said husband; that the forty
acres in dispute were part of the homestead
or farm upon which said Wilbanks, the father, and wife resided.
That Wilbanks, the father, married a second time and afterward died, leaving a son,
the defendant in error, by his second wife,
and made a will bequeathing to his said
second wife, for life, the homestead, and at
her death willed It to the defendant in error,
and that the forty acres were included In the
bequest.

That the plaintiffs in error were also provided for, one of them (T. J. Wilbanks) having a specific bequest left to him, of real
estate, and that the others
and personal
were also as to the balance of the real estate of the testator undisposed of, made
residuary legatees.
The defendant In error asl;s that the plaintiffs be enjoined from prosecuting their action at law, for the reason that the intestate,
by devising the said tract of land to the defendant, intended to put the plaintiffs off
with what he gave them under the will, and
that the plaintiffs ought to elect whether
they would refund the value of the land or
be perpetually enjoined from prosecuting
their action at law.
The plaintiffs demurred to the bill generally and specially, and contend that the facts
stated In the bill do not warrant the issuance of an Injunction against the plaintiffs,
because the defendants to the suit at law
are not parties; that from the face of the
bill they are manifestly proper parties to the
and for that cause the demurproceedings,
rer ought to have been sustained to the bill;
they also contend that the facts stated in the
bill do not show a case of election in equity
1st, they were residuary
at all, because:
the Intestate, was
2d, Wilbanks,
legatees;
tenant by the curtesy, and had an interest
In the land in question; 3d, because the testator treated the land as his own property;
and, 4th, the forty acres of land in dispute
are not described In the will at all, and the
court will not supply the defect by implication, from the fact that it was within the
boundaries of the land bequeathed to his sec-

and

the

defendant upon

her

de-

The plainThe demurrer was sustained.
tiffs stood by their demurrer; but the court
ruled them notwithstanding to answer over,
which they refused to do. A decree pro confesso was entered at September term, 1855,
of the Jefferson circuit court, and the plaintiffs were perpetually and unconditionally enjoined from prosecuting their suit at law.
The plaintiffs assign for error, the niling
of the court below, on the demurrer, and
contend that the demurrer ought to have
been sustained to the bill, and that the overruling the demurrer and granting the injunction was erroneous, and that the decree
of the court was rendered without any equity whatever to support it; and further,
that if the injunction ought to have been
awarded at all, it ought to have been awarded on condition of the plaintiff failing to
elect.

R. S. Nelson, for plaintiffs in error.
Baugh, for defendant in error.

D.

SCATES, C. .T. The testator in this case
disposed of all his estate, both real and perThe objects of his bounty were exsonal.
clusively those upon whom the law would
have cast the estate in case of Intestacy; but
whether in the same proportions under the
will as at law, does not appear. Whether
the provisions of the will are as beneficial
as those of the law, or not, the devisees may
not therefore disturb or set aside its provisions,
under circumstances which
unless
raise a right of election.
The widow accepted the devise made to
her, which barred her dower; and the heirs
as such merely could not avoid the proviof the
sions of the will, which disposed
whole estates, real and personal, so far as
they belonged to the testator.
The legal title
to the tract in controversy was not in the
testator, but the plaintiffs, his children by a
former wife, as heirs to their mother, in
whose name the land had been purchased of
the United States.
The testator devised this tract to his second wife for life, as a part of his homestead,
with remainder to defendant in fee, his son
by the second wife.
The object of the bill by defendant is to
enjoin the plaintiffs from proceeding in ejectment, to recover the land as heirs at law of
their mother, upon the ground that they
have devises and bequests
made to them
by the same will, of which they have accepted, and they cannot, therefore, in equity
and conscience be permitted to claim under
the will the benefit of the devises and bequests to them, without giving full effect to
it in every respect, so far as they are concerned.
We think the circumstances clearly present a case for election (waiving any question
of a resulting trust for the husband), and
assuming the fact to be as is alleged, that
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the provisions of the will have been accepted, the plaintiffs are estopped in equity and
conscience
from all claim to this tract of
their own, which is given to the defendant.
In the general language of the authorities,
they may not, at the same time, take under
the will and contrary to it. This was the
doctrine
of the civil law, from whence,
But it seems
doubtless, we derived the rule.
to have been confined to cases of wills by
the civil law, while the rule with us has
been extended to deeds and other contracts;
and it has been held to be the rule at law
as well as in equity.
The intention of the author of the deed
or will to dispose of property which is not
his, must be manifest; it is difficult to apply the doctrine of election when the testator
has some present interest in the estate disposed of, though, not entirely his own; for it
might be that he intended to dispose only of
Yet it Is a question of inhis own interest.
tention,
which is to prevail, and will be
gathered from the terms of the instrument.
An absolute power in the testator to dispose of the subject, and an intention to exercise that power, seems in general suflScient
a devise to the
to malce a case of election;
compels him to
heir, although inoperative,
elect between the estate devised, and claims
adverse to the will.
The estate descending
to the heir under his election to claim against
the will, descends subject to the implied condition.
These principles are extracted from Mr.
Swanston's note to Dillon v. Parker, 1
Swanst. 394b. The doctrine of election is
very fully and comprehensively laid down
in that case and note, and in Gratton v.
Haward, 1 Swanst. 413, and note c. See
also, Noys v. Mordaunt, 2 Vern. 581; 2 Story,
Bq. Jur. §§ 1075-1096; 2 Williams, Ex'rs 1236,
section 9 of Election (B) and notes; 1 Eop.
Husb. & Wife, 566, note 1; (7 Law Lib. 334.)
It has been suggested that the testator
here was tenant by the curtesy of this tract
of land, and it should therefore be intended
and understood that he devised that interest
which belonged to him, and not the fee,
which was in his children by his first wife.
This view of the devise cannot help or explain away the plain and obvious meaning
and intention upon the face of the instrument;
and that was to pass the fee in all
the lands disposed of in the will. Besides,
this would make the will inoperative as to
this tract; for the estate by curtesy terminated with the life of the testator, at which
time the devise took effect.
We cannot indulge in a construction that would defeat
the intention, make the provision inoperative,
or render the will void. Nor can we indirectly do the same thing by supiwsing that the
testator believed this tract to belong to him;
and intended only to dispose of so much as
belonged to him.
Where such appears to
have been the clear Intention of the testator
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of so much, and no more than he
might own, and the particular property was
devised or bequeathed under the impression
that it belonged to the testator, then, it may
be, that the question of repugnancy and election might not arise; but the devisee or
legatee might take the interest given, without surrendering his claim to his own property. Still the foundation of the doctrine of
election is the intention of the testator. So
that when he clearly intends to dispose of
the property of another, real or personal, although the will or deed alone and of itself
may be ineffectual, inoperative, or void as a
conveyance or sale, yet it affords authentic
evidence of the intention of the testator or
grantor, and that intention shall be made
effectual and prevail to transfer the property
of one who accepts a benefit under such will
Indeed,
or deed. 2 Story, Bq. .Jur. § 1077.
in section 1076, Mr. Justice Story illustrates
this doctrine of election by putting a case
precisely like that before us. If the testator
should devise an estate belonging to his son,
or heir at law, to a third person, and should
in the same will bequeath to his son, or heir
at law, a legacy of one hundred thousand
dollars, etc., an implied or constructive elecThe son or heir must relintion is raised.
quish his own estate or the bequest under
the will.
The party is entitled to a full knowledge
and of the situation
of the circumstances,
and value of the estates or provisions made;
and an election made in actual ignorance of
material facts will not preclude the party
from exercising the right anew upon obtaining full information. This record does not
show that the election here was without full
Ivuowledge of all material facts.
But admitting that the plaintiffs may yet
make a new election, if they claim, by descent and against the will, all the lands and
personalty devised and bequeathed to them
in the will, they will be liable to make compensation to the disappointed
devisee to the
extent of the value of the devise intended
for him. So that equity will lay hold of the
devise or bequest renounced, and substitute
compensation
for the devise or bequest defeated.
See 2 Story, Eq. Jur. and 1 Swanst.

to dispose

above.

Whether by renunciation the party forfeits all interest, as in case of estates upon
express conditions, or is entitled to any surplus after full compensation, as seems to be
warranted by the current of authorities, is
immaterial here, it seems to us. For its loss
to defendant from the midst of his homestead tract, would cost plaintiffs more in
compensation
out of their devises than it
could be worth to them thus situated and
surrounded. And they cannot now assert
their title as heirs to their mother, without
making compensation
to defendant,
out of
the devises to them in the will. Decree affirmed.
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ROGERS
(3 Ch.

V.

DiT.

JONES.
688.)

High Court of Justice.

By

marriage settlement
November,
1833,
certain
a

Aug.

3,

dated

1876.

the

lltli

of
messuages and
hereditaments (including six cottages
in
Rhos street, Ruthin) were settled to the use
of William Williams for life, with remainder to the use of his wife, Jane Williams, for
life, with remainder to the use of the first
and other sons of W. Williams in tail, and
for default of such issue to the use of his first
and other daughters in tail, and for default
of such issue to the use of the heirs of the
survivor of them, the said W. Williams and
Jane Williams.
William Williams, by his will made in
1860, gave to his said wife, Jane Williams,
all his real estate during her life, and after
her decease he purported to devise '■;ill those
six cottages situate in Rhos street" (being
part of the property included in the said settlement) to his nephew, Thomas Rogers, his
heirs and assigns.
The testator died in ]8<'iO without issue,
and his widow, Jane Williams, became absolutely entitled under the settlement to the
property therein comprised.
In 1864 Thomas Rogers, not being aware
of the settlement, sold and conveyed to the
plaintiff his supposed reversionai-y interest
under the testator's will in the said cottages.
In 1875 .Jane Williams died, having apW. D. Jones and
pointed the defendants,
R. P. Davies, her executors.
After the death of Jane Williams, the
plaintiff first ascertained that she had, in
1872,
sold the six cottages in Rhos street
to a ptu'chaser for value without notice of
the devise in the testator's will.
The plaintiff now brought his action
against the executors of Jane Williams, and
submitted that he was entitled to be indemnified out of her estate in respect of the
loss sustained by him in consequence of the
sale of the cottages by the defendant, or that
such sale was an election by her to take the
cottages against the will of the testator, and
that, consequently, the plaintiff, as the person injured by such election, was entitled to

receive compensation
for such Injury out of
the other benefits derived by Jane Williams
under the will of the testator, for the loss
occasioned to the plaintiff by such election,
and to have the amount of such benefits ascertained and paid out of her estate.
C.

C.

Ellis

&

Co.,

for plaintiff.

F. W.

Adams, for defendant.
Chitty, Q. C, and Mr. Romer, for plaintiff.
Q. C, and Mr. Bradford, for de-

Cookson,
fendant.

JESSEL. M. R. The testator in this case
gave his real estate to his wife for her life,
with remainder as to six cottages, which did
not belong to him, to his nephew Thomas
Rogers.
At the time of the devise the testator's only interest in these cottages was a
life estate under the settlement, with a contingent remainder if he survived his wife.
Under these circumstances
a case of election arises. The doctrine of election is this,
that if a person whose property a testator
affects to give away takes other benefits under the same will, and at the same time
he must
elects to keep his own property,
to the person affected
make compensation
by his election to an extent not exceeding
In this case the
the benefits he receives.
widow, having elected to take against the
will, was bound to make compensation
to
the plaintiff to the extent of the benefits she
Therefore, in her
received under the will.
lifetime, she might to this extent have been
thus made liable.
But it is said that the plaintiff's right to
be indemnified
is lost by the death of the
Why?
I see no principle upon
widow.
which her death should exonerate her estate. The liability of her estate must now
be ascertained,
and there must be an inquiry as to the amount of the benefits which
the widow received in her lifetime under the
will, and as to the compensation
to which
the plaintiff is entitled in respect of the loss
he has sustained by not getting possession
of the six cottages at the death of the
widow, so far as such loss does not exceed
her benefits under the will.
The pleadings to be amended by making
T. Rogers coplaintiff.
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KONVALINKA
(9 N.

E.

Court of Appeals

868,

SOHLEGEL

v.

104

N. Y. 125.)

of New York.

Appeal from supreme
second department.

John W. Konvalinka,

et al.

court,

.Tan.

general

Henry

and W. E. Glover, for appellant,
Bx'r, etc.
George Bliss, for
Maria Schlegel and another.

18, 1887.

term,

McCloskay,
Konvalinka,
respondents,

ANDREWS, J. The question is whether
the widow of the testator is put to her election between dower and the provision in the
will. The estate of the testator consisted of
The will,
both real and personal property.
after directing the payment of the testator's
debts and funeral expenses, and after giving
to his wife the bedroom furniture in his
dwelling-house,
and to his children the rest
of the furniture therein, proceeds as follows:
"All the rest, residue, and remainder of my
estate, property, and effects of every nature,
I give, devise, and bekind, and description
queath to my executors and executrix hereinafter named, and I authorize and direct
them to sell and dispose of the same at such
time, and on such terms, as to them shall
seem best, and to divide the proceeds thereof equally among my wife and children,
There can be no
share and share alike."
controversy as to the general principles governing the question of election between dower and a provision for the widow In the will.
It is never excluded by a
Dower is favored.
provision for a wife except by express words,
Where there are
or by necessary implication.
no express words, there must be, upon the
face of the will, a demonstration of the intention of the testator that the widow shall not
The will
take both dower and the provision.
only when it
furnishes this demonstration
clearly appears, without ambiguity or doubt,
that to permit the widow to claim both dower and the provision would interfere with
disturb the
and
dispositions,
the
other
scheme of the testator as manifested by his
The intention of the testator to put
will.
the widow to an election cannot be inferred
from the extent of the provision, or because
she is devisee under the will for life or in
fee, or because it may seem to the court
that to permit the widow to claim both the
provision and dower would be unjust as a
family arrangement;
or even because it may
be inferred or believed, in view of all the
circumstances,
that, if the attention of the
had been drawn to the subject,
testator
excluded
dower.
he would have expressly
We repeat, the only sufficient and adequate
which, in the absence of exdemonstration
press words, will put the widow to her election, is a clear incompatibility arising on the
face of the will between a claim of dower
and a claim to the benefit given by the will.
We cite a few of the cases in this state showHUTCH.& BXJNK.EQ.—
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Ing the general principle, and the wide range
Adsit v. Adsit, 2 Johns. Ch.
of application.
Sanford v. Jackson, 10 Paige, 266;
452;
Church V. Bull, 2 Denio, 430; Lewis v.
Smith, 9 N. Y. 502; Fuller v. Yates, 8 Paige,
Havens v. Havens, 1 Sandf. Ch. 331;
325;
Wood v. Wood, 5 Paige, 599.
In view of these settled rules, we think
the widow in this ease was riot put to her
The devise to the executors was
election.
void as a trust, but valid as a power in
trust, for the sale of the lands and a division of the proceeds, and the lands descended to the heirs of the testator subject to the
1 Rev. St. p. 729,
execution of the power.
§ 56; Cooke v. Piatt, 98 N. Y. 35.
It is strenuously urged that, the power of
sale being peremptory, it worked an eqluitaof the land into personalty,
ble conversion
as of the time of the testator's death, and
created a trust in the executors in the proceeds for the purpose of distribution, which
trust it is alleged is inconsistent with a
The doctrine of equitable
claim of dower.
conversion, as the phrase implies, is a fictionof equity, which is frequently applied to
solve questions as to the validity of trusts;
to determine the legal character of the interests of beneficiaries;
the devolution of property, as between real and personal representatives; and for other purposes.
It seems to
be supposed that there is a necessary repugnancy between the existence of a trust in
real property created by a will and an outstanding dower interest of a widow in the
trust property.
We perceive no foundation
for this contention.
If the purposes of a
trust, as declared, require that the entire
title, free from the dower interest of the
widow, should be vested in the trustees, in
order to effectuate the purposes of the testator in creating it, a clear case for an election is presented.
Vernon v. Vernon, 53 N.
Y. 351.
But the mere creation of a trust
for the sale of real property, and its distribution,
is not inconsistent with the existence of a dower interest in the same property.
There is no legal difficulty in the trustee executing the power of sale, but the sale
will necessarily be subject to the widow's
right of dower, as it would be subject to any
outstanding interest in a third person paramount to that of the trustee.
In the cases of Savage v. Burnham, 17 X.
Y. 577, and Tobias v. Ketchum, 32 N. Y.
327, the widow was put to her election, not
because the vesting of the title in trustees
was per se inconsistent with a claim for
dower, but for the reason that the will made
a disposition
of the income, and contained
other provisions which would be in part deThere
feated if dower was insisted upon.
is language in the latter case which, disconnected from the context, may give color to
But it is
of the appellant.
the contention
the principle upon which adjudged cases proceed which is mainly to be looked to, because a correct principle is sometimes mis-

130

ELECTION.

applied.
There is, however, no ground for
misapprehension
of the
of the meaning
learned judge in that case, interpreting his
language with reference to facts then under
consideration.
It has frequently been declared that powers of or in trust for sale are not inconsistent
with the widow's right of dower.
Gibson
Bending
V. Gibson, 17 Eng. Law & Eq. 349;
V. Bending, 3 Kay & J. 257;
Adsit v. Adsit,
supra;
In re Frazer, 92 N. Y. 239. And it
was held in Wood v. Wood, 5 Paige, 596,
that the widow was not put to her election,
where the testator devised all his property
to trustees,
power of
with a peremptory
sale, and directed the payment to the widow
of an annuity out of the converted fund.
The same conclusion
was reached, under
very similar circumstances,
in Fuller v.
Yates, 8 Paige, 32.3; and in Re Prazer, supra, the widow's dower was held not to be
excluded by a provision in the will, although
as to a portion of the realty the power of
sale given to the executors was peremptory.
The general doctrine is very clearly stated
by the vice-chancellor
in Ellis v. Lewis, 3
Hare, 310: "I take the law to be clearly settled at this day that a devise of lands eo
nomine upon trusts for sale, or a devise of
lands eo nomine to a devisee beneficially,
does not, per se, express an intention to de-

vise the lands otherwise than subject to Its
This relegal incidents,
dower included."
mark of the vice-chancellor also answers the
claim that the testator, when he described
as the subject of the dower, "all the rest,
residue, and remainder of my estate," meant
the entire title, or the estate as enjoyed by
him.
A similar argument was answered by
Lord Thurlow in Poster v. Cook, 3 Brown,
"Because,"
Ch. 347.
he said, "the testator
gives all his property to the trustees, I am
to gather, from his having given all he has,
that he has given that which he has not."
The argument that the testator intended
equality of division between his wife and
children is also answered by the same consideration.
The proceeds of the testator's estate were by the will to be equally distributed.
It left untouched the dower of the widow,
which he could not sell or authorize to be
sold, and which was a legal right not derived
from him, and paramount to all others.
It
may be conjectured, perhaps reasonably inferred, that the testator really intended the
provision for his wife to be exclusive of any
other interest, but so it Is not written in the
will, and we are not permitted to yield any
force to the suggestion.
It is a question of
legal interpretation, which has been settled.
The judgment should therefore be affirmAll concur.
ed.
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EEED

V.

(29

Supreme

Judicial
October

DICKEEMAN.
Pick.

146.)

Court of Massachusetts.
Term, 1831.

Writ of dower. The following facts were
agreed to by the parties.
Elijai Reed, the late husband of the demandant, died seised in fee of the land described in the writ.
On August 8, 1816, he made
his last will, containing the following provisions:
"I give and bequeath to my beloved
wife, Lucy Eeed, and Alice Eeed, my daughter, one-half of my dwelling house where
now live, the southerly part of said house,
and the north buttery in said house, during
my wife's natural life. Also to my beloved
give and bequeath one-half of my inwife
door movables.
I also give and bequeath to
my beloved wife one cow, which
order my
sons, Solomon and Elijah, to keep for her, or
some other in the room of it, free from any
expense to her during her natural life.
Also
I give and bequeath to my wife and my
daughter, Alice Eeed, one heifer, a year old
last spring, and hereby order my two sons,
Solomon and Elijah, to be at one-half the expense of keeping said heifer for their mother."
The will was proved In September,
1816.
Soon after the death of the testator,
the demandant selected a cow from the stock
on the farm, and that cow, or another instead of it, has ever since been kept on the
farm for her by her sons, Solomon and
Elijah, and she has had the use of it ever
since, until within a year past, when she sold
it. A heifer was provided for her and Alice
by Solomon and Elijah, and was kept by
them for their mother until it died, which
happened soon after the probate of the will.
The demandant has always, since the death
of her husband, been in the possession of the
indoor movables.
She has always lived in
that part of the house which was devised to
her, and Alice has lived with her.
It appeared by the records of the probate court
that in March, 1829, the judge of probate appointed a committee to set off by metes and
bounds and define that part of the dwelling
house of the testator unto his widow and
Alice, which was devised to them for their
use during their natural life, together with
the cellar, privileges, and appurtenances;
and
In April, 1829, the committee made a return,
showing their performance
of the duty required of them. The real estate of the testator was appraised, soon after his death, at
and the personal at ?647, his debts
$10,529,
amounted to a sum between $3,000 and $3,600, the real estate given to Alice was worth
$900,
one-half of the indoor movables was
worth $95, and the fee simple of the whole
dwelling house was worth between $1,300
and $1,400.
A demand was made upon the
defendant, on July 5, 1830, to assign dower to
the demandant.
On the foregoing facts, or such of them as
would be admissible in evidence on a trial

I

I

I

131

before a jury, and on such Inferences as may
be legally made from them, the case was
submitted to the court, and If, in the opinion
of the court, the demandant was entitled to
recover, the defendant was to be defaulted;
but otherwise, the demandant was to become
nonsuit.

Mr. Eddy, for demandant.
Mr. Miller, for tenant.

W. Baylies and

MORTON, J.
The demandant is clearly
entitled to recover her dower, unless she is
barred by the provision made for her in the
will of Elijah Eeed. In that is given to her
a freehold
estate In a part of the dwelling
house of the deceased, and also certain personal property.
The will contains no declaration of the testator's intention, whether this
was to be in lieu of, or in addition to, the
dower of his widow.
By St. 1788, c. 24, § 8, "the widow, in all
cases, may waive the provision made for her
in the will of her deceased husband, and
claim her dower, and have the same assigned
her In the same manner as though her husband had died intestate, in which case she
shall receive no benefit from such provision,
unless It appears by the will plainly the testator's intention to be in addition to her
dower." This Is a material alteration of a
rule of the common law applicable
to this
case. By that rule a devise or bequest to
a widow is presumed to be in addition to her
dower, unless It clearly appears that it was
the intention of the testator that it should be
in lieu of dower.
The wife has a legal interest in her husband's estate, of which she cannot be devested without her own consent.
After his
death she is legally entitled to dower, unless by some act of her own during his lifetime she has barred her right, or after his
decease voluntarily relinquished that right.
A bequest or devise Is deemed a bounty, and
not the payment or satisfaction of a pre-existing debt or obligation.
A gratuity cannot
extinguish a legal right; hence the commonlaw rule that a donation in a vyill does not
operate as an extinguishment of the right of
dower, but is presumed to be a gratuity in
addition to the existing legal right, but a
donation may be made on a condition, and
that condition may as well be the relinquishment of the right of dower as the performance of any other act, and if a donation In a
wiU be made on the express condition that
dower shall not be claimed, or. If it clearly
appear from the will that it was the Intention of the testator that the widow should not
have both the donation and the dower, then
the donation shall be taken to be in lieu of
dower, and the widow cannot hold both.
She
may have her election.
She cannot claim under the will and adversely to it; but she is
not thereby devested of her right of dower,
but may have -her election between her dower
and the provision made for her in the will.
By the clause of our statute just quoted.
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this presumption of law is reversed, and the
provision in the will is deemed to be in lieu
of dower, unless it plainly appears that the
testator intended it to be in addition to it.
In this case there is no express declaration that the testamentary provision was intended to be in addition to dower, nor can
any such intention be inferred from all the
will taken together. The inadequacy of the
provision alone will not justify such an inference.

The plaintiff must therefore take the devise and bequests in the will, unless she seaThe statute
sonably elected to waive them.
There is
seems to presume an acceptance.
some positive act to be done by the widow,
indicating her election, before she can be enThe demand required to be
titled to dower.
made thirty days before an action can be
commenced might be considered an election,
where no election had previously been made.
Within what time shall a widow be holden
to waive the provision made for her in the
will, or to be bound by it? In New York,
the widow shall be deemed to have elected
provision,
unless
to take the testamentary
she enters upon or commences a suit for her
dower within one year after her husband's
In Virginia, she is allowed nine
death.
months, and in Vermont only sixty days, in
which to make her election; and, on failure
to do it, she is confined to her dower at common law. Our statute has not fixed any precise time for the election; but doubtless the
widow would be holden to have accepted the
unless she waived
testamentary
provision,
it in a reasonable time, that the settlement
of the estate might be closed and distribution
What shall be deemmade among the heirs.
ed a reasonable time, not being fixed by statute, cannot be accurately defined by any gen-

rule, and need not now be discussed.
we are all of opinion that, under the circumstances of this case, the demandant is precluded from waiving the provisions of the
will and claiming dower.
Fourteen years elapsed after the probate
of the will before any demand of dower was
During the whole of this time she ocmade.
cupied the real estate which was devised to
her.
The personal property bequeathed to her
was received by her, and some of it has been
disposed of by her.
The benefit of the other
provision in the will in her favor had been
enjoyed by her. A decree of the probate
court has been made, assigning
to her by
definite bounds that part of the real estate
which was devised to her; and the whole estate has passed out of the hands of the original devisees. We think, after all this, it is
too late for the widow to waive the provision
made for her In the will and claim her
dower.
It is true that in equity the widow may
sometimes be relieved from an improvident
election; but this can only be done where
some deception or fraud was practiced upon
her, or at least where she acted under an
ignorance of the facts or a misapprehension
of her legal rights.
But here is no evidence
of any deception, or misapprehension,
or even
ignorance of the circumstances
of the case.
The plaintiff chose to regard and carry into
effect the provisions and directions contained
in her husband's will. No desire to avoid it
on her part was known to exist till many
years after the death of her husband, and
not until the estate had passed from her family into the hands of strangers.
We are entirely clear that she cannot now change her
determination,
waive the provisions of the
will, and claim her dower.
eral
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STRONG

V.

WILLIAMS.

(12 Mass.

Supreme Judicial

Court

391.)

of

Massachusetts.

1815.

PUTNAM, J. delivered the opinion of the
court.
The general rule anciently established in
chancery was, that when a testator being indebted gave to his creditor a legacy equal to,
or exceeding the amount of his debt, the legacy should be considered as a satisfaction for
the debt.
The rule has been acknowledged
in later cases, but with marks of disapprobation, and a disposition to restrain its operation in all cases where, from circumstances
to be collected from the will, it might be inferred that the testator had a different intention.
Haynes v. Mico, 1 Bro. Cha. Ca. 131.
Thus where the testator left a sufBcient estate, it was determined that he was to be presumed to have been kind as well as just. So
if the legacy was of a less sum than the debt;
or of a different nature; or upon conditions;
or not equally biBneflcial in some one particular, although more so in another.
All the cases agree that the intention of the
testator ought to prevail; and that, prima
facie at least, whatever is given in a will is
to be intended as a bounty.
But by later
cases the courts have not been disposed to
understand the testator as meaning to pay a
debt, when he declares that he makes a gift;
unless the circumstances of the case should
lead to a different conclusion.
Thus in the case cited for the plaintiff.
Brown v. Dawson, 2 Vern. 498, where the
wife joined in the sale of her jointure, and
the husband gave her a note of 11. 10s. per
annum for her life; and afterwards upon another such sale he gave her a bond for &l.
10s. per anjp,um for her life; and he afterwards made his will, and gave her 141. per
annum for life: the legacy was adjudged to
be a satisfaction for the note and bond.
Here
it will be perceived that the annuity given in
the will amounted
exactly to the sums secured by the bond and note: and the presumption of satisfaction proceeded upon the
similitude of the legacy to the debt. 2 Fonbl.
330, in notis.
So in the case of Fowler v.
Fowler, 3 P. "Will. 353, the general rule was
There the husband, being indebted
applied.
to the wife for arrears due by the marriage
settlement, gave her a larger legacy by the
will: and it was held a satisfaction of the
debt.
But it is to be observed that lord chancellor Talbot expressed great dissatisfaction
with the rule: and it does not appear that
any circumstances could be found, to take
the case out of its general application.
In
that case the court refused parole evidence,
to prove that the testator intended both
should be paid.
But cases of this nature must depend upon
the circumstances: and there must be a
strong presumption, to induce a belief that

13:^

the testator intended the legacy as a payment,
and not as a bounty. 2 Fonbl. 332. Thus
where the testatrix had given her servant a
bond for 201. free of taxes for her life, and
afterwards made her will and gave the servant 20Z. per annum payable half yearly, but
said nothing about the taxes, the court held
that both should be paid. Atkinson v. Webb,
2 "Vern. 478. — Here the legacy, being not
quite so beneficial as the debt, did not raise
a presumption that it was intended as a payment.
So where the testator having sufBcient assets, and having manifested great kindness
for the legatee, gave a legacy of a greater
amount than he owed, it was holden by lord
chancellor Cowper, that the testator might
be presumed to be kind as well as just: and
he decreed the payment of the legacy as well
Cuthbert v. Peacock, 1 Salk. 155.
as the debt.
It has been holden that a legacy for a less
sum than the debt shall never be taken as
satisfaction; 2 Salk. 508; and that specific
things devised are never to be considered as
2
satisfaction of a debt, unless so expressed.
Eq. Ca. Abr. title Devises pi. 21, cited Bac.

Abr. Legacies D.

So the circumstance, that the testator had
"
that all his debts and legacies should
devised
be paid," was holden sufficient to take the
case out of the general rule: as where the testator, indebted to his maid servant 1001., by
bond for wages, afterwards gave her 500^.
lord chancellor King decreed that both should
be paid, as the testator had made provilion for the payment of his debts.
1 P.
"Will. 408, 409. vide note.
So where it appeared that the legatee had
lived with the testatrix as a servant for twenty or thirty years, and she had given her a
bond for 2601. and in one montli afterwards
she made her will and gave her 500Z. : and
in another clause she gave the rest of her
servants 51. apiece, but not to Jane Oreese,
the legatee; "because," said the testatrix,
have done well for her before;" and she also
made provision for her debts and legacies.
Lord Hardwicke thought the circumstances
above stated took the case out of the general
rule, and decreed the legacy to be no satisfaction for the debt. Richardson v. ffreese, 3
Atk. 65; Nicholls v. Judson, 8. P., 2 Atk.
301; Clark v. Sewell, S. P., 3 Atk. 97.
So where the testator was indebted for
goods on an open account, a legacy for a larger
sura was not held a satisfaction: because he
might not know whether he was indebted or
not; and therefore no presumption was to
arise, that he intended merely to pay a debt.
Powers Case, 1 P. "Will. 299; 10 Mod. Case
No. 201, p. 398.
In the case at bar, the consideration for the
.legacy appears from the will to have been for
the services of the legatee.
A presumption
that the legacy was intended to be a satisfaction of the bond also, must rest on the fact
that the bond was given for the same services: of which fact there is no evidence be-
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It may have been for a different
cause.
We can only presume that it was for
a lawful one.
It appears also from the will, that the testator intended his debts and legacies should
be paid, before his residuary legatees should
take any thing.
The pecuniary legacy to the
plaintiff also is not so much as the debt; and
therefore cannot be considered as a payment
fore us.

of it.

Neither is there any declaration of the
testator, that the specific articles given should
be considered as a satisfaction of the debt.
It
appears also that there are sufficient assets.
From a consideration of the principles and
decisions applicable to this case, we are therefore all of opinion that the plaintiff ought to
recover.
B^endant d^aulted.
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DEICHMAN
(22

Atl.

V.

799, 49 N.

ARNDT.

J.

Eq. 106.)

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Oct. 26, 1891.

Action by Delchman against Arndt for
the construction of a will.
Charles .A. 2^ite/j, for complainant. Wm.
M. Davis, for defendant
BIRD, V. C. By the bill in this caHe the
complainant asks the aid of the court in
determining the true construction of the
last will of Ann Arndt, deceased, and consequently the rights of the legatees and
devisees under said will. At the time of
her death and of the making of her will
she was the owner of a lot of land with
a dwelling thereon, in which she resided.
Before the making of her will she gave a
bond to William M. Davis, the guardian
of Harry King Arndt, one of her infant
children, conditioned for the payment of
To secure this bond
$500, with interest.
she gave a mortgage upon said house and
lot. By her will she devises this house and

lot to her son Harry in the following
language : " I give to my son Harry King
Arndt, absolutely, to be held in trust,

hereinafter
however,
by my executor
named, the dwelling-house and lot wherein I now reside, situate on Main street, in
Phillipsburg, N. J., until he arrives at the
age of twenty-one (21) years; my executor
to rent the same, collect the rent, pay all
taxes, insurance, services, anH repairs, and
the balance remaining to be used for the
support and maintenance of my son Harry King Arndt, hereinbefore named."
Two questions are presented in the bill
for consideration, viz.: Is the devise to be
regarded as a payment and discharge of
the bond, and is the gift to Harry an
absolute fee? In this case the testatrix in
clear language directs that all of her
debts be paid as soon as conveniently can
She makes disposibe after her decease.
tion of her personal estate. Including bankstock, giving a portion thereof to her
daughter, a portion to another son, and
a portion to the said Harry. The division of this personal property is not equal,
but the extent of inequality is not made
apparent.
She first gives to her daughter certain household furniture; and, in
the second place, to her son Frank certain household furniture; and, in the third
place, makes the devise of the house and
lot to Harry. She then provides for the
protection of her cemetery lot, and gives
the three children all of her silver-ware.
Immediately after this she directs her executor to sell "the balance of my house"
and to divide the proceeds
hold effects,
thereof between her three children, directing him, however, to hold the share of
Harry until he arrives at the age of 21
years. Then she directs her executors to
collect the dividends of her 19 shares of
bank-stock, and to pay the same towards
the support and maintenance of Harry
until he arrives at the age of 21 years, at
date he is authorwhich last-mentioned
ized to sell the said stock and divide the
Notproceeds between her three children.
withstanding this last provision, she authorizes her executor to sell all the said

shares of bank-stock at snch time or
times as he shall think fit, and to iiive.st
the proceeds, and pay tlie interest thereof
for the support and maintenance of her
son Harry until he arrives at the age of
21 years. She then directs that the residue
of her estate, "consisting principally of
bonds and mortgages and notes, money
and stock, should be divided equally between my three children, share and share
alike, my executor, however, retaining
that portion falling to my son Harry
arrives at the age of
King Arndt until he
twenty-one years. " From this it appears
that the testatrix was indebted to the
guardian of her son in the sum of $500:
that she made her said son both devisee
and legatee, imposing a condition upon
the devise that the executor should receive the rents and profits until the son
arrives at the age of 21 years, for his support and maintenance, and a like condition upon the gift of the legacy ; and that,
as the matter stands, both the devise and
the legacy are of uncertain value. Where
there is nothing to show a contrary intention upon the part of the testator, and
he directs the payment of his debts, the
gift of a legacy is never presumed to have
been given for the purpose of discharging
a debt due from the testator to the legaEq.
Van Riper v. Van Riper, 2 N.
tee.
1 , Heisler v. Sharp, 44 N. J. Eq. 167, 14
Atl. Rep. 624; Rusling v. Rusling, 42 N. .T.
Eq.5<J4,8Atl.Rep. 534; Chaucey'sCase,! P.
Wras. 408, 410, 2 White & T. l.ead. Cas.
820; Reynolds
v. Robinson,
7.^12, notes,
82 N. Y. 103; Boughton v. Flint, 74 N. Y.
477; In re Huish, 43 Ch. Dlv. 260.
The
courts so little favor the discharge of debts
by legacies that they have uniformly laid
hold of slight circumstances to overcome
the presumption that payment was intended independently of the direction to
pay debts. Hence, when the gift has been
of land or of goods and chattels, or upon
conditions unfavorable to the donee when
compared with the present discharge of
the debt, the payment of both has been
required. 2 White & T. Lead. Cas. 821.
"Money and land being things of a different kind, the one, though of greater value,
shall never be taken in satisfaction of the
other, unless so expressed."
"Whatever
is given by will is prima facie to be in"
Eastwood v.
tended a benevolence.
Vinke, 2 P. Wms. 613, 616. In this casethe
"But, though the court
court remarked:
has gone so far, it never yet construed a
devise of land to be a satisfaction for a
debt of money."
In Bryant v. Hunter,
Wash. C. C. 48, Fed. Cas. No. 2,068,
3
Washington, J., says:
"The general
rule is that a devise of land is not a
satisfaction or part performance of an
See, also,
agreement to pay money."
The
Eaton V. Benton, 2 Hill, 576, 580.
bond in this case being for the payment
of money, and the gift being land, the
construction must necessnrily be controlled by the cases cited. It can make
no difference that the payment of the bond
was secured by mortgage on the land devised. It cannot be doubted but that the
gifts of goods and chattels and proceeds
of bank-stock and residue by the testatrix to her son Harry are alike subject to
the same conditions that govern with

J.
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respect to the devise of land. According;
to all of the cases there is no similitude
whatever between those gifts and the obligation which the testatrix had directed
her executor to pay.
have not thought it necessary to put
any stress upon the fact that both the
bond and the mortgage -were given to the
guardian of the devisee and legatee. It
has been suggested that if this bond be
paid to the guardian of Harry, Harry's
proportion of the estate of the testatrix
vsrill be much larger than the portion reby his brother and sister. This
ceived
would be an important consideration if
it were the duty of courts to construe
wills BO as to make an equal disposition
of the estate disposed of thereby among
legatees and devisees, irrespective of the
directions of the will. There is nothing
in this will to give any certain assurance
to the court that the testatrix intended
to make an equal disposition of her estate among herchildren.
If there be any
inequality in the value of the gifts, the
testatrix may have had very good reason
therefor; but, whether she had or not,
she had a lawful right to make any distinction she chose. This bond must be
first paid out of the personal estate, as
other debts, before the payment of any of
the legacies.
The next question presented tor consid-

I

eration is whether or not the Interest devised to Harry be less than the fee-simple
absolute.
When the sentence making the
devise to Harry is read, if there be any
doubt as to the extent of the interest devised, such doubt will be dissipated upon
careful reflection.
The testatrix first declares that she gives him the premises absolutely, but afterwards gives such directions as at first view would seem to have
been intended as a qualification to the exI
tent of limiting his interest to the rents
and profits until he arrives at the age of
21 years.
But when this sentence and this
apparent qualification are read in connection with the succeeding clauses in the
will, by which gifts are made to Harry, the
doubt is removed. She ordered the silver
to be divided between her three children ;
but Harry's interest in other personal
property and in the bank stock and in
the residue of the personal property is to
be retained by the executor, and the interest and dividends paid to Harry, until
he arrives at the age of 21 years, when he
is entitled to the possession of the principal. From the control given to the executor over the interest of Harry until
he arrive at the age of 21 years the testatrix in all probability intended to provide
against the necessity of appointing a
guardian for him. In my judgment the
fee-simple absolute vested In Harry.
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DEWITT

Johns.

(10

Supreme

Court

V.

YATES.
156.)

of New York.

May,

1813.

This was an action of debt for a legacy.
The cause was tried at the Saratoga circuit
in September, 1812.
Peter Yates, by his last
will, dated the loth of August, 1807, be"Item, I give to my
queathed as follows:
daughter Maria's children, of her body, two
hundred and fifty pounds; if any of the five
children should decease before my decease,
or after, the parts of the deceased shall
come to the then living; each of them is to
have fifty pounds when they come of age,
or when thev or either of them should marry."
In a subsequent part of the will, the testator having devised the half of a farm, etc.,
Philip Vanderbergh, and
to his son-in-law,
his wife, and the other half to his wife, etc.,
directs as follows:
"In consideration of
which, it is my will, and I do hereby order,
that the said Philip Vanderbergh, his heirs,
etc., shall pay to the children of my said
daughter Maria, to wit, Sarah (the wife of
the plaintiff), John, Maria, Catalina, and
Catharine, the sum of two hundred and fifty
pounds, equal to 625 dollars, to be paid unto
them and each of them, in sums of fifty
pounds, as they respectively shall arrive at
the age of 21 years, or on the day that they
or either of them shall marry," and appointed the defendant and three others his executors.

It was proved that Philip Vanderbergh,
the devisee, in October, 1807, paid to the
plaintiffs the 50 pounds given to Sarah, the
wife of the plaintifE, and named in the second clause of the wUl.
It was admitted that a year had elapsed
since the death of the testator; that the
plaintiffs had duly demanded payment of the
legacy, mentioned in the first clause, of the
defendant, previous to the commencement of
the suit, and had tendered and filed a bond
according to the directions of the statute;
and that the defendant had assets in his
hands, after payment of all debts and other
legacies, sufficient to pay the legacy in question.

The defendant offered a witness to prove
that, before and at the time the testator
made his will, he expressed his intention to
give one legacy to the children of his daughter Maria, and that was the legacy directed
to be paid by Philip Vanderbergh; but the
evidence was objected to, and overruled by
the judge.

A verdict was taken for the plaintiffs, subject to the opinion of the court, on a case

given twice in the same instrument to the
The general rule on this subsame legatee.
ject, from a review of the numerous cases,
appears evidently to be that where the sum
is repeated in the same writing the legatee
can take only one of the sums bequeathed.
The latter sum' is held to be a substitution,
and they are not taken cumulatively, unless
there be some evident intention that they
and it lays with
should be so considered,
the legatee to show that intention and rebut
the contrary presumption; but where the
two bequests are in different instruments, as
by will in the one case and by a codicil in
the other, the presumption is in favor of the
that
legfitee, and the burden of contesting
The
presumption is cast upon the executor.
presumption either way, whether against the
cumulation because the legacy is repeated in
the same instrument, or whether in favor
of it because the legacy is by different instruments, is liable to be controlled and repelled by internal evidence, and the circum
stances of the case.
Godol. Leg. p. 3, c. 26,
Duke of St.
§ 46; Swinb. pt 7, c. 21, § 13;
Albans v. Beauclerk, 2 Atk. 636; Garth v.
Meyrick, 1 Brown, Ch. 30; Ridges v. Morrison, Id. 389; Hooley v. Hatton, Id. 390,
note; Wallop v. Hewett, 2 Ch. R. 37; Newport V. Kinaston, Id. 58; James v. Semmens,
2 H. Bl. 214;
Allen v. Callen, 3 Ves. Jun.
289; Barclay v. Wainwright,
Id. 462; OsThis
borne V. Duke of Leeds, 5 Ves. 369.
question, which appears to have arisen so
often and to have been so learnedly and ably
discussed in the English courts, was equally
familiar to the civil law. The same rule existed there, and subject to the same control.
Dig. 30, 1, 34; Dig. 22, 3, 12; and the notes
of Gothofrede, Id.; Voet, Con. ad Pand. tom.
And Chancellor D'Aguesseau, in
2,408, s. 34.
in the Case of the Heirs of
his pleadings
Vaugermain (Oeuvres, tom. 2, 21), adopts
and applies the same rule to a case arising
under the French law. The civil law puts
the case altogether upon the point of the
testator's intention; but then, if the legacy
was repeated in the same instrument, it required the highest and strongest proof to
accumulate it. Bvidentissimis probationibus
ostendatur testatorem multiplicasse legatum
voluisse.
In the present case, what are the intrinsic
circumstances to show a manifest intent of
the testator to multiply the legacy?
The
only material variation in the two bequests
is that, in the latter instance,
the legacy
was charged upon Philip Vanderbergh in
respect of the real estate to him devised;
but this affords no evidence of an intention
to accumulate.
The inference is the other

Mr. Skin-

way. It was only strengthening the security
of the legacy by means of the charge. There
was no specified object. There was no as-

C. J., delivered the opinion of the
This is the case of a sum of money

signed reason or cause, as respected the legatees, for repeating the bequest
Courts have
required some new or additional cause for
enlarging the bounty before they have held

made.

Mr. Huntington,

for plaintiffs.

ner, for defendant.

KENT,
court.
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it accumulative, unless the words of the will
clearly showed the intent.
In a will, the
testator gave double legacies to his daughters, but he added, in those cases, that they
were "in addition" to what he had before
given; and the master of the rolls, in Barclay V. Wainwright, said that he laid considerable stress upon this, that where the
testator meant addition he expressed it. The
whole will denotes throughout a careful and
studied apportionment of the testator's estate among his children, according to his
opinion of their wants and circumstances;
and he imposed several trusts and charges,
probably with a view to greater accuracy In
He appoints fqur
the partition of his estate.
sons executors, but he charges his funeral
expenses upon three, and his debts upon two,
of them. A small variation in the direction

as to payment will not alter the construction.
In Halford v. Wood, 4 Ves. 76, the
legacy was an annuity of £30 for life, and
in the one instance It was declared to be
payable quarterly, and In the other instance
the will was silent as to the payment, and
yet it was not held accumulative. So, also,
in Greenwood v. Greenwood, 1 Brown, Ch.
31, note, the one legacy was simply to Mary
Cook, but the other was to Mary Cook "for
her own use and disposing, notwithstanding
her coverture"; and yet Lord Bathurst decreed that she was entitled to one legacy
only.
As, then, the substituted legacy In this
case has been paid by the devisee, on whom
it was charged, the defendant is entitled to

judgment.
Judgment for the defendant.

SATISFACTION.
EDWARDS

et
(17

Supreme Court

al.

v.

Ohio

RAINIER'S EX'RS.
St. 597.)

of Ohio.

Dec. Term,

1867.

Error

to court of common pleas, Pickaway
county.
Reserved in the district court.
The original petition was filed by the executors of Isaac Rainier, deceased, against
his devisees and legatees, on the 3d day of
June, 1864, in the court of common pleas
of Pickaway county, to obtain a construction
of the wiU of said deceased.
The will Is dated September 8, 1860, to
which a codicil is added, dated December 4,
1861.
The testator died March 25, 1863, and
his will was admitted to probate April 29,
1863, and Is as follows:
will that all my just debts and fu"(1)
neral charges be paid.
give and bequeath to Mary Rainier,
"(2)
wife, in lieu of her right
my much-esteemed
of dower, thirty acres of land during her nat*
*
*
ural life, and bounded as follows:
Out of the farm on which I now reside, situated in Madison township, Pickaway county.
And I also give to my wife all the
household
and kitchen furniture of every
description, except what is hereafter willed.
And I also give to my wife five hundred dollars in cash; and I also give her my sorrel
mare Fly, and my top buggy, with the harness belonging thereto.
And my said wife
is to have sufficient timber of any part of
said quarter section, for the use and support
of her said dower, together with fuel suffiAnd the widow may select
cient for fire.
what books she may think proper for her
own use, except those hereafter willed.
give and bequeath to my daughter
"(3)
Sarah A. Edwards, wife of Stephen S. Edwards, all notes
hold against Stephen S.
Edwards, of every description whatever, up
1852; and
to the first day of November,
also give to my daughter, Sarah A. Edwards,
fifteen hundred dollars in cash.
"(4) I give and bequeath to my son Isaac
Rainier the use, occupation, and enjoyment
of the northwest quarter of section eleven,
in Violet township, Fairfield county, Ohio,
to have and to hold during his natural life,
and then to his heirs.
give and bequeath to my daughter
"(5)
Hester Ann Adell the use, occupation, and
enjoyment of the northeast quarter of section number fourteen, situate in Violet township, Fairfield county, and state of Ohio, to
have and to hold during her natural life, and
then to her heirs, subject to the dower of
my wife, Mary Rainier. And the said Hester Ann Adell, wife of George Adell, is to
pay to my daughter Sarah A. Edwards, wife
of Stephen S. Edwards, one thousand dollars in money, in the following payments, to
wit, one hundred dollars per year. The first
payment
to be made one year after my
death, and if the said Hester Ann Adell
should fail to make the above payments as
required, and should it become necessary to

I

I

I

I

I

I
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sell any portion of the land, it is my will it
shall be taken off the west side, not to exceed thirty acres."
(6) In this item the testator gives to his
son John F. Rainier the northwest quarter
of section niunber fom'teen, in Madison township, "subject to the widow's dower above
written"; and he also gives him "the horse
power wood saw, and all the reaping and
mowing machines, and all wagons and farming utensils of every description whatever,
and all the stock of every kind (except two
cows, wbich I leave to the widow, she having choice);
also Clerk's Commentaries on
the Old and New Testament, six volumes,
Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, and all
the books belonging to me not taken by the
widow; and I also give to my son John F.
Rainier all mechanic
tools of every kind
whatever,
and one bedstead, bed, and bedding."
(7) In this item he gives to his daughter
Mary B. Pontius, wife of Franklin G. Pontius, the northwest half of the northeast
quarter of section eleven, in Violet township, and "five hundred dollars in money, including a duebill" of $82 against said Franklin G. Pontius.
"(8) I give and bequeath to my niece Almina Ebright one bedstead, bed, and bedding; and I also give to Almlna Ebright one
hundred dollars in money, provided she continues to live with the family imtll she arrives at the age of eighteen years, if there
should be that amount remaining after paying off the other legatees as above given.
"If the widow should see proper to marry
again, she then shall forfeit her interest in
my real estate, and my daughter Hester Ann
Adell and my son John F. Rainier shall pay,
each of them, two hundred and fifty dollars
in lieu thereof.
"All the above legacies to be paid in two
years after my decease, or as soon after as
can be collected."
The testator appointed John F. Rainier
and George Adell executors of his will.
By the codicil, the testator gave the northwest quarter of section eleven, m. Violet
township, to John F. Rainier and George
Adell in trust for Isaac Rainier for life, and
then to his heirs, and revoked all right that
Isaac had in the foregoing will except as
expressed in the codicil.
He gives to John all the household furniture after the death of iis wife, and adds
the following clause:
"And it is my will
that each my several children shall have all
the growing and matured crops that may be
(on) the different tracts of land that I have
willed to them as above written."
It was claimed by the executors that the
sum of $1,000, mentioned in the fifth item
of the will, was intended to be a part payment of the sum of $1,500 bequeathed in the
third item to Sarah A. Edwards; while the
latter claimed that said sum of $1,000 was
a legacy to her in addition to the sum of
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The executors aver tbat the personalty is Insufllcient to pay said legacy unless
said sum of $1,000 be applied for that purpose; but Mrs. Edwards answers that the
personalty was sufficient when the will was
executed,
and that if there is not now
enough it is because it was expended in imThis is not
provements
on the real estate.
$1,500.

denied

by reply.

claim the corn in cribs, on
at the time
lands devised as aforesaid,
of the testator's decease; but the same is
claimed by the respective devisees of the
land on which the corn was grown and matured, and on which the cribs were severally located.
The court of common pleas decreed that
the will be consti'ued to give to Sarah A.
Edwards a legacy of $1,500 only; that the
sum of $1,000 mentioned in the fifth clause
is a fund for the part payment thereof, and
that the corn in
not an additional legacy;
the cribs passed to the executors, and not
and that the sum of $500
to the devisees;
given to the widow is a debt in lieu of dower, and not a legacy.
To reverse this decree a petition in error
was filed in the district court, which was
there reserved for decision in this court.
The following are the assignments of erThe executors

the

ror:
(1)

legacy

of
of

There was error in finding that the
to Sarah A. Edwards was a legacy

$1,500

only,

and not a legacy

or legacies

$2,.5O0.

There was error in finding that the
named in the petition as being in the
cribs on the land of Isaac is not embraced
in the provisions of the will, but belongs to
the executors.
that the
(3) There was error in finding
sum of $.500 to the widow is a debt in lieu
of dower, and not a legacy.
assignment
of errors.
(4) General
(2)

corn

C. N. Olds, for plaintiffs.

Henry F. Page,

for defendants.

DAY, 0. J. We are called upon, under
this proceeding in error, to determine whether the court of common pleas correctly construed the will of Isaac Rainier, deceased.
Xo bill of exceptions was taken in that court
embodying the evidence there given, and, so
far as evidemce was admissible to aid in the
construction of the will, it may be presumed
to have been before the court.
At most,
however, the evidence could only inform the
court of all the circumstances that surrounded the testator, to aid it in determining the meaning the testator intended should
be given to the words he used in the will.
With this presumption in favor of the
judgment below, we are left to construe the
will by the language used therein, aided
only, on the principal question, by a fact
conceded by the pleadings, that the testator,

when he executed the will, had personal
property sutticient to fill all the legacies
upon the largest construction of the bequests.
It is claimed by the executors that the
sum of $1,000, to be paid by Mrs. Adell to
;Mrs. Edwards, is to be applied on the legacy
to her of $1,500, and is not to be regarded
as a legacy in addition to that sum.
Jlrs. Edwards claims that it was the intention of the testator to give her both sums.
Here arises the principal question presented for our consideration: Was the $1,000
Intended by the testator to be an additional
benefit or legacy to Mrs. Edwards?
The books afford us but little aid in the
solution of this question: for. in the language of Chief Justice Hornblower in Jones
127:
19 N. J. Law,
V. Creveling's Ex'rs,
".4.fter a careful examination of the cases
cited on the argument and of many others,
I am satisfied, notwithstanding all the nice
distinctions that have been taken by courts
of law and courts of equity upon the subject of single or cumulative legacies, we
must come down to the plain common-sense
question of what was the intention of the
testator."
Chief Justice Kent, after much research,
arrived at substantially the same result in
De Witt V. Yates, 10 Johns. 156. Although
the general rule that, where
he recognizes
the sum is repeated in the same writing, the
is against the legatee, and that
presumption
where the two bequests are in different instruments tlie presumption is in his favor,
way,
either
"The presumption
he adds:
whether against the cumulation, because the
legacy is repeated in the same Instrument,
or whether In favor of it, because the legacy
is by different instruments, is liable to be
controlled and repelled by internal evidence,
and the circumstances of the case."
The general rule is stated in an English
treatise to be that, where two legacies are
given by the same testamentary instrument
of equal amount, courts infer an intention in
the testator to give but one legacy; and that,
"where the legacies given by the same testamentary instrument to the same person are
of different amounts, the legacy shall be conRop. Leg. *996, *998.
sidered accumulative."
If the $1,000 was in the form of a direct
bequest, these authorities might aid us in
arriving at a conclusion; but the real question Is whether that sum was intended to be
of a legacy already exin part payment
pressly given in the will; if not, the question Is settled, for it Is clear that the testator intended Mrs. Edwards should have
If he did not intend that It
the money.
should apply In part payment of the $1,500,
it is equally clear that he intended it should
be an additional legacy.
The only question then is whether the testator intended that Mrs. Edwards should receive the sum of $1,000, to be paid to her
as directed in the fifth item of the will, in
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part payment of the legacy he had given
her in the third.
The Intention of the testator in relation to
this "is to be gathered from the phraseology
of the will itself, and, to arrive at this intention, it is necessary to look into the entire instrument."
Williams v. Veach, 17
Ohio, 180; Beckwith v. Moore, 14 Ohio St.
129; Brasher v. Marsh, 15 Ohio St. 103.
Let us then look at the will. We search
in vain for any expression of a purpose that
the $1,000 should be applied in part satisfaction of the legacy bequeathed in the third
item of the will.
There is no language used
in the instrument from which such an intention can fairly be implied.
It would have
been most natural, in a matter of so much
importance, to have indicated that the $1,000
was to be paid to Mrs. Edwards, to apply on
the legacy before given to her, if such was
the intention of the testator.
If he intended
to make the mode of paying this legacy of
$1,500 to differ so widely from that of paying all the other legacies in his will, it is
singular that he did not add to the gift of
"fifteen hundred dollars in cash" some words
indicating such a purpose, or else have done
so In connection
with the direction that a
$1,000 should be paid to the legatee of the
$1,500.
This strikes us with the more surprise, if such was his intention,
since in
other parts of his will, in matters of less importance, he is sufficiently explicit.
Where
he directs two of his legatees to pay money
to his widow in the contingency of her marriage, he specifies that it shall be "in lieu"
of her interest in his real estate. In the second item he gives his wife all the household and kitchen furniture, except what is
"hereafter willed"; she is also to have such
books as she may select, "except those hereafter willed"; and in the sixth clause he devises land subject to the widow's dower
"above
written."
While thus explicit in
minor matters, if such was his purpose he
would naturally have added to the legacy of
$1,500, or to the requirement to pay the legatee of that amount the sum of $1,000, some
words indicating a purpose to have the latter sum applied on the former.
Nor was it at all singular, as contended in
argument, tliat the testator did not embrace
in the third item all he intended to give his
daughter Mrs. Edwards, but left a part to be
inserted in the fifth.
After providing for his wife in the second
clause, it would seem that he makes a further provision for her in the fifth, in relation to the real estate; clearly, in the sixth,
he gives her some property in addition to
that bequeathed to her in the second. Moreover, there are obvious reasons, if he did
intend to give the $1,000 in addition to the
$1,500, why he should insert that gift in the
clause we find it, and no particular reason
why both gifts should be inserted in one
item' of the will. One was a general legacy;
the other was to be paid by a particular
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person, and at particular times, and is in a
clause naming the person to pay it, and providing the means of securing payment. It
would have been more certain, doubtless, if
the testator had added, in the fifth item, for
what purpose he directed the sum of $1,000
to be paid to Mrs. Edwards, whether as payment on the legacy already given to her, or
He did, however, take
in addition thereto.
care to express a pm'pose that the money
should be paid by Mrs. Adell to Mrs. Edwards; and there he leaves it in her hands,
without any intimation but that he intended
it should be fully and unconditionally her
property; certainly there is no intimation
that he intended it to diminish the amount
of the legacy before given to her.
Nor can the failure to express any pm'pose to have the $1,000 applied on the legacy of $1,500 be the result of haste, for the
testator lived two years and a half after he
made the will; neither was it the result of
accident or oversight, for he carefully revised his will, more than a year after its
execution, as is shown by the codicil then
added thereto.
While, then, we fail to find in the will
anything from which it can fairly be inferred that the testator intended the $1,000
should be applied in reduction of the legacy
of $1,500, is it not clearly inferable from
the will that he intended it should be in

addition thereto?
In Creveling's Ex'rs v. Jones, 21 N. J.
Law, 570, it is said:
"Upon a question
whether two legacies shall be construed to
be cumulative or not, a fair and forcible
argument in support of the increase may be
drawn from the fact that they are for different sums; or the sums are stated in different sections of the will; or one in the will
and another in a codicil; or the sums are
made payable at different times, or out of
different funds."
We find in this will nearly all these indices of cumulative legacies.
But if we
seek to find the intent of the testator,
I
think it may be clearly discovered
if we
give to the language he has used in the will
its natural and ordinary meaning, and give
to every part of the instrument its just operation and effect. 1 Redf. Wills, 431.
The testator concludes his will by directing "aU the above legacies to be paid in two
years" after his decease. This embraces the
whole $1,500, as much as any part of it. It
is a direction to his executors not to pay
part of any legacy, but "all."
This direction applies only to the legacies to be paid
by the executors, and not to the amount to
In such
be paid by one legatee to another.
the
cases the testator not only specifies
amount to be paid, but the person to pay it,
and in every instance it is to be paid in
The
consideration of real estate devised.
executors have no more to do, for aught that
appears in the will, with the amount to be
paid by Mrs. Adell to Mrs. Edwards, than
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they have with the several amounts to be
paid by other devisees to the widow in case
of her marriage.
The sum directed to be paid by Jlrs. Adell
to Mrs. Edwards is a matter that the testator has left entirely between them, and not
as a legacy that the executors are called upon to settle out of the personalty; therefore
they are directed to pay "all" the legacies
in two years, and the sum to be paid by
one daughter to the other is left upon a
different security, and to be divided Into
payments that are to run for longer periods.
Moreover, upon the other construction, the
executors might not linow for years, beyond
the time limited for the payment of legacies,
what amount to pay on the $1,500, for they
could not know how much Mrs. Adell would
pay, or, if she failed to pay, how much the
land charge would sell for.
If the clear and plain directions of the
testator in his will be executed, there will
be no difficulty; the executors will pay "all"
the legacies in two years, and the annual
payments due from Mrs. AdeU will be paid
every year for ten years; then the intent ot
the testator, as expressed by the language
he has used, will be fulfilled.
The will cannot be construed to apply the
of
$],000 to the reduction of the legacy
$1,500, without adding to the instrument material words not written there by the testator.

We cannot think, in the absence of any
intimation of the kind, that the testator Intended to diminish his legacy of $1,500 "in
cash," which he positively directs to be paid
in two years, by directing that part of it be
paid In ten years without Interest.
The plain reading of the will affords the
only consistent construction that can be given to it, and points out the only practical
If we give to all
method of its execution.
the language the testator has used bearing
upon the question its natural and ordinary
Import, and there stop to Inquire for the
meaning of the testator, his intention Is clear

obvious.
It Is only when we begin to
strain or distort what the testator has said
by constructions or presumptions that doubts
of his intention arise.
To adopt the construction claimed by one party, "we mnst
expunge, transpose,
or interpolate material
words; to sustain that of the other, we
Reading the will,
leave the will as it is."
then, as It Is vsrltten, we think the testator
clearly intended to give Mrs. Edwards a legacy of $1,500 in cash, to be paid In two
years by his executors, out of the estate that
would come to their hands; and, In addition
thereto, to give her $1,000, to be paid by a
different person, out of a different fund, and
In so holding we
at widely different times.
but leave the money where the testator
willed to leave it, and so left It after a deliberate revision of his will.
The court of common pleas, therefore, erred In their construction of the will upon this
and

point.

As to the amount bequeathed to the widow In lieu of dower, although error is assigned upon this ruling of the common pleas.
It is not now urged. We do not feel called
upon, therefore, to express an opinion on
Indeed,
that point.
It is doubtful If the
The
question can be made on this record.
reasons, however, for sustaining the holding
of that court on this point are so strong,
that we are content to affirm that part of the
decree without further consideration.
As to the corn In the cribs, we think the
codicil may be fairly construed to meaif as
held by the common pleas.
We see no reason, therefore, why the decree of that court should not be affirmed In
all respects, except as to the construction of
the win relating to the bequests to Mrs. Edwards; as to that, it must be reversed; and,
unless cause be shown to the contrary, a
final decree will be entered here in favor of
the plaintiffs In error.

WHITE, WELCH, BRINKERHOFF,

SCOTT,

33., concur.
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are specific or demonstrative in their
character, and that since it does not appear
(118 Ind. 147, 20 N. E. Rep. 733.)
that the money paid them was raised out
of, or derived from, the land comprised in
April
1889.
2,
Supreme Court of Indiana.
the homestead farm, the payment did not
Appeal from circuit court, Vigo county; work an ademption of the sums bequeathed
Josliua Jump, Special Judge.
The legacies were, however,
by the will.
Action by Hugh D. Roquet, administrator neither specific nor demonstrative.
Speakde- ing upon the subject of specific legacies, the
c. t. a., etc., of William B. Eldridge,
ceased, against William G. Eldridge and lord chancellor in Fielding v. Preston, 1 De
others, heirs, devisees, and legatees of said Gex & J. 438, said:
"There have been atFrom a judg- tempts in various cases to determine the
decedent, to settle the estate.
adeemed,
ment declaring certain legacies
meaning of a specific legacy, and what is
the legatees, William G. Eldridge and others, the test whereby such legacies may be disappeal.
There
tinguished from general bequests.
definitions,
but
objections
most
of
the
to
are
0. F. McNutt and Stimson & Stimson, for
quite safe in treating that as
appellants. S. 0. Davis and S. B. Davis, for 1 think we are
a specific bequest which the testator directs
appellee.
A legacy is specifto be enjoyed in specie."
ic when it can be satisfied only by the transMITCHELL, J. After the issues were fer or delivery of some particular portion of
joiued in the court below, the judgment ap- or article belonging to the estate, which the
pealed from was rendered upon an agreed testator intended should be transferred to
2 Redf. Wills, 122;
statement of facts. The questions for deci- the legatee in specie.
Lord
sion arise out of the facts agreed upon, 2 Rap. & L. Law Diet tit. "Legacy."
which, so far as they are material, are as Hardwicke said, in Ellis v. Walker, Amb.
In November, 1863, William B. 309: "The court leans against considering
follows:
Eldridge executed his last will and testa- legacies as specific." Unless, therefore, it
ment, by the second clause of which he de- appears that the money or thing to be transvised to his sons Hamilton Eldridge and ferred is so clearly identified and inherently
Abram A. Eldridge his homestead farm, to described as that the legatee can say to the
To his daughters, executor that all or a portion of the very
be held by them jointly.
Amanda and Cynthia, and to his sons Wil- fund or property in question was transferliam G. and Robert B., he bequeathed $500 red by the will, the bequest will not be reSidebotham v. Watson,
each, to be paid in cash, which sums were garded as specific.
to be taken and considered as in full of each 11 Hare, 170.
While it is true the doctrine of ademption
of their respective interests in the homeThe will contained a recital, does not apply to specific devises or legacies,
stead farm.
the effect of which was that the devises and as a general rule, (Swails v. Swails, 98 Ind.
bequests thus made were to be considered as 511,) yet, even in case of a specific devise
farm or bequest, if the very thing devised or bethe disposition of the homestead
among the testator's children, and were not queathed had been transferred to the devAfter- isee or legatee in the life-time of the testator,
to affect any other interest or estate.
wards, and during the life-time of the testa- so that there would be nothing left for the
tor, his sons Hamilton and Abram A. El- will to operate upon, an effectual ademption
dridge, devisees of the homestead farm, fur- would have taken place.
Accepting the foregoing as the true crinished their father $2,000 in money, out of
which he paid to each of the four legatees terion of a specific legacy, it becomes clear
that the bequest of $500 in cash to each of
above named the sum of $500, and received
from each a receipt of the following tenor, the sons and daughters named, and the furviz.:
"Received of William B. Eldridge, ther direction that this was to be considered
$500, in consideration of my interest in his in full of their respective interests in the
homestead farm, corresponding with his last homestead farm, and that the devises and
will."
One of the daughtei-s was a married bequests previously made were not to afwoman at the time she received the money fect any other interest or estate, did not conand executed the receipt therefor, as above. stitute a specific bequest of any portion of
The testator died in February, 1881, having the testator's estate to be transferred in
He specie.
Neither did the legacies belong to
had but the six children named above.
had only about $500 in value of personal that intermediate class which are sometimes
"demonstrative," and which
property, which, with the farm above men- denominated
tioned, valued at about $6,400, comprised his are peculiar, in that they are not ordinarily
whole estate.
liable to be adeemed or abated by an ad"A
On behalf of the administrator with the vancement made in a general way.
will annexed, it is insisted that the sums demonstrative legacy is a bequest of a sum
paid to the several legatees by the testator of money payable out of a particular fund or
In his life-time constituted a satisfaction or thing. It is a pecuniary legacy, 'given genof the legiacies provided by the erally, but with a demonstration of a parademption
will, while the legatees insist that the lega- ticular fund as the source of its payment'
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It is therefore equivalent to, or in the nature
of, a devise or bequest of so much or such
a part of the fund or thing specified."
Glass
V. Dunn, 17 Ohio St. 413; 5 Amer. & Bng.
Enc. Lave, 541; 2 Redf. Wills, 140, 141.
^A'hile it is quite true the -will plainly indicates
that the sums bequeathed
to the
sons and daughters named were to be taken in full of their respective interests in the
homestead farm, which was specifically devised to the two other sons named in the
will, there is no direction that the bequests
are to be paid out of any particular fund,
or that the fund out of wliich payment is
to be made is to be derived from the rents,
issues, or profits of the land, or that the
legatees are to have any interest, as such,
in the land itself. The implication is that
the bequests were chargeable against the
devisees of the land, or, at most, that they
should be chargeable upon the farm. Moreover, since it appears by the agreed statement of facts that the sons to whom the
homestead farm was devised furnished the
money with which the legacies were paid,
it is not apparent why this should not be
held to satisfy the bequests, even though it
should be conceded that they were payable
If thus payable, it must
out of the land.
that the amount
have been contemplated
should constitute a charge upon the farm,
to be removed by the devisees at some time,
hy paying the several amounts to the legatees.
We know of no authority which
would justify a holding that a general legacy which is payable out of a particular
fund, or in a specified manner, may not be
in case the legatee receives the
satisfied,
amount thereof from the testator in his lifetime, out of the very fund devoted to the
payment of the bequest, provided it clearly
appears that the amount was given and received with the intention that it should work
an ademption of the legacy.
If we assume

that the homestead farm was to be the
source from which the fund was to be derived, out of which the legacies were payable, the conclusion follows that the devisees of the farm were to take it subject to
the burden of paying the legacies after the
Having
testator's death.
furnished the
money to the testator during his life-time
with which to pay off the bequests, and the
money having been paid to the legatees and
received by them for that purpose, the legacies are effectually satisfied from the very
source contemplated by the will. An ademption results where a parent or other person
standing in loco parentis, after having made
a bequest, gives a portion to the child to
whom the bequest is made, equal to or in
excess of the amount bequeatlied,
the portion given and the legacy being ejusdem
generis.
Weston v. .Tolmson, 48 Ind. 1.
Within the rule thus stated the legacies
were adeemed.
Whether a legacy be specific or demonstrative, if it clearly appears that the particular
thing or fund bequeathed has been irrevocably delivered over to the legatee in the lifetime of the testator, the legacy is adeemed
because the testator's title to the thing or
fund has been divested by the gift, and has
become vested in the legatee during the lifeClayton v. Akin, 38
time of the testator.
Ga. 320.

The fact that one of the legatees was a
married woman at the time she received the
money from her father and signed the receipt is of no consequence.
The receipt of
the money from the source contemplated
by
the will satisfied the legacy by operation of
law, and not by force of any contract.
Money paid to a married woman in ademption of
a legacy produces the same legal result as if
she were unmarried.
There wii,s no error.
The judgment is affinned, with costs.
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et al. v.
(19

Supreme
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FRENCH.

Ga. 316.)

of Georgia.

Jan. Term,

1856.

Error from superior court, Marion county;
Worrill, Judge.
In equity.
Jolin French and Elizabetb, his wife, filed
a bill against the executors of John Rushin,

deceased, for the recovery of the legacies
left them under the will. The bill and answer are voluminous, as is also the evidence
in the case. The following is sufficient to
understand the questions made in this court:
The defendants gave in evidence the fol-

lowing receipt:

"July 30, 1830. Received of John Rushin
Five Hundred Dollars, which is considered
by all whom it may
and to be considered

concern as that amount advanced by him,
the said John Rushin, to me as legacy, that
would ever be coming to me from him in
his lifetime, or from his estate after his decease.
"[Signed]

John French."
John Rushin's will was dated 26th June,
and by that will he gave to Mrs.
1855,

a little negro worth not exceeding
and one equal share of all his propSubsequent to the making of his will,
erty.
he distributed some of his negroes to his
to Mrs. French.
children, among others,
There was some evidence to show that the
question of the ademption of this legacy of
the little negro had been submitted to Judge
Taylor. Defendants' solicitors requested the
court to charge:
"(1) That if they believed
that after the making of the will, bequeathing to complainant a little negro worth $200,
over and above her equal proportion of the
property to be distributed under the will of
John Rushin, the testator, in his lifetime,
gave complainant a negro of equal or greater
value than the one mentioned in the will,
this Is prima facie an ademption of the legacy; and, to rebut this presumption of an
ademption, the testimony must be clear and
but a
relevant, not presumptive merely,
demonstration from the language and conduct of the testator that he considered the
gift by the will as a subsisting benefit."
The court declined to charge the latter
portion of this request, but charged "that, to
rebut the presumption of an ademption, the
jury might resort to presumptive evidence,
but the presumption must be clear and sat-

French

$200,

isfactory; that if they believed the testator
gave complainant, after the making of the
will, and at or about the same time he gave
other property to each of his other children
of equal value, they might infer from these
facts that the legacy was not adeemed."
Defendants' counsel farther requested the
court to charge: (2) That In a court of equity the presumption is against a double
portion, and the receipt given by French in
1830, although It bears date prior to the will,

HUTCH.& BUNK.BQ—
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a charge against him, for
Is, nevertheless,
which he is bound to account.
This the court declined to charge: (3) As
to effect of a responsive answer as evidence,

and that an answer is responsive where it
has necessary connection with and grows out
of the allegation, and is explanatory thereof.
He supThis the court gave, and added:
posed the latter clause referred to that portion of defendants' answer which stated that
Judge Taylor had determined that the legacy
The court
of the little negro was adeemed.
charged that this was not responsive, there
being no allegation in the bill on the subject.
To these charges as given, and refusals to
charge, defendants excepted, and have assigned eiTor tliereon.

Miller & Hall, for plaintiffs In
Stubbs & Hill, for defendant in error.

error.

LUMFKIN, J. (1) Was the court right In
refusing to give the first charge as requested, without the modification and explanation
which accompanied It In the charge as given?

In Ex parte Pye, 18 Ves. 152, Lord Eldon
observes "that where a father gives a legacy
to a child the legacy, coming from the father to his child, must be understood as a
portion, though it is not so described In the
will, and afterwards advancing a portion to
that child, though there may be slight circumstances
of difference between the advance and the portion, and a difference in
amount, yet the father will be intended to
have the same purpose in each Instance; and
the advance is, therefore,
of
an ademption
But a stranger giving a legacy
the legacy.
is understood
as giving a bounty, not paying
a debt.
He must, therefore, be proved to
mean it as a portion or provision, either on
the face of the will, or If it may be, as it
seems It may, by evidence applying directly
to the gift proposed by the will." (See, also,
Elkenhead's Case cited in 2 Vern. 257; Precedents in Chancery, 182, and Ambler, 325.)
Thus, then, we have the rule clearly stated and carrying this doctrine of ademption
to Its utmost limits. The English courts regret, as well they may, that it has been
pushed so far. We see and feel the reasonableness of the rule which requires the courts
to lean against double portions, as it is called;
and we can readily understand why a legacy
in a will should be adeemed by a subsequent advance having the same object in
view as the legacy, notwithstanding any
slight difference in value or amount between
the legacy and the advance.
A father, for
Instance, directs by his will his executors to
pay to a daughter $1,000 to purchase, upon
The
her marriage, household
furniture.
child, however, marries in the lifetime of
the father, and he advances to her $1,000, or
some sum approximating to that, for the
same purpose specified In the wlU. This is,
and manifestly should be, a case of ademp-
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tion, and so should all others standing upon
But suppose the legacy
the same footing.
be a little negro for a nurse, and the subsequent advance be of money to buy a carriage, is there any propriety in construing
this advance to be an ademption of the leg-

acy?
Listen to the reasoning of the chancellor
in the case of Pye, just cited, in support of
what he deduces from the boolis as the
"unquestionable doctrine" of the courts upon the subject: "By a sort of artificial rule,
in the application of which legitimate children have been very harshly treated, upon
an artificial notion that the father is paying
if the father after\^ards
a debt of nature,
advances a portion on the marriage of that
child, though of less amount, it is a satisfaction of the whole or in part; and in some
cases it has gone the length, consistent with
the principle, but showing the fallacy of
that the portion,
much of the reasoning,
though much less than the legacy, has been
held a satisfaction, in some instances, upon
this ground, that the father, owing what is
called a debt of nature, is the judge of that
provision by which he means to satisfy it;
and though, at the time of making the will,
he thought he could not discharge that debt
with less than £10,000, yet, by a change of
his circumstances and of his sentiments upon that moral obligation, it may be satisfied
by the advance of a portion of £5,000."
Is not such reasoning from the mouth of
such a judge well calculated to inspire the
hope that the day is not distant when all

precedents will be abolished, and every case
be tried by an enlightened tribunal upon its
the
own merits? To such a consummation
world must, from the necessity of the case,
to say nothing of its policy, sooner or later
come;
for the world will not contain the
law books that \ull be written, much less
will lawyers and judges, with th€ir stinted
Necessity will
income, be able to buy them.
become the mother of justice in this case,
as she is said to be generally of Invention.
Would that some Caliph Omar would arise
of
to apply the torch to all the repositories
Precelegal learning throughout the globe!
This is the vampire that
Precedent!
dent!
is forever draining the very life blood of justice.
Give the books of reports as fuel for
They will contribute much more to
baths.
and convenience
of
the health, happiness,
the people than as at present employed.
But to return from this digression, and
without elaborating the rule further, we remark that the presumed ademption may be
destroyed or confirmed by the application of
parol evidence of a different Intention by the
2 Atk. 48; 3 Atk. 77; 7 Ves. 708;
testator.
And this was the subSelect Eq. Cas. 141.
The judge
stance of the charge as given.
instructed the jury that they might, in order
that the advance
to rebut the presumption
made by the testator to French and wife, in
his lifetime, and subsequent to the making

of the will, was an ademption, look to the
fact of whether or not similar advancements
were made to the other children; and this
the court was authorized to do by the testimony of Mrs. Wilkes, the widow of John
Rushin, who states that she lived with the
testator from 1834. the year before he made
his will, down to 1843. when he died, and
that the advancements made to all the children during that period were equal, and that
the testator

ti-ied to make them so.

Was the advance of $500 made in land
by the testator to John French, the husband of his daughter, in 1830, five years hefore he made his will, a charge against his
The case of Upton v.
share of the estate?
Prince, Cases Tem. Talb. 71, is cited in support of the proposition that an advance made
prior to the making of a will may adeem a
The testator, William Prince, had
legacy.
and Peter, Elizabeth,
two sons,— William
In his lifetime,
Mary, and Anne.
Sarah,
and soon after the sons became of age, they
desired their father to advance to each of
them a sum of money toward setting them
up in the world, and agi'eed that whatever
should be part of what
he should advance
he should give them by will, whereupon the.
father, on the 11th of June, 1734, advanced
Prince, who gave the fol£1500 to William
lowing instrument for the same: "Received
of my father the sum of £1500, which I do
(2)

hereby

acknowledge

to be on account

and in

part of what he hath given or shall, in and
And
by his last will, give unto me his son."
the father adon the 31st March, 1727,
vanced £1500 to Peter Prince, who gave a
similar instrument to that of his brother.
On the 17th of August, 1730, William Prince,
the father, executed hig will, which contains
"And whereas, I have
the following recital:
heretofore paid to, given, or advanced with
my children, William, Elizabeth and Sarah,
the sum of £1500 apiece, now, I do hereby,
in like manner, give and bequeath unto my
three other children, Peter, Mary and Anne,
He then
the several sums of £1500 apiece."
willed that the residue of his estate should
be divided in six equal parts, and gives the
He deto each of his children.
one-sixth
posited the two receipts given by William
and Peter in a drawer with his will, and intimated that the said drawer should not be
opened after his death by either of his aaid
sons unless his other children, or one of his
sons-in-law, were present.
The question was whether Peter should
have a new sum of £1500 upon the words of
the will, or whether he should not be in the
same case with William; they both being
equally advanced by the father, and this
The
seeming only a mistake la the testator.
lord chancellor decreed the £1500 received
by Peter in his father's lifetime to be a satisfaction for what the father gave him by
his will, and that he should not have another £1500 upon the words of the will.
While we controvert the general doctrine
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that a previous advance made to a child
shall adeem an express gift by a subsequent
will, wherein and whereby the testator undertakes to dispose of the property which he
then has, still we are not prepared to deny
the justice of this case. Here it was a question of intention, as it should be in every
case, and all the facts go to show that Peter's name was, by mistake,
inserted with
those of the unportioned part of the children.
The whole will establishes
that it
was the intention of the testator that the
two sums of £1500 paid to William and
Peter should be deducted out of the legacies
given to them;
else why deposit their receipts in a drawer with his will with directions that the drawer should not be opened
after his death by either of his said sons
unless his other children, or one of his sonsin-law, were 'present?
Before dismissing thia case, I would remark that the able counsel, Mr. Hall, who
adduces it, concedes that it is the only direct
authority he can find upon the point; and,
if he has found none others, we may safely
I will add
assume that none other exists.
that Upton v. Prince is only recognized by
Mr. Williams on Executors, and other law
They say, in referring
writers in this way.
to it, that if an advance previously
made
will adeem a legacy a fortiori will an advance made subsequent to the execution of
In our judgment it is always a
the will.
question of mtention, in all cases, whether
the advance be before or after the execution
of the will, and that no arbitrary rule should
control

the

matter.

How, then, stands the present case? The
testimony
shows that in 1830, the date of
the receipt given for $500 given by French
to his father-in-law, old man Rushin adThis
vanced $500 to each of his children.
fact is not disputed, but it is insisted that
French got $500 extra of the rest; else it is
asked, why should a receipt be required of
Perhaps
him when the rest gave none?
The dethey have been lost or destroyed.
fendants, and not French, have had the cusPerhaps
papers.
tody of the testator's
French lived at a distance and forwarded
this receipt, not knowing but such an acknowledgment would be exacted of all. Be
this as it may, there is one fact which, to
our minds, is conclusive, that this $500 was
not intended by the testator to be a charge
on the legacy of French and wife. In his
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he mentions, in every other case, what
sums are to be charged against his other
children, or a portion of them; and there is
not a word as to this extra advance, as it ia
It was made five
to French.
pretended,
years only before the will was executed, and
his attention was called to the subject by
referring to the respective advances made to
some of the other children. It is not likely
that this would have been overlooked or forHe is silent as to the $500 advance
gotten.
made to each of the children in 1830, and

will

from this we infer that the testator himself
considered that all, at that time, were advanced pari passu.
But it is suggested that the defendants
have sworn to the fact, and that their answer is not overcome by counteracting tesThey only testify as to their infortimony.
mation and belief, and the rule does not apply to such answers.
(3) Was the court wrong in making the
addition which it did to the third charge, as
requested?
It is not complained that the
The error
charge, as asked, was not given.
assigned is that the judge selected that portion of the defendant's
answer which set
forth the award made by Judge Taylor, and
stated that the same was not responsive to
the bill, whereas, it is urged that the same
was responsive, and that admitting it was
Still, it was wrong to single out this
not.
particular portion of the answer and omit
any reference to the rest.
In the first place, we concur with the circuit court in holding that the reference to
the award made by Judge Taylor was not
responsive
to any allegation,
but matter
purely in evidence; and, secondly, that the
omission of the court to refer to the rest of
the answer was favorable to the defendants.
It left the jury to infer that the balance of
the answer was responsive.
It is finally contended -that the advancements made to the different legatees, and
to French and wife amongst the rest, should
be brought into hotchpot; but no such necessity exists, provided the advancements were
equal, for in that event each is entitled to an
equal share under the will of what remains.
We see no error in this record, to make it
proper to send back a case, like this, which
has been pending

so long,

and occupied

so

much time of the country. There should be
an end of litigation unless manifest injustice
has been done.
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CLARK

V.

JETTON.

(5 Sneed, 229.)

Supreme

Court of Tennessee.
Term, 1857.

December

This bill was filed in the chancery court
at Murfreesboro, for the purposes fully stated in the opinion.
At the October Term,
1857, Chancellor Ridley gave a decree for the
complainants,
from which the defendants
appealed.

W. L. Martin, for complainants.
and E. A. Keeble, for defendants.

Ruclser

J. On the 29th April, 1851,
made his will, disposing of
all his property to his wife, children, and
grandchildren. He gave to his wife onethird of his land for life, and one-tenth of
"all his slaves and other personal property,"
after the payment of debts and expenses.
Item 3. "After the payment of debts and expenses aforesaid,
and the taliing out onetenth for my widow, the residue of said
slaves, and other personal property, monies,
CARUTHERS,
John L. Jetton

"I direct

to be divided into nine equal
one part of "which I give to my son
Lewis, one part to the children of Mary
Graham, one part to Jane Barr, one part to
Charlotte Bryant;" and so on to each of his
He limits the
nine in number.
daughters,
to their natural
estates of his daughters
lives, to their separate use, and then to their
cliildren, in remainder.
He died in 1854.
His will was proven and recorded without
After the execution of this will,
contest.
the testator made several deeds of gift to a
part of his children and his widow, the defendant.
On the 19th August, 1853, he made
a deed of gift to his wife for life, and then
to all her children one negro woman and
child; and, on the same day, he gave by
deed to a trustee, for the benefit and separate use of his daughter Francis L. Burlie,
and at the same time, and in
a negro man;
the same way, a negro man was given to
On the 25th Auhis daughter Jane Barr.
gust, 1853, he gave a negro boy to his son
Lewis; and, on the 29th, he gave to a trustee, for the use and benefit of his daughter
Martha A. Sawer, a lot in Pulasis;! and a
negro man, with the same limitations and
etc.,"
parts,

restrictions.
These deeds

of gift were all regularly
proven and recorded.
This bill was filed
September, 1856, by the children and legatees, not thus advanced, for the purpose of
setting aside all said deeds of gift, upon the
ground of the mental incapacity of the
donor, and undue influence on the part of
his wife; and, if this cannot be done, they
pray that the several gifts may be held to
satisfy the legacies of defendants by way
Upon the first question we
of ademption.
The old man was very
have no difliculty.
intemperate and aged, but had suflScient capacity to make a binding contract at the

time these deeds were made. Such is the
opinion of the witnesses to the deeds, although one of them, who was draftsman,
was led to doubt upon that subject by some
interviews a month or more afterwards, yet
at the time of the transaction he has no
doubt.
The proof falls short entirely of
showing that degree of mental unsoundness
or imbecility that would invalidate the gifts;
but it is insisted that, if he were not of unsound mind, yet his intellect was so enfeebled by long-continued inebriety that he
was easily influenced by his wife, and that
she, against his will, caused him to malie
these donations, by the exercise of an absolute dominion over his will. As an evidence
of this, it is said that she procured, by her
dictation and power over him, a remainder
interest to be vested in an illegitimate child
of hers, born before his marriage with her,
jointly with her children by him, in the two
slaves given to her for life. He had talien
this child with her, and raised it in his house
with his other children; and it is not unnatural that he should freely yield to hei'
wishes in giving to it a small pittance of his
estate.
Whether this child will get anything
under the deed is a question not now to be
decided, and does not affect the argument.
There is evidence that for several of the last
years of his life, embracing the time of these
gifts, she managed most of his business, and
that he deferred to her in many things; but
this was rendered necessary by his intemperate habits, and was a prudent delegation
of authority, rather than an evidence of
either a want of sense or submission to undue influence.
He sometimes said he was
in torment, etc., when he was drunlc.
It
was very natural he should feel that way
when under the dominion of liquor; and that
she should "torment" him about his self-destroying habits was to be expected, in view
of the destruction of health and happiness,
which was the inevitable consequence of his
ruinous course; but it by no means follows,
as a necessary
consequence,
that the fact
that she vexed or tormented him would augment her influence.
His remarks about not
being able to do as he pleased, or at liberty
to invite his friends to dinner, etc., are all
attributable to the same cause, and have
very little weight in establishing this point,
for which they are adduced in evidence.
In
all this, we find nothing to authorize the conclusion, or at least not suflicient for that
purpose, that he was unduly influenced
by
her to make the deeds of gift in question, or
that there was any fraud practiced upon him
by his wife, or anybody else. He dellljerately made the arrangement with his attorney to write them, and gave every evidence
of a free and settled purpose in doing what
he did.
The deeds of gift were, therefore,
valid and binding, and vested good titles In
the donees.
2. The second ground assumed

by the com-
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plainants is that the gifts, if good, operated
as an ademption of thp legacies in the will to
the extent, at least, of the Talue of the property, and that, in the division of the property
under the will, the respective donees must be
made to account for it.
This is a more difficult question, and must be decided by reference to the authorities. The general rule on
this subject is that where a parent, or one
standing in loco parentis, gives a legacy to a
child, and afterwards advances a portion to
that child, it will be an ademption or satisfaction of the legacy to the extent of the value of the portion, unless a contrary intent
2 Williams, Eix'rs, 1143, and subappears.
sequent pages; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1111.
But
the rule has several qualifications and exceptions.
It is founded on the presumption that
a bequest by the father is intended as a portion to the child, and so of the after gift;
and the presumption
will be that a double
portion was not intended, where nothing else
appears, and therefore it will be talien that
the gift was intended as a satisfaction of the
legacy when it is of equal or greater value,
Eop. Leg. 370, 374;
and, if less, pro tanto.
2 Williams, Ex'rs, 1143.
The word "ademption," is synonymous
with "satisfaction"
In that
when applied to specific legacies.
case, the disposition of the thing given before
the death of the testator is a complete extinction of the legacy, and the intention of
the testator in such cases is immaterial, because there is nothing at the time the Tvill
Rop. Leg.
takes effect for it to operate upon.
But in respect to general legacies, the
329.
question is one of intention, and this intention will be presumed, as we have said, in
all cases of legacies and subsequent gifts by
a parent, or one standing in, or occupying the
is
place of, parent, unless that presumption
rule.
But
rebutted.
Such is the general
tliis presumption of ademption will not prevail, (1) where the testamentary portion and
subsequent advancement
are not of the same
nature; (2) where the latter depends on a
contingency,
and the former is certain; (3)
when either is in lieu of, or a compensation
for, an interest to which the child is entitled;
or (4) where the bequest is of a residue or
Williams, Ex'rs, 1144,
part of a residue.
Rop. Leg. 377, states that another ex1145.
ception to the general rule is where the be"It has,
quest is of an "uncertain amount."
therefore, been determined more than once,"
he says, "that a devise of a residue, or of part
of a residue, to a child, is not adeemed oy a
subsequent gift upon the legatee's marriage."
Though, Sir W. Grant intimated a doubt as
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to the correctness of this opinion, in 15 Ves.
as the author states, yet it is considered
well settled as the law, when not controlled
In Farnham v.
by special circumstances.
Philips, 2 Atk. 216, Lord Hardwicke said,
"There was no case where the devise had
been of a residue that was uncertain, and
that at the testator's death might be more or
less, in which the gift of a subsequent porWhere
tion had been held an ademption."
a testator directed a debt of 100 pounds to be
paid out of an estate, and the residue divided between his wife and children, and afterwards gave one of his daughters a thousand
pounds, it was held that this did not operate
as an ademption of her testamentary share
This was the case of Farnof the residue.
The application
ham V. Philips, above cited.
of this doctrine to the case before us produces a result that we would rather avoid,
if we could do so upon any principle settled
by authority. It must result in giving the
defendants the benefit of the will, as well as
tlie deeds of gift. The provision for them under the will is that they are each to have oneninth of the residue of his slaves and other
personal property and money, after the payment of debts, expenses, and the one-tenth
The testamentary portions or
to the widow.
legacies must be fluctuating and uncertain,
or, in the language of the books, they may
"be more or less, something, or nothing" at
the death of the testator and settlement of
In answer to the seeming injusthe estate.
tice of this doctrine, it may be said that it is
the right of every man to give as a bounty
to his children, or others, in such proportions
as he chooses, to some more and others less.
Where he intends or desires equality, or to
make gifts in his lifetime operate in the
ademption or satisfaction of general legacies,
Where
it is easy to express such purpose.
he fails to do so, the rules of law must prevail without regard to the consequences.
This doctrine of ademption does not apply to
real estate, nor to legacies and gifts to others than children, or those who stand In that
This
relation, in cases of general legacies.
distinction rests upon artificial reasons, the
justice and propriety of which are not very
clear, nor the reasons on which it is founded
approved;
but that branch of the doctrine,
having no application to the case before us,
need not be discussed, but left for a case to
The decree will be reverswhich it applies.
ed, and the bill dismissed as to this branch
of the case, but remanded for further proceedings as to other matters connected with
the settlement of the estate.
513,
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KEEP

MILLER
N. J. Eq.

bond and mortgage, but he would not comply with the request; that neither David L.
(6 Atl. 495, 42
100.)
Miller, nor Hoyt, Reddish, or Ohlen, ever
Nov. 6,
requested the widow to release her dower to
Court of Chancery of New Jersey.
1880.
Reddish and Ohlen; that she never refused
to release it to them, but was at all times
Bill for relief. On final hearing upon
ready to release it upon condition
that the
Facts are given in
pleadings
and proofs.
purchase money should be paid, and secured
the opinion.
to be paid, to the administrator of John B.
S.
D.
Alfred Mills, for complainants.
:Miller, and that David L. Miller was aware
Haines and S. B. Ransom, for defendant
of her readiness to release upon that condiFaults.
tion; that on or about the thirteenth of December, 1872, the widow wrote a letter to
her late husband's administrator In which
RUNYON, Ch. The bill states that John
she said that she had expected to join with
B. Miller, deceased, late of Madison, in the
her husband in the conveyance to the purcounty of Morris, made and entered Into a
chaser, but he died before any conveyance
valid contract
in writing with Jehiel K.
was made; that she was still ready to do
Hoyt upon the twenty-fifth of April, 1872,
for the sale and conveyance by him to the I all that she could to perform the agreement,
latter, or to such company of individuals as I and was ready to release her dower on condlmight be named by him, (Hoyt,) certain land I tion that the purchase money should be paid,
or secured to be paid, to the administrator,
therein mentioned for the price of $800 an
and she offered to release her dower upon
acre;
and that on or about the tenth of
June following he made another like agree- those terms in case the administi-ator should
take judicial proceedings
ment in writing with Hoyt for the conveyto compel specific
performance
of the agreement; that he did
ance to him, his heirs and assigns, or to
bring suit to that end in this court in Decemsuch person or persons as he might desigber, 1872;
that in January following the
nate, of the same property, on or before the
widow died, and the complainants
first day of September then next, for the
in this
suit were appointed administrators of her
price of $39,392, to be paid, and which Hoyt
estate; that in the suit brought by the adthereby stipulated to pay, as follows: $100
ministrator of John B. Miller specific performupon the execution
of the agreement, and
ance was decreed, but the decree was, upon
$4,900 on the delivery of the deed,— the balance, $34,.392, to be secured by the bond of
appeal, reversed, so far as Hoyt and Reddish
and Ohlen, and the performance of the agreethe grantee or grantees, and his or their
ment by them, were concerned.
mortgage of the property;
that the time for
By the decree of the court of errors and
the delivery of the deed was, by another
appeals the bill was dismissed
agreement in writing, made on the twentieth
as to those
defendants, but was retained as to the others,
of August, 1872, between Miller and Hoyt,
in order that the legal representatives of the
extended to the first day of October then
next;
widow might have an opportunity of raising,
that Miller died September 5, 1872,
by cross-bill, the question whether they have
intestate,
leaving a widow and a sou, the
any remedy against David L. Miller.
defendant David L. Miller, who was his only
This
heir at law; that letters of administration
suit is brought accordingly by the administrators of Mrs. Miller against David L. Miller
of his estate were granted to Theodore Little, October 1, 1872; that after the death of
and his wife, and his assignee in bankruptcy,
John B. Miller, and on or about the twenty(he filed his petition in bankruptcy after the
eighth of September, 1872, -Hoyt notified Dadecree for specific performance was entered,)
the administrator of John B. Miller, (he revid L. Miller that he would be ready to take
fused to bring the suit, or to join in it, or
the deed, and carry out the agreement on
to permit the complainants to bring It in his
his part on the first of October then next,
name,) and the administrators of a judgment
and requested Miller, as heir at law, to deliver at that date a deed for the property, in
creditor of David L. Miller.
The prayer of
conformity with the contract, to Henry E.
the bill is that the land may be decreed to
be personal property, and may be sold under
Reddish and Henry 0. Ohlen, whom he desthat David L. Miller
ignated as grantees;
the order of this court; that the proceeds of
the sale may go into the hands of the admindid not and never would convey the property, except upon condition that he should
istrator of John B. Miller as personal property, to be administered
receive the purchase money for his own use;
and distributed by
are informed that
him accordingly;
that the complainants
that it may be decreed that
Reddish and Ohlen, on or about the first of the complainants, as the legal representatives
October, 1872, demanded of David L. Miller
of the widow, shall have her share thereof
according to law; and that, if necessary, it
that he convey the property to them by warmay be decreed that David L. Miller's wife
ranty deed, free from any dower of his wife,
has no dower in the property, and that the
and from the dower of the widow of his
judgment above mentioned is no lien upon the
father, and from the lien of certain judgpremises.
None of the defendants have anments which were of record against him,
swered except the assignee In bankruptcy.
David L. Miller, and tendered the money and
et al. v.

et al.
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By the decree in the above-mentioned suit,
brought by John B. Miller's administrator,
(Miller's Adm'r v. Miller, 25 N. J. Eq. 355;
S. C. on appeal, Reddish v. Miller's Adm'r,
27 N. J. Eq. 514,) in addition to decreeing
specific
performance,
it was decreed that
David L. Miller, at and ever since the death
of his father, had been, and at the date of
the decree was, seized of the property as a
trustee to and for the use of Reddish and
Ohlen, and not otherwise, and that David L.
Miller's wife was not, and had not been, entitled to any dower or right of dower in or
to the land, and that the judgment creditors
of David L. Miller were not entitled to any
lien to or claim upon or against the property
by virtue of their judgments,
and also that
the moneys decreed to be paid, and the bond
and mortgage decreed to be given, on account
of purchase money, were and should be personal assets in the hands of the administrator
of John B. Miller, and should be by him administered as personal property in due and
legal course of administration, and that he
should pay to the administrators of the widow
her distributive share thereof.
That decree
(it was made over 10 years ago) was not appealed from by David L. Miller.
The only question presented for decision is
whether, under the circumstances of the case,
the contract of sale worked an equitable conversion of the land into money at the death
of John B. Miller.
That it would have done
so had the contract been enforced against the
vendee is indisputable,
and is not denied.
But the answering defendant insists that the
prefailure to compel specific performance
vents
such result.
That failure, however,
was due, not to the invalidity of the contract, but to the fact that, because of the
length of time which had elapsed between
the time fixed by the contract (as extended)
for the completion of the purchase and the
making of the decree for specific performance, it was inequitable to require the vendee to coraplete the purchase, seeing that he
had tendered himself ready to comply with
of the contract on his part
the requirements
at the time fixed, and that in the meantime
It may be
the property had fallen in value.
upon the
remarked that the noncompliance
part of the ieir was not due to the widow.
She was never
She did not refuse to release.
On the thirteenth
of Deasked to release.
cember, 1872, she stated to her late husband's
administrator,
by letter, that she was willing
to release in case he should take judicial proof
ceedings to compel specific performance
It is proved that on the very
the contract.
day on which, under the contract as extended, the deed was to be delivered, her attorney
stated to the attorney of Reddish and Ohlen
that she was wUling to release upon such a
payment
as would secure her rights, by
Which was meant payment to her husband's
administrator, and not to David L. Miller.
A valid and binding contract of sale such
as a court of equity will specifically enforce
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against an unwilling purchaser operates as
a conversion.
The cases in which the comt
has refused to decree that a contract for
conversion are those
sale works equitable
in which the contract was such as equity
would not enforce.
The counsel for the answering defendant
insists that the decision in the case of Teneick V. Flagg, 29 N. J. Law, 25, is decisive
and is
of the question under consideration,
adverse to the claim of the complainants.
But it is to be observed that that was an
action
at law.
Mrs. Attie Teneick had
agreed to convey laud to James Buckalew,
and had received part of the purchase monHe refused to accept the deed because of
ey.
the pendency
of an action of ejectment
brought against Mrs. Teneick by other pai-She
ties to obtain possession of the land.
to her
delivered
a deed for the property
agent, to be delivered by him to Buckalew
upon the favorable termination of the action
of ejectment.
She died before the terminaBy her death the action
tion was reached.
of ejectment abated, and it was not renewed.
After her death her heirs conveyed the property to Buckalew in pursuance of her agreement, and the pvu-chase money was paid to
her administrators.
The husband of one of
the heirs brought suit against the administrators to recover a share of the money.
The court held that he was entitled to recover, on the ground that on the death of
Mrs. Teneick the title descended to her
heirs; the deed held in escrow passing no
title, since the event on which it was to be
delivered
to Buckalew did not happen in
the life-time of the grantor, and at her death
the deed ceased to have any validity.
In
the decision of the case the difference
between the equitable rule and the legal rule
was distinctly recognized by Justice Haines
in his opinion.
The cause was, of course, decided in the court of law upon the legal
rule.
Upon a full and careful consideration
of
the matter I reached the conclusion in the
suit for specific performance
that the contract worked a conversion.
See Miller's
Adm'r V. Miller, supra.
The only new feature now presented is the fact that the appellate court has decided that specific performance ought not to have been decreed.
The reason for that conclusion has already
been stated.
It was not the invalidity of the
contract, nor any consideration
which rendered the contract unenforceable
in equity
at the death of John B. Miller, or at the time
fixed by the contract for completing the pui'chase.
The contract was one which, at the
time fixed by it for completing the purchase,
could have been enforced against the purchaser in equity, and it would have been enforced at that time on the application of the
heir, with the consent of the widow, and she
was willing to join him in enforcing it if he
had been willing to secure to her her right
in the purchase money.
In equity he ought
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to have enforced It.
Equity regards that as
done wliich ought to have been done.
The
doctrine of conversion is a reasonable one.
In this case, John B. Miller had made a sale
of the property, which, had he lived, he
would have been able to enforce in equity,
and which it is to be presumed he would
have enforced.
He had sold the property
at a high price.
It should not he, and it is
not, in the power of the heir to defeat the
right of the next of kin by his ovsm unwillBy force
ingness to carry out the contract.
of the contract the vendor became in equity
trustee of the property for the vendee, and
the latter became trustee of the purchase
money for the former. It has been held that
the equitable rights of the next of kin of the
vendor are not defeated, where the vendee.

by his laches, after the death of the vendor,
loses his right to specific performance,
provided the contract was enforceable in equity
at the death of the vendor.
Curre v. Bowyer, reported in a note to Farrar v. Earl of
Winterton, 5 Beav. 1. Where there is a contract for the sale of an estate, the estate is
in equity considered as converted into personalty from the time of the contract, although the purchaser has an election to purchase or not as he shall see fit.
Lawes v.
Bennet, 1 N. J. Law, 167; Sugd. Vend. (8th
Am. Ed.) 187, and cases cited.
The sale in this case worked an equitable
conversion of the land into money, and the
widow was entitled, accordingly, to a distributive share of the purchase money as part
of the personal property of her husband.
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WHELESS
(21 S.

Supreme

W.

V.

WHELBSS
92 Tenn.

595,

Court of Tennessee.

et al.

293.)

March

2,

1893.

Appeal from chancery court, Davidson
county ;
A. Cartwright, Special Ctiancellor.
Bill for partition by Joseph Wheless and
others against H. H. Wheless. Judgment
forcoraplainants. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

J.

Dickenson & Frazer, Stokes & Stokes,
Joand Frizzell & Zarecor, for appellant.
seph Wheless, Jr., and N. D. Malone, for
respondent G. A. Tillman, guardian ad
litem. J. S. Pilcher, for widow of J. F.
"Wheless.
W. Byrnes, lor petitioner McCrosky.

J.

CALDWELL,

J.

Gen.

John F.

Wheless

died intestate and without issue, leaving
a widow, andnumerouscoUateralkindred.
The bill in this cause was filed for a partition of his lands, where that could be done,

ana for sale and division of proceeds,
where partition in kind might not he pracher answer,
ticable. The widow, in
claimed that the undivided interest of her
husband in what is known as the" Baxter
Smith Tract" was not realty, but personal
property, under the doctrine of equitable
conversion, and that it therefore belonged
to her, as distributee, and not to the heirs.
decided
this question
The
chancellor
against her, and she appealed.
No doctrine is more firmly fixed in English and American jurisprudence than that
of equitable conversion, by which, under
circumstances,
real
estate is
certain
treated, in equity, as personal property,
and personal estate as real property.
Through this doctrine, courts of equity
treat as land money directed to be employed in the purchase of land, and, as
money, land directed to be sold and converted into money; and the direction upon
which the conversion arises may be made
by will, or by deed, settlement, or other
contract inter vivos. Adams, Eq. *135,
136;

1

Pom. Eq. Jur.

§

371 ; 2

Story, Eq.

Araer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 127;
It was
6 Araer. & Eng. Enc. La w, 664, 665.
early recognized in this state, (Stephenson
V. Yandle, 3 Hayw. [Tenn.] 109,) and has
since been applied in several cases upon
the construction of wills. McCormick v
Cautrell, 7 Yerg. 615; Williams v. Bradley,
58; Green v. Davidson, 4 Baxt.
7 Heisk.
448.
The difficulty which sometimes arises
in the application of the principle to a particular instrument lies, not in the subtlety
of the principle itself, but rather in ascertaining the intention of the maker from
the words employed. To operate as a conversion, (he direction that the form of the
property be changed must be imperative,
in the sen.se of being positive and unmistakable. If the Intention, as gathered from
the whole instrument, be left in doubt, or
the direction allows the trustee to sell or
not, as he deems best, the courts are not
at liberty to say that a conversion has
taken place, but must deal with the property according to its actual form and charMr.
acter. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1214.

Jur.

§ 790; 4

Pomeroy says: "No express declaration in
the instrument is needed that land shall
be treated as money, although not sold,
or that money shall be deemed laud, although not actually laid out in the pur-

chase of land. The only essential requisite
is an absolute expression of an intention
that the land shall be sold, and turned into money, or that the money shall be ex•
*
»
pended in the purchase of land.
simple
a
cases,
is
test,
all
such
in
The true
one: Has the will or deed creating the
trust absolutely directed, or has the contract stipulated, that the real estate be
turned into personal, or the personal estate be turned into real?" 3 Pom. Eq.
Jur. § 1159. Again: "The whole scope
and meaning of the fundamental principle
underlying the doctrine are involved in the
existence of a duty resting upon the trustees or other parties to do the specified
act; for, unless the equitable right exists, there is no room for the operation of
the maxim, 'Equity regards that as done
•which ought to be done.' The rule is therefore firmly settled that, in order to work
a conversion while the property is yet actually unchanged in form, there must be a
clear and imperative direction in the will,
deed, or settlement, or a clear, imperative
agreement in the contract, to convert the
property; that is, to sell the land for
money, or to lay out the money in the purchase of land. If the act of converting —
that is, the act, itself, of selling the land,
or of laying out the money in land — is left
to the option, discretion, or choice of the
trustees, or other parties, then no equitable conversion will take place, because
no duty to make the change rests upon
them. It is not essential, however, that
the direction should be express, in order
It may be necessarily
to be imperative.
implied. * * * If by express language,
or by a reasonable construction of all its
terms, the instrument shows an intention
that the original form of the property
shall be changed, then a conversion necessarily takes place." Id. § 1160. To the
same effect are Wurt's Exr's v. Page, 19
N. J. Eq. 375; Ford v. Ford, 7P Wis. 19, 33
N. W. Eep. 188; Hobson v. Hale, 95 N. Y.
Numerous other authorities, text588.
books, and judicial decisions are at hand;
but they are, in the main, so harmonious,
and so entirely in accord with the full
quotations just made from Mr Ponieroy,
that we forbear to make further citations
with respect to the character of direction
necessary to work the notional change,
and call the doctrine of equitable conversion into play. As a matter of some moment on the question of construction, it is
well to oDserve that unless the sale or
purchase contemplated
is expressly directed to be made at a specified timeln the
future, or upon the happening of some
particular event, which mayor may not
happen, the conversion
takes place, in
wills, as from the death of the testator;
and in deeds, and other instruments inter vivos, as from the date of their execu-

tion.

3

Pom. Eq. Jur.

§ 1162.

The instrument upon which the controversy arises in this cause is a deed, in the
following language: " We, Baxter Smith
* • • in
and wife, Bettie G. Smith,
consideration of the sum of $34,395.60, paid
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and secured to be paid as hereinafter mentioned, have bargained and sold, and do
hereby transfer and convey, unto James
H. Yarbrough.in trust, as hereinafter mentioned, the following tract of land * * *
to have and to hold, for himself and other
beneficiaries hereinafter named, in trust for
the following uses and purposes : That is
to say, said tract of land has been jointly
purchased by James C. Warner, Percy
Warner, John P. White, John F. Wheless,
B. F. Wilson, W. M. Grantland, Charles L.
Ridley, Baxter Smith, and J. H. Yarbrough, L. H. Davis, and G. A. Maddux,—
the last three purchasing as a firm, under
the firm name and style of Yarbrough, Maddux and Davis,— each paying and to pay
one tenth of the purchase money for said
land, as hereafter set out, except John P.
White, whopays twotentiiH. * * * Said
tract of land is conveyed to said J. H.
Yarbrough, as trustee for eaid named purchasers, with power and authority to hold,
possess, and manage thesamein theirinterest and behalf, and to sell and convey the
same, by deed in fee simple, upon the written direction of a majority in value of the
adult beneficial owners then living, upon
such terms and conditions as they may
direct, and to collect and divide the proceeds of sale among said beneficiaries,
their heirs, administrators, executors, and
assigne, as their several interests may appear. * * The aforesaid sura of $34,395.60
has been paid, and secured to be paid, as
follows: * * To secure the payment of
the promissory notes herein described, a
lien is expressly retained upon the share
or interest of the maker alone, and not
against the tract as a whole. In case
any of the beneficiaries herein named, in
order to preserve his or their ovi^n title,
should have to pay and discbarge for another any accruing taxes or other incumbrance or lien upon the whole property,
then, in that event, he or they shall have
a lieu upon the share or interest of the person who has failed to make such payment. Should said J. H. Yarbrough desire to resign the trust herein given him,
he may do so, by and with the consent
and approval, in writing, of a majority
in value of the adult beneficiaries, owners,
named above, and appoint in his room
and stead a new trustee, and clothe him
with like power and duties as those now
conferred on him, by a suitable deed of
conveyance in writing, to be recorded in
the register's office of Davidson county,
Tennessee."
Such are the material portions of the
instrument the court is called upon to construe in this case; and the inquiry is whetherthe land conveyed thereby is to be treated, in equity, as realty, or as personalty.
If as realty, the share of Gen. Wheless
passed to his heirs, under the statute of
descent; if as personalty, it went to his
widow, as sole distributee, subject in either case, of course, to his debts.
A general view of the deed readily discloses a proposed speculation, entered into
by several persons jointly, — a syndicate
In furtherance
buying land to sell again.
of the scheme a trustee was appointed,
and the land conveyed to him for the benefit of all the purchasers, — for each of them
The idea of a
according to his interest.

resale, as the ultimate object of the enter'
prise, runs through the Avhole instrument.
It appears, from thenature of the transaction ; from the words conferring upon the
trustee power and authority "to sell,
* * * and collect and divide the proceeds;" and from the provision for appointment of a successor in case the trustee should resign.
That a partition in
kind should ever occur, or that the trust
should cease before a sale of the land and
division of its proceeds were fully accomplished, was never contemplated.
The
land was bought to sell again, and a trustee was appointed as a part of the plan.
All this is clear; but it is entirely consistent with the proposition that the trust
was created merely as a cheaper and more
convenient method of preserving and conveying theland.
More is required to mako
The fact
a case of equitable conversion.
of a contemplated resale is present in every purchase of land upon speculation ;
and land purchased with such view is not
converted into personalty by the mere appointment of a trustee to receive the title.
and as the agency through which theresale is to be accomplished for the owners.
It is manifest that the paramount object
of the enterprise was a resale of the land
through the trustee, as representative of
the beneficial owners, yet the deed does
not contain any Imperative direction that
he shall sell; no absolute, unconditional
duty to sell is placed upon him. "The
equitable ' ought' " is not to be found in
the deed, either as a matter expressed or
Not only does
to be necessarily implied.
it contain no positive direction that he
shall sell, but it, in reality, does not even
permit him to sell, upon his own motion.
His only power of sale is made to depend,
expressly, upon the direction of others.
He has no independent authority in that
respect. The words of the deed on this
point are: " With power and authorit.y to
bold, possess, and manage the same in
their interest and behalf, and to sell and
convey the same, by deed in fee simple, upon the written direction of a majority in
value of the adult beneficial owners then
living, upon such terms and conditions as
they may direct. " This language imposes
upon the trustee no positive, unqualified
obligation to sell the land at all events.
At most, it but gives him authority to
sell at such time, and upon such terms and
conditions, as others may direct. In effect,
it but makes him the instrumentalit.v
through which a majority of the beneficial
owners living at any given time may
make a sale. He has no right to sell without their written direction, and no authority to demand or require such direction at one time or another. It cannot be
that a conversion was wrought by the
creation ofa trust so passive as thisoneis.
To meet the fact that the trustee has no
power to sell unless directed by a majority
of the adult beneficiaries to do so, it is
suggested that thebeneficiariestbemselves
are clothed with a trust, to the extent of
being empowered to direct when and how
the sale shall be made, and that they are
bound to give such direction.
There can
be no doubt that it was contemplated
that the beneficiaries should at some time
give the trustee the required direction to
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sell the land, and that a duty was, to that
extent, indirectly devolved upon them ;
but that can hardly be said to have made
trustees of them, or to have magnifled the
limited power of the real trustee into an
imperative obligation to convert the land
into money. The purchasers, though intending an ultimate sale, clearly had no
thought that the terms of the deed
changed the character of the property,
and converted the real estate into personalty. That they intended the land to be
held
as realty until actually sold and
turned into money is manifest from the
general frame and terms of the deed, and
especially from those parts of it retaining
separate liens in favor of the grantor, and
providing for a special lien in favor of
such beneficiaries as might be compelled
to pay taxes or discharge liens for others.
In the portion of the deed last referred to,
the interest of each of the several beneficiaries is referred to as an interest in land,
as such, and provisions are made with reference thereto which would be inappropriate as applied to personalty.
We are
of opinion that the deed shows upon its
face when considered as a whole, that the
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land was conveyed to a trustee merely for
convenience, and to save expense and
trouble in the ultimate sale and conveyance, and that no conversion took place.
Our attention has been called to the
very
instructive and soundly reasoned
case of Crane v. Bollea, (N.
Ch.) 24
Atl. Rep. 237, in which a conversion of
land into money was held to have occurred under direction contained in a will.
There are several points of similarity between that case and this one, and perhaps
as many important differences. The principles of law laid down in that case are
the same recognized and applied by us in
this one, the difference in result reached
being due to differencein purport of instruments construed.
Without stating the
aspects in which the two instruments
agree, or those in which they differ, we
are content with simply saying that the
court in that case said that the direction
for sale was "imperative," and did not
depend on the "request or consent" of the
testator's children, while in this case there
is no imperative direction to sell, and the
power to sell does depend on the direction
of the beneficiaries. Affirm the decree.
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MILLER, J. The complaint In this action
demands
an equitable partition or sale of
several pieces of land therein described, upon a portion of which was erected a hotel,
called the Pavilion Hotel, together with the
personal property, consisting of furniture in
said hotel, and that an account be taken of
the disbursements and expenditures made by
the plaintiff, Augustus Prentice, for the benefit of and as additions to said property, and
that the share of the defendant, Mary Ann
Janssen, be charged upon the same and deducted from her portion of the proceeds of
the sale of the property. The land belonged
to Francis Blancard at the time of his decease in 1868, and the title is derived under
the provisions of his last will and testament.
The plaintiff, Augustus Prentice, holds threefourths, by conveyances from' the residuary
legatees or their representatives, and the defendant, Mary Ann Janssen, the remaining
one-fourth. The defendant last named has
joined with the plaintiff in making leases of
the property since 1873;
large sums have
been expended in making improvements by
the owners,
and the rents have been received and applied In part, if not entirely, for
that purpose.
The residuary clause in the will of Francis Blancard devised
and bequeathed
his
property to five of his children, among whom
were Francis H. Blancard and the defendant, Mary Ann Janssen.
It also authorized
Francis H. Blancard to carry on the hotel
business in the Pavilion Hotel, for the term
of five years, if he so desired, and the executors were empowered and directed, after
the testator's death, to sell and convert into
money all the real and personal property of
which he shoidd be seized or possessed, ineluding the hotel property, after the right
of occupancy of his son had ceased, as they
should deem advisable,
and divide the proceeds equally among the residuary legatees.
The son, Francis H., died before the testator, and no action was ever taken by the
executors
to sell the property,
and it reof, and was used and
mained undisposed
by the owners as real estate to
regarded
which they had title. Only one of the executors,
the defendant,
Gerhard Janssen,
was living at the time of the commencement of this action, and he is made a party,
as the husband of the defendant, Mary Ann
Janssen, and does not by his answer claim
any rights as executor or that he Is a proper
party as such. The answers admitted that
plaintiff and the defendant,
Mrs. Janssen,
owned the property as tenants in common.
We think that under the provisions cited

from the testator's will, the executors who
were donees of a power took no estate in
the lands as trustees, but merely a power in
trust to be executed for the purposes of distribution, according to the will, which was
liable to be defeated by a reconversion of
the property, which was made personal by
the will, into real estate.
The testator by the authority and direction to his executors to sell the real estate,
constructively converted the same Into personal estate, and being thus converted, the
residuary legatees were entitled to take the
same as such and had a right at their election to reconvert into real estate. No dis^
tinct and positive act is required for such a
purpose, and the rule applicable to such a
case is that "in the reconversion
of real estate a slight expression
of intention will
likewise be considered suiHcient to demonstrate an election on the part of those absolutely entitled."
Leigh & D. Conv. (5
Law Library), m. p. 168; Mutlow v. Bigg,
L. R., 1 Ch. Div. 385; 1 Jarm. Wills, 523 et
seq. The real estate was not disposed of
by the executors under the provisions contained In the will, and as there was no
lawful purpose for which a sale was absolutely required there was no obstacle to prevent a reconversion
of the same by the parties in interest from personal into real estate.
This they elected to do by positive
and unequivocal acts.
Three of the four
residuary interests were conveyed to the
plaintiff, Augustus Prentice, and the defendant, Mary Ann Janssen, retained the other
one-fourth.
The whole has since been enjoyed, possessed and treated the same as real
estate.
This was done by the acquiescence
of the executors and all the parties in Interest, not only by possession, but by acts showing their Intention beyond any question.
In
Story, Eq. Jur. § 793, it is said that if land
is directed to be converted into money merely, the party entitled to the beneficial interest may If he elects so to do, prevent any
conversion of the property and hold it as it
is. This has been done by the residuary
legatees here;
and as the lands were not
sold and disposed of by the executors, and
no diversion made, the rule applies that the
person entitled to the money, being of lawful age, can elect to take the land, if the
rights of others will not be affected by such
election.
Hetzel v. Barber, 69 N. Y. 1, 11.
No rights of other parties were injured by
the election
to reconvert;
and as threefourths of the residuary interests had been
sold and conveyed to the plaintiff by those
who were entitled to the proceeds of a sale,
if one had been made under the power, and
the owner of the remaining one-fourth had
assented to the reconversion,
by exercising
acts of ownership, and the purpose of the
power had become unattainable, the power
to sell became extinguished, and the plaintiff and defendant already named became
owners as tenants in common.
Hetzel t.
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Barber, supra; Garvey v. McDevitt, 72 N.
Y. 563. Neither the will Itself nor the surrounding circumstances evince in any way
that the testator intended not only to confer
a power of sale, but that the exercise of such
power would become absolutely necessary to
enable the executors to make the distribution
required to the residuary legatees, within the
principle laid down in Crittenden v. Fairchild, 41 N. Y. 289, 292, which is relied upon
by the defendant's counsel.
The facts here
are far different from the case cited.
The
distribution was actually made and the purpose of the will fully accomplished
by the
reconversion
of the personal estate into real
estate by the parties in Interest, as is quite
obvious, and each of the legatees had received their full share as directed;
thus rendering the exercise of the power of no avail.
It follows that the executors having only a
power to sell for the purpose of distribution
— which power never was exercised,
and
which became of no use by reason of the
of the land into realty— Gerreconversion
hard Janssen, the surviving executor, had no
right, title, interest, or lien upon the property, which rendered him a necessary party
The provito the action as such executor.
sion of 1 Rev. St. p. 735, § 107, which makes
a power of sale a lien or charge upon the
land, has no application when it had ceased
As
to operate, and was of no practical use.
by the reconversion no interest remained in
there could be no lien or
the executors,
Equity would not incharge upon the land.
terfere to compel the execution of the power
under 1 Rev. St. p. 784, § 96, because the
without its
purpose had been accomplished
exercise.

Nor was it necessary that Gerhard Janssen, the surviving executor, should be a parIn regard to the
ty for any other reason.
payment of debts and legacies there was no
evidence that any debt or legacy remained
unpaid when this action was brought. Seven years had then elapsed, and as debts and
legacies are primarily to be paid out of the
personal estate, unless express directions or
a clear intent to the contrary is found, or to
be gathered from the will (Bevan v. Cooper,
42 N. Y.
72 N. Y. 317; Klnnier v. Rogers,
531J, the presumption is that they have been
The burden of proof was on the depaid.
fendants to establish that they were not, if
such was the fact. No such defense was set
upon the
up in the answer or interposed
trial, and as the case stood the plaintiff was
not required to show that the debts and legThe same remarks
acies had been paid.
will apply to the point made, that there was
no payment or accounting for the testamentary expenses.
Charles Blancard, a son of the testator,
was not, we think, a necessary party deBy the will he is
fendant in this action.
bequeathed the sum of $5,000, and he is not
named therein as a residuary legatee.
It is
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claimed that he became entitled to an interest in the residuary portion of the estate
which was given by the testator to his brother Francis, who died before the testator,
without leaving any child or descendant,
and devised
and that the share bequeathed
to Francis lapsed and his share descended to
that Charles
heirs at law;
the testator's
Blancard was one of them, and therefore a
Without connecessary party to the action.
sidering the question whether the devise to
Francis H. Blancard having lapsed it passed, under the residuary clause, to the four
children named who survived him, or whether the papers produced upon the argument of
this appeal, showing that Charles Blancard
had sold and conveyed away all the interest
which he may have had in the property, and
was not a proper and necessary
therefore
party to the action, it is sufficient to say that
the point does not arise upon the record before us, and it is a complete answer fo the
objection that the admission made by the
pleadings, that the plaintiff and the defendant are the sole owners of the real estate,
dispensed with the production of evidence
upon the trial to establish such fact and preclude the objection that Charles Blancard
had an outstanding interest as an heir at
law under the residuary clause in the will of

Francis Blancard.
No title was acquired by the deed from
Wemple, as executor of Caroline Blancard,
deceased, of the interest of the decedent in
one of the lots of the Pavilion Hotel, to the
defendant, Mary Ann Janssen.
Nor is there
any valid reason why Mrs. Janssen should
be subrogated in this action to his rights because the real estate had been converted into
By the will of Caroline Blanpersonalty.
card the executor was authorized and empowered, during the minority of the nephews
and nieces of the testatrix, to whom she had
given one-half of the property, to sell or
lease jointly with the other owners of the
undivided shares therein.
After one of the
devisees became of age the executor
conveyed to Mrs. Janssen all the interest and
estate vested in him as such.
He had no
estate in the premises and only a power In
trust, which was to be executed while the
devisees were in a minority in connection
with the other owners.
He had therefore
no authority to execute the conveyance
to
Mrs. Janssen, and the deed was invalid and
conferred
upon her no title. Subsequently
Mr. Wemple, as special guardian of one of
the devisees, who was an infant, by order
of the court conveyed all of her interest under the will of Caroline Blancard, including
that which had been previously attempted to
be conveyed to Mrs. Janssen, to the plaintiff,
Augustus Prentice, and by other conveyances the interest of the other devisees was
acquired by him. As the executor had no
authority to convey the premises, the right
acquired by the deed of the special guard-
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ian could not be affected by the knowledge
of the puichaser of the conveyance to ilrs.
Janssen.
We think that the share of ilre. Janssen
was properly chargeable with its proportion
of expenditures made by Augustus Prentice,
the plaintiff, for repairs and improvements
of the property.
By the lease ?5,000 was to
be applied for improvements
It
and repairs.
was supposed that they would not exceed
that amount; but the covenant to make repairs was properly construed by the referee
to mean that the lessors were to make all
repairs, whether they exceeded the sum named or not.
It also appears from the referee's
findings that Mrs. Janssen after she had
knowledge that the repairs exceeded the
sum specified, assented to the appropriation
of additional sums due for rents, to be used
in making improvements;
that she stood by
and did not object to the erection of a new
building, and she thus acquiesced in all the
actually made. Under such cirexpenditures
cumstances
there certainly was an implied
obligation that she should pay her share of
the moneys expended for the benefit of the
property in which she had a common interest, and they are a proper charge against the
defendant's portion of the real estate sought
In making the reto be partitioned or sold.
pairs the plaintiff, Augustus Prentice, did
not occupy the position of a volunteer, without any authority of his co-tenant, but acted
under the lease, which, as we have seen,
covered the amount actually expended, and
that this was done with the assent and approval of the defendant.
The case of Taylor
V. Baldwin, 10 Barb. 582, 026, which is relied upon by the defendant's counsel, is not
adverse to the views expressed.
There Is no valid objection to charging the
defendant's
share of the proceeds of the sale
with the amounts expended, as found by the

referee.
These expenses were incurred In
reference to the property under special cirwhich,
think, render
we
it
cumstances
therewith, and the judgment
chargeable
properly provided for the payment of defendant's proportion out of her share of the
avails realized upon a sale. Nor is any reason shown why she should not be charged
with her share of the costs, as found by the
referee.
There was no error in the allowance of the
architect's fees. Although there is some confusion in the referee's report in regard thereto, it nevertheless appears from the receipts
introduced in evidence that the amounts
charged in the account were actually paid to
him.
We think the court properly ordered that
the sale of the real estate and the personal
property should be made as one parcel.
The
real estate as the referee found was so situated that a sale of one portion would interfere materially with the value of the remainder,
and the personal property,
being
purchased for the benefit of the hotel, was
of such a character that it could be disposed
of more advantageously by a sale with the
real estate than by a separate sale.
No reason therefore
exists why the sale of the
whole real and personal estate should not be
made together in a single lot. We have examined the authorities
cited by the defendant's counsel upon the question last considered, and none of them sustain the position
that the court has not the power, in an
equitable action, where the parties are tenants in common of real and personal property, to direct a sale of both In one parcel
when their interest will be promoted by such
a sale.
There was no error, and the judgment
should be affirmed.
All concur.
Judgment aflirmed.

ACCIDEiNT,

KOPPER V. DYER.
DYER V. KOPPER et
(9

Atl. 4.

59

al.

Vt. 477.)

Supreme Court of Vermont.

April

30,

1887.

Appeal from chancery,
Addison county,
December term, 1886; Tal;t, Chancellor.
Bill in chancery seeking relief from a decree of foreclosure,
which had become absolute, on the ground of accident.
Heard on
pleadings and master's report.
Decree that
the orator is entitled to relief according to
the prayer of his bill, and that the cross-bill
of defendant, Dyer, be dismissed, with costs,
from which defendant appealed.
In August, 1880, defendant, John M. Dyer,
sold and conveyed to Frederick Kopper the
premises in controversy, known as the "Lake
Dunmore Hotel Property," together with a
large amount of personal property used in
therewith, for $13,500.
connection
Of said
purchase
money, $10,500 was secured by
mortgages of said real estate and personal
property, both executed by Kopper to Dyer,
August 23, 1880, conditioned that Kopper pay
Mary C. Goddard, according to their tenor,
certain notes, amounting to $10,500, which
Dyer had executed, and which were secured
by mortgage on his other real estate; that
Kopper pay all unassessed taxes on the Lake
Dunmore property on the grand list of 1880;
and that he keep the premises insured in the
The premsum of $5,000 for Dyer's benefit.
ises have been continually occupied by Kopper, with the exception stated below, and he
The taxes were paid
is now in possession.
The conby Kopper to and including 1884.
has not been
insurance
dition respecting
In 1884, Dyer paid insurcomplied
with.
For
ance premiums to the amount of $75.
default in payment, Mary C. Goddard foreclosed her mortgage against Dyer, and obtained a decree of foreclosure at the September term, 1882, of the Franklin county court
January 19, 1883, DyeV, fearof chancery.
ing that Kopper might not satisfy the Goddard decree, and for the purpose of being
sure that his own property would not be
sacrificed, procured the National life Insurance Company to hold in readiness for him
the amount required to pay that decree; and
on May 23, 1883, obtained the same from the
company, and paid it in satisfaction of that
decree. Dyer was also compelled to pay the
company the further sum of $193.85, in consideration of its having held said amount in
Dyer also
readiness from January to May.
paid $32.86 costs of the Goddard foreclosure.
Dyer made several attempts to foreclose his
mortgage against Kopper, and finally it was
decreed "that, unless the said Frederick Kopper pay to the clerk of this court, for the
benefit of the orator, the sum of $500 on or
before January 1, 1885, and the sum of $8,052.09 on or before the first day of June, 1885,
he, (the said Frederick Kopper,) and all persons claiming under him, shall be foreclosed
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and forever barred from all equity of reKopper did not
demption in said premises."
pay the $500 as required by the decree, but
sent his personal check under circumstances
January 2, 1885, Dyer
stated in the opinion.
obtained of the clerk of the court a certified
copy of the decree tor record, and a writ of
possession thereunder, and immediately took
possession of the property, and has paid taxKopper at once brought
es thereon since.
the original bill in this cause, praying for
such relief as shall give the orator the benefit of the payment already made, as much as
he would have had if the currency had been
paid into court, as ordered by the decree;
that the decree be opened, and further order
made on terms, meet to the court, to relieve
the orator from the loss that must result to
and for an
him should no relief be granted;
Injunction restraining the defendant from
any further proceedings
under the writ of
possession', and from exercising any use or
control of the premises.
The bill and injunction were served, and Dyer withdrew
from the premises.
June 1, 1885, Kopper
caused the sum of $8,600 to be tendered Dyer
in payment of the installment of said decree
falling due on that day.
Dyer refused to
receive It, claiming that Kopper did not owe
him, and that the property was his.
Kopper afterwards filed his supplemental
bill in
this cause, setting up the tender, and claiming the benefit thereof, with said payment of
$500 to the clerk as a compliance with the
terms of the foreclosure
Dyer filed
decree.
his answer to said bill, September 22, 1885,
and an amendment
thereto,
February 20,
May 29, 1885, Kopper conveyed the
1886.
premises, together with the personal property
thereon, which had been mortgaged to Dyer,
to Wyman H. Merritt and Frank E. Brlggs by
warranty deed, which deed was given Merritt
and Briggs as security to them for the loan of
the money which was tendered to Dyer, June
April 14, 1886, Dyer filed his cross1, 1885.
bill against Kopper, Merritt, and Briggs, for
a disclosure of the mortgaged personal property, for surrender of the premises, and an
accounting for their use; or, if the decree is
to be opened and further time given to redeem, for a correction of the decree, and an
accounting and foreclosure.
Demurrers to
the cross-bill having been overruled, the same
was taken as confessed against Merritt and
Briggs; and Kopper filed his answer thereto
June 19, 1886. The other facts appear in the
opinion.

Stewart & Wilds, for Dyer. Ormsbee &
Briggs, J. M. Slade, and Noble & Smith, for
Kopper.

ROWELL, J. Kopper seeks relief on the
ground of accident.
That chancery may
grant relief on that ground, in cases of this
kind, cannot be doubted; and the first question that arises is, has the orator made a case
that calls for the interposition of the court
in his behalf?

ACCIDEiXT.

IGO

The term "accident," In its legal signification, Is difficult to define.
Judge Story defines it as embracing, "not merely inevitable
casualty, or the act of Providence,
or what
Is technically called vis major, or irresistible
force, but such unforeseen
events, misfortimes, losses, acts or omissions,
as are not
the result of any negligence or misconduct
in the party" affected thereby.
1 Story, Bq.

Jur.

§ 78.

Mr. Pomeroy justly criticises this

definition as including vchat are not accidents
at all, but mistakes, and as omitting the very
central element of the equitable conception,
" 'Accident'
and defines it thus:
Is an un-

foreseen and unexpected event, occurring external to the party affected by It, and of
vt^hlch his own agency is not the proximate
cause, whereby, contrary to his own intention and wish, he loses some legal right, or
becomes subjected to some legal liability, and
another person acquires a corresponding
legal right, which it would be a violation of
good conscience for the latter person, under
2 Pom. Eq.
the circumstances,
to retain."
Jur. § 823. And the chief point of the thing
is that, because of the unforeseen and unexpected character of the occiu-rence by which
the legal relation of the parties has been
unintentionally changed, the party injuriously affected thereby is. In good conscience, entitled to relief that will restore those relations to their original character, and place
him in his former position.
Id. § 824. But,
as a general rule, relief will not be granted
unless it can be done with justice to the other party; for, if he cannot be put in as good
a situation as he would have been in had
the other party performed, the court will not
Interpose.
Eose v. Rose, Amb. 331.
Equity, in many instances, relieves against
forfeitures occasioned by the non-payment of
and this, although
money at a day certain;
there is no accident, but negligence instead,
on the ground that the condition and the forfeiture are regarded as merely security for
the payment of the money.
This is the
ground on which tenants are relieved from
forfeitures for the non-payment of rent as
stipulated,
and mortgagors
are allowed to
redeem after the law-day has passed.
And
although the agreement Is not wholly pecuniary, nor measured by pecuniary compensation, still, if the party bound by it has
been prevented by accident, without his fault,
from an exact fulfillment, so that a forfeiture
is thereby Incurred, equity will Interpose,
and relieve him from the forfeiture, upon
his making compensation. If necessary, or doing anything else in his power to satisfy the
equitable rights of the other party. 2 Pom.
Eq. Jur. § 833.
In Cage v. Russel, 2 Vent. 352, It is laid
down as a standing rule of equity that a forfeiture shall not bind when the thing can
be done afterwards, or any compensation can
be made for it. Forfeitures are odious, and
courts struggle against them, and relief is
granted for the non-performance of diverse

collateral acts whereby they are Incurred; as
for not laying out a specific sum in repairs
in a given time, (Sanders v. Pope, 12 Ves.
for cutting down timber when cov282,)
enanted against,
v. Duke, Amb.
(Northcote
511,) for not renewing a lease in time, (Rawstorne v. Bentley, 4 Brown Ch. *415,) and the
like.
Relief is also granted against forfeitures incurred by unintentional breaches of
the condition
of mortgages for support, on
terms that the party in fault fully compensate and indemnify the other party for all
Henry
he has lost by reason of the breach.
V. Tupper, 20 Vt. 358.
In Adams v. Haskell, 10 Wis. 123, the defendants
were prevented by accident from
reaching the place of a foreclosure sale until
after It was completed, and the court for
that reason ordered a resale, but on terms.
In Piersou v. Clayes, 15 Vt. 93, the orator,
by reason of pending negotiations of settlement, without negligence on his part, let the
time of redemption expire; and he was relieved by opening the decree, and giving further time to redeem.
ITie case of Bostwick v. Stiles, 35 Oonn.
195, Is confessedly
much in point.
That was
a bill to open a decree ol foreclosure, and obtain further time.
The mortgage debt was
about ?4,C00, and the value of the premises
twice that sum. The time limited for payment was August 5th. The petitioner intended to redeem, but, not having
sufficient
means of his own, he applied to his uncle— a
man of property— to help him, and he agreed
to, and to furnish the money on August 3d,
on which the petitioner relied; but, for some
reason not explained, he did not furnish the
money as agreed, and the petitioner delayed
making other arrangements until the evening
of August 5th, when he applied to Russell for
assistance.
Russell had no money, but plenty of government bonds, and agreed to make
payment In them If defendant
would take
them; and accordingly went to defendant's
house that evening, after defendant had gone
to bed, and told his wife that he had come
prepared to redeem the mortgage for the petitioner, but defendant did not get up, but
sent word by his wife that he was sick, and
Russell went away. On this state of facts,
the court held that the petitioner's failure to
pay on August 5th was occasioned by accident, without fault or neglect on his part,
and that the accident lay in the fact of his
uncle's
failure to furnish the money as
agreed, and as the petitioner had reason to
believe he would.
The court says that there
Is a degree of uncertainty in regard to all
business
expectations,
and that no more
ought to be required in respect of future obligations Imposed by law than that such means
shall be taken to fulfill them as will render
it reasonably certain, as far as human sagacity can foresee, that they will be perfoimed.
It Is common in England to enlarge the
time of redemption on application before the
day of payment;
and, though the indulgence
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is not granted of course, it is said not to require a very strong case to obtain it. And
the time may be enlarged more than once.
Thus, In Jones v. Creswicke, 9 Sim. 30i, after the time had been enlarged,
and after
the order absolute had been made, though
not drawn up, the time was again enlarged,
on the ground that the man who had agreed
to lend the defendant
the money was prevented by illness from going up to London on
the day it was due, and his wife, whom he
had deputed to carry it up, was prevented
from doing so because the London coach was
And see Edwards v.
full the day before.
CunlifCe, 1 Madd. 287.
And the decree may be opened after the
order absolute has been made and enrolled.
Thus, in Ford v. Wastell, 6 Hare, 229, notwithstanding the order absolute had been
drawn up and enrolled, the decree was opened because all the plaintiff's property was
involved in an administration suit that she
was justified in believing would terminate
in season to enable her to avail herself of
her property with which to meet the payment, but which had not yet terminated.
See, also, Thornhill v. Manning, 1 Sim. (N.
of the
S.) 451, in which the promptness
mortgagor in applying was regarded as the
great and important feature in the case to
guide the court in deciding what it ought
to do.

Applying these principles, as shown and
illustrated by the cases, it is quite out of
the question to say that the defendant is
entitled to keep this property, and that the
orator has not made a case that calls for the
interposition of the court in his behalf.
The orator gave $13,500 for the property,
and had paid .?2,724 towards it, and expended about $10,000 upon it in improvements
and repairs; and on January 1, 1885, the
time limited bj' the decree for paying the
installment of $500, he believed the real estate fairly worth $5,000 or $6,000 more than
he gave for it. He was exceedingly anxious
to redeem the property, but had no available
means of his own, and relied for means
wherewith to pay his debts partly on income
assured to members of his family, and partly on the equity of redemption in the property, his ability to make which available at
the value he put upon it being his only
means of escape from absolute bankruptcy.
It appears that his wife and her sister. Miss
Jenkins, owned property in New York City,
as to which he was agent, and that before
and on December 29, 1884, he had been in
negotiation with one Martin of that city in
respect to leasing it to him; and it was
agreed that, on delivery of proper leases
thereof, Martin should advance to him $650
towards performance on his part, and Kopper relied on the use of that money to pay
the $500 installment.
Accordingly he went
to New York on December 30th, with the
lease executed, found Martin, and made an
appointment with him for 11 o'clock the next

HUTCH.& BUNK.EQ.— 11

*

161

day; and, on going to the place at the time
appointed, found a message postponing the
appointment to the office of an attorney
down town at 2 that afternoon; whereupon,
with Martin,
being unable to commtinicate
he went to the office down town at 2, and
found that Martin had been there, but had
He afterwards met Martin on the
gone.
anxious to
exceedingly
street, and, being
him to go
obtain the money, persuaded
back to the attorney's office; but, he being
out, they went to another attorney's office,
and he was out; and iinally he persuaded
Martin to give him his check for $650 before the leases were approved by an attor'
ney.
But this was after 3 o'clock, when
Said
.all the banks in the city were closed.
check was good, but, being drawn on a
bank in the upper part of the city, and it
being after banking hours, it was impossible for Kopper to draw the money on it
that day. He had for several years kept a
deposit account with the Second National
Bank of that city, and had at this time a
small balance standing to his credit there,
and that bank was accustomed to place to his
credit the amount of such checks as he deposited there properly indorsed.
He had
previously carried checks to that bank after
business hours for deposit, handing them in
over the railing to be credited to him at the
opening of the bank the next day.
On this
occasion
he properly indorsed said check
"for deposit," and sent it to said bank by a
district messenger boy, but whether it reach
ed the bank or not that day does not appear.
At the same time he drew two checks on
said hank to the order of the person who
was then the clerk of the court in which
the decree
was obtained,— one for $575,
(which he supposed to be the amount required to pay said installment, but which
was in fact more than was required;) and
one for $25, for a sum otherwise payable to
the clerk, — inclosed them in an envelope,
with a letter to the clerk, went to the Grand
Central Depot, and sent the package to Middlebury by the porter of the sleeping-car,
inclosing it in another envelope to the station-agent
there, requesting him to deliver
the package to the clerk immediately, which
he did on the morning of January 1st, which
day was a legal holiday in New York; and
the $650 check was passed to Kopper's credit
by the Second National Bank on the next
day, the first business day after it was reDyer refused to take Kopper's check
ceived.
of the clerk, and the clerk did not treat it
as payment of the installment, nor regard
it as available funds in his hands, until it
was paid, and the avails credited to him by
the collecting bank, which was on January
5th, on which day he was trusteed by some
of Kopper's other creditors, and on the 6th
this bill was brought.
On these facts, and the others disclosed
by the record, Kopper cannot justly be charged with negligence.
The means he had tak-
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en to obtain the money rendered it reasona
bly certain tliat he would succeed, and that
he was anxious to obtain it abundantly appears.
That he did not meet Martin at 11
nor at 2 was an unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence,
external to himself, of which
his agency was not the proximate, nor even
the remote, cause, and thereby he was prevented ffom sending his money seasonably,
in a form that would have been treated and
regarded as payment,
whereby, contrary to
his own Intention and wish, he lost his legal
right to pay, and Dyer acquired a legal right
not to have him pay; and in these circumstances Kopper is entitled to relief that will
reinstate him in his former position, on terms
that he satisfy the equitable rights of the
other party.
I'>ut he cannot
have relief under his bill
as drawn, for it is not adapted to his case.
The original bill goes upon the ground that
he Is entitled to have his attempted payment
of the first installment treated as an actual,
seasonable payment;
while the supplemental
bin sets up a tender of the other installment, and aslis that it be adjudged a payment thereof, and that the defendant be
decreed to accept and receive the same in
full satisfaction and discharge of the decree.
But his attempted payment was not payment, and he is not entitled to have it treated as such, because neither the money, nor
seasonably
its equivalent,
came into the
hands of the clerk, and Dyer was not bound
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accept and receive his checli as payment,
though he might have safely taken the money after the time expired, if he could have
got it; for taking an installment after the
time for paying it Is expired does not open
the decree as to installments for the payment
Smalley
of which the time has not expired.
Gilson v. Whitney,
V. Hickok, 12 Vt. 153;
an unreported case in Windsor county a few
years ago, ut audivi. Nor was the tender
of the second installment effective; for, not
having paid the first, he had no legal standing for tendering the second.
Redemption is the appropriate relief in
this case. Indeed, it is said that whenever
a mortgagor is driven to the necessity of filing a bill against the mortgagee, it must be
one to redeem, and that the court can relieve
him' only by allowing a redemption.
Goldsmith V. Osborne, 1 Edw. Oh. 560; Cholmley
of Oxford, 2 Atk. 267; Lord
V. Countess
Langdale in Dalton v. Hayter, 7 Beav. 313.
But the bill lacks some of the essential eleIt neither offers
ments of a bill to redeem.
nor avers a willingness to pay, which is necessary by all the authorities. But, inasmuch as the orator is entitled to relief, he
should not be turned out of court, but allowed to amend his bill into a bill to reHarrigan
deem, if he shall be so advised.
V. Bacon, 57 Vt. 644.
There was no necessity for bringing the
cross-bill. The chattel mortgage was not embraced in the original bill, and so could not

be the subject of a decree; and discovery of
property subject to it could not aid in defeuding the original bill. As to the execution of the decree by giving possession, that
can be done by summary process.
R. L. §§
TOO, 767;
Kershaw v. Thompson, 4 Johns.
Oh. 609; Ludlow v. Lansing, Hopk. Ch. 231;
Valentine v. Teller, Id. 422; Yates v. Ham-

bly, 2 Atk. 237.
As to the use of the premises pending suit,
the defendant would be entitled in respect
thereof, if at all, only on failure of the
original bill, in which event he could avail
himself of his rights by way of claim for
injunction damages.
And, as to the alternative prayer for foreclosing any remaining
equity, that would be the result of any decree on the original bill.
Nor was there
any necessity for bringing in Briggs and
Merritt, for they purchased
pendente lite,
and so will be bound by any decree made.
Besides,
treating them as entitled to the
benefit of their demm'rer, as they were treated at the bar, they are not proper parties to
the cross-bill;
for new parties cannot be
A cross-bill, by force of
made in that way.
the term, is a bill by a defendant against
the plaintiff or other defendants in the same
suit, or both.
If an orator desires to make
new parties, he amends his bill, and makes
them, although it be in respect of matters
that have transpired since the filing of his
bill; though until very recently, in respect
of such matters, he would have brought a
supplemental
bill. If the interest of the
defendant requires the presence of new parties, he takes his objection for want of
them, and the orator is forced to bring them
in, or have his bill dismissed; and if, at the
hearing, the court finds new parties indispensable, it refuses to proceed.
These remedies cover the whole subject, and a crossbill to make new parties is not only Irregular and improper, but wholly unnecessary.
Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130.
But if they are not entitled to the benefit
of their demurrer because the bill has been
taken as confessed as to them, yet Kopper's
defense avails for them; for, when the defendants are jointly interested, a decree pro
confesso as to some merely takes away their
standing in court, and disentitles them' to
appear or be heard on many questions certainly without an order of court; but the
success of the others avails for them, and
the bill will be dismissed as to all. 1 Hoff.
Ch. Pr. 554; Clason v. Morris, 10 Johns. 524;
Frow V. De La Vega, 15 Wall. 552.
As to the terms that will satisfy the equitable rights of Dyer. As between the two,
it belonged to Kopper to pay the Goddard
mortgage, and Dyer stood as his surety in
respect thereof.
Field v. Hamilton, 45 Vt.
35; Wells v. Tucker, 57 Vt. 223; Comstock
V. Drohan, 71 N. Y. 9.
Hence Dyer is entitled to be reimbursed, not only the principal
sum that he paid to redeem said mortgage,
but his reasonable costs and expenses in that
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behalf In good faith Incurred. Hayden v.
Cabot, 17 Mass. 168; Downer v. Baxter, 30
Vt. 467; Hulett v. Soullard, 26 Vt. 295; Comstock V. Drohan, 71 N. Y. 9.
As to the costs of that foreclosure, It sufficiently appears that they were properly incurred, and Dyer is justly entitled to reimBut, as to the amount paid by
bursement.
him to the insurance company for holding
in readiness the money wherewith to redeem, it does not sufficiently appear that that
was such a prudent and necessary thing to
do in the circumstances as to entitle him to
reimbursement. The mortgage of the premises in question being conditioned to keep
the property insured for Dyer's benefit,
which Kopper neglected to do, he is chargeable with the insurance premium of $75 that
Dyer was compelled to pay in 1884, and this
was included In the decree.
He is also
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with the $60.30 paid by Dyer
chargeable
for taxes, as shown by the master's report,
as well as with all the other taxes that Dyer
has since paid, or that he shall hereafter
pay, or become liable to pay, on the property.
As Kopper put his bill upon false ground,
namely, that he had performed the decree
when he had not, Dyer was justified in defending it, and should recover his costs; and
as Dyer had a right, after the decree became
absolute, to deal with the property as his
own, he is entitled to the costs of his writ of
possession, and of the execution of it. Cree
In Thornhill v. ManV. Lord. 25 Vt. 498.
ning, ] Sim. (N. S.) 451, the costs of an
ejectment were allowed in a similar case.
The decree dismissing the cross-bill is affirmed; but the decree for the orator in the
original bill Is reversed, a.nd the case remanded, with mandate.
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Bupreme Court of Dlinois.

Sept. Term, 1873.

Bentley, Swett & Quigg, for
Waite & Clarke, for appellee.

appeUants.

CRAIG, J. This was a bill In chancery,
filed in the superior court of Cook county,
by George W. Campbell, as assignee in bankruptcy of the late firm of Durham & Wood,
against William Patton and others, to recover the value of certain goods which had
been replevied by Patton & Co. from Durham & Wood.
It appears from the record that on or about
the 20th of October, 1870, Patton & Co., of
New York, sold Durlham & Wood, of Chicago, a bill of goods, amounting to $1,600, on
About the first of
a credit of four months.
November, after the sale, Durham & Wood
failed, and Patton & Co. commenced an action of replevin to recover the goods they
had sold. A replevin bond in the penal sum
of $1,000, in the usual form, was filed with
the papers in the action, and $800 or $900
worth of the goods were replevied.
In the fire of October 8th and 9th, 1871, the
papers in the case, including the bond, were
the action was disSubsequently
destroyed.
missed.
The defendants answered the bill, to which
replication was filed, the cause was heard on
In
the proofs taken, and decree rendered
favor of complainants for $850.
bring the cause
The defendants
court,

and seek to reverse

to this
the decree on two

grounds:
First. For the reason a court of chancery
has no jurisdiction, the remedy of complainants being complete at law.
Second. The purchase of goods from Patton & Co., by Dm-ham & Wood, was fraudulent, and Patton & Co., upon discovery
of
the fraud, had the right to rescind the sale
and replevy the property.
The questions will be considered In the
order in which they are raised.
The bill in this case is filed to recover upon
aD instrument under seal, which had been
destroyed.

The jurisdiction of a cotttt of equity arising from accident is a very old head,
in
equity, and probably coeval with its existence. But it is not every case of accident
which wiU justify the interposition of a
The jurisdiction will be
court of equity.
maintained only when a court of law can not
grant siiitable relief; and where the party
title to relief. 1 Story,
has a conscientious
Eq. Jur., § 79.
In case, however, of lost instruments under
seal, equity takes jurisdiction, on the ground
that, untU a recent period, it was the settled
doctrine that there was no remedy on a lost
bond in a court of common law, because there
could be no profert of the instrument, without which the declaration would be defect-

The jurisdiction having been assumed
and exercised on this groimd. It is stlU re1 Story, Eq. Jur., § 81;
tained and upheld.
Walmsley v. ChUd, 1 Vesey, Sen., 341; Fisher
V. Sievres, 65 lU. 99.
Under the allegations In the bill In this
cause, we think it is well settled that a court
of equity had jurisdiction.
The remaining question in the case Is, were
ive.

under
the goods purchased
such circumstances as gave the appellants the right of
on the ground of fraud, or was
rescission
there such a fraud practised that the title
to the property did not pass to Durham &

Wood?
The evidence shows that Hart, who was a
traveling agent for appellants, called on Durham & Wood, in Chicago, to sell them goods.
They examined his samples and told him
they wanted to make a large order, and
wanted to buy on four months' time. Hart
told them, Patton & Co. hardly ever vary
from three months' time. Durham remarked,
buy of A. T.
and could
he had bought
Stewart & Co., of New York, on four months'
time. On tills statement.
Hart sold the
goods on four months' time.
It turned out, on investigation, that Durham & Wood had only bought two biUs of
goods of Stewart & Co., and they were sold
on thirty days' credit.
While it is true the statement made by
Durham, that he had bought and could buy
goods of Stewart & Co. on four months'
time, was false, yet, it does not appear that
this statement induced Hart to seU the goods;
it only had the effect to cause him to
give one month longer credit on the goods
than he otherwise would, which did not, in
this case, in anywise affect the rights of appellants, for the reason that the failure occurred and the goods were replevied witMn
less than two months after the sale.
It appears, from the evidence, that Hart
made no objection to sell the goods on three
months' time; he neither asked nor required
any repre.sentations from Diu-ham, as to the
standing or responsibility of the firm, to induce him to seU the goods on a credit of
three months.
At the time the goods were
purchased, it does not appear that Durham
& Wood were in failing circumstances.
Insolvent, or in any manner pressed by their
creditors; for aught that appears they were
at that time solvent, and responsible for all
their contracts.
Neither does it appear that they made any
false representations
in regard to what they
were worth, what property they owned, or
the amount of debts they had contracted.
It is not shown that the goods were bought
with the intent not to pay for them, or with
a view to make an assignment.
We understand the rule to be, that if a
party, knowing himself to be insolvent, or
in failing circumstances, by means of fraudulent pretenses or representations,
purchases
goods with the intention not to pay for them.
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that the goods were bought with any Impure
or wrong motives.
It is true that, some two months after the
purchase of the goods, the parties went into
banliruptcy, but this was involuntary, and
does not, of itself, show the condition of the
firm at the time the goods were bought.
4 Scam. 97.
Upon a careful examination of the whole
But the case under consideration does not record, we are satisfied the decree of the
come within this rule.
court below was correct, and It will be afThere is no evidence in this record to show firmed.

but with the design to cheat the vendor out
of his goods, such facts would warrant the
vendor in rescinding the contract for fraud,
and would justify him in recovering possession of the property by replevin, where the
goods had not in good faith passed into the
hands of third parties. Henshaw v. Bryant,
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BREWER
(30

Court

of Appeals

V.

HERBERT.

Md. 301.)

of Maryland.

March

11,

1869.

Appeal

from circuit court, Washington
as a court of equity.
The bill in this case was filed by the appellee for an Injunction to restrain proceedings at law and for the specific performance
of a contract.
The appellee was the owner
of a dwelling house and balf lot of ground
situate in Hagerstown, and sold the same to
the appellant on the 9th of October, 1865, by
their agreement in writing, as follows, to wit:
"Articles of agreement made and concluded
this 9th day of October, 1865, between F.
Dorsey Herbert and John A. K. Brewer, both
of Washington county and state of Maryland,
witnesseth:
That in consideration of the sum
of four thousand dollars, to be paid as hereinafter mentioned, the said Herbert has this
day sold to the said Brewer his house and
half lot of ground, situated on the corner of
West Washington and Prospect streets, in
Hagerstown; and the said John A. K. Brewer on his part agrees to pay the said sum of
four thousand dollars, as follows: Two thousand dollars on the 1st day of April, 1866;
and one thousand dollars on the 1st day of
April, 1867; and one thousand dollars on the
1st day of April, 1868,—with interest from the
1st day of April, 1866; and the said Herbert
doth further agree to give the said Brewer
possession of the same on the 1st day of
April, 1866, and on payment of the whole
purchase money to make a good and sufficient
deed for the same, clear of all incumbrances,
In witness whereof the
to the said Brewer.
parties hereto have set their hands and seals
on the day and year first above written.
"[Signed]
F. Dorsey Herbert. [Seal.]
"J. A. K. Brewer.
[Seal.]"
Of the $2,000 to be paid by the agreement
on the 1st day of April, 1866, the appellant,
at the request of the appellee, paid $1,000 on
At the time
the 10th day of October, 1865.
of sale the said premises were under lease by
Herbert to Dr. Berry, whose term expired on
The appellee held
the 1st day of April, 1866.
a policy of insurance for $1,000 on the house
at the time of sale, which was allowed by
him to expire about the last of January, 1866.
On the 5th day of February, 1866, the house
was totally destroyed by fire, but without any
fault on the part of the appellee or his tenant,
Berry. On Monday, the 2d day of April, 1866,
the 1st being Sunday, the appellee made a
tender of the premises, then a vacant lot, to
the appellant, which he refused to receive in
its destroyed condition. The appellant having refused to receive the ground, and holding
that the appellee was unable to perform his
part of the contract, by reason of the destruction of the house, brought suit on the law
side of the court, to recover from the appellee the said $1,000, so as aforesaid paid to
county,

Whereupon the appellee filed the bill
In this cause to enjoin said proceedings at
law and for a specific execution of the agreement.
The court below by Its decree enjoined said proceedings
at law, and decreed a
specific
execution.
From this decree the
present appeal was taken.
Before BARTOL, C. J., and GRASON,
him.

MILLER,

and

ROBINSON,

Wm. T. Hamilton,
for appellee.

JJ.

for appellant.

A. K.

Syester,

MILLER, J. After the execution of the
written contract for the sale of the house and
lot, and before the day fixed for delivery of
possession and payment of the first installment of purchase money, the house was accidentally destroyed by fire, without fault of either party or of the tenant then in possession of the same. The vendor had a fee
simple title to the property, and at the proper
time, under the contract,
offered to deliver
possession of the premises in the condition in
which they then were. Tliis the vendee refused to receive because of the destruction of
the house by fire, and the main question in
the case is, can he on this ground successfully
resist this application in equity by the vendor
for a specific performance of the contract?
In contracts of this kind between private
parties, the vendee is in equity the owner of
the estate from the time of the contract of

sale, and must sustain the loss if the estate
be destroj'ed between the agreement and the
conveyance, and will be entitled to any benefit which may accrue to it in the interim.
This doctrine, notwithstanding the dictum in
Stent V. Bailey, 2 P. Wms. 290, to the contrary, was plainly announced and settled by
the decision of Lord Bldon, In Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. 349, a case very similar In its circumstances to the present, where it was held
that if there was no objection to the title of
the vendor, or it had been accepted in fact
by the vendee before the houses were burned,
no solid objection to the bill for specific performance could be founded on the mere effect
of the accident before conveyance, "for if
the party," says the lord chancellor, "by the
contract has become in equity the owner of
the premises, they are his to all Intents and
purposes.
They are vendible as his, chargeable as his, capable of being incumbered
as
his; they may be devised as his; they may
be assets;
and they would descend to his
heir." This decision has always been regarded as fixing the true equitable rule in such
by Sir Thomas
cases. It was recognized
Plumer in Harford v. Purrier, 1 Madd. Oh.
287, and In Rawlins v. Burgis, 2 Ves. & B.
387, and by Lord Chancellor Manners in Bevell V. Hussey, 2 Ball & B. 287. From these
and other authorities of equal weight announcing the maxim that equity regards as
done that which was agreed to be done is
deduced as the established doctrine In equity
that from the time the owner of an estate
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enters into a binding agreement for its sale
lie holds the same in trust for the purchaser,
and the latter becomes a trustee of the purchase money for the vendor, and being thus
in equity the owner the vendee must bear any
loss which may happen, and is entitled to any
benefit which may accrue to the estate in the
Interim between the agreement and the con1 Sugd. Vend. 228, 388-391; 2 Powveyance.
ell, Cont. 69; Dart, Vend. 114^118;
2 Story,
Eq. § 1212.
The contract here is not for a
sale at a future day; it does not use in this
Its
respect prospective or contingent terms.
language is: The vendor "has this day sold
to" the vendee his house and lot, which clearly imports a binding contract then executed
By such terms the title
and consummated.
in equity passes from the date of the contract,
and if there were nothing else in it there
would be no room for argument, for It would
be impossible to withdraw the case from the
operation of the rule above stated.
But It has been earnestly and strenuously
urged by the appellant's
counsel that as the
contract contains an agreement by the vendor to deliver possession of the house and
lot to the vendee on the 1st of April, 1866,
the destruction of the house by fire before
that period rendered performance by the
vendor of this part of the contract impossitherefore, either' in law
ble, and he cannot,
or equity,
ask the vendee to perform his
part of it; and this circumstance,
it is insisted, distinguishes
the case from those cited, and prevents it from falling within the
principle established by them.
Let us test
the soundness of this argument.
The vendee knew before and at the time of the contract there was a tenant In possession whose
term would not expire until the 1st of April,
and the first Installment of the purchase money is made payable on, and interest on the
deferred payments runs from, that day.
The
subject-matter of sale is realty,— a lot of
ground with a house upon it, described as a
house and lot.
The agreement as to delivery is not like the usual covenant by a tenant in a lease, to deliver in as good condition and repair as when the contract was
made.
There is also no difficulty about delivery, except that the premises were not,
as to the buildings upon them, in the same
condition as at the date of the contract.
The question then resolves itself into this,
does the fact of the insertion into a contract
like the present for the sale of real estate,
of an agreement to deliver possession at a
future day, make any difference in the application of the rule? It is true it does not
appear in the cases cited there were in the
contracts any stipulations as to delivery of
possession at a future day, nor is this circumstance
alluded to, but they explicitly
say it is the passing of the title in equity
which throws the risk of loss upon the vendee, and entitles him to accruing benefits.
To this, as we have seen, a conveyance is
not necessary, nor is payment of the pur-
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chase money or any part of it; for in Hampson V. Edelen, 2 Har. cfe J. 66, this court
has decided that "a contract for land bona
fide made for a valuable consideration vests
the equitable interest in the vendee from the
time of the execution of the contract, although the money is not paid at that time."
NeiSee, also, Siter's Appeal, 26 Pa. 180.
ther can possession nor delivery of possession be necessary, for, if the contract had
been silent on this subject, the vendor would
have had the right to retain possession at
least until the 1st of April, when the first installment of the purchase money was payable, and if the vendee had obtained possession before he would have been restrained
in equity from exercising any acts of ownership prejudicial to the inheritance (Crockford V. Alexander, 15 Ves. 138; Reed v.
Lukens, 44 Pa. 202); and yet the equitable
title would all the while have been in him,
subject to his disposition by deed or will,
If, then, in the aband liable for his debts.
sence of a stipulation to deliver at a future
day, there is an implied right in the vendor to retain possession until that period,
and this would make no difference as to the
liability of the vendee for an intermediate
loss, how can the insertion of such a stipulation have in equity any different effect? The

whole foundation of this doctrine of equity
is that the equitable title and interest passes
by the contract of sale, and from the time
of its execution, and it contemplates delivery of possession as well aa payment of purchase money, and a conveyance at a future
period.
Hence Sir Edward Sugden and Sir
Thomas Plumer both cite, as in exact accord
with the decision of Lord Eldon, the rule of
the civil law, where the very case is put in
the Institutes: "Cum autem emptio et vensit, periculum rei venditse
ditio contracta
statim ad emptorem pertinet, tametsi adhuc
ea res emptori
tradita non sit: Itaque, si
cedes totfe vel aliqua ex parte incendio
consumptae fuerint— emptoris damnum
est, cul
necesse est, licet rem non fuerit nactus, pretium solvere."
In sales of personal property
delivery of the goods sold is not necessary
to pass the title as between the parties,
where the statute of frauds has been gratified by giving something in earnest, or payment of the whole or part of the purchase
money,

or a sufficient

note or memorandum

in writing of the bargain, and in such case
the property is at the buyer's risk before delivery. Franklin v. Tx)ng, 7 Gill & J. 418.
And even where the seller remaining in actual possession agi'ees to deliver the property at a particular place, and it is destroyed

fire before such delivery,
the loss will
on the purchaser.
Terry v. Wheeler,
25 N. Y. 520.
Where sales are made under
authority of a court, the contract is not regarded as consummated until it has received
the court's sanction or ratification, and therefore any loss happening before confirmation
falls upon the vendor.
Ex parte Minor, 11
by

fall
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Ves. 559; Wagner v. Cohen, 6 Gill, 102.
But where a loss occurs after confirmation,
by which the contract is consummated,
it
falls upon the vendee, even though no purchase money

has been paid,

and the vendor

remains in possession.
This was exisressly
decided in Kobertson v. Skelton, 12 Beav.
"In
260,
where Lord Langdale also said:
equity

the

estate

belongs

to the

purchaser

from the date of the order to confirm the report, and the right of possession belongs to
the vendor till the purchase money, for which
it is securitj', has been paid." Again, if we
look to the contract itself, and gather therefrom the intent of the parties, it is clear
from the language used their intention was
that the equitable title and interest should
Upon
pass from the day of its execution.
this point its tenns are too positive and explicit to admit of doubt. Delivery of possession and payment of purchase money were
postponed to a future day for the convenience
and we cannot
of each party respectively,
construe the agreement to deliver into a condition that the contract shall be void if
there is any change in the state or value of
the property on the day of delivery, nor interpolate
any such words into the instruconstrained to hold
ment.
AVe are therefore
the argument founded on this delivery clause
to be unavailing to the appellant.
But it is said specific execution of contracts is in all cases not a matter of absolute
right, but of sound discretion in the court,
and as the vendor cannot now deliver the
house which was the main Inducement to the
vendee to buy, and constituted the chief
value of the property, it would be inequitable to enforce the contract as against him.
If this objection were sound, this doctrine of
losses and benefits could never have been
But, whilst it is conceded an
established.
application for specific performance is always addressed to the sound discretion of
the court, yet where a conti-act respecting
real estate Is in writing, and is in its nature
unobjectionable,
it is as
and circumstances
much a matter of course for a court of equity to decree a specific performance of it as it
is for a court of law to give damages for a
breach of it. Smoot v. Eea, 19 Md. 405; ■2
Eq. Jnr. § 751.
"The fairness or
Story,
hardship of a contract, like all its other
qualities, must be judged of at the time it
was entered into, not by subsequent events."
If It was then certain, mutual, fair in all its
parts, and for an adequate consideration, it is
immaterial that by force of subsequent cirit has become less beneficial to
cumstances
one party, unless such change is in some
way the fault of the party seeking its speRevell v. Hussey, 2 Ball &
cific execution.
B. 2X8: Lawder v. Blachford, Beat. 526;
Webb V. Railway Co., 9 Hare, 129; Low v.
Tread well, 3 Fairf. .')41; Fry, Spec. Pert. 93,
the
Adherence to principle compels
88.
courts to overlook the hardship of particular
cases. But the doctrine upon which this de-

cision rests is founded in strict justice and
equity, for whilst the vendee may think it
hard to be compelled to pay for that which
he cannot have in the condition it was when
he purchased,
the vendor, with equal justice, might think it hard to lose his money
after a bona fide sale of his property, because of an accident accruing to it without
fault on his part.
It is to be remembered
too that whilst the rule burthens the vendee
with a loss it also entitles him to all benefits.
Thus where a reversionary interest is agreed
to be purchased,
and lives drop, or one
agrees to purchase
an estate in consideration of a life annuity to the vendor, and the
cestui que vie dies, or where there is a sudden rise in the value of the land from its being required for a public purpose, before conveyance, in all such cases the vendee reaps
the benefit.
So in the case before us, if a
valuable mine had been discovered on the
premises the day after the contract, or by
any unforeseen or unexpected circumstances
their value had been increased a hundred
fold, the benefit would have resulted to the
vendee, and the vendor could not have been
released
from his contract.
We cannot,
therefore, sustain this objection to the bill.
It appears that at the date of the contract
the vendor held a policy of insurance upon
the house, which by accident he allowed to
expire without renewal before the fire, and
of this the vendee received from him no notice.
A similar state of facts existed in
Paine v. Meller, and was held to constitute
no objection to the vendor's bill.
It is admitted there was no understanding between
the parties that the vendor should keep the
policy alive.
They did not contract on any
such basis.
After the contract the vendee
had an insurable interest In the house, and,
in the absence of all agreement on the subject, the presumption is he intended to protect himself by insuring In his own name, or
to take the risk of a failure to insure.
The
vendor was not bound to keep up the insurance or give notice to the vendee of its having expired.
If the policy had existed at
the time of the loss, the vendor could have
recovered from the insurance company, but,
being trustee of the premises for the vendee,
he would be bound in equity to account to
the latter for the money so received (Reed v.
Lukeus, 44 Pa. 200); but his failure to renew or to give notice cannot deprive him of
his right to enforce the contract of sale.
It also appears there was at the date of
the contract a judgment against the vendor
for $2,363.38, but he had at tliat time entered an appeal from the judgment to the court
of appeals, and given an appeal bond with
security amply suflicient for that purpose to
pay the amount of the judgment with costs,
in case he should fail to prosecute his appeal
with effect.
The authorities are dear that
equity will not compel a vendee to take an
imperfect or defective title, yet cases of high
authority are to be found in which a pe-
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iiuniary charge against which adequate security has been given has been held not to
constitute a defect In title, and also where
equity has enforced the agreement where a
perfect title can be made at the time of the
decree.
But this judgment thus appealed
from, with appeal bond given, does not, in
the sense in which courts of equity use the
terms, maie this such an imperfect or defective or incumbered title as will prevent
specific execution, and especially not where
the decree itself, as that appealed from in
fact does, can protect the vendee by pro-
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viding that the judgment debt may be paid
by him out of the purchase money due on
the conti'act and in discharge thereof.
We have bestowed upon the case our best
care and consideration. We find nothing in
the authorities cited by the appellant's counsel sufficient to overthrow the doctrine upon
which we have based our decision, and can
discover no ground upon which, in justice
and equity, the appellee can be denied the
relief he seeks.
The decree must be affirmed.
Decree affirmed.
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Appeal from circuit court of Rhode Island.
The original bill, filed by the appellant,
Hunt, stated, that Lewis Rousmanier, the intestate of the defendants, applied to the
plaintiff, in January, 1820, for the loan of
offering to give, in addition to his
$1,450,
notes, a bill of sale, or a mortgage of his interest in the brig Nereus, then at sea, as
collateral security for the repayment of the
money.
The sum requested was lent; and
on the 11th of January the said Rousmanier
executed two notes for the amount; and on
the 15th of the same month, he executed a
power of attorney, authorizing the plaintiff
to make and execute a bill of sale of threefourths of the said vessel to himself, or to
any other person; and in the event of the
said vessel, or her freight, being lost, to collect the money which should become due on
a policy by which the vessel and freight
were insured. TUs instrument contained
also, a proviso, reciting, that the power was
given for collateral security for the payment
of the notes already mentioned, and was to
be void on their payment; on the failure to
do which, the plaintiff was to pay the amount
thereof, and all expenses, out of the proceeds
of the said property, and to return the resiThe bill furdue to the said Rousmanier.
ther stated, that on the 21st of March, 1820,
the plaintiff lent to the said Rousmanier the
additional sum of $700, tailing his note for
payment, and a similar power to dispose of
his interest in the schooner Industry, then
also at sea. The bill then charged, that on
the 6th of May, 1820, the said Rousmanier
died insolvent, having paid only $200 on the
The plaintiff gave notice of his
said notes.
claim; and on the return of the Nereus and
Industry, took possession of them, and offered the intestate's interest in them, for sale.
The defendants forbade the sale; and this
bill was brought to compel them to join in it.
The defendants demurred generally, and the
court sustained the demurrer; but gave the
plaintiff leave to amend his biU. Hunt v.
Ennis, 2 Mason, 244, Fed. Gas. No. 6,889.
The amended bill stated, that it was expressly agreed between the parties, that
Rousmanier was to give specific security on
the Nereus and Industry; and that he offeron them.
a mortgage
That
ed to execute
on the subject, who
counsel was consulted
such as
advised, that a power of attorney,
was actually executed, should be taken in
preference to a mortgage, because it was
equally valid and effectual as a security,
and would prevent the necessity of changing
the papers of the vessels, or of taking possession of them on their arrival in port. The
powers were, accordingly, executed, with
the full belief that they would, and with the
intention that they should, give the plaintiff

as full and perfect security as would be
given by a deed of mortgage.
The bill prayed, that the defendants might be decreed to
join in a sale of the interest of their intestate
in the Nereus and Industry, or to sell the
same themselves,
and pay out of the proTo this
ceeds the debt due to the plaintiff.
amended bill, also, the defendants demurred,
and on argument, the demurrer was sustainFrom this deed, and the bill dismissed.
to this court
cree, the plaintiff appealed
The cause was argued at the last term.

Mr. Wheaton, for appellant.
for respondents.

MARSHALL,

Mr. Hunter,

O. J., delivered the opinion
The counsel for the appellant
objects to the decree of the circuit court on
He contends, 1. That this
two grounds.
power of attorney does, by its own operalion, entitle the plaintiff, for the satisfaction
of his debt, to the interest of Rousmanier in
2. Or, if this
the Nereus and the Industry.
be not so, that a court of chancery will, the
being defective, lend its aid to
conveyance
carry the contract into execution, according
to the intention of the parties.
1. We will consider the effect of the power
of attorney. This instrument contains no
words of conveyance or of assignment, but
As
is a simple power to sell and convey.
the power of one man to act for another,
depends on the will and license of that other,
the power ceases, when the wiU, or this perThe general rule,
mission,
is withdrawn.
therefore, is, that a letter of attorney may,
at any time, be revoked by the party who
nmkes it; and is revoked by his death. But
tills general rule, which results from the nature of the act, has sustained some modification.
Where a letter of attorney forms a
part of a contract, and is a security for
money, or for the performance of any act
which is deemed valuable, it is generally
in terms, or if not so, is
made irrevocable,
deemed irrevocable In law. 2 Bsp. 565. Although a letter of attorney depends, from its
nature, on the wUl of the person making it,
and may, in general, be recalled at his will;
yet, if he binds himself, for a consideration,
in terms, or by the nature of his contract,
not to change his will, the law wiU not permit him to change It Rousmanier, therefore, could not, during his life, by any act
of his own, have revoked this letter of attorney. But does it retain its efficacy after
his death? We think, it does not. We think
it well settled, that a power of attorney,
though irrevocable during the life of the party, becomes extinct by his death.
This principle is asserted in Littleton (section 66), by Lord Coke, in his commentary
(52b), and in Willes' Reon that section
ports (105, note, and 565). The legal reason
of the rule is a plain one. It seems founded
on the presumption, that the substitute acts
by virtue of the authority of his principal,
existing at the time the act is performed;
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and on the manner in ■which Jie must execute
his authority, as stated in Combes' Case, 9
Coke, 766.
In that case, it was resolved, that
"when any has authority, as attorney, to do
any act, he ought to do it in his name who
gave the authority."
The reason of this
resolution is obvious.
The title can, regularly, pass out of the person in whom It is
vested, only by a conveyance
In his own
name; and this cannot be executed by another for him, when it could not, in law, be
executed by himself.
A conveyance in the
name of a person, who was dead at the time,
would be a manifest absurdity.
This general doctrine, that a power must
be executed in the name of a person who
gives it, a doctrine founded on the nature
of the transaction, is most usually engrafted In the power itself. Its usual language is,
that the substitute shall do that which he is
empowered to do, in the name of his principal. He is put in the place and stead of
his principal, and is to act In his name.
This accustomed
form is observed In the
instrument under consideration.
Hunt is constituted the attorney, and is authorized to
make, and execute, a regular bill of sale,
Now, as an
in the name of Kousmanier.
authority must be pursued, in order to make
the act of the substitute the act of the principal, it is necessary, that this bill of sale
should be In the name of Rousmanier; and
it would be a gross absurdity, that a deed
should purport to be executed by him, even
by attorney, after his death; for, the attorney is in the place of the principal, capable
of doing that alone which the principal might
do.
This general rule, that a power ceases with
\he life of the person giving it, admits of
If a power be coupled with
one exception.
an "Interest," It survives the person giving
it, and may be executed after his death. As
this proposition Is laid down too positively
in the books to be controverted. It becomes
necessary to inquire, what is meant by the
expression,
"a power coupled with an interest ?" Is It an interest in the subject on which
the power Is to be exercised? or is it an interest in that which Is produced by the exercise of the power? We hold it to be clear,
that the interest which can protect a power,
after the death of a person who creates it,
must be an Interest In the thing Itself. In
other words, the power must be engrafted on
The words theman estate in the thing.
selves would seem to import this meaning.
"A power coupled with an interest," Is a
or Is connected
power which accompanies,
with, an Interest.
The power and the interBut if we
est are united In the same i)erson.
are to understand by the word "interest,"
an interest in that which is to be produced
by the exercise of the power, then they are
The power, to produce the
never united.
interest, must be exercised, and by Its exercise, is extinguished.
The power ceases,
when the interest commences, and therefore.
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cannot, in accurate law language, be said
to be "coupled" with it.
But the substantial basis of the opinion of
the court on this point, is found in the legal
reason of the principle. The Interest or title
in the thing being vested in the person who
gives the power, remains in him, unless it
be conveyed with the power, and can pass
out of him only by regular act In his ovra
name.
The act of the substitute, therefore,
which, in such a case, is the act of the
principal, to be legally effectual, must be in
his name, must be such an act as the principal himself would be capable of performing,
and which would be valid, if performed by
him.
Such a power necessarily ceases with
the life of the person making it But if the
interest,
or estate, passes with the power,
and vests in the person by whom the power
is to be exercised, such person acts In his
own name. The estate, being In him, passes
from him, by a conveyance In his own name.
He Is no longer a substitute, acting in the
place and name of another, but Is a principal, acting in his own name, in pursuance
of powers which limit his estate. The legal
reason which limits a power to the life of the
person giving It, exists no longer, and the
rule ceases with the reason on which It is
The intention of the instrument
founded.
may be effected, without violating any legal
principle.
This idea may be in some degree Illustrated
by examples of cases In which the law is
clear, and which are incompatible with any
other exposition of the term "power coupled
with an interest"
If the word "Interest,"
thus used, indicated a title to the proceeds
of the sale, and not a title to the thing to be
sold, then a power to A., to sell for his own
benefit, would be a power coupled with an
Interest; but a power to A., to sell for the
benefit of B., would be a naked power, which
could be executed only in the life of the perYet, for this distinction,
son who gave It.
no legal reason can be assigned.
Nor is
for, a
there any reason for It in justice;
power to A., to sell for the benefit of B., may
be as much a part of the contract on which
B. advances his money, as if the power had
been made to himself. If this were the true
exposition of the term, then a power to A.,
to sell for the use of B., Inserted in a conveyance to A., of the thing to be sold, would
not be a power coupled with an interest,
and, consequently,
could not be exercised,
after the death of the person making it;
while a power to A., to sell and pay a debt
to himself, though not accompanied
with any
conveyance
which might vest the title in
him, would enable him to make the conveyance, and to pass a title, not In him, even
after the vivifying principle of the power
But every day's exhad become extinct.
perience teaches us, that the law is not, as
We know,
the first case put would suppose.
that a power to A., to seU for the benefit
of B., engrafted on an estate conveyed to

it,

in which parol testimony has been rejected,
are cases in which the agreement itself has
been committed to writing; and one of the
parties has sought to contradict, explain or
vary it, by parol evidence. That in this case,
the agreement is not reduced to writing. The
power of attorney does not profess to be the
agreement, but is a collateral instrument, to
enable the party to have the benefit of
leaving the agreement still in full force, in its
original form. That this parol agreement, not
being within the statute of frauds, would be
enforced by this court, if the power of attorney
had not been executed; and not being merged
In the power, ought now to be executed. That
the power being incompetent to its object, the
court will enforce the agreement against general creditors. This argument is entitled to,
and has received, very deliberate consideration.

The first inquiry respects the fact.
Does
this power of attorney purport to be the
agreement?
Is it an instrument collateral to
the agreement?
Or is it an execution of the
agreement itself, in the form intended by
both the parties
The biU states an offer on
the part of Rousmanier to give
mortgage
on the vessels, either in the usual form, or
In the form of an absolute bill of sale, the
vendor taking a defeasance;
but does not
state any agreement for that particular security. The agreement stated in the bill is,
generally, that the plaintiff, In addition to
the notes of Rousmanier, should have specific
security on the vessel; and
alleges that the
parties applied to counsel for advice respecting the most desirable mode of taking
this security.
On
comparison
of the advantages and disadvantages of
mortgage,
and an irrevocable power of attorney, counsel
advised the latter instrument, and assigned
reasons for his advice, the validity of which
being admitted by the parties, the power of
attorney was prepared and executed, and
was received by the plaintiff as full security
for his loans.
This Is the case made by the
amended bUl; and it appears to the court, to
be a case in which the notes and power of
attorney are admitted to be a complete consummation of the agreement.
The thing
stipulated was a collateral security on the
Nereus and Industry.
On advice of counsel,
this power of attorney was selected, and given as that security.
We think
a complete
execution of that part of the agreement;
as
complete, though not as safe an execution
of it, as a mortgage would have been.
It is contended, that the letter of attorney
does not contain all the terms of the agreement
Neither would a bill of sale, nor a
deed of mortgage, contain them.
Neither instrument constitutes the agreement itself,
but is that for which the agreement stipulated.
The agreement consisted of a loan of
money on the part of Hunt, and of notes for
its repayment, and of a collateral security
on the Nereus and Industry, on the part of
Rousmanier. The money was advanced, the
a

it

a

it

A., may be exercised at any time, and is
not affected by the death of the person who
created it. It is, then, a power coupled with
an interest, although the person to whom it
is given had no interest in its exercise.
His
power is coupled with an interest in the
thing, which enables him to execute it in
his own name, and is, therefore, not dependent on the life of the person who created it.
The general rule, that a power of attorney,
though Irrevocable by the party, during his
life, is extinguished by his death, is not affected by the circumstance,
that testamentary powers are executed after the death of
the testator.
The law, in allowing a testamentary disposition
of property, not only
permits a wUl to be considered as a conveyance, but gives it an operation which is
not allowed to deeds which have their effect
during the life of the person who executes
them.
An estate given by will may take effect at a future time, or on a future contingency, and in the meantime, descends to the
heir.
The power is, necessarily, to be executed after the death of the person who
makes It, and cannot exist during his life.
It is the intention, that it shall be executed
after his death. The conveyance made by
the person to whom it is given, takes effect
by virtue of the will, and the purchaser holds
his title under it. Every case of a power
given in a will, is considered in a court of
chancery as a trust for the benefit of the
person for whose use the power is made,
and as a devise or bequest to that person.
It is, then, deemed perfectly clear, that the
power given in this case, is a naked power,
not coupled with an interest, which, though
irrevocable by Rousmanier himself, expired
on his death.
It remains to inquire, whether
the appellant is entitled to the aid of this
court, to give effect to the Intention of the
parties, to subject the interest of Rousmanier
in the Nereus and Industry to the payment
of the money advanced by the plaintiff, on
the credit of those vessels, tlie instrument
taken for that purpose having totally failed
to effect its object.
This is the point on which the plaintiff most
relies, and is that on which the court has
felt most doubt That the parties intended,
the one to give, and the other to receive, an
effective security on the two vessels mentioned in the bill, is admitted; and the question is, whether the law of this court will
enable it to carry this intent into execution,
when the instrument relied on by both parties has failed to accomplish its object The
insist, that there is no defect
respondents
in the instrument itself; that it contains
precisely what it was intended to contain,
and is the instrument which was chosen by
the parties, deliberately, on the advice of
counsel, and intended to be the consummaThat in sucn a case
tion of their agreement.
the written agreement cannot be varied by
The counsel for the appelparol testimony.
lant contends, with great force, that the cases
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notes were given, and this letter of attorney
was, on advice of counsel, executed and received as the collateral security which Hunt
required.
The letter of attorney is as much
an execution of that part of the agreement
which stipulated a collateral security, as the
notes are an execution of that part which
stipulated that notes should be given.
But this power, although a complete security, diu'ing the life of Rousmanier, has been
The lerendered inoperative by his death.
gal character of the security was misunderThey did not suppose,
stood by the parties.

that the power would, in law, expire with
Rousmanier. The question for the considIf money be
eration of the coiurt is this:
advanced on a general stipulation to give security for its repayment on a specific article;
and the parties deliberately, on advice of
counsel, agree on a particular instrument,
which is executed, but, from a legal quality
Inherent in its nature, that was unknown to
the parties, becomes extinct by the death of
one of them; can a court of equity direct a
new security of a different character to be
given? or direct that to be done which the
parties supposed would have been effected
by the instrument agreed on between them?
This question has been very elaborately
argued, and every case has been cited which
No one
could be supposed to bear upon it
of these cases decides the very question now
It must depend on the
before the court
principles to be collected from them.
It is a general rule, that an agreement in
writing, or an instrument carrying an agreement into execution, shall not be varied by
parol testimony, stating conversations or ciranterior to the written instrucumstances
ment This rule is recognized in courts of
equity as well as in courts of law; but
courts of equity grant relief in cases of
fraud and mistake, which cannot be obtained
in coxurts of law. In such cases, a court of
equity may carry the intention of the parties
into execution, where the written agreement
fails to express that intention. In this ease,
Mistake is
there is no ingredient of fraud.
the sole ground on which the plaintiff comes
into court; and that mistake is in the law.
The fact is, in all respects, what it was supThe instrument taken, is the
posed to be.
But It is,
instrument intended to be taken.
contrary to the expectation of the parties, extinguished by an event not foreseen nor adverted to, and is, therefore, incapable of effecting the object for which it was given.
Does a court of equity, in such a case, substitute a different instrument for that which
has failed to effect its object?
In general, the mistakes against which a
court of equity relieves, are mistakes in fact
The decisions on this subject, though not always very distinctly stated, appear to be
of fact. Yet
founded on some misconception
some of them bear a considerable analogy to
that under consideration. Among these, Is

that class of cases In which a joint obligation has been set up in equity against the
of a deceased obligor, who
representatives
If the principle of
were discharged at law.
these decisions be, that the bond was joint,
from a mere mistake of the law, and that
the court wlU relieve against this mistake, on
the ground of the pre-existing equity, arising
from the advance of the money, it must be
admitted, that they have a strong bearing
But the judges in the
on the case at bar.
courts of equity seem to have placed them
on mistake in fact, arising from the igIn Simpson v.
norance of the draftsman.
Vaughan, 2 Atk. 33, the bond was drawn by
the obligor himself, and under circumstances
which induced the court to be of opinion,
that it was intended to be joint and several.
In Underbill v. Hoi-wood, 10 Ves. 209, 227,
Lord Eldon, speaking of cases in which a
joint bond has been set up against the representatives of a deceased obligor, says, "the
court has inferred, from the nature of the
condition, and the transaction, that it was
That is, the instrumade joint, by mistake.
ment is not what the parties intended lu
fact. They intended a joint and several obligation; the scrivener has, by mistake, prepared a joint obligation."
All the cases in which the coiurt has sustained a joint bond against the representatives of the deceased obligor, have turned upon a supposed mistake in drawing the bond.
It was not until the case of Sumner v. Powell, 2 Mer. 36, that anything was said by
the judge who determined the cause, from
which it might be inferred, that relief in
these cases would be afforded on any other
principle than mistake in fact In that case,
the court refused its aid, because there was
no equity antecedent to the obligation.
In
delivering his Judgment, the master of the
rolls (Sir W. Grant) indicated very clearly
an opinion, that a prior equitable consideration, received by the deceased, was indispensable to the setting up of a joint obligation against his representatives; and added,
"so, where a joint bond has, in equity, been
considered as several, there has been a credit
previously given to the different persons who
have entered into the obligation."
Had this .
case gone so far as to decide, that "the credit
previously given" was the sole ground on
which a court of equity would consider a
joint bond as several, it would have gone far
to show, that the equitable obligation remained, and might be enforced,
after the
legal obligation of the instrument had expired. But the case does not go so far;
it does not change the principle on which the
court had uniformly proceeded, nor discard
the idea, that relief is to be granted, because
the obligation was made joint, by a mistake
The case only decides, that
in point of fact.
this mistake, in point of fact, will not be
presumed by the court, in a case where nc
equity existed antecedent to the obligation.
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where no advantage was received by, and
no credit given to, the person against whose
Yet,
estate the instrument is to be set up.
the course of the court seems to be uniform,
to presume a mistake, in point of fact, in every case where a joint obligation has been
given, and a benefit has been received by the
No proof of actual misdeceased obligor.
tsike is required; the existence of an anteIn cases attendcedent equity is sufficient.
so
ed by precisely the same circumstances,
far as respects mistake, relief will be given
against the representatives of a deceased
obligor, who had received the benefit of the
obligation, and refused against the representatives of him who had not received it.
Yet the legal obligation is as completely extinguished in the one case as in the other;
and the facts stated, in some of the cases in
made,
been
which these decisions
have
would rather conduce to the opinion, that the
bond was made joint, from ignorance of the
legal consequences of a joint obligation, than
from any mistake in fact
The case of Lansdown v. Lansdown, Mos.
364, If It be law, has no inconsiderable bearing on this cause. The right of the heirat-law was contested by a yoimger member
of the family, and the arbitrator to whom
against
the subject was referred decided
him. He executed a deed in compliance with
this award, and was afterwards relieved
against It, on the principle that he was ignorant of his title. The case does not suppose this fact, that he was the eldest son,
to have been unknown to him; and if he was
ignorant of anything, it was of the law,
which gave him, as eldest son, the estate he
had conveyed to a younger brother.
Yet he
was relieved In chancery against this conveyance.
There are certainly strong objections to this decision In other respects; but,
as a case in which relief has been granted
on a mistake in law. It cannot be entirely
disregarded.
Although we do not find the naked principle, that relief may be granted on account
of ignorance of law, asserted In the books,
we find no case in which it has been decided,
that a plain and acknowledged
mistake in
law Is beyond the reach of equity. In the
case of Iiord Irnham v. Child, 1 Brown, Ch.
91, application was made to the chancellor
to establish a clause, which had been, it was
said, agreed upon, but which had been considered by the parties, and excluded from
the written Instrument, by consent
It Is

true, they excluded the clause, from a mistaken opinion that it would make the contract usurious, but they did not believe that
the legal effect of the contract was precisely
the same as if the clause had been inserted.
They weighed the consequences of inserting
and omitting the clause, and preferred the
latter. That, too, was a case to which the
statute applied.
Most of the cases which
have been cited were within the statute of
frauds, and it is not easy to say, how much
has been the influence of that statute on
them.
The case cited by the respondent's counsel
from Precedents In Chancery, is not of this
description; but it does not appear from that
case that the power of attorney was intended, or believed, to be a lien. In this case,
the fact of mistake
is placed beyond any
controversy.
It is averred in the bill, and
admitted by the demurrer, that "the powers
of attorney were given by the said Rousmanier, and received by the said Hunt, under the belief that tbey were, and with the
Intention that they should create, a specifla
lien and security on the said vessels." We
find no case which we think precisely
in
point; and are unwilling, where the effect of
the instrument is acknowledged to have been
entirely misunderstood
by both parties, to
say, that a court of equity is incapable of
affording relief. The decree of the circuit
court is reversed; but as this is a case in
which creditors are concerned, the court, instead of giving a final decree on the demurrer, in favor of the plaintiff, directs the cause
to be remanded, that the circuit court may
permit the defendants to withdraw their demurrer, and to answer the bill.
Decree:
This cause came on to be heard,
on the transcript of the record of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Rhode Island, and was argued by
counsel: on consideration whereof, this court
Is of opinion, that the said circuit court erred,
in sustaining the demurrer of the defendants, and dismissing the bill of the complainant It Is, therefore, decreed and ordered,
that the decree of the said circuit court in
this case be, and the same is hereby, reversed and annulled.
And It Is further ordered, that the said cause be remanded to
the said circuit court, with directions to permit the defendants
to withdraw their demurrer, and to answer the bill of the com-

plainants.
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HUNT

V.

KOUSMANIERE'S
(1 Peters,

Suprene

ADM'KS.

1.)

Court of the United States.
Term,
(See

January

1828.

ante, 170.)

Appeal from the circuit court of Rhode Island. The appellant filed a bill on the chancery side of the circuit court of the United
States for the district of Rhode Island, setting forth that, in January, 1820, Louis
Eousmaniere obtained from him two loans
of money, amounting, together, to $2,150;
and at the time the first loan was made,
Rousmaniere offered to give, in addition to
his notes, a bill of sale, or mortgage, of his
interest in the brig Nereus, then at sea, as
a collateral security for the repayment of
A few days after the delivery of
the money.
the first note, dated 11th of January, 1820,
he executed a power of attorney, authorizing the plaintiff to malie and execute a bill
of sale, of three-fourths of the Nereus, to
himself, or to any other person; and in the
event of the loss of the vessel, to collect the
money which should become due on a policy, by which the vessel and freight were
insured. In the power of attorney, it was
recited that it was given as collateral security for the payment of the notes, and was
to be void on their payment; on the failure of which, the plaintiff was to pay the
amount and all expenses, and to return the
residue to Rousmaniere. On the 21st of
March, 1821, an additional sum of ¥700 was
loaned, for which a note was taken, and
similar power of attorney given, to sell his
interest in the schooner Industry; this vessel being also still at sea.
On the 6th of May, 1820, Rousmaniere
died intestate and Insolvent, having paid
$200 on account of the notes; and the plaintiff gave notice of his claim to the commissioners of insolvency, appointed under the
authority of the insolvent law of Rhode Island. The plaintiff, in his bill, alleged, that,
on the return of the Nereus and Industry,
he took possession of them, and offered the
interest of the intestate in them, for sale;
and the defendants having forbidden the
sale, this bill was brought to compel them
to join in it.
To this bill, the defendants demurred; and
their demurrer was sustained in the circuit
court; but leave was given to the plaintiff
An amended bill was then filed,
to amend.
in which it was stated, that it was expressly agreed between the parties, that Rousmaniere was to give specific security on the
Nereus and Industry, and that he offered to
Counsel was
execute a mortgage on them.
consulted on the subject, who advised that
the power of attorney, which was actually
executed, should be taken in preference to
a mortgage,
because It was equally valid
and effectual as a security, and would prevent the necessity of changing the papers of
the vessels, or of taking possession of them
on their return to port. These securities
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it was alleged, executed, with a full
belief that they would, and with intention
that they should, give to the plaintiff, as full
and perfect a security, as would be given
by a mortgage.
The defendants having also demurred to
the amended bill, the circuit court decided
in favor of the demurrer, and dismissed the
bill; and an appeal was entered to this
At the February session, 1823, this
court.
court considered that the appellant might be
entitled to the relief prayed for in equity,
but the respondents were permitted to withdraw their demurrer, and to file an. answer
8 Wheat. 174, 5 L. Ed.
in the court below.
The answer of the defendants admit589.
ted the loans of money, and the delivery of
the promissory notes, and that but $200 were
The
paid, before the death of the intestate.
execution of the powers of attorney was also
admitted, but it was denied that possession
of the vessels was taken by the appellant;
and they alleged their resistance of the atThe antempt to take possession of them.
swer also asserted ignorance of any agreement for a specific lien on the vessels, except that imported by the language of the
powers of attorney; that they had heard
and believed, that the appellant meant to
be concerned, as a partner, in a voyage of
one of the vessels, which was relinquished,
and that afterwards he offered to loan the
money on security; upon which, the intestate offered to give a mortgage, but the appellant preferred taking the powers of attorney, to avoid inconvenience, and took the
powers of attorney, by advice of counsel.
The answer also stated, that a bill of sale
of the vessels, dated the day before the
death of the intestate, by which the vessels
were Intended to be conveyed to one Bateman, and which the respondents stated, they
had heard and believed;
was intended to be
executed on the evening of that day.
The
answer also alleged the insolvency of Rousmaniere, and that it existed a long time before his death; which they asserted must
have been known to the appellant, and that
the intestate resorted to improper modes to
keep up his credit.
The evidence taken in the case, consisted
of the deposition of Mr. Hazard, the counsel
who drew the papers, and in which he stated, that they were intended by both parties
to have the effect of a specific lien or mortgage, and he advised them, they would have
that effect; and also the deposition of Mr.
Merchant, to show that the appellant admitted, that the motive by which he was induced to make the loan, was to compensate
Rousmaniere for the disappointment sustained by his not uniting with him in a voyand, accordingly,
age of one of his vessels;
an agreement was made, by which the appellant was to let Rousmaniere have a sum
of money, and that he was to give a bill of
but that afterwards
sale of a certain vessel;
he refused to take the same, on account of
the inconvenience and difficulties which

were,
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might attend tbe same; aud that he had
consulted with Mr. Hazard, upon the subject, who told him, that he could or would
draw an irrevocable power of attorney to
sell, which would do as well, or words to that
effect; and which was accordingly done.
The circuit court pronounce a decree, declaring, that the appellant had no specific
lien or security upon either of the vessels,
respecting
and no equity to be relieved
them, and dismissing the bill, with costs;
from which decree, an appeal was entered to
this court.
On the part of the appellant it was contended, that the decree ought to be reversed,
That
and a decree entered for the appellant.
the answers to the bill did not respond to
the only material facts in the cause; it being fully proved, that the powers of attorney were intended to have the effect of a
specific lien, the appellant was entitled to
the relief he sought, upon the principles laid
down in the former decisions of this court.

Kimball & Webster, for appellant. Mr.
Wirt, Atty. Gen., and Mr. Robbins, for appellees.

WASHINGTON, J. This case was before
this court in the year 1823, and is reported
in 8 Wheat. 174, 5 L. Ed. 589, and was then
argued at great length, by the counsel concerned in it.
After full consideration, it was
decided, that the power of attorney given by
Rousmaniere, the intestate, to the appellant.
Hunt, authorizing him to malje and execute
a bill of sale of three-fourths of the Nereus
and of the Industry, to himself, or any other
person, and in the event of their being lost,
to collect the money which should become
due under a policy upon them and their
freiglit, was a naked power, not coupled
with an interest, which, though irrevocable
by Rousmaniere,
in his lifetime, expired on
his death.
That this species of security was agreed
upon, and given under a misunderstanding
by the parties, of its legal character, was
conceded in the argument of the cause by
the bar and bench; and the second question
for the consideration of the court, was,
whether a court of equity could afford relief in such a case, by directing a new security of a difiCerent character to be given?
or by decreeing ihat to be done, which the
parties supposed would have been effected
by the instrument agreed upon?
After an
examination of the cases, applicable to the
general question, it was stated by the chief
justice, who delivered the opinion of the
court, that none of them asserted the najked
principle, that relief could be granted, on the
ground of ignorance of law. or decided, that
a plain and aclinowledged mistake in law,
(vas beyond the reach of a court of equity.
to which he came, is exThe conclusion,
pressed in the following terms: "We find no
case which we think precisely in point; and.
are unwilling, where the effect of the instru-

ment is acknowledged to have been entirely
misunderstood, by both parties, to say, thac
a court of equity is incapable of affording
relief." The decree was, accordingly, reversed;
but the case being one In which
creditors were concerned, the court, instead
of giving a final decree on the demurrer.
In favor of the plaintiff, directed the cause
to be remanded, that the circuit court might
permit the defendants to withdraw their demurrer, .and to answer the bill.
After The cause was returned to that court,
the demurrer was withdrawn, and an answer was filed, in which the defendants,
after admitting the loans mentioned in the
bills, by the plaintiff to their intestate, and
the notes given for the same, by the latter,
and their non-payment; asiiert their ignorance of any agreement between the plaintiff
and their intestate, that the former' should
have a specific security, other than the powers of attorney, to sell vessels and to collect
the proceeds, or, the amount of the policies,
in case they should be lost; but express their
belief, that the powers of attorney were selected by the plaintiff, in preference to the
other securities, which were offered by the
intestate.
The answer further states, that
the estate of Rousmaniere is greatly insolvent, and had been so before his death; that
the plaintiff had exhibited and proved his
demand,
as stated in his bill, before the
commissioners of insolvency, duly appointed
upon the estate of Rousmaniere; and that
his dividend thereon declared, or to be declared, the defendants were, and would be
ready to pay according to law.
The principal deposition,
in the
taken
cause, is that of Benjamin Hazard, counsellor at law, who deposes, that he drew the
powers of attorney, annexed to the original
bill; that on the day the first power was
eiecuted. Hunt and Rousmaniere came to
his oflice, when the latter stated, that the
former had loaned, or agreed to loan, to him,
a sum of money, upon security to be given
by him, on his interest in the brig Nereus,
and that he was desirous the security should
be as ample and avajlable to Hunt, as it
could be made; that he wished and was
ready, to give a bill of sale ot the property,
or a mortgage on it, or any other security,
which Mr. Hunt might prefer. Both the
parties declared, that they had called upon
the witness, to request him to draw the
writings, and to obtain his opinion, as to
the kind of instrument which would give the
most perfect security to the lender.
That
the deponent
then told the parties, that a
bill of sale, or mortgage, would be good
security, but that an irrevocable power of
attorney, such as was afterwards executed,
would be as effectual aud good security, as
either of the others; and would prevent the
necessity of changing the vessel's pajyers,
and of Hunt's taking possession of the vessel, upon her arrival from sea. That the
parties then requested him to draw such
an instrument, as, in his opinion, woul(}
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most effectually and fully secure Mr. Hunt;
and that the plaintiff frequently asked him,
whilst he was drawing the power, and after
he had finished, and read it to the parties,
if he was quite certain, that the power
would be as safe and available to. him, as a
bill of sale or mortgage, and that upon his
assurances that it was, it was then executed.
The witness then proceeds to express his
opinion, from his knowledge of the parties,
and from their declaration at the time, that
Rousmaniere would readily have given an
absolute bill of sale of the property or any
other security which could have been asked;
and that Hunt would not have accepted the
one which was afterwards executed, if he
had not considered it to be as extensive and
perfect a security, in all respects, as an absolute bill of sale; and he adds, more positively, that such was the understanding and
agreement of both the parties. It appears,
by the testimony of this witness, that he
drew the power of attorney concerning the
Industry, for securirg the second loan made
by the plaintiff to Rousmaniere, and that the
circumstances attending that transaction,
were essentially the same as those which
have been stated, in respect to the first loan.
We find another deposition In the record,
which deserves to be noticed, as it consists
of declarations, made by the plaintiff, after
the powers of attorney were executed, and
may serve, in some measiu-e, to explain the
more positive testimony given by Mr. Hazard.
This witness, William Merchant, deposes, that after the decease of Rousmaniere, the plaintiff stated to him, and to a Mr.
Rhodes, that in consequence of his declining
to engage in an enterprise in one of the vessels of Rousmaniere, to which he had at one
time consented,
and of the complaints of
Rousmaniere, on that account, he was induced to offer to Rousmaniere a loan of
money.
That an agreement was accordingly
made, by which he. Hunt, was to let Rousmaniere have a certain sum on loan, and
Rousmaniere was to give him a bill of sale
of a certain vessel; but that, afterwards.
Hunt, reflecting, that If he took that security, he would have to take out papers at
in his own name, be subthe custom-house,
ject to give bonds for the vessel, and perhaps, be made liable for breaches
of law
committed by others, he consulted with Mr.
Hazard upon the subject; who told him,
that he could, or would, draw an irrevocable power of attorney to sell, which would
do as well, and which was accordingly done.
The cause coming on to be heard in the
court below, and that court being of opinion, that the plaintiff had no lien or specific
security upon these vessels, and no equity
to have such lien or security created, against
the general creditors of Rousmaniere, dismissed the bill; from which decree, the
cause has been brought, by appeal, to this
court.
It must be admitted, that the case,
AS it is now presented to the court, is not
materially variant from that which we for-
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merly had to consider; except in relation to
the rights of the general creditors, against
the insolvent estate of a deceased debtor, in
opposition to the equity which a particular
creditor seeks, by this bill, to set up. The
allegations of the bills, filed in this cause,
which were, on the former occasion admitted by the demurrer to be true, are now fully
proved, by the testimony taken in the cause.
Before proceeding to state the general
question, to which the facts in this case give
rise, or the principles of equity which apply
distinctly, to asto it, it will be necessary,
certain, what was the real agreement concluded upon between the plaintiff and the
intestate, the performance of which, on the
part of the latter, was intended to be secured
Was it, that
by the powers of attorney?
Rousmaniere should, in addition to his notes
for the money agreed to be loaned to him by
the plaintiff, give a specific and available
security on the Nereus and the Industry, or
was the particular kind of security selected
by the parties, and did it constitute a part
of the agreement?
It is most obvious, from
the plaintiff's own statement, in his amended
bill, as well as from the depositions appearing in the record, that the agreement was
not closed, until the interview between the
parties to it, with Mr. Hazard, had taken
place.
The amended bill states, that the specific security which Rousmaniere offered to
give, was a mortgage of the two vessels, for
which irrevocable powers of attorney were
substituted, by the advice of Mr. Hazard,
and for reasons, which it would seem, were
approved of and acted upon by the plaintiff. From the testimony of Mr. Merchant,
it would appear, that the security proposed
by Rousmaniere was a bill of sale of the
vessels, which the plaintiff declined accepting, for reasons of his own, uninfiuenced by
any suggestions of Mr. Hazard, who merely
proposed the powers of attorney as a substitute for the other forms of security which
had been offered by Rousmaniere.
The difference
between
these statements
is not
very material, since it is apparent, from both
of them, that the proposed seciu-ity, by Irrevocable powers of attorney, was selected by
the plaintiff, and Incorporated into the agreement, by the assent of both the parties.
The powers of attorney do not contain, nor
do they profess to contain, the agreement of
the parties; but was a mere execution of
that agreement, so far as it stipulated to
give to the plaintiff, a specific security on
the two vessels, in the mode selected and
approved of by the parties; to which extent, it was a complete
consummation of
the agreement.
Such was the opinion of
this court, upon a former discussion of this
cause, In the year 1823, and such is its presUpon this state of the case, the
ent opinion.
general question to be decided, is the same
now that it formerly was, and is that which
has already been stated.
There are certain principles of equity, applicable to this question, which, as general
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principles, we hold to be incontrovertible.
The first Is, that where an Instrument is
drawn and executed, which professes, or is
intended, to carry into execution an agreement, whether in writing or by parol, previously entered into, but which, by mistake
of the draftsman, either as to fact or law,
does not fulfil, or which violates, the manifest intention of the parties to the agreement, equity will correct the mistake, so as
to produce a conformity of the instrument
to the agreement.
The reason is obvious:
the execution
of agreements, fairly and legally entered into, is one of the peculiar
and if the
branches of equity jurisdiction;
instrument which is intended to execute the
agreement, be, from any cause, insufficient
for that purpose, the agreement remains as
much unexecuted, as if one of the parties
had refused, altogether, to comply with his
engagement;
and a court of equity will, in
jurisdiction,
the exercise of its acknowledged
afford relief in the one case, as well as in
the other, by compelling the delinquent party
fully to perform his agreement, according to
the terms of it, and to the manifest intention
So, if the mistake exist, not
of the parties.
in the instrument, which is intended to give
but in the agreeeffect to the agreement,
ment itself, and is clearly proved to have
been the result of ignorance of some material fact, a court of equity will, in general,
grant relief, according to the nature of the
particular case in which it is sought. Whether these principles, or either of them, apply
to the present case, must, of course, depend upon the real character of the agreement under consideration. It it has been
correctly stated, it follows, that the instrument, by means of which the specific security was to be given, was selected by the
parties to the agreement, or rather by the
plaintiff; Rousmaniere having proposed to
give a mortgage or bill of sale of the vessels,
which the plaintiff, after consideration, and
advice of counsel, thought proper to reject,
for reasons which were entirely satisfactory
That the form of the instruto himself.
ment, so chosen by the plaintiff, and prepared by the person who drew it, conforms
not, in every respect, to the one agreed upon,
is not even asserted in the bill, or in the
argument of counsel.
The avowed object of
the plaintiff was, to obtain a valid security,
but in such a manner, as that the legal interest in the property should remain with Rousmaniere, so that the plaintiff might be under
no necessity to take out papers at the custom-house, in his own name, and might not
be subject to give bonds for the vessels, or
to liabilities for breaches of law, committed
by those who were intrusted with the manThat the general intenagement of them.
tion of the parties was, to provide a security,
of the vessels
as effectual as a mortgage
would be, can admit of no doubt; and if
such had been their agreement, the insufficiency of the instruments to effect that ob■ject, which were afterwards prepared, would

furnished a ground for the interposition of a court of equity, which the representatives of Rousmaniere could not easily
have resisted.
But the plaintiff was not satisfied to leave the kind of security which he
was willing to receive, undetermined; having finally made up his mind, by the advice
of his counsel, not to accept of a mortgage,
or bill of sale, in nature of a mortgage.
He
thought it safest, therefore, to designate the
instrument; and having deliberately done so,
it met the view of both parties> and was
as completely incorporated into their agreement, as were the notes of hand for the sum
intended to be secured.
In coming to this
determination, it is not pretended, that the
plaintiff was misled by ignorance of any
fact, connected with the agreement
which
If, then, the
he was about to conclude.
agreement was not founded in a mistake of
any material fact and if it was executed in
strict conformity with itself; we think it
would be unprecedented,
for a court of
equity to decree .another security to be given,
not only different from that which had been
agreed upon, but one which had been deliberately considered and rejected by the party
now asking for relief; or to treat the case,
as if such other security had in fact been
agreed upon and executed.
Had Rousmaniere after receiving the money agreed to be
loaned to him, refused to give an irrevocable
power of attorney, but offered to execute
a mortgage of the vessels, no court of equity
could have compelled the plaintiff to accept
Or, if he had totally
the security so offered.
refused to execute the agreement, and the
plaintiff had filed his bill, praying that the
defendant might be compelled to execute a
mortgage. Instead of an iri-evocable power of
attorney; could that court have granted the
relief specifically asked for? We think not.
Equity may compel parties to perform their
agreements,
when fairly entered into, according to their terms; but it has no power
to make agreements
for parties, and then
compel them to execute the same.
The former is a legitimate branch of its jurisdiction, and in its exercise, is highly beneficial
to society; the latter is without its authority, and the exercise of it would be not only
an usurpation of power, but would be highly mischievous in its consequences.
If the court could not have compelled the
plaintiff to accept, or Rousmaniere to execute, any other instrument than the one
which had 'been agreed upon between them,
the ease is in no respect altered, by the
death of the latter, and the consequent inefflclency
of the particular security which
had been selected; the objection to the relief asked for, being in both cases the same,
namely, that the court can only enforce the
performance of an agreement, according to
its terms, and to the intention of the parties; and cannot force upon them a different agreement.
That the intention of the
parties to this agreement, was frustrated,
by the happening of an event, not thought
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yf, probably, by them, or by the counsel who
ivas consulted upon the occasion,
Is manliest.
The kind of security which was
chosen, would have been equally effectual, for
the purpose intended, with a mortgage, had
Rousmaniere lived until the power had been
executed;
and it may, therefore, admit of
some doubt, at least, whether the loss of the
intended security is to be attributed to a
want of foresight, in the parties, or to a
mistake of the counsel, in respect to a matter of law,. The case will, however, be considered in the latter point of view.
The question, then, is, ought the court to
grant the relief which is asked for, upon the
ground of mistake arising from any ignorance of law?
We hold the general rule to
be, that a mistake of this character is not a
ground for reforming a deed founded on such
mistake; and whatever exceptions there may
be to this rule, they are not only few in
number, but they will be found to have
something peculiar in their characters.
The strongest case which was cited and
relied upon by the appellant's counsel, was
that of Lansdown v. Lansdown, reported in
Admitting, for the present, the auMos. 364.
thority of this case, it is most apparent,
from the face of it, that the decision of the
court might well be supported, upon a principle not involved in the question we are
examining. The subject which the court
had to decide, arose out of a dispute between an heir-at-law, and a younger member
of the family, who was entitled to an estate
descended;
and this question the parties
agreed to submit to arbitration.
The award
being against the heir-at-law, he executed a
<Jeed in compliance with it, but was relieved
against it, on the principle, that he was
ignorant of his title. If the decision of the
court proceeded upon the ground, that the
plaintiff was ignorant of the fact that he
was the eldest son, it was clearly a case
proper for relief, upon a principle which has
already been considered.
If the mistake
was of his legal rights, as heir-at-law, it is
not going too far, to presume, that the opinion of the court may have been founded
upon the belief, that the heir-at-law was imposed upon by some unfair representations
of his better informed opponent; or that his
ignorance of a legal principle, so universally
understood by all, where the right of primogeniture forms a part of the law of descents,
demonstrated
a degree of mental imbecility,
which might well entitle him to relief. He
acted, besides,
under the pressure of an
award, which was manifestly repugnant to
law, and for aught that is stated in this case,
this may have appeared upon the face of it.
But if this case must be considered as an
•exception from the general rule which has
been mentioned; the circumstances attending it, do not entitle it, were it otherwise objectionable, to be respected as an authority,
but in cases which it closely resembles.
There is a class of cases which, it has
■been supposed, forms an exception from this
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general rule, but which will be found, upon
examination, to come within the one which
The cases alluded to, are
was first stated.
those in which equity has afforded relief
against the representatives of a deceased
obligor, in a joint bond, given for money
lent to both the obligors, although such representatives were discharged at law. The
principle upon which these cases manifestly
proceed, is, that the money being lent to
both, the law raises a promise in both to
pay, and equity considers the security of the
bond as being intended, by the parties, to
be co-extensive
with this implied contract
by both to pay the debt. To effect this intention,
the bond should have been made
joint and several; and the mistake in the
form, by which it is made joint, is not in the
agreement of the parties, but in the execution of it by the draftsman. The cases m
which the general rule has been adhered to,
are, many of them, of a character
which
strongly test the principle upon which the
rule itself is founded.
Two or three only
need be referred to. If the obligee, in a
joint bond, by two or more, agree with one
of the obligors, to relieve him from his obligation, and does accordingly execute a release, by which all the obligors are discharged at law, equity will not afford relief
against this legal consequence, although the
release was given under a manifest misapprehension of the legal effect of it, in relation to the .other obligors. So, in the case
of Worrall v. Jacob, 3 Merv. 271, where a
person having a power of appointment and
revocation, and, under a mistaken supposition, that a deed might be altered or revolted, although no power of revocation had
been reserved,
executed the power of appointment, without reserving a power of revocation; the court refused to relieve against
the mistake. The case of Lord Irnham v.
Child, 1 Brown, Ch. 92, is a verj' strong one
in support of a general rule, and closely resembles the present, in most of the material
circumstances attending it. The object of
the suit was to set up a clause containing a
power of redemption, in a deed granting an
annuity, which, it was s.aid, had been agreed
upon by the parties, but which, after deliberation, was excluded by consent, from a
mistaken opinion, that it would render the
contract usurious. The court, notwithstanding the omission manifestly proceeded upon
a misapprehension
of the parties as to the
law, refused to relieve, 'by establishing the
rejected clause.
It is not the Intention of the court, in the
case now under consideration, to lay it
down, that there may not be case in which
a court of equity will relieve against a plain
mistake,
arising from ignorance of law.
But we mean to say, that where me parties,
upon deliberation and advice, reject one species of security, and agree to select another,
under a misapprehension of the law as to
the nature of the security so selected, a
court of equity will not, on the ground of
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such misupprehenslon, and the insufficiency
of such security, in consequence of a subsequent event,
or
perhaps,
not foreseen,
thought of, direct a new security, of a different character, to be given, or decree that
to be done, which the parties supposed would
have been effected by the instrument which
was finally agreed upon.
If the court would not Interfere In such a
case, generally, much less would it do so in
favor of one creditor, against the general
creditors of an insolvent estate, whose equity
Is, at least, equal to that of the party seeking to obtain a preference,
and who, in
point of law, stand upon the same ground
with himself. This is not a bill asking for
a specific performance of an agreement to
execute a valid deed for securing a debt; In

which case, the party asking relief would be
entitled to a specific lien; and the court
would consider the debtor as a ti'ustee for
the creditor, of the property on which the
security was agreed to be given.
The agreement has been fully executed, and the only
complaint is, that the agreement itself was
founded upon a misapprehension of the law,
and the prayer is to be relieved against the
consequences of such mistake. If all other
difficulties were out of the way, the equity
of the general creditors to be paid their
debts equally with the plaintiff, would, we
think, be sufficient to induce the court to
leave the parties where the law has placed
them.
The decree is to be affirmed, with
costs.
Decree affirmed.
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there was no fraud; and the mistake
was not one of fact, but of law.
In this state Jurisdiction in equity in cases
of "mistake" is expressly conferred by statute; nor is it, in terms, limited to mistakes
of fact. The legislature may be presumed
to have used the word as generally understood in equity proceedings; and therefore we
shall have to inquire whether courts of equity
have been accustomed to grant relief in cases
like the one before us.
This question has frequently arisen in this
country and in England, and authorities are
not wanting in both countries in support of
the doctrine
that no distinction should be
made between mistakes of law and mistakes
of fact.
It is quite true, as Judge Bedfield observes
(1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 130, note), "that the distinction between mistakes of law and mistakes of fact, so far as equitable relief is concerned, is one of policy rather than of principle"; and yet it may not be the less necessary to maintain and observe it. No government could be administered
at all, under
which ignorance of the criminal law should
be held a sufficient excuse for violating it;
and the same principle is applicable to the
civil law. This is not on the ground that
every one is presumed to know the law; for,
though this is often repeated as an axiom,
a presumption
so variant from the truth cannot be recognized by the law. The ground
on which the doctrine rests is this, that it is
cause

Me. 78.)
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Fox,

DAVIS, J. Jonathan Stevens, tbe father
of the parties to this suit, died in November,
leaving personal property valued at
1857,
about $3,000,
and real estate worth nearly
The plaintiff, being a widow, had
$5,000.
worked in his family for many years, receiving therefor one dollar a week.
A short time
before his death he gave her a life lease of
his homestead in Portland, worth about $2,000, to take effect upon his decease.
Whether he did this for the reason that he thought
that he had not paid her enough for her services, or because she needed a larger share
of the property than the other heirs, does not
appear, and is immaterial. He died intestate,
leaving seven children, and the issue of another not living.
The property leased to the plaintiff was described
as situated
"on Chestnut
street."
After the death of her father, the plaintiff had
the lease altered so as to read "Wilmot
street."
This was done at the suggestion of
some of the defendants; and besides, as the
property was otherwise sufficiently described,
the mistake of the street did not affect the
lease, and the alteration was immaterial.
It is contended that the lease was void because it was not to take effect until a future
day; but, whatever may have been supposed
to be the law in regard to the validity of
deeds to take effect In futuro, it is now well
settled in this state that such deeds are not
for that reason void. Wyman v. Brown, 50
Me. 139.
But some of the defendants thought the
lease to the plaintiff was invalid, and so informed her. Taking their testimony as true,
which we do not question, they did not intentionally deceive her on this point.
They actually thought there was a defect of which
they could take advantage.
She was unlearned in every respect, not being able to
write her own name. It is evident that she
put confidence in them, believing them to be
better informed than herself; and supposing,
from their representations,
that her title to
the homestead, by the lease, had failed, she
was induced by them to relinquish all her
interest in the whole estate of her father, in
consideration of a new life lease from them of
the same property embraced in her first lease.
One-eighth
of the estate, subject to her
life interest in the homestead, must have
been worth nearly or quite eight hundred
dollars.
This she conveyed to them. Their
new lease to her was of no value whatever;
for the title was already in her. Can she obtain relief in equity?
It is claimed that she has no remedy,

be-

impossible to uphold the government, and so
to maintain its administration as to protect
public and private rights, except on the principle that the rights and liabilities of every
one shall be the same as if he knew the law.
If all contracts made in ignorance of the
law were to be held invalid, there would be
no certainty in business and no security in
titles. AH rights of property would be endangered, and the most important encouragements for industry and enterprise would be
taken away.
It is indispensable, therefore,
that the obligation
of contracts should be
maintained, unless there is some stronger reason for annulling them than a mere mistake
of the law. Champlin v. Daytin, 18 Wend.
407.

This question is discussed at length by
Judge Story, and nearly all the English and
American authorities are referred to, and
many of them examined.
1 Story, Eq. Jur.
c. 5 (Redf.
But while the weight of
Ed.).
authority is clearly against granting relief
merely on account of a mistake of the law,
it seems to be conceded in nearly all the
cases, and expressly decided in many of them,
that there are exceptions to this rule. Hunt
V. Rousmanier, 1 Pet. 15; Bank v. Daniel, 12
Pet. 32.
Instead of saying that there are "exceptions" to the rule, it would probably be more
correct to say that, while relief will never
be granted merely on account of the mistake
of the law, there are cases where there are
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other elements, not in themselves sufHcient to
authorize the court to interpose, but which,
combined with such a mistalie, will entitle
the party to relief.
It is important therefore
to inquire what it is that, with a mistake of
the law, will justify the interposition of the
court, where there is no fraud, or accident, or
mistake of fact.
If a party, who himself knows the law,
should deceive another, by misrepresenting
the law to him, or, knowing him to be ignorant of it, should therein take advantage
of him, relief would be granted on the ground
of fraud. So that such a case is within neither the rule nor the exception.
It has sometimes been said that when money or other property has been obtained under a mistake of the law, which the defendant ought not in good conscience to retain, he
Northrup
should be compelled to restore it.
V. Graves, 19 Conn. 548; Stedwell v. Anderson, 21 Conn. 139.
This is just as a principle, but entirely indefinite as a rule.
It proposes nothing but the opinion of the court in
each case, on a matter In regard to which
there may be great differences
of opinion.
It overlooks the public interests involved in
maintaining the obligation of contracts.
Generally, as between the parties, a mistake of
law has as equitable a claim to relief as a
mistake of fact.
It is believed that in nearly all such cases,
where relief has been granted, in addition
to the intrinsic equity in favor of the plaintiff, two facts have been found, (1) that
there has been a marked disparity in the position and intelligence of the parties, so that
they have not been on equal terms;
and (2)
that the party obtaining the property persuaded or induced the other to part with it,
so that there has been "undue influence" on
the one side and "undue confidence" on the
Eq. 120.
1 Story's
other.
^^'hen property
has been obtained under such circumstances,
and by such means, courts of equity have
never hesitated
to compel its restoration,
though both the parties acted under a mistake of the law; and there would be still
stronger reasons for granting relief in such
a case, if the party from whom the property
had been obtained had been led into his mistake of the law by the other partry. Sparks
V. "White, 7 Humph. 86; Fitzgerald v. Peck, 4

Litt. (Ky.) 127.
Thus, in Pickering v. Pickering, 2 Beav.
31, Lord Langdale set aside certain agreements entered into under a mistake of the
law, on the ground that "the parties were
not on equal terms," and that the plaintiff
acted under the Influence of the defendant;
and the same thing was done in Wheeler v.
Smith, 9 How. 55, because the parties "did
not stand on equal ground," and the plaintiff
"did not act freely, and with a proper understanding of his rights."
This question has arisen more frequently
In cases where parties have been mistaken in
Thus,
regard to their titles to real estate.

in Bingham v. Bingham, 1 Ves. 126, the defendant sold to the plaintiff property which
he already owned, and the court compelled a
restoration
of the purchase money.
It may
been, as Bronson, J., suggests,
have
in
Champlin v. Laytin, 18 Wend. 407, on the
ground that the defendant "misled" the plaintiff in regard to his title; but the correctness
of the decision is not questioned by Lord C5ottenham, In Stewart v. Stewart, 6 Clark &

F.

964.

Judge

Story suggests that such a case
"seems to involve, in some measure, a mistake of fact,— that is, of the fact of ownership, — arising from a mistake of the law."
1

And, in King v.
Story, Bq. Jur. §§ 122, 130.
Doolittle, 1 Head, 77, the decision is put on
But, if all the other facts are
that ground.
agreed and known to the parties, the question of "ownership" can be nothing but one
of law;
and in such cases, as in others,
courts of equity should not interfere, unless
it appears that there was a difference in the
condition of the parties, so that, instead of
both acting voluntarily, one was misled or
unduly influenced by the other. Nor will the
court then interpose, in the absence of fraud,
unless the defendant, as well as the plaintiff, can be restored substantially to the same
situation as before. Crocier v. Acer, 7 Paige,
187.

Nor where there is a real controversy
tween
doubt,

be-

parties, and the case is one of any
will the court set aside a compromise
fairly made by them, though it should afterwards appear that one has thereby received
property to which he was not legally entitled.
Steele v. White, 2 Paige, 478; Trigg v. Reed,
5 Humph. 529.
On the contrary, courts of
equity
encourage
compromises;
such
but
here, too, as In other cases, if the parties are
not on equal terms, and one misleads
the
other, and obtains property thereby against
right and equity, as well as against law, he
will be compelled to restore it. "If a party,
acting in Ignorance of a plain and settled
principle of law," says the vice chancellor,
Sir John Leach, "is induced to give up a portion of his indisputable property under the
name of a compromise, a court of equity will
relieve him from the consequences
of his
mistake." Naylor v. Winch, 1 Sim. & S. 564.
And though this was a dictum, the principle was fully applied by the supreme court
of the United States In Wheeler v. Smith,
previously cited. And the same doctrine has
been recognized by this court in the case of
Freeman v. Curtis, 51 Me. 140.
And, in
both of these cases, relief was granted, not
on the ground that a mistake of the law
alone entitles one to relief, but that, though
there be no actual fraud, if one is unduly influenced and misled by the other to do that
which he would not have done but for such
influence, and he has In consequence conveyed to the other property without any contherefor, or purchased
sideration
what was
already legally his own, the court will. If it
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cair be done, restore both of the parties to the
same condition as before.
The ease at bar is one of this kind. The
parties were not on equal terms.
The plaintiff was ignorant, in business affairs, as well
as in other respects.
Having confidence in
the defendants,
she relied upon what they
told her. It does not appear that she doubted the validity of her father's lease to her,
until such doubts were communicated to her
from them.
The proposition for her to release her interest in all the other property
did not originate with her, but with them;
and she was induced to accept it by the fear
which they had impressed upon her that she
otherwise would have to give up the homeThey
stead. She acted under their Influence.
believed that there was a defect in the first
lease, and they meant to take advantage of

183

it. As was said by the master of the rolls,
afterwards Lord Kenyon, in Evans v. Llewellyn, 1 Ooxe, 333, "though there was no fraud,
there was something like fraud, for an undue
The
advantage was taken of her situation.
party was not competent to protect herself,
and therefore this court is bound to afford
her such protection."
The bill is sustained, with costs; and the
defendants must be decreed to pay her a distributive share of the personal estate, vnth
interest from the time of distribution, making her equal with them, and to release to
her on(^eight,h of all the real estate, and account to her for her share of the rents atid
profits of the portion not occupied by her.

APPLETON, O. J., and KENT, WALTON,
DICKERSON, JJ., concurred.

and
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v.

Iowa, 484.)
Supreme Court of Iowa.
March 23,
(8 N. W. 322,

Appeal from circuit

court,

Warren

1881.

coun-

ty.

Action at law against the Indorser of a
promissory note. Defendant set up an equitable defense, and the relief prayed for
therein was granted him by the decree of the
circuit court.
Plaintiff appeals.
Seevers & Sampson, for appellant.
Neil, for appellee.

The
by them, constitutes their contract
written instrument is made the evidence of
If it falls to present their
that contract
agreement the contract It expresses Is not
the agreement of the parties, and the true
In such a case
contract remains unexecuted.
equity will reform the writing, causing
it to express the intentions of the parties.
This relief will be granted without regard to
the cause of the failure of the Instrmnent
to express the true contract, whether it be
from fraud, mistake in the use of language,
or any other thing which prevented the exof the intentions of the parties.
pression
familiar rule of
4. But there Is another
equity upon which plaintiff relies to defeat
to this
the application of these doctrines
case, namely, relief will not be granted to
correct mistakes at law.
The rule has no application to mistakes in
the language of a contract, or in the choice
of the form of an instrument, whereby it
has an effect different from the intention of
If parties, intending to sell and
the parties.
purchase lands, should, in ignorance of its
ed

55

H. Mc-

BECK, J. 1. The defendant, being the
payee of a negotiable promissory note, transferred it to plaiutltc by the following indorsement:
"For value received, I assign
the within note to James Stafford.
[Signed]
H. J. Fetters." The action was brought at
law upon this indorsement.
The defendant
pleaded an equitable defense, wherein he substantially alleged that, by the agreement
under which the note was transferred, the
plaintiff was to take the note without recourse upon defendant, and that the parties
adopted the form of transfer as expressing
such agreement, and neither of them at the
time intended that it should have any other
effect than to express the agreement between
them, and neither knew that it did have the
effect which the law gives to such instruDefendant,
ments.
upon this answer, as in
a cross-bill, prays that the indorsement
be
reformed so as to express the true agreement made and intended to be set out by the
parties, and that other proper relief be granted.
A demurrer to this count of the answer
was overruled, and the issues raised by this
pleading were tried as an action in chancery.
It is triable here de novo.
2. The evidence very satisfactorily establishes the facts set up in the equitable depositively and exfense.
The defendant
plicitly testifies that the agreement required him to transfer the note without liability; that he had no intention to express any
different
contract by the indorsement,
and
was Ignorant of the legal effect of the instrument;
and that plaintiff expressly
disclaimed that he expected or desired defendant to become bound for the payment of the
Six witnesses positively and strongly
note.
testimony.
They
defendant's
corroborated
between the parties
heard the conversation
the indorsement
signed
defendant
when
The plaintiff, in his testimony, denies the
We must accept
of defendant.
statement
the facts of the case presented by the testiand hia witnesses.
We
mony of defendant
are required to determine whether, upon these
facts, equity will grant relief to defendant
by reforming the indorsement upon the note
so that it will express the real contract of
the parties.
3. The agreement of the parties, the meeting of their minds upon the conditions and
obligations touching the subject contemplat-

legal

effect,

execute

a

lease,

equity

would

reform the instrument, though it was a mistake of law which led them to adopt it.
This mistake, it will be noticed, affects the
They invery contract the parties intended.
But
tended a deed, but a lease was made.
where two are bound by a bond, and the
obligee releases one, mistakingly believing
that the other will remain bound, equity will
not grant him relief, for the reason that the
release is just what he intended it to be;
his mistake related to the effect of the conti'act in matters not contemplated
therein.
The mistakes of law against which equity
will riot relieve are those which pertain to
the subject of the contract,
and were inthereto, or considerations
theresuch cases the parties intended to
make the very contracts which they executed,
but were induced to make them by a misducements

for.

In

take of law.
Further illustrations taken from the books
make our expression
of the rules plainer.
A tenant for life purchased a reversion under the mistake of law that such purchase
would cut off the remainder in tail and vest
the fee in him.
It was held that he could
not have relief. A power of attorney was
taken from a debtor as a security; bvit the
debtor died before the power was executed.
Equity would not grant relief. In each of
these cases the very contracts entered into
by the parties were embodied in the instruments.
The mistakes were as to the results
to be reached which were Inducements to the
In the first case the purchaser
contracts.
supposed that the acquisition of the reversion
would vest in him the fee-simple title. This
was the inducement
It
for the purchase.
was a mistake of law. In the second case
it was the purpose of the parties to secure
They mistakenly
the payment of the debt
chose a power of attorney to effect their

MISTAKE OF LAW.
object. But their purpose was defeated by
the law which provides that the death of the
grantor revokes a power of attorney.
In
these cases, it will be observed, the instruments were of the character intended by the
parties.
The mistakes pertained to the effect
of the instruments upon the rights of the
parties not contemplated by the contracts or
provided for therein.
But, on the other hand, when parties enter into an agreement, which, through mistake of law or fact, they reduce to writing,
and the Instrument fails to express their true
agreement, or omits stipulations agreed upon, or contains terms contrary to the intention of the parties, equity will reform the
writing, making it conform to the agreement
eiitered into by the parties.
The doctrines we have stated are familiar
They have ample support
to the profession.
in the authorities. See Noulln v. Pyne, 47
Iowa, 293; Hunt v. Rosemaniers, 8 Wheat.
174, 1 Pet. 1; 1 Story, Bq. Jur. §§ 113, 116,
et seq., and cases cited; Kerr, Fraud & M.
(Am. Ed.) 396 et seq., and page 418 and
Reynolds v. Meelick, 17 Iowa,
cases cited;
585.

In

before us the parties agreed
that plaintiff should taKe the note without
They mistakenly
on defendant.
recourse
supposed that the form of assignment of the
note would have that effect, being ignorant
the

case
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of the provisions of the law of commercial
paper which makes the indorser liable in
case of default of the maker of the note.
This was a mistake of the law, but it pertained to the instrument itself, and, by reason of it, the writing does not express the
Equity will
true agreement of the parties.
reform it.
Glenn v. Statlee, 42 Iowa, 107, and Moorman V. Collier, 32 Iowa, 138, are not in conIn
flict with our conclusions just expressed.
each case the mistake was not in expressing
The
the contract, but as to its legal effect.
parties
executed an instrument expressing
the very contract intended, but the instruments had a legal effect unknown to, and not
intended by, the parties.
These decisions
are also distinguishable
from the case at bar by the fact that in each
of them the rights of persons other than
the parties to the contracts
are involved.
They were actions upon delivery bonds.
Creditors not parties thereto were beneficiaries. The law will, in such cases, rather impose hardship upon the parties who made a
mistake than upon one chargeable with no
fault.
We reach the conclusion that the circuit
court correctly rendered a decree reforming
the assignment
indorsed upon the note, and
dismissing plaintiff's petition.
Aflli-med.
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October

Term,

L. A.
E. W. Wbelpley, for demurrer.
Chandler and F. T. Prellnghuysen, contra.

THE CHANCELLOR.

The following are
The
material facts stated in the bill:
complainant is the owner of a farm in the
The defendants, in the
county of Morris.
construction of their railroad, made an excavation through the complainant's farm of
about live hundi-ed feet in length, and varying from five to tvyelve feet deep. Commissioners were called under the charter of the
company,
who assessed the complainant's
damages at six hundred and eighty dollars.
From this award the complainant appealed
to the inferior court of common pleas of the
county of Morris, in which court he was entitled to review the award and to a trial by
.lury.
Before the time for hearing arrived,
Samuel B. Halsey and Freeman Wood represented to the complainant that they were
acting for and on behalf of the railroad company, and proposed to submit the matters in
difference to three arbitrators, to be selected
by the parties, to which the complainant assented.
The arbitrators were selected, and
The
the submission was reduced to writing.
same matters were submitted to the arbitrators as were before, and acted upon by the
appointed under and by vircommissioners
tue of the charter. By the ninth section of
the charter of the company, they are obliged
to construct and keep in repair good and sufficient bridges or passages over or under the
said railroad or roads, where any public or
other road shall cross the same; and also,
where the railroad shall intersect any farm
or lands of any individual, to provide and
keep in repair suitable wagonways over or
under said road, so that he may pass the
same;
and if the company neglect to perform the said duty, after giving tvrenty days'
notice to the company, the owner of the land
may do it himself, and recover the valuation
by common process of law.
The arbitrators, thus selected, proceeded
the

to discharge the duties imposed upon them
in the presence of the complainant,
and of
Halsey and Wood, who appeared and acted
During their deon behalf of the company.
liberations, the complainant stated that he
should require a suitable wagonway over the
railroad, where it crossed his farm. This
was assented to, but Halsey and Wood stated that this was a matter with which the
arbitrators had nothing to do, and was no
part of the submission,
but was an independent duty, imposed upon the company by
This view was acquiesced in
tlieir charter.
by the arbitrators and by all parties, and
it is admitted to have been a correct view.
The arbitrators awarded that the company
should pay to the complainant eight hundred

dollars for his damages.
In awarding this
amount, they did not take into consideration
the matter of bridges or crossings.
Soon after the award was completed,
Halsey and
"N^'ood went to the complainant with eight
hundred dollars, and with a deed, prepared
and ready for execution, from the complainant and his wife to the company.
The complainant objected to signing the deed on the
ground that it did not, in express words, reserve all his rights as to a crossing or
bridges over the railroad. Halsey and Wood
assured him that such rights were not at all
affected by the deed. The deed was a special one in its character.
Mr. Halsey was a
lawyer by profession.
The complainant knew
this, and he relied upon his integrity, as
well as his professional learning. Upon Mr.
Halsey's reassurances
that the deed was a
one, and did not compromise
proper
the
complainant's rights to proper crossings over
the road, he received the monej', and executed and delivered the deed to Halsey and
They delivered it to the company,
Wood.
giving the officers full knowledge of all that
had occurred.
The complainant gave notice
to the company to construct a bridge over
their railroad where it crosses his land, and
upon the company's neglecting to do so the
complainant himself constructed the bridge
at an expense exceeding seven hundred dollars. He then instituted a suit in the supreme court against the company, under the
ninth section of their charter, to recover the
value of the work done. The company set
up, as a plea in bar to the recovery, the deed
given by the complainant to the company.
This bill is brought to relieve the complainant from legal effect of that deed. The bill
prays that the deed may be reformed, and
that the defendants may be enjoined from
setting up the deed in bar to the complainant's action at law. To this bill the defendants have filed a general demurrer.
The principal ground urged in support of
the demurrer is that the object of the bill is
to correct a mistake of law, and that the
maxim is that ignorance of law furnishes no
excuse to a person either for a breach or for
an omission of a duty, ignorantia legis neminem excusat, and that the same principle
applies to agreements
entered into in good
faith, but under a mistake of the law.
Such undoubtedly is the general rule.
It
has been adhered to with great strictness by
some authorities, while by others exceptions
have been made to the rule altogether irreconcilable with the principles and reasons upon which it has been established.
Some of
these conflicting authorities are referred to
and commented upon in 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §
113, etc.
But that the rule has its proper
exceptions is beyond all dispute.
In 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 113, 116, the rule is
laid down that agreements made and acts
done under a mistake of law are, if not other^^ise
objectionable, generally held valid
and obligatory.
The author says that he

It

1

a

as

a

a

a

set aside or rescinded

contract

founded

a

a

a

in mistake of matters of fact. In his opinion
So, if
in that case the vice chancellor says:
matter of
both parties should be ignorant of
law, and should enter into
contract for
particular object, the result whereof would,
by law, be different from what they mutualIntended, — here, on account of the surprise
or immediate result of the mistake of both,—
there can be no good reason why the court
should not interfere in order to prevent the
enforcement of the contract, and relieve from
To refuse
the unexpected consequences of it.
would be to permit one party to take an unadvantage of the other, and to
conscientious
derive
benefit from
contract which neither
of them intended it should produce.
In
Stapylton v. Scott, 13 Ves. 424, the lord chanadmit,
cellor says:
where the contract
has proceeded upon the mistake of both parties, that avoids the contract at law as well
In Willan v. Willan, 16 Ves. 72,
as here.
a

I

a

an agreement was decreed to be given up
upon the ground of surprise,
neither party
understanding
the effect of it. This exception to the rule is recognized
in the case

a

a

a

it

a

5

8

of Hunt V. Eousmanier,
Wheat. 174,
L
Ed. 589.
The case before the court Is entitled to
much more favorable consideration than these
cases, from the fact, before referred to, that
the mutual mistake is to be attributed to the
agent of the defendants.
He prepared the
deed, and he assured the complainant that it
was correct.
There was no want of ordinary
prudence in the complainant's
relying upon
his judgment.
He was
lawyer by profession, and
was natural and becoming that
the complainant should have confided in him.
There Is ianother consideration which very
properly enters into the case. It is
deed
procured from the complainant, by the solicitation of the defendants or their agent, which
conveys to them valuable rights and privileges without any consideration.
The award
giv«s to the complainant eight hundred dollars as
remuneration
for his damages; but
the legal effect of the deed is not only
release of the damages, for which the defendant
was compensated, but a release of rights and
privileges more valuable to the complainant
than the pecuniary compensation awarded to
him.
The relative situation of the parties is
matter of some consideration
in
court of
equity.
plain man, the other
One was
professional man, professing skill and experience as to the matter in which he volunteered to advise.
have no doubt, if this
deed does not comport with the award, as to
the propriety of the court's reforming it.
am embarrassed with another view
But

a

a

a

I

a

a

it,

upon the complainant's
lands as the
award gave them, and no more. All that is
necessary to enable the court to reform this
deed, and to make it comply with the intention of the parties, is to have before it the
award which it was the design of all parties,
by this deed, to carry into execution.
The
mistake is a mistake of the draftsman, and
he acting as the agent of the party who now
seeks to take advantage of the mistake.
Mr.
Halsey prepared the deed, and took it to the
complainant to be executed.
It was his misapprehension of the law that led to the mistake.
It was not the carelessness or ignorance of the complainant,
but of the defendants' agent.
Mr. Justice Story, in commenting upon the case already referred to in 1
Pet. 1, 13, 7 L. Ed. 27, 14 Story, Eq. Jur.
If there had been any mis§ 115, remarks:
take in the instrmnent itself, so that it did
not contain what the parties had agreed on,
that would have formed a very different case,
for where an -instrument is drawn and executed which professes, or is intended,
to
carry into execution an agreement previously
entered into, but which, by mistake of the
draftsman,
either as to fact or to law, does
equity
not fulfill that intention, or violates
will correct the mistake, so as to produce
conformity to the instrument.
Now we have
before us an agreement in writing, the award
of the arbitrators, to carry which into execuBy
tion the deed was executed.
misapprehension of the law on the part of all parties,
and more particularly of the defendants'
agent, who drew the deed,
releases valuable legal rights of the complainant which are
not afEected by that award. All the bill asks
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is that the deed may be made to conform
to the award.
Edw.
In the case of Champlin v. Layton,
contract enCh. 467, it was decided that
mutual misconception of
tered into under
mistake of law
legal rights, amounting to
in the contracting parties, is as liable to be

I

and

LAW.

ly

lays down the doctrine in this guarded and
qualified manner because there are authorities which are supposed to contradict it, or
at least to form exceptions to it; and In the
'
case of Hunt v. Eousmanier, 1 Pet. 17, 7 L.
Ed. 27, a case much relied upon by the defendant's counsel, Mr. Justice Washington,
in delivering the opinion of the court, says,
"It is not the intention of the court, in the
case now under consideration, to lay it down
that there may not be cases in which a court
of equity will relieve against a plain mistalie
arising from ignorance of law."
There are several considerations which induce me to consider this case as very properly embraced within the exceptions to the
rule.
The decision of the case does not rest
exclusively upon the mere fact of a mistake
in law upon the part of the complainant.
This deed does not carry out the intention of
the parties; and it is not necessary to resort
to parol testimony to establish this fact.
It
was executed for the sole purpose of carrying into effect the award of the arbitrators.
By that award, the complainant's rights and
privileges under the ninth section of the defendant's charter were not impaired, nor were
they in any manner whatever affected by it.
The object of the deed was to give to the
company the same rights and privileges in

or

a
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of the case.

In my Judgment, tlie deed in
does not operate as a release of any
rights the complainant may have under the
ninth section of the defendants' charter.
In
other words, it is no legal bar to the complainant's recovery in his suit at law. The
bill assumes that it Is a bar. The counsel
for the defendants raised an objection that
the fact of its being a bar to the complainant's
recovery was not, with suflBcient directness
and distinctness, averred in the bill; but it is
assumed throughout the bill to be, in connection with the use the defendant is making of
the deed, the foundation for the complainant's
suit.
A distinct averment as to the legal
The coneffect of the dued is not necessary.
struction of the deed by the court could not
opinat all depend upon the complainant's
ion of it, nor would the complainant be bound
here or elsewhere by such an averment.
The deed recites that the company, by virtue of their act of incorporation, had surveyed
their route from Morristown to Dover over
and upon the lands of the complainant, giving
a description of the land by metes and
bounds, and then proceeds as follows:
"Now
be it known that the said Thomas Green and
his wife, in consideration
of the sum of eight
hundred dollars, to them in hand well and
truly paid by the said the Morris and Essex
Railroad Company,
the receipt whereof is
hereby acknowledged, have and by these pressell, convey,
and
bargain,
ents to grant,
confirm to the said the Morris and Essex
Railroad Company, and to their successors
and assigns, forever, the right, liberty, and
privilege of erecting upon the tract of land
above described, by its officers, agents, engicontractors, workmen,
neers, superintendents,
and other persons in their employ, and to
take possession of, hold, have, use, occupy,
and excavate the same, and to erect embankments, bridges, and all other works necessary to lay rails, and do all other things
which shall be suitable or necessary for the
completion or repair of said road or roads;
to have and to hold the said tract of land
and premises unto the said the Morris and
Essex Railroad Company, and to its successors and assigns forever, for the purposes
above mentioned, and for all the other purposes mentioned in the said act of incorporaIn
tion and the several supplements thereto.

question

witness whereof," etc.
The seventh section of the act provides
the mode in which the company shall proceed, if they cannot agree with the owner
of the land, to acquire the same by assessare to be apThree commissioners
ment.
pointed, who are to assess the value of the
land and the damages, upon payment of
which the company have the right to enter
upon and occupy the land for the purposes
of the railroad. The provisions of the ninth
of those of
section are wholly independent
the seventh section, and make it obligatory
upon the' company to construct and keep in
repair bridges or passages over or under

the railroad, where It crosses public or private roads, and where it intersects lands of
individuals.
It is very manifest that the
assessment to be made by the commissioners
does not include any compensation
for such
bridges or passages, and that, notwithstanding such assessment, the duty still remains
upon the company to construct such bridges
and passages over the road.
If this is not
so,
then the ninth section is superfluous.
The company cannot take possession of the
laud except under the provisions of the sevand, if the assessment
enth section;
provided
for in that section includes a remuneration to the land owner for bridging,
etc., there could be no propriety in imposing
that duty by the ninth section.
The deed
in question conveys to the defendants nothing more than the liberty of erecting upon
the land described the necessary superstructure for their railroad, and the necessary
embankments, bridges, etc. This is the same
right, and neither more nor less than they
would have acquired by an assessment under the seventh section of the act.
I do not
see how, with any propriety, a construction
can be put upon this deed that will release
the company from the duties imposed by the
ninth section.
An assessment by commissioners would not have released them, and,
in my judgment, this deed confers upon
them no additional rights, and releases them
from no other duties or obligations. The
language used in the deed is the same language used in the sixth section of the act,
which defines what rights the company acquire by assessment.
The deed confines the
company to the same use of the land as the
act confines
them
under the assessment.
The language in the deed is an exact copy
of the language of the act.
If, then, this construction of the deed is
the correct one, there is no necessity of reforming it; but the defendants contend for
a different construction, and, upon their construction, insist that it is a bar to the complainant's recovery in his suit at law. If
their construction is the correct one, then
the complainant is entitled to the protection of the court.
Under such circumstances he had a right, when the defendants,
by a formal plea at law, contended for such
a construction of his deed, to claim the protection of this court.
It was not safe for
him to risk his case at law. If the court
at law should be against him, it would then
be too late for him to ask relief in this
court.
Would it be right, notwithstanding
the construction this court has put upon the
deed, to dismiss the complainant out of
court? The court at law is not bound by
the construction this court may put upon
the deed.
If the complainant's bill should
be dismissed,
and the court at law should
differ from this court, the complainant will
be without remedy.
It may be asked, how
can this court make a decree to reform the
deed when it is of opinion that it needs no
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reformation? But the court need not adopt
any such inconsistencj'. It can afford to
complainant adequate
the
relief without
making a decree to reform the deed. A decree enjoining the defendants from setting
up the deed as a bar to the complainant's
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recoveiy in the action at law will afford him
all the protection that Is necessary.
have no doubt that, under the circumstances of this case as it is made by his bill,
the complainant is entitled to relief.
The demurrer is overruled, with costs.
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GRISWOLD

V.

HAZARD
(Nos.

(11 Sup.

et

al. (four cases).

50-53.)

Ct. 972, 141 U. S. 260.)

Supreme Court of the United
18!tl.

States.

May

25,

In error to the circuit court of the United
States for the district of Rhode Island.
Appeals from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Rhode Island.
The first of the above suits was brought
by Gris-svold, a citizen of New York, against
the appellees, citizens of Rhode Island, to obtain a decree canceling or (if relief of that
character could not be granted) reforming a
certain bond, for the sum of $53,735, executed
by Thomas C. Durant, as principal, and GrisIt
■wold and S. D. Bradford, as his sureties.
was heard upon bill, answer, and proofs, and
the bill was dismissed.
The action at law, No. 53, was brought by
Griswold upon the
against
the appellees
above bond in one of the courts of Rhode
Island, and was removed, upon his petition,
to the circuit court of the United States for
the district of Rhode Island, where a judgment was rendered against him for the sum

of

566,470.

The other two cases, Nos. 51 and 52, were
suits in equity brought by Griswold, pending
the action at law in the circuit court, to obtain an injunction against its further proseThe relief asked, in each of those
cution.
suits, was denied, and the bills were dismissed.

All of the cases have their origin in a suit
In equity brought, August 22, 1868, in the supreme court of Rhode Island, by Isaac P.
Hazard, of that state, against Thomas C.
Durant, Oliver Ames, Benjamin E. Bates,
John Duff, Cornelius S. Bushnell, Sidney Dillon, Henry S. McComb, the Credit Jlobilier
of America, a Pennsylvania corporation, and
the Union Pacific Railroad Company, a corHazporation created by acts of congress.
ard sued on behalf of himself and all other
corporation
In the first-named
stockholders
who should become parties to his bill. Durant, from an early date in 1864 until May 18,
1867, was president of the Credit Mobilier of
America; having, it was alleged, to a great
extent, the management of its affairs, and the
and trustees, as
confidence of Its directors
well as the control of its finances and disbursements, and of its treasurer, clerks, and
The theory of the bill was that he
servants.
had acquired a large amount of the stock of
'
Credit Mobilier of America upon which
Idends had been paid in money and in the
of the Union Pacific Rail■|{6ck and bonds
road Company, the amount of such bonds exand the
ceeding, it was alleged, $700,000,
amount of such stock of the last-named corporation being nearly $2,000,000; and that
the shares of stock, bonds, and moneys, so
received by him, belonged equitably to the
Credit Mobilier of America and its stockhold-

The bill alleged that Durant's pecuniary
condition was precarious; that he was, and
for a long time had been, largely engaged in
and financial operaspeculations
hazardous
tions, sustaining thereby heavy losses, and lithat any recovery
able to sustain others;
against

him,

it

was feared,

could

not be en-

forced by execution or the ordinary process
of law; that he was "about to depart out of
the state, and out of the jurisdiction of this
court;" and that the defendants, (the individual defendants being sued as trustees in
veith the Union Pacific
a certain contract
Railroad Company, the profits of which belonged to the Credit Mobilier of America and
its stockholders,) "though requested so to do,"
had wholly neglected and refused to take any
steps to compel him to account for said moneys, stocks,

and

bonds,

so

received

and im-

properly appropriated.
. The principal relief asked was that Dm-ant
be required to pay over and deliver to the
Credit Mobilier of America and the plaintiff
Hazard such sums of money and shares of
stock as should appear upon an accounting
to be justly due or belonging to that corporation and to Hazard, and to make such transfer of the stock and bonds as would fully prothat
tect its and his rights in the premises;
to be due be adthe amounts ascertained
judged a lien upon the shares in the stock of
each of said corporations,
owned or held by
or standing in the name of Durant, as well as
upon the above contract assigned to the defendant trustees and the dividends, earnings,
stocks, and bonds received or to be received
by virtue of that contract, to the extent of
the shares to which Durant might be entitled
under it; and that, on default in the payment and delivery of the moneys, stocks, and
bonds so found due, all such stocks and
bonds be sold under the direction of the
court, or otherwise transferred and apportioned equitably among the rightful owners and
stock,
claimants thereof;
and that such
bonds, moneys, interest, and rights, so procured by Durant, be deemed and taken as
the rightful property of the Credit Mobilier
of America and its stockholders.
The bill
prayed that Durant be restrained from departing out of the state, and out 'Of the jurisdiction of the court, by writ of ne exeat, issued under its seal and by its order.
A writ of ne exeat was ordered to be issued, August 22, 1868, for $53,735.
It was
in these words:
"Whereas, it is represented to our supreme
court, sitting in equity, on the part of Isaac
P. Hazard and others, complainants,
against
Thomas C. Durant and others, defendants,
that said Thomas C. Durant is greatly Indebted to the said complainant,
and designs
quickly to go into other parts beyond this
state, (as by oath made in that behalf appears,) which tends to the great prejudice and
damage of the said complainants: Therefore, in order to prevent this injustice, we
hereby command you that you do, without
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the said Thomas 0. Durant to
you and give sufficient bail or
security, in the sum of fifty-three thousand
seven hundred and thirty-five dollars, that he,
said Thomas C. Durant, will not go, or attempt to go, into parts beyond this state without the leave of our said court; and, in case
the said Thomas C. Durant shall refuse to
give such bail or security, then you are to
commit him, the said Durant, to our county
jail, in your precinct, there to be kept in safe
custody until he shall do it of his own accord;
and when you shall have taken such security
you are forthwith to make and return a certificate thereof to om- said court, distinctly
and plainly, under your hand, together with

delay, cause
come before

this writ."
Durant was arrested under this writ on the
night of August 22, 1868, and on the 24th he
executed, with Griswold and Bradford, as
his sureties, the following bond, drawn by
one of Hazard's attorneys:
"Know all men that we, Thomas C. Durant, as principal, and John N. A. Griswold
and S. Dexter Bradford, as sureties, are firmly bound to Isaac P. Hazard, Rowland Hazard, Eowland 6. Hazard, Elizabeth Hazard,
Elizabeth Hazard, trustee, Anna Hazard,
Mary P. Hazard, Lydia Torrey, Sophia Vernon, and Anna Horner in the sum of fiftythree thousand seven hundred and thirty-five
dollars, to be paid said obligees, their executors, administrators, or assigns; to which
payment we bind ourselves, our several and
respective heirs, executors, and administrators, jointly and severally, hereby.
"Sealed with our seals and dated this 24th
day of August, A. D. 1868.
"The condition of this obligation is that
said Thomas C. Durant shall on his part
abide and perform the orders and decrees of
court of the state of Rhode
the supreme
Island in the suit in equity of Isaac P. Hazard and others against said Thomas C. Durant and others, now pending in said court
within and for the county of Newport."
This is the bond above referred to.
Under the latter date, and presumably before the execution of that bond, the attorneys of Hazard and Durant signed the follow"In the above enti;tled case
ing agreement:
it is agreed that said Thomas C. Durant shall
file a bond, with surety in the penalty marked in the writ of ne exeat therein, to abide
and perform the orders and decrees of the
court in said cause, and that thereupon the
writ of ne exeat aforesaid shall be discharged, and that the court may enter decree accordingly." The court, under the same date,
"Thomas C.
entered the following order:
Durant, one of the defendants In this suit,
having executed and filed a bond, with sureties, to abide and perform the orders and
decrees of the court made in this suit, it is
now, by consent, ordered that the writ of ne
For
exeat heretofore issued be discharged."
the writ of ne
some reason not explained,
exeat was not returned to the clerk's office
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The sheriff
and filed until October 21, 1868.
"Newport, Aumade this return on the writ:
I caused the within-named
gust 24, 1868.
Thomas C. Durant personally to come before
me, as within commanded, on the 22d day of
this month, and now the writ Is discharged
by order of court."

On the 2d day of
than 14 years after
Hazard's suit, it was
decreed in that suit,
follows:
"Second. That the

more
1882,
December,
of
the commencement
ordered, adjudged, and
among other things, as

defendant Thomas C.
Dm-ant is accountable for and do, within 90
days from the date hereof, pay the sum of
$16,071,659.97, with interest from this date,
the said sum, with interest thereon, to be
deposited in the registry of this court, or be
paid, in the first instance, to Rowland Hazard, of South Kingston, in said state, and
Henry Martin, of Brooklyn, in the state of
New York, who are hereby appointed special

commissioners,
with authority, jointly and
severally, to collect and receive the same, and
with power to take such steps to collect 'the
same as may be necessary and according to
law, and said fund, or so much thereof as
may be collected by process or otherwise, is
hereby directed to be paid and deposited in
the registry of this court to the credit of this
cause.
"Third. Of the aforesaid total sum of $16,the defendant Thomas O. Durant
071,659.97,
is hereby allowed and is decreed to be entitled to pay and discharge $8,816,232.93, or
any part thereof pro tanto, by transferring
and delivering stock of the Union Pacific
Railroad Company and first mortgage and
sinking fund bonds of said company, as per
Statement G, now exhibited to the court, and
directed to be filed in this cause, with all
dividends which may have been collected or
received by said defendant or his assigns after the date of this decree, together with interest on the same to the date of payment
thereof by said defendant, the certificates of
said stock, with transfers thereof, and the
said bonds to be delivered to the said Rowland Hazard and Henry Martin, who are
hereby appointed special commissioners
to receive the same, and who are hereby authorized and directed to sell the same, or such
portions thereof as may be delivered to them
from time to time as they are secured, at
public auction, and receive the proceeds thereof, and, after deducting the costs and charges
of such sales, deposit the same in the registry
of this court to the credit of this cause: provided, however, that the said privilege herein
granted to the said defendant Thomas 0. Durant to transfer and deliver said stocks and
bonds in partial discharge and payment of
the sum hereinbefore decreed to be paid by
him be exercised by him within thirty days
from the date of the entering this decree; and
that, in default of such transfer and dehvery,
or of the transfer and delivery of the entire
amount of said stock and bonds within the
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thirty days, the obligation of the defendant Thomas C. Durant to pay the said
proportion of the said sum or of the -residue
of the same, after deducting the amount of
such stoclis and bonds as may be delivered,
as aforesaid,
at their face value, shall become, and Is hereby declared to be, absolute:
and provided further, nevertheless,
that the
said option or privilege of the said Thomas
C. Durant shall not Interfere in any manner
with any order or decree in the cause touching the transfer, delivery, sale, or other disposition of said stock and bonds.
"Fourth. The defendant Thomas C. Durant is likewise ordered and directed to transfer and deliver, within thirty days from the
said

date hereof, five thousand seven hundred and
seven 45-100 (5,707 4.>-100) shares of the stock
of the Credit Mobiller of America, (which
stock has been found by the master to have
been purchased with the funds of the Credit
Mobiller, and which stock, with any dividends or profits accrued or to accrue on the
same, is hereby declared to be the property
of said corporation, subject to the decrees and
orders in this cause,) with any interest, dividends, rights, benefits, and profits which may
have accrued to the said Thomas C. Durant
as the holder of the said 5,707 45-100 shares
of stock, or any part thereof, and not hereinbefore charged against him, said transfer
and delivery to be made to the said Rowland
Hazard and Henry Martin, or either of them,
with power, which
as special commissioners,
is hereby granted to said commissioners,
forthwith to take such measures, by suit or
suits in their own names, or otherwise, as
they may be advised is lawful and necessary
or deto enforce such transfer, collection,
livery, and said stocks to be held by said
subject to the further order of
commissioners
the court in this cause.
•'Fifth. All interlocutory injunctions heretofore made in this cause, so far as consistent with this decree, are declared to be
and are hereby made perpetual, and the further consideration
of the cause, and particularly as to allowances to the complainants for
costs, expenses, and services, and as to the
distribution of the funds that may be deposited in the registry of the court to the credit
of
of the cause, and also the consideration
any order or decree which may be necessary
in the premises against the defendant Thomas C. Durant, by reason of any default which
may be made by him touching any portion of
this decree, and also the consideration of any
other and further decree herein against or
the defendants
other than the
concerning
said Thomas C. Durant, be, and they hereby
are, directed to stand over, with leave to any
party in Interest, save parties in contempt
or parties who may appear to be for any othto apply at any time
er cause disqualified,
for further orders and directions."
The bill in case No. 50 was filed September
That suit proceeds upon these
13, 1881.
That the bond of August 24, 1868,
grounds:

whereby Griswold became bound, as one of
the sureties of Durant, that the latter should
"on his part abide and perform the orders
and decrees of the supreme
court of the
state of Rhode Island in the suit in equity of
Isaac P. Hazard and others against said
Thomas C. Durant and others, now [then]
pending
in said court," was obtained
by
fraud, and by concealment from him of facts
he was entitled to have communicated
to
him before he assumed the obligations imposed by that instrument; that he intended to
sign, and believed, at the time, that he signed, a bond which simply bound him for the
appearance of Durant, so that he should be
personally amenable to the process and orders of the court in the suit brought by Hazard; that the execution of the bond in question was the result of mistake; that the
agreement

whereby,

Durant of

a bond, the

upon

the

execution

by

writ of ne exeat was
to be discharged,
was made without his
knowledge or consent, as was also the order
of court in pursuance of such agreement, and
was in derogation of his rights; that his purpose to become surety only for Durant's appearance to answer the process of the court
was well known at the time to the plaintiff
and his attorneys, who prepared, and supervised the execution of, the bond; and that
the writ of ne exeat was sued out upon the
ground that Durant was about to depart
from the state, when, in fact, he only contemplated coming to the state.
Protesting that the legal effect of the bond
was that he should be responsible only for
the appearance of Durant, so as to be subject
to the process of the court in the Hazard
suit, and averring his willingness to execute
a proper ne exeat bond, he prayed that the
bond in question be set aside as having been
obtained by fraud, imposition, and mistake,
or reformed, as indicated, and that the defendants be restrained by injunction from
enforcing it in its present shape.
The answers of the defendants put in issue
the material allegations
of the bill.
The
plaintiff filed a replication, and proofs being
taken, and the cause heard, the bill, as already stated, was dismissed.
(C. O.) 26 Fed.
135.

The action at law, being case No. 53, was
commenced March 3, 1883, in one of the
courts of Rhode Island, and was removed,
upon Griswold's application, to the circuit
court of the United States. The declaration
set out the bond of August 24, 1868, alleged
that Bradford, one of the sureties thereon,
was dead, and that Durant had not kept
its condition, in that he had not performed
the above decree of December 2, 1882, in the
equity suit brought by Hazard; whereby the
plaintiffs Rowland Hazard, Rowland G. Hazard, Anna Hazard, and Lydia Torrey were
entitled to have and demand
of him the
amount of said bond, $53,735. A copy of
that decree was made an exhibit In the declaration. The defendant Griswold filed ten
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pleas, each of which was in bar of the action.
One of the pleas made a copy of the
proceedings
in Hazard's suit a part of it.
Demurrers and replications were filed to the
pleas, those to the second, third, fourth, fifth,
and seventh pleas being special demurrers.
By an order entered July 1, 1884, the demurrers were sustained to the second, third,
fourth, fifth, and seventh pleas, the opinion

of the court being delivered by Mr. Justice
Gray.

(0. C.) 21 Fed. 178.

Pursuant to a stipulation of counsel, dated
November 26, 1883, that the plaintifE might
demur specially to the second, third, fourth,
fifth, and seventh pleas, and, in case the demurrers were overruled, reply to those pleas
as if no demurrers had been filed, and that
amended pleas, if desired, might be filed by
the defendant, and in obedience to the order
of court requiring the amended pleas to be
filed on or before October 15, 1884, the defendant, on the 14th of October, 1884, filed
third, fom-th, fifth, and seventh
amended
pleas.
The case was subsequently heard on
by plaintiff, made November 19,
a motion
1884, that the amended pleas be stricken out,
and on the 30th of March, 1883, this order
motion to strike
was made:
"Plaintiff's
amended pleas from the files is granted."
made
between
Certain stipulations were
counsel; among others, one to the effect "that
the plaintiffs were able to prove under the
decree of the supreme court of Rhode Island,
in the equity suit brought by Hazard, an
amount of damage in excess of the pena) sum
of the bond declared on in this suit." A jury
having been waived in writing, the court
gave judgment, as of February 12, 1887,
against Griswold, for $66,470.
The suit in equity No. 51 was brought June
The bill in that case, after refer12, 1885.
ring to the suit in equity brought by Isaac
P. Hazard in 1868, showed that, on the 17th
of November, 1875, Rowland G, Hazard commenced a suit in equity in one of the courts
of Pennsylvania, against the Credit Mobilier
of America and others, which was subsequently removed to the circuit court of the
United States for the eastern district of
Pennsylvania, that being the domieile^of the
corporation; that in such suit Oliver Ames
was appointed receiver of all the goods, chattels, rights, and effects of the corporation,
and was authorized by the court in Pennsylvania to deliver to Durant a deed of release
from all actions, causes of action, suits, bills,
bonds, writings obligatory, debts, dues, duaccounts,
sums of money,
ties, reckonings,
executions, extents, quarrels, conjudgments,
trespasses, damages, and demands
both In law or equity, which the
Credit Mobilier of America then had, or
might at any time thereafter have, claim,
allege, or demand, against said Durant, for
or by reason or means of any matter, cause,
or thing whatever; that afterwards, on the
27th day of October, 1881, Ames, under the
said authority, and In consideration of the
troversies,
whatever,
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execution by Durant of a deed conveying the
title to certain lands mentioned in the order
of court authorizing the release, delivered to
the latter a deed of release, of the kind above
indicated,
of all sums of money then due
or owing to, or thereafter to become due to,
that the above equity suit
said corporation;
in the supreme court of Rhode Island was,
and had been, wholly controlled by Rowland
G. Hazard; that, notwithstanding the delivery of the above deed to Durant, the latter
suit was proceeded with, and the supreme
court of Rhode Island rendered a decree refusing to allow him to set it up as a bar to
the entering of such decree, on the ground
that he was in contempt of that court for
violation of one of its decrees rendered therein; and that after the delivery of the deed
of release to Durant the plaintiff requested
the defendants to surrender the bond of August 24, 1868, and to abstain from suing him
thereon, but they refused to comply with that
request.
The relief asked was an injunction
restraining the defendants from further proceeding in the action at law. Upon a hearing
before Judges Colt and Carpenter a demurrer
to the bill was sustained, and the bill dismissed, October 28, 1886, Judge Carpenter delivering the opinion of the court.
(0. 0.) 28
Fed. 597.
The bill in case No. 52 was filed June 12,
1885.
It assailed the jurisdiction of the supreme court of Rhode Island over the subject-matter of the suit in equity brought by
Hazard, upon the ground that before bringing it neither the plaintifC therein, Isaac P.
Hazard, nor any other stockholder
of the
the
Credit Mobilier of America, requested
managing committee of the board of directors or the stockholders of that corporation to
against
begin legal or equitable proceedings
Durant. The cause was heard upon demurThe
rer before Judges Colt and Carpenter.
demurrer was sustained, and the bill dismissed, the opinion of the circuit court being delivered by Judge Carpenter.
(C. C.) 28 Fed.
578.

James C. Carter, for appellants and plaintiffs in error. Ellas Merwin and Sam'l'Maddox, for appellees and demandants in error.
Mr. Justice HARI/AN, after stating the
facts in the foregoing language, delivered the
opinion of the court.
These four cases are so closely connected
in their facts, as well as in the questions of
law presented for determination,
that it is
convenient to dispose of them by one opinion.
Our attention will be directed first to case
No. 50, in which a decree is sought to cancel,
or, in the alternative, to reform, the bond
of August 24, 1868, executed by Durant as
principal, and by Griswold and Bradford as
sureties, and to restrain the defendants from
suing upon it in its present form. The granting or refusing of such a decree depends, of
course, upon the inquiry whether the plaintiff Griswold has, by eyidence sufflciently
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to provide

the necessary

bonds."

Shortly after Griswold, accompanied
by
Gray, reached the jail, the two counsel of
Hazard, namely, Bradley and Peckham, arrived there, and a few moments later Gov.
Van Zandt came in obedience to a message
from Durant, conveyed by Bradford, to act
Hazard, it seems, did not
as his counsel.
his counsel to the jail.
accompany
It was
All who were at the
now nearly 12 o'clock.
jail agree that they were there only because
of the arrest of Durant under a writ commanding the sheriff to take bail from him, in
the sum of $5.S.73.5, that he would not go or

to go into parts beyond the state
without the leave of the court, and. If sucli
bail were not given, to commit him to and
keep him in jail until he gave bail of his (iwn
accord;
and, such security being taken, the
officer was required by the writ to return a
certificate thereof to the court.
There is no
claim that any one present Avas ignorant of
the terms of the writ, or of the extent of the
authority of the officer charged with its execution.
It is further agreed by all the witnesses that there was a conversation
at the
jail between the lawyers and Durant as to
what could be done in order to effect the latter's release.
But in this discussion or conversation
Griswold took no part whatever.
That much is distinctly stated by Peckham,
one of Hazard's attorneys
who drew the
bond, and supervised
the execution of the
writ of ne exeat, although he says that the
sureties could not "help hearing, if they paid
any attention." It is equally beyond dispute
that the object of Griswold's presence at the
jail was well known to Hazard's attorneys.
attempt

Just here arises the difference among the
witnesses
as to what took place at the
jail. Detailing what occtu-red according to
his recollection at that place, Peckham says:
"When I got to the jail I found there Judge
Bradley, who had only preceded me there by
a minute or two;
Mr. Durant; Charles C.
Van Zandt, his counsel; Mr. Griswold; Dexter Bradford;
and a stranger,
who was, I
presume,
Mr. Gray.
Mr. Van Zandt and
Judge Bradley were already talking about
the release of Mr. Durant from custody.
Judge Bradley said: 'That is a simple matter.
Let him give the bond called for by
the writ.'
The nature of that bond was
briefly explained.
Mr. Durant said that it
was out
the question for him to give it;
that he couldn't remain any longer in Rhode
Island; that his presence was absolutely demanded outside of the state, and forthwith;
and that he must leave here Monday morning.
It was suggested that he might file his
answer, and apply for the discharge of the
writ immediately; but he said,
know what
in court are, and
proceedings
can't remain here at all.' It was then proposed that
he should give a bond in the same amount
marked in the two writs in the two cases,
conditioned
to abide and perform whatever
decrees the court might make against him in
those suits.
The nature of these proposed
bonds was freely discussed by Judge Bradley, Mr. Van Zandt, and Mr. Durant, and
the fact that they were bonds which would
hold the principal and sureties liable to pay
money in case Durant should not perform
any decree made by the court was commented on by Mr. Van Zandt and Mr. Durant.
During all this interview Judge Bradley did
all the talking for the complainants, and Mr.
Van Zandt and Mr. Durant spoke about
equally for their side."
The same witness
states:
"Mr. Van Zandt having conferred
with Mr. Durant, and those two having
'I

I

clear and convincing, manifested bis riglit to
the relief asked.
While in respect to some luatters there is
a conflict among the witnesses, certain facts
and circumstances
are clearly established,
and may be summarized as follows: Dm-ant,
in August, 1868, was a citizen and resident of
New York. He went to Newport for a brief
stay, and was there on the morninu of Saturday, August 22d.
About noon of that day
the suit in which the writ of ne exeat issued
was commenced against him.
He was then
sailing, with several friends, in his yacht on
the high seas. The yacht landed at the Newport wharf shortly before 11 o'clock at night.
Upon his stepping ashore he was notified by
two officers, who had kept continuous watch
for him at the wharf during the afternoon,
that they had a writ for his arrest,— meaning
the above writ of ne exeat,— and that he
must go to jail.
He accompanied them to
that place, one of the counsel of Hazard, Mr.
Peckham, following on foit to the sheriff's
office. Information of the arrest having been
communicated
to Mr. H. W. Gray, also a citizen of New York, temporarily at Newport,
that gentleman went to Griswold, who was
his uncle, and begged the latter to go to the
jail and become bail for Durant's appearance.
Griswold had only a slight acquaintance with Durant, never having met him until the spring of 18G8, and held no personal
or business relations of any kind with him.
To oblige his nephew, who was Durant's
friend, and merely as an act of kindness and
courtesy to a stranger, (Griswold then resided in Newport,)
he acceded to the request
to become bail for Durant's appearance in
court, and for that purpose only went to the
Hazard learned, a little before 11
Jail.
o'clock, that Durant had been arrested as he
landed from his yacht, and that owing to the
lateness of the hour the sheriff had taken
him directly to jail instead of his own office,
"as had been previously arranged."
He went
immediately to the lodgings of one of his
attorneys, Mr. Bradley, and caused him "to
go and see what could be done to prevent
Durant from remaining in jail over Sunday;"
authorizing his attorney to use his name "for
said Durant from
the purpose of releasing
jail until Monday, it being regarded as very
doubtful whether Durant in the short time
then remaining before Sunday would be able

oJE
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conferred with the sureties, — I mean Mr.
Grlswold and Mr. Bradford,— Mr. Van Zandt
then announced that they would give the
bonds proposed.
As it was then very late,
it was fiirther agreed that all should meet
at my office on the following Monday morning, soon after midnight, and execute the
papers.
Besides
these bonds, it was also
agreed that the respective
counsel
should
sign an agreement that upon the bonds being executed the writs of ne exeat should be
absolutely discharged.
Just at the close of
the interview Judge Bradley addressed himself to all present, isaying that he wished to
make sure that all understood the arrangement alike, and he stated that Mr. Durant
was to give bonds, with Mr. Griswold and
Mr. Bradford as sureties, in the sums marked in the writs, to abide and perform all the
decrees of the court in the suit; that counsel
should sign agreements for the discharge of
the writs; that all should meet at my oflSce
soon after midnight Monday morning and
sign the papers;
that in the meantime Mr.
Durant w^ould go free from custody upon his
word of honor, and he appealed to the sureties, saying:
'We rely upon you, gentlemen,
to see that he attends.'
We then separated.

I

prepared

the

papers,

and

had

them

lying upon my table when We met, pursuThey were read.
ant to the arrangement.
Mr. Griswold took an active part at this
meetings and. I think, read the papers for
himself. The papers were signed without
any objection
or discussion
at that time.
Probably we were not together at my office
Referring to the
more than ten minutes."
interview at the jail, Bradley testiiied that
nothing was said, to the best of his recollection and belief, by any one. conveying the
idea that the complainants were to obtain
from the defendant only a bail-bond for his
appearance;
and that "the terms of the bond
were expressed so as to exclude the idea
that it was merely a bail for appearance,
and to provide that it should be a bond to
abide and J^erform the order of the court."
He further said that the bond "was to be
In all
a security," and it was so announced.
material respects his evidence was in accord

with the recollection of Peckham.
But there was other evidence which precludes our accepting
the version of the afGray, Grisfair given by those gentlemen.
wold, Durant, and "Van Zandt, with more or
less distinctness,
but all emphatically, state
that neither at the jail Saturday night, nor
at the meeting before daylight on Monday
was there a hint, suggestion, or
morning,
proposition, in any form, that Durant should
give bond, vrith sureties, conditioned that he
would abide and' perform the decrees that
might be rendered in the Hazard suit, or
that any bond was talked of except one that
would make the sureties responsible simply
for his appearance in the state, so as to be
subject to the orders and process of the
■court.
Gov. Van Zandt testifies, touching
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the meeting at the jail: "It was proposed
by Judge Bradley that Dr. Durant should
give bond, with two sureties, which should
for the writ and the writ
be substituted
then understood from the conwithdrawn.
versation that the bond was in the nature of
a bail-bond, and that when the sureties delivered Dr. Durant into the custody of the
court, to either perform its orders and deor to suffer such penalties
crees personally,
personally
as the court might impose, they
would comply with the conditions of the
Nothing was said in my presence by
bond.
with these views."
any person inconsistent
Again, referring to what took place at the
time the bond was actually signed, the same
witness says: "A bond, prepared by Messrs.
Peckham and Bradley, was handed to me
as counsel for Mr. Durant; there was some
little discussion as to whether it should be
made to the sheriff of Nevsrport county, or
in the then suit. Judge
to the complainants
Bradley preferred the latter, and it was so
done. I told Mr. Durant that, in my opinion,
it was a proper bond to secure his appearance in the suit, and the bond was then exa= *
*
ecuted.
I heard nothing said by
Judge Bradley or ftlr. Peckham, except what
I have already stated; I myself told Mr.
Durant that, in my opinion, the instrument
was,
in
effect,
a
bail-bond."
Further:
"There was nothing said or intimated by
any person in my presence or hearing on
that occasion to indicate that the bond was
a security instead of a surety." The statements of Gov. Van Zandt are fully sustained
by the depositions
of Gray, Griswold, and

I

Durant.
In view of this great preponderance
of
evidence upon the side of the plaintiff, as
to what occurred at the jail before the separation of the parties to meet Monday morning for the consummation of the business,
the court is not at liberty to accept the account given by the defendants'
attorneys of
the interview of Saturday night. And we
have a strong conviction that the recollection
of Griswold, Gray, Dmant, and Van Zandt
as to that interview, is sustained by all thf,
inherent probabilities of the case. And In
saying this we would not be understood as
reflecting upon the integrity of Hazard's at
torneys.
The difference in the recollection of
gentlemen,
in respect to transactions in
which they took part, often happens, without any reason to suspect that any of them
would intentionally deviate from the line
of absolute truth. Such differences existing,
the court can only be guided by the weight
of the evidence, where the witnesses are intelligent, of equal credibility, and had equal
opportunities
to know what occmred.
In
the first place, it is not at all probable that
Griswold would have executed the bond in
question, as surety, if he had been informed,
or believed, that it bound him absolutely,
within the amount specified in such bond,
for the payment of any sum adjudged
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against Diiiant,— almost an entire sti-anger
to him.
In the next place, we cannot suppose that the -counsel who went to the jail to
represent the interests of Hazard, had any
other purpose In going there except to see
that that was, substantially, accomplished
which the writ of ne exeat authorized, namely, the obtaining of bail that would prevent
Durant's departure from the state without
the leave of the court, and thus have him,
at all times, pending Hazard's suit, subject
to its rightful power in respect to any decree
to be rendered.
That was evidently Bradley's purpose, for, according to Peckham's
evidence, he suggested that Durant could
effect his release by executing the bond specified in the vsrrit.
But when the nature of
such a bond was explained, and it appeared
that the necessity for Durant's being out of
the state on Monday rendered that course
entirely impracticable, the latter was then
inforroed — according to the evidence of Peckham— fhat he could file an answer and apply
for the discharge of the writ immediately.
It
What was meant by this suggestion?
could have meant but one thing, namely,
that it was in the power of Durant to obtain, without objection, if not of right, a
discharge
of the writ, after answering, by
A party arexecuting a bond of some kind.
rested upon ne exeat may obtain the discharge of the writ, upon motion or petition,
and after notice, and according to some authorities, "it is a matter of coui'se to order
the ne exeat to be discharged, upon the defendant's giving security to answer the complainant's bill, and to render himself amenable to the process of the court pending the
litigation, and to such process as may be issued to compel a performance
of the final
*
*
* Or, where the defendant
decree.
cannot procure such security as will satisfy
the sheriff, or if he wishes to leave the state
before the termination of the suit, he may
apply to the court to discharge the ne exeat
upon his giving proper security to answer and
to process; and upon such apbe amenable
plication the court will take such security
as it may deem suflBcient, and will discharge
2 Barb. Ch. Prac.
the sheriff from liability."
655, 656; Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige, 606,
(!21;
Bray ton v. Smith, 6 Paige, 489, 491;
McNamara v. Dwyer, 7 Paige, 239, 244.
See, also, Jae. Law Diet. tit.
"Ne Exeat
Regno;" Johnson v. Clendenin, 5 Gill & J.
In He Griswold, 13 R. I. 126,
481.
463,
20,
Griswold,
1880,
September
determined
by petition, sought to be discharged from the
bond in question on his principal's placing
himself within the jurisdiction of the court,
and subject to its orders and decrees.
He
seems to have proceeded, in that case, upon the ground that he was entitled, of right,
asked.
But the
to the order of discharge
supreme court of Rhode Island did not accept that view, observing that it could not
regard "a bond to abide and perform the decree as equivalent merely to a bond to abide

the event of the suit."
To du so, the court
said, would be to ignore wholly the word
"perform" contained
In the bond, which,
upon its face, appeared to be given by agreement of the parties.
While it was there
said, and properly,
that the court may requu-e as a condition of the discharge of a
writ of ne exeat that the respondent give
security to perform the decree,— citing Robertson r. Wilkie, Amb. 177, and Atkinson v.
Leonard, 3 Brown, Oh. 218,— it was conceded
that "courts will generally discharge a writ
of ne exeat upon the respondents giving security to abide the decree on the hearing of
If Durant had remained in Newthe suit."
port, and, upon filing his answer, had applied
for the discharge of the writ of ne exeat upon his giving bond with security simply to
abide the decree, and place himself, when
required, within the jurisdiction of the court,
it is inconceivable that the state court would,
have denied his
under the circumstances,
application. But it was further said in that
case— and this is quite significant in its bearing upon another question to be presently
adverted to— that, "even if the bond in question was to be considered as having no other
effect than a bond to abide the decree made
upon hearing the cause, the petition could
not be granted in the present stage of the
No final decree in the cause
proceedings.
has yet been reached."
As, therefore,
Durant could have filed
his answer, and, conformably to the general rule, have obtained a discharge of the
writ upon giving bond, with surety, that
to the orders and
he would be amenable
as he could not, conprocess of the court;
sistently with his engagements, remain in
Rhode Island long enough to have an answer prepared, and to move for the discharge of the writ, upon sufficient bond to
be by him given; and as Hazard and his
expressed
a desire that Durant
counsel
should not be held in custody over Sunday, — what more natural and equitable than
that the parties should, by consent, bring
about that which Durant must have understood from Bradley that he could accomplish, through the orders of the court, namely, h^ve a bond executed with surety compelling his presence in the state when required by the orders of the court, or subjecting his sureties to personal liability If he did
not render himself amenable to Its process.
If the suggestion that Durant could file his
answer and apply to the court for the discharge of the writ (of course, upon bond
securing his amenability to the process of
the court) had been adopted, the plaintiff
would not have obtained a bond making the
surety absolutely responsible, within the
penal sum named in the writ and bond, for a
money decree against Durant.
It is therefore unreasonable to suppose that the parties
separated
Saturday night under an agreement that Hazard should have from Durant
a bond that would subject Ms sureties to a
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larger responsibility

than was involved in
that Durant could obtain an order of court for the discharge of
the writ.
On the contrary, it is more reasonable to suppose that the bond which, on
Saturday night, was agreed to be executed
on the next Monday morning, was cue that
would accomplish, by agreement of parties,
precisely what Hazard's attorney sliggested
that Durant might accomplish by an order
of the parties
of court.
The agreement
was thus made to take the place of an order
of court, because Durant assured Hazard's
attorneys that he could not remain in Newport long enough to make a formal application for the discharge of the writ upon a
proper bond.
We are of opinion that, although the condition of the bond in question was that Durant should "abide and perform the orders
and decrees" of the coui-t in suit in which
it was given, all the parties, according to the
decided preponderance
of evidence, intended
to, at the time, as an instrument binding the
sureties for the appearance of the principal
the suggestion

made

so as to be amenable to the process and decrees of the court, upon default in which,
and not before, were they to be liable to
pay the penalty. If the bond means, in law,
more than that,— and counsel in this court
agree that it does,— the case is one of a
as to
mutual mistake, clearly established,
the legal efCect of the instrument. There
was no mistake as to the mere words of the
bond; for it was drawn by one of Hazard's
attorneys, and was read by Griswold before
signing it. But, according to the great
weight of the evidence, there was a mistake,
on both sides, as to the legal import of the
terms employed to give effect to the mutual
In short, the instrument does
agreement.
not express the thought and intention which
the parties had at the time of its execution.
And this mistake was attended by circumstances that render it inequitable for the
obligees in the bond to take advantage of it.
The instrument was drawn by one of Hazard's attorneys, and was presented and acprevicepted as embodying tise agreement
ously reached.
Griswold was unskilled in
the law, and took the word "perform" as
implying performance in the sense of Durant's becoming amenable to the process of
He had no reason — unless the
the court.
recollection of Gray, Durant, Van Zandt, and
himself as to what occurred is wholly at
fault— to doubt that the bond expressed the
especially if he heard Van
real agreement;
Zandt's statement to Durant, when the latter
was about to sign the bond, that it "was, in
A court of equity
effect,
a bail-bond."
ought not to allow that mistake, satisfactorily established and thus caused, to stand
uncorrected,
and thereby subject a surety to
liability he did not intend to assume, and
which, according to the decided preponderance of the evidence, there was at the time
no purpose to impose upon him. While it is
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laid down that "a mere mistake of law,
stripped of all other circumstances, constitutes no ground for the reformation of written contracts," yet "the rule that an admitmisapprehension
ted or clearly established
of the law does create a basis for the interference of courts of equity, resting on discretion and to be exercised only in the most
unquestionable and flagrant cases, is certainly more in consonance with the best-concases upon this
sidered and best-reasoned
Snell v.
point both Enghsh and American."
Insurance Co., 98 U. S. 85, 90, 92, 25 L. Ed.
52; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. (Redf. Ed.) §§ ISSe,
138f; Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Hudson Iron
Co., 102 Mass. 45, 48; Underwood v. Brockman, 4 Dana, 309, 316; Jones v. Clifford, 3
Ch. Div. 779, 791, 792; Canedy v. Marey, 13
Gray, 373, 377; Green v. Railroad Co., 12
N. J. Eq. 165, 170; Beardsley v. Knight, 10
Vt. 185, 190; State v. Paup, 13 Ark. 129;
2 Pom. Eq.
2 Lead. Cas. Eq. pt. 1, 979-984;

Jur.

§§ 843-847.

The conclusion reached upon this branch
of the case is the only one consistent with
fair dealing towards those who were willing to become sureties for the appearance
of Durant. If it be not justified upon the
ground of mistake as to the mutual agreement, superinduced by the conduct of the
party seeking now to take advantage of it,
there could be no escape from the conclusion
that the taking of a bond that made Griswold absolutely liable as surety, for any
amount adjudged to be due from Durant,
and not greater than the penal sum named,
was, under all the circumstances disclosed,
a fraud in law upon him. If the attorneys
of .Hazard intended to obtain, by means of a
bond, more than he was entitled to by such
a bond as the writ of ne exeat called for,
and more than the court would ordinarily
have given them, upon Durant's application
to discharge the writ; If they intended to
secure a bond that would make Griswold
personally liable, within the penal sum, for
any money decree passed against Durant,
then a fraud was perpetrated upon him,
which entitles him to relief; for, according
to the decided preponderance
of the evidence it must be assumed that Hazard's attorneys knew that he signed the bond in the
belief that, pursuant to the previous tmderstanding, it was one to secm-e Durant's appearance, nothing more, and yet they failed
to inform him, at the tim:e, that it was
drawn so as to impose upon him a much
larger responsibility.
upon
Their silence
that question was, under the circumstances,
equivalent to a direct affirmation that the
bond meant what Griswold supposed it did.
In view of what passed at the jail on Saturday night, their duty was, by sufficient
explanation, to correct the misapprehension
Besides,
under which he evidently labored.
there can be no doubt, under the evidence,
that the agreement to discliarge the writ
was reached without consultation with Gris-
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wold.
No one of tbe witnesses states that
lie was consulted about that matter, or tliat
he was informed as to the legal result of
an agreement or order to discharge the writ.
He testifies that he knew nothing of any
such agreement.
So that while Hazard's attorney, according to his evidence, was preparing a bond that would bind Griswokl
absolutely to pay any decree, not in excess
of t$53,735, that might be rendered against
one who was almost a stranger to him, and
who, Hazard stated in his bill, was then
and was
engaged in hazardous speculations,
in a precarious condition pecuniarily, he was,
as the representative of Hazard, under an
agreement with Duraut, of which Griswold
had no knowledge, that the writ of ne exeat
should be discharged; thus compelling the
surety to risk the insolvency of the principal,
and putting it out of his power, for his own
protection,
to surrender the principal, and
obtain the cancellation of the bond, as, in
that case, the surety might have done, if
the bond had been, as he supposed it was,
of Durant.
one simply for the appearance
The concealment
of this agreement from
a
Griswold was, under the circumstances,
wrong to him.
"The contract
of suretyship," says Mr. Story, "imports entire good
faith and confidence between the parties in
regard to the whole transaction. Any concealment of material facts, or any express
or implied misrepresentation of such facts,
or any undue advantage taken of the surety
by the creditor, either by surprise or by
information, will unwithholding proper
doubtedly furnish a sufficient ground to invalidate the contract." Again: "If a party
taking a guaranty from a surety conceals
from him facts which go to increase his risk,
and suffers him to enter into the contract
under false impressions as to the real state
of the facts, such a concealment will amount
to a fraud, because the party is bound to
make the disclosure." 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§
To the same effect are Bank v.
324, 215.
Cooper, 36 Me. 180, 196; Smith v. Bank, 1
Dow, 272, 292; Railton v. Mathews, 10 Chark
& F. 934, 943; Small v. Gurrie, 2 Drew. 102,
Phillips v. Foxall, L. R. 7 Q. B. 666,
114;
672;
Pidcock v. Bishop, 3 Barn. & C. 605;
Adams' Eq. 179. But we do not rest our
decision upon any ground of fraud in law
We acquit the attorneys
or fraud in fact.
of Hazard of any desire or purpose to do
injustice to Griswold, or to commit a fraud
But we are constrained, by the
upon him.
settled rules of evidence, to hold, as already
indicated, that their recollection of the cirunder which the bond of Aucumstances
gust 24th was executed is materially at fault,
and that the alleged mistake is established
by convincing proof.

But it is said that Griswold was guilty
of such laches in seeking the relief now asked that he is not entitled to the aid of a
This position is based princourt of equity.
cipally upon what Peckham says occurred

between him and Griswold in the fall of the
year after the execution of the bond. Peckham testifies:
"About the last of October or
the 1st of November,
1868, along that time,
I met Mr. Griswold on Thames street, in
Newport, near my office. He spoke of this
bond as if it were a bail-bond.
I said, 'No;
it is a bond upon which you may be liable to
If, for example, the court
pay
money.
should find a judgment against Durant for
any sum of money, and he did not pay It,
you could be held for the amount named in
these bonds.'
He said, 'Well, I guess you
are right, but I must see Durant about it.
He must do something about it.' I asked
him, 'Why, he is rich enough, isn't he?' and
Mr. Griswold said, 'Yes; he is rich enough,
but he is reckless, and there is no tellinghow long such a man may stay rich, and he
must give me security.' I would like to add
here that I mentioned this to Mr. Honey last
winter. Mr. Honey said that he was confident, from conversations he had had with
his client, Mr. Griswold, that Mr. Griswold
had no recollection of any such conversation
with me; and I replied that, if Mr. Griswold
did not recollect it, I should hesitate about
swearing to it, and that I did not think I
would swear to it under those circumstances, and that certainly I would not like to
Still I have felt bound to state it
do so.
here, upon further reflection,
with these
explanations." If this be a correct statement of what passed between Peckham and
Griswold, upon the occasion referred to, it
is significant as showing that months after
the bond \\'as executed Griswold spoke of it
as a bail-bond.
His declaration, after Peckof its terms, "I guess you
ham's explanation
are right," naturally meant no more than a
acquiescence,
courteous
without discussion,
in the opinion expressed by one learned in
Griswold, while recalling the fact
the law.
that he expressed to Peckham his belief
that it was a bail-bond, denies explicitly that
he, on that or any other occasion, ever admitted that it was other than a bail-bond.
Besides, there was no absolute necessity
for Griswold's moving in the matter until
after some decree was passed against Durant, and until an attempt was made to hold
him personally responsible for the amount
of the bond. He made an effort in Re Griswold, 13 R. I. 125, to be discharged from
his bond upon the principal's placing himself
But, as
within the jurisdiction of the court.
we have seen, the court, after declining to
discharge the bond, said that, even if the
bond in question was to be considered
as
having no other effect than a bond to abide
the decree made upon hearing the cause,
the petition for its discharge would not be
by it until a final decree was
considered
The judgment in that case was
passed.
30, 1880.
passed September
Notwithstanding this announcement,
and doubtless because of the intimation that the bond meant
more, in law, than he supposed, Griswold
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commenced the present suit more than a year
before tlie decree was rendered against Durant, and before the action at law was
brought on the bond.
Under the peculiar
circumstances of this case, we thinli the
defense
of laches Is without substantial
merit. Whether laches is to be imputed to
a party seeking the aid of a court of equity
depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. There are no circumstances
here that would Justify a refusal to grant
the relief asked because of Griswold's delay
in iustituting suit to have the bond canceled
or reformed.
In the view the court takes of this case,
the proper decree to make, if Durant were
living, would be one reforming the bond
of August 24, 1868, so as to make Griswold
liable for the penal sum named only in the
event that the principal failed to appear
and become subject to the orders and decrees of the court In the suit in which the
writ of ne exeat was issued. But such a
decree would not now be appropriate.
Under the circumstances,
the only decree that
will accomplish the ends of substantial justice is one pei-petually enjoining the prosecution of any action, suit, or proceeding to
.make him liable in any sum on or by reason
of said bond.
We come now to the action at law No. 53,
in which there was a judgment against
Griswold on the bond of August 24, 1868,
It is assigned for
for the sum of $66,470.
error that the court sustained the demurrers
and
to the original second, third, fourth,
third,
ordered
the amended
fifth pleas,
fourth, and fifth pleas to be stricken from
the files, and denied the defendant's motions, at the trial, for judgment on his
eighth and ninth pleas.
It has been assumed in argument that the record in this case
substantially presents, among other questions, the following:
(1) Whether the bond
of August 24, 1868, was not obtained by
as rendered It
such fraud and concealment
void as against Griswold.
(2) Whether upon the face of the record of the equity suit
in which the order or decree of December
2, 1882, was rendered the court was not without jurisdiction of the subject-matter of that
suit, the essential object of which, it is argued, was to administer the affairs, and distribute the assets, of a Pennsylvania corporation, by means of decrees and orders of
a court in Khode Island.
(3) Whether simple duress operating only on the principal in
the bond could he taken advantage of by
the surety.
(4) Whether the plaintiffs, notwithstanding the stipulation of Griswold's
counsel, at the trial, that they were able to
prove, under the decree of December 2, 1882,
"an amount of damage In excess of the penal
sum of the bond declared on," could maintain an action on the bond for that or any
other sum, until it was ascertained and adjudged in Hazard's eqmty suit, what distinct
part, if any, of the $16,071,059.97 for which
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Durant was adjudged by the supreme court
of Rhode Island to be accountable to the
Credit Mobllier of America, actually belonged, or would be ultimately awarded, to
the obligees in the bond.
These questions have been argued by the
counsel of the respective parties with signal
ability, and their importance is recognized.
But, in view of the present condition of the
record of this case, it is not deemed best
The ground upon
now to discuss them.
which the court below ordered the amended
pleas to be stricken from the flies does not
appear.
It may be that the motion was
v.
treated as a formal demurrer (Slocomb
Powers, 10 R. I. 255), or was granted because, in the judgment of the court, the
amended pleas did not materially change the
defense as presented in the pleas to which
special demurrers were sustained, and were
not, therefore, fairly embraced by the stipulation made by counsel for their being filed.
But, in our judgment, the amended pleas
were much broader, as well as more specific in their averments, than were the original pleas; and the questions arising upon
them' could have been more appropriately
raised by demurrer.
Smith v. Carroll (R. I.
July 19, 1890) 20 Atl. 227. We are the more
willing to make this disposition of the case,
because of the decision in case No. 50 in respect to Griswold's liability upon the bond
sued on. In view of what has been there
said, the discussion of the above questions
would seem to be unnecessary.
The demurrer to the bill in No. 51 was
properly sustained.
The error, if any, committed by the supreme com't of Rhode Island
in not allowing the release, executed to Durant by the receiver in the Pennsylvania
court of the Credit Mobllier of America, to
in the suit
be interposed
as a defense
brought by Hazard against Durant and others, could not be corrected by bill in equity,
filed by a surety on the bond of August 24th;
for the reason, if there were no other, that
the release was delivered prior to the judgment in the state court constituting the basis
of the action at law on the bond.
The demurrer to the bill in case No." 52
In that case
was also properly sustained.
in the suthe validity of the proceedings
preme court of Rhode Island, by Hazard
against Durant and others, was assailed
upon the ground that the bill in that suit
did not sufficiently show that any effort had
been made by Hazard, the plaintifC therein,
and who sued as stockholder,
to procure
corporate action against Durant by the Credit Mobllier of America. It is only necessary
to say that this ground presents only a question of mere error in the judgment of the
state court, and does not afEect its jurisdiction.

The decree in suit No. 50 must be reversed, with directions to enter a new decree perpetually enjoining the defendants
therein, and each of them', from prosecut-
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any suit, action, or proceeding
against
Griswold on the bond executed by him on
the 24th of August, 1868, as one of the
sureties of Thomas C. Durant; the decrees
In cases Nos. 51 and 52 must be atErmed;
and the judgment in the action at law No.
53 must be reversed with directions for further proceedings not Inconsistent with this
ing

opinion. Griswold Is entitled to his costs
in this court in cases 50 and 53, and the
appellees in the other cases are entitled to
their costs here as against Griswold. It is
so ordered.

BRADLEY

and

JJ., did not
of this case.

BREWER,
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MARSHALL
(67

N. W.

et al. v.
257,

WESTROPB.

98 Iowa, 324.)

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May

18, 1896.

Appeal from district court, Slielby county;
A. B. Thornell, Judge.
Suit in equity to reform a contract of assignment of certain accounts made by defendant to plaintiffs, and to recover on the
contract so reformed the sum of $270, being
the value of certain machinery delivered by
plaintiffs to defendant in consideration of the
assignment.
The defendant admitted the receipt of the machinery, the assignment of the
accounts, and a certain modiflcation
of the
contract of assignment, but denied each and
every other claim of plaintiffs.
He also
pleaded an election of remedies on the part
of plaintiffs, by which they confirmed and
elected to stand on the original contract as
made.
There was a trial to the court, and
judgment and decree for plaintiffs. Defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Smith & Cullison, for appellant.
Phelps & Mosier, for appellees.

Nash,

DBBMER, J. In the year 1891, plaintiffs,
a copartnership,
were engaged in selling farm
machinery at the town of Audubon.
Defendant had for a number of years prior thereto
been managing and conducting
a farm in
Audubon county for his father. On or about
March 1st, he moved onto a farm of his own,
in Shelby county, intending to cultivate it for
his own use and benefit.
Desirous of purchasing some farm implements,
he visited
plaintiffs' place of business, with the avowed
intention of securing the same. It appears
that the defendant was the owner of a stallion, which was "stood" for the season of
1890 in Montgomery or Cass counties, by an
agent of defendant, under an arrangement by
which the parties who received the services
of the stallion were to pay a certain amount
therefor in the event the mares bred to him
were got with foal; otherwise, nothing should
be paid.
The defendant was the owner of
certain claims for services resulting from
the use of the stallion, which he proposed to
transfer to plaintiffs for the farm machinery
he desired to purchase.
No agreement was
reached at the first interview, but it was arranged that defendant should see if he could
purchase the machinery of some other person at a lower price, and, if not, it was supposed that the negotiations
would be renewed.
About March 27th, the defendant wrote
plaintiffs a letter of which the following is a
copy:
"Marshall & Sharp: I (Ian make the
trade in Harlan, but they are not so low
in price as you are. Jones would not make
the price he stated and furnish the goods
he named.
Inclosed find assignment for
same.
Please sign and date, and keep one,
and send me one, and let me know by return mail, because I will want to know at
once if the deal is closed.
would come

I
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over, but my~ housienBiamed to the ground
cannot
leave.
last Saturday night, and
Very truly, O. D. Westrope." In this letter
was inclosed a contract for the plaintiffs' signature, the material parts of which are as
follows: After stating that plaintiffs had sold
it recites:
certain machinery to defendant,
"That, as payment therefor, the said O. D.
Westrope enters into and does hereby assign
and transfer to said Marshal & Sharp the
following accounts for services of the stallion named General Duke, in the year 1890,
to wit: [Here follows a list of the accounts,
with the amounts of each set out, aggregating the sum of $300.]
The said Marshall «&
Sharp taking and accepting said accounts in
full satisfaction of said claim; the said O.
D. Westrope hereby agreeing that all foals
not paid for by July 1st, 1891, that he will
pay to said Marshall & Sharp such account
remaining unpaid, and said account so paid
Marshall
by him to be reassigned to him.
Dated at Audn& Sharp.
O. D. Westrope.
These contracts
bon, la., March 28, 1891."

I

and
were signed by appellees as indicated,
one of them (there being two) was returned
to appellant, and the other retained by appellees.
Afterwards one of the articles called for by the contract was substituted by another, and all the goods with the substitute
named were shipped to the appellant. But
three of the mares served to appellant's horse
proved to be with foal, and appellees received but $30 from the accounts so assigned.
The other accounts never matured, because
the. mares did not prove to be with foal. The
being called upon to make payappellant,
ment of the balance of the purchase price,
refused, claiming that he had fully performThe appellees thereupon ined his contract.
stituted an action at law against the appellant, alleging (1) that appellant had procured its signature to the contract by fraud and
misrepresentation; (2) that there was an implied warranty in the sale of the accounts,
to the effect that they were subsisting and
against the parties whose acenforceable
counts they purported to be; and (3) that appellant received the property without any
consideration therefor having been paid by
The appellant made an issue erf fact
him.
on the first claim, and demurred to the second and third. The demurrer was sustained
as to the third, and overruled as to the second.
Defendant thereupon answered the second, pleading that, under the arrangMnents
had with those who secured the services of
his stallion, it was agreed that nothing
should be paid unless the mares were got
with foal; that plaintiffs linew of this arrangement when they accepted
the assignment
of the accounts. Thereupon plaintiffs amended their petition by adding another count, in
which they claimed that, by mutual mistake,
or by mistake on their part and fraud on defendant's, the words "foals" was inserted in
that part of the contract containing the guaranty, instead of the word "accounts"; and
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they asked that the mistake be corrected, aud

the contract reformed.
A motion was then
filed by defendant attacking the petition on
the ground of misjoinder.
This motion was
sustained, but plaintlflfs were permitted to file
this last count as an independent action In
equity. Certain pleadings were filed attacking this equitable pleading, which need not
be referred to, and finally the defendant answered, admitting the receipt of the goods as
alleged, but denying the fi-aud and mistake.
He also pleaded that plaintiffs, by the institution of the law action, had confirmed the contract, and elected to stand thereon, and that
they could not now be allowed to repudiate
it; and that the contract was merged in a
judgment by which the rights of the parties
were fully determined.
Defendant also pleaded that plaintiffs, with full knowledge
of the
contents of the written contract, and that the
word "foals" was used therein, confirmed the
same, and elected to stand by the conditions
thereof.
The plaintiffs filed a reply, denying
this last claim of defendant, and also filed a
demurrer to that part of the answer pleading an election and confirmation.
This demurrer was submitted with the case, and the
court, in rendering the decree, sustained the
demurrer,
reformed the contract as prayed,
and rendered judgment tor plaintiffs.
Defendant excepted to the rulings, and appeals.
1. The first point relied upon by appellant
is that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to that part of his answer pleading
It is said that
election and confirmation.
plaintiffs, by reason of having commepced
their suit at law, elected to rely upon the
contract, and that they cannot now be allowed to change front, and seek to have it
reformed.
The question presented is not
open for our consideration.
The suit is an
equitable one, triable de novo in this court,
upon the issues of fact presented to the lower court; and, while the appellant might
also have the case considered on error, yet,
to do so, he must assign the errors of which
he complains.
Powers v. O'Brien Co., 54
Iowa, 501, 6 N. W. 720; Patterson v. Jack,
59 Iowa, 632, 13 N, W. 724; Hodgin v. Toler, 70 Iowa, 21, 30 N. W. 1.
There is no assignment of errors, and we cannot, therefore,
review the action of the trial court in sustaining appellees' demurrer.
It may not be
inappropriate to say, however, that we do
not thinlv the facts as pleaded in defendant's answer constitute such an election of
remedies, or such a claim of right, as prevents the appellees from asking for a reformation of the contract upon which the suit
is founded.
2. The appellees
alleged in their petition
that the contract of sale "did not express the
real contract entered into between plaintiff
* * • in that the
and defendant,
word
'foals' was, by fraud or mistake of the defendant, used in the place of the word 'ac* * * but that plaintiff, through
counts,'

mistake as to the contents

of said instru-

ment, believed that the word 'accounts' was
used in the said instrument where the word
'foals' is found, and was thereby Induced
to sign the said instrument."
In an amendment to the petition, the appellees said "that
either said instrument did not express the
intention and real contract of the parties
signing the same by reason of the mistake of
both parties or of the scrivener drawing the
same, or that the defendant fraudulently presented the same to plaintiffs, intending that
plaintiffs should be misled thereby,
and
knowing that plaintiffs were in error as to
the terms and to its sufficiency
to express
the contract between them."
It is now insisted that the evidence does not sustain either claim.
It seems to us that this is true
in so far as it relates to the alleged mistake
of fact recited in the original petition. The
evidence conclusively shows that both members of plaintiffs' firm knew when they signed the contract just what it contained.
They
knew that the word "foals" was used. InThey talked
stead of the word "accounts."
about the contract with each other before
signing it. The defendant says that there
was no mistake; that the language used
Manifestly, there
was just as he intended.
was no such mistake of fact as to justify a
reformation of the instrument, for the plain
reason that neither party was mistaken in
regard to what was in fact in the contract.
A mistake, to be such as the law will relieve
from, must be mutual aud reciprocal. When
the contract as executed is just as the parties intended to make it, the court has no
power to reform it because of mistake of
fact.
To do so would be making a new
contract for the parties, and would also impose upon one burdens which he did not intend to assume.
No coiu't has the power to
make a new contract for the parties. It can
only do what the parties mutually and manifestly intended at the time they signed the
same.
The mistake made, if any, was with
reference to the efficacy of the terms used to
carry out the intent of the parties, and this
is the real claim made by the appellees.
We
have, then, the question:
Will a court of
equity reform a contract under such circumstances?
In the case of Lee v. Percival, 52
N. W. 543, we held, following the rule laid
down by Prof. Pomeroy in his work on Equity Jurisprudence, that "if, on the other
hand, after making an agreement, in the process of reducing it to a written form, the instrument,
by means of a mistake of law,
fails to express the contract which the parties actually entered into, equity will interfere with the appropriate relief, either by
way of defense to its enforcement
or by
cancellation or reformation, to the same extent as if the failure of the writing to express the real contract was caused by a
mistake of fact. In this instance there is
no mistake as to the legal import of the contract actually made; but the mistake of
law prevents the real contract from being
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emljodied In the written instrument."
The
counterpart of this proposition announced by
Prof. Pomeroy is: "The doctrine is settled
that, in general, a mistake of law, pure and
simple, is not adequate ground for relief."
Section 842.
"The rule Is well settled that
a simple mistake by a party as to the legal
effect of an agreement which he executes, or
as to the legal result of an act which he
performs. Is no ground for either defensive
or affirmative relief. * • * The principle
underlying this rule is that equity will not
interfere for the purpose of can'ying out an
intention which the parties did not have
when they entered into a transaction, but
which they might or even would have had If
they had been more correctly informed as to
the law,— if they had not been mistaken as
to the legal scope and effect of their transaction."
Section 843.
"If an agreement is
what it was intended to be, equity will not
interfere with it because the parties have
mistaken its legal import and efCect." Section 845.
We now have the two rules stated
as concisely as general principles may be,
and it is next important to determine under
which of them this case falls. We have
seen that if the parties, at the time they
made their agreement,— at the time their
minds met, — mutually understood that the
defendant was to guaranty all the accounts
which he transferred to plaintifEs, but that,
in the process of reducing their agreement
to writing, they used the word "foals" under
the mistaken idea that it was as broad as
the word "accounts," then equity will afford
relief. But if they made an agreement that
defendant should guaranty the foals, under
the mistaken idea that this would be a guaranty of the accounts, then no relief can be
granted.
It is also a well-settled and oftrepeated rule of law that, before mistakes
of either fact or law can be relieved from
either affirmatively or negatively, it is essential that the proofs be clear, strong, convincing, and free from reasonable
doubt.
Gelpcke V. Blake, 15 Iowa, 387; Clute v. Frazier (Iowa) 12 N. W. 327
There is another
rule which it may be well to note, as it is
relied upon by the appellees in this case. It
is as follows: "A mistake which will warrant a court of equity in reforming a written contract must be a mistake made by
both parties to the agreement, or it must be
the mistake of one party by which his intentions have failed of correct expression,
and there must be fraud in the other party
in taking advantage of the mistake, and obtaining a contract with the knowledge that
the one dealing with him is in error as to
what are its terms." Bryce v. Insurance
Co., 55 N. Y. 243; Wlnans v. Huyck, 71 Iowa,
459, 32 N. W. 422.
Another principle which
is suggested by appellant may also be stated.
It is to the effect that a mistake caused
by the want of that care and diligence in the
transaction which should be used by every
person of reasonable prudence, and the ab-
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sence of which would be a violation of legal
duty, will not be relieved from by a court
of equity.
Turning now to the evidence, we find that
it establishes the following facts: The defendant,
desirous of purchasiug some farm
machinery, visited the plaintiffs, and received
from them their lowest and best price thereHe then offered to exchange some acfor.
counts in payment or as collateral security
for the purchase price.
The plaintiffs would
not accept these accounts without a guaranty
from the defendant, and they so told him.
Defendant then said he would be responsible
and pay aU accounts that were not paid and
turned over to plaintiffs by July 1st. The
plaintiffs then said they would accept the
All parties understood at the
proposition.
time the condition of the accounts, — ^that the

parties against whom they purported to be

were not to be responsible unless the mares
The defendant
proved
to be with foal.
wished to do a little more figuring, and said
that he was going over to his farm, and
would look the matter up a little further,
and would write what he concluded to do
about the matter.
It was further agreed
that, if the trade was consummated,
the
goods should be shipped to defendant over
the Rock Island Railroad.
The next plaintiffs heard from defendant was by letter of
date March 27, 1891, a copy of which we have
already given.
When plaintiffs signed the
contract which was inclosed in defendant's
letter, they understood
they were carrying
arrangements
previously made.
out
the
Some time in September of the year 1891, the
plaintiffs ascertained
they were not going
to receive more than $30 from the accounts
which were assigned them, and they called
on defendant for payment
Defendant put
them off from time to time, and finally announced that he intended to stand upon his
contract
When plaintiffs signed the contract, they knew the words it contained, and
their mistake, which we are abundantly satisfied they made, was as to the legal effect
thereof.
We feel quite certain that the defendant, when he first talked to the plaintiffs, intended to guaranty all the assigned
accounts, and not those only which fully matured.
It is not so clear, however, that he,
in drafting the contract, intended, by the
words used, to make himself responsible for
the accounts without reference to the foals.
Now, in applying the law to these facts,
the first inquiry is, what was the contract
as actually entered into by the parties? for
It must be remembered that this is not a suit
to cancel or set the writing aside, but to
make it conform to the real agreement
of
If, then, the instrument itself
the parties.
is the contract the parties in fact made,
then there is nothing to reform.
But if they
made a parol contract, — if there was in fact
a meeting of the minds of the parties,— and
they made a mutual mistake in reducing it
to writing, and used terms which did not
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express

the real contract between
them,
equity will reform the instrument to make it
correspond
with the contract as actually
made.
It is apparent from what we have
said, as well as from some other circumstances in the case which we cannot take the
space to state, that, whUe the parties were
making propositions
and negotiations
with
each other for a trade, their minds never in
fact met until the plaintiffs signed the written instrument which was sent for their signature.
This was the contract l»etween the
parties; and although it did not, for lack of
apt words, express what they thought it did,
this wns the only agreement they made.
It is well to inquire what other contract
did they in fact make which should be given force and vitality.
The answer is, none.
The whole matter as it stood at the end of
the personal interview between the parties
was in the form of propositions by one to
the other.
The acceptance by the defendant
was not of the offer made him by the plaintiffs. He in truth sent another proposition
when he mailed the contracts signed by himself.'

These contracts
were not in accord
with the previous negotiations of the parties;
but the plaintiffs, when they signed them,
knew full well what they contained, and, if
any agreement was made, it was the one expressed in the writing.
It may be that, because of a mistake of law, the minds of the
parties never met. But, if this he conceded,
it will not aid the plaintiffs; for they are
insisting upon the performance of a contract
which they say they did make. They are
not suing to avoid an instrument because
they never agreed to it.
Moreover, if they
were asking cancellation or rescission, their
own negligence in signing the contract would
seem to be a bar to relief of this kind.
There is no evidence of fraud of any kind
on the part of the defendant.
He forwarded such an agreement as he proposed to make
with the plaintiffs, and they, without any
kind of imposition,
misrepresentation,
con-

or other Inequitable conduct on defendant's part, signed the instrument with
full knowledge of what it contained.
The
most that can be claimed from the evidence
is that the defendant forwarded the instrument with intent to induce plaintiffs to believe that it was in accord with the previous
negotiations,
but this is a mere Inference,
which is squarely denied by the defendant.
The presumptions
are with the defendant,
and the rule is well settled that fraud will
not be presumed, but must be proved by him
who alleges it
An insuperable objection to relief on the
ground of fraud is the negligence
of the
plaintiffs in signing the instrument.
They
had the same means of knowledge as to the
legal effect of the words used as the defendant; and, if they were mistaken as to the
proper legal constniction thereof, it was not
due, so far as we can learn from the record,
to any fault of the defendant.
The case,
then, is one of mistake of law, pure and simple, and a court of equity cannot reform it.

1 cealment,

If

we should attempt to do so, we would
make a new contract for the parties, and impose upon one of them burdens to which he
has never assented.
While it may seem like
a hardship to say that plaintiffs shall not
recover for the machinery delivered defendant, yet the case is one of mistake of law, in
which some person must suffer; "and the
law wisely, though sometimes with great apparent hardship, leaves it for him to suffer
who committed the mistake."
These conclusions are supported by the following, among other, authorities: Beed v.
Root, 59 Iowa, 359, 13 N. W. 323; Moorman
V. CoUier, 32 Iowa, 138; Stafford v. Fetters,
55 Iowa, 484, 8 N. W. 322; Baker v. Massey,
50 Iowa, 399; Nowlin v. Pyne, 47 Iowa, 293;
Hallam v. Corlett, 71 Iowa, 446, 32 N. W. 449.
See, also, the cases cited in the first part of
this opinion.
It follows from what we have said that the
judgment must be reversed.
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CLINK

692, 91

et al.

Mich.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

1.)

March

18,

1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Charlevoix county, in chancery;
Jonathan G. RamsdeU,
Judge.
Suit to foreclose a mortgage by Louisa
Renard against Alice A. Clink, Eliza S. Fogg,
John Nichols, and Walter L. French. Bill
Reversed.
Complainant appeals.
dismissed.
Norton & Keat, for appellant.
for appellees.

S. H. Clink,

MONTGOMERY, J. The bill In this cause
was filed to foreclose a mortgage executed by
the defendant Alice A. Clink to one A. H.
Van Dusen, and by him assigned to complainant. The other defendants are subsequent purchasers with notice, after the mortgage became due. A foreclosure at law was
attempted, a sale made, and a deed executed
to complainant; but, owing to the fact that
the assignment of the mortgage to complainant was not of record at the time of said
attempted foreclosure, that proceeding proved
After the complainant had obineffectual.
tained her deed on the foreclosure at law, and
before the filing of the present bill, the defendant Clink tendered to complainant the
amount due upon the mortgage, exclusive of
the costs of such former foreclosure; and In
this proceeding it is claimed that such tender
operated to discharge the lien of the mortThe court below sustained this degage.
fense, and dismissed the bill.
It is made clear by the testimony that the
complainant, at the time she refused the tender, supposed that she had acquired title by
her former foreclosure,
and that, notwithstanding this, she was ready to accept the
amount of the mortgage, interest, and costs.
It also appears that she offered to take the
money tendered so far as it would go, but
that defendant refused to permit this unless
she would accept it In full payment and discharge of the mortgage.
Under these circumstances, we think the court below erred in
dismissing the bill. Under the repeated rulings of this court, a tender of the full amount
due upon the mortgage will operate to discharge the lien of the mortgage if the tender
Moynabe refused without adequate excuse.
han V. Moore, 9 Mich. 9; Eslow v. Mitchell,
26 Mich. 500; Sager v. Tupper, 35 Mich. 134;
Stewart v. Brown, 48 Mich. 383, 12 N. W. 499.
But In the present case it appears beyond
question that the complainant had no purpose
of exacting from the defendant any sum beyond what she believed to be her legal due.
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While it is a general rule that equity will not
relieve against a mistake of law, this rule Is
not universal. Where parties, with knowledge of the facts, and without any inequitaor
have made an agreement
ble incidents,
other instrument as they intended it should
be, and the writing expresses the transaction
to be
and designed
as it was understood
made, equity will not allow a defense, or
grant a reformation or rescission, although
one of the parties may have mistaken or misconceived its legal meaning, scope, or effect.
Martin v. Hamlin, 18 Mich. 354; Lapp v.
Lapp, 43 Mich. 287, 5 N. W. 317. But where
a person is Ignorant or mistaken with respect
to his own antecedent and existing private
legal rights, interest, or estate, and enters Into some transaction the legal scope and operation of which he correctly apprehends and
understands, for the purpose of affecting such
assumed rights. Interests, or estates, equity
will grant its relief, defensive or affirmative,
treating the mistake as analogous to, if not
2 Pom.
identical with, a mistake of fact.
Eq. § 849, p. 314; Reynell v. Sprye, 8 Hare,
222; Blakeman v. Blakeman, 39 Conn. 320;
Whelen's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 410; Hearst v.
Pujol, 44 Cal. 230; Morgan v. Dod, 3 Colo.
551; Cooper v. Phibbs, L. R. 2 H. L. 149;
Lansdowne v. Lansdowne, 2 Jac. & W. 205.
In Myer v. Hart, 40 Mich. 517, the mortgagor filed his bill to set aside a mortgage
sale, and asked that the premises be relieved
from the mortgage lien.
The court found
that the mortgagee was mistaken as to his
legal rights, but was acting In good faith, and
refused to enforce the statutory penalty, and
decreed that the mortgagor pay the mortgage
debt as a condition to relief. In Canfield v.
Conkling, 41 Mich. 371, 2 N. W. 191, a bill
was filed to set aside a mortgage, and to recover the penalty for refusal to discharge it
on tender of the amount due.
The court
found that the tender was sufficient, and say:
"He [defendant] was bound to accept the tender, and complainant had made out a sufficient
case for relief. But the question was one on
which he might be mistaken without any
serious fault, and we do not think it one
where the mortgage ought to be held canceled without payment; nor is it a case calling for the statutory penalty for a willful and
knowing wrongful refusal to discharge the
mortgage." The decree below should be reversed, and a decree entered in this court
providing for a sale of the mortgaged premises to satisfy the amount due and unpaid upThe defendant will recover
on the mortgage.
the costs of the court below, and the complainant will be entitled to the costs incurred
In this court. The other justices concurred.
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ROCHESTER GERMAN INS.
(31 S.

W.

127, 97

Ky.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

CO.

567.)

May

24,

1895.

Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson county.

"To be oflacially reported."
Action by XJ. S. Titus against the Roctiester
German Insurance Company for rescission
of a contract.
From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
Simrall, Bodley & Doolan, for appellant.
Gibson, Jlarshall & Lochre, for appellee.

EASTIN, J. This equitable action was
brougtit by appellant to rescind a contract
made witb appellee by whicli, as alleged, he
was induced to accept, in satisfaction of a
loss under a policy of insurance issued to
him by appellee, an amount equal to one-half
of that loss and to one-half of the amount
of insurance
policy.
named
in the
As
grounds

of

rescission,

the

petition

charges

that appellant was ignorant of his legal
rights under the policy, and that, through
fraud and imposition practiced upon him by

appellee's agents, and by willful misrepresentations made by them as to his rights under the contract
of insurance, he was induced to accept a part of his claim in satisfaction of the whole.
The chancellor sustained a general demurrer to the petition,
and. appellant declining to plead further, his
petition was dismissed, from which ruling
this appeal is prosecuted;
so that the only
here is whether
question for consideration
or not the facts alleged in the petition, and
admitted by the demurrer, are sufficient in
equity to entitle appellant to the relief sought.
The petition charges, in the fullest and
strongest terms, appellant's ignorance of the
rights and oWigations of the parties under
the policy of insurance, and full knowledge
on part of appellee both as to the rights of
the parties and as to appellant's ignorance of
them, as well as false and fraudulent misrepresentations
agents
made by appellee's
for the purpose of deceiving, and which did
deceive, appellant, as to the validity of his
It charges, among
claim under the policy.
other things, that appellee fully understood
its liability to appellant for the full amount
of his loss; that he was ignorant of the law
his rights and appellee's obligagoverning
tions, while appellee both knew his rights
and knew that he was ignorant of them,
and with this knowledge, and intending to
deceive and defraud him, fraudulently represented to him that, by reason of an incumbrance on a part of the insured property, his
entire claim under the policy was forfeited;
were made
that these false representations
to him by appellee for the purpose of deceiving and defrauding him; and that by
these false and fraudulent representations,
and through ignorance of his legal rights, he
was induced to accept the sum of $100 in

satisfaction of a loss of $800, when, except
for these fraudulent representations and his
ignorance, he would not have done so. These
charges being admitted, it seems to us that
the case presented involves something more
than an effort to obtain relief purely on the
ground of a mistake of law, or mere ignoras to his legal
ance on part of appellant
rights under the contract of insurance.
It
becomes, in addition to this, a case of actual
fraud, where, by fraudulent misrepresentations, made for the pm'pose and with the
intent to deceive, the known ignorance of one
of the parties to the contract has been willfully taken advantage of, and he has thereby been induced to surrender a valid, subsisting right without consideration.
It is
true that the ignorance relied upon Is an
ignorance of law, rather than of facts, and
that this is not always or perhaps generally,
and when standing alone, available as a
ground of relief against an executed contract, no matter how inequitable it may be.
On this point the decisions of the courts of
this country, as well as the Bngtish courts,
are by no means uniform; but, in our opinion, the weight of authority and the decisions of this court would now forbid that a
party who, with full knowledge of the ignorance of the other contracting party, has not
only encouraged that ignorance, and made
it the more dense by his own false and fraudulent misrepresentations,
but has willfully
deceived and led that other into a mistaken
conception of his legal rights, should shield
himself behind the general doctrine that a
mere mistake of law affords no ground for
relief.
This view seems to be upheld by
many, if not all, of the modern text writers
who are recognized as authority on the question.
Mr. Kerr, in his well-known work, in
treating of this subject, tays: "But if it appear that the mistake was induced or encouraged by the misrepresentations of the
other party to the transaction, or was perceived

by him, and taken

advantage

of, the

court will be more disposed to grant relief
than in cases where it does not appear that
he was aware of the mistake." Kerr, Fraud
And, in his work on
& M. pp. 399, 400.
Equity, Mr. Bispham lays down this doctrine
in even stronger and less uncertain terms.
He says:
"Where ignorance of the law exists on one side, and that ignorance is known
and taken advantage of by the other party,
the former will be relieved.
More particularly will this be so if the mistake was encouraged or induced by misrepresentations
of the other party." Bisp. Eq. § 188. Under the admitted facts of this case and the
surrounding and leading up to
circumstances
the mistake relied on here, It Is clearly
brought within the text above quoted; and
many other authorities to the same effect,
including reported cases in many of the
states of this Union, might be cited, if it
were

necessary.

We fully recognize the wisdom of that rule

MISTAKE OF LAW.
-which always Inclines the courts to uphold
and enforce the validity of voluntary compromises and adjustments between parties
of tlieir legal differences, when fairly arrived at. Nor would any mere ignorance
of or mistake in the law governing any
doubtful and disputed legal proposition, on
part of either of the parties to the compromise, in the absence of evidence tending
to show that he has been overreached or unfairly dealt with or taken advantage of, and
by a good consideration,
where supported
be sufficient, in our judgment, to justify the
rescission of a compromise
desettlement
liberately made between parties, standing
upon an equal footing, and with full knowledge of all the facts.
If every mistake of
law were sufficient to warrant the interference of the courts, then no compromise
of a disputed legal proposition would be
final, for in every such case one party or
the other to the controversy is mistaken as
Upon the record beto the law of the case.
fore us, there may be some question as to
how far there was a controversy between
these parties over any doubtful legal question that might have been litigated In court,
or exactly what was the nature and extent
of the same. It is alleged in the petition
that appellee claimed that all rights of appellant under his policy of insurance were
forfeited by reason of the existence of an
incumbrance upon a part of the insured
property; but it is further alleged that appellee, at the time the contract of insurance
was m- 'e, "had full knowledge of the same,
and, having such knowledge,
made the contract, and issued
the policy aforesaid."
This allegation is admitted to be true, and,
in the absence of anything further in the
pleading pertaining to this point, we are
unable to see in this the basis of a doubtful
disputed legal proposition which might have
been litigated in the courts, or to know exactly what controversy was settled by the
parties. But waiving the question as to the
nature and extent of the controversy between appellant and appellee, and reverting
which
to the character of the compromises
courts will uphold, we now quote from an
other text writer, who uses this language,
are so fato wit: "Voluntary settlements
vored that if a doubt or dispute exists between parties with respect to their rights,
and all have the same knowledge or means
of obtaining knowledge concerning the circumstances involving these rights, and there
is no fraud, misrepresentation, concealment,
or other misleading incident, a compromise
into which they thus voluntarily enter must
stand and be enforced, although the final issue may be different from that which was
anticipated, and although the disposition
made by the parties in their agreement may
not be that which the court would have decreed had the controversy been brought beOf course, there must
fore it for decision.
Imposition,
not only be no misrepresentation,
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or concealment; there must also be a full disof all material facts within the
closure
knowledge of the parties, whether demanded or not by the others." Pom. Eq. Jur. §
Under the authorities quoted, it is
850.
manifest that the compromise contract
sought to be rescinded here is within the
control of a court of equity, and may be
And now, referring to the deset aside.
cisions of this court, and to the doctrine established in this state, it seems to up still
clearer that the contract complained of, and
which was made under the circumstances
set forth in the petition and admitted by apIn an exhaustpellee, cannot be sustained.
ive opinion, in which the authorities were
ably reviewed, by Judge Robertson, after referring to the difficulty of determining in
every case when a contract was, in fact,
made under a mistake of law, it is said:
"When it can be made perfectly evident that
the only consideration of a contract was a
mistake as to the legal rights or obligations
of the parties, and when there has been no
fair compromise of bona fide and doubtful
claims, we do not doubt that the agreement
might be avoided on the ground of a clear
mistake of law, and a total want, therefore,
Underwood
of consideration or mutuality."
In the case of
V. Brockman, 4 Dana, 309.
Bay V. Bank, 3 B. Mon. 510, this court referred to and approved the above case, and
said: "Upon the whole, we would remark
that whenever, by a clear and palpable mistake of law or fact, essentially bearing upon
and affecting the contract, money has been
paid without cause or consideration, which
in law, honor, or conscience was not due and
payable, and which in honor or good conscience ought not to be retained, it was and
ought to be recovered back." Both of these
cases are cited with approval in the case of
Louisville & N. R. Co v. Hopkins Co., 87
Ky. 613, 9 S. W. 497, and the doctrine laid
down therein has not been departed from
by this court.
It will be seen that the question of fraud did not enter into the decision
of either of those cases, but that they are
almost entirely based upon the fact that
there was no good consideration to uphold
the contracts; that it was not a fair compromise of bona fide and doubtful claims;
and that the money was not In law, honor,
payable,
or conscience
and ought not in
honor or good conscience
to be retained.
If, for these reasons, a contract made under a clear mistake of law may be set aside,
then how much stronger reason is there for
annulling the contract under consideration?
Not only was this contract, according to this
record, as it comes before us, wholly without consideration, and not only was the
money surrendered by appellant on his claim
not due in law, honor, or conscience, and
surrendered only under a clear mistake of
law, but it is further admitted by the demurrer that this contract was obtained, and
that appellant was induced to surrender one-
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half of his claim,
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by the actual false and
fraudulent misrepresentations of appellee,
knowingly made for the purpose of deceiving and defrauding appellant We are clearly of the opinion that the chancellor erred
in sustaining the demurrer to the petition.

indicated, his Judgment
dismissing appellant's petition is reversed,
and the action is remanded, with directions
to set aside that order, and to overrule the
demurrer, an"! give appellee leave to file an
answer.
and, for the reasons
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NICOLIN.

(40 N. W. Rep. 567, 39 Minn. 461.)

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 28, 1888.

Appeal by defendant
from an order of
the district court for Scott county, Edson,
J., presiding, refusing a new trial after a
trial by tbe court.
Peck & Brown, for appellant.
worth, for respondent.

E.

South-

MITCHELL, J.

Action to recover back the
paid by plaintiff to defendant for a
quitclaim deed of a piece of land in the village
of Jordan.
The facts, as disclosed by the
evidence, are that defendant platted into lots
a tract of land, of which he was the owner,
lying between Water street and Sand creek.
As shown upon the plat, the north and south
lines of the lots extend from Water street
to the creek. The distance marked on the
plat gave the length of these lines as 80 feet,
but the actual distance from Water street to
the creek was 110 feet. One of these lots,
and the adjoining 35 feet of another, had
money

according
to
been conveyed by defendant,
the plat, to plaintiff or plaintiff's grantor.
claimed and stated
defendant
Subsequently
to plaintiff, in substance, that the lots only
extended back 80 feet, according to the distance indicated on the plat, and hence that
he stiU owned the strip of 30 feet next to the
creek. Plaintiff knew that defendant's claim
was based wholly upon the theory that the
given on the plat would control,
distance
and hence that his claim of title was in fact
but expressions of opinion as to the legal effect and construction to be given to the
plat. So far as the evidence shows, defendant made this claim in good faith, and honestly supposed that his deeds of the lots only
conveyed 80 feet. Plaintiff took the matter
under consideration for nearly a month, and
went to the register's office and examined
the plat for himself. He then obtained from
defendant and wife a quitclaim deed of all
the land down to the creek, and paid therefor the money which he now seeks to recover.
When he paid the money he knew all
the facts, and had the same means of knowledge of them which defendant had. The
transaction was unaffected
by any fraud,

HUTCn.& BXJNK.EQ.—
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trust, confidence, or the like. The parties
Plaindealt with each other at arm's length.
tiff was not laboring under any mistake of
facts.
He took the deed and paid his money
under a mistake of law as to his antecedent
existing legal rights in the property, supposing that, according to the proper legal construction of the plat, the lots were only 80
feet deep. However, under the doctrine of
Nicolin v. Schneiderhan, 37 Minn. 63, 33 N.
W. Rep. 33, since decided by this court, it
is now settled that a deed of lots according to
this plat would cover all the land down to
the creek, under the rule that distances must
yield to natural boundaries called for in a
deed. We are vmable to see that this case
differs in principle from Perkins v. Trinka,
30 Minn. 241, 15 N. W. Rep. 115, and Hall v.
Wheeler, 37 Minn. 522, 35 N. W. Rep. 377.
It is unnecessary to enter into any discussion of the question (left in great confusion
in the books) when, if ever, relief will be
granted on the ground of mistake in law
alone, or whether there is any difference between mistake of law and ignorance of law,
or between ignorance or mistake as to a
general rule of law and ignorance or mistake
of law as to existing individual rights in tlie
property which is the subject-matter of the
contract.
We hold that money paid under
mistake
of law cannot be recovered back
where the transaction is unaffected by any
fraud, trust, confidence, or the like, but both
parties acted in good faith, knew all the
facts, and had equal means of knowing them,
especially where, as was evidently the fact
in this case, the transaction was intended to
remove or settle a question of doubt as to
title. It would be impossible to foresee all
the consequences which would result from allowing parties to avoid their contracts in
such
cases on the mere plea
of ignorance or mistake
of law affecting their
rights.
It would be difficult to tell what
titles would stand, or what contracts would
be binding, if grantors and grantees were at
liberty to set up such a plea. This may seem
to work inequitably in the present case, but
more mischief will always result from attempting to mould the law to what seems
natural justice in a particular case than from
a steady adherence to general principles.
Order reversed.
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GRYMES

V.

SANDERS et

al.

(93 U. S. 55.)

Supi tvae Court of the United States.

Oct. Term,

1876.

Appeal from the circuit court of the United
States for the eastern district of Virginia.
Conway Robinson and Mr. Leigh Robinson,
for appellant.
Edwin L. Stanton and George
M. Dallas, for appellees.
Mr. Justice SWAYNE.

The appellant was

The recthe defendant In the court below.
ord discloses no ground for any imputation
against him. It was not claimed in the discussion at the bar, nor is it insisted In the
printed arguments submitted by the counsel
for the appellees, that there was on his part
any misrepresentation. Intentional or otherNor
wise, or any indirection whatsoever.
has it been alleged that there was any intentional misrepresentation or purpose to deceive on the part of others.
The case rests entirely upon the ground of
mistake.
The question presented for our determination is whether that mistake was of
such a character, and attended with such circumstances,
as entitle the appellees to the
relief sought by their biU and decreed to
them by the court below.
Peyton Grymes, the appellant, owned two
tracts of land in Orange county, Va., lying
about twenty-five miles from Orange com-thouse. The larger tract was regarded as valuable, on account of the gold supposed to
be upon it. The two tracts were separated
by intervening gold-bearing lands, which the
appellant had sold to others. Catlett applied
to him for authority to sell the two tracts,
It was
which the appellant stlU owned.
given by parol; and the appellant agreed to
aU he could
give, as Catlett's compensation,
Catlett
get for the property above $20,000.
offered to seU to Lanagan. Lanagan was
unable to spare the time to visit the property, but proposed to send Howel Fisher to
examine it This was assented to; and Catlett thereupon wrote to Peyton Grymes, Jr.,
the son of the appellant, to have a conveyance ready for Fisher and himself at the
court-house upon their arrival. The conveyance was provided accordingly, and Peyton
They
Grymes, Jr., drove them to the lands.
arrived after dark, and stayed all night at a
tract.
Fisher Inhouse on the gold-bearing
sisted that he must be back at the courthouse in time to take a designated train east
the ensuing day. This involved the necessity
It was
of an early start the next morning.
that Peyton Grymes, Jr., should
arranged
have Peyton Hume, who lived near at
hand, meet Fisher on the premises In the
morning and show them to him, while
Grymes got his team ready for their return
Hume met Fisher accordto the court-house.
ingly, and showed him a place where there
had been washing for surface-gold, and then
took him to an abandoned shaft, which he

supposed was on the premises.
There Fisher
examined the quartz and other debris lying
about. But a very few minutes had elapsed
when Qrymes announced that his team was
ready.
The party Immediately started back
to the cotfft-house.
Arriving too late for the
train, they drove to the house of the appellant: and Fisher remained there until one
o'clock that night. WhUe Fisher was there,
considerable
conversation
occurred between
him and the appellant in relation to the property; but It does not appear that any thing
was said material to either party in this
controversy.
Fisher proceeded to Philadelphia, and reported
favorably to Lanagan,
and subsequently, at his request, to Repplier,
who became a party to the negotiation.
He
represented to both of them that the abandoned shaft was upon the premises.
Catlett went to Philadelphia, and there he sold
the property to the appellees for $25,000.
Fisher was sent to the court-house to investigate the title. He employed Mr. Williams,
a legal gentleman living there, to assist him.
A deed was prepared by Mr. Williams, and
executed by the appellant on the 21st of
March, 1866. On the 7th of April ensuing,
the appellees paid over $12,500 of the purchase-money, and gave their bond to the appellant for the same amount, payable six
The deed
months from date, with interest.
to
was placed in the hands of a depositary,
be held as an escrow until the bond should
be paid. Catlett, under a power of attorney,
received the first Installment, paid over to the
appellant $10,000, and retained the residue
to which
on account of the compensation
he was entitled under the contract between
them. The vendees requested Hume to hold
possession of the property for them until
they should make some other arrangement.
He occupied the premises until the following
July, when, with their consent, he transferIn that
to Gordon.
red the possession
month, Lanagan and Repplier came to see
the property.
Hume was there washing for
gold. He began to do so with the permission
of the appellant before the sale, and had continued the work without intermission. The
appellees desired to be shown the boundarylines. Hume said he did not know where
they were, and referred them to Johnson.
Johnson came. The appellees desired to be
taken to the shaft which had been shown
to Fisher. Johnson said it was not on the
premises.
Hume thought it was. Johnson
was positive; and he was right. The appellees seemed surprised, but said little on the
They proceeded
subject.
to examine
the
premises within the lines, and, before taking
their departure, employed Gordon to explore
the property for gold. Subsequently
this arrangement
was abandoned, and they paid
him for the time and money he had expended in getting ready for the work. In September, they sent Bowman as their agent to
make the exploration.
On his way, he stopped at the court-house, and told the appel-
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lant that the shaft shown to Fisher as on the
land was not on It The appellant replied
instantly, "that there was no shaft on the
land he had sold to Repplier and Lanagan,
and that he had never represented
to any
one that there was a shaft on the land, and
that he had never authorized any one to
make Such a representation, nor did he know
or have reason to believe that any such representation had, in fact, been made by any
one." It does not appear that his attention
had before been called to the subject, or that
he was before advised that any mistake as to
the shaft had occurred.
Bowman spent
some days upon the land, and made a number of cuts, all of which were shallow. The
It
deepest was only fifteen feet in depth.
was made under the direction of Embry and
Johnson, two experienced miners living in
It reached a vein of
the neighborhood.
quartz, but penetrated only a little way into
it. They thought the prospect very encouraging, and m-ged that the cut should be made
deeper.

Bowman declined to do anything more,
No further exploraleft the premises.
tion was ever made. Johnson says, "I know
the land well, and know there has been gold
found upon it, and a great deal of gold, too,—
that is to say, surface-gold,— but it has never
The gold that
been worked for vein-gold.
refer to was found by the defendant, Grymes,
and those that worked under him." He conBowman's examination "imperfect
sidered
and insufflclent." He had had "twenty-three
years' experience in mining for gold."
Embry's testimony is to the same effect,
both as to the surface-gold and the character of the examination made by Bowman.
The premises lie between the Melville and
the Greenwood Mines. Before the war, a
bucket of ore, of from three to four gallons,
taken from the latter mine, yielded $2,400 of
This, however, was exceptional.
In
gold.
the spring of 1869 a vein was struck, from
forty to fifty feet below the surface, yielding
Work was stopped by the
$500 to the ton.
influx of water. It was to be resumed as
soon as an engine, which was ordered, should
arrive. Ore at that depth, yielding from
eight to ten dollars a ton, will pay a profit.
Embry says he is well acquainted with the
courses of the veins in the Melville and the
Greenwood Mines, and that "the Greenwood
veins do pass through the land in controversy, and some of the Melville veins do
also." Speaking of Bowman and his last cut,
and

I

he says: —

I

"At the place
showed him where to cut
he struck a vein, but just cut into the top
of it; he did not go down through it, or
across it. From the appearance of the vein,
was very certain that he would find gold
ore. If he would cut across It and go deep
into it, and
told him so at the time; but
he said that they had sent for him to return
home, and be couldn't stay longer to make

I

I
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the examination, and went off, leaving the
cut as it was; and the exploration to this
am still satday has never been renewed.
isfied, that, whenever a proper examination
is made, gold, and a great deal of it, will be
found in that vein; for it is the same vein
which passes through the Greenwood Mine,
which was struck last spring, and yielded
$500 to the ton. His examination in other
respects, as well as this, was Imperfect and
don't think he did any thing
insufficient.
like making a proper exploration for gold.
don't think he had more than three or four
hands, and they were not engaged more than
eight or ten days at the utmost."
In September, 1866, Repplier instructed
Catlett to advise the appellant, that, by reason of the mistake as to the shaft, the appellees demanded the ret\u;n of the purchasemoney which had been paid. In the spring
of 1867, Lanagan, upon the same ground,
The apmade the same demand in person.
pellant replied, that he had parted with the
money. He promised to reflect on the subject, and address Lanagan by letter. He did
write accordingly, but the appellees have
not produced the letter. This blU was filed
on the 21st of March, 1868.
A mistake as to a matter of fact, to warrant relief in equity, must be material, and
the fact must be such that it animated and
controlled the conduct of the party. It must
go to the essence of the object In view, and
not be merely incidental. The court must
that but for the mistake the
be satisfied,
complainant would not have assumed the
obligation from which he seeks to be reKerr on Mistake and Fraud, 408;
lieved.
Trigg v. Read, 5 Humph. 529; Jennings v.
Broughton, 17 Beav. 241; Thompson v. Jackson, 3 Band. 507; Harrod's Heirs v. Cowan,
Hardin, 553; Hill v. Bush, 19 Barb. (Ark.)
522; Juzan v. Toulmln, 9 Ala. 662.
Does the case in hand come within this
category?
When Fisher made his examination at the
shaft, it had been abandoned.
This was prima facie proof that it was of no account.
It does not appear that he thought of having
an analysis made of any of the debris about
it, nor that the debris Indicated in any wise
the presence of gold. He requested Hume
to send him specimens from the shafts on
the contiguous tracts, and it was done. No
such request was made touching the shaft
in question, and none were sent. It is neither alleged nor proved that there was a
purpose at any time, on the part of the appellees, to work the shaft. The quartz found
was certainly not more encouraging
than
that taken from the last cut made by Bowman under the advice of Embry and Johnson.
This cut he refused to deepen, and
abandoned.
When Lanagan and Repplier

I

I

I

were told by Johnson that the shaft was not
they said nothing about
the premises,
abandoning the contract, and nothing which
on
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manifested that they attached any particular
certainly
and
consequence
to the matter,
nothing which Indicated that they regarded
the shaft as vital to the value of the property.
They proceeded with their examination of the premises as If the discovery had
not been made. On his way to Philadelphia,
after this visit, Lanagan saw and taUsed several times with Williams, who had prepared
the deed. Williams says, "I cannot recollect
all that was said in those conversations, hut
do know that nothing was said about the
shaft, and that he said nothing to produce
the Impression that he was dissatisfied or
disappointed In any respect with the property after the examination that he had made of

I

It"

Lanagan's conversation with Houseworth was to the same effect.
The subsequent conduct of the appellees
shows that the mistake had no effect upon
their minds for a considerable period after
Its discovery, and then it seems to have been
rather a pretext than a cause.
Mistake, to be available In equity, must not
from negligence,
where the
have arisen
means of knowledge were easily accessible.
The party complaining must have exercised
at least the degree of diligence "which may
be fairly expected from a reasonable person."
Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 407.
Fisher, the agent of the appellees, who had
the deed prepared, was within a few hours'
travel of the land when the deed was executed. He knew the grantor had sold contiguous lands upon which veins of gold had
been found, and that the coiu-se and direction
of those veins were important to the premises
He could easily have taken
in question.
measures to see and verify the boundaryHe did nothing of the
lines on the ground.
kind. The appellees paid their money without even inquiring of any one professing to
know where the lines were. The courses
and distances specified In the deed show that
Why was he
a surveyor had been employed.
not called upon? The appellants sat quietly
In the dark, until the mistake was developed
by the light of subsequent
events.
PuU
knowledge was within their reach all the
tltne, from the beginning of the negotiation
It was
until the transaction was closed.
their own fault that they did not avail themselves of it. In Shirley v. Davis, 6 Ves. 678,
the complainant, being desirous to become a
freeholder In Essex, bought a house which
It proved
he supposed to be In that county.
to be in Kent. He was compelled In equity
the purchase.
The mistake
to complete
there, as here, was the result of the want of
See also Seton v. Slade, 7
proper diligence.
Ves. 269; 2 Kent's Com. 485; 1 Story's Eq.,
sects. 146, 147; Attwood v. Small, 6 CL & Fin.
338; Jennings v. Broughton, 17 Beav. 234;
Campbell v. Ingilby, 1 De G. & J. 405; Garrett V. Burleson, 25 Tex. 44; Warner v. Daniels et al., 1 Woodb. & M. 91; Ferson v. Sanger, id. 139; Lamb v. Harris, 8 Ga. 546;

V. Read, 5 Humph. 529; Haywood t.
Cope, 25 Beav. 143.
Where a party desires to rescind upon the
ground of mistake or fraud, he must, upon
the discovery of the facts, at once annovmce
his purpose, and adhere to it. If he be silent, and continue to treat the property as
his own, he wlU be held to have waived the
objection, and wUl be conclusively bound by
the contract, as If the mistake or fraud had
not occurred. He is not permitted to play
fast and loose. Delay and vacillation are
fatal to the right which had before subsisted. These remarks are peculiarly applicable
property like that here In
to speculative
question, which Is liable to large and constant fluctuations In value. Thomas v. Bartow, 48 N. Y. 200; Flint v. Woodin, 9 Hare,
622; Jennings v. Broughton, 5 De G., M. &
Lloyd v. Brewster, 4 Paige, 537;
G. 139;
Saratoga & S. R. R. Co. v. Row, 24 Wend.
74; Minturn v. Main, 3 Seld. 220; 7 Rob.
Prac, c. 25, sect. 2, p. 432; Campbell v.
Fleming, 1 Ad. & El. 41; Sugd. Vend. (14th
ed.) 335; Diman v. Providence, W. & B. R.
R. Co., 5 R. I. 130.
A coiu-t of equity is always reluctant to rescind, unless the parties can be put back In
statu quo. If this cannot be done, It wIU
give such relief only where the clearest and
it
strongest
equity imperatively demands
Here the appellant received the money paid
on the contract In entire good faith. He
parted with It before he was aware of the
claim of the appellees, and cannot conveniently restore It The imperfect and abortive
exploration made by Bowman has Injured
the credit of the property. Times have since
There is less demand for such
changed.
property, and it has fallen largely In market
the loss
value,
tinder the circumstances,
ought not to be borne by the appellant
Hunt V. Silk, 5 East, 452; Mlntiffu v. Main,
3 Seld. 227; OklU v. Whlttaker, 2 PhiU. 340;
Brisbane v. Dacres, 5 Taunt. 144; Andrew
Skyrlng v.
V. Hancock, 1 Brod. & B. 37;
Greenwood,
4 Bam. & C. 289; Jennings v.
Broughton, 5 De G., M. & G. 139.
The parties, in dealing with the property
In question, stood upon a footing of equality.
They judged and acted respectively for themselves. The contract was deliberately entered into on both sides. The appellant guaranteed the title, and nothing more. The appellees assumed the payment of the purchaseThey assumed no other ilabillty.
money.
There was neither obligation nor liability on
either side, beyond what was expressly stipIf the property had proved unexulated.
pectedly to be of Inestimable value, the appellant could have no further or other claim.
If entirely worthless, the appellees assumed
the risk, and must take the consequences.
Segur V. Tingley, 11 Conn. 142; Haywood v.
Cope, 25 Beav. 140; Jennings v. Broughton,
17 Id. 234; Attwood v. SmaU, 6 01. & Fin.
497; Marvin v. Bennett, 8 Falge, 321; Thom-
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as ▼. Bartow, 48 N. Y. 198; Hunter
v.
Goudy, 1 Ham. 451; Hall v. Thompson, 1
Sm. & M. 481.
The bill, we have shown, cannot be maintained.
In our examination of the case, we have
assumed that those who are alleged to have
spoken to the agent of the appellees upon
the subject of the shaft, before the sale, had'
the requisite authority from the appellant
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Considering this to be as claimed by the
our views are as we have expressWe have not, therefore, found it
to consider the question of such
authority; and hence have said nothing upon
that subject, and nothing as to the aspect
the case would present if that question were
resolved in the negative.
Decree reversed, and case remanded with
directions to dismiss the biU.
appellees,
ed them.
necessary
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13,
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Appeal from court of common pleas,
Philadelphia county; Thayek, Judge.
Bill by E.Theresa Riegel, administratrix
the
against
of Jacob Eiegel, deceased,

American Life Insurance Company, asking
the reinstatement of a surrendered policy.
Decree sustaining a demurrer to the bill,
and dismisBiug it, from which plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
GeiWilliam W. Porter and Frederick
H. Hazelhurst, for apger, for appellant.

J.

pellee.

S'l'ERRETT,

J.

When this cause was here

two years ago, on appeal from decree sustaining the general demurrer, and dismissing the bill, an amendment, for the
purpose of clearly expressing what at

moKt was only implied, was moved, and
allowed at bar, by adding to the fifth paragraph of the bill these words: "Both of
the parties acting in respect to the transaction on the basis that the said Leisenring was then alive." That defect in the
hill, however, did not appear to be the
ground on which the demurrer was susThe plaintiff's
tained in the court below.
equity, grounded on averments of fact
contained in the bill, and admitted by the
pleading, was then fully considered, and
emphatically sustained, in a clear and convincing opinion by our Brother Williams.
reported in 140 Pa. St. 201, and 21 Atl. Ren.
The decree was accordingly reversed,
392.
and record remitted, with direction that
the defendant plead or answer, etc. After
full consideration of the facts and circumstances, the opinion referred to concluded
thus: "Upon these facts, if the attention
of the learned judge had not been diverted
from them, we feel sure he would have
reached the same conclusion that we have
reached,— that it would be grossly inequitable to hold the plaintiff to a bargain
made under the influence of n mistake of
fact like that before us. This mistake the
If there had been any
demurrer admits.
circumstance which the defendant could
have set up to show that a correction of
this mistake at this time would be inequitable, it should have been shown to
If such circumstanthe court by answer.
ces do exist, they may yet be presented,
as the case goes back to enable the defendant to take defense upon the merits." The
defendant company, having been declared
Insolvent, was duly dissolved, on application of the attorney general, more than
a year before the answer was filed by Mr.
Ritchie, the then president of the Real-Estate Title Insurance Company, which, in
the interim, appears to have been appointNo
ed receiver of the defunct company.
plea or answer was ever filed by any officer of said company, nor by any one, on
its behalf, who had any knowledge, otherwise than by information obtained from
others, of the facts averred in the bill.
Mr. Ritchie and his company were entire
(Strangers to the transaction, and neither
of them appears to have had any knowl-

of the facts upon which plaintiff's
equity is grounded ; and of course it was
Impossible for him, as president of the
receiver company, to answer otherwise
than upon information and belief.
In the
jurat to his answer he swears the allegations thereof are true "so far as they are
therein stated as of his own knowledge,"
etc. ; but the answer contains not a single
allegation that purports to be "as of his
own knowledge."
The special evidential efficacy of a responsive answer in equity is due to the
fact that the plaintiff, by calling on the defendant to answer the allegations of the
hill, appeals to his conscience, accredits
him, and pro bar. makes him his own witness.
The plaintiff in this case never
called upon Mr. Ritchie, or any other
alleged in
stranger to the transactions
the bill, to make answer thereto. The
officers of the insurance company, who
werecognizantof those transactions, were
the proper persons to deny, if they could
of their own knowledge, the averments of
the bill, and thus make the answer responsive. The answer of Mr. Ritchie in this
case is in no sense a responsive answer.
It is merely pleading; and, as such, put in
issue the facts in dispute, without more.
Eaton's Appeal, 6fi Pa. St. 490; Burke's
Appeal, 99 Pa. St. ;161; Socher's Appeal, 104
Pa. St. 609; Coleman v. Ross, 46 Pa. St.
1H5; Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 1528,1529; 3 Greenl.
Ev.§§ 287-2S9; Daniell.Ch. Pr. 846. In note
to the latter it is waid that an answer
which alleges as facts what the defendant could not personally know, though responsive to the bill, simply puts plaintiff
So,
upon proof of his own allegations.
too, in 3 Greenl. Ev. § 287, it is said that, if
the fact asserted by the defendant is such
mat it is not and cannot be within his own
knowledge, but is in truth only an expression of his strong conviction of its existence, or is what he deems an infallible deduction from facts which were known to
him, his answer is not responsive, in the
sense of being evidence In his own favor.
The nature of his testimony cannot be
changed by the positiveness of his assertion. The answer of an infant by his
guardian ad 7iteHj, though It be responsive
to the bill, and sworn to by the guardian,
is not evidence in his favor.
But whether the answer he regarded as
responsive or not, the proofs were quite
sufficient to warrant the learned master
in finding, as he did, the truth of every
material averment in the bill. His findings of fact are in strict accord wth the
testimony, and his conuncontradicted
clusions of law are so manifestly correct
that his report should have been unhesitatingly approved, and decree made in
accordance
No testimony,
therewith.
either written or oral, was introduced b.v
or on behalf of the defendant. All the
material facts on which plaintiff's equity
is grounded were as clearly and conclusively established as if they had been admitted by answer, or by demurrer to the
bill; so that practically we have now before us substantially the same questions
that were fully considered and determined
when the case was here before. In that
appeal the fourth and fifth specifications
edge
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of errors are quotations from the opinion
of the learned president of the court below dismissing the bill, wherein, spealiing
ol the new contract, he says: " (4) It was
not a contract induced by a mistake
about facts, but a contract made in view
of doubtful facts, and because
of the
doubtful facts. (5) It was in the nature
of a compromise,
upon the
founded
doubts wliich existed, not upon any mistake of the facts." In this appeal the
third specification, quoted from the opinion of same learned judge, again dismissing the bill, is that "the new contract
was not a contract induced by fhutual
mistake about the facts, but a contract
made in view of doubtful facts, and because of the doubtful facts." The second
specification in this is in effect the same as
the fifth in theformer appeal. These propositions go to tlie very heart of the plainThey substantially involve
tiff's case.
the only cardinal questions that are or
ever have been in it, and about which
there is the slightest room for doubt.
They are the very questions that were
considered and decided by this court when
the case was here before. That clearly
appears iu the opinion, wherein, after reciting the facts averred in the bill, it is
said: "The case presented on these facts
was that of a contract entered into under
the influence of a mutual mistake, and a
claim for relief from such contract. The
mistake was in relation to the fact of
Ijeisenring's death. Both parties evidently supposed and acted on the supposition
that he was alive, and that theannual premiums upon his life, which had become
burdensome to Mrs. Eiegel, must be continued indefinitely until his death should
take place. As it had become difficult for
her to pay these premiums, the only way
in which she could be relieved from them
was to surrender her policy, and accept a
paid-up policy for such smaller sura as the
premiums already paid would purchase.
Bather than take the risk of losing the
entire amount of the policy, by her inability to keep up the annual payments, she
surrendered her policy for $6,000, and accepted in lieu of it a paid-up policy for
$2,500. This was the contract she made
while in ignorance of Leisenring's death.
At the time she made it she was already
relieved from the burdensome premiums,
and the entire amount of the policy was
honestly due her from
the company.
What was the effect of the mistake upon
her? Simply to take from her the difference between the two policies, and give
her absolutely nothing for it. She surrendered a policy for $6,000, on which the
liability of thecompany was already ti.>;ed.
and received one for .f 2,500, to secure relief
The
from a burden already removed.
company parted with nothing. She secured nothing. The whole transaction
was a mistake, and, if the decree of the
court stands, the result will be to take
$3,500 from Mrs. Riegel and give it to the
These facts seem to
insurance company.
us to present a clear and a strong case for
equitable relief, so strong, indeed, that
a mere statement of them is the only argument necessary for its support. The
duty of a chancellor to relieve in cases of
mutual mistake is so well settled that no
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of authorities can be needed.
The learned judge who heard this
case in the court below, and who is thoroughly
familiar with the principle to
which we have referred, seems to have
been misled in regard to the facts set up
in the bill. He treats the arrangement
made between Mrs. Riegel and the company on the 20th of March as a compromise of a claim against the company for
which
the alleged death of Leisenring,
Mrs. Riegel was unable to establish, because unable to show the death. As the
fact of the death, and the consequent liability of the company on the policy, were
uncertain, it was a case for the application of the doctrine that the adjustment
a valid
of a doubtful claim constituted
consideration for the surrender of the policy and the acceptance of the new one,
and upon this theory the decree was entered. But it nowhere appears that Mrs.
Riegel made any claim on the company,
or supposed that she had any. She was
asking relief from future payments of premiums on a policy on which she supposed
future payments would have to be made,
and, to get this relief, she was willing to
sacrifice more than one half of the sum
was willing, in
Insured. The company
of the large reduction of its
consideration
liability, to give her a policy for what her
payments would purchase, and relieve her
in future.
This is an exchange often
made, and adjusted by well-settled rules.
It was a compromise of nothing. We do
not doubt the correctness of the rule applied
by the learned judge in cases to which it
is fairly applicable, but this is not one of
them. The plaintiff distinctly avers that
she did not know of the death of Leisenring until some 10 days after the exchange
of policies was effected, and that' both parties to the transaction were acting, in respect thereto, on the basis that Leisenring was alive.' She distinctly avers that
the object of the arrangement was to secure relief for herself from the iudefiiiite
payment of premiums that had become
burdensome to her; that the new policy
was accepted for that reason, and the old
one surrendered, at a time when, had she
known the fact, she was entitled to demand the entire sum upon which she had
so long and so steadily paid the burdensome premiums."
Little, if anything, can be profitably
added to what is so clearly and forcibly
said in the foregoing quotatiojis in support of our former decree. The error into which the learned judge of the common
pleas appears to have unintentionally
fallen in the outset, and to which he
seems to cling so pertinaciously, is not so
much in regard to the well-settled principles of equity, upon which relief is granted
in cases of mutual ignorance or mistake
of material facts, as in the construction
which he put upon the undisputed acts
and declarations of the parties to this contention, and the circumstances connected
to those
therewith.
Sufficient reference
principles is made in our former opinion,
but it may not be amiss to revert to some
of them. The general rule is that an act
done or a contract made under a mistake
of a material fact is voidable and relievable in equity.
The fact must of course be
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resulting from mutual mistake or Ignorance oF material facts, but entire failure of
consideration is not an essential ingredient
in any case.
It cannot be doubted that in exchanging
the old for the new policy both parties
acted on the basis that Leisenring was
then alive.
Their every act in the transaction was predicated of that as an assumed fact. The new policy, like the old
one, was a risk on a life assumed to be
then in being.
The difference between
them was that the one carried with it an
obligation on the part of theholdertopay
annual premiums during the life of Leisenring; the other exempted her from that
obligation. She purchased that exemption
by surrendering seven twelfths of theoriginal insurance, or ^S.iiOO. If the exchange
was not made on the assumption by both
parties that Leisenring was then alive, the
company stultified itself by issuing
paidup policy on the life of one who was then
in his grave; and the plaintiff was guilty
of the supreme folly of paying
3,500 for
exemption from a liability which, by the
previous death of I.ieisenring, had ipso
facto ceased.
In other words, at the time
the exchange of policies was made, the
plaintiff had
perfectly valid claim upon
the defendant for the full amount of the
insurance, $6,000, and surrendered $3,500
of that to secure exemption from
liability that had ceased to exist; but she
and the company were both at that time
ignorant of the fact that the life on which
the original risk was taken had pi-eyiously dropped.
The supposed element of
doubt as to whether Leisenring was then
dead or not never entered into the contemplation of either part.y; nor did it
form any part of tlie consideration for exchange of policies. The positive and unproof by the actuary of the
contradicted
company was that the amount of the
paid-up policy was ascertained and fixed,
according to the established rules of the
company, at the very sum that would
have been required
Leisenring had been
personally present in the office when the
terms of exchange were settled. The central fact underlying the transaction, and
to which every circumstance connected
therewith clearly points, was the assumption by both parties that Leisenring was
then in full life. When last theretofore
heard from he was alive, and the presumption was that he continued to live.
In the absence of any knowledge to the
contrary, it was quite natural and reasonable that the parties, in making the
exchange, should act upon that presumption, and assume, as they evidently did,
that he was still alive. Of course they
could not know positively that he was
then alive, any more than any one can
certainly know that
friend from whom
he is far separated b.y distance is now living. In view of the undisputed facts as to
the acts of both parties, and everything
connected with the transaction, it would
be wholly unreasonable
and unwarranted to hold that the parties treated upon
the basis that the fact which was the subject of their agreement was doubtful, or
that the contract was made "in view of
doubtful facts, and because of the doubtful facts. " In the light of the proofs upon
a

if

a

if

3

a

§!j

material to the act or contract; for,
though there may be an accidental mistalfe or ignorance of the fact, yet, if the
act or contract is not materially affected
Thus, A.
by it, relief will not be granted.
buys from B. an estate to which thelatter
is supposed to hare an unquestionable title.
It turns out, upon due investigation
of the facts unknown at the time to both
parties, that B, has no title; as, if there
be a nearer heir than B., who was supposed to be dead, but is in fact living. In
such a case equity would relieve the purchaser and rescind the contract. But suppose A. buys from B. an estate the location of which was well known to each of
them, and they mutually believed it contained 20 acres, when in fact it contained
only 19% acres, and the difference would
not have varied the purchase in the view
of either party ; in such a case the mistake would not beground for rescission of
1 Story, Eq. Jar. §§ 140, 141.
the contract.
It makes no, difference in application of
tne principle that the subject-matter of
the contract be known to both parties to
be liable to a contingency which may destroy it immediately; for, if the contingency has, unknown to the parties, already happened, the contract will be
avoided, as founded on a mutual mistake
of a matter constituting the basis of the
1 Story, Eq. Jur.
143a, 1436.
contract.
The principle is illustrated by familiar
examples, employed by text writers, thus:
A. agrees to buy a certain horse from B.
It turns out that the horse is dead at the
time of the bargain, though neither party
was then aware of the fact. The agreement is void. A. auroes to buy a house
belonging to B. The house was previously destroyed by fire, but the parties dealt
in ignorance of that fact. The contract,
not being for sale of the land on which the
house stood, was not enforceable. So,
too. A., being entitled to an estate for the
life of B., agreed to sell it to C. B. was
dead, but both parties were ignorant of
the fact. The agreement was avoided.
For similar reasons, a life insurance canpremium
not be revived by payment of
within the time allowed for that purpose
by the original contract, but after the life
had dropped, unknown to both insurer
and assured, although it was in existence
when the premium became due, and although the insurer hfis waived proof of
the party's health, which, b.v the terras of
the renewal, it might have required. The
waiver applies to the prcof of health, not
to the factof his beingalive.
Pritchard v.
Society,
C. B. (N. S.) 622.
Mr. Pollock,
in his excellent treatise on the Principles
of Contract, (page *441,) states the general
principle thus: "An agreement is void
it
relates to a subject-matter
(whether a
material subject of ownership, or a particular title or right) contemplated by the
parties as existing, but which in fact did
not exist." This Is followed by an interesting discussion of the subject, with numerous illustrations of the principles involved. See Cochrane v. 'Willis,
Ch. App.
58; Allen v. Hammond, 11 Pet. 71; HitchPrice, 135; Hore v.
cock V. Giddings,
Becher, 12 Sim. 465; Couturier v, Hastie,
H. L. Cas. 673. In many of thecases prominence is given to failure of consideration.

a
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■which theflndings of the masterare based,
It is therefore adjudged that the decree of
and of all the circumstances, the acts of the court of common pleas be reversed
the parties are not susceptible of any such and set aside, and exceptions to master's
construction as has been put upon them report dismissed; and it is now adjudged
by the learned judge of the common pleas. and decreed, that the contract under which
In shprt, the facts established by the un- said exchange of insurance policies was
contradicted proofs, and found by the made be rescinded; that the paid-up polimaster, are essentially the same as those cy for $2,500 be surrendered and canceled ;
by the demurrer,
admitted
and upon and that the original policy of insurance
which our former decree was based. Cer- be reinstated, as of date of its surrender;
tainly they are not less favorable to the and it is further adjudged and decreed
plaintiff now than then. It therefore ap- that the defendant company pay to the
pears to UH that a proper consideration
plaintiff the sum of $6,0()0, with interest
of the orderly administration of justice from October 4, 1889, and also all thecosts

should have resulted in a decree in accordance with the views expressed in our former opinion.
This proceeding is not grounded upon a
previous rescission of the agreement under which the exchange of policies was
made, but is for the purpose of enforcing
a rescission by decree of this court, etc.

of this proceerling.

PAXSON,C.J. I dissent, and would affirm the decree, upon the clear and able
opinion of the learned judge below.
MITCHELL,

J. I concur

justice in his dissent.

with the chief
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NEWTON
TOLLES
(19

Supreme

Atl.

Court
ough.

V.
V.

1092,

TOLLES.
NEWTON.

66 N.

of New

March

H.

136.)

Hampshire.

Hillsbor-

14, 1890.

Bill in equity for the rescission of a contract for the purchase of a farm and other
property, and for the return of money paid
as a part of the purchase
Facts
money.
found by the court: The defendant, Sophia
A.

ToUes, employed

E.,

a real-estate

agent;

in

Nashua, to sell her farm. In May, 1886,
Newton, seeking to buy a farm, applied to R.,
who informed him of the Tolles farm, told
him it contained 200 acres, took him to see
it, and there pointed out to him such of the
courses and boundaries as he knew; but he
to point out,
did not know, or undertake
all of them. Afterwards, li., as agent of
Tolles, and Newton executed an agreement
by which Tolles agreed to sell, and Newton
to buy, the Tolles farm for .$5,400, to be paid
of the agreement,
$200 on the execution
$],000 on the delivery, on or before June 1,
1886, of a bond for a deed, $1,000 on or before July 10, 1886, and $3,200 on the delivery, on or before October 20, 1886, of a good
and sufficient deed, "said Newton to have all
the stock, tools, hay, grain," etc.
On the
margin of the agreement, "farm contains
about 200 acres" was written.
Newton paid
$200 May 15, Tolles executed and delivered
to Newton a bond conditioned to convey to
him "a certain lot or parcel of land situated
in Nashua," and particularly described by
metes and bounds, "meaning and intending
to convey all the homestead farm, containing
about two hundred acres, as by deed of heir's
of Horace C. Tolles, to me, and all other
land and right in said homestead farm,"
upon Newton's payment of .'#1,000 on the
delivery of the bond, $1,000 on or before July
10, 1886, and $3,200 on the delivery, on or
before October 20, 1886, of a good and sufficient deed. On the margin of the deed was
written: "It is agreed, for the above consideration, that said Newton is to have all the
stock, tools, hay, grain, &c., and that said
Tolles is to remove only household furniture
and family stores from said premises. " Prior
to 1879 the Tolles farm comprised about 203
acres, of which thedefendantand her husband
owned a part in common, and each a part in
severalty. Jn that year the heirs of Horace
C, then deceased, conveyed a parcel of about
25 acres to Xenophon Tolles, and all their interest in the rest of the farm to the defendant.
In January, 1886, the defendant sold about
18 acres to C, who sold to lioby.
A parcel
of about 25 acres, called the "Salmon Brook
Meadow," was half a mile distant from, and
had no connection with, the rest of the farm,
except in its use as a part of it.
These parcels were not shown to Newton by R., and
are not covered by the particular description
given in the bond.
Newton at the time of
the bargain did not understand
that they
were included in his purchase, but he un-

of pact.
derstood that he was buying the Tolles farm,
and that it contained 200 acres.
The defendant did not intend to convey, nor understand
that she agreed to convey, the three parcels,
or any of them; but she understood and believed that the farm, as described in the
bond, contained about 200 acres.
It in fact
contains about 135 acres. In June, 1886,
Newton discovered that Tolles owned the
Salmon Brook meadow, and learned of its
connection
with the farm.
He thereupon
claimed possession of it, and that it was included in the bargain, but his claim was deHe refused to pay the installment due
nied.
July 10th and August 21st. Tolles brought
a suit at law to recover it, which is the record of the above-named actions.
About the
1st of August, Newton found by a survey
that the farm as described in the bond contains only 135 acres.
October 20, 1886,
Tolles tendered to Newton a warranty deed
of the premises of which he is in possession,
and demanded payment of the balance of the
Newton refused to accept
purchase money.
the deed, and on the same day filed his bill,
in which he offers to restore the real and personal property to the defendant, and give up
and cancel the bond, and to account for the
rents and profits while he has been in posHe has consumed the hay and
session.
grain, but has other hay and grain out of
which he can return an equivalent. He sold
four cows in August, but replaced them with
four others of greater value. The farm has
not deteriorated in value.
Evidence to show
that the property which Tolles by her bond
was obliged to convey was of the value of
$5,400 or more was excluded, subject to the
defendants exception.
6?. B. a. French and H. B. Cutter, for
Newton.
C. W. Hiolt and M. 8. Cutter, for

Tolles.

J.

Caepbnteb,
There was a mutual mistake in ths quantity of land.
The defendant
understood she was selling, and the plaintiff
that he was buying, a farm of 200 acres. It
in fact contains only 135 acres.
The defendant, believing that the farm contained 200
acres, informed the plaintiff that it did contain that number.
The plaintiff relied on
her statement.
Under the influence of the
error common to both parties, the transaction
was consummated.
The mistake was one of
fact in a material point affecting the value
of the property. Boynton v. Hazelboom, 14
Allen, 107, 108. Its prejudicial consequences
to the plaintiff are the same as if the defendant's statement had been designedly fraudulent. Spurr v. Benedict, 99 Mass. 463, 467.
The deficiency is so great that it would "naturally raise the presumption of fraud, imposition, or mistake in the very essence of the
contract," if the mistake were not affirmatively found. Stebbins v. Eddy, 4 Mason,
414, 420.
A material mistake in the quantity does not, in its effect upon the equitable
rights of the parties, differ from a like mistake in the character, situation, or title of the
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bargained property. It is equivalent to a mistake in tlie existence of a material part of tlie
subject of tlie contract. The case is as if before the contract was executed, and witliout
the knowledge of either party, a parcel containing 65 acres of the 200 contracted for had
sunk in the sea. Allen v. Hammond, 11 Pet.
63, 71, 72; Hitchcock v. Giddings, 4 Price,
135; Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 141. 142. The error is
as injurious to the plaintiff as if 200 acres were
comprised in the state boundaries, and the
defendant had no title to a parcel of 65 acres,
or as if she had title to only 135-200 of the
whole in common with a stranger. Hooper
V. Smart, L. R. 18 Eq. 683.
The defendant
could not sustain a bill to compel a specific
performance of the contract by the plaintiff,
because it would be inequitable.
Pickering
V. Pickering, 38 N. H. 400, 407, 408; Eastman V. Plumer, 46 N. H.464, 479. Theparty
against whom a contract, made under a mutual mistake of material facts, will not be specifically enforced, is in general entitled to
rescind. Pom. Spec. Perf. § 250. If there
are exceptions to the rule, this case does not
fall within them. It is inequitable, in the
highest degree, that the defendant, by reason of her negligent and erroneous, tlaough
not fraudulent, representation, should make
a profit of the sum at which the parties valued
65 acres of land, and that the plaintiff, without fault on his part, should lose that sum.
Equity will prevent such a result by rescinding the contract, or decreeing a specific performance with compensation in behalf of the
injured party, at his election, or by refusing
specific performance on the application of the
other party. Hill v. Buckley, 17 Ves. 395;
Price V. North, 2 Younge & C. 620; Dalby v.
Pullen, 3 Sim. 29; Leslie v. Tompsbn, 9
Hare, 268; Barnes v. Wood, L. R. 8 Eq. 424;
Whittemore v. Whittemore, Id. 603; IronWorks v. Wickens, L. R. 4 Ch. 101; Denny
V. Hancock, L. R. 6 Ch. 1; Torrance v. Bolton, L. R. 8 Ch. 118; In re Turner, 13 Ch.
Div. 130; Belknap v. Sealey, 14 N. Y. 144;
Paine v. Upton, 87 N. Y. 327 ; Couse v. Boyles,
4 N". J. Eq. 212; Thomas v. Perry, 1 Pet. C.
C. 49; Daniel v. Mitchell, 1 Story, 172; Doggett V. Emerson, 3 Story, 700; Smith v. Babcock, 2 Woodb. & M. 246; Quesnel v. Woodlief, 2 Hen. & M. 173; Lawrence v. Staigg,
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R. I. 256; Noble v. Googins, 99 Mass. 231.
Neither of the parties understood that the
contract to convey "about" 200 acres was
Wilson
performed by conveying 135 acres.
Y, 338, 341, 342, and cases
V. Randall, 67 N.
8

above cited.
No laches can be imputed to the plaintiff.
He had a right to rely on the defendant's
He could not disstatement of the quantity.
cover the mistake by examining the external
Paine v. Upton, 87 N. Y. 327,
boundaries.
When, by the defendant's tender of a
337.
deed and demand of payment, he ascertained
that she would not voluntarily correct the
mistake, he immediately filed h'S bill.
The personal property formed no substan-

It is not
tial part of the consideration.
named in the body of the bond, but is mentioned, apparently as an afterthought, on the
margin. Upon the rescission, for any cause,
by a vendee in possession of a sale of farm
lands, there must in most cases, necessarily,
be an accounting, in order to restore the parties to the situation they occupied priorto the
contract. Upon such an accounting, all the
property, the possession of which passed from
to the plaintiff, or its full
the defendant
equivalent, together with the income derived
It is
from it, may be fully restored to her
in a case of
no objection to a rescission,
this character, that such articles as are necessarily consumed in the proper and ordinary
management of a farm cannot be restored in
It does not appear that the plaintiff,
specie.
after his discovery of the mistake, took any
action by which he intended to afiirm the
contract, (Montgomery v. Pickering,
116
Mass. 227,) or that he did anything with the
property not reasonably necessary lor its preservation, or which equity would not require
The plaintiff is to be relieved
to be done.
upon such terms as justice to both parties requires. Wiswall V. Harriman, 62 N. H. 671,
672;2Story, Eq. Jur. §707. The offered evidence of value was immaterial, and was propIn tlie suit at law, there must
erly excluded.
The details
be judgment for the defendant.
of the decree will be settled at the trial term.
Decree for the plaintiff.
Allen, J.,
curred.

did not sit.

The others con-
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DAMBMANN

v.

(75 N.

Court of Appeals

SCHULTING.
Y.

56.)

of New

York.

1878.

Action to set aside a release under seal,
and to recover a balance for money lent defendant by the firm of C. F. Dambmann &
Co., of wiilch firm plaintiflE was a partner,
The facts
and to wliose rights he succeeded.
Judgment for
are set forth in the opinion.
plaintiff.
C. Bainbridge Smith, for appellant
liam Watson, for respondent.

Wil-

EARI^ J. Prior to 18i>v,, the defendant had
for many years been a merchant extensively
engaged in business in the city of New York.
In February of that year Jie had become
and contemplated
financially embarrassed,
an assignment for the benefit of his creditors.
He was finally dissuaded from making an
assignment by the promise of his creditors
to loan him the sum of $100,000 to aid him
There was eviin meeting his obligations.
dence tending to show that the sums thus to
be loaned were to be repaid when he became
able; but he testified that it was to be optional for him to repay them, in case he
paid the debts, which he then owed, in full.
The court at special term found that the arrangement was that he was to repay these
In pursuance
sums when he became able.
of this arrangement, the firm to which plaintiff belonged, and to whose rights he had
On the
succeeded, loaned defendant $10,000.
7th day of March, 1867, defendant had paid
in full all the debts he owed when the money was loaned to him, and then, at his request, all the creditors who made the loans
executed and delivered to him an instrument,
of which the following is a copy, to- wit:
"We the undersigned agree. In consideration
of one dollar paid to us, to discharge H.
Schulting from the legal payment of the money loaned to him February 1, 1806, said
Schulting giving his moral obligations to refund the said money, in part or whole, as his
This was not
means will allow in future."
a sealed instrument, and was executed upon
the request of the defendant, upon the claim
by him that he had done as he had agreed
It
when the money was advanced to him.
was the clear intention of the parties, by this
instrument to discharge the defendant from
all legal obligation to pay the money advanced, leaving an obligation simply binding
upon his conscience, but not enforceable at
law, to pay when he became able, in whole
or in part. If this instrument had been under seal or based upon a sufiicient consideration, no proceedings in law or equity could
have been thereafter taken to enforce payment against the defendant.
But according to the finding of the special
term, before the execution of this Instrument,
the defendant was legally liable to pay when
he became able, and this liability was not

discharged by this instrument, for the simple
reason that it was not based upon any consideration.
It was oot in the nature of a
composition
of a debtor with his creditors,
and cannot be sustained upon the principles
applicable
agreements.
to composition
It
does not even appear that each creditor signed it upon the consideration that other creditors would also sign it. It was a mere agreedebts without payment,
ment to discharge
and such an agreement cannot be upheld.
Down to this period of time there is no
claim that there was any fraud or mistake
which influenced the conduct of the plaintiff
and the other creditors, and the position of
was as folthe plaintiff and the defendant
lows: While the plaintiff could legally enforce the payment of the $10,000 (the defendant being able to pay), he was under a moral
obligation not to do so; and the defendant
not to be legally bound to pay,
intending
was yet under both a legal and moral obligation to pay.
The defendant continued in business until
August, 1868, when on account of failing
he sold out his
health and despondency,
whole stock of goods to the firm of H. & A.
Strousburgh & Co. for the sum of $225,000,
they agreeing to pay the most of that sum
upon certain of his debts, and also to pay
him one-third of what the goods should sell
The value
for above the sum of $275,000.
of the goods was not known to the defendant or his vendees, and there is no claim that
this sale was not made in good faith. Soon
after this sale the plaintiff, having heard
thereof, called upon the defendant, and was
duly informed of the sale and the terms
thereof, and of the amount of his property at
that time aside from his interest in the onethird of the surplus. As to that one-third,
the defendant
informed him that that was
not worth much, and that he had offered to
sell it for $18,000 or $20,000.
There is no evidence or claim that In this conversation
the
defendant
made any intentional mis-statement.
He had offered to several parties to
sell his one-third Interest for the sum named,
and there is no evidence that he then believed it to be worth more.
He actually made
an arrangement to sell it for $20,000 to one
A few days after however he
Von Keller.
repudiated this arrangement,
but Von Keller
claimed it was valid.
Defendant's vendees went on and sold the
goods, and they brought $576,981; and his
one-third interest amounted to about $100,000.
The defendant knew as early as the
8th day of October, 1868, that goods to the
amount of $400,000 had been sold, and that
some yet remained to be sold.
On the lastnamed day he went to the plaintiff and said
to him that he understood that the previous
paper signed by him— the discharge above set
out — was not a legal release, because he had
not paid any thing on account of the $10,000,
and he wanted to know if the plaintiff would
sign a legal release upon payment of $5,000.
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The plaintiff said lie would. Nothing more
was said, aind defendant paid him $5,000; and
then the plaintiff executed to him, Undar seal,
a full and absolute discharge from all liability. This action was brought to set aside
this release, and to recover the balance of the
$10,000.

The plaintiff seeks to impeach this release
on account of fraud, and the court at special
term decided In plaintlfC's favor that the release was inoperative, as obtained by misrepresentation
and concealment
of material
facts.
The court did not And that there was
any fraudulent misrepresentation, and there
was none In fact. So far as I can discover,
there was no misrepresentation
of any kind.
Neither did the court find that there was any
fraudulent concealment
of any facts; and
there was no evidence to justify such a finding.
The plaintiff had executed a discharge
of his Claim, which was illegal, and the defendant went to him and informed him of
this fact, and stated that he wanted a legal
release, and that he would pay him $5,000 if
he would give it; and he gave it. He stated
to the plaintiff that he was not discharged,
that he wanted to be, and the plaintiff discharged him.'
He made no statement and
used no artifice to throw him oft' from his
guard or to entrap or mislead him.
There
was no reluctance on the part of the plaintiff,
and the defendant had no reason to suppose
there would be, as the plaintiff had already
The priagreed in writing to discharge him.
or instrument shows that it was the understanding of the parties that the defendant
should, so far as concerned any legal liability, have just such a discharge.
The claim, under these circumstances.
Is
that the defendant was bound to disclose to
the plaintiff the change in nis pecuniary circumstances
since the prior conversation
in
August, above alluded to, and that he had no
right to leave him under the erroneous impression occasioned by that conversation.
It
must be borne in mind that the declarations
made by the defendant in that conversation
were made in entire good faith, and that they
were not made in any business transaction
with the plaintiff, and that they had no reference to or connection with the release. The
plaintiff, in executing the release, had no
right to rely upon them.
The general rule is, that a party engaged
in a business transaction with another can
commit a legal fraud only by fraudulent misrepresentations
of facts, or by such conduct
or such artifice for a fraudulent purpose as
will mislead the other party or throw him off
from his guard, and thus cause him to omit
inquiry or examination which he would othA party buying or selling
erwise make.
property, or executing instruments, must by
inquiry or examination gain all the knowledge he desires.
He cannot proceed blindly,
omitting all inquiry and examination, and
then complain that the other party did not
volunteer all the information he had. Such
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But there are exceptions
Where there is such a relation of trust and confidence between the parties that the one is under some legal or equitable obligation to give full information to
the other party—information which the other
party has a right, not merely in f oro conscientiae, but juris et de jure, to have, then
the withholding of such Information purposely may be a fraud. Story, Eq. Jur. § 207 et
seq.; Hadley v. Importing Co., 13 Ohio St.
502, 82 Am. Dec. 454; Bench v. Sheldon, 14
Barb. 66; Paul v. Hadley, 23 Barb. 521.
It is not always easy to define when this
relation of trust and confidence exists; and
no general mle can be formulated by which
It is sufficient
its existence can be known.
for this case to say that' it did not exist here.
The defendant had no reason to make the
disclosure which it is claimed he should
have made, and the plaintiff had no right
to expect it. The defendant had no reason to
suppose that the plaintiff would be under
the influence of the casual conversation which
was had some two months before.
And
further, if the defendant thought upon the
subject, he had no reason to suppose that if
he stated all the facts within iis knowledge,
it would prevent the plaintiff from giving a
discharge
which he had agreed to give.
While he would have stated that unexpectedly his share in the proceeds of the goods
was much larger than $20,000, yet he would
also have stated that he had contracted to
sell the share for $20,000, and that the vendee
claimed to hold him to the contract.
That
the claim was a serious one is shown by the
fact that in January, 1869, Von Keller sued
him, and in April, 1870, after a trial before
a referee, sustained the contract and recovered a judgment for upward of $100,000,
which defendant was able to defeat finally
only after a litigation of several years and a
decision by this court.
Von Keller v. SchultIng, 50 N. Y. 108.
In October, 1868, the defendant could have informed the plaintiff
what his interest in the proceeds of the goods
was, subject to the chances of a litigation,
but what it was actually worth no one cotdd
is the general
to this rule.

rule.

then have told.
Without therefore
questioning
the facts
found by the court at special term, we are of
opinion that there was error In the legal conclusion that plaintiff was entitled to any relief on account of fraud.
It is further claimed that the plaintiff
ought to be entitled to relief on account of
mistake.
He testified that he would not have
executed the release if he had known the defendant's financial condition.
But as already
shown, the defendant was in no way responsible for his Ignorance, and was under no legal
or equitable obligation to disclose the facts
The plainas to his pecuniary circumstances.
tiff could have learned the facts by Inquiry
There was
of the defendant or his vendees.
no mistake as to any fact intrinsic to the
Plaintiff knew that the defendant
release.

MISTAKE OF FACT.
had not been legally discharged from his liability, and that for the !fo,000 he was to give
him an absolute release; and he gave him
just such a release as he intended to. There
was no mistake of any intrinsic fact essential
to the contract or Involved therein.
The defendant's financial condition was an extrinsic
fact, which might have influenced the plaintiff's action if he had known it But ignorance of or mistake as to such a fact is not
ground for affirmative equitable relief.
The
following illustrations of mistakes as to intrinsic facts essential to contracts, against
which courts of equity will relieve, are found
in the books.
A. buys an estate of B. to
which the latter is supposed to have an unquestionable title. It turns out, upon due investigation of the facts, that B. has no title;
in such a case equity will relieve the purchaser and rescind the contract
Bingham v.
Bingham, 1 Ves. Sr. 120. If a horse should
be purchased, which is by both parties believed to be alive, but is, at the time, in fact
dead, the purchaser
would, upon the same
ground, be released by rescinding the contract. Allen V. Hammond, 11 Pet. 71. If a
person should execute a release to another
party upon the supposition, founded on a mistake, that a certain debt or annuity had been
discharged, although both parties were innocent the release would be set aside. Hore
If one should execute
V. Becher, 12 Sim. 405.
a release so broad in Its terms as to release
his rights in property, of which he was wholly ignorant and which was not in contemplation of the parties at the time the bargain
for the release was made, a court of equity
might either cancel the release or restrain its
application as Intended.
Cholmondeley
v.
Clinton, 2 Mer. 352; Dungers v. Angove, 2
Ves. Jr. 304.
On the other hand, if the vendee is in possession of facts which will materially enhance the price of the commodity
and of which he knows the vendor to be ignorant, he Is not bound to communicate those
facts to the vendor, and the contract will be
held valid.
Laidlaw v. Organ, 2 Wheat. 178.
In such a case the facts unknown to the
vendor are extrinsic to the contract and are

not of Its substance;
and hence there is no
ground for the interference of a court of
equity.
It is clear from these and other Illustrations which might be given, that a court of
equity will not give relief In all cases of
mistake.
There are many extrinsic facts sm'rounding every business transaction which
have an important bearing and influence upon its results.
Some of them are generally
unknown to one or both of the parties, and
if known, might have prevented the transaction. In such cases, if a court of equity could
intervene and grant relief, because a party
was mistaken as to such a fact which would
have prevented him from entering into the
transaction if he had known the truth, there
would be such uncertainty and instability
in contracts as to lead to much embarrassment. As to all such facts, a party must rely
upon his own circumspection,
examination
and inquiry; and if not imposed upon or defrauded, he must be held to his contracts.
In
such cases, equity will not stretch out its arm
to protect those who suffer for the want of

vigilance.
Judge Story lays It down as a general rule
"that mistake or ignorance of facts In parties
is a proper subject of relief only when it
constitutes a material ingredient in the contract of the parties, and disappoints their intention by a mutual error;
or where it is
with good faith, and proceeds
inconsistent
from a violation of the obligations which are
imposed by law upon the conscience of either
party.
But where each party is equally innocent, and there is no concealment of facts
which the other party has a right to know,
and no surprise or imposition exists, the mistake or ignorance, whether mutual or unilateral, is treated as laying no foundation for
equitable Interference."
Story, Eq. Jur. § 151.
We are therefore of opinion that upon the
facts

disclosed

in the record

before

us, the

plaintiff was not entitled to any relief, and
the judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted, costs to abide event. All concur
except MILLER, J., not voting.
Judgment reversed.
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CONNER

V.

WELCH

et al.

(8 N. W. 260, 51 Wis. 431.)

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

March

2,

1881.

Appeal from circuit court, Dane county.
The case established by the pleadings and
evidence is correctly stated in the brief of
counsel for the plaintiff, as follows:
"This
action was brought to foreclose four certain
mortgages made by Martin Osborne and wife
upon 80 acres of land in Dane county, three
of which mortgages had been satisfied of
record before the commencement of the action.
The facts are that on November 11,
1871, Martin Osborne was seized in fee of
the W. % of N. W. % of section 25, tovm 8,
range 9, Dane county.
November 11, 1871,
Osborne and wife gave a mortgage thereon
This
to John W. Allen for $800 and interest.
is still in force as a first mortgage on the
property, and is not one of the four mortgages for the foreclosure of which the action was brought. It confers a right of
property prior to the rights of all parties
to it in the
hereto, and further reference
November 23, 1871, Oscase is unnecessary.
borne and wife gave a mortgage thereon to
This
Patrick Duffy for $200 and interest.
mortgage bears date prior to the Allen mortgage, but was executed later, and in terms
made subject thereto.
October 1, 1875, Osborne and wife gave another mortgage thereon to Patrick Duffy for $250 and interest.
December 2, 1876, Osborne and wife gave a
mortgage thereon to Elizabeth Duffy for $135
February 21, 1878, Osborne
and interest.
and wife gave a mortgage thereon to Michael
G. Conner, the plaintiff, for $229 and interest,
which mortgage has never been satisfied of
record.
March 1, 1878, the defendant Christian R. Stein caused judgment to be entered
against Martin Osborne in the circuit court
for Dane county upon a judgment note, with
warrant of attorney, by his attorneys, Welch
& Botkin, a law finn of which the defendant
March 2,
William Welch was a member.
1878, the defendant Stein assigned said judgment to said William Welch. March 4, 1878,
the said mortgages, numbers two, three, and
four, for $200, $250, and $135, were assigned
March 5, 1878, the
to the defendant Stein.
defendant Stein, by his attorneys, the said
Welch & Botkin, brought suit to foreclose
the said mortgages, numbers two and three,
for $200 and $250, making parties defendant
thereto Osborne and wife, the mortgagors,
and Conner, the plaintiff herein, holding the
number five, above
subsequent
mortgage,
mentioned, but not making a party defendant the said Welch, holding by assignment
the said judgment number six. March 8,
1878,
Osborne and wife, by deed of quitclaim, conveyed said premises to the plaintiff, Conner, who, at the time, had an actual
knowledge of the Stein judgment and its assignment to Welch. April 9, 1878, at the
office of Welch & Botkin, in the presence of
Botkin, the plaintiff, Conner, paid to the de-
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fendant Stein the amount, principal and interest, of the mortgages in suit, (Nos. 2 and
with about $115, costs of suit.
3,) together
At the time of payment he was still without
knowledge of the Stein judgment. Neither
Stein nor Botkin spoke of it. Botkin, when
asked if he had told Conner of the existence
of the Stein judgment, testified: 'I do not
think
did.
He (Conner) paid the money,
and then said that he wanted the mortgages
satisfied, and asked Mr. Stein to come right
up with him and satisfy the mortgages, at
the register of deeds' office, and get done
with it; and he and Mr. Stein went out of
the ofiice for that purpose.
It was at Conner's request.
Not a word was said by me
or Stein in regard to satisfying. There was
not a syllable or whisper in regard to It.'
The two mortgages were then satisfied by
April 29, 1878, the plaintiff, Conner,
Stein.
paid Stein the amount, principal and interest, of the mortgage for $135, number four,
which, with the accompanying
note, was
delivered to him.
Thereupon,
at plaintiff's
instance and request. Stein went to the regby plaintiff, and
ister's office, accompanied
satisfied the mortgage;
Stein knowing, and
the plaintiff not knowing, of the judgment.
1878,
About December,
the plaintiff first
learned
of the existence of the judgment
from the officer having an execution thereon

I

against this property." The complaint prays
that the discharges of the three Duffy mortgages be cancelled, and for the usual judgment of foreclosure and sale in respect to
those mortgages, and the mortgage for $229
to the plaintiff, dated February 21, 1878.
It is claimed in the complaint that 40 acres
of the mortgaged land was the homestead of
Osborne,
and an injunction
was prayed
against the sale of such 40 acres, on execution issued upon Stein's judgment. As to
the agreement between the plaintiff and Osborne, pursuant to which the latter conveyed
to the plaintiff the land mortgaged, the plaintiff testified as follows:
"I bought the place
of Osborne.
I was to pay the mortgages.
I did not give him any money besides the
* • *
mortgages.
gave him an account
I held against him, more or less. » * *
He had no money, and I paid for the making
out of these papers. Forget how much that
was. That is all I paid for his deed to me,
t-icept that I released him from his liability
on the note of $229.
Think it was agreed
that I should let Osborne have his note and
mortgage.
Have no further claim on him or
his land for that." The witness testified later that he understood he took the property
In satisfaction of his claims, but that it was
no part of the consideration of the deed;
and, further, to the question, "Didn't you regard the giving to you by Osborne of the
quitclaim deed as, between you and Osborne,
a settlement
of your note and mortgage
against him for $229?" the plaintiff answered: "I presume so, but that was omitted in
putting the amount in the deed." This is

i
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the substance of all the evideijce on tlie subject.
The court found— "Fii-st, that all the facts
stated in the complaint are true, except that
no part of the mortgaged premises was the
homestead of Osborne when Stein recovered
his judgment, and that Stein is not the owner of such judgment; second, that the defendant Welch purchased said judgment
from the defendant Stein, and took the assignment thereof absolutely, for full value,
and without notice, fraud, or collusion, and
that he paid therefor by crediting the said
Stein on the account of the firm of Welch &
Botkin, of which the defendant Welch was
then and still is a member, with the face
amount thereof, towards the payment for legal services theretofore rendered by the said
Welch & Botkin for the said Stein, and that,
as between
the said Welch and the said
Botkin, it was agreed that the amount of
said judgment should be received by tlie
third,
said Welch on his individual account;
that Mr. Botkin, the law partner of the said
defendant Welch, transacted the business in
the foreclosure suits set out in said complaint, and that said Welch had no knowledge of the details of said foreclosure, and
of the satisfaction of the mortgages as set
out in said complaint; fourth, that the cancellation of the mortgages as set out in said
complaint was founded upon a mistake upon
the part of the plaintiff.
That mistake was
the supposition that the several mortgages
of record, including his own, to the amount
in all of the full value of the i^remises, were
the only liens prior to his deed from said Osborne."
As conclusions
of law, the court found
that the mortgage for $229, executed by Osborne to the plaintiff, is a valid subsisting
lien on the land; that the discharge of the
three Duffy mortgages
should be cancelled,
and those mortgages adjudged to be valid
and subsisting liens; and that the plaintiff
is entitled to a judgment of foreclosure in
respect to all four mortgages, and to a sale
of the land mortgaged, but not to a personal
judgment against either defendant.
The defendants have appealed from the judgment
entered pursuant to such findings.
S. W. Botkin, for appellants.
vens & Morris, for respondent.

LYON, J.

Sloan,

Ste-

As we understand the testiof the plaintiff he accepted the quitclaim deed of the mortgaged premises from
Osborne pursuant to an express agreement
between them that the note and mortgage of
February 21, 1878, for $229, was thereby satisfied and discharged.
His testimony seems
to admit of no other construction. By this
the $229 mortgage was discharagreement
ged, and the satisfactions of the Duffy mortgages by Stein, in the proper records of the
county, at the request of the plaintiff, disHence, by the acts
charged those mortgages.
and procurement of the plaintiff, the four
mony

mortgages in controversy were cancelled and
cease to be liens upon the land covered
by them.
Were these subsisting mortgages,
we might not find it very difficult to hold,,
under the authorities cited, that the interest
represented by the $229 mortgage was not
merged in the legal title conveyed
to the
plaintiff by Osborne, and that the plaintiff
should be subrogated
to the rights of the
mortgagees in the Duffy mortgages, so that
all of these mortgages could be made avallable to protect the plaintiff against the lien
I
of
the Stein judgment, which is junior therei
to. But before the questions of merger and
subrogation can be raised at all, the mortgages now cancelled
and discharged
must
be restored and vitalized. This can only be
done by cancelling and holding for naught
the satisfactions of the Duffy mortgages,
which the plaintiff caused to be entered of
record, and his express agreement with Osof the legal
j borne to accept the conveyance
; title in full satisfaction and discharge of the
; $229 mortgage.
The precise question is, therefore, wheth.
I er, under the circumstances
of the case, the
of those
I plaintiff is entitled to be relieved
'
satisfactions and of such agreemient.
Has
j he shown himself entitled to have them set
aside, cancelled, and held for naught? The
1 circuit court found (no doubt correctly)
that
I there was no fraud or collusion on the part
Welch, the owner of the
! of thie defendant
Stein judgment, and granted the relief prayed on the sole ground that plaintiff acted in
ignorance of the existence of that judgment,
in the matter of tlie satisfaction and discharge of the mortgages.
Undoubtedly the
plaintiff knew nothing of the judgment, and,
presumably,
(although he has not so testified,) had he known of its existence he would
not have had the mortgages discharged,
or
I made the contract he did with Osborne for
the conveyance.
But that alone is not suffij
I cient to entitle him to have the discharged
i mortgages reinstated as valid liens upon the
land.
He must also have exercised reasonable diligence
to ascertain
whether subsequent liens had been put upon the property.
A court of equity never relieves a man from
the consequences of his own culpable negligence.
Discussing the rules upon which
courts of equity proceed In relieving, or refusing to relieve, against contracts made or
acts done through mistake, or in ignorance
of material facts. Judge Story says that
"where an unconscionable
has
advantage
been gained by mere mistake or misapprehension, and there was no gross negligence
on the part of the plaintiff in falling into the
error, or in not sooner claiming redress, and
no intervening rights have accrued, and the
parties may still be placed in statu quo, equity will interfere, in its discretion, in order to
prevent intolerable injustice."
1 Story. Eq.
Jur. § 1381. In section 146 the learned author says:
"It is not, however, sufficient in
all cases to give the party relief, that the
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fact is material; but it must be sucli as lie
could not by reasonable diligence get knowledge of when he was put upon inquiry.
For
if, by such reasonable diligence, he could obtain knowledge of the fact, equity will not
relieve him, since that would be to encourage
culpable negligence." In a note to the section last cited is the following:
"If a court
of equity is asked to give relief in a case,
not fully remediable at law, or not remediable at all at law, then It gi'ants it upon its
own terms and according to its own doctrines.
It gives relief only to the vigilant
and not to the negligent; to those who have
not been put upon their diligence to make
inquiry, and not to those who, being put upon inquiry, have chosen to omit all inquiry,
which would have enabled them at once to
correct the mistake, or to obviate all 111 effects therefrom. In short, it refuses all Its
aid to those who, by their own negligence,
and by that alone, have incun-ed the loss, or
may suffer the inconvenience."
In Mamlock v. Fairbanks, 46 Wis. 415, 1
N. W. 167, this court made an application of
the rule above stated.
That was an action
to rescind a conti'act of sale of a certain note
and mortgage by the defendant to the plaintiff, and to recover the money paid therefor.
The ground upon which relief was claimed,
was that the defendant misrepresented
the
identity of the debtors, which misrepresentation affected the value of the securities.
It
was held that if, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, the plaintiff had the present
means of ascertaining the identity of the
debtors, and was not prevented from doing
so by any artifice of the vendor, there could
be no recovery.
The opinion contains some
of the authorities for the rule, not specially
cited herein, and the case is a very strong
one against the plaintiff'.
Levy V. Martin, 48 Wis. 198, 4 N. W. 35,
There the mortgage sought
is not in point.
to be revived was discharged without the
consent of the plaintiff, and against an express agreement between him and the perof the deceased mortsonal representatives
to him.
gagor that it should be assigned
Under these circumstances we found no difficulty in cancelling the satisfaction, and
subrogating the plaintiff to the rights of the
original mortgagor. There was no question
of diligence in the case.
We have examined the cases cited by the
learned counsel for the plaintiff on the subject of the rescission of contracts or instruments for ignorance or mistake of material
facts, but in none of th'em, so far as we
have perceived, is the question of diligence
raised or passed upon.
We are now to consider the question
whether the present plaintiff used proper
diligence to ascertain the condition of the tiwith Ostle when he made his agreement
borne, and when he paid and procured the
discharge of the Duffy mortgages.
The plaintiff' is a man of some wealth,
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and is apparently familiar with the usual
He
modes of ti-ansacting ordinary business.
evidently knew that a judgm'eot against Osborne would be a lien upon the mortgaged
premises, and also the effect upon the title
He knew
of a discharge of the mortgages.
also that Osborne was utterly insolvent and
thriftless. The number and amount of mortgages which the latter had put upon his
land during the preceding seven years, absorbing its whole value, was sufficient notice to him of Osborne's pecuniary condition.
The known insolvency of Osborne would naturally make an ordinarily prudent man more
cautious when dealing with the title to his
Then, again, the mortgage of Allen
land.
nearly or quite one-half of the
represented
value of the land, and was paramount to all
the others.
Stein is a merchant in Madison,
and plaintiff knew him well. It does not appear that he is a dealer in real estate to any
considerable
extent.
The very fact that he
had purchased
the Duffy mortgages, which
were junior to the Allen mortgage,
would
seem to suggest to a reasonable mind that
he must have had some special reason for
doing so, and that such reason might well
be that he became interested in some way
in the land.
But these circumstances,
suggestive as they were, failed to open the lips
of the plaintiff. He made no inquiry concerning the title either of Stein or Botkin or
Had he done so, and been told
Osborne.
that no encumbrance had been placed upon
to his mortgage
for
the land subsequent
$229, he might stand in a very different position in this action.
But this is not all. A month after he took
the conveyance from Osborne, he went vsdth
Stein to the office of the register of deeds to
have the latter discharge the two oldest Duffy mortgages, and some weeks later went
again to the same office to have the other
Duffy mortgages discharged.
Of course, he
was in close proximity to the office of the
clerk of the circuit court, and could easily
have gone there and ascertained
whether
any judgments had been entered against Osborne.
It seems to us that common prudence required him to do so,- or else to interrogate Stein or Osborne or Botkin as to the
condition of the title.
Yet he made the
agreement,
and took the conveyance
from
Osborne, and procured Stein to discharge the
Duffy mortgages, without doing either.
He
suffered the matter to rest in statu quo until an execution was issued on the judgment,
and, so far as it appears, first asserted the
rights claimed in this action on the day the
land was sold by the sheriff under the execution, which was about 10 months after
the last Duffy mortgage
was discharged.
Our minds are impelled to the conclusiou
that, under these circumstances, the plaintiff"
was guilty of most culpable negligence in
failing to inform himself of the existence of
the Stein judgment, and hence that he has no
standing in a coui't of equity to obtain the
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relief he seeks. It there Is any ease in the
books which grants such relief, where the
act sought to be relieved against was the
result of negligence so gross and inexcusable,
we have failed to find it Oertainly, no such
case is cited by counsel.
The application of
this rule may work hardship in some cases;
perhaps it does in this case.
But the rule
requires nothing unreasonable and is a most
salutary one. It is infinitely better that men
should be held to the consequences of their
own culpable carelessness, than that courts
of equity should undertake to relieve there-

OP FACT.
from.

The rule requires reasonable caution
and prudence in the transaction of business,
and is deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence.
It w within the principle and reason of caveat emptor.
Mamlock v. Fairbanks, supra.
The abrogation of the rule would tend to
encourage
negligence, and to introduce uncertainty and confusion in all business transactions.
The judgment of the circuit comt must be
reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to that court to dismiss the comolaint
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TORRANCE, J. This Is an action brought

to recover damages for the breach of a written contract, dated December 14, 1888. The
contract Is set out in full in the amended
complaint. It is in the form of a written
addressed by the plaintiff to the
proposal,
defendant, and Is accepted by the defendant in writing upon the face of the contract. Such parts of the contract as appear
to be material are here given: "We propose
to supply you with fifteen net tons of tool
steel, of good and suitable quality, to be
furnished prior to January 1, 1890, at" prices
set forth in the contract for the qualities of
"Deliveries to be made
steel named therein.
f. o. b. Pittsburgh, and New York freight alTo be specified for as
lowed to Hartford.

your wants may require." The contract
was made at Hartford, by the plaintifC
through its agent A. H. Church, and by the
defendant through its agent J. B. Clapp.
After filing a demurrer and an answer,
which may now be laid out of the case, the
defendant filed an "answer, with demand
for reformation of contract," in the first
paragraph of which it admitted the execuThe second,
tion of said written contract.
third, and fourth paragraphs of the answer
are as follows: "The defendant avers that
, 1888, it was
on or about December
agreed by and between the plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff acting by its said
agent, A. H. Church, that the plaintiff should
supply the defendant prior to January 1,
1890, with such an amount of tool steel, not
exceeding
fifteen tons, as the defendant's
wants during that time might require, and
of the kinds and upon the terms stated in
said contract, and that the defendant would
purchase the same of the plaintiff on said
by the mistake of the
terms.
(3) That
plaintiff and defendant, or the fraud of the
plaintiff, said written contract did not embody the actual agreement made as aforesaid by the parties.
(4) That the defendant
accepted the proposal made to It by the
plaintiff, and contained in said written contract, relying upon the representations of
the plaintiff's said agent, then made to it,
that by accepting the same the defendant
would only be bound for the purchase of
such an amount of tool steel of the kinds
named therein as its wants prior to Janu-
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might require, and the dethen believed that such proposal
embodied the terms of the actual agreement
made as aforesaid by and between the plainThe fifth and last
tiff and defendant"
paragraph of the answer is not now material. The answer claimed, by way of equitable relief, a reformation of the written
contract
In reply the plaintiff denied the
three paragraphs above quoted; denied specifically that the written contract did not
embody the actual agreement made by the
parties; and denied the existence of any
joint mistake or fraud. Thereupon the court
below, sitting as a coiu't of equity, heard
the parties upon the issues thus formed,
found them In favor of the defendant, and
adjudged that the written contract be reformed to correspond with the contract as
set out in paragraph 2 of the answer. At a
term of the court, final judgsubsequent
ment in the suit was rendered In favor of
The present appeal Is based
the defendant.
during the trial with
upon what occurred
to the reformation of the conreference
tract Upon that hearing the agent of the
defendant was a witness, on behalf of the
defendant, and was t-jked to state "what
conversation occurred between him and A.
H. Church in making the contract of December 14, 1888, at and before the execution
The plainthereof, and relevant thereto."
tiff "objected to the reception of any parol
testimony, on the ground that the same was
inadmissible to vary or contradict the terms
of a written instrument, or to show any other or different contract than that specified
In the Instrument, or to show anything relevant to the defendant's prayer for Its reformation." The court overruled the objection,
and admitted the testimony,
and upon such
testimony found and adjudged as hereinbefore stated.
The case thus presents a single question,
- -whether the evidence objected
to was admissible under the circumstances; and this
depends upon the further question,
which
will be first considered, whether the mistake was one which, under the clrcumstanoes disclosed by the record, a court of equity
will correct The finding of the coiu-t below Is as foUows: "The actual agreement
between the defendant and the plaintiff wa?
that the plaintiff should supply the defendant, prior to January 1, 1890, with such an
amount of tool steel, not exceeding fifteen
tons, as the defendant's wants during that
time might require, and of the kinds and
upon the terms stated In said contract and
that the defendant would purchase the same
of the plaintiff on said terms.
But by the
mutual mistake of said Church and said
Clapp, acting for the plaintiff and defendant
concerning the legal construcrespectively,
tion of the written contract of December 14,
that contract failed to express the
1888,
actual agreement of the parties; and that
said Church and said Clapp both intended tc
ary 1,
fendant

1890,
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the said written contract express the
actual agreement made by them, and at the
time of its execution believed that it did."
No fraud is properly charged, and certainly
none is fo\m.d, and whatever claim to relief
the defendant may have must rest wholly on
the ground of mistake.
The plaintiff claims
that the mistake in question is one of law,
and is of such a nature that it cannot be
corrected in a oourt of equity.
That a court
of equity, under certain circumstances,
may
reform a written Instrument founded on a
mistake of fact Is not disputed; but the
plaintiff strenuously insists that it cannot,
or will not, reform an instrument founded
upon a mistake like the one here in question,
which is alleged to be a mistake of law. The
distinction between mistakes of law and mistakes of fact is certainly recognized in the
text-books
and decisions, and to a certain
extent is a valid distinction; but It is not
practically so important as it is often represented to be. Upon this point Mr. Markby, in his "Elements of Law" (sections 208
and 269), weU says: "There is also a peculiar class of cases in which courts of equity
to undo what has been
have endeavored
done under the influence of error and to reThe
store parties to their former position.
courts deal with such cases in a very free
doubt whether it is possible
manner, and
to bring their action under any fixed rules.
But here again, as far as I can judge by
what find in the text-books and in the cases
referred to, the distinction between errors
of law and errors of fact, though very emhas had very little
phatically announced,
practical effect upon the decisions of the
courts.
The distinction is not ignored, and
it may have had some influence, but it is
always mixed up with other considerations,
which not unfrequently outweigh it The
distinction between errors of law and errors
of fact is therefore probably of much less
importance than is commonly
supposed.
There is some satisfaction In this, because
the grounds upon which the distinction is
made have never been clearly stated." The
distinction in question can therefore afCord
little or no aid in determining the question
under consideration. Under certain circumstances a court of equity will, and under
others it will not, reform a writing founded
on a mistake of fact; under certain circumstances it will, and under others it will not,
reform an instrument founded upon a mistake of law. It is no longer true, if it ever
was, that a mistake of law is no ground for
relief in any case, as wUl be seen by the
Whether, then, the
cases hereinafter cited.
mistake now in question be regarded as one
of law or one of fact is not of much consequence;
the more important question
is
whether it is such a mistake as a court of
and this perhaps can
equity will correct;
only, or at least can best, be determined by
seeing whether It falls within any of the
well-recognized
classes of cases in which
At the same time
such relief is furnished.
have

I
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OF FACT.
fundamental equitable principle which
was specially applied in the case of Northrop V. Graves, 19 Conn. 548, may also, perhaps, afford some aid in coming to a right
briefly and generally^
conclusion.
Stated
and without any attempt at strict accuracy,
that principle is that in legal transactions
no one shall be allowed to enrich himself
unjustly at the expense of another through
or by reason of an innocent mistake of law
or fact, entertained without negligence by
the loser, or by both.
If we apply this principle to the present case, we may see that, by
means of a mutual mistake In reducing the
oral agreement to writing, tlie plaintiff, without either party intending it, gained a deadvantage
cided
over
the defendant,
to
which it is in no way justly entitled, or at
least ought not to be entitled. In a court of
the

equity.

The written agreement certainly fails to
express the real agi-eement of the parties in
a material point; it fails to do so by reason of a mutual mistake, made, as we must
assume, innocently, and without any such
negligence on the part of the defendant as
would debar him from the aid of a court of
equity.
The rights of no third parties have
The instrument, if corrected,
Intervened.
will place both parties just where they Intended to place themselves in their relations
to each other; and, if not corrected, it gives
the plaintiff an inequitable advantage
over
the defendant It is said that if, by mistake,
words are inserted in a written contract
which the parties did not Intend to Insert, or
omitted which they did not intend to omit,
this is a mistake of fact which a court of
equity will correct in a proper case. Sibert
If, then, the oral
V. McAvoy, 15 111. 106.
agreement in the case at bar had been for
the sale and purchase of 5 tons of steel, and,
in reducing the contract to writing, the parmistake, inserted
ties had, by an unnoticed
"15 tons" instead of "5 tons," this would
have been a mistake of fact entitling the defendant to the aid of a court of equity.
In
the case at bar the parties actually agreed
upon what may, for brevity, be called a conditional purchase and sale, and upon that
only.
In reducing the contract to writing,
they, by an innocent mistake, omitted words
which would have expressed the true agreement, and used words which express an
agreement differing materiilly from the only
one they made.
There is perhaps a distinction between the supposed case and the actual case, but it is quite shadowy. They differ not at all in their unjust consequences.
In both, by an innocent mistake mutually
entertained,
the vendor obtains an uncon
scionable advantage over the vendee, a result which was not intended
by either.
There exists no good, substantial reason, as
it seems to us, why relief should be given
in the one case and refused in the other,
other things being equal.
It is hardly necessary to say that, in cases like the one at
bar, courts of equity ought to move witb-
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great caution.
Before an Instrument is reformed, under such circumstances,
the proof
of the mistake, and that it really gives an unjust advantage to one party over the other,
ought to be of the most convincing character.
"Of course the presumption in favor of the
written over the spoken agreement is almost
resistless; and the oourt has wearied itself
in declaring that such prayers (for relief of
this kind) must be supported by overwhelming evidence, or be denied." Palmer v. Insurance Co., 54 Conn. 501, 9 Atl. 248. We
are not concerned here, however,
with the
amount or sufficiency of the proofs upon
which the court below acted, nor with the
sufficiency of the pleadings; we must, upon
this record, assume that the pleadings are
sufficient, and that the proofs came fully up
to the highest standard requirements in such
oases. Upon principle, then, we think a court
of equity may correct a mistake of law in a
case like the one at bar, and we also think
the very great weight of modem authority
The case
is in favor of that conclusion.
clearly falls within that class of cases where
there is an antecedent agreement, and, in reducing It to writing, the instrument executed,
by reason of the common mistake of the parties as to the legal effect of the words used,
fails, as to one or more material points, to
It is perexpress their actual agreement.
haps not essential in all cases that there
should be an antecedent agreement, as appears to be held in Benson v. Markoe, 37
Minn. 30, 33 N. W. 38; but we have no oo
casion to consider that question in the case
at bar.
The authorities in favor of the conclusion that a coiu-t of equity in such cases
wiU correct a mistake, even if it be one of
law, are very numerous, and the citation of
a few of the more important must suffice.
In Hunt V. Rousmanier's Adm'rs, 1 Pet. 1,
decided in 1828, It is said: "Where an instrument is drawn and executed which professes, or is intended, to carry into execution an agreement, whether in writing or by
parol, previously entered into, but which by
mistake of the draftsman, either as to fact or
law, does not fulfill, or which violates, the
manifest intention of the parties to the
agreement,
equity wiU correct the mistake
so as to produce a conformity of the instrument to the agreement."
It was said in
the argument before us that this was a mere
obiter dictum, but that is hardly correct.
It
is true the case was held not to fall within
the principle, but the principle was said to
be "incontrovertible" (page 13), and was applied to the extent at least of determining
that the case then before the com-t did not
come within it.
In Snell v. Insurance Co..
98 U. S. 85, the court applied the principle so
clearly stated in the case last citeji, and rethough the
formed a policy of insurance,
mistake was clearly one as to the legal effect of the language of the policy.
In numerous other decisions
of that court the
same principle has been cautiously but repeatedly applied, but it is not necessary to
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On the general question, whethcite them.
er a court of equity will relieve against a
mistake as to the legal effect of the language
of a writing, the case of Griswold v. Hazard,
141 U. S. 260, 11 Sup. Ct. 972, 999, is a strong
hardly an authority
case, though perhaps
Canupon the precise question in this case.
edy V. Marcy, 13 Gray, 373, was a case
where the oral contract was for the sale of
two-thirds of certain premises, but the deed,
by mistake of the scrivener, conveyed the enThe words used were ones
tire premises.
intended to be used in one sense, the error
supposed
those
being that aU concerned
words would cari-y out the oral agreement.
This, was clearly a mistake "concerning the
legal construction
of the written contract,"
but the court, by Chief Justice Shaw, said:
"We are of the opinion that courts of equity in such cases are not limited to affording
relief only in cases of mistake of fact, and
that a mistake in the legal effect of a description in a deed, or in the use of technical
language, may be relieved against upon propIn Goode v. Riley, 153 Mass. 585,
er proof."
28 N. E. 228, decided in 1891, the court says:
"The only question argued is raised by the
defendant's exception to the refusal of a ruling that, if both parties intended that the
description should be written as it was written, the plaintiff was not entitled to a reforIt would be a sufficient answer
mation.
that the contrary is settled in this commonwealth, "-siting a number of cases. In Kennard v. George, 44 N. H. 440, the parties, by
mistake as to its legal effect, supposed a
mortgage deed to be valid when it was not.
The court relieved against the mistake, and
said: "It seems to us to be a clear case of
mutual mistake, where the instrument given
and received was not in fact what all the
parties to it supposed it was and intended
it should be; and in such a case equity will
interfere and reform the deed, and make it
what the parties at the time of its execution intended to make it; and in this respect it makes no difference
whether the
defect in the instrument be in a statutory or
common-law
requisite,
or whether the parties failed to make the instrument in the
form they intended, or misapprehended
its
legal effect."
In Eastman v. Association, 65
N. H. 176, 18 Atl. 745, decided in 1889, the
mistake was as to the legal effect of an insurance certificate, but the court granted relief by way of reformation. The court says:
"Both parties intended to make the benefi,t
payable to Gigar's administrator. That it wa'j
not made payable to him was due to theit
mutual misapprehension of the legal effect of
• * •
the language used in the certificate.
Equity requires an amendment of the writing
that wiU make the contract what the parties
supposed it was, and intended it should be,
although their mistake is one of law, and not
of fact." In Trusdell v. Lehman, 47 N.
J. Eq. 218, 20 Atl. 391, the marginal note is
as follows: "Where it clearly appears that
a deed drawn professedly to carry out the

230

MISTAKE OF FACT.

agreement of the parties, previously entered
In his able argument before us.
Upon Wa
into, is executed under the misapprehension brief, he cites five from Illinois, two froi,"
that It really embodies the agreement, where- Indiana, and one from Arkansas. After an
as, by mistake of the draughtsman either as examination of them, we can only say that
to fact or law, it fails to fulfill that purpose,
most of them seem to support the claims of
equity will correct the mistake by reforming the plaintiff.
If so, we think they are opthe instrument in accordance with the con- posed to the very decided weight of authoritract." In a general way, the same rule Is ty, and do not state the law as it is held in
recognized
and applied with more or less this state.
sirictness in the following cases: Clayton v.
Before closing, however, we ought to noFreet, 10 Ohio St. 544; Bush v. Hicks, 60 N. tice the case of Wheaton v. Wheaton, supra,
Y. 298; Andrews v. Andrews, 81 Me. 337, 17 upon which the plaintifC's counsel seems to
Atl. 1G6; May v. Adams, 58 Vt 74, 3 Ati. place great reliance.
The case is a some187;
Griffith v. Townley, 69 Mo. 13; Benson what peculiar one. Even in that case, howV. Markoe, 37 Minn. 30, 33 N. W. 38; Gump's ever, the court seems to recognize the princiAppeal, 65 Pa. St. 476; Cooper v. Phibbs, ple governing the class of cases within which
L. R. 2 H. L. 170. See, also, 2 Pom. Eq. we decide the case at bar falls, for it says:
Jut. § 845, and Bisp. Eq. §§ 184^191.
And, "It is not alleged that the writings were not
whatever the law may be elsewhere, this is so drawn as to effectuate the intention of the
certainly the law of oiu* own state.
through the mistake of the scrivChamparties,
berlain v. Thompson, 10 Conn. 243; Stedwell ener. On the contrary it is alleged that the
V. Anderson, 21 Conn. 144; Woodbury Savscrivener was not even informed what the
ings Bank v. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 31 Conn.
agreement between the parties was."
Prom
518;
Palmer v. InsTii-ance Co., 54 Conn. the statement of the case In the record and
9 Atl. 248; and Haussman v. Burn488,
In the opinion. It clearly appears that the
Indeed, mistake was not mutual; Indeed, It does not
ham, 59 Conn. 117, 22 Ati. 1065.
sinoo the time of Northrop v. Graves, supra,
even appear that at the time when the note
it is difficult to see how our law could have was executed the other party even knew
We conclude then that by that there was any mistake at all on he part
been otherwise.
our own law, and by the decided weight of of anybody. Upon the facts stated, the
authority elsewhere, the defendant was en- plaintiff In this case did not bring it within
titled to the relief sought If this is so, then the class of cases we have been considering.
clearly he was entifled to the parol evidence The case was correctiy decided, not on the
which the plain tifC objected to; for in no ground that the mistake was one of law,
other way, ordinarily, can the mistake be but on the ground that the mistake of law
shown.
"In such cases parol evidence is was one which, under the circumstances aladmissible to show that the party is entitled leged, a court of equity would not correct.
to the relief sought"
Wheaton v. Wheaton, The court, however, in the opinion, seems to
9 Conn. 96.
"It is settled, at least In equity, base its decision upon the distinction bethat this particular kind of evidence, that is tween mistakes of law and mistakes of fact;
to say, of mutual mistake as to the meaning
holding in general and unqualified terms, as
of words used, is admissible for the negative
was once quite customary, that the latter
purpose we have mentioned.
And this prin- could be corrected and the former could not
ciple is entirely consistent with the rule that The court probably did not mean to lay the
you cannot set up prior or contemporaneous
law down In this broad and unqualified way;
oral dealings to modify or override what you but If it did, it is sufficient to say that it Is
knew was the effect of your writing." Goode not a correct statement of our law, at least
V. Riley, 153 Mass. 585, 28 Ati. 22S; Reyn.
of Northrop t. Graves,
since the decision
Theory Ev. § 69; 1 Greenl. Ev. {15th Ed.) | supra.
On the whole, this case of Wheaton
269a; Steph. Dig. Ev. § 90.
as supV. Wheaton can hardly be regardea
The view we have taken of this case ren- porting the plaintiff's contention.
There is
In this
ders it unnecessary to notice at any Ijngth no error apparent upon the record.
the cases cited by counsel for the plaintiff opinion the other judges concurred.
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Trusts are either express or implied, the
former being such as are raised or created
by the act of the parties, and the latter being such as are raised or created by presumption or construction of law. Cook v.
Fountain, 3 Swanst 585, 592.
Implied trusts may also be divided Into
two general classes: First, those that rest
upon the presumed intention of the parties.
Secondly,
of
those vchich are independent
any such express intentions, and are forced
upon the conscience of the party by operation of law. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1195.
Sufficient appears to show that Sarah S.
Walden, the complainant,
on the sixth day
of May, 1874, filed her bill of complaint in
the court below against the respondents, to
wit, Darius S. Skinner and John N. Lewis
and Charles S. Hardee, executors of Charles
S. Henry, deceased, who in his lifetime was
the trustee of Penelope W. Tefft and her
Preliminary to the charging
three children.
part of her complaint she alleges and states
that on the 28th of October, 1847, she intermarried with William P. TefCt, who on the
9th of August, five years later, departed this
life intestate and without children, leaving
the complainant as his sole heir and legal
representative; that on the 4th of June,
six years subsequent to the death of her first
husband, she intermarried with Charles C.
Walden, who, on the eighth day of December of the next year, departed this life testate, leaving no children by the complainant,
and that he by his will bequeathed to her
all the property and rights owned and possessed by her at the date of their marriage;
aud that the father of her first husband
died intestate on the 30th of June, 1862, but
that no administration was ever had upon his
estate, and that his widow, the mother of
her first husband, departed this life testate
on the 11th of September eleven years later;
that her first husband had two brothers at
the date of her marriage neither of whom
ever married and both of whom died without
children; that at the death of the elder of the
two he had a life policy of insurance for
$5,000, which his administrator collected and
paid to his two living brothers.
Allegations then follow in the bill of complaint which relate more Immediately to the
from
subject-matter
of the controversy,
which it appears that Ellas Fort, June 28,
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conveyed a certain tract of land to
Charles S. Henry and Stephen C. Greene, as
trustees and in trust for Penelope W. TefCt
and her three sons, William P. Tefl:t, Henry
D. TefCt, and Charles E. Tefft, and it is
therein declared that the said property is
for the use of the mother during her lifetime and the three sons, and that after the
death of the mother it shall be for the use
of the three sons alone as tenants in common, and that in case of sale "the proceeds
upon the same uses and
to be reinvested
trusts as aforesaid, and if not sold, then
the property, after the death of the mother,
was to be distributed by said trustees to
each of the said sons as shall sm'vlve and
attain the age of twenty-one years."
Greene, one of the trustees, subsequently
died, leaving Charles S. Henry the sole surviving trustee under the trust-deed, and she
charges that on the 19th of July, 1848, the
mayor and aldermen of the city of Savannah
conveyed to him as such trustee a certain lot
of land numbered five, Monterey Ward, in
said city, the lot being then subject to certain annual ground-rents, as specified in the
conveyance, and the complainant avers that
the conveyance is informal and incomplete,
inasmuch as the trustee never signed it, as
it was intended, and that it fails to set forth
and express the trust interests of the three
children as it should do. Wherefore she alleges that it should be reformed and be made
to conform to the purposes of the trust as
created and set forth in the original trustdeed.
Persuasive and convincing reasons in support of that request are alleged which will
hereafter be reproduced when the merits of
the controversy are considered.
Relief specific and general is prayed, as is
more fully set forth in the transcript.
Process was served and the respondents appeared, and after certain interlocutory proceedings filed separate answers.
All of the defenses to the merits are set
up in the answer of tlae first-named respondent, who admits all of the preliminary matters alleged in the bill of complaint.
He
also admits that there was in existence at
the time of the first marriage of the complainant the trust estate held by the surviving trustee
arising under the conveyance
from Elias Fort to the said two trustees,
which, as he alleges, was held for the sole
and separate use of the mother during her
life, and remainder at her death to her three
sons as tenants in common.
Prior to that transaction there is no controversy between the parties as to the facts,
and he also admits that the authorities of the
city conveyed the lot called Monterey Ward
to the surviving trustee, but he alleges that
by the terms of the conveyance the legal
title to the lot vested in the trustee in trust
for the sole and separate use of the mother,
the trust being executory only so long and
for such time as the cestui que trust should
1831,

S. 577.)
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a feme covert;
and he denies tliat
the conveyance is informal and incomplete in
any particular, or that it was ever expected
or intended
by any one that the trustee
should sign the same, and he avers that it
was acct-pted by the trustee for the purposes therein set forth.
Attempt is also made to enforce that view
by a specific denial of most of the reasons
assigned in the bill of complaint in support
of the request that the conveyance to the
trustee of the lot called Monterey Ward may
be reformed so as to conform to the trusts
created and expressed in the antecedent trustdeed.
Both of the other respondents allege that
they are citizens of the state where the suit
is brought, and deny that the circuit court
had any jurisdiction to make or execute any
order, judgment,
or decree against them in
the premises.
Proofs were taken, the parties heard, and
the circuit court entered a decree in favor
dismissing the bill of
of the respondents,
Prompt appeal was taken by the
complaint.
complainant to this court, and since the appeal was brought up she has filed the assignment of errors set forth in the brief of
They are ten in number, all
her counsel.
of which will be sufliciently considered in
without giving
the cou:se of the opinion,
each a separate examination.
Before examining the questions presented
in respect to the second deed, it becomes necessary to ascertain the true consti'uction and
of the original trust-deed so far
meaning
as respects the second trust therein created
Eight hundred dollars constiand defined.
of the conveyance,
tuted the consideration
and it was made upon the trust that if, during the lifetime of the mother of the three
sons, it should be deemed advisable by her
to sell and convey the premises, then upon
this further trust that the ti-ustees as aforesaid, or the survivor of them, upon her application and with her consent, signified by
her being a party to the conveyance, will sell
for the
and convey the lot and improvements
best price which can be obtained for the
same, to any person or persons whatsoever,
■without applying to a court of law or equity
for that purpose to authorize the same, and
the proceeds thereof upon the same trusts
as aforesaid to invest in such other property
or manner as the mother of the sons shall
direct and request for the same use, benefit,

and behalf.

as that proviExplicit and unambiguous
is, it requires no discussion
to ascertain its meaning; nor is it necessary to enter into any examination of the third trust
specified in the conveyance, as it is conceded
that the titist property was sold by the surduring the
viving ti'ustee for reinvestment
lifetime of the mother at her request, she
joining in the conveyance as required by the
terms of the instrument creating the trust.
Twenty-four hundred dollars were receivsion

for the conveyance of the trust property,
and all of that sum, except $600 turned over
to the mother,
was invested in buildings
then being erected upon lot numbered five,
called
the Monterey Ward.
Purchase of
that lot had previously been made by the
surviving trustee named in the original trustdeed, and it appears that the parties understood that it was to be upon the same uses
and trusts as were contained
in the trustdeed by which the title to the lot sold was
acquired.
Proof that the new lot numbered five,
called Jlonterey Ward, was purchased by the
father and the three sons during the lifetime of the father seems to be entirely satisfactory, and it is equally well established
that each contributed one-fourth part of the
sum of •'?240 paid for the purchase-money
of
Satisfactory proof is also exhibited
the lot.
that Henry D. Telft, one of the three brothers, died Aug. 13, 1849, unmarried and intestate, and that he had a valid subsisting
insurance upon his life in the sum of $5,000,
which his administrator collected and paid
to his surviving brothel's.
Eighteen hundred dollars of the proceeds
arising from the sale of the property acquired by virtue of the first trust-deed were
appropriated
towards erecting buildings on
the new lot purchased by the father and the
three sons while in full life, and when the
one whose life was insured deceased, the two
survivors appropriated each his proportion of
to the same purpose,
the money received
with the understanding that the property
was subject to the same uses and trusts as
the property previously acquired and sold.
Competent proofs of a convincing character are also exhibited in the transcript that
the first husband
of the complainant contributed other sums towards completing the
buildings, leaving no doubt that he paid his
full proportion for the improvements as well
as for the lot purchased of the city authorities.
Enough appears to show that the buildings
were completed more than two years before
the first husband of the complainant died intestate and without children,
when it is
obvious that she became the sole heir to all
the interest he possessed in the said estate,
whatever it might be. Two years elapsed
after the buildings were completed before the
father of the three sons died, and the proofs
show that during that period the complainant resided with the parents of her husband,
and that her rights as his heir-at-law were
uniformly recognized by the family; that
she continued to reside there with her mother-in-law after the death of thie senior Tefft,
until the decease of his widow, and that
throughout that period she paid one-half of
all repairs, taxes, insurance, and other expenses of the property as If she were equally
in the same with her mother-ininterested
law, and was liable to bear an equal proportion of all such expenses.
ed
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Opposed to that is the proof that the mother-in-law, one year before her death, when
in a low and depressed frame of mind, bequeathed the whole of the lot in question to
the first-named respondent, who is her nephew, and on the same day executed a deed
to him of the entire property, to false eflfect
in possession after her death.
Sole title to
the premises in fee-simple is claimed by the
respondent
under those Instruments, and he
brought ejectment against the complainant
to dispossess her of the premises, and it appears that she was at great disadvantage in
attempting to defend the suit, because the
trustee had omitted to see that the title was
conveyed in trust for the benefit of the cestuis que trust as in the prior trust deed, as
he should have done, to can-y into effect the
understanding of all the parties to the sale
of the prior trust premises and the purchase
of the lot in question.
What she alleges is
that the purchase of the new lot was made
for the same cestuis que trust as those described in the deed of the old lot, and that
the understanding of all was that the deed
of the new lot should contain and declare
the same uses and trusts in favor of the
same persons, and the proofs to that effect
are full and entirely satisfactory.
Support to that view is also derived from
the fact that the surviving trustee in the old
deed is the grantee in the new deed, and that
he is therein more than once described astrustee, and in the introductory part of the
instrument is denominated trustee of Mrs.
Penelope W. Tefft, wife of Israel K. Tefft,
of the city and state previously mentioned in
the same instrument.
Ten years before the suit was instituted
the trustee in the new deed departed this
life, an>d the other two respondents were appointed and qualified as his executors.
Unable to obtain complete redress at law, the
complainant prays that the deed of conveyance from the city of the lot and improvements in question may be reformed and be
made to conform to the true intent and purpose for which the lot was purchased,
and
to that end that it may be made to include
created,
the same uses and trusts raised,
and declared in the prior deed from Elias
Fort, according to the understanding and
agreement of all the parties.
Besides that she also prays that her equiincluding the
ties in and to the property,
may be set forth, decreed,
improvements,
and allowed by the court. Including such as
are In her favor from the payment of taxes,
insurance, and repairs upon the property during the lifetime and since the death of her
mother-in-law,
and that the first-named respondent may be Enjoined from further proceeding in his ejectment suit to recover possession of the premises.
Courts of equity afford relief in case of
mistake of facts, and allow parol evidence to
vary and reform written contracts and in-
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struments,
when the defect or error arises
as properly
from accident or misconception,
forming an exception to the general rule
which excludes parol testimony offered to
vary or contradict vrritten instruments.
Where the mistake is admitted by the other
party, relief, as all agree, will be granted,
and if it be fully proved by other evidence,
.Judge Story says, the reasons for granting
relief seem to be equally satisfactory. 1
Story, Eq. .Tur. § 156.
Decisions of undoubted authority hold that
where an instrument is drawn and executed
that professes or is intended to carry into
execution an agreement, which is in writing
or by parol, previously made between the
parties, but which by mistake of the draftsman, either as to fact or law, does not fulfill
or which violates the manifest intention of
the parties to the agi'eement, equity will correct the mistake so as to produce a conformity of the instrument to the agreement, the
reason of the rule being that the execution
of agreements fairly and legally made is
one of the peculiar branches of equity jurisdiction, and if the instrument intended to
execute the agreement be from any cause
insufficient
for that purpose, the agreement
remains as much unexecuted as if the party
had refused altogether
to comply with his
and a coiu-t of equity will, in
engagement,
jurisdiction,
the exercise of its acknowledged
afford relief in the one case as well as in
the other, by compelling the delinquent party to perform his undertaking according to
the terms of it and the manifest intention of
Hunt v. Rousmaniere's Adm'rs,
the parties.
1 Pet. 1, 13; Id., 8 Wheat. 174, 211.
Even a judgment when confessed, if the
agreement was made under a clear mistake,
will be set aside if application be made, and
the mistake shown while the judgment is
within the power of the court.
Such an
agreement, even when made a rule of court,
will not be enforced if made under a mistake, if seasonable
application be made to
set it aside, and if the judgment be no longer in the power of the court, relief, says Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall, may be obtained in a
court of chancery.
The Hiraha, 1 Wheat.
440,

444.

Equitable rules of the kind are applicable
to sealed instruments,
as well as to ordinary
written agreements, the rule being that if
by mistake a deed be drawn plainly different
from the 'agreement of the parties, a court
of equity will grant relief by considering the
deed as if it had conformed to the antecedent
agreement.
So if a deed be ambiguously
expressed in such a manner that it is difficult to give it a construction, the agreement
may be referred to as an aid in expounding
such an ambiguity; but if the deed is so
expressed that a reasonable construction may
be given to it, and when so given it does not
plainly appear to be at variance with the
agreement, then the latter is not to be re-
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In the construction of the former.
Hogan V. Insurance Co., 1 Wash. C. C. 419,
422, Fed. Gas. No. 6,582.
Rules of decision in suits for specific performance are necessarily
affected by considerations peculiar to the nature of the right
garded

sought to be enforced and the remedy employed to accomplish
Where no
the object.
question of fraud or mistake is involved, the
rule with respect to the admission of parol
evidence to vary a written contract is the
same in courts of equity as in those of common law, the rule in both being that when
an agreement is reduced to writing by the
act and consent of the parties, the intent and
meaning of the same must be sought in the
instrument which they have chosen as the
repository and evidence of their purpose, and
not in extrinsic facts and allegations.
Proof
of fraud or mistake, however, may be admitted in equity to show that the tenns of
the instrument employed in the preparation
of the same were varied or made different
by addition or subtraction from what they
were intended and believed to be when the
same was executed.
Evidence of fraud or mistake is seldom
found in the instrument itself, from which it
follows that unless parol evidence may be
admitted for that purpose the aggrieved party would have as little hope of redress in a
court of equity as in a court of law. Even
at law, all that pertains to the execution of
a written instrument or to the proof
that
the instrument was adopted or ratified by the
parties as their act or contract, is necessarily
left to extrinsic evidence, and witnesses may
consequently be called for the purpose of impeaching the execution of a deed or other
writing under seal, and showing that its sealing or delivery was procured by fraudulently
substituting one instrument for another, or by
any other species of fraud by which the complaining party was misled and induced to put
his name to that which was substantially difThoroughferent from the actual agreement.
good's Case, 4 Coke, 4.
When the deed or other written instrument
is duly executed and delivered, the courts of
law hold that it contains the true agreement
of the parties, and that the writing furnishes
better evidence of the sense of the parties
than any that can be supplied by parol; but
courts of equity, says Chancellor Kent, have
a broader jurisdiction and will open the written contract to let in an equity arising from
facts perfectly distinct from the sense and
construction
of the instrument itself. Pursuant to that rule, he held it to be established
that relief can be had against any deed or
contract in writing foimded on mistake or
fraud, and that mistake may be shown by
parol proof and the relief granted to the injured party whether he sets up the mistake
affirmatively by bill or as a defense. Gillespie V. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. 585, 596.
Parol proof, said the same learned magistrate, is admissible in equity to correct a
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mistake in a written contract in favor of
the complainant
seeking a specific performance, especially
where the contract
in the
first instance is imperfect without referring
to extrinsic facts.
Keisselbrack v. Livingston, 4 Johns. Ch. 144; Cathcart v. Robinson,
5 Pet. 204.
Many cases support that proposition without qualification, and all or nearly all agree
that it is correct where It is invoked as defence to a suit to enforce specific performance. Little or no disagreement is found In
the adjudged eases to that extent, but there
are many others where it is held that the rule
is unsound when applied in behalf of a complainant seeking to enforce a specific performance of a contract ^Yith variations from the
Difficulty, it must be
written instrument.
admitted,
would arise in any attempt to
reconcile
the decided cases in that regard,
but it is not necessary to enter that field of
contest and conflict in the case before the
by
1. Because
court for several reasons:
comparing the original trust deed with the
deed of the lot in question, in view of the
attendant circumstances, the Inference is very
cogent that the second was designed and
intended as a complete substitute for the first.
2. Because the proof shows to a demonstration that the consideration
for the purchase
of the second lot was paid in equal proportions by the father and each of the three
sons. 3. Because it appears that the expensive improvements made upon the lot in question were made from the moneys of each of
the three sons, advanced at the request of
the father.
4. Because it appears that the
family and every member of it understood
from the first and throughout that the trustee
held the property in trust for the mother and
the three sons.
5. Because the father, from
the date of the deed to the time of his death,
recognized the premises as acquired and held
for the benefit of his wife and their three
sons.
the mother
of the three
6. Because
sons, after the decease of the first husband
recognized her as intei'ested
of complainant,
in the property, and continued to do so at all
times throughout her life until about the time
she conveyed the lot in question to the respondent.
Both the deed and her will bear date Sept.
28, 1872, and the proofs show that she was
at the time in a low, depressed state of mind,
and that she departed this life within one
year subsequent to the execution of those instruments.
Prior to that, and throughout the
whole period subsequent to the death of her
husband, the proofs show that she uniformly
recognized the complainant
as the owner of
a moiety of the lot and the improvements,
and always required her to pay one-half of aU
repairs, taxes, insurance, and other expenses
of the property.
By the terms of the original deed the property was conveyed to the trustees, subject to
the payment
of taxes, assessments,
and
ground-rent, to and for the sole and separate
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use, benefit,
and behoof of the mother and
her three sons during her lifetime, and after
her death to the three sons as tenants in common in equal parts, with the provision that if
the mother during her lifetime should deem It
advisable she might sell and convey the premises, and that In that event the further ti-ust
was raised and created that the trustees or
the survivor of them, upon her application
and with her consent signified by becoming
a party to the conveyance, might sell and convey the lot and improvements
for the best
price which could be obtained for the same,
without any application to a court of law or
equity for that purpose, and to invest the
proceeds thereof upon the same trusts in such
other property or manner as the mother should
direct, and for the same use, benefit, and
behalf.
Provision was also made that if no such
sale and re-investment
was made during the
lifetime of the mother, then the trustees were
to sell the same for the sole use and benefit
of the three sons or the survivor or survivors
of them, share and share alike, until the
youngest should arrive at the age of twentyone years, when the trustees might sell and
convey the same at the request of such survivor or survivors, and divide the proceeds to
the survivor or survivors, share and share
alike.
Taken as a whole the proofs show to the
entire satisfaction of the court that the lot in
question was purchased and conveyed to the
surviving trustee upon the same trusts as
those raised and created in the first deed, and
that the trustee, through mistake, failed to
have those trusts properly declared in the
deed of trust to him as he should have done,
and that the prayer of the bill of complainant, that the deed of the lot and improvements In question ought to be reformed and
be ascertained
the rights of the complainant
and adjudged as if the deed in question contained the same trusts as those raised and
created in the original trust deed is reasonable
and proper and should be granted.
Courts of equity, beyond all doubt, possess
the power to grant such relief, and the proofs,
In the judgment of the court, are such as to
entitle the complainant to such a decree, unless the remaining defence set up by the respondent must prevail.
Cooper v. Phibbs, L.
R. 2 Oh. App. 149, 186; Cochrane v. Willis, 34
Such a decree, of course,
Beav. 359, 366.
cannot now be made against the trustee, as
he is not living; but the executors, as contended by the complainant, are competent to
perform
that duty, and she prays that the
decree may be adapted to the present state
of the parties.
Suppose all that Is true, still it Is contended
that the decree
by the principal respondent
below is correct, because the claim is barred.
Much discussion of that defence will not be
necessary, beyond what is required to ascertain the facts.
When the father died, the complainant was
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living on the premises, and she continued to
there most or all the time during the
widowhood of the mother of her first husband, except while she lived with her second
husband, and when he died she returned to
live with her mother-in-law. During all that

reside

time the proofs show that she was constantly
recognized as the lawful heir to the estate of
her deceased husband, until about a year before the decease of the mother, who also rePrior to that, the
sided on the premises.
rights of the complainant were unmistakably
recognized, and nothing of consequence had
occurred to indicate any Intent to call her
just right in question.
Soon after that, however, the respondent
commenced an action
of ejectment against her to recover possession of the entire lot and improvements,
she
still being in possession, and doubtless hoping
and expecting that her rights would yet be
acknowledged without the necessity of expensive litigation. Expectations of the kind not
being realized, she filed the present bill of
complaint.
Laches are imputed to her; but
the court, In view of the circumstances
and
growing out of the
of the embarrassments
obvious defects in the conveyance intended to
secure her rights, is of the opinion that the
evidence of laches Is not sufficient to bar her
right to recover In the present suit. Without more, these remarks are sufficient to show
that the defence cannot be sustained, and it
is accordingly overruled.
Two or three remarks will be sufficient to
show that the objection that the circuit court
has no jurisdiction to enter the required decree against the executors of the deceased
trustee cannot be sustained.
Jurisdiction as
between the complainant
and respondent Is
unquestionable;
and, if so, it is clear that the
fact that the trustee If living was a citizen
of the same state with the complainant would
not defeat the jurisdiction in a case where he
is a mere nominal party, and Is merely joined
to perform the ministerial act of conveying the
title if adjudged to the complainant.
Where
that is so, the executor, in case of the decease of the trustee. If authorized by the law
of the state to execute such a conveyance,
may also be joined In the suit under like circumstances merely to accomplish the like purpose. Where the real and only controversy
is between citizens of different states, or an
alien and a citizen, and the plaintiff is by
some positive rule of law compelled to use the
name of anBther to perform merely a ministerial act, who has not nor ever had any
Interest in or control over It, the courts of the
United States will not consider any others as
parties to the suit than the persons between
whom the litigation before them exists.
McNutt V. Bland, 2 How. 9, 15; Browne v.
Strode,
5 Cranch,
303; Coal
Company
v.

Blatchford,

11

Wall.

172,

177.

Cases arise in the federal courts in which
nominal or even immaterial parties are joined,
on the one side or the other, with those who
have the requisite citizenship to give the court
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jurisdiction in tlie case; and where that is so,
the rule is settled that the mere fact that
one or more of such parties reside in the
same state with one of the actual parties to
the controversy will not defeat the jurisdiction of the court.
Decisive authority for that
proposition is found in a recent ruling at Mr.
Justice Miller, in which he states to the effect that mere formal parties do not oust the
jurisdiction of the court, even if they are
without the requisite citizenship, where it apis between
pears that the real controversy
Arapahoe Oo. v.
citizens of different States.
Kansas Pac. Ry. Co., 4 Dill. 277, 283, Fed.
Cas. Xo. 502.
Xothing is claimed of the executors in this
case except that they shall perform the ministerial act of conveying the title, in case the
power to do so is vested In them by the law
of the state, and the court shall enter a decree against the principal respondent to that
effect.
From all which it follows that the
complainant
is entitled as between herself
and the principal respondent
to the relief
prayed in the bill of complaint; but the court,
in view of all the circumstances, will not proceed to determine either the proportion of the
trust property which belongs to the complainant or the amount she is entitled to recover
Instead of that,
of the said respondent.
those matters are left to be ascertained and
by the circuit court, with audetermined
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thority, if need

be, to refer the cause to a
master to report the facts, with his opinion
thereon, subject to the confirmation
of the
circuit court.
Executors of the trustee, in such a case as
the complainant alleges, are under the law of
the state the successors of the deceased trustee, and that as such they may execute whatever remains executory in the trust at the
time of his decease; from which it would follow, i£ that be so, that it will be the duty
of the executors of the deceased trustee in
this case, when the rights of the complainant
are fully ascertained, to make the necessary
conveyance to perfect her title to the same
extent as the trustee might do if in full life.
Express authority is reserved to the circuit
court to ascertain the rights of the complainant as if the trust-deed was reformed, and
to make the necessary decree to perfect her
title in such mode and form as the law of
the state and the practice of the state courts
Crafton v. Beal, 1 Ga.
authorize and provide.
322; Brown v. Tucker, 47 Ga. 485.
Costs in this court will be taxed to the
principal respondent in favor of the complainant, but no costs win be allowed against the
other two respondents.
Decree will be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity
with the opinion of the court.
So ordered
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METROPOLITAN LUMBER CO. v. LAKE
SUPERIOR SHIP-CANAL, RAILWAY & IRON CO. et al.
(60 N.

W.

278,

101

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Mich.

577.)

Sept. 25, 1894.

Appeal from circuit court. Iron county, in
chanceiy; John W. Stone, Judge.
Bill by the Metropolitan Lumber Company
against the Lake Superior Ship-Canal, Railway & Iron Company and others. From a
decree for complainant, defendants appeal.
AflBrmed.

Ball & Ball, for appellants. Mead & Jennings (B. E. Osborn, of counsel), for appellee.

HOOKER, J. Complainant's bill is filed
to correct a contract for the purchase of timber, by adding to it the description of certain lands which is claimed to have been
omitted by mistake.
The negotiations took
place in Chicago, between the presidents of
the corporations, complainant and defendant. The contract conveying the timber was
prepared by defendants' counsubsequently
sel in Michigan, and was afterwards signed
Upon discoverby the respective
parties.
ing the omission, which discovery was made
some time after the contract was signed by
complainant's president,
defendants
were
asked to correct the mistake, but declined to
do so without suit.
Some time afterwards

this suit was instituted. The learned circuit judge who heard the cause filed a written opinion, in which he quotes the testimony at length, which, we think, is as fair
a review of the case as could be made.
We
agree with him that the evidence shows that
the parties who negotiated
the deal, both
understood that the "Perch Lake Group" of
It aplands was included in the purchase.
pears to have been omitted because defendants' president, Mr. Davis, did not specifically mention it in his telegram of instructions, — if it can be called sucji, — which he
sent to Mr. Longyear, who was agent for the
defendants at Marquette, from whom the
upon
attorney received
information
the
which he prepared the contract. The telegram read as follows, viz.: "Chicago, June
6th, 188—.
J. M. Longyear: Have sold to
Atkinson all groups under refusal to him;
Theo. M.
[Signed]
also the Felch group.
It appears that complainant had
Davis."
written options on all the land covered by
except the Felch group and
the negotiations,
The latter, not being
the Perch lake group.
was omitted.
in the telegram,
mentioned
All of the witnesses who were present at the
Chicago Interview agree that this group was
talked about, and specifically mentioned as
one of the tracts to be included. Davis himself concedes this, but claims that he was
figuring upon the basis of the amount of
timber upon the groups, for which the complainant had written options, and that he
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supposed the Perch lake group was one of
He admitted, however, that he conthese.
sented to take $500,000 for the timber, exclusive of the Perch lake group, and that he
As these sums agasked $250,000 for that.
gregate $750,000,— the exact amount paid,—
there seems little doubt of the justice of
complainant's claim. We are satisfied that
the complainant is justly entitled to relief.
It remains to Inquire whether there is any
It is opposed
legal obstacle to granting it.
upon several grounds, viz.: (1) The mistake
was not mutual.
(2) The mistalie on part of
complainant was committed through gross
negligence,
and equity will not relieve in
such cases.
(3) Delay in attempting to enforce complainant's claim, and going on to
carry out the contract after refusal by the
defendants to correct the contract, until it
was impossible to put the parties in statu
a waiver of complainant's
quo, constitutes
claim.
(4) The addition of more land to the
description, upon evidence of a parol contract, is contrary to the statute of frauds.
We are satisfied that the omission was the
result of the mistake of defendant's president in sending the telegram,
it
supposing
to be full enough to cover the Perch lake
group.
There is no reason to believe thai
he intentionally caused this omission.
We
cannot accede to the proposition that complainant's president was so negligent in executing the contract without discovering the
omission as to deprive the complainant of
property worth $250,000.
He had no reason
to anticipate an attempt to cheat his company, and therefore had no occasion to be
more than ordinarily careful.
He was dealing with a concern whose business was methodically conducted, and he knew that it
was in possession of accurate descriptions.
The contract was drawn by a reputable and
To hold that he was negligent
able lawyer.
would be to say that acceptance of a deed or
writing without a, comparison and verification of descriptions is such negligence as to
preclude relief against mistake, no matter
how serious the consequences.
Atkinson
died before these proceedings
were commenced, and we have not the light tiiat his
testimony might throw upon the question
of caution.
Prom the testimony of Mr. Barrett, one of the defendants' witnesses,
it
would seem that he took the trouble to bring
the contract to defendants' ofiice, to make a

comparison of the descriptions, which was
done, and he went away satisfied.
During
this time he was ill, with a malady from
which he died soon after. The claim that a
mistake had been made was asserted as soon
as it was discovered, and was insisted on at
all times afterwards.
It is true that suit
was not immediately commenced, but complainant never gave the defendants reason
to suppose that it had abandoned or intended to waive its claim.
No injury resulted to
the defendants from the delay, and the complainant was justified in exhausting persua-

.
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before resorting to litigation, especially In view of Davis' repeated admission tbat
he understood the Perch lake land a part of
It Is strenuously urged that
that contract.
the relief
the statutes of frauds preclude
sought by complainant, the negotiations
having been oral.
There is conflict in the
books upon the question of the effect of the
statute of frauds upon the jurisdiction of
courts of equity to reform instruments made
in pursuance of oral agreements, where the
correction sought is the addition of lands to
those described.
We are cited to the case of
Macomber v. Peckham, 16 R. I. 485, 19 Atl.
niO, as a recent adjudication upon the subject, and to Climer v. Hovey, 15 Mich. 18,
In
in support of defendants' contention.
the former case the court was careful to
withhold an opinion beyond what was reIn stating the
<iuired by the facts before it
facts, Durfee, C. J., says: "Nor is it a case
in which it is claimed that the contract is
taken out of the operation of the statute of
frauds by part performance on the part of
It presents the naked
the complainant.
question whether oral testimony will be received in equity for the purjiose of reforming a written contract for the sale of real
estate on the ground of mutual mistake, and
of enforcing it specifically when reformed."
Opposed to this case is that of Hitchins v.
Pettingill, 58 N. H. 386, decided 11 years
earlier by the supreme court of the state of
New Hampshire, which was not noticed by
It was there held
the Rhode Island court.
that "when reformation is sought of a deed
which, through fraud or mistake, conveys
less land than was orally bought, and paid
for, the case does not stand as if there were
no deed; and the error may be corrected
without proof of such part performance as
is necessary for a decree of specific performance compelling a conveyance of the whole
land when no part of it has been conveyed."
Many cases are cited in the opinion as supThis subject is alporting this proposition.
in the notes to
so thoroughly considered
WooUam v. Heam, 2 White & T. Lead. Cas.
sion,
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Eq. 1008 et seq. The case of Climer t. Hovey, 15 Mich. 18, like the Rhode Island case,
was one where the parties had not acted under the contract
In the language of Campbell, J.: "No payments are alleged, and no
acts of part performance.
We are therefore
brought down to the simple inquiry whether
mere mistake, when neither party has parted
with or done anything beyond signing an
executory
contract for one description of
land, can authorize a court of chancery to
enforce a parol contract by applying the
terms written concerning one estate to another not referred to in writing."
The bill
was dismissed, Mr. Justice Campbell basing
his opinion upon the fact that nothing had
been done under the contract, and that it
was therefore within the operation of the
statute of frauds. Chief Justice Martin concurred in the result.
Mr. Justice Cooley reserved his opinion as to the power of the
court to correct a mistake in a suit to enforce it concurring upon other grounds, and
with him Mr. Justice Christiancy concurred.
But, whatever may be the rule where nothing has been done under the oral contract,
we think that in this country the overwhelming weight of authority supports the
where part performance is
Jurisdiction
shown sufficient to warrant a specific performance under an oral contract
In this
case a payment was made, and the purchaser proceeded to lumber the tracts not in dispute, before the omission was discovered, as
was the case in Hitchins v. Pettingill,
The case of Toll v. Davenport,
above cited.
74 Mich. 397, 42 N. W. 63, appears to recognize the jurisdiction of chancery In such
cases, when a parcel was omitted from a
mortgage, relief being denied, for the reason
that the rights of a bona fide purchaser InIn the later case of Kimble v.
tervened.
Harrington, 91 Mich. 281, 51 N. W. 936, a
mortgage was reformed by the insertion of
the description of a 40-acre parcel a mile distant, which was omitted by mistake.
The
decree of the circuit court will be affirmed,
with costs. The other justices concurred.
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FOSTER, J. When reformation is sought
of a deed whicli, through fraud or mistake,
conveyed less land than was orally bought
and paid for, the case does not stand as if
there were no deed; and the error may be
corrected without proof of such part performance as is necessary for a decree of specific
performance compelling a conveyance of the
whole land when no part of it has been conAdams,
1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 152-161;
veyed.
Eq. 169, 171; 3 Greenl. Ev. §§ 360, 363;
Bloomer v. Spittle, Fisher, Ann. Dig. (1872)
131; Tilton v. Tilton, 9 N. H. 385, 392; Purcell V. Miner, 4 Wall. 513; Prescott v. Hawkins, 12 N. H. 19, 28, 16 N. H. 122; Way v.
Cutting, 17 N. H. 450, 451; Bellows v. Stone,
14 N. H. 175, 201; Smith v. Greeley, 14 N.
H. 378; Craig v. Kittredge, 23 N. H. 231,
236; Busby v. Littlefleld, 31 N. H. 193, 199,
33 N. H. 76; Webster v. Webster, 33 N. H.
18, 22, 23, 25; Doe v. Doe, 37 N. H. 268, 285;
Herbert v. Odlin, 40 N. H. 267; Brown v.
Glines, 42 N. H. 160; Kennard v. George, 44
N. H. 440; Leach v. Noyes, 45 N. H. 364;
Peterson v. Grover, 20 Me. 363; Parley v.
Bryant, 32 Me. 475; Tucker v. Madden, 44
Me. 206; Adams v. Stevens, 49 Me. 362; Burr
514;
Beardsley v.
61 Me.
V. Hutchinson,
Knight, 10 Vt. 185, 190; Griswold v. Smith,
Goodell v. Field, 15 Vt. 448;
10 Vt. 452;
Blodgett T. Hobart, 18 Vt. 414; Brown v.
Lamphear, 35 Vt. 252; Shattuck v. Gay, 45
Vt. 87; Allen v. Brown, 6 R. I. 386; Holabird
V. Burr, 17 Conn. 556; Wooden v. Haviland, 18
Conn. 101; Stedwell v. Anderson, 21 Conn. 139;
Knapp v. White, 23 Conn. 529; Blakeman v.
Blakeman, 39 Conn. 320; Gillespie v. Moon, 2
Johns. Ch. 585; Wiswall v. Hall, 3 Paige, 313;
Johnson v. Taber, 10 N. Y. 319; De Peyster
V. Hasbrouck, 11 N. Y. 582; Rider v. Powell,
28 N. Y. 310; Welles v. Yates, 44 N. Y. 525;
Bush v. Hicks, 60 N. Y'. 298; Ginschio v. Ley,
Bartle v. Vosbury, 3 Grant,
1 Phila. 383;
Cas. 277; Wyche v. Greene, 16 Ga. 49; Durant v. Bacot, 13 N. J. Eq. 201; Weller v.
Rolason, 17 N. J. Eq. 13; Ehleringer v. Moriarty, 10 Iowa, 78; Barber v. Lyon, 15 Iowa,
37; Canedy v. Marcy, 13 Gray, 373; Metcalf
v. Putnam, 9 Allen, 97, 100.
In the last of these eases, Bigelow, J., de'TJpon elemenlivering the opinion, says:
tary principles, the plaintiff is entitled to have
his deed reformed so that it may truly set
»
* Upon
*
forth the whole contract.
proof of fraud in the omission of material
stipulations in a written contract, a court of
equity will admit parol evidence to establish
the agreement, as it was understood and con-
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The defendthe parties."
cluded between
ants rely upon Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24,
where the doctrine of reformation of written
was subjected to a limitation at
contracts
variance with the settled law of this state.
A court cannot disregard a valid statute,

nor regard it with favor or disfavor, nor take
out of its operation a case that is within it,
nor grant relief, at law or in equity, against
it. The judicial question is, What purpose
of the legislature appears in its acts, upon the
"No acrules of construction?
established
tion shall be maintained upon a contract for
the sale of land, imless the agreement upon
which it is brought, or some memorandum
Gen. St. c. 201, § 12.
thereof, is in writing."
"The supreme court shall have the powers
of a court of equity in cases cognizable in
such court, and may hear and determine, according to the course of equity, in case of
charitable uses, trusts, fraud, accident, or
mistake; * * * of specific performance of
contracts; * • * and in all other cases
where there is not a plain, adequate, and comGen. St. c. 190, § 1.
plete remedy at law."
These provisions, though printed in different
parts of one law.
chapters, are consistent
We are not to give either of them a strained
construction, liberal or strict, for the special
purpose of justice in a particular case, or for
the general purpose of making the law what
in our judgment it ought to be. The meaning of one act may be shown by other acts.
There may be several acts, neither of which
can be properly administered in a particular
ease, except as part of one law comprising
them all.
It may be necessary to consider
one statute on any subject a part of the
whole law, statutory and common, on that
subject, as it is necessary to consider one section or word of a statute a part of that statute. The statute of frauds, severed from all
other law, written and unwritten, and taken
in its literal sense, would deny these plaintiffs the relief of specific performance,
even
if they had taken possession of the ten-acre
lot and made valuable improvements upon it,
and would leave people remediless in a great
number of cases of fraud, accident, or mistake, for which ample remedies are provided
by the statute of equity jurisdiction; and the
latter statute, torn from the general body of
the law, taken literally, and administered as
if there were no other law, would deprive the
community of safeguards which the statute
of frauds and the common law were designed
to afford, and which the statute of equity was
not designed to take away. The well-known
general objects of these statutes are the principal guides for their construction. The statute of equity authorizes this court to administer the legal principles of the general system of equity, which, as a great branch of the
law of their native country, was brought over
by the colonists, and has always existed as a
part of the common law, in its broadest sense,
in New Hampshire. Wells v. Pierce, 27 N.
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H.
339,

503,
349.

Walker v. Oheever,
The statute of frauds

512;

N.
•.^.:<

H.

prevents
cases by the tes-

wrong being done in certain
timony of witnesses.
If, without written evidence of a contract
tor the sale of land, the vendee pays for the
land, and, with the knowledge and consent of
the vendor, takes possession of it, and makes
valuable improvements upon it, he is entitled
Upon
to the relief of specific performance.
of the statute of
the literal construction
frauds there could not be a decree for specific performance in such a case, and there
could not be, by parol evidence, a reformabut the
tion of a deed enlarging its operation;
statute, rightly construed, does not destroy

of these remedies, as the statute of
limitations does not destroy the remedy in
cases of fraudulent concealment of the cause
of action (Bank v. Fairbanks, 49 N. H. 131,
141), as the registry laws do not destroy the
effect of actual notice of an unrecorded deed
(Gooding v. Riley, 50 N. H. 400), and as the
statute of frauds does not disturb a boundary
fixed by parol agreement
and possession
(Kellogg v. Smith, T.Cush. ST-j; Knowles v.
Toothaker, 58 He. 172).
The plainlifCs are entitled to a decree for a
conveyance of the ten-acre lot.
either

Case discharged.

STANLEY,

,T., did

not sit.
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et al.

(30 111. 228.)

Court of Illinois.
Jan. Term, 1S63.
W. H. Herndon, and S. P. Moore, for appellant. J. & D. Gillespie, for appellees.

Supreme

BREESE, J. John B. Hunter, as administrator of Samuel W. Hunter, deceased,
brought his action in the circuit court of
Bond county, against Wesley A. and Finis
Bilyeu, on a note executed by them to the
intestate,
dated March 30, 1850, and
due
March 30, 1855. Pending the action the defendants obtained an injunction on their
biU of complaint, to which the administrator, and the heirs-at-law of the intestate,
who were minors, and their guardian, together with Joseph Smith, were made defendants.
The bill alleges, that the note sued upon, together with others which were paid, was
one and the last of a number of notes they
had executed to the intestate,
for certain
lands lying In Bond county, for which a
bond for a deed was executed and delivered
to them by the intestate.
That they were
put into possession of the lands, and made
lasting and valuable improvements on some
of the tracts, but have discovered that one
or more tracts, which they supposed they
had bought, were not included in the bond.
One of those tracts is described as "the old
field tract" lying south-east of Shoal creek,
and being part of the west half of the northwest quarter of section twenty-three, in
tovm five north, range four west, containing
forty and nineteen-hundredths acres; and the
other, the "Gillespie tract," being the east
half of the north-west quarter of the northeast quarter of the same section, township
and range, containing twenty acres; theimdivided half of both which tracts, the complainants allege, was purchased by them of
the intestate, and was to have been included
in the title bond, but by mistake was left
sold by
out, and these tracts subsequently
the intestate to Joseph Smith.
The bill also alleges, that some time anterior to the commencement of this suit on
the note, the administrator had filed a petition in the circuit court, at the September
term, 1855, praying the court for an order to
authorize him to make a deed to complainants for the land described in the bond; that
this petition contained the same errors and
as are now complained of, with
mistakes
in describing the
another error superadded
lands as being in section "twenty-five." The
complainants admit they were made defendants, and had due notice of the pending of
the petition, but they did not appear to defend, supposing the lands were described as
in the bond, and their being made defendants was a mere ceremony, and the proceedings consistent with their rights. That these
errors and mistakes were carried into the
decree rendered on this petition, and in the
HUTCH.& BUNK.EQ.— 16
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to
deed which the administrator tendered
No exhibit is
them, and by them refused.
made of these proceedings or of this deed.
The title bond is alleged to have been writand delivered to the
ten by the intestate,
complainants and accepted by them without
any objection, on the 30th of March, 1850.
In the following year, 1851, the intestate left
the state, and in 1852 died, leaving these infant defendants his only heirs at law.
The prayer of the bill is, that the court
to
would order and direct the defendants
convey to complainants all of the land agreed
to be conveyed to them by, the Intestate, and
to annul and hold for naught the order of
the circuit court in behalf of the administrator, or to amend and correct the decree so as
to comport with justice and good conscience,
and perpetually enjoin the collection of the
note sued on, until they are able to comply
with the understanding of Samuel W. Hunter, the intestate.
The bond is made an exhibit, and describes
the lands sold, and to be conveyed on payThey are:
money.
ment of the purchase
"The undivided half of a certain lot, beginning at the south corner of the south-west
quarter of section 14, town 5 north, of range
4 west of the third principal meridian; thence
running north fifty poles; thence west to the
middle of the channel of Shoal creek; thence
down the channel of Shoal creek, to the section line; thence east to the beginning corner, containing thirty-eight acres, more or
less. Also, the undivided half of so much of
the west half of the north-west quarter of
section 23, town 5 north, range 4 west of the
third principal meridian, lying on the west
side of Shoal creek. Also, twenty poles south
from the creek on the east line of said half;
thence west to said creek; thence up said
creek to the beginning. Also, the undivided
half of twelve acres, more or less, of the
south-west quarter, town 4 west of the third
principal meridian, commencing at the southwest corner of said section; thence north
fifty; thence east to the middle of the channel of Shoal creek; thence down said creek
to the section line; thence west to the beginning. Also, two acres and a half of the
west half of the north-west quarter of section
23, in same township and range, commencing
at a slake on the east line of said land at the
south-east corner of the mile post; thence
twenty poles; thence west twenty
south
poles;
thence north twenty poles;
thence
east twenty poles, to the beginning."
This
last tract was in a separate bond to Finis
Bilyeu, one of the complainants, made at the
same time and on the same conditions, as
the bond to complainants jointly, and for
convenience, no question being made on it,
both bonds are considered as one.
There is a slight apparent ambiguity In the
description of the undivided half of twelve
acres, which is explained by the plat sworn
to by the witnesses, and is the tract on the
west side of the creek, contained within the
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north and south lines of the tract of thirtyacres, if extended west to the section
There is no dispute about this tract.
The tract described as "also twenty poles
south from the creek on the east line of said
half; thence west to said creek; thence up
said creek to the beginning," is understood
to describe the mill yard, having the shape
of a rectangular triangle, the south line being the perpendicular, the west line the base,
About this
and the creek the hypothenuse.
tract there is no dispute.
The administrator demurred to the biU,
which was afterwards withdrawn, and his
answer filed, not admitting the mistake alleged, to which there was a replication. At a
subsequent term, he also filed a plea of the
Smith also
statute of frauds and perjuries.
answered, denying any knowledge when he
purchased, of any sale of the tract south-east
of Shoal creek, in section twenty-three. On
the hearing, the bill was dismissed as to him.
Much testimony was introduced on behalf
of complainants, for the purpose of showing
by the declarations of the intestate, that an
undivided half of other tracts besides these,
namely, the tracts known as the "old field"
tract, sold to Smith, and the "Gillespie" tract,
were bargained for and sold, but, for some
cause not fuUy explained, omitted from the
title bond.
The lasting and valuable improvements
on other tracts,
were made by complainants
about which there is no dispute.
The bill Is, in effect, a bill to reform by
parol, this title bond by incorporating into It
the part lying south-east of the creek, called
the "old field" tract, and the "Gillespie"
eight
line.

tract, and when reformed, to decree a specific
The contract must be reformperformance.
ed before such a decree can pass.
This presents a question which has been
much discussed in the courts of this country and of England, and on which there is

great contrariety of opinion.
The question is, in a bill to reform a written instrument, in the absence of any allegation or proof of fraud, and on the ground of
and mistake alone, is parol eviaccident
dence admissible to prove an agreement to
further than is contained In
do something
the writing, the statutes of frauds and perjuries being relied on in the defense, and
which that statute requires to be proved by
writing?
Whilst in England, the weight of adjudications seems to be opposed to the admission
■of parol evidence, in this country, it appears
to be the other way. One of the leading
cases in England, is that of WooUam v.
Hearn, 7 Ves. 211. It is prominent among the
Leading Cases of "White & Tudor (pt. 1,
vol. 2), with copious notes by Hare & Wallace 510.
In this case the bill filed by Wm. WooUam
against Hearn, stated that the rent of seventy-three pounds ten shillings was inserted in
the written lease by mistake, or with some
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unfair view; the real agreement being that
the plaintiff was to have the lease upon the
same rent as the defendant paid to his lessor,
and that he did not pay more than sixty
pounds.
The prayer was for a specific pei-formance,
and that the defendant may be
decreed to execute a lease according to the
agreement, at the rent of sixty pounds, or
such other rent as the defendant paid his
lessor.
The defendant, in his answer, denied
that seventy-three pounds ten shillings was
inserted by mistake, or with any unfair view;
or that the agreement was that the plaintlfE
should pay the same rent as the defendant
paid, which he admitted was sixty-three
pounds.
The bill was proved by depositions.
Sir Wm. Grant, M. R., said: "By the rule
of law, Independent of the statute (of frauds
and perjuries), parol evidence cannot be received to contradict a written agreement.
To
admit it, for the purpose of proving that the
written instrument does not contain the real
agreement, would be the same as receiving
it for every purpose.
It was for the purpose
of shutting out that inquiry, that the rule of
law was adopted. When equity is called upon to exercise its peculiar jurisdiction by decreeing a specific performance,
the party to
be charged is let in to show, that, under the
circumstances,
the plaintiff is not entitled to
specifically performed;
have the agreement
and there are many cases in which parol
has been adevidence of such circumstances
mitted, as in Buxton v. Lister, 3 Atk. 383.
There on the face of the instrument, a specific sum was to be given for the timbers,
but it was shown, by parol, that the defendants were induced to give that, upon the
that it was valued by two
representation
If
timber merchants which was not true.
this had been a bill brought by this defendant
I should have
for a specific performance,
been bound by the decisions to admit the
parol evidence, and to refuse a specific perBut this evidence is offered, not
formance.
for the purpose of resisting, but of obtaining
a decree, first to falsify the written agreement, and then to substitute in its place a
parol agreement to be executed by the court
There is no case in which the court has gone
The evidence offered
the length now desired.
Is to vary an agreement In a material part,
and having varied It, to procure It to be executed In another form. There Is nothing to
show that ought to be done; and my opinion being that it ought not,
must dismiss
the bill."
In the case of Rogers v. Earl, 1 Dickson,
294, which was a bill to rectify a mistake of
the solicitor in drawing a marriage settlement; In Thomas v. Davis, Id. 301, to rectify
a mistake in a conveyance by the omission of
one of the parcels of land intended to be conin Sims v. Urry, 1 Ch. Cas. 225, to
veyed;
prove a mistake In the penal sum of a bond,
by writing it forty instead of four hundred
pounds,— verbal evidence was admitted.
In Hardwood v. Wallace, cited in Targus v.
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Puget, 2 Ves. Sr. 195, where it was proposed
to prove a mistake in drawing a settlement;
and in Attorney General v. Sitwell, 1 Young
& C. 559, etc., where it was proposed to
show, by parol, that in a contract with the
crown for the sale of a certain manor, with
the advowson was omitthe appurtenances,
ted by mistake,— such evidence was rejected,
or deemed inadmissible. In this case Baron
Alderson said: "I cannot help feeling that
In the case of an executory agreement, first
to reform and then to decree an execution
of it, would be, virtually, to repeal the statute of frauds."
In cases within the statute of frauds,
verbal evidence was held inadmissible, as in
Dwight V. Pomeroy, 17 Mass. 303, where the
plaintiff, being creditor of an insolvent debtor who had executed a deed of assignment
in trust, for the benefit of his creditors, filed
his bill against the trustees to reform an alleged mistake in the trusts expressed in the
deed. And In Elder v. Elder, 10 Me. 80,
where the written agreement was for the conveyance of a lot of land in Windham, formerly owned by J. E., and the plaintiff proposed to prove by parol that it was intended
to include the adjoining land in Westbrook,
under the same ownership, but that this was
In Osbom v. Phelps,
omitted by mistake.
for the sale of
19 Conn. 63, an agreement
land was drawn in two separate instruments,
one to be signed by the vendor, and the
other by the purchaser, and neither of the
instruments contained any reference to the
other, but each was signed by the wrong
party by mistake.
This the plaintiff sought
to prove by parol evidence, but the court
held it inadmissible.
In other American cases, such evidence has
been held admissible. In Gillespie v. Moon,
2 Johns. Ch. 585, which was a bill for relief
and for the reconveyance of a tract of land,
by mistake or
which had been included
fraud in a deed of conveyance, verbal evidence of the mistake, on a review of all the
cases, was admitted, and a reconveyance decreed. In Tilton v. Tilton, 9 N. H. 385, where
tenants in common agreed to make partition
pursuant to a verbal award, and executed
deeds accordingly; but, in the deed to the
plaintiff, a parcel assigned to him was omitted by mistake; in a bill for relief, verbal
evidence
was held admissible, and relief
thereupon decreed. So in Langdon v. Keith,
9 Vern. 299, where upon the transfer of a
part of several promissory notes, secured by
mortgage, an assignment of the mortgagee's
entire interest in the mortgage was made, by
mistake, instead of a part, relief was decreed
In De Riemer v. Canupon verbal proof.
tillon, 4 Johns. Oh. 85, where a portion of the
land purchased at sheriff's sale was by mistake omitted in his deed to the purchaser,
upon parol evidence of the fact the judgment
debtors were decreed to convey to the purSeveral
other
chaser the omitted parcel.
cases are referred to in this note.
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It does not appear that tbp statute of frauds
and perjuries was pleaded in any of these
cases, though referred to in the argument,
and in the opinion of the court.
In Woollam v. Hearn, and in many of the
cases referred to in Hare & Williams' notes
to that case, a distinction is made between
seeking and resisting specific performance,
It Is said,
as to the admission of evidence.
though a defendant resisting a specific performance, may go into parol evidence to show
that by fraud the written agreement does
not express the real terms, a plaintiff cannot do so for the purpose of reforming the
agreement and obtaining a specific performance of it as reformed.
This doctrine is critically examined in Gillespie V. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. 585, before cited. In that case the bill was filed to rectify
which, by an
a mistake In the conveyance
error In the description of the land, conveyed the whole lot, or two hundred and fifty
acres, instead of two hundred acres, parcel of
the same.
The mistake Is positively denied in the answer, and the point was, is parol proof of
this mistake admissible, in opposition to the
plain language of the deed, and especially in
opposition to the defendant's answer?
It will be seen the statute of frauds and
perjuries was not set up in the case.
After entering minutely into the parol
proof of the fact of the mistake. Chancellor
Kent says: "The rule in courts of law is,
that the written instrument does, in contemplation of law, contain the true agreement of the parties, and that the writing furnishes better evidence of the sense of the
parties, than any that can be supplied' by
parol. But equity has a broader jurisdiction, and will open the written contract to
let in an equity arising from facts perfectly
distinct from the sense and construction of
the instrument Itself.
have looked
Into
most, if not all the cases on this branch of
equity jurisdiction, and it appears to me to
be established on great and essential grounds
of justice, that relief can be had against any
deed or contract In writing, founded In mistake or fraud. The mistake may be shown
by parol proof, and the relief granted to the
injured party, whether he sets up the mistake affirmatively by bill, or as a defense."
After reviewing many of the decisions on
this question, the chancellor decides that
parol proof was admissible, and that It established the mistake as charged In the bill.
It will be observed, the contract In this
case was an executed contract,
a deed of
having been made; there was
conveyance
no prayer for a specific performance of a
contract,
but to correct a mistake in the
deed. The
chancellor remarks; "Whether
such proof be admissible on the part of a
plaintiff, who seeks a specific performance
of an agreement In writing, and at the same
time seelis to vary it by parol proof, has
been made a question.
Lord Hardwicke, In
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Jacques v. Statham, 3 Atk. 388, seemed to
tbink it might be done, but such proof was
rejected in Woollam v. Hearn, 7 Ves. 211
(which we have cited at length) ; and in Hlgginson v. Clowes, 15 Ves. 516; and when Lord
1
said,
Redesdale
in Clinan v. Cooke,
Schoales & L. 39, that he could find no decision in which a plaintiff had been permitted
to show an omission in a written agreement,
by mistake or fraud, he must be understood
to refer to the cases of bills for a specific performance
of an agreement, which was the
case then before him."
This case would seem to decide nothing
more than this: that in a bill to correct a mistake in an executed contract, parol proof of
and that such
the mistake is admissible,
proof is as available for one party, or for one
purpose, as for another,— as available for the
plaintiff In setting up a claim, as for the
defendant in resisting it It is nowhere said,
that a bill to reform an executory contract,
when
and then decree a specific performance
reformed, against a denial, in the answer, of
any mistake, and the plea of the statute of
frauds and perjuries, can be sustained by
parol evidence.
This decision, so far as it goes, has been
followed by the courts of many other states.
The cases are referred to by Hare & Wallace,
on pages 539, 540, but in none of them was
by a
the denial in the answer accompanied
plea of the statute of frauds and perjuries.
Nor do these cases go farther than to assert
of
principle, that independent
the general
this statute, where it is not set up as a de-

fense, parol evidence will be received to correct an alleged mistake in a written executed
contract,
when asserted by a plaintiff, and
is as available for him, as for defendant.
The cases go to the extent of declaring,
that parol evidence shall be admissible to
correct a writing as well for a plaintiff as
against him, thus establishing mutuality and
equality in the operation of the doctrine.
In 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 161, in commenting
on the distinction set up, the learned author
says, in a note, that it is of a very artificial
character, and difficult to be reconciled with
the general principles of courts of equity.
He says: "The ground is very clear, that a
court of equity ought not to enforce a contract, when there is a mistake, against the
insisting upon and establishing
defendant
the mistake; for it would be inequitable and
And if the mistake is vital
unconscientious.
to the contract, there is a like clear ground,
why equity should interfere at the instance
of the party as plaintiff, and cancel it; and if
the mistake is partial only, why, at his instance, it should reform it. In these cases,
the remedial practice is equal; and the parol
evidence to establish it, is equally open to
Why should
both parties to use as proof.
not the party aggrieved by a mistake in an
agreement, have relief in all cases when he
is plaintiff, as well as when he is defendant?
If the doctrine be founded upon the impro-
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priety of admitting parol evidence to contradict a written agreement, that rule is not
more broken in upon by the admission of it
for the plaintiff than it is by the admission
of it for the defendant.
If the doctrine had
been confined to cases arising under the statute of frauds, it would, if not more Intelligible, at least

practice."

have been less inconvenient

in

In a subsequent case,— Kelsselbrack v. Livingston, 4 Johns. Ch. 145,— which was a bill
for the specific performance of an agreement
in writing to execute a lease for lives "containing the usual clauses, restrictions and
reservations contained in the leases given by
defendant,"
the bill stated that a lease was
offered, containing a provision that upon every sale of the demised premises, one-fifth of
the purchase or consideration
money should
be taken by the defendant to his own use,
which complainant refused to receive, alleging, that at the time of the execution of the
writing, it was agreed no such quarter or
fifth sales should be demanded or paid.
The defendant did not, in direct and clear
terms, deny any such agreement, but denied
any other or different contract than the one
set forth made in writing, and as to the validity of the supposed verbal agreement, he
pleaded the statute of frauds.
The point in the case was, whether this
verbal agreement could be established by parol.
The learned chancellor says, it did not
appear to him, that the statute of frauds
had any bearing on the case.
"The agreement for the three life lease is in writing, and
it has been partly performed, by possession
taken and transfei-red, and rent paid.
The
right of the plaintiff rests upon the contract
in writing, and the only inquiry is, whether
there is not a mistake in the generality of
the expression, that the lease was to contain
the 'usual clause,' etc., and whether the parties did not intend an exception in respect
to the quarter sales.
There is no doubt of
their declared intention to make such an exception at the time the agreement was drawn;
and I am inclined to think that the writing
is, and ought to be, susceptible
of amendment and correction in that particular."
The proof was admitted, and the mistake
corrected, partly upon the ground, that the
writing itself let in parol proof, to show
which were "the usual clauses," etc., and such
proof being let in by the contract itself, it
might, on the principle of the agreement itself, be applied to correct any mistake manifestly shown to exist, in the general and unqualified terms of that part of the written
agreement which depended for its explanation upon external proof.
This court has held, as a general proposition, that the terms of a written agreement
cannot be changed by parol.
Baker v. Whiteside, Breese, 132; Penny v. Graves, 12 111.
And so it is held by all courts.
298.
At the
same time, we have said, that whatever covenants an absolute deed may contain, parol
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may be admitted to show that It
intended as a mortgage, or mere security
for the payment of the debt, and the grantor can have relief in equity, and this, where
mistake is not alleged.
Purviance v. Holt,
3 Gilman, 405; Ferguson v. Sutphen, Id. 547.
And it is also held, in Harlow v. Boswell, 15
111. 57, where parties commit their contracts
to writing, this forms the only evidence of
its terms.
In Scott V. Bennet, 3 Gilman, 254, this
court said, it Is a familiar principle that you
may give evidence to explain, but not to vary,
add to, or alter a written contract.
Courts
cannot make a new contract for the parties.
But if there is doubt and uncertainty, not
about what the substance of the contract is,
but as to its particular application, it may
be explained, and properly directed.
As a general principle, where a contract is
reduced to writing, the writing affords the
only evidence of the terms and conditions of
the contract; all antecedent and contemporaneous verbal agreements are merged in the
written contract.
There is an apparent contradiction in these
several opinions, but we think a few familiar
considerations
will serve to reconcile them, or
show that it is not real.
The subjects peculiarly proper for the jurisdiction of courts of
equity,
are well understood
to be, fraud,
trusts, accident and mistake, and these courts
are vested with the power to afford relief in
all cases, wherein, by reason of the universality and rigor of the rules of the common law,
a remedy
cannot otherwise be had.
The
power to correct a mistake in a writing, is as
much within the scope of this jurisdiction as
any other mistake.
The whole realm of
mistake is laid open to the court, and its powers are limitless to correct, on a proper case
made.
That it should be dormant, when invoked to correct a mistake in a written conIt is no antract, would be strange indeed.
swer to say, that within the rigid rule of law,
the power may be exercised, but not outside
In our
of it, as that would destroy the rule.
judgment, it has no such effect The jurisdiction of a court of chancery to correct
mistakes, is no less important to the due administration of justice, and the safety of the
citizen, than the rule of the common law, that
parol evidence cannot be received to add to,
or vary a written contract, and in a court of
equity, it must be determined, on the circumstances of each case, which shall prevail, the
power of the
exercise of an unquestioned
court, or the rule of the common law.
The doctrine is undisputed and incontestable, that a deed, absolute on its face, may be
shown, by parol, to have been intended by
the parties to it, as conditional, merely, and a
court of equity, on proper proof, will so hold.
This contract is explained by parol evidence,
and if it is made to speak a language its
words do not import, who will deny that it
is within the competency of that court to ascertain the real contract of the parties, and
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then enforce It, according to the intention of
If a court of equity has not the
the parties?
power to correct mistakes In a deed, or other
writing, on convincing proof of the existence
of the alleged mistake, great injustice would
with impunity. A man sells
be perpetrated
a vacant lot adjoining the lot on which he
has a costly residence, but by the mistake of
the scrivener, the deed describes the lot of
An ejectment is brought—the
his residence.
purchaser claiming under his deed — and if
no power exists in a court of equity to corhe must surrender that
rect the mistake,
which he never sold, and the purchaser reA court
cover a property he never bought.
of chancery should not hesitate to receive parol evidence of this mistake, and on sufflcieiit
proof, correct it, else the most flagrant injustice would be perpetrated, and an undoubted
power of that court be rendered ineffectual
and worthless. There can be no danger in
exercising this power, since the court has
before it all the facts, and if they are not convincing, the stern rule of law will prevail.
The court has, in many cases, acknowledged and exercised this power, and we do
not know that it has been questioned by the
bar here or elsewhere.
The doctrine is fully recognized in the case
of Broadwell v. Broadwell, 1 Gilman, 599,
that a court of chancery will always correct
any mistakes of fact which have occurred in
drawing up a paper, when a proper case is
presented and clearly proved, and then carry
into effect the instrument when thus corrected.
And herein is found the safeguard for
those so litigating, a proper case must be
If it be clearpresented and clearly proved.
ly proved, who shall say that a court of equity transcends its powers, or violates the
rule of law, in declaring the contract to be
as the parties have made it?
We cannot
think the statute of frauds and perjuries has
any application to such cases.
Here the bill is filed to reform this contract,
by inserting in it several tracts of land, alleged to have been omitted from it by mistake, and parol evidence is relied on for such
purpose; and when reformed, then the prayer
is, to decree a specific performance of the contract.
This proof makes the contract different from what its words import, and adds
It, in
to it, and varies it very materially.
fact, makes a new and different contract;
yet if the mistake is clearly established,
which should give way, that rigid rule of the
common law, or that power residing in a
The
court of equity, to correct mistakes?
strongest and most convincing evidence will
be required, before the common law rule is
postponed, and the power of the court exerNow, what is the testimony in this
cised.
case?
It consists, in great part, of loose conversations held by one Gillespie and others, with
the intestate, in which he said, there was a
mistake in the bond; that the tract lying
south-east of Shoal creek, being part of th»

246

MISTAKE— PAROL EVIDENCE

half of the north-west [quarter] of
twenty-three was not In the bond,
or not In right, and the Bilyeus had found it
out.
This witness states nothing In positive
terms, but "thinljs" the facts were so and so,
as he details them.
He "thinks" all the
lands claimed by complainants were Included
in the bond, except the Gillespie tract, and
thinks that intestate told him some of the
numbers were wrong, and some of the land
was not named In the bond. He spoke of the
west half of the north-west [quarter of section] twenty-three lying south-east of Shoal
creek, as not included in the bond, and that he
would not rectify the mistake because they
could not agree upon a division of the lands
according to his understanding of the conThis witness says that he can neither
tract.
read nor write, and details only such parts
of the conversation, as he "thinks" was had
He does not say in poswith the intestate.
itive terms, that the intestate admitted to
him he had sold this tract to complainants,
or that it was left out of the bond by mistake.
No testimony could be more unsatisfactory than his, taking the whole of it toFenton says he "thinks" Hunter
gether.
told him he drew the bond himself and that
there was a mistake in it, but does not recolHe says it was
lect what the mistake was.
his understanding a bond was given by Huntand notes given for the
er to complainants,
payment of the money— does not say he ever
west

[section]

saw the bond or notes— says the complainants
never took possession of the Gillespie tract—
on the tract south-east of the creek; they cut
some timber off, put a blacksmith shop upon,
and pastured the field on it while they and
Hunter were in partnership; there was some
money paid on the general contract, but don't
know how much.
Paine states that Hunter told him complainants were to have half of this tract,
when he. Hunter, sold or left, according to
in
the contract as made with complainants,
He
the sale of the mill, which was in 1850.
had this conversation in the winter after the
sale of the mill property; that complainants
have cut and hauled saw logs, and Hunter
and complainants built a blacksmith shop on
this land; and "thinks" complainants repaired the fences some, but is not certain,
and they used it as a pasture in connection
Hunter also said he had sold
with Hunter.
the Gillespie tract to them, and that David
Hunter was to make a deed to it. Don't
know that complainants ever exercised any
acts of ownership over this tract. Hunter
said there was a mistake in the bond, and if
his health would permit, he was coming to
town to get it fixed; "thinks" the mistake applied to the tract south-east of Shoal creek,
Does not
on which there was an old field.
know of complainants exercising any acts of
ownership over this "old field tract," since
they and Hunter dissolved partnership; don't
know the numbers of the land.
The testimony of Clouse, and of L. G. BU-
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yeu, does not differ, substantially, from that
of other witnesses.
Smith says. Hunter told him, that all the
lands the complainants were to get, were Included In the bonds; that half of the timber
on the tract lying on the south-east side of
Shoal creek, on which there was an old field,
was included in the contract with complainants, and that they had got their share off,
and that he had not sold the land to them.
Wesley Bilyeu had stated to witness that he
had an interest In this tract, and Hunter then
told him as above stated.
Hunter had possession of this tract when witness bought It,
and had corn standing
In the field on It
George Smith stated that Hunter told him
that complainants
had no right to the tract
lying south-east of Shoal creek, but as soon
as he could buy a piece from John Clouse, he
would make It right, but they were to have
It when he sold or left; understood this same
tract was included In the original contract.
This is the substance of the evidence to
prove the mistake in the bond, and part performance, which, it Is very clear, is wholly
insufficient for either purpose.
It would be
relaxing too much those salutary rules of evidence, which require a contract to be clearly
proved, before a specific performance of it
will be decreed. It Is discretionary with the
court. In all such cases, to decree or not a
specific performance
of a contract, and that
discretion will not be exercised except In a
vfirv clear case.
This contract was made in March, 1850,
and the intestate remained In the state until
1851, during a part of which time he was in
partnership with complainants,
in using the
They paid their notes as they
mill property.
became due, and not a word of complaint Is
heard of any mistake.
They were Impleaded, by the administrator of the Intestate,
in
a petition in chancery, for the purpose of obtaining an order of court, authorizing him to
make a deed to them In performance of the
covenant;
In which suit. It was fully competent for the complainants to have litigated
all these matters, but which they neglected
Though these proceedings are not
to do.
pleaded, or set up in bar by the defendants,
they might have been, successfully,
and the
case thus disposed of, rendering unnecessary
the examination we have been compelled to
give It on the issues made.
We are satisfied nothing has been shown to
establish a mistake, its nature, or extent, so
clearly, as to leave no doubt on the mind of
the actual existence of the alleged mistake.
The decree, as to the old field tract, being a
part of the west half of the north-west quarter of section twenty-three, lying north-east
of Shoal creek, and as to the Gillespie tract,
is reversed, and the decree so modified as to
exempt those tracts from its operation.
The
Injunction will be dissolved, and the administrator, the appellant here, will be allowed to
proceed with his action at law.
Decree modified.
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Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Sept. Term, 1869.

Bill in equity for the reformation of a conireyance of lands, and for further relief. The
case was reserved by the chief justice "for
the consideration and decision of the full
court upon the question whether, upon the

allegations of the bill, the plaintiff is entitled
to relief in equity, and whether the plaintiff
has not a full, adequate, and complete remedy at law; the defendant also relying In
his answer upon the statute of frauds."
W. H. Swift and S. W. Bowerman, for
plaintiff.
M. Wilcox and W. T. Filley, for
defendant
WPjL/LS, J. The plaintiff purchased certain lots of land of the defendant, received a
deed, and paid the whole amount of the purchase money.
This suit is brought for relief
or redress in several particulars, dissimilar
in character, but all connected with the alleged oral contract of purchase.
He complains: First That a proviso was inserted
in his deed. Imposing upon him the burden of
supporting the whole fence upon the south
line of the land conveyed; and that he was
Induced to assent to its insertion upon the
consideration,
and false representation of the
defendant, that the whole fence upon the east
side of said land was to be maintained by
the adjoining proprietor, PatrlcK McDaniels,
by virtue of a written obligation to that effect, and that the plaintiff would be relieved
from all liability to maintain any fence upon
that side; as well as by certain other false
representations of the defendant in relation
thereto.
Second. That he delivered
to the
defendant, In part payment of said purchase
money, three bonds of the United States of
$1,000 each, upon the agreement of the defendant that he would allow the full market
value of the same, including premium and accrued, interest at the time of the transfer
thereof; and that the defendant refuses to
allow and pay him the value of such premium and interest, amounting together to
the sum of $315; that sum being in excess
of the whole purchase money due to the defendant Third. That during the negotiations
for the sale and purchase of said lands the
defendant pointed out the southeast corner
of the premises proposed for sale, and represented that the land of the adjoining proprietor, McDaniels, extended to that point, and
that the southerly line of the land sold would
extend from the same corner to a point on
the highway near a bridge; that the deed
was accordingly written and accepted, describing the land as bounded on the south by
a line running from the southwest corner of
land of said McDaniels, at right angles to
the westerly line of said McDaniels, to the
highway, the defendant representing said line
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to be the same line previously pointed out by
him to the plalntifC, and that it would strike
the highway within one rod of said bridge;
whereas in fact the land of said McDaniels
did not extend so far as to the southeast corner of the defendant's land as pointed out
by him, and the south line, running at right
angles therefrom to the highway, did not
strike the same within one rod of said bridge;
and the deed so written and accepted did not
include a considerable part of the land so
to be sold, and inoffered and represented
by the plaintiff to
tended and understood
by him; the pait so
have been purchased
excluded consisting of about 17 acres of
land, comprising the greater part of the
meadow land In the tract as pointed out by
the defendant.
The plaintiff, by his bill, does not seek to
rescind the contract and conveyance,
and
does not offer to reconvey or release to the
defendant the land conveyed, nor pray that
he may be allowed to do so, and recover back
the purchase money paid and bonds delivered

in payment
The relief prayed for is that
the defendant may be required to convey to
the plaintiff the portion of the tract which
was so by fraud or mistake omitted from the
conveyance already made to release the plaintiff from the proviso in his deed in regard to
the fence, and to pay to the plaintiff the
aforesaid amount of premium and interest
upon said bonds.
The argument of the plaintiff is addressed
mainly to the question of the equity jurisdiction of this court in cases of fraud or mistake
like that alleged in the present suit. There
There is
can be no doubt upon that point.
no ground upon which jurisdiction in equity
is so readily entertained and freely exercised,
It is given to this court without restriction,
if the parties have not a plain, adequate,
and complete remedy at law. Gen. St. c. 113,
Having jurisdiction, the question is as
§ 2.
to the appropriate remedy.
Jurisdiction In
equity Is often maintained, even when there
is a remedy at law, for the sake of the greater facility it affords for adapting the proper
relief to the peculiar necessities of each case.
If the party suing is entitled to no relief other than that which may be had in an action
at law, he is remitted to his remedy in that
form. Even in a proper case for an appeal
to equity the remedy must be sought in reference to certain recognized rules and principles of chancery jurisprudence, and is often
restricted by provisions of positive law. It
is not administered arbitrarily.
It must flow
out of and accord with the agreements and
obligations of the parties, and be adapted to
the condition of facts to which it is to be
applied.

In the present case, the principal ground of
action is the fraud or mistake by which an
Important part of the subject-matter of the
was
alleged contract of sale and purchase
If the
omitted from the deed of conveyance.
allegations of the bill should be sustained by
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the proofs, tbey would show a clear right to
have a rescission of the contract; and, upon
reconveyance of the land covered by the deed,
to have restoration of the bonds and money
that were delivered In payment But this relief the plalntiC does not seek; and his bill
contains no offer to reconvey, without which
he cannot have such relief. The prayer of
the bill, and its sole purpose in this particular, is that the defendant may be compelled
to convey to the plaintiff the 17 acres of land
which he alleges were included in the oral
contract of sale, or represented by the defendant to be so included, but omitted from the
deed.
',
If the case stood merely upon the oral contract of sale, with a conveyance of part and
a neglect or refusal to convey another part of
the land which was the subject of the alleged contract, we do not think it would be
contended that the plaintiff could compel a
conveyance of the other land, against a party
denying the contract and setting up the statCourts are bound to regard
ute of frauds.
that statute in equity as well as at law. The
only remedy in equity, in such case, would
be by a rescission of the entire contract in
which the aid of the court could be obtained,
if necessary, upon proper grounds.
There has been no part performance here,
such as, according to the general practice in
courts of equity, would be held to take the
case out of the statute of frauds.
1. Payment of the whole consideration Is
not sufficient for that purpose. Hughes v. Morris, 2 De Gex, M. & G. 356; Thompson v.
Gould, 20 Pick. 134, 138; Browne, St. Frauds,
§ 461; Fry, Spec. Perf. § 403; Dale v. Hamilton, 5 Hare, 360; Clinan v. Cooke, 1 Schoales
& L. 22, 41; Allen's Estate, 1 Watts & S.
383; Purcell v. Miner, 4 Wall. 513.
2. Possession by the purchaser, under such
a deed as was given to the plaintiff, is possession according to the title thereby
conveyed;
and is not such a possession as to
afford ground for enforcing an alleged oral
agreement to convey other land, claimed to
have been embraced in the same oral agreeMoale v. Buchanment with that conveyed.
The plaintiff does not
an, 11 GiU & J. 314.
appear to have been let into actual possession of the 17 acres, nor to have been induced to do any acts thereon, as owner, under his supposed rights as purchaser.
3. The conveyance of a portion of the land
nor is it a
is neither a part performance,
recognition of the alleged oral contract, so far
as it relates to the remaining land not included iu the deed. On the contrary, it is in
distinct disregard and implied disavowal of
The deed was given and acsuch a contract.
cepted in execution of the entire contract of
sale. Its terms are In literal conformity with
The plaintiff conthe agreement as made.
cedes that the southern boundary was stipulated to be described as it is written in the
deed, to wit, running from the southwesterly
correr of land of McDaniels, and at right
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with his westerly line, to the highway.
But the plaintiff claims that he In fact purchased the whole of a certain tract of land
which included the 17 acres now in dispute;
that the description of the boundaries,
as
agreed upon and inserted in the deed, was so
angles

agreed

on and inserted

upon the representa-

tion of the defendant and the belief of the
plaintiff that it did include said 17 acres;
and that the failure of the deed to embrace
and convey that part of the land was occasioned either by the mutual mistake of the
parties as to the position of the southwest
corner of land of McDaniels, or else by the
misrepresentation,
deceit, and fraud of the
defendant in relation thereto.
In either alternative,
the plaintiff contends that he is
entitled
to a reformation of the deed, to
make it conform to the sale actually contracted by the parties.
Such a reformation not only requires a description of the subject-matter of the sale,
different from the express terms of the oral
contract, but would enlarge the effect 'and
It
operation of the deed as a conveyance.
involves the transfer of the legal title to land
It
not covered by the deed already given.
requires

a new deed to be executed

and

de-

livered by the defendant to the plaintiff.
Whether that deed shall embrace the entire
subject of the alleged contract of purchase,
with a corrected description to make it conform to facts and abuttals as they were represented to be, or merely convey the 17 acres
omitted from the deed already given, the order for its execution will enforce the specific
of a contract for the sale of
performance
lands, for which there exists no memorandum, note, or other evidence in writing signed by the party to be charged therewith.
As to the 17 acres in dispute, the obligation
to convey them rests solely In the oral contract.
The defendant denies any contract
which includes them. The plaintiff seeks to
establish such a contract by parol evidence,
and enforce it. The deed itself furnishes no
means of making the correction sought for,
and no evidence of the contract relied on for
this purpose; nor is it in any sense an acknowledgment of the substance of the alleged oral agreement.
The power to rectify deeds and other wiitten instruments undoubtedly exists in this
court, under the clauses of the statute giving
equity jmisdiction in cases of fraud, accident, and mistake, or the clause giving it genei'ally where there is no adequate remedy at
law. It has been exercised in several cases.
Canedy v. Marcy, 13 Gray, 373; Metcalf v.
Putman, 9 Allen, 97. But the power will be
exercised in subordination to other fixed principles of law, and especially to statute provisions. If the rules, restricting the administration of judicial remedies, which are prescribed by the statute of frauds, were to be
disregarded in this branch of equity procedure, it would open the door to all the
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forms of fraud which that statute was Intended to prevent.
The statute is not a mere
rule of evidence, but a limitation of judicial
authority to afford a remedy.
It requires
that contracts for the sale of lands, in order
must
to be enforced by judicial proceedings,
This probe substantiated by some writing.
vision of law cannot be dispensed with merely for the reason that the want of such
writing was occasioned by accident, mistake,
unless some
or fraudulent representations,
other ingredient enters into the case to give
rise to equities stronger than those which
stand upon the oral contract alone, which
estop the other party from setting up the
statute.
It makes no difference whether the want
of a writing was accidental or intentional, by
way of refusal or by reason of mutual mistake; nor that there were false representations, and a pretence of conveying the land,
but a fraudulent evasion, by means whereof
in fact, and no
there was no conveyance
proper written evidence of the agreement to
From the oral agreement there can
convey.
be derived no legal right, either to have performance of its stipulations or written eviSo long, therefore, as the
dence of its terms.
effect of the fraud or mistake extends no further than to prevent the execution, or withhold from the other party written evidence
of the agreement, it does not furnish sufficient ground for the court to disregard the
statute of frauds, and enter into the Investigation of the oral agreement for the purpose of enforcing it. And we do not see that
the present case stands otherwise in this respect than It would if there had been no conAs alveyance of any part of the land.
ready shown, that conveyance was not in execution or recognition of the contract which
the plaintiff seeks, by this bill, to enforce;
and does not furnish any reason for taking
the case out of the statute, on the ground of
Indeed, the rule seems to
part performance.
by the party
be that no part performance
sought to be charged will take an agreement
out of the statute of frauds, except in those
cases where the statute itself provides for
It is part performance by the
such effect.
party seeking to enforce, and not by the other party, to which courts of equity look, in
Caton v.
giving relief from the statute.
Caton, 1 Ch. App. 137, L. R. 2 H. L. 127;
Mundy v. Jolllffie, 5 Mylne & C. 167; Buckmaster V. Harrop, 7 Ves. 369; Browne, St.

Frauds. § 453.
When the proposed reformation of an instrument involves the specific enforcement of
within the statute of
an oral agreement
frauds, or when the term sought to be added
would so modify the instrument as to make
it operate to convey an interest or secure a
right which can only be conveyed or secured
through an instrument in writing, and for
which no writing has ever existed, the statute of frauds is a sufficient answer to such a
proceeding, unless the plea of the statute can
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be met by some ground of estoppel to deprive the party of the right to set up that
defence.
Jordan v. Sawkins, 1 Ves. Jr. 402;
Osborn v. Phelps, 19 Conn. 63; Cllnan v.
Cooke, 1 Schoales & L. 22.
The fact that the omission or defect in the
writing, by reason of which it failed to convey the land or express the obligation which
it is sought to make it convey or express,
was occasioned by mistake, or by deceit and
fraud, will not alone constitute such an esconcur,
Thei-e
toppel.
also,
must
some
change in the condition or position of the
party seeking relief, by reason of being induced to enter upon the execution
of the
agreement, or to do acts upon the faith of
it as if It were executed, with the knowledge
and acquiescence of the other party, either
express or implied, for which he would be
left without redress if the agreement were
to be defeated.
Upon a somewhat extended examination
of the decisions in regard to the effect of the
statute of frauds upon the right to have equitable relief where the writing is defective,
although many of them, where relief has
been granted, hardly come within this definition in the apparent character of the par
ticular facts upon which they were decided,
yet we are satisfied that this principle of discrimination is the only one which can give
consistency to the great mass of authorities
upon this subject
The case of Smith v. Underdunck, 1 Sandf.
Oh. 579, is nearly like the present in its facts;
and the opinion of the assistant vice-chancellor would seem to sustain the right of the
plaintiff here. There was no fraud in the
preparation of the deed. The judgment was
based mainly upon the ground of part performance.
It was held to be sufficient to
take the case out of the statute that the
plaintiff had been let into possession as purchaser; and the opinion Indicates that possession under and in accordance with a deed
of part would be a sufficient possession of
the whole for the purpose of requiring a deed
of the remainder.
But the decision rests upon the fact of possession by the plaintiff of
the entire premises, including the part for
which the bill was brought. The case arose
upon demureer to the bill, which of course
admitted the contract, and the alleged possession of the whole tract. The question of
the statute of frauds did not arise therefore.
That the purchaser has been let Into possession in pursuance of a parol agreement
has been very generally recognized as suffiThe reacient to take It out of the statute.
soning by which this result was reached is
far from satisfactory; and even where the
rule prevails there are frequent Intimations
that it is regarded as trenching too closely
upon the spirit as well as the letter of the
statute.
If it were now open to settle the
rule anew, we cannot doubt that it would
with
be limited to possession accompanied
or followed by such change of position of the
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purchaser as ■would subject him to loss for
which he could not otherwise have adequate
compensation
and that
or other redress;
mere change of possession would not be held
to take a case out of»the statute.
However
it may be elsewhere, we are disposed to hold
the rule to be so In Massachusetts.
Previously to the Statutes of 1855, c. 194,
and

1856,

c.

38 (Gen.

St. c.

113,

§

2), the

power of the court to direct specific performance was confined to written contracts.
Rev. St. c. 74, § 8. That power was held to
be strictly limited to contracts in which the
was exwhole obligation to be enforced
Dwight v. Pomeroy,
pressed in the writing.
17 Mass. 303; Brooks v. Wheelock, 11 Pick.
439; Leach v. Leach, 18 Pick. 68; Buck v.
Dowley, 16 Gray, 555; Park v. Johnson, 4
Allen, 259. The provision conferring that
power specifically in case of written contracts is still retained in the Gen. St. c. 113,
clauses, conferring
§ 2. If the subsequent
jurisdiction generally, are to be construed,
as we think they are, to extend the power
of the court, so as to give relief by way of
specific
performance,
either of contracts
wholly unwritten, or of stipulations proved
by parol and incorporated into a contract by
judicial rectification of a written instrument,
as in Metcalf v. Putman, 9 Allen, 97, still
that power ought to be exercised with constant reference and in subordination to the
condition that "the party asking relief has
not a plain, adequate, and complete remedy
each
at common law," which accompanied
of the equity power of the
enlargement
and closes the
court, and which prefaces
of those powers in the General
enumeration
The force of this consideration Is
Statutes.
not

lessened

when

applied

to

agreements

within the statute of frauds.
Mere possession of land does not expose
the party to loss or danger of loss without
redress at law. The parol agreement of sale
to enter,
with permission
and purchase,
though not to be enforced as a valid contract
of sale, will constitute such a license as will
protect the party from liability for acts done
before the license is revoked, and for all acts
necessary to enable him to remove himself
and his property from the premises after
If possession be taken
revocation.
such
without such permission, express or implied,
it is no foundation for relief in equity, according to any of the authorities. The argument, for the admission of parol evidence to
within the statute of
prove an agreement
frauds in order to enforce it in equity, drawn
from the admissibility of such evidence to
maintain a defence, either at law or in equity, seems to be based upon a misconception of the purport and force of the statute,
which reaches no farther than to deny the
right of action to enforce such agreements.
the possession
of
In this commonwealth,
land by a purchaser is not even notice to a
deed.
The
third party of an unrecorded
whole spirit of our laws in respect to real es-
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tate Is against the policy of enabling parties
to acquire or confer title, either legal or equitable, by mere parol and delivery of possession. The possession
of the plaintiff,
therefore, even if it extended to the tract in
dispute, is not sufiicient to entitle him to relief against the statute.
The principle, on which courts of equity
rectify an instrument, so as to enlarge its
operation, or to convey or enforce rights not
found in the writing itself, and make it conform to the agreement as proved by parol
evidence, on the ground of an omission, by
mutual mistake, in the reduction of the
agreement to writing, is, as we understand
it, that in equity the previous oral agreement is held to subsist as a binding contract,
notwithstanding the attempt to put it in
writing; and upon clear proof of its tenns
the courts compel the Incorporation of the
omitted clause, or the modification of that
which is Inserted, so that the whole agreement, as actually intended to be made, shall
Hunt v.
be truly expressed and executed.
Rousmaniere, 1 Pet. 1; Oliver v. Mutual
Commercial Marine Ins. Co., 2 Curt. 277,
Fed. Gas. No. 10,498. But when the omitted
term or obligation is within the statute of
frauds, there is no valid agreement which
the court is authorized to enforce, outside of
In such case, relief may be had
the writing.
against the enforcement of the contract as
written, or the assertion of rights acquired
under it contrary to the terms and intent of
the real agreement of the parties. Such relief may be given as well upon the suit of a
plaintifC seeking to have a written contract,
or some of its terms, set aside, annulled, or
restricted,
as to a defendant resisting its
Canedy v. Marcy, 13
specific performance.
Gray, 373; Gillespie v. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch.
585; Keisselbrack v. Livingston, 4 Johns. Ch.
148.

Relief In this form, although procured by
parol evidence of an agreement
differing
from the written contract, with proof that
the difference was the result of accident or
mistake,
does not conflict with the provisions of the statute of frauds. That statute
forbids the enforcement of certain kinds of
agreement without writing; but it does not
forbid the defeat or restriction of written
contracts; nor the use of parol evidence for
of establishing the equitable
the purpose
grounds therefor. The parol evidence is introduced, not to establish an oral agreement
independently of the writing, but to show
that the written instrument contained something contrary to or in excess of the real
agreement of the parties, or does not properly express that agreement. Higginsou v.
Clowes, 15 Ves. 516; Clowes v. Higginson, 1
Ves. & B. 524; Squier v. Campbell, 1 Mylne
& C. 459, 480.

But rectification by making the contract
include obligations or subject-matter to
which its written terms will not apply Is a
direct enforcement of the oral agreement, as
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much In conflict with the statute of frauds
as if there were no writing at all. Moale v.
Buchanan, 11 Gill & J. 314; Osborn v. Phelps,
19 Conn. 63; Elder v. Elder, 10 Me. 80.
In
Parkhurst v. Van Cortland, 14 Johns. 15, 32,
it is said that, "where it is necessary to
make out a contract in writing, no parol evidence can be admitted to supply any defects
in the writing." Per Thompson, C. J. Such
rectification, when the enlarged operation includes that which is within the statute of
frauds, must be accomplished, if at all, under
the other head of equity jurisdiction, namely,
fraud. Irnham v. Child, 1 Brown, Ch. 92;
Da vies v. Fitton,
1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 770a;
2 Dru. & War. 225; Wilson v. Wilson, 5 H.
L. Cas. 40, 65; Manser v. Back, 6 Hare, 443;
Clarke v. Grant, 14 Ves. 519; Clinan v. Cook,
1 Schoales & L. 22.
The fraud most commonly treated as taking an agreement out of the statute of frauds
is that which consists in setting up the statafter the other
ute against its performance,
party has been induced to make expenditures, or a change of situation in regard to
the subject-matter of the agreement, or upon the supposition that it was to be carried
into execution, and the assumption of rights
thereby to be acquired; so that the refusal
to complete the execution of the agreement
is not merely a denial of rights which it
was intended to confer, but the infliction of
an unjust and unconscientious injury and
loss. In such case, the party is held, by
force of his acts or silent acquiescence,
which have misled the other to his harm, to
be estopped from setting up the statute of
frauds. Hawkins v. Holmes, 1 P. Wms. 770;
Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt, 1 Johns. Oh. 274,
14 Johns. 15; Browne, St Frauds, § 437 et
Caton y.
seq.; Fry, Spec. Perf. §§ 384r-388;
Caton, 1 Ch. App. 137, 147, L. R. 2 H. L. 127.
In the last named case it is said that "the
right to relief in such cases rests not merely on the contract, but on what has been
Per
done in pursuance of the contract"
See, also, 1
Lord Chancellor Cranworth.
Story, Eq. Jur. § 759. But the present case,
as we have already seen, does not come
within the principle of this ground of equi-

table relief.
Fraud, which relates only to the preparation, form, and execution of the writing, is
sufficient to vitiate the instrument so made.
It may be set aside either in equity or at
law. If it is made to include land not the
subject of the actual sale, it Is inoperative
as to such land; and the fraud may be
shown, for the purpose of defeating Its reWalker v.
covery, in an action at law.
Swasey, 2 Allen, 312, 4 Allen, 527; Bartlett
V. Drake, 100 Mass. 174. It has been questioned whether any other effect can be given
to such fraud than to defeat the operation of
the instrument altogether; and whether a
court of equity can reform by giving it a
by parol
narrower operation, as modified
proof. In a case within the statute of frauds.
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Attorney General v. Sitwell, 1 Tounge & C.
The difficulty is that, if the
Exch. 559.
fraud vitiates and defeats the insti-ument,
then the modified agreement to be enforced
must be that which is proved by parol evidence; and this seems to violate the statute. But the instrument, in such case, is
not void. It is voidable only; and that not
at the election of the party who committed
the fraud. He is not entitled to control the
extent of the effect that shall be given to
and it is not for
his fraudulent conduct;
him to object that the fraud is availed of
only to defeat the rights, which he has secured by fraud, beyond what he is fairly entitled to by the terms of the real agreement
When those are sepbetween the parties.
arable, and the nature of the case will admit of it the court may enforce the written
contract in accordance with its terms, giving
relief against the fraudulent excess, or the
clause improperly Inserted. Parol testimony,
used to defeat a title or limit an interest acquired under a written Instrument or to convert it into a trust, does not necessarily conflict with the statute of frauds. It has been
held that an absolute deed may, in this
mode, be converted, In equity, into a mortgage.
Washburn v. Merrill, 1 Day, 140;
Taylor v. Luther, 2 Sumn. 228, Fed. Cas.
No. 13,796; Jenkins v. Eldredge, 3 Story,
181, 293, Fed Cas. No. 7,266; Morris v. Nixon, 1 How. 118; 4 Kent, Comm. (6th Ed.)
>»hetner this can be done in Massachu143.
setts has not yet been decided.
Newton v.
Pay, 10 AEen, 505. But if it were to be so
held, it would not be upon the ground of enforcing a parol agreement to reconvey; but
upon the ground that such an agreement together with proof that the deed was given
and accepted only as security for a debt,
made out a case of fraud, or trust, which
would warrant a decree vacating the title of
the grantee, as far as he attempted to hold
contrary to the purposes of the conveyance.
In such cases the court acts upon the estate

or rights acquired under the written instrument; and within the power over that instrument which is derived from the fraud or
other ground of jurisdiction.
But when it
is sought to extend that power to interests
in land not included in the instrument and
In relation to which there Is no agreement
in writing, the case stands differently.
Fraud may vitiate the writing which Is
tainted by it, but It does not supply that
which the statute reqiures. It may destroy
but
a title or right acquired by its means;
It has no creative force. It will not confer
title. In the absence of a legal contract by
the agreement of the parties, it will not establish one, nor authorize the court to declare one, by Its decree.
This distinction Is Illustrated by the analGen.
ogous rule in regard to implied trusts.
St c. 100, § 19. Parol evidence may charge
the grantee of lands conveyed with a resulting or implied trust, which equity will en-
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force.
But such evidence wiU not create a
trust in lands already held by an absolute
title.
although
A fraudulent misrepresentation,
sufficient to sustain an action for damages,
cannot be converted into a contract to be
enforced as such. Neither will it furnish the
measure by which a written conti'act may be
reformed. In this discussion we have assumed that there was a clear agreement between the parties, which the deed fails to
carry out, and to which it might properly be
made to conform, but for the obstacle in the
statute of frauds.
Ithasbeen of ten asserted thatwhereone by
deceit or fraudulent contrivance prevents an
agreement
intended
to be put in writing
from being properly written or executed, he
shall not avail himself of the omission, and
shall not be pennitted to set up the statute
of fraud against the proof and enforcement
of the parol agreement, or of the pai'ol stipulation improperly omitted. But in our opinion this doctrine would practically annul the
statute.
The tendency of the human mind,
when fraud and injustice are manifest, is to
strain every point to compass its defeat; and
to render fuU redress to the party upon
Mundy v. Jolwhom it has been practiced.
liffe, 5 Mylne & C. 167; Taylor v. Luther, 2
This inSumn. 233, Fed. Cas. No. 13,796.
fluence has led to decisions in which the facts
of the particular case were regarded more
than the general considerations, of public policy upon which the statute is founded and
entitled to be maintained. Courts have sometimes regarded it as a matter of judicial merit to wrest from under the statute all cases
in which the lineaments of fraud in any
form were discernible. But the impulse of
moral reprobation of deceit and fraud, however commendable in itself, is liable to mislead, if taken as the guide to judicial decrees.

We apprehend that in most instances where
fraud occasioning a failure of written evidence of an agreement or particular stipulation has been held to take the case out of the
statute of frauds, there was some fact of
prejudice to the party, or change of situation consequent upon the fraud, which was
regarded as sufficient to make up the elements of an equitable estoppel.
In such case,
the argument is transferred to the simple
question of the sufficiency of the additional
circumstance
for that purpose.
The cases
most frequently referred to are those arising
out of agreements for marriage settlements.
In such cases the marriage, although not regarded as a part performance of the agreement for a marriage settlement, is such an
Irretrievable change of situation, that, if procured by artifice, upon the faith that the settlement had been, or the assurance that it
would be, executed, the other party is held
to make good the agreement, and not permitMaxted to defeat it by pleading the statute.
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well V. Mountacute, Prec. Ch. 526; Browne,
St. Frauds, §§ 441-445.
Another class of cases are those where a
party acquires property by conveyance or devise secured to himself under assurances that
he will transfer the property to, or hold and
appropriate it for the use and benefit of, another.
A trust for the benefit of such other
person is charged upon the property, not by
reason merely of the oral promise, but because of the fact that by means of such
promise he had induced the transfer of the
property to himself. Brown v. Lynch, ]
Paige, 147; Thynn v. Thynn, 1 Vern. 296;
Oldham v. Litchfield, 2 Vern. 506; Devenish
V. Raines,
Prec. Ch. 3; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §
768.

When these cases are cited in support of
the doctrine that artifice or fraud in evading
or preventing the execution of the writing is
alone sufficient to induce a court of equity to
disregard the statute and enforce lie oral
agreement, the subsequent change of situation or transfer of property, without which
the deceit would be innocuous, seems to be
overlooked, because it is not strictly in part
performance
of the agreement sought to be
enforced.
It must be manifest, however, that
without such consequent act there would be
no standing for the case in a court of equity.
That which moves the court to a decree to
enforce the agreement Is not the artifice by
which the execution of the writing has been
evaded, but what the other party has been
induced to do upon the faith of the agreement for such a writing.
It is not that deceit, misrepresentation,
or fraud, of Itself, entitles a party to an equitable remedy;
but
that equity will interfere to prevent the accomplishment
of the fraud which would result from the enforcement of legal rights contrary to the real agreement of the parties.
Indeed, the fraud which alone justifies this
exercise of equity powers by relief against
the statute of frauds consists in the attempt
to take advantage
of that which has been
done in performance
or upon the faith of an
agreement, while repudiating its obligations
under cover of the statute.
When a writing
has been executed, the courts allow the fraud
or mistake by which an omission or defect in
the instrument has been occasioned to defeat
the conclusiveness
of the writing, and open
the door for proof of the real agreement.
But the obstacle of the statute of frauds to
the enforcement of obligations, or the security
of rights not expressed in the instrument remains to be removed in the same manner as
if there were no writing. Phyfe v. Wardell,
2 Edw. Oh. 47; Moale v. Buchanan, 11 Gill &
J. 314. The power to reform the Instrument
is not an independent power or branch of equity jurisdiction, but only a means of exercising the power of the court under its general
jurisdiction in cases of fraud, accident, and
mistake.
We are aware that the limitation which we
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have undertaken to define has not been uniformly observed or recognized.
In Wisvcall v. Hall, 3 Paige, 313, Chancellor Walworth granted a perpetual Injunction,
and ordered a deed of release of title to land
omitted from a deed by fraud and secret contrivance. There was no discussion of the authorities, nor of the principles upon which the
case was decided;
and no reference to the
statute of frauds; and the statute does not
appear,, by the report, to have been set up
against the prayer for relief.
In De Peyster v. Hasbrouck, 11 N. Y. 591,
a similar decision was made In the court of
appeals in New York.
Here again there Is
no reference to the statute of frauds, no discussion of the principles involved In the decision, and no authority or precedent cited except that of Wiswall v. Hall. The mortgagor
whose deed was reformed put in no answer
whatever.
The defence was made by parties
claiming under him, and the statute of frauds
does not appear to have been pleaded.
Denio, C. J., in giving the opinion, proceeds to
say: "It is unnecessary to refer to cases to
establish
the familiar doctrine
that when
through mistake or fraud a contract or conveyance fails to express the actual agreement
of the parties, it will be reformed by a court
of equity, so as to correspond with such actual agreement.
The English cases have been
ably digested by Chancellor Kent, and the
principle has been stated with his accustomed care and accuracy, in Gillespie v. Moon,
2 Johns. Ch. 585."
But in Gillespie v. Moon the relief sought
and granted was by way of restricting, and
not by enlarging, the operation of the deed.
Such relief would not, as already shown, conflict with the statute of frauds; and neither
the discussion in that case nor the citation
of authorities had reference to the bearing of
the statute of frauds upon the question of affording relief upon contracts relating to land.
Indeed, the English cases furnish but little
aid upon that point, for the reason that the
courts there have generally, without reference to the statute of frauds, refused to enforce written contracts with a modification
or variation set up by parol proof. Woollam
V. Heam, 7 Ves. 211, and notes on the same
in 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 404; Nurse v. Seymour,
13 Beav. 254.
The principle which was maintained by
Chancellor Kent, and upon which the English authorities were cited by him in Gillespie V. Moon, was that relief in equity against
the operation of a written instrument, on the
ground that by fraud or mistake it did not
express the true contract of the parties,
might be afforded to a plaintiff seeking a
modification of the contract, as well as to a
defendant resisting its enforcement.
That
proposition must be considered as fully esIt is
tablished. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 161.
quite another proposition, to enlarge the subject-matter of the contract, or to add a new
term to the writing, by parol evidence, and
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enforce It. No such proposition was presented by the case of Gillespie v. Moon, and it
does not sustain the right to such relief
against the statute of frauds.
That Chancellor Walworth, in Wiswall v.
Hall, did not intend to decide that the statute of frauds could be disregarded if properly
set up against such an enlargement of the
operation of the written contract is apparent
from the remarks of the same learned judge
in the subsequent case of Cowles v. Bowne,
10 Paige, 535.
He says: "Whether a party
can come into this court for the specific performance of a mere executory agreement for
the sale of lands, which in its terms is materially variant from the written agreement
between the parties that has been executed
according to the statute, where there has
been no part performance or other equitable
circumstance sufficient to taJie the case out
of the statute of frauds, as a mere parol contract between the parties, is a question
which it will not be necessary for me to consider in this case."
In Gouverneur v. Titus, 1 Edw. Ch. 480,
there was a deed of land described as being
In the northwest comer of a township by mistake for the northeast corner. The grantor
admitted the real contract, and had corrected
the mistake by deed. The only question was
whether equity would enforce the corrected
deed against the lien of a judgment creditor,
who had notice of the mistake. In the opinion
it is said: "It is a case in which this court
would interfere, as between the immediate parties, to correct the mistake." The judgment
was clearly right. The dictum we are disposed to question, unless the deed itself contained some other description
by means of
which the land might be identified and the
mistake corrected.
In Newson v. Bufferlow, 1 Dev. Eq. 379, a
deed was reformed,
which was made, by
fraud, to include land not sold; and the fraudulent grantee was required to execute a reconveyance of the excess. The opinion contains
a remark of the court that this power may be
exercised as well by inserting what was omitted as by striking out what was wrongfully included. But this remark is clearly
obiter dictum, and is not sustained by the
authority cited, namely, Gillespie v. Moon.
In Blodgett V. Hobart, 18 Vem. 414, a
mortgage was reformed by including other
lands omitted by mistake. The statute of
frauds was not set up in the answer nor referred to in the opinion of the court, and the
answer was considered by the court to be
evasive in regard to the alleged agreement
for security upon such other lands.
In Tilton v. Tilton, 9 N. H. 385, the court
controvert the doctrine of such a limitation,
as declared in Elder v. Elder, 10 Me. 80; but
the decision did not involve the question so
discussed.
The case arose from an attempted
partition between tenants in common of real
estate. There was a written agreement for
partition according to the award of certain
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arbitrators named, and the only question was
as to the effect of a substitution of other arbitrators by parol. Deeds had been executed,
and the plaintiff had fully performed his part
of the agreement.
It was a case of part performance sufficient to take the case out of
the statute of frauds, and was decided upon
that ground. Besides, a partition of lands,
though effected by mutual deeds of release,
is not a contract for the sale of land.
Craig V. Kittridge, 3 Fost. (N. H.) 231,
arose upon a partition, and was decided upon
Smith v.
the authority of Tilton v. Tilton.
Greeley, 14 N. H. 378, was a decree upon default, without argument or opinion, against
the executors and heirs of a party whose
failed to include
deed, by mutual mistake,
certain land sold. It does not appear whether
there was written evidence of the agreement,
nor whether there was possession or acts of
performance.
It was sufficient, perhaps, that
the ■statute was not pleaded, and the default
admitted the agreement.
Caldwell v. Carrlngton, 9 Pet. 86, was an
agreement for exchange of lands, and stands
entirely upon the ground of part performance.
Notwithstanding contrary decisions and dicta, we are satisfied that upon principle the
conveyance of land cannot be decreed in equity by reason merely of an oral agreement
therefor against a party denying the alleged
agreement and relying upon the statute of
fi-auds, in the absence of evidence of change
of situation or part performance creating an
This
estoppel against the plea of the statute.
of
rule applies as well to the enforcement
such an agreement by way of rectifying a
deed as to a direct suit for its specific perWe are satisfied also that this is
formance.
the rule to be derived from a great preponderance of the authorities. Whitchurch v.
Bevls, 2 Brown, Ch. 559; WooUam v. Hearn,
Cas. Eq. (3d Am. Ed.)
7 Ves. 211; 2 Lead.
notes, [*414], Am. Notes, 691; Townshend
V. Stangroom, 6 Ves. 328; Beaumont v. Bramley, Turn. & R. 41. See, also, Moale v. Bu-
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chanan, 11 Gill & J. 314; Osborn v. Phelps,
19 Conn. 63; and Elder v. Elder, 10 Me. 80,
already cited above; Adams, Eq. 171, 172;
Churchill v. Rogers, 3 T. B. Mon. 81; Purcell
v. Miner, 4 Wall. 513.
The prayer in regard to the fence stands
differently. If that stipulation had been
fraudulently inserted in the deed, the agreement being otherwise, the deed might be reformed by striking out that provision, or requiring a release of it, so as to make the writing correspond with the actual agreement.
But upon the allegations of the bill there is
no other agreement by which to reform the
deed, and to which to make it conform.
The
plaintiff admits that the stipulation in the
deed is precisely in accordance with the actual agreement The fraud which he alleges
relates only to the consideration
or inducement upon which he was led to make that
agreement;
not to the form of the agreement
itself. If that stipulation were to be stricken
out, the writing would then not express the
agreement actually made by the parties. The
court cannot rectify an instrument otherwise
than in accordance with the actual agreement. It cannot make an agreement for the
parties.
Hunt v. Rousmaniere,
1
Pet. 1,
14; Brooks v. StoUey, 3 McLean, 523, Fed.
Cas.
No. 1,962.
If the subject-matter of
this stipulation were of sufficient materiality,
the fraud alleged might have the effect to
defeat the whole instrument. But this effect
is not sought. The plaintiff's remedy, therefore, is at law, in damages for the deceit and
false representation.
The alleged agreement in regard to the premium and accrued interest upon the bonds
transferred in payment for the land will not
sustain a bill In equity. If such an agreement
was made and broken, we see no reason why
an action of assumpsit will not lie upon the
agreement,
or for the overpayment of the
agreed price of the purchase.
The remedy
at law is as effectual as it can be in equity.
The entry must therefore be, bUl dismissed.
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a civil action trieii before Boya jui-y at spring term o£ the su-

perior court of Pasquotank county. The
complaint was as follows : (1) That on
the 22d day of April, 1884, the plaintiff and
defendants entered Into a contract with regard to the sale and division of the Great
Park estate; that a paper writing, purporting to contain the terms of said contract, was executed by Timothy Ely and
wife, Hannah, by their duly-authorized
agent, Harvey Terry, and by the plaintiff,
through his agent, William J. GrifiBn, A
copy of this writing is hereto attached,

marked "Exhibit A," and is made apart
of this complaint.
(2) That the recitals and
agreements set forth in said contract, down
to section numbered 40, are all true. (3)
That the agreement which was intended to
be embodied in the contract, of which the
exhibit hereto attached is a copy, was
made by Francis Davis, Esq., father of the
said John F. Davis, and Harvey Terry,
agent of Timothy Ely, and wife, Hannah.
(4) That, before the contract could be reduced to writing, the said Francis Davis left
Elizabeth City for his home in Ohio, and directed one W. J. Griffln, an attorney at law,
to draft said contract, and have the same
executed and recorded. (5) That the said
draughtsman was compelled to rely upon
statements of the said Terry, and, by false
and fraudulent representations
by said
Terry, the said contract, or that portion
set forth in the paragraph numbered 40 of
the exhibit, hereto attached, does not set
forth the true terms agreed on. (6) That
the Great Park estate was incumbered by
a mortgage which had been purchased by
Timothy Ely, and the equity of redemption
was held by a firm known as Conrow,
Bush &Lippincott; that the said John F.
Davis had entered into a contract with
the said Conrow, Bush & Lipplncott for the
l^urchase of their interest in the Great Park
estate, except a portion known as the
"Hall Tract," and the said Davis bound
himself to pay off and discharge the mortgage, which was then held by the plaintiff
Ely, and thereby leave the Hall tract to
Conrow, Bush & Lippincott, unincumbered.
This contract of Davis with Conrow, Bush
& Lippincott was well known to Harvey
Terry, the agent of the defendant Ely.
(7) That the said Terry, as agent of the
said Timothy Ely, had obtained a judgment of foreclosure on his mortgage, and
the sale of the Great Park estate was advertised to take place April 22, 1884 ; that,
after the advertisement had been posted,
the said John F. Davis applied for and obtained a restraining order, commanding
the commissioners to desist from the sale
of the Great Park estate until a certain
time mentioned in said restraining order.
(8) That the said Francis Davis and Timothy Ely and Harvey Terry met in Elizabeth
City on the 21st day of April, 1884, and on
that day verbally made a contract which
was intended to be embodied in the contract hereinbefore set out. It was only

tract. (9) Thesaid FrancisDavis,asagent
for his son, John F. Davis, refused to treat
with the said Terry upon any basis except
that the Hall tract should be given or set
apart to his son, John F. Davis, in order
that the said John F. Davis might perform
bis contract with the said Conrow, Bush &
Lippincott. (10) That, after much talking,
it was finally agreed that the said Hall
tract should be excepted, and the balance
of the Great Park estate should be divided
into two parts, equal in area, by a line running north and south, and the western half
thereof should be given or allotted to John
F. Davis and the eastern half to Timothy
Ely, and, in addition to the western half,
the said Davis should have the portion
known as the "Hall Tract." (11) That the
said Terry represented unto the said Davis
that thesaid Hall tract contained butl,300
acres, which the said Terry well knew to
be false. In truth and in fact this complainant has been informed that the said
Hall tract contains 3,000 acres. (12) That,
having confidence in the integrity of said
Terry, and having urgent business engagements in Ohio, the said Francis Davis left
Elizabeth City on the 22d day of April, 1884,
and this plaintiff did not learn of the error
in the agreement for some time thereafter,
and instituted suit as soon as he heard
thereof. Wherefore plaintiff prays — First,
that the said contract may be reformed so
as to speak the true agreement of the parties as herein set out ; second, that the defendants be decreed to pay all costs of this
proceeding ; and third, for such other and
further relief as to thecourt mayseemmeet.
The answer fully denied all the allegations
imputing fraud, and the following issues
were submitted without objection to the
jury. (1) Does the written contract dated
April 22, 1884, contain the true agreement
entered into between theparties? (2) Was
it the agreement between the parties that
John F. Davis should have the Hall tract

and one-half of the balance of the Great
Parker estate, and the defendants the other
half of the Great Parker estate?
(3) Was
the reservation of the Hall tract to J. F.
Davis omitted from the written contract
by reason of false and fraudulent representations made to the draughtsman by the
defendants, or either of them? The issues
show the true contention of the parties.
The plaintiff offered evidence tending to
show the fraud set out in the complaint,
and all the other allegations of the complaint, for the purpose of reforming the
contract.
The defendants objected to the
testimony, unless it was introduced for the
purpose of rescinding the contract, whereupon the counsel for the plaintiff stated
that the purpose of the testimony offered
was to reform the contract, and not to rescind it. Thecourt excluded the testimony,
holding that it was not admissible for the
purpose of reforming the contract, but
that it was admissible for the purpose of
rescinding thecontract.
Upon this intimation the plaintiff submitted to a nonsuit,
and appealed.
C. W. Grandy, for appellant.
Terry, for appellees.
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SiinpHEKD, J., {Hfter.stitiuff the fycts as
There is a hopeless conflict of auiihove.)
thority upon the question whether a court
of equity will correct an executory contract
on the ground of fraud or mistake, and enforce it with the variation. In England and
several of the American states such relief is
denied, although a defendant, for the purpo.se of resisting specific performance, may
show that byfraud or mistake the written
contract does not express the real terms of
the agreement. In other states this distinction is repudiated, and thecontract will
be corrected and enforced in proper cases at
the instance of either party. Where such
executory contracts, within the statute of
frauds, are corrected and enforced, there is
a further diversity, some courts holdingthat they will only exercise the power where
the object is to restrict the sub.iect-matter
of the contract, while others hold that the
contract will be corrected, although its subject is enlarged. Of this latter opinion is
Mr. Pomeroy (2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § ncl' et seq.)
and other writers of great respectability.
Opposed to this view we have the ICnglish
authorities, (A\'oollara v. Hearn, 2 White &
T. Lead. Cas. Eq. llL'O,) and Bisp. Eq. § ys3;
AVhart. Ev. S 10-'4, and many decisions in
the United States, of which the leading case
is GhisK v. Hulliert, 102 .Mass. 24. In this
" when the proease the court sa.vs that
posed reformation of an instrument involves the specific enforcement of an oral
agreement witliin the statute of frauds, or
when the terms sought to be added would
so modify the instrument as to make It
operate to convey an interest or secure a
right which can onlj' be conveyed or secured through an instrument in writing,
and for which no writing has ever existed,
the statute of frauds is a suflicient answer
to such a proceeding, unless the plea of the
statute can be met by some ground of estoppel to deprive the party of the right to set
up that defense. Jordan v. Sa wkins, 1 Ves.
Jr. 402; Osborn v. Phelps, 19 Conn. {i:i; Clinan v. Cooke, 1 Schoales & L. 22. The fact
that the omission or defect in the writing
by reason of which it failed to convey the
land or express the obligation which it is
sought to make it convey or express was
occasioned by mistake, or by deceit and
fraud, will not alone constitute such an
estoppel. * * » Rectification, by making the contract include obligations or subject-matter to which its written terms will
not apply, is a direct enforcement of the
oral agreement, as much in conflict with the
statute of frauds as if there were no Mriting
at all." This decision, in so far as it holds
thatthe subject-matter of thecontract may
not be enlarged, is supported by abundant
authority. Story's Equity Jurisprudence
is often cited to sustain the other view, but
the argument there seems to be directed
against the distinction between parties
seeking and parties resisting specific performance. It refers to the decisions of Chancellor Kent in (iillespie v. Moon, 2 Johns.
v. Livingston, 4
Ch. ."iS.j, and Keiselbrack
Johns. Ch. 144. In neither of these cases
was the subject-matter enlarged. In Gillespie's Case (so often cited) the correction
made was tlie striking out of hO acres from
a written agreement which included 2.50.
Bisp. Eq. 445, says that "in cases which fall
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within the statute it is obvious that to
carry tlie rule in (;illesi)ie's ('ase to the extent of holding that an agreement (for example) to convey fifty acres may, for the
sake of justice and equity be construed! to
mean a contract to convey one hundred,
would be to repeal the statute of frauds and
to give effect to a simple verbal agreement
to sell land. Where, however, the contention of the complainant is that something
which is actually embraced in the writing
was not intended to be included therein, to
suffer him to show this is not to enforce a
parol contract in relation to land. It is
simply to provethat a written contract did
not embrace all that, on its face, it appeared to include. Such was the actual
state of the case in Gillespie v. Moon." It
maybe remarked liiat inmost of thestates
where such relief is granted the doctrine of
"part performance" is recognized, and the
proof required is but little short of that
which is necessary to enforce a contract
In North Carolina, so
upon that ground.
far from correcting such executory contracts within the statute so as to enlarge
their terms, the tendency of our decisions is
to confine such corrective relief to executed
contracts alone. A\'ehave been able to find
no decision in point, but the words of H.^r.i,,
J., in Newsom v. lUifferlow, 1 Dev. Eq. .'!7'.),
strongly show the disinclination
of the
court to depart from the statute, excei)!
upon the most imperative demands of jusThe learned judge says:
tice and equity.
"It is altogether unnecessary to inquire in
this casehowfarcourts of equity have gone
in carrying into eflect written executory
contracts or varying them by parol evidence. Suffice ittosay that thereason why
they have declined giving i-elief in many such
cases is that the plaintiff had a remedy at
law. Thatreason is not applicable to executed contracts. In thesecascs theplaintiff
has no remedy at law, and, unless a court
of equity will give relief, he can have no redress." This distinction between executed
and executory contracts is clearly put by
Adams, Eq. 171 : " Where land is thesubject
of the erroneous instrument, the reformation of an executed conveyance on parol
evidence is not precluded by the statute of
frauds, for othervviseitwould
be imjjossible
* * » But it does not apto give relief.
pear that, where the defendant has insisted
on the benefit of the statute, the court has
ever reformed such an executory agreement
on parol evidence and specifically enforced
it."
Land is regarded as such a high species of
property that exceptional safeguards have
been devised for the preservation and security of its title, and these should not be

departed from unless such departure is absolutely necessary to subserve the ends of
justice. Qnder the former system the equitable relief we have mentioned was administered by the trained minds of learned
judges, sitting as chancellors, who appreciated the grave evils which the statute was
designed to prevent, and who gave full effect to the rule which required the clearest
andmostcogenttestimony. Even then the
relief in this state was confined, it seems,
to executed contracts, and surely there is
nothing in the new method of trying equitable issues which encourages us to leave the
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old moorings and venture upon a sea of
trouble, confusion, and insecurity.
On the
ground of necessity we correct conveyances
by adding clauses of defeasance and words
of inheritance.
We also restrict or enlarge
the subject-matter, but we decline to do this
in the case of executory contracts, where
there can necessarily be no other object
than, as in the case before us, to have it
specifically enforced. Itis believed that no
great hardship can result from such ruling,
as the court will, upon rescission, endeavor
to place the parties in-statu quo, and damages maybe given for the fraud and deceit.
The court is liberal in the adjustment of
equities arising in such cases ; but, even if
occasional instances of hardship occur, it is
farbetterthattheseshonldbe endured thau
that every title in the state should be exposed to the assaults of false and fraudulent oral testimony.
What we have said
has no reference to the correction of ordinary executory contracts in aid of actions
for damages at law, such as the correction
of theterms of a bond and the like. Equity
will always make the correction, and the
party can sue upon the corrected contract
at law. The two jurisdictions being now
blended, such relief will be granted in a
single action. It may be that in cases of
personal property, where there is apretium
affectionis, the contract may be corrected
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and specifically enforced, but it is unnecessary to pass upon that question here.
The relief sought in this action Is to correct the contract so as to include the "Hall
tract." It seems from the complaint that
the alleged fraud consisted in certain false
representations as to the number of acres
made to the plaintiff when the parol agreement was made. False representations are
also alleged to have been made to Mr. Griffin, the draughtsman ; but these are not
specified, so we must assume that they
were the same as those made to his principal, Davis. However this maybe, we have
here a plain case where it is proposed to
correct an executory contract for the sale
of land by making it include a larger quantity than is stated in the writing. The
plaintiff does not wish to rescind, and offers
the parol testimony solely for the purpose
of reformation.
We think tnat to admit
the testimony in such cases would be, as
has been said, virtually repealing the statute of frauds, and opening the door to a
flood of evils, the extent of which it would
be impossible to estimate.
The plaintiff
may enforce thecontract in its present form,
or he may rescind it, and ask for an adjustment of any equities which may have grown
out of the transaction.
We think tjiat the
testimony was properly rejected, and that
there is no error.
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MILLER

et al. v. SCAMMON.

(52 N. H. 609.)

Supreme Judicial

Court of New Hampshire.
June, 1873.

In

equity.
The bill by Frank W. Miller
George
W. Marston against Stephen
Scammon alleged that the plaintiffs were the
publishers of a dailj* newspaper,
that the
defendant, fraudulently intending to deceive
and injure the plaintiffs, and to expose them
to loss and to a prosecution
for libel, persuaded and procured them to insert in their
newspaper an advertisement over th« signature of the defendant, and which he said
was true, and which he alleged was necessary and designed to protect him against
being compelled to pay certain notes therein
described, which he then and there solemnly
declared had been wrongfully obtaiued, and
pui-porting to have been for a valuable consideration, and to have been signed by the
defendant, and which he then and there pretended and asserted he never signed, and upon which he might be sued, or which might
be set up in a suit against him.
The bill then avers that the allegations of
were false, and the presthe advertisement
ent plaintiffs, as well as the defendant, were
indicted and convicted for publishing a false
and malicious libel in said advertisement,
and the present plaintiffs were fined $150,
^^•hich they have paid, with costs taxed at
$21.63, together with other costs for counsel
fees and other expenses amounting to $50,
amounting in the whole to $221.63.
The plaintiffs pray that the court will ascertain the amount which they have had to
pay and the damages they have suffered by
reason of the fraud and deceit of the defendant, and that he may be ordered and decreed
to pay the same to the plaintiffs, with interest, and for such other relief as may be just.
To this bill there was a general demurrer,
of law thus raised were
and the questions

and

reserved.

W. H. Y. Haokett, for plaintiffs.
gin, for defendant

Mr. Wig-

FOSTER, J. As a declaration In case, to
recover damages for the deceit and fraud of
the plaintiffs' bill does not
the defendant,
seem wanting in the essential and ordinary
The prayer of the biU
forms of pleading.
is that the court may ascertain what the
plaintiffs "have had to pay, and the damages
they have suffered by reason of the fraud
and that he
and deceit" of the defendant,
may be ordered and decreed to pay the same;
but the damages are specifically enumerated
in dollai-s and cents In the bill, and no aid
In equity is required for their ascertainment.
No reason is suggested in the bill why the
plaintiffs have chosen to proceed in equity
rather than by the usual course of the law,
which is ample in its form and power for the
redress of such grievances as the plaintiffs
complain of, provided they are entitled to re-

lief or satisfaction. If the plaintiffs' remedy
at law is not as plain, full, complete, and
adequate as it is by proceedings in equity,
neither the fact nor the reasons why are
suggested In this bill, which, if it may be
adopted for the disposition of such a case
as the present, may just as well serve hereafter as a precedent, mutatis mutandis, for
a bill to recover damages for deceit, in any
case in which such damages are now sought
by means of an action of tort.
It is quite true that, not only by force of
our statutes, but upon general principles,
courts of equity exercise a general jurisdiction in cases of fraud, sometimes concurrent
with, and sometimes exclusive of, the common-law courts.
Gen. St. c. 190, § 1; Snell,
Eq. 359. And it is said tliat in some cases
of fraud, for which the common law affords
complete and adequate relief, chancery may
have concurrent jurisdiction.
Snell, Eq. 859.
This general proposition,
however,
is too
broad when applied to our practice, under
the rules of evidence which permit or require
parties to testify. In the English practice,
and perhaps in some American states, equity
may entertain
this concurrent jurisdiction,
because, although the remedy at law may be
said to be adequate, the means of obtaining
the truth, where discovery by the oath of
the party is essential, may be wanting or
deficient in the com'ts of common law. "The
jurisdiction of the courts of equity for the
of civil rights, as distinguished
enforcement
from the jurisdiction of the courts of common law, derives much of its utility from
the power of the great seal to compel the
defendant,
in a suit, to discover
and set
forth, upon oath, every fact and circuminformation,
stance within his knowledge,
and belief material to the plaintiff's case."
Adam, Eq. 1. But to a very great extent the
right to enforce discovery, and to search the
conscience of the party, which was formerly
only to be had in chancery, is afforded in the
practice and by the statutes of our law
courts as fully and effectually as by a court
of equity.
"Perhaps the most general, if not the most
precise, description of a court of equity, in
the English and American sense," says Judge
Story, "is that it has jurisdiction In cases
of rights recognized and protected by the
municipal jurisprudence, where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy cannot be had in
the courts of common
law. The remedy
must be plain, for, if it be doubtful and obscure at law, equity will assert a jurisdiction.
It must be adequate, for, if at law it
falls short of what the party is entitled to,
that founds a jurisdiction in equity; and it
must be complete, that is, it must attain the
full end and justice of the case. * ♦ *
The jurisdiction of a court of equity is,
therefore, sometimes concurrent with the
jurisdiction of a court of law. It is sometimes exclusive of it, and it is sometimes
auxiliary to it." 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 33.
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In the matter of actual fraud, Blackstone

said that "courts of equity are estal)lished to detect latent frauds and concealments which the process of the courts of law
is not adapted to reach." 3 Bl. Comm. 431.
And although it may still be that courts of
liberal equity powers may entertain concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of law,
even in those cases of fraud which are effectually remediable in the latter, such jurisdiction is very seldom exercised anywhere,
as we believe, and never, to our knowledge,
in this state. Its ordinary application is
restricted to cases in which a decree is required compelling- the wrongdoer, specifically,
to make good his default; "and therefore,"
says Mr. Adams, "if the wrong require specific redress, and such specific redress is not
attainable at law, there is a prerogative
jurisdiction in equity to relieve." Adams'
also,
Bq., Introduction *xxxv. Sometimes,
where the remedy at law would seem to be
equity will entertain jurisdiction
effectual,
for the sake of avoiding circuity of action
Smith, Man. Eq. §
or multiplicity of suits.
Indeed, as we regard it, the correct prin1.
ciple is laid down by Judge Story in his
Equity Pleadings (section 473), where he
says, "In general, courts of equity will not
assume jurisdiction where the powers of the
ordinary courts are sufficient for the purposes
of justice, and therefore it may be stated
as a general rule, subject to few exceptions,
that where the plaintiff can have as effectual
and complete a remedy in a court of law
as in a court of equity, and that remedy is
direct, certain, and adequate, a demurrer,
which is in truth a demurrer to the jurisdiction of the court, will hold; but where there
is a clear right, and yet there is no remedy
in a court of law, or the remedy is not plain,
adequate, and complete, and adapted to the
particular exigency, then, and in such cases,
com'ts of equity will maintain jurisdiction."
And see 1 Daniell, Gh. Prac. 610.
Although the plaintiffs have not told us,
in their complaint, wherein their remedy is
deficient at law, they have suggested it in
They say, "It is a recognized
argument.
rule that equity will give relief against fraud
upon less direct proof than would induce a
court of law to afford the same relief."
But
the only difference in the quality of proof
seems to be with regard to the matter of
presumptions; and altJiough it is said, in
support of the plaintiffs' general proposition,
that courts of equity will grant relief upon
the ground of fraud, established by such
presumptive evidence as courts of law would
not always deem sufficient proof to justify
a verdict (1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 190), it seems
quite manifest from the charge of the plaintiffs' bill that they cannot support or derive aid to their claim from any presumptions other than those which could as well
be deduced in a court of law as in equity,
from the circumstances which may be disclosed and developed before a jury.
has
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Again, the plaintiffs say, "In equity the
plaintiff's are entitled to search the conand to have the
science of the defendant,
benefit of his answer under oath, or of his
refusal so to make it; and it is not quite
certain that the defendant could be compelled to state facts as a witness which,
while they would make out the plaintiffs'
case, would expose him to another indictment." But our statute, permitting and compelling the testimony of parties in civil actions, seems to afford all the advantages
claimed for chancery jurisdiction in this respect; and an answer to a question, searching the defendant's conscience to its lowest
depths, could not, after his conviction for
the libel which he uttered and the plainon the
tiffs published, be now avoided
ground of its tendency to expose him to a
and
that prosecution
criminal prosecution,
its consequences having once been suffered
and expiated.

And, finally, they submit that "the remedy
may be neither plain nor adequate, which
depends upon the unwilling testimony of a
convicted
libeler." But a remedy will not
be regarded as inadequate simply because it
may be said that the evidence required to
enforce it is that of an imwilling, or perhaps
and, moreover,
an untrutlifui, witness;
it
is not very apparent that equity is more effectual tlian the law to extract truth from
the lips of an unwilling "convicted libeler."
In the one tribunal, as in the other, the process is the same; in the one tribunal, as in
the other, both parties may testify, and both
be cross-examined.
In short, we are unable to discover any
sufficient grounds for entertaining equitable
jurisdiction of the plaintiffs' case. If the
plaintiffs are entitled to relief, their remedy
is plain, and not doubtful or obscure.
It is
by an action on the case for deceit.
It is
adequate, and does not fall short of what the
party is entitled to, that is, it entitles him to
a verdict for full and ample damages, and
a judgment and
thereon,
execution
with
costs, to be levied upon his goods or estate,
and, for want thereof, upon his body.
And
in this particular it is complete, attaining
the full end and justice of the case, which
requires no other decree than such a judgment and execution.
In all these particulars, the definition of the terms "plain, adequate, and complete,"
as furnished by the
books, is fully satisfied.
1 Story, Eq. Jur.
§

33.

It

is unnecessary to entertain the question
whether the plaintiffs, upon the statements
contained in their bill, might have a remedy
at law. It would seem that everything alleged In the bill might, upon the indictment
against them, have been shown in evidence.
Whether, if proven by credible testimony, it
would constitute a legal defense, we need
not now inquire.
It is said that, before a
person gives general notoriety to oral calumny by circulating it in print, he must be
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prepared to prove its truth to the letter.
An editor gives publicity to a private slander
at his own risk, for he has no more right
to take away the character of a man, without being able to prove the charge that he
has made against him, than he has to take
his property, without being able to justify
tlie act by which he possessed himself of it.
Add. Torts, 775, 776. And even the truth
of the thing charged is in many jm'isdictions
inadmissible as a justification, and, if admitted at all, can only be received to rebut
or refute the proof or inference of malice,
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which is said to constitute the essence of
the offense.
Whart. Cr. Law, 850.
It \^ould seem that if the plaintiffs might
have shown the facts which they now allege
in defense of the indictment upon which
they have been convicted, or if the proffered testimony was inadmissible, because
affording no justification, the conviction must
be regarded as putting all the parties to this
bill in pari delicto, and that the plaintiffs
can therefore have no claim, either in law
or equity, for relief.
Bill dismissed.
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et al. v.

(7 Sup. Ct. 249,

HOUSTON.

119

U.

Supreme Court of the United

S. 347.)

States.

Dec. 13,

1886.

Appeal from tlie Circuit Court of the Unitof Texas.

ed States for the Western District

This was a bill in equity, filed November
of
23, 1881, by Buzard and Hillard, citizens
Missouri, against Houston, a citizen of Texas,
the material allegations of which were as
follows:
That the plaintiffs were partners in the
business
of pasturing and breeding cattle
upon a tract of land owned by them in the
state of Texas, and on October 14, 1881, negotiated a purchase from the defendants of
at
1,500 cows and 50 bulls, to be delivered
Lampasas, In that state, in May, 1882, at
the price of $15.50 a head, one-half payable
and the
upon the signing of the contract,
that
other half upon delivery of the cattle;
the terms of their agreement were stated in
of that date, signed by the
a memorandum
parties, and intended as the basis of a more
formal contract to be afterwards executed;
and that the plaintiffs at once paid to the
That
defendant $500 in part performance.

1881, the parties resumed neand met to complete the contract; that the defendant then proposed that,
in lieu of the contract with him for the cattle mentioned in the memorandum, the plaintiffs should talie from him an assignment of
a similar contract in writing, dated August
13, 1881, and set forth in the bill, by which
one Mosty agreed to deliver to the defendant
an equal number of similar cattle, at the
same time and place, at the price of $14 a
head; that the defendant then stated that
he had paid the sum of $15,000 on the contract with Mosty; and aslied that, in case of
his assigning that contract to the plaintiffs,
they should pay him that sum, and also the
difference of $1.50 a head in the prices mentioned in the two contracts, but finally proposed to deduct from this 25 cents a head;
that, as an inducement
to the plaintiffs to
make the exchange of contracts, the defendant represented to them that Mosty was good
and solvent, and able to perform his contract; that he was better than the defendant, and then had on his ranch 1,200 head
of the cattle; and that there was no doubt
of the performance of this contract, because
one McAnulty was a partner with Mosty in
its performance;
of all which the plaintiffs
knew nothing, except that they knew that
McAnulty was a man of wealth, and fully
able as well as willing to perform his contracts.
That on November 1, 1881, the plaintiffs,
believing and relying on the defendant's repaforesaid,
accepted his proposiresentations
tion, and paid the sum of $14,500, making,
with the sum of $500 already paid, the
amount of $15,000, which he alleged he had

on October
gotiations,

31,
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paid to Mosty on his contract, and executed
and delivered to the defendant their obligation to pay him, on the performance by
Mosty of that contract, an additional sum of
being the profit on the contract
$1,837.50,
with Mosty in the sale to the plaintiffs, less
and rethe deduction of 25 cents a head;

to him his original contract with
turned
them, and in lieu thereof received from him
his contract with Mosty, and his assignment
thereof to the plaintiffs indorsed thereon, and
set out in the bill, containing a provision that
he should not be responsible in case of any
failure of performance by Mosty; that the
of the defendant
aforesaid representations
were absolutely untme, deceitful, and fraudulent, and were known by the defendant to
be false, and the plaintiffs did not know and
had no means of knowing that they were
were inuntrue; that those representations
tended by the defendant to deceive the plaintiffs, and did deceive them, to their great
injury, to-wit, to the extent of the amount of
$15,000 paid by them to him, and to the further extent of $10,000 for the expenses necessary to obtain other cattle, and for the loss
of the increase of such cattle for the next
year by reason of the impossibility of obtaining them in the exhausted condition of
the market; and that Mosty, at the time of
the assignment, was absolutely insolvent, and
had no property subject to be taken by his
creditors, and his contract was utterly worthless, as the defendant then knew.
The bill then stated that the plaintiflfs
brought into court the contract between the
defendant and Mosty, that it might be delivand also the asered up to the defendant;
signment
thereof by the defendant to the
plaintiffs, that It might be canceled.
The
bill prayed for a discovery; for a rescission
and cancellation of the assignment
of the
contract with Mosty, and also of the plaintiffs' obligation to pay to the defendant the
sum of $1,837.50; for the repayment to the
plaintiffs of the excess of money received by
the defendant from them beyond the amount
which they were to pay him under the original conti'act;
for a reinstatement
and confirmation of that contract, and its enforcement upon such tenns as the court might
deem just and proper; or, if that could not
be done, that the defendant be compelled to
restore to the plaintiffs the sums of $500 and
$14,500 received from them, and also to pay
them the sum of $10,000 for damages which
they had sustained by reason of the defendant's fraudulently obtaining the surrender of
the original contract, and by reason of the
other injuries resulting to them therefrom;
and for further relief.
The defendant demurred to the bill, assigning as a cause of demurrer that the bill
showed that the plaintiff's' only cause of action, if any, was for the sums of money paid
by them on the contract, and for damages
for breach of the contract, for which they
at
had an adequate and complete remedy
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law.
The circuit court overruled the demurrer.
The defendant then answered fully under oath, denying that he made any of the
representations
alleged, and repeating the defense taken by demurrer; the plaintiffs filed a
general replication; conflicting testimony was
taken; at a hearing upon pleadings and proofs
the bill was dismissed, with costs; and the
plaintiffs appealed to this court.

H. E. Barnard, for appellants Buzard and
Jas. F. Miller, for appellee Hous-

another.
ton.

Jlr. Justice GRAY, after stating the case
as above reported, delivered the opinion of
the court.
In the judiciary act of 1789, by which the
first congress established the judicial courts
of the United States, and defined their jurisdiction, it is enacted that "suits in equity
shall not be sustained in either of the courts
of the United States, in any case where plain,
adequate, and complete remedy may be had
at law."
Act of September 24, 1789, c. 20.
Five days
§ 16 (1 Stat. 82; Rev. St. § 723.)
later, on September 29, 1789, the same congress proposed to the legislatures of the several states the article afterwards ratified as
of the constitution,
the seventh amendment
which declares that "in suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
1 Stat. 21, 98.
be preserved."
The effect of the provision of the judiciary
act, as often stated by this court, is that
"whenever a court of law is competent to
take cognizance of a right, and has power to
proceed to a judgment which affords a plain,
adequate, and complete remedy, without the
aid of a court of equity, the plaintiff must
proceed at law, because the defendant has a
constitutional right to a trial by jury." Hipp
V. Babin, 19 How. 271, 278; Insurance Co.
v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616, 621; Grand Chute v.
Winegar, 15 Wall. 373, 375; Lewis v. Cocks,
23 Wall. 466, 470; Root v. Railway Co., 105
U. S. 189, 212; Kjllian v. Ebbinghaus, 110
U. S. 568, 573, 4 Sup. Ct 232. In a very re"This enactment
cent case the court said:
and, if only decertainly means something;
claratory of what was always the law, it
must, at least, have been Intended to emphasize the rule, and to impress it upon the attention of the courts." New York Guaranty
Co. V. Memphis Water Co., 107 U. S. 205, 214,
2 Sup. Ct. 279.
Accordingly a suit in equity to enforce a
legal right can be brought only when the
court can give more complete and effectual
relief, in kind or in degree, on the equity side,
side;
as for inthan on the common-law
stance, by compelling a specific performance,
or the removal of a cloud on the title to real
estate;
or preventing an Injury for which
at law, as in
damages are not recoverable
Watson V. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74; or where
an agreement procured by fraud is of a con-

tinuing nature, and its rescission will prevent
a multiplicity of suits, as in Boyce v. Grundy,
3 Pet 210, 215, and in Jones v. Holies,
9
Wall. 364, 369. In cases of fraud or mistake,
as under any other head of chancery jurisdiction, a court of the United States will not
sustain a bill in equity to obtain only a decree for the payment of money by way of
damages, when the like amount can be recovered at law in an action sounding in tort
or for money had and received.
Parkersburg
V. Brown, 106 U. S. 487, 500, 1 Sup. a. 442;
Ambler v. Ohoteau, 107 U. S. 586, 1 Sup. Ot.
556; Litchfield v. Ballon, 114 U. S. 190, 5 Sup.
Ct. 820.

In England, indeed, the court of chancery,
in cases of fraud, has sometimes maintained
bills in equity to recover the same damages
which might be recovered in an action for
money had and received.
But the reason for
this, as clearly brought out by Lords Justices
Knight Bruce and Turner, in Slim v. Croucher, 1 De Gex, F. & J. 518, 527, 528, was that
such cases were within the ancient and original jurisdiction in chancery before any court
of law had acquired jurisdiction of them, and
that the assumption of jurisdiction by the
courts of law, by gradually extending their
powers, did not displace
the earlier jurisdiction of the court of chancery.
Upon any
other ground, such bills could not be maintained.
Clifford V. Brooke,
13
131;
Ves.
Thompson v. Barclay, 9 Law J. Ch. 215, 218.
And we have not been referred to any instance in which an English court of equity
has maintained a bill in such a case as that
now before us. In Newham v. May, 13 Price,
749, Chief Baron Alexander said:
"It is not
in every case of fraud that relief is to be
by a court of equity.
administered
In the
case, for instance, of a fraudulent warranty
on the sale of a horse, or any fraud upon the
sale of a chattel, no one, I apprehend, ever
thought of filing a bill in equity."
The present bill states a case for which an
action of deceit could be maintained at law,
and would afford full, adequate, and complete remedy.
The original agi-eement for
the sale of a number of cattle, and not of any
cattle in particular, does not belong to the
class of contracts of which equity would decree specific performance.
If the plaintiffs
should be ordered to be reinstated in all their
rights under that agreement, and permitted now to tender performance thereof on
their part, the only relief which they could
have in this suit would be a decree for damages, to be assessed by the same rules as in
an action at law. The similar contract with
Mcsty, and the assignment thereof to the
plaintiffs, are in the plaintiffs' own possession, and no judicial rescission of the assignment is needed.
If the exchange of the contract was procured by the fraud alleged, it
would be no more binding upon the plaintiffs
at law than in equity;
and in an action of
deceit the plaintiffs might treat the assignment of the contract with Mosty as void.
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delivering up that contract to the
recover full damages for the nonperformance of the original agreement.
No
relief la sought against Mosty, and he is not
made a party to the bill. The obligation executed by the plaintiffs to the defendant is
not negotiable, so that there is no need of an
injunction. A judgment for pecuniary damages would adjust and determine all the rights
of the parties, and is the only redress to
vyhich the plaintiffs, if they prove their allegations, are entitled.
There is therefore no
ground upon which the bill can be maintained.
Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 61S,
and, upon
defendant,

and other cases above cited.

The comparative weight due to conflicting
testimony such as was introduced in this
case can be much better determined by seeing and hearing the witnesses
than upon
written depositions or a printed record.
This case does not require us to enter upon
a consideration
of the question under what
circumstances a bill showing no ground for
relief, and praying for discovery
equitable
as incidental only to the relief sought, is open
to a demurrer to the whole bill, or may. If
discovery is obtained, be retained for the purposes of granting full relief, within the rule
often stated in the books, but as to the proper
limits of which the authorities are conflicting. It is enough to say that the case clearly
falls within the statement of Chief Justice
Marshall: "But this rule cannot be abused
by being employed as a mere pretext for
bringing causes, proper for a court of law, inIf the answer of the
to a court of equity.
and the plaindefendant
discloses nothing,
tiff supports his claim by evidence in his own
possession,
unaided by the confessions
of
the defendant, the established rules, limiting
the jurisdiction
of courts, require that he
should be dismissed from the court of chancery, and permitted to assert his rights in a
court of law." Russell v. Clark, 7 Cranch,
See, also, Horsburg v. Baker, 1 Pet.
69, 89.
232, 236; Brown v. Swann, 10 Pet. 497, 503.
The decree of the circuit court, dismissing
the bill generally, might be considered a bar
to an action at law, and It is therefore, in
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with the precedents in Rogers v.
U. S. 644, 1 Sup. Ct. 623, and the
cases there cited, ordered that the decree be
reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to enter a decree dismissing the bill
for want of jurisdiction, and Without prejudice to an action at law.
accordance

Durant,

106

I

dissent from
BRADLEY, J. (dissenting.)
the judgment in this case so far as it directs
the bill to be dismissed by the court below
for want of equitable jurisdiction. The complainant had been induced to give up a contract for cattle made to him by the defendant, and to accept in lieu of it an assignment
from the defendant of a contract which he
had from a third person who was insolvent,
and whose Insolvency was not known by the
complainant,
but was known by the defendant, though he asserted that the third person
The bill seeks to
was entirely responsible.
and
abrogate and set aside the assignment,
to restore to complainant his original contract, on account of the fraud and misreppracticed upon him.
Having
resentation
been induced to pay $15,000 in the transaction, and suffered a large amount of damages, he adds to the relief sought a prayer
to have his damages assessed and decreed.
This is the case made by the bill. I think it
is clearly within the scope of equity jurisdiction, both on account of the fraud, and from
the nature of the relief asked by the complainant; namely,
the cancellation of an
agreement, and the reinstatement
of a contract which he had been fraudulently induced to cancel.
If the bill had prayed nothing
else, it seems to me clear that it would have
presented a case for equity.
A court of law
could not give adequate relief.
The existence of the assignment,
and the cancellation of the first agreement, would embarrass
the plaintiff in an action at law. It is different from the case of a lost note or bond.
Fraud is charged, and documents exist which
in equity ought not to exist.
think the
complainant is entitled to have the fraudulent transaction wiped out, and to be restored
to his original status.

I
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TEFT

V.

STEWART

(31 Mich.

et aL

367.)

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Jan. Term,

Appeal from circuit court,
In chancery.

Berrien county;

1875.

Edward Bacon, for complainant. George
S. Clapp and D. Darwin Hughes, for defendants.

GRAVES, C. J. The real grievance alleged
by complainant is, that defendants
combined to defraud him, and the substance
of the
transaction, and its incidents, which he relates at much length, may be stated from the
bill as follows:
The defendant Stewart resided In St. Joseph, Berrien county, and owned a stock of
goods, including a quantity of boots and
shoes.
This property was at Bangor, Van
Buren county, and was valued by Stewart at
some fourteen thousand dollars, and he wished to sell it.
One Sherwin, residing in Illinois, owned a tract of about two hundred
acres of land in Berrien county, which he desired to dispose of.
Complainant was an
acquaintance
of Sherwin, and after some negotiations, it was agreed between the different parties, that Stewart should transfer to
complainant the boots and shoes and onehalf of the remainder of the stock, and that
complainant.
In consideration thereof, should
procure Sherwin, upon certain terms agreed
on between
Sherwin and complainant,
to
convey the land to Stewart, but subject to
an existing mortgage on it of one thousand
dollars; that Carroll should buy the remaining half of the stock of Stewart, at two thousand five hundred dollars; that complainant
in a few days received from Sherwin the
deed going to Stewart, and called on the latter to deliver it, and get possession of the
boots and shoes and his share of the other
goods; whereupon
Stewart stated that complainant would have no trouble about the
goods, as Carroll was at Bangor, in charge
of them and making an inventory; that complainant expressed himself as unwilling to
deliver the deed unless Stewart would give
him some writing which would assure to him
his portion, as he had nothing to do with
Carroll; that Stewart then stated his readiness to give such a paper, and one Devoe, a
brother-in-law of complainant, being present,
it was arranged that the writing should run
to Devoe instead of complainant; although,
complainant was solely
as was understood,
interested;
that Stewart then made a bill of
sale to Devoe of the boots and shoes, and
half of the rest of the stock, and added an
order to Carroll to make delivery; that complainant then gave up the deed to Stewart,
who subsequently put it on record, and Devoe received the bUl of sale and order, and
proceeded to Bangor for the property; that
complainant and Devoe then called on Carroll
tor it, when he refused to deliver any of it,
or to allow any of it to be taken, and claimed

the whole In virtue of a purchase by hlmaelf
of Stewart; that complainant succeeded in
getting a part of the boots and shoes, but
was precluded by Carroll from getting anything more; that complainant discovered, after this claim by Carroll, that subsequent to
the conclusion of the terms of the bargain
as before mentioned, but before the delivery
of Sherwin's deed to Stewart, and the making of the bill of sale and order by Stewart
to Devoe, Carroll and Stewart had fraudulently, and without complainant's knowledge,
and with intent to cheat him, made an arrangement by which Stewart had given a bill
of sale of the whole property to Carroll, ard
had taken back a mortgage on it for two
thousand five hundred dollars; that complainant had neither knowledge nor notice of
this transaction when the deed was delivered
to Stewart, and the bill of sale and order received from him, and first became aware of
it when Carroll refused to allow anything to
be taken; that Stewart and Carroll refused
to recognize any right of complainant in or
to the property, and refused to allow him to
have any of it; that Stewart and Carroll, or
one of them, have converted
a portion of
it and appropriated the proceeds, and mixed
with the rest of the old stock other goods
since procured; that Devoe has assigned to
complainant, but that Stewart and Carroll
wholly deny his right.
The bill waived answer on oath, and asked
no preliminary or final relief by injunction.
Neither did it seek to get rid of the deed
made to Stewart, or to obtain the land conveyed by Stewart to complainant.
The defendants answered separately, and
denied the fraud charged, and most of the material matter tending to show the grievance
alleged in the bill.
Their account of the
transaction was in substance, that complainant was not known to Stewart in the transaction as vendee, or as a party in any way to
the trade concerning the goods, and that Carroll was sole vendee.
They further explicitly claimed that the
biU did not make a case of equitable cognizance, and insisted that his remedy, if any,

was at law.
Proofs having been taken, the court on final
hearing decreed that the defendants, within
forty days after the 11th of August, 1874,
should pay to complainant, or his solicitor,
two thousand nine hundred and fifty dollars,
with interest from that date at seven per
cent., together with complainant's costs, and
that he should have execution therefor.
The
defendant Stewart thereupon appealed, whilst
the defendant CarroU acquiesced
in the decree

It appears to me quite impossible, in the
face of the objection taken and insisted on,
to sustain this decree without sanctioning
the right to come into equity in all cases to
recover damages where the grievance asserted is a fraud committed by one upon another in a dealing in personal property.
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If the right contended for and carried out
by the decree can be maintained, no reason
is perceived why, upon the same principle, a
party claiming to have been cheated in a
horse trade, or In a purchase of any chattels
where the amount is sufficient, may not at
his election proceed to sue in chancery for
damages, and preclude an Investigation before a jury.
The principles and course of practice of the
court are, however, not in harmony with any
such procedure.
It is admitted that the books commonly say
that equity has jurisdiction in all cases of
fraud, but every one knows that the proposition Is not to be accepted literally.
It must
always be understood in connection with the
general and specific remedial powers of the
These, confine it absolutely to civil
court.
suits. They also confine It, when the point
is seasonably and properly made and Insisted
on, to transactions where, in consequence of
the indicated state of facts, there appears to
be ground for employing some mode of action, or some kind of aid or relief not practicable in a court of law, but allowable in
equity.

In the present case no injunction was called for, and there was no ground for discovery, and no discovery was sought, as the bill
waived an answer on oath.
No claim was set up to have the deed from
Sherwin to Stewart set aside, or to have the
land conveyed to complainant, and no case is
made to warrant such a claim, since the bill
contains nothing to show that third persons
may not have acquired Interests on the faith
of Stewart's title.
Indeed, no circumstances are set forth to
call specially for equitable intervention or for
any assistance or mode of redress peculiar to
chancery procedure.
The facts as given, and the case as shaped,
point to just the action and relief peculiar to
They look to a single judga court of law.
ment for damages, and nothing else.
The case, then, was really of legal, and not
In strict propriety of equitable cognizance.
The objection was timely made and urged.
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and complainant was bound to regdrd it; and
unless it is to be maintained that in all cases
standing on the same principle, a complaining party is to be allowed by his election to
try in chancery, and prevent an investigation
by jury, the point made by appellant must
be sustained, and in my judgment it should
Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 72-74; 1 Spence, Eq.
be.
Jur. 691-700; Adams, Eq. Introduction, pp.
57, 58; Shepard v. Sanford, 3 Barb. Oh. 127;
Bradley v. Bosley, 1 Barb. Oh. 125; Monk v.
Harper, 3 Edw. Oh. 109; Pierpont v. Fowle,
2 Woodb. & M. 23, Fed. Gas. No. 11,152; Vose
V. Philbrook, 3 Story, 335, Fed. Gas. No. 17,010; Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616;
Hipp V. Babin, 19 How. 271; Parker v. Manufacturing Co., 2 Black, 545; Jones v. Newhall. 115 Mass. 244; Suter v. Matthews, Id.
253; Foley v. Hill, 2 H. L. Cas. 28; Crampton V. Varna E. Co., 7 Ch. App. 562, 3 Bng.
R. 509; Hoare v. Bremridge, L. R. 14 Eq.
522, 3 Eng. R. 824, cited by Lord Hatherly
with approbation in Dchsenbein v. Papelier,
8 Ch. App. 695, 6 Eng. R. 576; Kemp v.
Tucker, 8 Ch. App. 369, 5 Eng. R. 596; Warne
V. Banking Co., 5 N. J. Eq. 410; Haythom v.
Margerem, 7 N. J. Eq. 324.
There would be more reason than there is
for wishing to escape from the objection noticed, if complainant's version of the affair
was placed by the proofs beyond fair controversy; but It is not.
The evidence is extremely conflicting in regard to the true nature of the transaction, and there is room for
arguing in favor of the theory advanced on
The case is, then, specifically
each side.
suited for investigation by jury, where the
witnesses can be seen and their trustworthiness be better understood.
think that, so far as the defendant Stewart is concerned, who alone has appealed,
the decree should be reversed, and the bill
dismissed, with his costs of both courts, but
that the dismissal should be without prejuat law against him
dice to any proceedings
the complainant may think proper to take.

I

OAMPBEIili and COOLEY, JJ., concurred.
OHRISTTANOY, J., did not sit in this case.
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HICKS

V.

(11 N. E. 241,

STEVENS.
121

Supreme Court of Illinois.

22, 1887.

Error

to appellate court, First district.
Stevens, the plaintiff, was introduced to
Hicks, the defendant, by Jones, who had the
option for purchasing the rights in tube-closer,
an invention of Hicks, for the state of New
York. Stevens talked with Hicks about investing in it.
Hicks asked $50,000 for each
of several states, including Pennsylvania and
Ohio, and that the rights for each of these
states were worth that sum, as were also the
rights for the state of New York. After several interviews, Stevens told Jones he should
have to give it up, as Hicks' prices were
too high.
Jones then asked him to take half
of New York with him, and that they go
in as partners on an option he had to purNegotiations
chase that state for $20,000.
were had, and a number of interviews took
were made by
place, at which representations
Hicks as to the capabilities and merits of his
invention, and Hicks gave Stevens a circular
containing a description of such capabilities.
May 30, 1883, an agreement of purchase was
executed by the parties, wherein Hicks sold
to Jones and Stevens the territorial rights for
the state of New York to make and sell the
his
executed
Tube-closer.
Stevens
Hicks
three notes for $2,500 each, and delivered
them to Hicks, and shortly thereafter paid
him $2,500 in cash. Jones did the same.
Stevens paid Jones $250, half of the amount
This sum
he paid Hicks for the option.
Hicks gave Stevens credit for on one of bis
Being unable to sell the tube-closer,
notes.
October 16, 1883, Stevens and Jones gave
Hicks a reassignment of their rights, and demanded their money and notes, which Hicks
refused
to give up. October 23d, Stevens
notified Hicks in writing that he rescinded
the contract, and demanded a return of the
November 5th he filed his bill
consideration.
the
and recover
the contract,
to rescind
The judge found that the
money and notes.
patent was worthless; that Hicks' representations were material and false; and decreed
that the contract be rescinded, and that the
$2,500 paid and the notes be returned, but
did not decree the repayment of the $250 paid
by Stevens to Jones, and indorsed by Hicks
on one of Stevens' notes.
On appeal the appellate court affirmed the
decree, except that it added the $250 paid by
Stevens to Jones to the money decree.

H. W. Wolseley,
and
fendant in error.
man

Strong

satisfies us that, prior to the
consummation of the sale, the parties had frequent interviews, in which Hicks represented
to Stevens and Jones that the Hicks Tubecloser was a new and valuable invention, and
would save both steam and fuel; that it was
a good and profitable thing to sell, and would
bring great profits.
Hicks also gave Stevens
a printed circular setting
forth therein its
capabilities and merits, which, among other
things, stated that "the use of the tube-closer
demonstrates to a positive certainty its ability to show by the steam-guage. In the morning, before firing up, the same steam pressure
that is felt at night after the day's work. It
will even hold steam in the boiler from Saturday night until Monday
morning.
It is
guarantied to save fully 15 per cent, of fuel,
or whatever fuel is usually required to raise
steam in the morning.
The Hicks tube-closei'
will do it. It will save its cost every month."
Hicks also assured Stevens, in some of the
interviews, that the right to make and sell
the tube-closer in either of the states of Ohio
or Pennsylvania was worth $50,00p; that the
right to the state of New York was worth the
same sum; and that the appliances could be
manufactured
for five dollars apiece, and
would sell for $30 each, and that there was
not less than 2,000 boilers in each of the
Most of these representations,
states named.
especially those in the circulars, are not deHicks, by his answer and testimony,
nied.
claims that all the representations he in fact
made were true, but, whether true or false,
they were not relied on by Stevens in making
the purchase.
It is claimed there was an error in admitting in evidence the verbal statements made
by Hicks, in regard to the tube-closer, prior
Such
to the written agreement for its sale.
statements were not admitted for the purpose
of changing the terms of the written contract,
but to show that its execution was procured
through fraudulent misrepresentations
on the
part of the vendor, and for that purpose it
was certainly proper.
But it is said there
is no charge of fraud in the bill, and hence
there was no foundation in the pleadings to
justify the admission of the evidence. This
is a misapprehension.
Good pleading requires
fraud to be charged specifically, and not in
general terms.
The facts relied on as constituting fraud should be set. forth so as to
apprise the opposite party what he is called
on to meet.
Elston v. Blanchard, 2 Scam.
420; Davis v. Pickett, 72 111. 483.
The bill
sets forth the specific representations
made by
Hicks which induced the complainant to make
the purchase, and then charges "that the representations in the circular given by Hicks to
the complainant and Jones, and the representation that by Hicks' experience, by the use
of said invention, great saving of steam and
fuel could "be made, and other representations of like effect, whereby complainant and
Jones were induced to purchase said rights,
are and were utterly false, and said inven-

The evidence

111. 186.)

March

FRAUD.

for plaintiff in error. UtlEdward A. Dicker, for de-

SHOPB, J. There is no disputing as to the
making of the contract of sale in this ease,
or as to its terms; the principal controversy
being whether Hicks, before the sale, made
as to the utility and
material representations
value of the Invention sold, which were relied on by Stevens, and which were false.
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tion Is -worthless, and by i'ts use no saving of
any practical value can be made," and vcere
known by Hicks to be wortbless and of no
value.
The facts alleged in the bill, if true,
constitute a fraud. If it v^ere otherwise,
Hicks s"hould have interposed a demuirer or
motion to dismiss for want of equity.
It is urged that Stevens did not rely on any
of the representations
made by Hicks, but
acted upon his own judgment; and that, if he
did rely upon them, he was guilty of such
negligence, in failing to properly investigate,
as to deprive him of any equitable
relief.
To entitle a party to relief, either legal or
equitable, on the ground of a fraudulent misrepresentation,
he must have relied upon the
representation
as true; for unless the representations are believed to be true, and acted
upon, it can cause no legal injury.
It is
necessary that he should trust the representation, but It is not essential that the false
representations
should be the sole inducement
to his entering into the contract.
2 Pom. Eq.
Jur. § 890; 2 Pars. Cont. (5th Ed.) 773. The
party acting upon a representation must, under the circumstances
of the case, have been
justified in relying upon it, in order to entitle him to relief.
As stated in Pom. Eq.
Jur. § 891: "It may be laid down as a general proposition that where the statements
are of the first kind, [relating to substantial
matters of fact, and not mere opinion,] and
especially when they are concerning matters
which, from their nature or situation, may be
assumed to be within the knowledge or under the power of the party making the representation, the party to whom it is made has
a right to rely on them; and, in the absence of
any knowledge of his own, or of any facts
which should arouse suspicion and cast doubt
upon the truth of the statements, he is not
bound to make inquiries and examination for
himself. It does not, under such circumstances, lie in the mouth of the person asserting the fact to object or complain beIf he
cause the other took him at his word.
claims that the other party was not misled,
he is bound to show clearly that such party
did know the real facts; the burden is on
that such
him of removing the presumption
party relied and acted upon his statements."
And in section 895 the same author says:
is made of facts
"When a representation
which are, or may be assumed to be, within
the knowledge of the party making it, the
knowledge of the receiving party concerning
the real facts, which shall prevent his relying
on and being misled by it, must be clearly
and conclusively established by the evidence."
When a party, ignorant of the real facts,
and having no ready means of information,
makes a purchase, or enters into a transaction as to the subject-matter of which representations
have been made which are material, the law will presume, as a matter of
Kedgrave v.
fact, that he relied on them.
Hurd, 20 Ch. Div. 1; Nicols' Case, 3 De
Gex & J. 387; Fishback t. MUler, 15 Nev.
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Benj. Sales (4th Am. Ed.) 465, note
are made as to
false representations
matters of fact, and the means of knowledge
are at hand, and equally available to both
parties, and the purchaser, instead of resorting to them, trusts the vendor, the law, as
a general rule, will not relieve him from his
Oooley,
own want of ordinary prudence.
Torts, 487. This is the case where the property is tangible and is at hand, and subject
to inspection,
but a different rule obtains
when the property is at a remote distance,
or where the property right is Intangible, and
cannot be
the falsity of the representations
In Smith v. Richdetected by inspection.
ards, 13 Pet. 26, it is held that when a sale
is made of property,
but at a remote distance, which the purchaser
knows that the
seller has never seen, but which he buys
upon the representation
of the seller, relying
in effect
on its truth, such representation
must be deemed to amount to a warranty, or
at least that the seller is bound to make it
good. Cooley, Torts, 488; Maggart v. Freeman, 27 Ind. 531; Lester v. Hahan, 25 Ala.

428;
b.

If

445.

In

case at bar the purchaser was
unacquainted with the use, operation, and management of steam-boilers,
and
of the utility and value of the invention, and
it is doubtful whether its capabilities, usefulness, and practical value could then have
been determined,
even by experts, without
very considerable use and long experiment.
At the date of this contract, the patent,
though allowed, had not been issued, and
but few of the tube-closers had been used or
tested by others than the inventor. Stevens
testifies that he had not seen the tube-closer
in use or operation before he signed the contract; that he inquired, of several to whom he
was refeiTed by Hicks, but could learn nothing as to their merits, except from one party,
who said they had tried It, but had thrown
it away. When Hicks was informed of this,
he said he had met a similar case, and had
fixed it up so that it worked all right, and
that he would do the same with this one.
Hicks was the inventor, and claimed to have
made thorough tests of his invention, and
presumably had a greater knowledge of its
use, capabilities,
utility, and value than any
other person.
From these facts, and his
profession of friendship to Jones, and of his
desire to put him Into a good paying business, we think Stevens and Jones not only
relied upon the representations,
but had a
right to rely on them in making their purAUin V. Millison, 72 111. 201.
chase.
It is true that Hicks told Stevens and
Jones not to take his word, but to satisfy
themselves as to the merit of his invention
before buying, but this cannot relieve him
from liability for his misrepresentation made
for the purpose of inducing the purchase.
He must have known that but little, if any,
information could be obtained by Inquiry,
from the fact the tube-closer had not been
the

wholly
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brought into general use. The inqiilries made
proved fruitless, as he must have known they
would. In 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 806, it is said:
"If, therefore, the party accompanies or follows his misrepresentations
by words of general caution, or by advice to the other that
he consult his friends or professional advisers before concluding the agreement, he
does not thereby counteract any effect upon
the transaction which his untrue statement
citing Keynel v.
would otherwise produce;"
Smith v.
Sprye, 1 De Gex, M & G. 709;
Richards, 13 Pet. 1'6. In Eaton v. ^^'iunie,
"When one as20 Mich. 156, the court say:
sumes to have linowledge upon a subject of
and
may well be ignorant,
\\ liicU another
knowingly makes false statements regarding
it, upon which the other relies, to his injury,
we do not think it lies with him to say that
the party who took his word, and relied upon
it, was guilty of negligence in so doing, so as
to be precluded from recovering compensation
for the injiu:y which was inflicted upon him
citing Railunder cover of the falsehood;"
Pa. 72; Gordon v.
road Co. V. Ogier, .">.">
Railroad Co., 40 Barb. .">.">0;Ernst v. RailSee, also, Walsh v.
road Co., 3.5 N. Y. 28.
Hall, 66 N. C. 238; Oswald v. JIcGehee, 28
•Miss. 340;
JlcClellan v. Scott, 24 Wis. 81;

Starkweather v. Benjamin, 32 Mich. 305;
Kendall v. Wilson, 41 Vt. 567; Pierce v. Wilson, 34 Ala. 603.
Tti maintain an action at law for fraud
and deceit arising from false representations
of a material matter connected with a transaction, it is necessary to show that the party
making it knew it to be false, or occupied
such a position as that the law would impute to him a knowledge of the fact. -V person cannot, it is believed, be free from fraud
in a court of equity when he makes a positive
of a material fact which he
representation
does not know to be true, or has good reason
to believe is true, and which in point of fact
In Allen v. Hart. 72 111. 104, it is
Is false.
held that it Is not indispensable to a right to
rescind a contract that the party making the
knew it to be false, provided
representation
it is material, and the other party had a right
to rely upon it and did so, and was deceived;
and this is believed to be sustained by the
weight of authority. In this case, Hicks'
facilities were superior to those of any one
else for knowing whether the representations
If he did not in fact
made by him were true.
know them to be true, he should not have so
asserted to Stevens, whom he knew had no
means at hand by which to detect their
falsity.
There was no error in admitting in evidence the printed circular of Hicks, showing
The
the valuable qualities of his invention.
proof shows that he gave Stevens one of
containing
them during their negotiations,
of
material and important representations
what his invention would accomplish as a
means of saving steam and fuel; that it
would save its cost in a month; while the

proof showed

that practically It was of no
value in the respect mentioned in the circular.
These circulars were printed and disti'ibuted for the purpose of inducing others
to purchase rights of him, and the statements therein may be regarded as of a more
deliberate character than if made in a conThey were properly admitted.
versation.
See 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 881, and also Cooley,

Torts, 477.
As a general rule, representations as to the
value of property sold, though exaggerated,
do not constitute fraud, but It has some exceptions.
As said in Cooley, Torts (page
in
484:) "There are some cases, however,
which even a false assertion of an opinion
will amount to a fraud; the rctison being
that under the circumstances the other party
has a right to rely upon it without bringing
his own judgment to bear. Such is the case
when one is purchasing goods, the value of
which can only be known to experts, and is
relying upon the vendor, who is a dealer in
such goods, to give him accurate information
concerning them.
The same rule has been
applied when a dealer in patent-rights sold
certain territory to one who was ignorant
of its value, representing it to be very valuable, when he knew it was not."
See Allen
V. Hart, 72 111. 104.
Tlie value of a patentright for the purpose of sales depends largely upon the usefulness of the invention, and
the demand for the article patented.
Objection is made to the admissibility of
In chancery it will be
some other evidence.
presumed that the court considered and actAs the
ed only upon such as may be proper.

other evidence in the ease is sufficient to sustain the decree of the superior court. It will
not be necessary to consider the objection.
It is also claimed that the appellate court
erred in directing that the i|!250 paid by
BeStevens be added to the money decree.
fore Stevens was introduced to Hicks, the
latter made sale to Jones of an option to purchase the right to the state of New York at
and Jones had paid him .$500 there$20,000,
for.
Jones wag not bound to take the right
for the state of New York, but, if he did
not, he could not recover back the money
Stevens bought
he had paid for the option.
of Jones a half interest in the option, for
which he paid Jones $2.50. To this transaction Hicks was not a party. If Jones and
Stevens together failed to purchase the state
right, Stevens could not have called on Hicks
to refund to him the money he had paid to
Jones; and, when the contract for the purchase of the right for the state of New York
was rescinded, it was the same, in substance,

Hicks was
as if it had never been made.
again placed where he was before his sale,
and Jones and Stevens having failed to exercise their option, could not compel Hicks to
return the price paid for it. The bill did not
seek to set aside and rescind Jones' connor
tract for the purchase of the option;
did Hicks refuse to let either Jones, or Jones
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and Stevens, purchase the right for the state
of New York, but, on the contrary, was anxious to have them take it. This ruling of
the appellate court is, we think, clearly erroneous.
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The judgment of the appellate court will
be reversed as to so much of its judgment as
adds to the decree the said sum of $250, and
the decree of the superior court is affirmed.
Reversed in part, and affirmed in part.
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1270

STIMSON

T.

(10 Pflo. Rep.
Suprru^e

HELPS
290,

et al.

9 Colo. 33.)

Court of Colorado.

Feb. 26, 1886.

Appeal from county court, Boiilder county.
The complaint sets out that on the sixth
day of October, 1881, William Stimson leased
to the defendants in error the S. W. %, of section 21, in township 1, range 70 west, in said
county, for the period of four years and six
months, for the pm-pose of mining for coal,
under the conditions of said lease; that they
had no knowledge of the location of the
boundary lines of said tract at the time of
the leasing, and that they so informed Stimson, the defendant in the case; that they requested Stimson to go with them and show
them the boundary lines; that the defendant,
pretending to know the lines bounding said
land, and their exact locality, went then and
there with plaintiffs, and showed and pointed
out to them what he said was the leased
land, and the boundary lines thereof, especially the north- and south lines thereof;
that plaintiffs not then knowing the lines
bounding said land, nor the exact location
thereof, and relying upon what the defendant
then and there pointed out to them as the
leased land, and the lines thereof, then and
there proceeded to work on the land pointed
out, and sank shafts for mining coal thereon,
thereon, —
and made sundry improvements
made buildings, laid ti-acks, etc.; that all the
said work was done and labor performcj
and improvements made on the land pointed
out by defendant to plaintiffs as the leased
land, and that plaintiffs, relying upon the
statements
of defendant as aforesaid, and
not knowing otherwise, believed they were
performing the work, and making all the improvements on the land they had so leased,
which they did by direction of the defendant; that while they were working on the
said land Stimson was frequently present,
and told the plaintiffs they were on his land,
and received royalty from ore taken therefrom; that about April 10, 1882, they were
notified to quit mining on said ground by
the Marshall Coal Mining Company; that the
that none of
land belonged to said company;
the said improvements were put on said
leased land; and that they were compelled
that the
to quit work and mining thereon;
made by them were worth $2,improvements
000; that Stimson falsely represented
to
them other and different lines than the true
boundaries of said premises, and showed and
pointed out to them other and different lands
than the lands leased them, and thereby deceived them, and damaged them, in the sum
of $2,000. Issue joined, and trial to the court
Motion by defendant's counsel for judgment
on the pleadings,
.Judgment for the
$2,000, and costs.

and

evidence

plaintiffs

Wright & Grifan, for appellant.
ley,

lor

appellees.

overruled.

in the sum of
G. Berk-

ELBERT, J. The law holds a contracting
party liable as for fraud on his express representations concerning facts material to the
treaty, the truth of which he assumes to
know, and the truth of which is not known
to the other contracting party, where the
representations were false, and the other
party, relying upon them, has been misled
Upon such representations so
to his injury.
made the contracting party to whom they
are made has a right to rely, nor is there any
duty of investigation cast upon him.
In
such a case the law holds a party bound to
Bigknow the truth of his representations.
elow,

Fi-aud,

57,

60,

63,

67,

68,

87;

Kerr,

Fraud & M. 54 et seq.; 3 Wait, Act. & Dcf.
436.
This is the law of this case, and, on the
evidence, warranted the judgment of the
court below.
The objection was made below, and is renewed here, that the complaint does not state
sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.
Two points are made: (1) That the
complaint does not allege that the defendant
Icnew the representations to be false; (2)
that it does not allege intent to defraud.
It is not necessary, in order to constitute
a fraud, that the party who makes a false
representation should know it to be false.
as of his
He who makes a representation
own knowledge, not knowing whether it be
true or false, and it is in fact untrue, is
guilty of fraud as much as if he knew it to
In such a case he acts to his
be untrue.
own knowledge falsely, and the law imputes
Kerr, Fraud & M. 54 et
a fraudulent intent.
Bigelow, Fraud, 63,
seq., and cases cited;
84, 453; 3 Wait, Act. & Def. 438 et seq.; 2
"Fraud" Is a term
Estee, Pr. 394 et seq.
which the law applies to certain facts, and
where, upon the facts, the law adjudges
fraud, it is not essential that the complaint
should, in terms, allege it It is sufficient if
the facts stated amount to a case of fraud.
Kerr, Fraud & M. 366 et seq., and cases
cited; 2 Estee, PI. 423.
The complaint In
this case states a substantial cause of action, and is fully supported by the evidence.
The action of the county court in refusing
to allow the appellant to appeal to the district court after he had given notice of an appeal to this court, and time had been given in
which to perfect it, cannot be assigned as
If it was an error, it
error on this record.
was error not before, but after, the final
judgment from which this appeal is taken.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed.
[Note from 10 Pac. Rep. 292.]

A contract secured by false and fraudulent
representations cannot be enforced.
Mills v.
Collins, 67 Iowa, 164, 25 N. W. Rep. 109.
A court of equity will decree a rescission of
a contract obtained by the fraudulent repr^entations or conduct of one of the parties thereto,
on the complaint of the other, when it satisfactorily appears that the party seeking the
rescission has been misled in regard to a ma-
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terial matter by such representation or conduct,
But when the facts
to his injury or prejudice.
are known to both parties, and each acts on his
own judgment, the court will not rescind the
contract because it may or does turn out that
they, or either of them, were mistaken as to
the legal effect of the facts, or the rights or obligations of the parties thereunder, and particularly when such mistake can in no way injuriously affect the right of the party complaining
under the contract, or prevent him from obtaining and receiving all the benefit contemplated
by it, and to which he is entitled under it. Seeley V. Reed, 25 Fed. Rep. 361.
or misrepWhen, by false representations
resentations, a fraud has been committed, and
by it the complainant has been injured, the general princuiles of equity jurisprudence afford a
remedy. Singer Manufg
Co. v. Yarger, 12
Fed. Rep. 487.
v. Childs, 42
See Chandler
Mich. 128, 3 N. W. Rep. 297; Cavender v.
Roberson, 33 Kan. 626, 7 Pac. Rep. 152.
When no damage, present or prospective, can
result from a fraud practiced, or false representations or misrepresentation made, a court
of equity will not entertain a petition for relief.
Dunn V. Remington, 9 Neb. 82, 2 N. W. Rep.
230.

A person is not at liberty to make positive
assertions about facts material to a transaction
and if a
unless he knows them to be true;
statement so made is in fact false, the assertor cannot relieve himself from the imputation of fraud by pleading ignorance, but must
respond in damages to any one who has sustained loss by acting in reasonable reliance upon
such assertion. Lynch v. Mercantile Trust Co.,
18 Fed. Rep. 486.
Equity will not relieve a,gainst a misrepresentation, unless it be of some material matter
constituting some motive to the contract, something in regard to which reliance is placed by
one party on the other, and by which he was
actually misled, and not merely a matter of
opinion, open to the inquiry and examination
of both parties. Buekner v. Street, 15 Fed.
Rep. 365.
False representations may be a ground for
relief, though the person making them believes
them true, if the person to whom they were
made relied upon them, and was induced thereSeeberger v. Hoby to enter into the contract.
bert, 55 Iowa, 756, 8 N. W. Rep. 482.
Fraudulent representations or misrepresentations are not ground for relief, where they are
immaterial,
even though they be relied upon.
Hall V. Johnson, 41 Mich. 286, 2 N. W. Rep.
See, to same effect. Lynch v. Mercantile
55.
Trust Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 486; Seeberger v. Hobert, 55 Iowa, 756, 8 N. W. Rep. 482.
In fraudulent representation or misrepresentation the injured parties may obtain relief, even
though they did not suppose every statement
made to them literally true. Heineman v. Steiger, 54 Mich. 232, 19 N. W. Rep. 965.
Where the vendor honestly expresses an in-
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correct opinion as to the amount, quality, and
value of the goods he disposes of in a sale of
his business and good-will thereof, and the
purchaser sees or knows the property, or has an
opportunity to know it, no action for false representations will lie. Collins v. Jackson, 54
Mich. 186, 19 N. W. Rep. 947.
Mere "dealing talk" m the sale of goods, unless accompanied by some artifice to deceive
the purchaser or throw him off his guard, or
some concealment of intrinsic defects not easily
detected by ordinary care and diligence, does
Reynolds v.
not amount to misrepresentation.
Palmer, 21 Fed. Rep. 433.
False statements made at the time of the
sale by the vendor of chattels, with the fraudulent intent to induce the purchaser to accept
an inferior article as a superior one, or to giv6
an exorbitant and unjust price therefor, will
render such purchase voidable; but such false
statement must be of some matter affecting the
character, quantity, quahty, value, or title of
such chattel. Bank v. Yocum, 11 Neb. 328, 9
N. W. Rep. 84.
A statement recklessly made, without knowledge of its truth, is a false statement knowingCooper v.
ly made, within the settled rule.
Schlesinger, 111 U. S. 148, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 360.
or not omission to communicate
Whether
known facts will amount to fraudulent repreof
upon the circumstances
depends
sentation
the particular case, and the relations of the
parties. Britton v. Brewster, 2 Fed. Rep. 160.
Where a vendor conceals a material fact,
which is substantially the consideration of the
contract, and which is peculiarly within his
misrepresentation.
knowledge, it is fraudulent
Dowling V. Lawrence, 58 Wis. 282, 16 N. W.
Rep. 552.
Evidence of fraudulent representations must
be clear and convincing.
Wickham v. Morehouse, 16 Fed. Rep. 324.
Where a man sells a business, and the contract of sale contained a clause including all
right to business done by certain agents, evidence that the seller was willing to engage in
the same business with such agents is not proof
of fraud in making the contract. Taylor v.
Saurman, 110 Pa. St. 3, 1 Atl. Rep. 40.
It was recently held by the supreme court of
Indiana, in the case of Cook v. Churchman, 104
Ind. 141, 3 N. E. Rep. 759, that where money
is obtained under a contract, any fraudulent
representations employed by a party thereto as
a means of inducing the loan to be made, if
otherwise proper, are not to be excluded because of the statute of frauds; also that where
parol representations are made regarding the
credit and ability of a third person, with the intent that such third person shall obtain money
or credit thereon, the statute of fraud applies,
and no action thereon can be maintained, although the party making the representations
may have entered into a conspiracy with such
person with the expectation of obtaining some
incidental benefit for himself.
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MITCHELL

et al.

t. McDOUGALL.

(62 111. 498.)

Jan. Term, 1872.
Court of lUinois.
Appeal from circuit court, McLean county;
Thomas F. Tipton, Judge.
Bill in equity to rescind a conveyance of
lands on the ground of misrepresentation and
Supreme

fraud.

R. B. Williams, for appellants.
& Weldon, for appellee.

Benjamin

BREESE, J. In Lockridge v. Foster, 4
Scam. 569, which was a biU in chancery praying, in the alternative, for the rescission of
an executed contract for the sale of land, on
by
the ground of fraudulent representations
the vendor, this court said, on the principles
of equity and justice, a contract, to be obligatory, must be justly and fairly made.
The contracting parties are bound to deal
honestly, and act in good faith with each other. There should be a reciprocity of candor
and fairness. Both should have equal knowlthe subject-matter of the
edge concerning
contract; especially ought all the facts and
circumstances
which are likely to influence
their action to be made known. If they have
not mutually this knowledge, nor the same
means of obtaining It, it is then a duty incumbent on the one having the superior information to disclose it to the other. In making the disclosure, he is bound to act in good
faith and with a strict regard to truth. If
respecting
makes false representations
Le
material facts, or intentionally conceals or
suppresses them, he acts fraudulently, and
for the consehimself responsible
renders
Fraud may conquences which may result.
sist as well in a suppressio veri as in a suggestio falsi, for. In either case, it may operate
to the injury of the innocent party. A false
representation by the vendor, which influences the conduct of the other party, and
Induces him to make the purchase, will vitiate
and avoid the contract. And in making the
it is immaterial whether he
representation,
knows it to be false or not, for the consequences are the same to the vendee. If he reli^ on the truth of the declaration, he Is
equally Imposed on and injured, and ought
to have redress from the one who has been
So a suppression or
the cause of the injury.
by the vendor of facts, which,
concealment
if known to the vendee, would have the effect to prevent him from making the purchase, win, in equity, equally vitiate the contract. A court of equity will not enforce and
carry Into effect contracts thus unfairly and
fraudulently made; and when the injured
party Invokes its aid in proper time, and the
of the case will permit it to be
circumstances
done, the contract will be rescinded and the
parties restored to their original rights.
The court refers to 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 191197, 204-207, and 2 Kent, Comm. 482, 490.
Sections 191-197, inclusive, treat of false
suggpstions, and fully support the doctrine of

the case cited, on that point.
Sections 204
to 207, inclusive, treat of the doctrine of
suppressio
veri, a doctrine which, though
true in morals, is not the doctrine recognized
by courts of equity, except under certain circumstances.
The extreme doctrine of some courts is, that
undue concealment
of a fact resting in the
knowledge of one contracting party, which,
if known to the other, would have prevented
the contract, will vitiate the contract.
The true definition is found in section 207,
supra, where it is said undue concealment
which amounts to a fraud in the sense of a
court of equity, and for which it will grant
relief, is the non-disclosure of those facts and
circumstances
which one party is under some
legal or equitable obligation to communicate
to the other, and which the latter has a right,
not merely in foro conscientlse, but juris et
de jure, to know.
Under such circumstances, the concealment
o( an important fact would be improper and
unjust; it would be an undue concealment
on account of the fiduciary relation existing;
but where two parties, in the absence of any
such relation, are treating for an estate, and
the purchaser knows, from surface indications, or otherwise,
by actual boring, there
is a valuable mine upon the land, the purchaser is not bound to disclose that fact to
the owner, for the means of information on the
subject were as accessible to the owner of the
land as to the purchaser.
The rule stated by Chancellor Kent, at page
482, refen-ed to in the opinion in 4 Scam., supra, is that each party is bound to communicate to the other his knowledge
of the material facts, provided he knows the other to
be ignorant of them, and they be not open
and naked, or equally within the reach of his
observation.
This, we admit, is a rule of moral obligation,
but not enforced in the courts. It is by them
qualified, as we have stated above, that the /
party in possession of the facts must be un- j
der some special obligation, by confidence re}
posed, or otherwise,
to communicate
them
truly and fairly, and this is the doctrine of
this court in the cases of Fish v. Cleland, 33
111. 243, and aeland v. Pish, 43 111. 282, referred to by appellee's counsel.
It is qualified by Beach v. Sheldon, 14 Barb.
72; Laidlaw v. Organ, 2 Whart 178; Knitzing
V. McElrath, 5 Pa. St. 467.
In Fox V. Mackeath, 2 Brown, Ch. 400,
Thurlow, Lord Chancellor, in delivering the
opinion in the case where undue concealment
of an important fact was charged, said:
"The doubt I have is, whether this case affords facts from which principles arise to set
aside this transaction, which will not, by necessary application, draw other cases into hazard. And, without Insisting upon technical
morality,
don't agree with those who say,
that where an advantage has been taken In
a contract, which a man of delicacy would
not have taken, it must be set aside. Sup-
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pose, for instance, that A, knowing there to be
a mine in the estate of B, of which he Isnew
B was ignorant, shoTild enter Into a contract
to purchase the estate of B for the price of the
estate without considering the mine, could the
court set it aside? Why not, since B was not
apprized of the mine and A was? Because B,
as the buyer, was not obliged, from the nature of the contract, to make the discovery.
It is, therefore, essentially necessary, in order
not only that a
to set aside the transaction,
great advantage should be taken, but it must
arise from some obligation in the party to
Not, as Justice Story
make the discovery."
says (1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 148), from an obli-

gation- in point of morals only, but of legal
duty. In such a case he says, a court of equity
wiU not correct the contract merely because a
man of nice morals and honor would not have
entered Into it. Lord Eldon, in Turner v. Harvey, Jac. 178, approved the doctrine of Lord
Thurlow and the illustration of the mine, and
BO does Justice Story in 1 Eq. Jur. § 207.
But we are dealing in this case with the
doctrine of suggestio falsi and not of suppressio verl, as the charge in the bill is, false representations made by appellee of the value of
the land and lots in Missouri.
There is much testimony in the record, from
which we derive the knowledge that appellee
represented to appellant, who had never been
in Missouri (appellee having resided there before coming to Bloomington), that the land
was good land, and was the land occupied by
one Judge Smith, before the Rebellion, and improved by him. This land was the south part
of section eighteen and the north part of section twenty -four, in all one hundred and sixty
acres, and was worth, probably, fifteen dollars
per acre. The land conveyed was in section
fifteen, stony, poorly timbered, and comparatively worthless. The house in Montevallo,
Instead of being a desirable residence, and
worth one thousand dollars, as represented
by appellee, proved to be a mere sheU, one
story high, occupied by hogs and goats, bringing not eight dollars a month rent "right
along," as represented, but unfit for human
abode, and worth, with the "lot and a half,"
not over two hundred and fifty dollars, and,
as we should judge, not at all saleable.
So
soon as appellant, by personal inspection on
a visit to the locality, discovered the facts, he
came to the conclusion appellee had imposed
upon him, and at once, on his return to
Bloomington, demanded a rescission of the
contract and a reconveyance of the Bloomington property, and tendering deeds for the Missouri property, together with appellee's note
for three hundred dollars, part of the purchase money. This being refused by appellee,
this bill was filed by appellants, and pending
the biU the house was consumed by fire, on
which, however, appellee had effected an Insurance of three thousand dollars.
The court dismissed the bill and complainants appealed.
There Is no question

of law made except

HUTCH.& BUNIi.EQ.— 18
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the one we have discussed, and there is some
conflict in the testimony, but a careful examination of it, as we find it In the record, satisfies us appellant has not received from appelfor, and which conlee what he contracted
tract he made wholly on the representations
of appellee, which have proved to be untrue.
It is said by appellee, there was a mistake
in conveying the land as in section fifteen—
that he supposed the "Smith farm" was on
that section, but is willing and offers to convey the land in fact occupied by Smith in sections eighteen and twenty-four, and he insists, that a mistake being made is no ground
for the rescission of the contract, as the court
can and will correct the mistake.
But this
consideration
should not prevail in this case,
because appellee represented the land he was
selling to be worth twenty dollars per acre,
which he had purchased but a short time previously for four dollars per acre, and he asserted to appellant that such land was selling
for twenty dollars an acre in that neighborhood. This he based upon a letter said to
have been received by him from one Selsor, a
land agent in that county. Selsor in his deposition says, the lands he referred to in that
letter were among the best improved farms in

that portion of Cedar and Vernon counties;

he says he had no idea of fixing the price of
raw lands by these figures, and did not suppose any one would be so foolish as to attempt it.
That letter, which appellee says was burnt
up in the building when it was destroyed,
was to this effect: "We have sold within the
last two weeks ten thousand dollars worth of
land, from fifteen to twenty-five dollars an
acre." This was so construed by appellee to
appellant as to induce the latter to believe
they were lands in the neighborhood of those
he was about to purchase.
The town property was of small value.
Now, under such circumstances, it would not
be just to allow appellee to correct the mistake in the land and claim the contract as
made, but it would be just, as a mistake was
made by appellee in the deed, to permit the
injured party to avail of it, and, through that,
repudiate the entire contract. In a case where
false representations
have been made, it is
the province of a court of equity, if applied to
for that purpose, to rescind the contract, putting the parties in statu quo.
It is claimed by appellee that the Bloomington property was taken at a very high valuation, and that he ought to be permitted to
show that appellant has received from him its
full value.
This we do not consider as the question before us. The question is, did appellant get
what he bargained for? That he did not we
think the evidence satisfactorily shows.
Appellant's right to the insurance money
will hardly be questioned, as the building upon the lot when sold, is now represented by
that money, and after deducting the premium
paid by appellee and the cost of the addition
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to the building ■which he erected, and was
covered by the Insurance, we are of opinion
the company should pay the balance to appellant.
On the point that Mrs. Mitchell, appellant's
wife, was improperly rejected as a witness,
we think the court ruled correctly; the case
was in no correct legal sense her own case.

The views here expressed reverse the decree of the circuit court dismissing the bill.
The cause is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Decree reversed.
SCOTT, J., did not hear the argument
this case, and ga^e no opinion.

In
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SOUTHERN DEVELOPMENT
NEVADA V. SILVA.
(8 Sup. Ct. 881,

Supreme Court

CO.

OF

125 U. S. 247.)

of the Unitefl

States.

March

19, 1886.

Appeal from the circuit court of the Unitfor the Northern Distiict of California.
Wm. M. Stewart, A. T. Britton, and A. B.
J. P. Langhorne and
Browne, for appellant.
John H. Miller, for appellee.
ed States

LAMAR, J. This is a bill in equity to
of a silver
rescind a contract of purchase
mine on the ground of fraudulent representations, and to recover the consideration paid.
The suit was commenced originally in the
supei-ior court of Inyo county, Cal., on the
Sth of May, 1884; but on account of the diverse citizenship of the parties, the plaintiff
being a corporation organized under the laws
of Nevada, and the defendant a citizen of
California, it was removed Into the United
Demurrers to the origiStates circuit court.
nal bill and to an amended bill having been
sustained, the present "second amended" bill
of complaint was flled. Answer was filed by
and
replication by complainant,
defendant,
Testimony was talien, and
issue was joined.
the case was heard, resulting In a decree
dismissing the bill on the 14th of March,
It appears from the record that on
1887.
the 15th of March, 1884, the appellant (who
was the complainant below) purchased from
the defendant a mining claim, known as
the "Sterling Mine," together with other
mining property, all situated in Inyo county, Cal., paying him therefor the sum of
^10,000.
On the 8th of May, 1884, the original bill of complaint was filed,, charging, in
substance,
that complainant was induced
to purchase said mine and mining property
solely upon the representations made by Silextent, and value;
va as to its condition,
were made to H.
that such representations
M. Terington, the president of said complainant company, and to one Forman, a mining
expert in his employ, in January, 1884, when
an examination
of said mine was made by
were false
them;
that said representations
-and fraudulent, and were well known to the
defendant at the time to be such; and that
were, in substance and
said representations
in a somewhat different order, as follows:
(1) That there were 2,000 tons of ore in the
mine; (2) that the bottom of what is called
the "Ore Chamber" was solid ore, as good
as the ore exposed on the sides of the chamber; (3) that there were not less than 500
tons of ore in and about the said ore chamber; (4) that the mine was worth $15,000;
and (5) that, after going through the mine,
the defendant represented to said Yerington
and Forman that he had shown them all the
work which had been done in or about the
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that would throw any light upon tlie
quantity of ore therein.
The answer of the defendant is direct, positive, and unequivocal m its denials of the
allegations of the bill; and, as an answer on
oath is not waived, unless these denials are
disproved by evidence of greater weight
than the testimony of one witness, or by
that of one witness with corroborating circumstances, the complainant will not be entitled to a decree; and this effect of the defendant's answer is not weakened by the
fact that the equity of the complainant's bill
is the allegation of fraud. Vigel v. Hopp,
104 U. S. 441; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1528; 1
Daniell, Ch. Prac. 844. The burden of proof
is on the complainant; and unless he brings
evidence sufficient to overcome the natural
presumption of fair dealing and honesty, a
court of equity will not be justified in setting
aside a contract on the ground of fraudulent
representations.
In order to establish a
charge of this character the complainant
must show, by clear and decisive proof—
First, that the defendant has made a representation in regard to a material fact; secondly,
that such representation is false;
thirdly, that such representation was not actually believed by the defendant, on reasonable grounds, to be true; fourthly, that it
was made witlj intent that it should be acted
on; fifthly, that it was acted on by complainant to his damage; and, sixthly, that in
so acting on it the complainant was ignorant
of its falsity, and reasonably believed it to
be true.
The first of the foregoing requisuch statements
as consist
sites excludes
merely in an expression
of opinion or judgand, again, (exment, honestly entertained;
cepting in peculiar cases,) it excludes statements by the owner and vendor of property
in respect to its value.
The evidence in the case shows that in
the development of this mine a tunnel, called
the "Sterling Tunnel," had first been dug.
At a distance of about 140 feet along the line
of this tunnel, from its mouth, there are
branches running easterly and westerly.
About 60 feet from the main tunnel, in the
eastern branch, winze No. 1 starts down.
About 38 feet below the level of the tunnel,
a level, known as thie "3S-feet level," starts
off from this winze, and at the bottom of the
winze, a distance of about 82 feet vertical
below the main tunnel, there is another level,
known as "82-feet level." In the easterly
branch of the tunnel, about 30 feet from
winze No. 1, there is another winze starting
downward, inclining to the southeast as it
goes down.
This winze is numbered 2, and
is connected with the 38-feet and the 82-feet
levels.
Intermediate between these levels is
another level, known as the "55-feet level,"
which opens out to the eastward of winze
No. 2 into a chamber about 15 feet long and
about 8 feet wide. In the south-east corner
of this chamber was a little hole or shaft.
mine
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In
extending downward a few feet only.
sinking winze No. 2, Silva struck an ore
body at a point opposite the 38-feet level.
It was irregular in shape, dipping at an angle
Ctommencing
at a
of about 45 degrees.
it increased
point, comparatively speaking,
gradually as it descended, and was in form
somewhat
like a pyramid. At its base it
measured 4 or 5 feet across, and it was about
The surface of this Inclined
nine feet long.
pyramid formed the floor or bottom of the
a small
There was, however,
chamber.
space between the base and opposite footwall, which is called the "bottom" of the
and it
chamber by complainant's witnesses,
The
is the "bottom" spoken of in the bill.
ore comprising this pyramid was carbonate,
and, being friable, had slacked down over the
face of the pyramid to the bottom, partially
covering it and partially filling up the little hole or shaft in the south-east corner.
as
As to the first alleged representation,
classified above,— viz., that there were 2,000
tons of ore in sight in the mine, and that
Yerington relied upon such statement when
he made the purchase,— the proof utterly
fails to establish either that Silva made the
statement, as a statement of fact, or that
Yerington relied upon such statement, even
had It been made. Silva, both in his answer
denies ever having
and in his testimony,
and the testimony of
made the statement,
Yerington himself is to the effect that Silva' s statem«»nt was qualified by the phrase
"in his judgment." This, then, is shown to
have been nothing more than an expression
of opinion on the part of Silva as to the
But,
quantity of ore in sight in the mine.
even if Silva had made the statement imputed to him in the bill, there is abundant evidence to show that Yerington did not rely
Yerupon it in the purchase of the mine.
own evidence, on this point, is
ington's
against him. He testifies that he did not
believe that there were more than 1,000 tons
of ore in the mine, and that B'orman agreed
with him on that point. And he further testifies that, valuing this ore at 32 ounces of
ore and 45 per cent, of lead per ton, (which it
appears was its approximate value, as determined by several assays,) and calculating
that there would be 1,000 tons of ore there,
the mine would be worth $10,000,—the sum
he actually gave for it This lacks much of
coming up to the rule that the complainant
must have been deceived, and deceived by
Atwood
the pereon of whom he complains.
V. Small, 6 aark & F. 232; Pasley v. Freeman, 3 Term R. 57. Besides, the quantity of
ore "in sight" in a mine, as that twm is unamong the miners, is at best a mere
It cannot be calculated
matter of opinion.
or even with approxiwith mathematical,
mate, certainty. The opinions of expert miners, on a question of this kind, might reasonably differ quite materially. In the case of
Tuck V. Downing, 76 111. 71, 94, the court
say: "No man, however scientific he may be,
derstood

certainly state how a mine, with the
flattering outcrop or blow-out, will
finally turn out. It is to be fully tested and
worked by men of skill and Judgment
Mines are not pui'chased and sold on a warranty, but on the prospect.
'The sight' determines the purchase.
If very fiattering, a
party is willing to pay largely for the chance.
There is no other sensible or known mode
of selling this kind of property.
It is, in the
nature of the thing, utbei-ly speculative, and
every one knows the business is of the most
fluctuating and hazardous character.
How
many mines have not sustained
the hopes
created by their outcrop!" We approve the
position of the court below, that "Yea-lngton
and his expert, Forman, were as competent
to judge how much ore there was 'in sight'
They were novices in matters
as Silva was.
of that kind.
This misrepresentation,
if
such it be, does not contain either the first,
fourth, or fifth element stated by Pomeroy
as essential elements in a fraudulent misrepresentation."
As stated above, the substance of the allegation of the bill is that Silva represented
that the bottom of this ore chamber, which
was covered with loose ore slacked down
from the pyramid, was composed of ore as
good as that exposed on the sides of the
Silva, in his answer,
expressly
chamber.
denies ever having made such statement.
Forman testifies that with a little prospecting pick he had with laim he raked through
the dirt and loose ore that had slacked
dovra, to see if it would reach the bottom of
the ore chamber, but that it would not.
He
further says: "I asked Silva how the botHe
tom was; if he had sunk below there.
said, 'No.'
I said, 'How is the bottom. You,
as a miner, know it is a suspicious thing to
see a bottom covered up, or anything of that
kind.'
He said the bottom Avas as good or
better than any ore which we saw in the
Yerington at first testifies that
chamber."
Silva, in reply to a question
by Forman,
stated that this floor was solid ore; but he
says that he does not think any comparison
was made between that ore and the ore in
the sides of the chamber, as narrated by
Forman. On the next day, however, Yerington having, as he says, refreshed his memory, — "and I [he] had the means of doing it,"
—was positive that the conversation between
Silva and Forman at that time was as Forman afterwards stated It. Silva, in addition
to his positive denial in his answer, testifies
that "there never was a word said about
They asked me this: 'What I thought
that.
of the ore body?' and
said 'I thought it
would be extensive.'
I thou.fht so at the
time, and I think so yet" The witness Eddy, who was present all the time in the ore
chamber, except when he went to the 88-feet
level to get a pick, does not know anything
about a conversation such as Yerington and
Forman narrate.
On this point then, the
testimony of Silva is directly to tlxe contrary
I
could
most

I
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of that of Yerlngton and Forman. Oertain
otliei' material facts in the case seem to indicate that there is just as strong probability
that Sllva's statements in this matter are
true as that those of Yerington and Forman
are true.
In the bill Yerington alleged, under oath, that Sllva had discovered the fact
that the bottom of the ore chamber was not
composed of ore, and had afterwards covered the bottom with ore, vein-rock, and matter, — in other words, had "salted" the mine.
There is no evidence in the record to prove
this, or tending to prove it; on the contrary,
the evidence of Yerington himself, and of the
other witnesses who were examined on that
point, is all to the effect that the ore covering the floor of the chamber had slacked
down from natural causes in fine particles
Nor is there such evidence to
like wheat.
show that Silva knew the character of this
floor, or of the extent of the ore vein, or deposit, (as it afterwards turned out to be,) as
would justify the interposition of a court of
equity to set aside the contract on the ground
of fraudulent representations.
He had come
onto the -ore in excavating from the top.
The sides of the ore chamber contained some
ore of a good quality, and he had never demonstrated the extent and amount of ore in
the pyramidal wedge in the side of the chamber.
It is shown by the evidence of Yerington himself that, in the side of a drift
running westerly from the ore chamber,
there was ore which appeared to be continuous with the body of ore in the chamber;
so that the statement Silva said he made, —
viz., that he thought the ore body would be
Upextensive,— at least, appears reasonable.
apparent
on all the facts and circumstances
of record, he might have made the statement he says he made, and believed he was
telling the truth. For there is also some
evidence to the effect that Silva had commenced to run a drift from the bottom of
winze No. 1, for the purpose of striking and
cutting the supposed downward extension of
and this, bethe ore body in the chamber;
fore the examination of the mine by Yering-'
After the sale of the mine,
ton and Forman.
Coffin, the superintendent
for the complainant company, when he commenced work in
the mine, started in where Silva had left off
in this drift, and carried it immediately beneath the ore chamber, entering the chamber
Then it was that the disby an up-raise.
covery was made that the ore body, instead
of being a continuous ledge or lead, was
Furthermore, the testimerely
a deposit.
mony of Yerington and Forman, as regards
the little hole or shaft in the south-east corner of the chamber, is directly opposed by the
testimony of Silva and Eddy. Both Yerington and Forman testify that this little shaft
was completely fllled up with dirt and loose
ore; while Sllva and Eddy both testify that
it was not so filled up, but that both Yerington and Forman stood in that shaft, and
took samples of ore from it. It is thus seen

t
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that the evidence on this material point does
not clearly establish the fraudulent representations of Silva as claimed by the complainant; but that, on the contrary, the material
as disclosed by the
facts and circumstances
record are entirely compatible with the theory that Silva did not make the representiitions charged against him, or, at most, that
he merely gave expression to an opinion as
erroneous
to the extent of the ore body,
though it proved to be. This would not constitute fraud. In the language of the court
below: "This testimony was taken in June,
1866, about two and a half years after the
conversations took place. They were present at the time, examining the mine, and enfor an hour or more.
gaged in conversation
These discrepancies in matters of detail during a long conversation, related by different
viewing the subject from different
parties,
after the lapse of so long a pestand-points
rlod of time, are no more than might reasonably be expected, even in honest witnesses.
There is no occasion to impute any
intention to testify falsely to either. * * *
Parties are extremely liable to misunderstand each other, and, in looking back upon
the transaction in the light of subsequent
developments,
are prone to take the view
most

advantageous

to themselves."

As to the third alleged representation, — towit, that there were not less than 500 tons of
ore in and about that ore chamber,— Silva,
both in his answer and in his testimony, denies that he ever told Yerington and Forman, or anybody else, that there were 500
tons of ore there, or that there was any
amount fixed or agreed upon by them as to
the quantity of ore there;
while the testimony of both Yerington and Forman is to
the effect that Silva said, in his opinion, or in
his judgment, there were 500 tons of ore in
the chamber.
So that, taking the strongest
testimony produced on the part of complainant upon this point, it simply amounts to an
expression of opinion on the part of Silva as
to the amount of the ore in the Chamber,
and not a statement
of fact. It therefore
does not constitute fraud.
It is equally true that any statements that
may have been made by Silva with reference
to the value of the mine, cannot, under the
circumstances
of this case, be considered an
act of fraud on his part sufficient to warrant
a court of equity in setting aside the contract
Yerington testifies that Silva said he
herein.
had been asking $15,000 for the mine, but
that he would take $12,500; while Forman
says he does not recollect that Silva made
any statement as to the value of the mine,
but that he heard Silva say he thought it
was worth $15,000.
Such statements are not
fraudulent in law, but are considered merely
as trade talk, and mere matters of opinion,
which is allowable.
Gordon v. Butler, 105
U. S. 553; Mooney v. Miller, 102 Mass. 217.
Moreover, it is clear, beyond question, that
Yerington did not purchase the mine upon
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Silva's representations
as to Its value, as we
shall hereafter see.
This disposes of all the alleged fraudulent
representations, as arranged above, except the
last, adversely to the complainant; and it is
to this one that attention will now be directed. This charge is, substantially, that Silva
represented to Yerington and Forman, when
they visited the mine In January, 1884, and
had gone through it, that he had shown them
all the work which had been done in and
about the mine that would throw any light
on the quantity of ore therein.
This representation Is alleged to have been false and
fraudulent, and well known by Silva to be
such, because at a cut a short distance from
the mouth of the main tunnel, at a point
known as the "point of location," a little hole
or shaft had been sunk which had been filled
up, and was not observable at the time of
the examination of the mine in January, 1884,
and also because there had been a number of
drill-holes made in the sides of the ore chamber, and afterwards filled up before the examination in January, 1884, so that they were
not observable
at that time;
which holes
clearly developed the fact that the ore about
the chamber was nothing more than a shell,
instead of a continuous body, as it appeared
to the observer.
The existence of the plugged-up drill-holes in the sides of the ore chamber is the worst feature of the case against
Silva. They could not have been made by a
former proprietor of the mine, as is slightly
claimed in his behalf; for, as has been already shown in this opinion, Silva himself, or
at least persons in his employ, had excavated
that chamber after he had purchased it from
And certain it is that
one Edwards, in 1876.
the drill-holes were found plugged up within
a short time after he had sold the mine to the
complainant company, March 15, 1884. The
question Is, did Silva know of their existence
at the time he sold the mine, and, having
such knowledge,
did he falsely represent to
of
the complainant that he knew nothing
them, thereby inducing complainant to act
Upon this quesupon such representations?
tion the evidence is somewhat conflicting.
Yerington testifies that after going through
the mine, he asked Silva If he had shown him
the whole of the mine, and he replied that he
And Forman testifies that Silva, in rehad.
ply to a question from him, said that he had
shown him all the work that had been done
in and about the mine that would throw any
light upon the quantity of ore in the mine, or
Silva adthe extent of the ledge or deposit.
mits that. In reply to a question by Yerington,
he told him that he had shown him all the
work that had been done in and about the
mine, either by himself or under his direcSo that the question Is narrowed down
tion.
to simply this: Were said drill-holes in existence at the time Silva made such statement? If so, had they been made by him, or
under his direction, or did he know of their
In his sworn answer Silva exexistence?

pressly "denies that he drilled any such hole
or holes through the ore into the country rock
or otherwise, or thereby or at all discovered
the extent of said ore, or that he filled up
said drill-holes, or concealed them from view,
or kept them secret from complainant," etc.;
and in his testimony he also denies having
any knowledge of their existence.
He says
that he drilled no holes in the mine except
what he had to do as a miner, and that he
concealed nothing from Yerington when he
showed him the mine.
And again he says:
"I showed Mr. Yerington all the work that
was done in the mine that I knew anything
of." There is no direct evidence going to
show who drilled the holes; and there is nothing In the entire record to connect Silva with
them, except the fact that he was the owner
of the mine, and was in possession of it at a
time when it is most likely they were drilled.
But this circumstance alone should not outweigh the positive denial of Silva in his answer, and also in his equally positive denial
in his testimony, of his knowledge of the exThe law raises
istence of said drilled holes.
no presumption of knowledge of falsity from
the single fact per se that the representation
was false.
There must be something further to establish the defendant's knowledge.
Barnett v. Stanton, 2 Ala. 181; McDonald v.
Trafton, 15 Me. 225. This rule is fortified by
that, had he known of the
the consideration
limited quantity of ore in and about the "ore
chamber,"
Silva would hardly have gone to
the expense and labor of starting a drift from
the bottom of winze No. 1, and constructing
it for a certain distance, before the sale of the
mine, for the purpose of reaching the supposed downward extension of the ore in and
Knowing that the ore
about that chamber.
body terminated within a few inches of the
surface of the chamber, and then, in the face
of that knowledge, actually constructing a

drift

on the 82-feet level, at enormous expense, for the purpose of getting under that
limited quantity of ore, would not appear a
reasonable thing to do by any one, especially
by such an experienced and practical miner
as Silva is admitted to have been. The testimony, therefore, and all the other facts and
of record, do not substantiate
circumstances
complainant's
theory of the case on this
point; in other words, there is not a satisfactory case of fraudulent representations
on
this point made out,— not such a case as
would justify the interposition of a court of
equity to set aside the contract under consideration on the ground of fraudulent representations.
As regards the little hole or shaft
that had been sunk at the "point of location,"
and afterwards filled up, so that it was not
observable at the time of Yerington's visit in
January, 1884, there Is absolutely no testimony at all to show that Silva knew anything about its existence.
He had done no
work at that place, or very little at most, and
was using the cut there as a sort of kitchen.
The sides of the cut indicated that there was
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a ledge of ore there.
It Is admitted that Forman asked SUva why he did not "go down"
on that ore, and that he replied that he considered the tunnel the best place to mine.
Silva denies, both in his answer and in his
testimony that he ever knew that a shaft had
been sunk at the point of location, and no one
is found who can testify that he did know
anything about it; on the contrary, the former owner of the mine, one Edwards, testifies that he himself dug that shaft, and filled
it up, prior to the time Silva purchased it, and
that to his knowledge Silva did not know
anything about that shaft.
It is essential that the defendant's representations should have been acted on by complainant, to his injury. Where the purchaser
imdertakes to make investigations of his own,
and the vendor does nothing to prevent his
investigation from being as full as he chooses
to make it, the purchaser cannot afterwards
allege that the vendor made misrepresentations.
Atwood V. Small, supra; Jennings v.
Broughton, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 126; Tuck v.
Downing, supra.
The evidence abundantly
shows that Yerington had been willing to

279

give $10,000 for the mine prior to the time
he visited it, and made his examination, in
He had made inquiries of
January, 1884.
various persons for months previous to that
visit. Several experts in his employ had visited the mine, had taken samples of ore from
it; and it must have been from reports thus
received that Yerington had made up his

mind as to what the mine was worth. From
the letters of an agent (Woods) to Eddy, the
of the witness Boland, the testitestimony
mony of the witness Anthony, Eddy's testimony, and from the testimony of Silva himself, there can be no doubt that Yermgton
for the mine several
had offered $10,000
months before he had ever seen it; thus
showing that his examination of the mine in
January, 1884, merely went to corroborate the
reports that he had received of it from his
experts, Forman, Bliss, et al., and that it was
upon such reports, and his own judgment after an examination of the mine, that he made
the purchase of it.
From all which it is clear to this court that
the complainant has not proven his case, and
the decree below Is affirmed.
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"To be officially reported."
Action by John T. Prewett, trustee, etc.,
against James G. Trimble for rescission of a
contract for the purchase
of bank stock.
Judgment for defendant.
Plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.

Ed. 0. O'Rear and Z, T. Young, for appellant. Wood & Day, for appellee.

J. January 19, 1888, appellee,
president
of the Exchange Bank of
Kentucky at Mt. Sterling, sold and transferred to appellant 20 shares of stock in that
bank at the price of $120 per share, and 21
shares in the Mt. Sterling National Bank
at $120 per share for 20 shares, and $118 for
the remaining one, payment for which was
then made partly in notes assigned to and
received by appellee at their face value, and
partly in money.
May 14, 1888, appellant
brought this action for rescission of the contract and restoration of the notes, or, if collected, payment of amount thereof, and the
money
by appellee, and interest
received
on the whole;
it being alleged and not denied that a tender and offer to retransfer
the stock and demand of repayment of the
purchase price had been made by appellant
and refused
by appellee.
It appears that
December 31, 1887, a statement of resources
and liabilities of the Exchange Bank of Kentucky, signed by the cashier, was published
in newspapers of Mt. Sterling, and by printed cards, which were generally distributed;
there being at foot of the statement an announcement that the bank had declared its
per cent,
usual semi-annual
4
dividend.
There was printed on the same card a statement, signed by the president and directors,
in which the cashier's statement was referred to as evidence of the prosperous condition
and increasing business of the bank.
According to that statement, the resources of
having a capital of $100,000,
the bank,
amounted
to $329,380.42, of which $245,790
were loans and discounts and $13,338.68 overdrafts, while the undivided profits were $15,But no mention was made of any in851.41.
solvent debts being part of the aggregate of
either loans or overdrafts. In respect to the
statement it is alleged and appears that of
the total amount of loans and discounts more
than $30,000 consisted of stale and worthless
demands, and of overdrafts at least $7,000
the drawers being
were likewise worthless,
insolvent;
and that, after charging off such
worthless demands, there would be left in
It is
the bank no undivided profits at all.
further alleged and proved that the books of
the bank showed at date of the statement
LEWIS,

then

about $7,600 more due to depositors,
and,
consequently, that much more liabilities than
disclosed by it
The evidence places beyond question that
when the statement was published and circulated the real value of stock in the Exchange Bank of Kentucky, calculated
and
determined by the actual condition of its resources and liabilities, was not over $70 per
share.
It is also satisfactorily shown that
when he made the purchase appellant did not
know, nor have any other means of knowing,
the true condition of that bank's affairs than
such information as was afforded
by the
cashier's statement, and that given directly
to him by appellee, and that he believed and
acted on that information.
There is discrepancy in the testimony
of the parties as to
wliat occurred between them when the eontract was made; but that of another person,
present at the time, is substantially that appellee said, if not directly to, in hearing of,
appellant,
that the notes held by the Exchange Bank of Kentucky were worth dollar
for dollar, and, being asked about value of
the stock, took in his hands the card upon
which was printed the cashier's statement,
one of which he had on a previous occasion,
in person given to appellant, and, referring
to it, explained that, the capital being $100OOO, the surplus of $15,000 made the stock
worth $115 per share and more as an Investment,
and that It was going at $120.
But, independent of what occurred between
the parties at the time of the contract, it is
manifest the cashier's statement was published and circulated by authority of the
president and directors for the purpose and
in e.\:pectatIon of it being accepted, and treated by the public as in all respects true and
reliable; thereby not only increasing business of the bank, but keeping up or enhancing market value of the stock, in which each
of them had a personal interest; and, as their
own accompanying
statement was obviously intended to be, it should be regarded a
deliberate affirmation of the truth of that of
the cashier, and as equivalent to a report of
the affairs of the bank, made directly by
them;
and, if so, upon both prmclple and
authority no other relation or privity between the parties to this action need be
shown than the act of appellee as president
indorsing and authorizing publication and
circulation of the cashier's statement, and
the resulting Injury to appellant,
who was
within the class designed to be influenced by
Cook, Stocks, §§ 353, 354, and
the statement.
cases cited.
Whether they published and
gave currency to the statement, knowing it to
be materially untrue, and for the fraudulent
purpose of deceiving the public as charged In
the petition, we need not Inquire; for it Is
not, in order to maintain this action, Indispensable
that appellee be shown to have
known the statement was false, for It Is elementary doctrine that a false representation
may, in contemplation
of law, be made with
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knowledge of Its falsity,— that is, made scienter,— so as to afford a right of action in damages, and, a fortiori, ground for equitable
proceedings, (1) without actual knowledge of
either its truth or falsity, as when the party
his knowledge by a positive
has affirmed

statement which implies knowledge; (2) when
made under circumstances in which the party ought to have known, if he did not know,
of its falsity, as when, having "special means
of knowledge," it is his duty to know. Bigelow, Fi-auds, pp. 509, 516. In Story, Eq. Jur.
§ 193, it is laid down that affirmation of a
material fact that "one does not know or
believe to be true is equally, in morals and
law, as unjustifiable as the afiirmation of
what is known to be positively false; and
a
even if the party innocently misrepresents
material fact by mistake, it is equally conclusive, for it operates as surprise and impoby a
sition on the other." Representations
party having means of knowledge in regard
to a matter, not possessed generally, are apt
to be believed and acted on, especially if he
is in a situation where he owes a duty to
the public to deal honestly and intelligently.
Therefore something more than use of ordinary diligence to know the condition of a
bank should be required of the president in
order to exempt him from liability to a person who has suffered loss by a false statement or report of its affairs, officially made
or affirmed by him, especially when he has
In Cook,
been thereby personally benefited.
Stock & S. § 145, it is said on authority of numerous cases cited that any statement by
the authorized agents of a corporation in regard to the status of the corporation, or material matters connected therewith, whereby
subscriptions of stock are obtained, is a
fraudulent representation, for which a person
sustaining loss thereby may hold such agents
personally liable, or have the contract rescinded.
This is upon the principle and for
the reason that such agents have exceptional
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and owe a duty to
means of knowledge,
speak the truth or not at all about the matter. But, as observed by the author, "in all
statethese cases the distinction between
ments relative to the prospects and capabiland statements speities of the enterprises,
cially specifying what does or does not exist,

In this
must be carefully borne in mind."
case, not the bank, but appellee personally,
profited by the bargain appellant was induced by the false report or statement of its condition to make with him; and therefore it
would be contrary to reason and justice for
Uim to be permitted to enjoy the benefit of it,
at the expense of appellant, upon the flimsy
ground of ignorance about the material matters in reference to which he made the delibfor, leaving
erate and positive representation,
out of view the question whether he did in
fact know the statement was untrue, being
in a situation to know, and where it was
his duty to know, he, in contemplation of
such
law, did know it, and consequently
statement is to be held fraudulent; and appellee has a remedy for the loss sustained
either by action in damages or for rescission,
for it is a settled rule that, even where one
who brings about a contract by misrepresentation commits no fraud, because his representation was, when made, innocent In the
ordinary sense, still if, when the fact of its
falsity becomes known, he refuses to relinquish the advantage, upon offer of reciprocal
relinquishment received by the injured party, it would make him guilty of constructive
fraud, and the contract subject to rescission
by a com-t of equity.
In our opinion, appellant, as the record stands, was entitled to a
rescission
of the contract as prayed for in
his petition, and the court had jurisdiction
to grant it; wherefore the judgment is reversed, and cause remanded
for judgment
in favor of appellant.
HOLT,

C.

J., not

sitting.
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N. T. 604.)
Oct. 5, 1897.

Hemy

VANN, J.
Prior to the 15th of September, 1888, Deloss Brown, as principal, and Joseph Brown, as surety, were indebted to the
defendant on a past-due note for over $300,
and payment thereof had repeatedly been demanded.
After trying in vain to borrow
money to pay the note, Deloss told the defendant that he did not know where they could
get It, and asked if he must have it. The defendant said "yes," and, upon being further
asked by Deloss where the money could be
had, recommended him to call on one Benjamin Hadcock. He did so, and was told by
Benjamin that he could not lend the money,
but that his brother, Emmanuel, who was
stopping with him, could let him have it. Deloss reported to the defendant that he thought
he could get the money of "the Hadcocks,"
and that they w^ould let him have it "some
When the time came
time In October."
around, the Messrs. Brown started to see if
they could get the money of Emmanuel Hadand
coc-k, but first went to the defendant,
He said that he could
asked him to go along.
not, when Deloss declared there was no use
of their going alone, and thereupon the defendant wrote and delivered to the Browns a
paper, of which the following is a copy: "Mr.
Hadcock: The Browns are good for what
[Signed] L. Osmoney you let them have.
The Hadcocks did not know the
mer."
Browns, but, as they knew the defendant, on
the strength of this paper Emmanuel Hadcock
lent them $400, taking their note therefor, and
on the same day they used the most of the
money to pay their debt to the defendant.
Both of the Browns were insolvent at this
time, and, while the defendant may have believed they were good, he did not know whether they were good or not, and did not try to
Upon the trial of this action, which
find out.
was brought to recover damages for false repby means of said paper, there
resentations
was but slight dispute as to the representations, their falsity, or the injury resulting
therefrom;
but the defendant insisted that,
as he did not know that his representations
were false, there could be no recovery against
Through his counsel, he asked the trial
him.
court to charge the jury "that there can be no
recovery in an action of deceit unless It appears that the defendant made the represen-

true."
An action to recover damages for deceit
cannot be maintained without proof of fraud
as weU as injury.
Actionable deceit cannot
be practiced without an actual intention to
deceive, resulting in actual deception, and
But, while there must be
consequent loss.
furtive intent, it may exist when one asserts
a thing to be true which he does not know to
fraud to affirm positive
be true, as
is
knowledge of that which one does not positively know. Where a party represents a
matei'ial
fact to be true to his personal
knowledge,
as distinguished from belief or
opinion, when he does not know whether it is
true or not, and It is actually untrue, he Is
guilty of falsehood, even if he believes it to
be true; and if the statement is thus made
with the intentiofl that it shall be acted upon
by another, who does so act upon it, to his
injury, the result is actionable fraud. Kountze
V. Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124, 130, 41 N. E. 414;
Rothschild v. Mack, 115 N. Y.
21 N. B.
726;
Marsh v. Falker, 40 N. Y. 562, 573;
Bennett v. Judson, 21 N. Y. 238; Add. Torts,
1007;
Bigelow, Fraud, 514.
Such seems to
be the case now before us, as the facts are
presumed to have been found by the jury.
The plaintiff's testator did not ask for information In regard to the solvency of those
who wished to borrow money of him, but the
defendant volunteered to give it. He was interested In the result of the loan, for the bulk
of the proceeds was for his benefit.
On being told that the loan would not be made

a

Watson M. Rogers, for appellant.
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Appeal from supreme court, appellate division. Fourth department.
^Act ion by Charles E. Hadcock, as executor,
against Luman Osmer, for deceit.
From a
judgment of the appelIatS"af?lsKnri38
T38 N. Y.
Supp. 618) affirming a judgment entered on a
verdict for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Af-
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tations knowing them to be false, with Intent
to deceive, and that the plaintiff suffered
damages in consequence thereof."
The court
refused to so charge, except with the modification: "That, if he made the statement that
they were good as a fact, not as an opinion,
without knowing whether It was true or not,
then it was false in the sense that he made
a statement of fact as though he knew it to
be true, which he did not know to be true.
That, together with what I have already said
in my charge in regard to
will enable tlie
jury to understand what
Excepmean."
tion was taken to the refusal to charge as reIn the
quested and to the charge as made.
body of the charge, the court, after instructing the jui7 as to the difference between the
assertion of a fact and the expression of an
opinion, told them, in substance, that if the
either
defendant
made the representation,
knowing it to be untrue, or, without knowing
whether it was untrue or not, stating it as
an existing fact, intending that it should be
taken and acted upon as such, they might in"because," as the
fer an intent to defraud;
court continued, "a man has no right tt) stati'
a thing as a fact, which misleads the other
party to his damage, unless he knows whethand if he states it,
er it is true or untrue;
knowing and understanding that he does not
know whether it is true or not, he just as
much misleads the other man as though he
with the knowledge that it was unstated

a

E.

OSMER.
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(47 N.

V.

It

HADCOCK
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without his presence, he armed the proposed
borrowers with a written statement over his
own signatiire, containing a positive assertion of a material fact, with the intention
that it should be acted upon, and should induce the loan of the money.
Yet he did not
know the assertion thus positively made for
such an important purpose to be true, and he
did not investigate or seek to discover whether it was true or not, although he had dealt
some with the Browns, and had some inforHe intendmation as to their circumstances.
ed, as the jury has found upon sufficient evidence, that the lender should understand
him as communicating his actual knowledge,
and not as expressing his opinion, judgment,
Knowing that he did not know
or belief.
what he said he did, and what he intended
to cause another to believe he did, he toolc
the responsibility of its truth; and honesty of
belief in the supposed fact, under such circumstances, cannot relieve him from the imputation of falsehood and fraud. As was
said by Judge Peckham in Eothschild v.
Mack, supra: "He either knew or he did not
know of the financial condition of the makers of the note.
If he did know it, then ha
knew that the note, as to both makers and
indorsers, was without value.
If he did not
know its condition, he yet assumed to have
actual knowledge of the truth of his statement. * * * He certainly meant to convey the impression of actual knowledge of the
truth of the representations he made as to
the value of the note, and he either knew
.such representations were false, or else he
was conscious that he had no actual knowledge while assuming to have it, and intending

If damage ento convey such impression.
sue, this makes an actionable fraudulent representation." The language of Chief Judge
Andrews, in Kountze v. Kennedy, supra, is
"One who falsely asserts
equally applicable:
of accurate
a material fact, susceptible
knowledge, to be true of his own knowledge,
and thereby induces another to act upon the
fact represented to his prejudice, commits a
fraud which will sustain an action for deceit.
This is not an exception to, but an application of, the principle that actual fraud
must be shown to sustain such an action.
The purpose of the party asserting his personal knowledge is to induce belief in the
fact represented;
and if he has no knowledge, and the fact is one upon which special
knowledge can be predicated, the inference
of fraudulent intent, in the absence of explanation, naturally results."
The rule is tha
Thus,
same in other states and in England.
in Furnace Co. y. MofCatt, 147 Mass. 403, 18
N. E. 168, the court said: "The charge of
fraudulent intent, in an action for deceit, may
be maintained by proof of a statement made
as of the party's own knowledge,
which is
false, proviaed the thing stated is not merely
matter of opinion, estimate, or judgment, but
is susceptible of actual knowledge; and in
such case it is not necessary to make any fur-

283

ther proof of an actual intent to deceive.
The fraud consists in stating that the party
knows the thing to exist, when he does not
know it to exist; and if he does not know it
to exist he must ordinarily be deemed to
Forgetfulness of its
know that he does not.
or a
existence after a former knowledge,
mere belief of its existence, will not warrant
or excuse a statement of actual knowledge."
See, also, Bullitt v. Farrar, 42 ilinn. 8, 43 N.
W. 566; Hexter v. Bast, 125 Pa. St. 52, 17
Atl. 252; Wells v. McGeoch, 71 Wis. 196, 35
N. W. 769; Swayze v. Waldo, 73 Iowa, 749,
33 N. W. 78; Craig v. Ward, 1 Abb. Dec.
The
454; Evans v. Edmonds, 13 C. B. 777.
charge of the learned trial judge was within
these rules, and the exceptions under consideration furnish no ground for a reversal of
the judgment.
The court was further asked to charge that
"there can be no recovery in this case, in
any event, unless it be proven or be found
that there was an actual purpose or intent
on the part of the defendant, on the 15th day
of September, 1868, to defraud Emmanuel
Hadcock of his property." The court so
charged, but added: "Of course, that is in
connection with what I have already charged, that it was not necessary it should have
been determined, when he made the paper,
before they got the money, as to which of
the Hadcocks it was to go, but there must
have been an intention to cheat and defraud
the person to whom this paper should be deThe defendlivered, the one or the other."
ant excepted to the modification, and now arIn the
gues that it was reversible error.
course of his charge the trial judge had said:
"If it was understood by the defendant that
there was a proposition to borrow of one or
more Hadcocks, and he sent out a general
paper addressed to Mr. Hadcock, why, then
you can say whether it was not fairly intended to be delivered to such person of the family as would loan the money; and, if that is
true, it is not essential that it should appear
to you that It had been determined, at thetime the paper was drawn, that the loan
should be from one or the other.
If 3*du find
that fairly the meaning, intention, and design
of the parties was that whoever loaned the
money should have this paper presented to
him, then it may be fairly said that the representation was made to whoever did loan
the money to those persons." While the defendant had at first suggested that the money might be bon-owed of Benjamin Hadcock,
he was finally told that "the Hadcocks"
would probably make the loan.
Since the
brothers Hadcock lived together as members
of the same family, and the paper was addressed generally to "Mr. Hadcock," it was
properly left to the jury to find whether it
was not the intention of the defendant that
the paper should be delivered to such member of the Hadcock family as would make
the loan, which was the primary object of
As a general recommengiving the writing.
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datlon of credit, knowingly given to an insolvent person, will support an action for deceit in favor of any one acting thereon to
his injury, so, as we think, a letter addressed
simply to "Mr. Hadcock" would justify any
man of that name in acting upon It, at least
when it was delivered to him with the apparent authority of the writer, and tliere was
no direction from the latter as to which one
of the Hadcocks it should be given.
More-

FRAUD.
the evidence warranted the Inference
that the Browns had implied authority from

over,

the defendant to deliver the letter to either
one of the Hadcocks, and hence to the plaintiff's testator.
We agree 'vith the conclusion
reached by the learned apppUate division, and
think that their judgment should be affirmed,
with costs.
All concur, except O'BRIEN, J.,
who takes no part, and GRAY, J., absent.
Judgment affirmed.
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Appeal from appellate court, Fourth district.
Bill by H. A. Kattleman against William R. Borders to set aside a sale for
Complainant
obtained a decree,
fraud.
whicli was affirmed by the appellate court.
Affirmed.
Defendant appeals.
Koerner & Koerner, for
Clay Horner, for appellee.

appellant.

H.

SHOI'E, J. This was a bill in chancery
by appellee against appellant. Borders, to
set aside and rescind a sale of property on
the ground of fraud practiced by appellant
whereby the latter was inupon appellee,
duced to part with his property in exchange
for a comparatively worthless note and mortAbout the 1st of July,
gage of a third party.
1884, appellee deposited in the banking house
of Borders & Boyle $2,000, taking a certificate of deposit therefor, payable in six months
after date, at 5 per cent, interest per annum.
A few months thereafter the firm became
embarrassed,
and was dissolved by the retirement of Boyle. A new firm was formed,
composed of James J. Borders and appellant, who, for a valuable consideration,
agreed to indemnify Boyle against all debts
of the late banking firm.
and liabilities
Shortly after the maturity of the certificate
of deposit appellee applied to appellant at
the bank for payment of said certificate,
who then, as the weight of proof tends to
show, stated to him that he tappellant) had
a tract of land in Randolph county worth
§2,800, which he had just sold and conveyed
to Crozier at that price; that Crozier had
paid $700 in cash, and given his promissory
for $2,142, secured
note to him (appellant)
by mortgage on the land.
It is also shown
that he represented to appellee that the laud
was well worth $2,800; was ample security
for the note, which would be promptly paid
at its maturity. He advised appellee, as
appellee testified, to go and see Crozier, who
he represented
was well posted in respect
The proofs leave but little, if
of the land.
any, doubt that the sale of the land to CroIt appears,
zier was not a sale in good faith.
also, from the testimony that appellee did
call on Crozier for information, and was assured by him' that he (Crozier) had in fact
bought the land for $2,800, and given a mortgage on the same to appellant to secure a
note of $2,142. Appellant also, it seems,
represented their tract of land had 40 acres
cleared and under cultivation.
Proof shows
there were only 8 or 9 acres cleared on the
tract. Appellant also represented to appellee, as the chancellor found from the evidence, that the firm of Borders & Boyle was
financially as to endanger
so embarrassed
the loss of his money deposited with that
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firm; that he told appellee that he did not
want to see him lose anything, and advised
him to take the Crozier note and mortgage
in exchange for his certificate of deposit, as
the only sure means of protecting himself
from loss. It is only just to say that appellant denies most of these alleged representations, or that he was guilty of deceiving appellee in respect of the value or nalnire of
the land. Appellant knew that James J.
Borders, one of the partners in the firm of
Borders & Boyle, was perfectly solvent, and
that the new firm of which appellant was a
to Boyle,
member had obligated themselves
the outgoing partner of the firm of Borders
& Boyle, to protect him from all the liabilities of the late firm, which, of course, inAppellee not
cluded appellee's
certificate.
closing with the terms offered at once, appellant wrote him, urging speedy and prompt
He wrote: "We are
action in the matter.
In
settling very fast with out depositors.
* * »
this way, delay is dangerous.
could have used the note offered you, [Crozier note,] and can do so yet. If you want
it on the terms offered, to wit, trade my note,
for you to give me an order on Crozier for
difference, which order, if not paid, shall not
bind you, and you to become owner of full
face of note and interest, which terms, if satisfactory, put your name on it, without recourse, and send same to me, and I will send
you note and mortgage
indorsed in same
way; mortgages duly recorded.
Answer by
return mail. * * *
-^m take pleasure
in showing you the land at any convenient
I am too busy now. Besides, the
time.
ground is covered with snow, and you could
not judge of the quality of the soil. I cannot put this matter off. Time is very
precious with me now."
It is shown by the witness Stout that appellant told him he was about to sell this
land to a man named Kattleman, and that
if he cornered witness, and asked anything
about the value of the land, for the witness
to put the price up. After Borders had sold
the notes to appellee, this same witness asked him (appellant) how he came to sell the
land for the price he did, and appellant
replied, as Is testified, that he "had got hold
of a man that had more money than brains;"
and also said, in reply to a remark by the
witness, that Crozier would never pay the
notes,— "Of course, that Is the calculation."
Most of the material representations shown
by the evidence to have been made by appellant to appellee, to induce the purchase of
the Crozier note and mortgage, are shown
to have been untrue.
Some of them, at least,
if the evidence is to be credited, appear to
have been made under circumstances strongly tending to charge appellant with knowledge of their untruthfulness, or, at least, he
occupied such a position as to lead to the
presumption of his knowledge of their falsity. He admits that he knew that J. J. Borders, one of the firm of Borders & Boyle,

j
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was perfectly solvent at the time it is shown
he was endeavoring to induce appellee to believe that the firm was insolvent, and that
he was in danger of losing his money.
He
had owned the land in question some time
before the pretended sale to Crozier, professed to be familiar with it, and must be held
to have had notice of its value.
The point is made that, if the means were
at hand by which appellee might have satisfied himself as to the truth or falsity of the
representations,
he was bound to do so, and,
failing to avail himself of such means, he
is not entitled to the relief sought.
If appellant could make a defense based upon appellee's credulity and faith in appellant's representations,
it could not prevail here. It
appears that appellee did try to see the land
before concluding his purchase from appellant. But, it being covered with snow, It
could not, as stated by appellant in his letter, be properly examined;
and, moreover,
appellee was assiu'ed by appellant and Crozier, to whom the land had been conveyed,
that the land was of the value of $2,800,
and that practically one third of it was clearAppellant says in his leted and improved.
ter, as has been seen, that he will take
pleasure
in showing appellee the land at
any convenient time; that he was too busy
then;
and that no proper judgment could
be formed by his personal inspection of it
at that time.
While willing to show the
land at some convenient time in the future,
he was unwilling to delay concluding tlie
He wrote: "I
transaction with appellee.
cannot put this matter off. If you do not
want tlie note, say so, and I will place it
He wanted an answer by reelsewhere."
turn mail. Time was exceedingly precious
Under such circumstanto appellant then.
ces, it would be in the highest degree unto permit appellant to take adconscionable
vantage of the fact that appellee gave credence to his word, and relied upon his stateIn such case, the party will
ments as true.
from the consequence of
not be relieved
because the party
his false representations,
thereby injured trusted him, and parted with
his property upon false representation of
fact, which he assumed to know to be true.
Where the sale is of property at a distance,
so that the purchaser has not the means at
hand of ascertaining the truthfulness of the
the vendee may revendor's representations,
ly upon their truth, and have redress if they
are shown to have been materially false.
Smith V. Richards, 13 Pet. 26; Maggart v.
Freeman, 27 Ind. 531; Harris v. McMurray,
Ladd v. Pigott, 114 111. 647, 2
23 Ind. 9;
N. E. 503; Savage v. Stearns, 126 Mass. 207.
Here, as it appears, appellee did not have

the ability to make any proper examination
Appelof the land without further time.
lant, it would seem, was imperious in his
demand that the transaction be closed at
once, having first Induced
appellee to believe, as before stated is shown by the evidence, that he was in danger of losing his
money unless he took the Crozier notes and
mortgage.
Nor is it important that it should
be aJfirmatively found that the untrue representation should have in fact been known
It is well settled
I to appellant to be false.
that it is immaterial whether a party misrepresenting a material fact knows it to be
false, or makes the assertion of the fact
without knowing it to be true; for the affirmation of what one does not know to be
true is unjustifiable, and, if another act upon the faith of it, he who induced the action
Story, Eq.
must suffer, and not the other.
Jul-. § 193; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 877; Bigelow,
Frauds, p. 410 et seq.; Cooley, Torts (2d
Ed.) 582; Thompson v. Lee, 31 Ala. 292;
Co. v. Tyng, 63 N. Y. 653; Allen
Fauntleroy v. Wilcox,
111. 104;
80 111. 477; Hicks v. Stevens, 121 111. 186197, 11 N. E. 241.
So it has been held that,
where the representations relate to facts
which must be supposed to be within the
defendant's knowledge, proof of their falsity
is a sutficient showing of his knowledge that
they were false.
Cooley, Torts, 583; Morse
V. Dearborn, 109 Mass. 593; Morgan v. SkidAnd so a party selling
dy, 02 N. Y. 319.
property Is presumed to know whether the
representations
he affirmatively makes in reIt he know
spect of it are true or false.
them to be false, it is a positive fraud; and
if he make them without knowing them to
be true, for the purpose of inducing another
to act upon them, it in equity amounts to
fraud. Miner v. Medbury, 6 Wis. 295; Smith
v. Taylor, 3
V. Richards, supra; McFerran
Cranch, 270; Glasscock v. Minor, 11 Mo.
Taking the evidence on the part of
655.
appellee, supported by the letters of appellant and proof of extrinsic facts, we are unable to say that the chancellor was not justified in finding that appellee was induced to
part with his certificate of deposit by the
statements and representations of appellant
of matters materially affecting the transaction, and which are shown to be untrue.
All fraud and untrue statement, and that he
made any untrue representations.
Is denied
by appellant, and his version of the transaction is consistent with his honesty and
good faith; but in the conflict we think the
of the evidence is with appreponderance
pellee, and sustains the material allegations
of the bill. The decree of the circuit court
will accordingly be affirmed.
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Appeal from court of common pleas, ForCharles P. Noyes, Judge.
Bill by Elizabeth P. Nelll against B. F.
Shamburg and H. W. Shamburg,
administrators of G. Shamburg, deceased, to rescind a contract of sale by plaintiff to
defendants' intestate of an undivided half
interest in a leasehold of a 200-acre tract of
oil land. The price consideration of the contract of sale was $550 paid in cash, and $100
to be paid in case a vyell producing six or
more barrels of oil per day should be found
on the land.
The bill was dismissed, and
complainant appeals. AflBrmed.

est county;

T. F. Richey and Samuel T. Neill, for appellant Julius Byles, Samuel D. Irwin, and
Eugene Mackey, for appellees.

MITCHELL, J. There are two main questions of fact upon which the plaintiff's claim
to relief must ultimately rest— First, serious
inadequacy of price; and, secondly, fraud,
actual or constructive. If either of these
grounds fails, the case must faU. The master finds that there was no inadequacy of
price, and, as the learned court concm-s in
this finding, it would be sufficient for us to
say that we have not been shown that it
was clear error. But an examination of the
whole evidence, in deference to the earnestness of counsel, who regard this as a turning point in the case, leads us to the same
conclusion.
At the time of the sale,— July,
1879,— the 200-acre tract was undeveloped,
except for one well, No. 8, which had been
in operation about three months.
The most
favorable evidence as to this well was given
by James, who said, "My recollection is
that it started off between five and seven
barrels, somewhere,"
while the Mclntyres,
Tucker, and other witnesses, put its production at from one to three barrels. The same
witnesses describe the neighboring territory
as "spotted," good wells and dry holes being
found close together. The 50-acre tract adjoining on the northwest had at that date
three wells, two of which, Nos. 5 and 6, were
small, and one. No. 7, was a valuable well,
having produced as high as 75 barrels, sad
ranging down, according to the different witnesses, from that to 7 or 8 barrels, which
James Mclntyre says was its production in
July, 1879. Business was duU, and there
was no active market for leases in that
neighbtwhood,
Under
(Jenkins and Fogle.)
these circumstances,
it is plain that the value
of the lease was almost entirely speculative.
Indeed, James testifies that the value of oil
territory is always speculative,
until it is
actually developed.
It is a business with
elements of great uncertainty, and that appears to have been peculiarly so in the presEverything depended on whether
ent case.
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No. 7, or the little wells near it, should be
taken as the best index of the nature of the
territory. The three witnesses for plaintiff
put the value of the lease at from twenty
thousand to eight or ten thousand dollars;
the highest estimate being gives by Egoff,
whose testimony is badly handicapped by
the fact that he was a discharged employe,
who admitted that he had come forward in
the case partly "to get even with" his former
On the other hand, we have the
employer.
testimony of eight or nine witnesses, most
of them with superior local knowledge, and
several owners of land in the immediate
vicinity, with certainly no bias to depreciate
aU concurring that the
the neighborhood,
lease was worth nothing beyond the royalty.
The decided weight of the evidence is
in favor of the adequacy of the consideration
paid.

As this finding takes away the foundation
of the plaintiff's claim to relief, the other
matters may be dismissed briefly.
There was no proof of actual fraud. No
express misrepresentations
were shown, all
that there was on the subject being the
clause in the assignment of the lease stipulating a "further consideration of one hundred dollars when a well is found on said
lease producing six barrels per day," etc.
The master construed this as "a practical
representation that no such well had then
been found."
In view of the fact that this
is writing into a paper in which the plaintiff
is the grantor, and which the grantee has
not signed, a representation by the latter
which is not to be found in the words used,
this construction might be difficult to maintain; but, as it is in favor of the appellant,
we need not consider it further.
Even conceding
that the representation was thus
made, the master finds that it has not been
shown to be untrue.
It is further claimed that Shamburg, Intentionally and in bad faith, concealed from
the plaintiff facts relating to the production
of oil on the 50-acre lease, which she was
entitled to know. It was certainly shown
that Shamburg had directed his employes
not to give information on this subject, but
to refer parties to him.
The plaintiff had
no interest in the 50-acre lease, but we may
concede that, when she was about to sell her
part of the other lease to her cotenant, she
became entitled to know such facts with regard to its production as would bear upon
the value of the other. But, unless there is
some exceptional
circumstance to put on
him the duty to speak, it is the right of
every man to keep his business to himself.
Possibly, Shamburg was unduly suspicious
on this point, but the nature and position of
his business suggested caution. Fogle testifies that Shamburg was the only person
operating in that neighborhood,
and James
says that Shamburg told him he had spent
near $150,000 in developing that territory,
"and now aU these fellows are anxious to
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pry into my business." We do not find in
under the circumtbe acts of Shamburg,
stances, anything more than a positive intention and effort to reap the benefit of his
enterprise, by Iseeping the knowledge of its
results to himself, and we agree with the
master that this "falls far short of establishing fraud."
The claim of constructiye fraud is based
on the relations of the parties as partners,
The masand as mortgagor and mortgagee.
ter has rightly found that there was no partnership.
The parties were tenants in common.
No presumption of partnership arose
from that relation. Walker v. Tupper, 152
Pa. St 1, 25 Atl. Rep. 172; Dunham v. Loverock, 27 Atl. Rep. 990, (not yet officially reported.)
And there was no evidence from

which to infer a partnership by Intention
and agreement of the parties.
The relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee, like that
of tenants in common, is in some respects,
and to a limited degree, one of confidence.
There are certain things, approximating to,
if not actually involving, a breach of good
faith, which neither will be permitted to do,
to the prejudice of the other. But we do
not find in the present case anything which
requii-es the application of this principle.
The mortgage was merely for indemnity
against a contingent
loss by having to pay
a guaranty to third persons.
Until such loss
occurred,
Shamburg had no claim on the
mortgaged premises wh'ch changed the relation of the parties as tenants in common.
Decree affirmed.
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were such services as a son or brother might
render for a mother or a sister, without expectation of compensation, except by way of
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gift.
This narrative shows that the relation between the parties was one of great trust and
almost blind confidence on one side, and comThe defendant,
plete control on the other.
therefore,
occupied a position towards the
complainant where he was bound not only to
deal with her honestly and justly, but to
scrupulously
avoid engaging in any transaction, in respect to her estate, in which his
interests might be put in antagonism to hers.
He was required, in all things relating to
his interests to
her estate, to subordinate
hers, and carefully abstain from using his
power and influence over her for his own
The law by
advantage
and to her harm.
which he was bound to regulate his conduct
is a law of jealousy, and under its wise provisions he can keep nothing that he has obtained from her, under the guise of a contract, to which he cannot show a title entrenched in the utmost good faith. His title

October

1882.

On bill, answer and proofs taken
court.

In open

Keen, S.
Pennington,
Oscar
H.
and
Thomas X. McOarter, for complainant.
John
R. Emery and Henry C. Pitu6y, for defendant.

VAN FLEET, V. 0. This is a bill by a
principal against her agent. The complainant
charges the defendant with many acts of misconduct in the course of his agency, some of
which constitute gross frauds. The relation
of principal and agent was formed between
the parties in January, 1873.
The complainant's husband died November 29, 1872.
She
was then about 68 years of age, childless, and
without experience in business.
She lacked
both a knowledge
of business and an inclination to acquire it. Her husband, by Jais
will, gave his whole estate to her. His perHe
sonal estate amounted to about $60,000.
had, by a writing, which has not been put
in evidence, but the existence of which has
been fully proved, recommended the defendant as a fit person to assist the complainant
In the management of her estate. The defendant had been associated with the complainant's husband for many years as a ruling
of the spiritual
elder in the superintendence
affairs of one of the most influential PresbyHis
terian churches of the city of Newark.
reputation as a capable and trustworthy busiHe was president of
ness man stood high.
one of the most prominent fire insurance comHis high repanies of the city of Newark.
ligious character, and the position of trust he
occupied in the business community, were almost sure to give him the confidence of the
Very shortly after tlie
most cautious person.
surdeath of her husband, the complainant
rendered into the possession of the defendant
all her papers and securities, and requested
him to have the safe in which her husband
had kept his securities removed to his office.
In order that he might manage her affairs
with less inconvenience to himself. This he
did.
From this time forth until the latter
part of December, 1879, the defendant exercised over the securities and moneys of the
complainant a dominion almost as absolute as
he did over his own.
The complainant,
in
her relations to the defendant,
describing
says:
"I looked to the defendant for everything without anxiety.
just threw myself
on his fidelity, as a child would on a parent,

I

without questioning."
And the defendant, speaking on the same
subject, says that the complainant and he
were on terms of close friendship and intimacy; that she looked upon him as her adviser, comforter and friend, and that what
he did for her was done as a friend, and
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must have been acquired openly, on a full
and frank disclosure of every fact likely to
influence her conduct, and his contract must
be shown to have been just and honest in
every particular.
The first of the several claims to relief presented by the bill, which I shall consider, is
that in which the complainant charges that
the defendant is liable for the profit made on
the purchase
and sale of certain
railroad
Among the property which the comstock.
plainant acquired, under the will of her husband, were 67 shares of the capital stock of
the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey. After this corporation became insolvent
and passed into the possession of the chancellor,
the complainant
very much
became
troubled about what was best to do with her
stock, whether to sell it or to keep it.
She
sought information in many directions,
consulted the defendant almost daily, and after
undergoing much perturbation of mind upon
the subject, at last, under a strong fear that
if she continued to hold it, the whole would
be lost, she gave the defendant peremptory
direction to sell it at $16 a share. This direction was given about the 1st of May, 1878.
The defendant did not sell the stock, but
caused it to be transferred to his wife, and
paid the complainant for it at the price it
was then selling for on the market.
The
amount he paid was $1,072.
He did not tell
the complainant that he intended to purchase
the stock himself or of his purpose to have
it transferred to his wife, but, on the contrary, by his answer, he says that after he
made up his mind to buy, he went to the
complainant and told her that a sale had been
effected, or could be effected, at $16 a share.
In his evidence, he says that the idea of purchasing the stock for himself, as a speculation, first entered his mind after he had received direction to sell it, and after he had
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an interview with Vermilyea & Co.,
stockbrokers of ttie City of New York, in
which they told him that they thought the
market price of the stock would advance. At
the time he told the complainant that a sale

had

had been effected, or could be eflfected, at $16
a share, he did not tell her that he had consulted these gentlemen, nor what opinion they
had expressed.
After the stock was transferred, the defendant paid to the receiver in
charge of the affairs of the corporation under
scheme, the sum of $500,
the re-organization
and in return received an adjustment bond,
and also surrendered
five shares of stock,
On
and in return received an income bond.
January 30, 1880, he sold the 62 shares still
standing ui the name of his wife, for $5,091.75. The defendant's wife had no beneficial interest in the transaction, she paid no
part of the purchase money, and received no
part of the proceeds of sale.
The defendant's reticence under the circumstances was not only unnatural, but undutiful. It amounted to a concealment of information which, I think, he was bound to give.
He knew that the complainant had long been
in a state of painful anxiety about her stock,
that she had been reaching out in almost
every direction for help, and that she seized
upon every scrap of information that came
in her way with the greatest avidity; he
knew, also, that her mind had been in a
very unstable condition as to what it was
best for her to do, and that she had great
confidence in his shrewdness, as well as his

retreating from the purpose to sell, and he
afterwards found it necessary to adhere to it
to escape her reproaches for not dealing with
her openly and fairly.
The legal principle to be applied in deciding whether the defendant can successfully
resist the complainant's claim is too firmly
established to warrant even the most astute
and courageous counsel in attempting to overthrow it or to narrow its scope. The general interests of justice and the safety of
those who are compelled to repose confidence
in others alike demand that the courts shall
always inflexibly maintain that great and
salutary rule which declares that an agent
employed to sell cannot make himself the

purchaser, nor, if employed to purchase, can
The moment he
he be himself the seller.
ceases to be the representative of his employer and places himself in a position towards
his principal where his interests may come in
conflict with those of his principal, no matter how fair his conduct may be in the parthat moment he ceases
ticular transaction,
to be that which his service requires and his
He Is no
duty to his principal demands.
longer an agent but an umpire; he ceases to
be the champion of one of the contestants
and sets himself
in the game of bargain,
up as a judge to decide, between his principal and himself, what is just and fair.
The reason of the rule is apparent; owing to
and greed of our nature,
the selffishness

integrity, and that she would be likely to be
I am
by his conduct.
sti-ongly influenced
thoroughly persuaded that he concealed from
her the fact that he intended to buy for the
purpose of inducing her to sell, believing that
if he told her he intended to become the purchaser himself, she would at once refuse to

there must, in the great mass of the transactions of mankind, be a strong and almost
between the interantagonism
ineradicable
ests of the seller and the buyer, and universal
experience has shown that the average man
will not, where his Interests are brought in
conflict with those of his employer, look upon his employer's interests as more important
than his
and entitled to more protection

sell.

own.

This conviction is greatly strengthened by
Shortly after the
his subsequent conduct
stock was transferred, its market price began to advance, and the complainant expressed regret that she had sold, and applied
to the defendant to know whether she could
He told her
not get the stock back again.
He did not acshe had spoken too late.
knowledge that he was its purchaser, and
frankly state, as I think he should have done,
that he was unwilling to return it. Subsequently, v^hen applied to for information as
to whom the complainant's stock had been
that he did not know,
sold, he answered
but said it had been sold through Vermilyea
& Co. This statement, it will be perceived,
involved something more than concealment.
The evidence renders it entirely clear, I
think, that from the time the defendant
made up his mind to buy the stock, up until
the evidence of his purchase was discovered, he made a constant effort to conceal from
the complainant the fact of his purchase.
His motive for adopting this course originally was to prevent the complainant from

In such cases the courts do not stop to inquire whether an agent has obtained an advantage or not, or whether his conduct has
been fraudulent or not, when the fact is established that he has attempted to assume
two distinct and opposite characters in the
same transaction, in one of which he acted
for himself and in the other pretended to act
for another person, and to have secured for
that
each the same measure of advantage
would have been obtained if each had been
represented by a disinterested and loyal representative;
they do not pause to speculate
the merits of the transaction,
concerning

whether the agent has been able so far to
curb his natural greed as to take no advantage, but they at once pronounce the transaction void because it is against public polThe salutary object of the principle is
icy.
not to compel restitution in case fraud has
been committed or an imjust advantage has
been gained, but to elevate the agent to a
position where he cannot be tempted to betray his principal. Under a less stringent
rule, fraud might be committed or imfair
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advantage taken, and yet, owing to the imperfections of the best of human institutions,
the injured party be unable either to discover
it or prove it in such manner as to entitle
him to redress.
To guard against this uncertainty, all possible temptation is removed,
and the prohibition against an agent acting
in a dual character is made broad enough
to cover all his transactions. The rights of
the principal ■will not be changed, nor the
capacity of the agent enlarged, by the fact
that the agent is not Invested with a discretion, but simply acts under an authority to
purchase a particular article at a specified
price, or to sell a particular article at the
market price.
No such distinction is recognized by the adjudications, nor can it be
established without removing an important
safeguard against fraud. Benson v. Heathorn, 1 Tounge & 0. Ch. 326; Conkey v.

Bond, 34 Barb. 276, 36 N. Y. 427.
In pronouncing the judgment of the court
of errors and appeals in Staats v. Bergen,
17 N. J. Eq. 554, 558, the present chief justice has discussed this whole subject with his
vigor and perspicuity. "The rule,"
usual
just stated, he says, "is one of public polthink, it
icy.
The trustee,"— and here,
should be said that the persons referred to
are not simply those who are strictly entitled
to be called trustees, but the term is used
in its most comprehensive sense, and intended to embrace all persons who act in a repaccording to
capacity, whether,
resentative
exact nomenclature, they are styled agents,
factors, executors, adrninistrators or trustees,
—"the trustee is not prevented from bidding
for property which he himself sells, on the
ground simply of a supposition of actual
fraud, bat because the law has established,
as an inflexible rule, applicable to every
emergency, that he shall not place himself in
a situation in which he will be tempted to
take advantage of his cestui que trust. This
is a wise public regulation, intended to protect a species of property which otherwise
would be constantly exposed to peculiar hazard. The trustee, therefore, must submit to
this regulation, and if he does an act in violation of it, no matter how pure his intention may be, such act is voidable at the instance of the person whom he represents.
* * * At these sales, then, the trustee is
forbidden to purchase, because his interest,
as such pm^chaser, is opposed to the interest
of his cestui que trust, and he acts, thereNor
fore, under a bias in his own favor.
exdoes this rule rest, to any considerablp
tent, in the fact that, in a particular line of
cases, the trustee has peculiar opportunities
for the practice of fraudulent acts with regard to the property in his charge.
The rule,
to be efficacious, must be general, and the
law Implies, therefore, that in all cases of
trusts such opportunities may exist, and
the prohibition is universal.
consequently
*
*
* So jealous is the law on this point,
ihat a trustee may not put himself in a posi-
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tion in which, to be honest, must be a strain
on him." The cases are numerous in which
these principles have been enforced against
I
persons acting in the capacity of agents.
Ex
shall cite only those most pertinent.
parte Lacey, 6 Ves. 625; Brookman v. Rothschild, 3 Sim. 153; Rothschild v. Brookman,
3
2 Dow & C. 188; Gillett v. Peppercorne,
Beav. 78; Moore v. Moore, 5 N. Y. 256;
New York Cent. Ins. Co. v. National Protection Ins. Co., 14 N. Y. 85.
It is possible for an agent, dealing directly
with his principal, to make a contract which
but such transacthe courts will uphold;
must be charactertions, to be maintained,
ized by the utmost good faith. There must
and an entire abbe no misrepresentation,
of any
sence of concealment or suppression
fact within the knowledge of the agent,
which might influence the principal; and the
burden of establishing the perfect fairness
of the contract, in such cases, rests upon the
agent.
Condit v. Blackwell, 22 N. J. Eq.
481.
Such transactions are never upheld,
unless it is clearly shown that there has been,
on the part of the person trusted, that most
marked integrity, that uberrima fldes, which
removes all doubt respecting the fairness of
Rothschild v. Brookman, ubi
the contract.
supra.
My conclusion is that the defendant is liable to the complainant for the profit made
on the purchase and sale of the complainant's
railroad stock.
The second claim to relief which
shall
consider is that in which the complainant insists that she is entitled to have the sum
which shall be found to be due her in the
transaction just discussed, charged as a lien
for unpaid purchase money on certain real
estate which she conveyed,
at the defendant's instance, to the defendant's wife.
This
claim rests upon the following facts: In
March, 1874, the defendant purchased a house
and lot on High street, in the city of Newark,
for a residence for himself, for the sum of
$15,000.
On the 1st of April, 1874, he procured them to be conveyed to the complainant, and paid the purchase money as follows:
The complainant and defendant executed two
bonds of $4,500 each, which were secured by
two mortgages,
made by the complainant
alone, on the property conveyed,
and the
complainant also assigned to the vendor a
mortgage held by her against Leopold and
Herman Graf for $4,000, and the balance of
the purchase money, viz., $2,000, was paid in
The defendant admits that at the time
cash.
he made this payment he might have had
$2,000 of the complainant's money in his
hands.
During the year immediately succeeding
the conveyance, the defendant says he made
improvements
on the property which cost
$7,000. The complainant continued to hold
the title to the property until she severed her
relations with the defendant.
On the severance of their relations, the complainant
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demanded
that the defendant should take
disthe title to the High street property,
charge her from liability on the bonds which
she had executed in his behalf, and return
to her such part of the purchase money as
her money and securities
had paid. This
was done. The house and lot were conveyed
to the defendant's wife January 7, 1880, and
the defendant then paid to the complainant,
in cash, in satisfaction of the money and
securities
belonging to her, which he had
used in paying for the house and lot, the
sum of $4,391.90.
The funds he used in making this payment were the proceeds of the
sale of the railroad stock, which the defendant had induced the complainant to transfer
to his wife.
Under the force of these facts,
the complainant insists that inasmuch as the
moneys which the defendant paid to her
were the proceeds of her property, and were,
therefore, in equity hers, and not his, that it
should be adjudged
that the consideration
which the defendant agreed to pay for the
conveyance
to his wife has not been paid,
and consequently
that she is entitled to a
lien as for unpaid purchase money.
First, that
Two things are undisputed.
part of the consideration which the defendant was to pay for the conveyance to his
wife, was to make restitution to the complainant, in money, of so much of her property as he had used, at the time of the purchase, in paying for the house and lot; and
second, that in going through the form of
making such restitution, he simply gave to
the complainant what in equity was hers already.
If the defendant, in going through
had
the form of paying the complainant,
to
used money in his possession belonging
her, the legal nature of the transaction would
clear that it
have been so conspicuously
would have been impossible to misunderstand it. So too, if he had secretly converted one of her securities into money and handthough he
ed that over to her as payment,
might have deceived her for the moment, his
act would have not constituted a payment,
but a fraud. This is exactly what he did
do. He converted property which in equity
was hers, into money, and attempted to pay
He attempted to
her with her own money.
use that which was hers as his, and to discharge his obligation to her by giving her
that which he had attempted, wrongfully, to
take from her and 'to vest in himself. Except we travesty reason and ridicule truth, it
to call such a transaction a
is impossible
payment.
This conclusion makes it the duty of the
court to declare that the whole of the consideration which the defendant agreed to give
for the conveyance to his wife has not been
given, and this places the complainant In a
position before the court where she is entitled to the aid of the court in enforcing her
equitable rights against the land conveyed.
The right of a vendor of lands to a lien In
equity for unpaid purchase money, has been

fully

and repeatedly recognized by this court
and is now a part of its established jurisprudence.
This lien will be enforced, not
against the purchaser, but against all who
claim under him as volunteers or donees.
Graves v. Coutant, 31 N. J. Eq. 763.
Jly judgment is that the complainant Is
entitled to a lien as for unpaid purchase
money, against the house and lot conveyed
by her to the defendant's wife, to the extent that the defendant used the money of
the complainant in paying the consideration
he agreed to give the complainant therefor.
The third claim made by the complainant
presents the question
whether or not the
defendant is liable for $1,000 of the purchase
money of a lot of land conveyed by the complainant to one David Brackin, in July, 1874.
The lot was sold for $1,200, $200 of which
was paid in cash, and the balance, as the
complainant alleges, was to be secured by
a first mortgage on the property sold.
The
defendant, she says, had charge of the whole
matter, and, instead of secui-ing the balance
of the purchase money by a first mortgage
on the lot sold, accepted a second mortgage
on another lot, and that since then the first
mortgage has been foreclosed, the mortgaged
premises sold and the whole of her money
lost I shall not restate or discuss the evidence pertinent to this branch of the case.
It is enough to say that, according to my
view, the evidence entirely fails to establish a case against the defendant.
It should
be said that it clearly appears that the complainant is entirely wrong in the facts on
which she rests her right to relief. It was
not the first mortgage that was foreclosed,
but the one held by the complainant.
At the
sale of the mortgaged
premises they were
bid in by the solicitor employed by the defendant, for the complainant,
to foreclose
her mortgage, for $700.
The complainant refused to take title to the mortgaged premises, and they were afterwards conveyed to
daughter by his direction,
the defendant's
and he subsequently assumed control over
them.
The defendant paid the taxed costs
of the suit and the expenses of the sale,
but nothing more, though he procured the
mortgaged
premises to be conveyed to his
daughter.
In stating the account between
the parties the defendant must be charged
with the sum for which the premises were
sold, and credited with whatever he has paid
on account thereof.
The complainant also seeks to hold the defendant liable for making an improper or
Insecure
investment of her moneys.
In
March, 1875, the complainant received from
the sale of some land located in Pennsylvania the sum of $6,000, and handed It over
to the defendant to invest for her.
The defendant, March 17, 1875, deposited the money
to an account he kept in one of the Newark
banks, as trustee.
He is unable to tell how
many different trusts this account represented, or when this particular $6,000 was
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demnation.
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But while
appears to be very clear that
the defendant's
conduct in this transaction
has been highly improper,
still
think
equally clear on the proofs as they now stand
that no case is established
against the defendant which can be made the basis of relief to the complainant.
It has not been
shown that the mortgage in question is either
worthless
or an inadequate security.
No
loss has as yet been sustained, nor has any

to

show

that

the

com-

is

I

a

a

a

a

a

a
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the defendant has invested the complainant's
know of no
second mortgage.
money in
authority which goes to the length of declaring that
trustee shall he liable, whether loss
is sustained or not, simply because he has insecond
vested the fimds in his hands in
He is bound to make safe investmortgage.
reasonable income
ments, such as will yield
and
return of the principal when required.
If he does that, though the security he takes
may not be the most desirable, he incurs no
genHe should not, as
personal liability.
if he
eral rule, invest in second mortgages;
does, he takes the risk of being personally answerable in case loss ensues, but he is not
understand the rule, simply beliable, as
cause he has made such an investment, if no
loss has been sustained, and In the absence
of evidence that any will be sustained.
The next claim made by the complainant
Among the property which
uncontested.
the complainant
received under the will of
her husband were ten shares of the stock of
a corporation known by the name of the PeDividends, in
ters Manufacturing Company.
both cash and stock or bonds, were declared
on this stock in 1873, 1874, and 1875.
Those
of 1873 were 30 per cent, in cash, and 40 per
cent, in stock; in 1874, 40 per cent, in cash,
25 per cent, in stock, and 35 per cent, in
bonds; and in 1875, 30 per cent, m cash, and
The defendant collect20 per cent, in bonds.

He paid the cash
all these dividends.
to the complainant,
dividends
but had the
stock and bond dividends issued to himself
as trustee.
His explanation or justification
of his conduct in this matter is this: he says
when the first stock dividend was declared,
he inquired of the complainant
what he
should do with it, and that she replied he
might do with
what he liked, or what he
had
mind to, and that he understood her by
this form of expression to say to him that she
gift. When
meant that he should take
as
the subsequent dividends
were declared, he
says he supposed that she entertained
the
same intention with respect to them, and he
procured them also to be issued to himself,
though he made no further inquiry of her respecting her purpose, and she made no furof her intention.
ther declaration
The defendant sold the stock and bonds thus obtainBut before
ed, in January, 1877, for $1,300.
making the sale, he had received on the stock
so obtained by him dividends in cash to the
amount of $561.
The defendant, by his answer, admits that he
liable for the value
of the stock and the amount that he has reand says that
ceived thereon in dividends,
he is willing to account to the complainant
for the same, if she Insists that he shall do
This claim is one of
so.
She does so insist.
The defendant,
the foundations of her bill.
in the accounting, must be charged with what
he received on the sale of the stock and

it

ed

a

it

is

I

it

a

it,

viser of the complainant, from giving her
such counsel respecting it as she was enSimply placing the mortgage
titled to have.
the complainant's papers,
without
among
other evidence of her ownership, not only
put her title to it in a condition of extreme
jeopardy, but left the defendant free to use
as occasion might seem to require, as
security belonging to both funds, and thus
malse
answer a double purpose.
The defendant kept no account of his transactions
on behalf of the complainant,
and she was,
therefore,
deprived of the protection which
the performance of that duty would have afforded her. The defendant's conduct in this
think, the severest conmatter deserves, as

been made

plainant must inevitably or will probably
that
suffer loss. All that has been shown

a

and one vpithout any designation.
It is evident at a glance that the defendant's conduct in this transaction is open to
the very gravest suspicion.
The security, in
the first place, was one that a trustee could
not accept without rendering himself personally liable in case it proved to be worthless
or inadequate.
Gilmore v. Tuttle, 32 N. J.
Eq. 611. The defendant, therefore, occupied
a position in respect to this security which
entirely disqualified him, as the trusted ad-

attempt

is

disbursed, or to whom. On March 6, 1875,
WiUiam A. Pruden and Amos W. Austin
executed a second mortgage on a lot In Commerce street, in the city of Newarl£, to the
defendant as executor of Robert 0. Stoutenburgh, deceased, for $6,000.
The defendant
says he Invested the complainant's money in
this mortgage.
The prior mortgage on this
The defendlot secured the sum of $10,000.
ant says, before Investing the complainant's
he
money in the mortgage just described,
told her it was a second lien, that he was
satisfied the security was sufficient and that
the mortgagors were good and prompt payers, and that she thereupon directed lilm to
malie the investment. The mortgage was
not assigned to the complainant at the time
the investment was made, but the defendant
says he took It from the pacliage containing the papers of the Stoutenburgh estate,
and placed it among the papers he held for
was not
the complainant
The mortgage
formally assigned until after the complainant had revolsed the defendant's authority as
her agent, and called upon him to surrender
The defendant made seven inher property.
dorsements of interest on the bond after he
says he placed the mortgage among the papers of the complainant; four of them are
made by him as attorney, two as executor
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bonds, and also with whatever he has received thereon as dividends.
I shall dispose of the other questions at issue between the parties by simply stating my
conclusions, without attempting to review the
evidence or stating the argument upon which
they rest.
1. The complainant
is not entitled to a decree setting aside tlie deed made by her to
the defendant's daughter as compensation for
the defendant's services.
2. The defendant, in the accounting,
is entitled to a credit of $50 for money paid to
the complainant in December, 1879.
in the accounting, must
3. The defendant,

be charged vritli the dividends
received by
him for the complainant on her stock In the
Amei-ican Insurance Company, for the years
also with three sums,
1876, 1877 and 1878;
of $17.50 each, for unpaid interest on the
Graf bonds and mortgages, due February 1,
1873, August 1, 1873, and February 1, 1874;
and also with $6.20 which, in his account, he
charged
against the comhas erroneously
plainant.
The account between the parties will be
Eistated and settled by the vice chancellor.
ther party may bring on the hearJng on the
accounting on ten days' notice to the other.
The complainant is entitled to costs.
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VIRGINIA LAND
(19

00.

v.

HAUPT.

S. E. 168, 90 Va. 533.)

Supreme Court of Appeals

a

of Virginia.

March

1894.

Error

to circuit court of city of Roanolie.
by the Virginia Land Company
Judgment for defendant,
against one Haupt.
Affirmed.
and plaintiff brings error.

Action

Watts, Robertson & Robertson, for plainGriffin & Glasgow, for defendtiff in error.
ant in error.

LEWIS, P. The defendant in error was sued
by the Virginia Land Company to recover certain unpaid assessments on the stock of the
The principal
$2,800.
company aggregating
grounds of defense were (1) fraud in procuring the contract of subscription; and (2)
the prospeca material variance between
The
tus and the charter of the company.
jury found for the defendant, and the court
refused to disturb the verdict. The defendant subscribed for the stock at the Instance
of one O'Leary, who was a real estate agent
at Roanoke, and one of the promoters of the
It was proposed In the prospectus
company.
"to organize a company for the purchase of
a certain tract of land, lying near the said
city, containing about 550 acres, and to lay
It out in residence lots, and to develop its
natural attractions." By the charter subsequently obtained the company was authorized to buy land, not exceeding 5,000 acres,
also personal property, and to issue mortgage bonds; to loan money to develop lands;
to construct street railways, and to use cars
impelled by any kind of motive power; to
erect and operate motor, gas, and electric
works, etc. O'Leary was known to the defendant as a successful business man, and
his name headed the subscription list. When
he solicited
the defendant
to subscribe he
informed him, in answer to a specific Inquiry,
that the land proposed to be purchased beIn
longed to Gates, Moorman & Moorman.
point of fact, O'Leary and one Christian,
another subscriber to the stock and a promoter of the company, held options on the
land, which fact was not mentioned to the
O'Leary recommended the stock
defendant.
to the defendant as a desirable Investment,
and upon his advice the defendant agreed to
After the organization of
take 100 shares.
the company the land was transfei-red
to
the company, and in consequence O'Leary
ind Christian realized a very large profit.
The company was chartered early In March,
1890, and on the 19th of the same month the
first stockholders' meeting was held, at which
meeting O'Leary represented the defendant
as his proxy.
At the same meeting an assessment of 10 per cent, of the capital stock
was ordered, notice of which was afterwards
and on the 23d of
sent to the defendant;
the ensuing August another assessment of
Upon receipt of
5 per cent, was ordered.
notice of this last assessment the defendant
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wrote the secretary of the company as folhave your notice of
lows: "Dear Sir:
September 1st, calling for an assessment of
$500.00,— five per cent, on one hundred shares
If you wUl please refer to
of your stock.
my letter of April the 28th, addressed to
your treasurer, you will notice that am not
Although
a stockholder in your company.
have never received a reply to this letter,
take it. In the absence of such acknowledgment, my stock was, as a matter of course,
So that there may be no further
canceled.
misunderstanding in the matter, however, I
am not a stockholder in
beg to advise that
the Virginia Land Company, having paid no
assessment whatever on the subscription."
In the notice of the 10 per cent, assessment
of March 19, 1890, It was said: "This amount
must be paid promptly, or the stock will be
declared forfeited;" and in response to this
letter of the 28th of April,
the defendant's
above referred to, was written, which is as
have your favor of
follows: "Dear Sir:
the 24th Inst, calling attention to ten per
cent, assessment of the Virginia Land Company's stock, and in reply beg to say that
in another direcent financial arrangements
am suddenly called upon to
rection, that
provide for, will make It Impossible for me
to pay this assessment now; and to prevent
delays, as well as to avoid bemg a hindrance
in any way to the success of the company,
will be glad If you will consider my stock
forfeited, as provided for in notice of assesswin be glad, therefore. If
ment. * * *
you will dispose of my stock to other parties.
have been informed that the stock Is selling
presume there vrill be no
at a premium, so
Having paid nothing
difficulty in doing this.
am, of course, not entitled to
on the stock,
anything from it." At the trial the defendant testified that when he made the contract
of subscription he had no other information
respecting the proposed enterprise than such
as he obtained from the prospectus and what
was told him by O'Leary; that he was Induced to subscribe by the urgent solicitation
of O'Leary, In whose judgment and integrity
he had confidence, and who earnestly recommended the scheme as a good Investment.
He also testified that he had no idea that
O'Leary was Interested In the land which
It was proposed to buy otherwise than as a
stockholder,
and that, so far from the fact
being disclosed to him, O'Leary, when questioned on the subject, represented that it belonged to Gates, Moorman & Moorman.
He
testified further that he would not have consented to subscribe had he known of the
promoter's interest in the land, and that he
had no Intimation of any such thing as a
"promoter's fund" until several weeks after
he had subscribed.
The court, among other things, instructed
the jm-y that if they believed from the evidence that O'Leary and Christian held options on the land, and that O'Leary induced
the defendant to subscribe in ignorance of
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that fact, relying on his (O'Leary's) supposed
disinterested and superior judgment, and that
he, the defendant, was thereby misled, to his
injury, into making a contract that he otherwise would not have made, then the subThis
scription was voidable, at his option.
the law correctly.
construction propounds
The authorities are abundant in support of
the general rule that one who is fraudulently
induced by an agent of a corporation—and a
is an agent of the proposed corpromoter
to its capital stock
poration—to
subscribe
may, at his option, repudiate the contract;
and that a fraud may consist as well in the
of what is true as in the repsuppression
Indeed,
the
of what IS false.
resentation
law is that, where the person solicited to
subscribe has no other isiformation on the
subject than that the agent chooses to convey,
the statement of the agent ought to be characterized by the utmost candor and honesty.
Cook, Stock, Stockh. & Corp. Law (3d Ed.)
§ 147; Crump v. Mining Co., 7 Grat. 352;
Bosher v. Land Co., 89 Va. 455, 16 S. E. 360;
Directors, etc., v. Kisch, L. R. 2 H. L. 99.
It is contended, however, that the defendant
has by his conduct waived the right to annul
But there can be
the contract in question.
no waiver in a case of this sort without full
of the facts, and such knowlknowledge
on
pdge of the facts and such knowledge
has not been
the part of the defendant
He says he had an intimation a
shown.
few weeks after the organization of the company that there was a large promoters' fund,
but as to who were the parties interested in
He made
the fund he was not informed.
Inquiry on the subject, he says, but could
ascertain nothing definite; and that he relied
on his letter of the 2Sth of April, in reply
to the notice of the first assessment, to which
And afterwards, when
he received no reply.
notified of the 5 per cent, assessment, he
promptly replied, calling attention to his said
letter, and saying he was not a stockholder.
He also called the attention of one of the
directors of the company to the intimation
he had had in regard to the promoters' fund.

and informed him that he repudiated
the
contract.
It Is true, he gave a proxy to
O'Leary to represent him at the first stockholders' meeting, at which meeting the facta
in regard to the promoters' options on the land
but, as was well said in the
were disclosed;
argument, it would be absurd to hold that
he was affected by notice to O'Leary of
what the latter knew from the beginning,
And if he was
and failed to disclose to him.
not affected by notice to O'Leary, then there
is no proof that he received any certain information of the facts constituting the fraud
of before the institution of the
complained
In treating of laches as a
present action.
bar to the subscriber's remedies, Cook says:
"The date from which laches begins to run
is first
Is the time when the subscriber
chargeable with notice that a fraud has been
upon him.
Mere suspicions or
perpetrated
statements,
random
heard in public or In
meetings,
do not necessarily
stockholders'
But, after a subscriber's
constitute notice.
aroused, it is his
suspicions are reasonably
duty to investigate at once. The corporation
has the burden of proof in asserting that the
had notice and was guilty of
subscriber
Cook, Stock, Stockh. & Corp. Law
laches."
Applying these principles to
(3d Ed.) § 162.
the present case, we are of opinion upon the
ground of fraud the case is with the defendant, and that there has been no waiver of
the fraud on his part; and, as this view Is
decisive of the case, it Is needless to consider
whether the case is within the ruling in
Manufacturing Co. v. Hockaday, 89 Va. 557,
16 S. B. 877, on the ground of a variance
between the prospectus and the charter of
the company.
There were a number of exceptions taken
to the rulings of the court during the progress of the trial, to review which seriatim
would extend this opinion to a great length.
It is enough to say in this connection that
the case was submitted to the jury In substantial conformity v?lth the views expressed
in this opinion, and that the judgment must
be affirmed.
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ZAHN
(36

et al. v.

Atl.

188,

McMILLIN
179

et al.

Pa. 146.)

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Jan.

4, 1897.

Appeal from court of common pleas, LawWilliam D. Wallace and S. H.
Miller, Judges.
Action by William A. Zahn and others
From a
against E. A. McMillin and others.
plaintiffs appeal.
judgment for defendants,
rence county;

Reversed.
S. W. Dana, S. D. Long, A. Leo. Weil, and
O. M. Thorp, for appellants. J. Norman Martin, D. B. Kurtz, and L. T. Kurtz, for appellees.

DEAN, J. On April 22, 1891, through negotiations conducted by E. A. McMillin, he
and William Smith took by assignment from
Thomas A. Book 19 oil and gas leases In
The vrritten assignment
Lawre<nce county.
was to Smith, he to hold the same in trust as
of three-fourths for
One-eleventh
follows:
McMillin, and ten-elevenths of three-fourths
for such persons as should contribute towards the common enterprise and the cost of
of
drilling two wells for the development
Smith resided
the common property for oil.
In Pittsburg, and McMillin in Newcastle;
the last named, not far from the territory to
It was alleged by plaintiffs
be developed.
that McMillin got his brother, J. M. McMillin,
of Newcastle, to join in the project. Smith
induced a number of his friends in Pittsburg to join as contributors, they to share In
the profits in proportion te their contributions.
From the money, two wells were drilled, which developed as good gas producers,
but no oil was struck. At the time he made
the assignment to Smith, Book had reserved
one-fourth the oil or gas to be developed,
which was afterwards purchased by E. A.
McMillin, plaintiffs alleged, for himself and
brother.
As to the three-fourths in name of
Smith, he made a written declaration that
he held the same in trust for himself, the
McMillins, and the other contributors. The
production of the wells indicated that the
property was valuable for gas purposes, and
efforts were made by the parties to sell it at
a. profit.
A committee, of which E. A. McMillin was one, was appointed to bring the
property to notice of purchasers and conduct
Meetings were held
negotiations for a sale.
In Pittsburg; two of them, at least, attended
by both the McMillins, and others by E. A.
McMillin alone. In January, 1893, both the
brothers opened negotiations with O. C. RedIck for the purpose of selling the property
They discovered from him, in their
to him.
conversations,
that the salt water which was
obstructing production in one of the wells
could be shut off at a small expense, and this
would add largely to the value of the property.
Full examination of the property by Redick
resulted in am offer from him to take the gas,
pipe it at his own expense to Newcastle, sell
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it, and pay to the owners one-half the gross
Immediately after securproceeds of sales.
ing this ofijer, E. A. McMillin, on January 17,
1893, wrote to W. A. Zahn, one of his coowners and one of these plaintiffs, at Pittsburg, asking him if he could get the consent
of the contributors to take one-fourth the
net earnings, and pay one-fourth the cost of
drilling new wells. In this letter he concealed from his co-owner, Zahn, Redick's offer of one-half the gross proceeds of sales.
Zahn replied that he thought he could get
E. A. McMillin then went to
such consent.
Pittsburg with a contract drawn, naming the
Pittsburg parties as the assignors, and the
In this
two McMillins as the assignees.
agreement it was set forth that all the parties were associated together as owners of
the property, and it was stipulated that the
McMillins were to take the gas, pipe it to
and pay one-fourth the net proNewcastle,
ceeds to all the owners, including themselves;
The Pittsburg
they to retain three-fourths.
parties were urged to immediately execute
the contract, but, as one or more of them desired to consult counsel, Its execution was deferred. They finally prepared another draft
of a contract, embodying substantially the
same terms, with the names of the purchasers left blank. This was executed January
As to this contract, it is not dis31, 1893.
puted that J. M. McMillin solicited plaintiffs
No disclosure of
to affix their signatures.
the Redick offer was made to the Pittsburg
parties when they signed.
After signature,
ilie McMillins filled in the blank with their
names as purchasers, and the same day contracted with Redick according to the terms
He piped
of his proposition already noticed.
the gas to Newcastle, and paid to the McMillins one-half the gross proceeds of sales.
About a year afterwards plaintiffs discovered
the facts, and filed this bill against both the
McMillins for an account; averring them to
be joint owners or tenants in common with
them of the leaseholds, and that a fraud had
been practiced upon them in obtaining the
contract of 31st January, 1893.
The defendants made answer, denying all the material
averments of plaintiffs' bill. J. M. McMillin
especially denied having any interest in common with plaintiffs and his brother prior to
the' execution of the contract of 31st January,
1893.
The court below, after full hearing,
dismissed the bill, and from that decree we
have this appeal by plaintiffs.
The principal errors alleged are the finding of fact that
J. M. McMillin was not interested in the original project, and the conclusion of the court
that he was not liable to account, on the
facts, even if his interest commenced at the
date of the second purchase.
The court does not seem to question that on
the evidence the bill could have been maintained if filed against E. A. McMillin alone,
but being against the brothers jointly, and
not sustained as to J. M. McMillin, it must be
dismissed.
The learned court below, in its
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opinion, speake as foUows: "There are two
main questions of fact upon which plaintiffs'
claim for relief must ultimately
rest: First,
that J. M. Mcilillin had an interest in the
leases mentioned in plaintiffs' bill, and was a
tenant in common with plaintiffs in said leases
on January 31, 1893; second, fraud, actual or
constructive, on the part of the defendants in
procuring from plaintiffs the contract Exhibit
A. If either of these grounds fall, the case
must
fall. » * * An examination
of the
whole evidence fails to show the relationship
of tenant in common between the plaintiffs and
J. M. Jlcilillin. We would hesitate to find
such a relationship from the evidence of the
plaintiffs, if it was not contradicted.
Both J.
^I. JIcMillin and E. A. McMillin, however, positively deny such relationship in their answer,
and also upon the stand as witnesses, and their
by plaintiffs' counsel does
cross-examination
not in the least weaken their evidence. The
plaintiffs also contend that, even if J. M. McMillin was not a co-tenant, he occupied such a
fiduciary relation towards them which required
him to disclose the offer which Redlck had made
prior to January 31, 1893, and which offer was
concluded in the conti-act of February 1, 1893.
They urge that he had so conducted himself
as to lead the plaintiffs to believe he was acting with them and for them.
They also urge
that he misrepresented the facts, by stating
that the terms of the contract he was obtaining
fa-om them were the best that could be obtained for the property. We have already
found that J. M. McMillin was not a co-tenant
We
with the plaintiffs and B. A. McMillin.
find nothing in the evidence which should have
induced the plaintiffs to believe that he was a
co-tenant, or tliat he was acting in any fiduciary capacity for them or with them. It is true
that he was present at two meetings of the
parties in Pittsburg, but there was no evidence
to show that he took auy part in the proceedThe
ings, or acted other than as a spectator.
value of the property was purely speculativ'e,
and the plaintiffs had the same opportunity to
foiTn an opinion as to its prospective value as
J. M. McMillin. It is true, Redick had proposed
to him to lease the premises on more favorable
terms than what the plaintiffs were to get by
their contract, but there was no such fiduciary
relation subsisting between J. M. McMillin and
them as required him to disclose Redick's of-

fer."
Whether a tenant in common, or merely a
partner in a project for gain, E. A. McJIillin,
on the undisputed facts, by reason of his confidential relation with his co-cuutributors to the
common enterprise, perpetrated upon them a
palpable fraud, — not a constructive fraud merely, but an actual fraud. If the brother aided
and abetted him in consummating this fraud,
that they two might reap the fruits of it, and
they have succeeded, they are jointly boimd to
On sufficient evidence, the
make restitution.
court below has found that J. M. McMillin had
no interest in the purchase from Book, April
There was much evidence to the
22, 1891.

contrary, but the error Is not so clearly manifest in the finding as to move us to disttffb it.
Therefore we assume as a fact that his property interest dated from the contract of 31st January, 1893. It is not denied— nor could It be, In
the face of the evidence— that by that contract
J. M. shares in the fruits of the fraud to which
E. A. was an active pai-fy, and for which he Is
answerable in an account. But did J. M., by
his declarations and conduct, aid his brother in
procuring the fraudulent contract, so as to render him accountable In equity to these plaintiffs? The learned court below thinks not, because he was not one of the contributors to the
first enterprise, and therefore must be treated
as a stranger dealing at arm's length with the
co-partners or co-tenants of his brother. This
is a mistake, for that one fact warrants no
such conclusion. If he had been a member of
the first association, and had untruthfully represented a material fact to his associates, to induce them to part with their interests, that
would have been conclusive against him, because of the legal presumption of a confidential
relation; but, if there was not presumptively a
confidential relation, still was there one In fact,
or such relation as warranted them In relying
on the truthfulness
of his statements? The
principle controlling such cases, and deducible
from all the authorities, is well stated by Perry on Trusts (volume 1, p. 179): "There are
cases where a party must not be silent upon
a material fact within his knowledge, although
he stands in no relation of trust and confidence.
• ■* • If a party knows that another
is reIj ing upon his judgment and knowledge in contracting with him, althouga no confidential relation exists, and he does not state material
facts within his knowledge, the contract will
be avoided; for knowingly to permit another
to act as though the action was confidential,
and yet not state material facts, is fraudulent.
It is said that a party in such circumstances is
bound to destroy the confidence reposed in him,
or to state all the facts that such confidence
demands."
The court's twelfth finding of fact is that,
at the time the contract was entered into, J.
M. McMillin represented to the Pittsburg
parties that the terms, one-fourth the net
proceeds of the oil, embodied in the contract
he was soliciting them to sign, were the best
that could be got. This representation was
willfully false. He admits that Redick had
made an offer of double that price, which
had been accepted by him and his brother, on
which a contract had been framed, which
he had in his pocket, ready to be signed as
soon as the Pittsburg parties signed the con-

tract for one-fourth. In whose interest was
he acting when this falsehood was uttered?
It is argued, his own expectant interest In
the contract with the Pittsburg parties.
But
he was also dealing as the agent of his brother. They two were the purchasers, parties
of the second part to the contract which inured to the benefit of both. He was there
to conduct the negotiations and close the con-
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tract In pursuance of his brother's letter to
Zahn of 10 days previous, which did not
hint at Redicli's offer.
There can be no
severance of the falsehood by imputing one
half of it to E. A., who held a legal, confidential relation, and the other half to J. M.,
who, if representing himself alone, did not
hold the same relation. By taking his brother's place and representing him, he spoke for
both, and put himself in a position where
the brother's co-tenants were justified in relying on this false statement of a most material fact. This gave him a vantage ground
wliich naturally invited confidence in his
statements, and he must be held to the same
rule of conduct as B. A. would have been
held to had he, on the same representation,
personally solicited the assent of his co-part"It is naught, it
ners to a sale at half price.
is naught, saith the buyer; but when he is
gone his way he boasteth himself."
This is
the attitude of a stranger towards the seller
whose wares he depreciates, and the one the
court below finds J. M. to have held. It is
not the one the facts put him in. To hold J.
M. answerable, it is not essential that another ease exactly like this on the facts
should have been decided fraudulent.
This,
clearly, is within the scope of established
principles, where in equity a party dare not
falsely represent a material fact. "Courts
liave never laid down as a general proposition what [facts] shall constitute fraud, or
any rule beyond which they will not go, lest
other means of avoiding equity will be
found" (2 Pars. Cont. 760), and certainly
have never held that, where a party aiding
in a fraud has not theretofore acquired a
fractional interest in the property which is
the subject of the fraudulent bargain, he
But, if
cannot be called to an accounting.
he had no direct interest of his own, the misrepresentation went still further than as a
representative of his brother, for the very
agreement he had asked them to sign says;
"AVhereas, the said parties of the first part
toand of the second part are associated
gether as owners of leases for oil and gas
purposes on one thousand acres of land in
Shonango and Slippery Rock township, Law*
* * the said first parties
rence county,
owning one hundred and twenty shares and
owning fifty-six
the said
parties
second
shares; and whereas, two wells have been
drilled at the joint expense of all of said
♦
*
* and whereas, all of said
owners;
owners are desirous of having said gas used
'* *
*■ so as to realize a profit.
*
*
*"
True, this was not the agreement signed tnree
days thereafter,
but it was one E. A. McMillin had, acting for both, asked them to
sign.
B. A. was then acting for J. M. in
efCorts to secure a contract in which both concurred, and which was framed with a view
to accepting the Redick proposition, and was
by both. It
therefore a false representation
was not signed only because the Pittsburg
parties desired their own counsel to frame it.

!
j
'
,
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The one adopted by the two brothers, and
first exhibited to the Pittsburg parties, contained a deliberate declaration in writing that
J. M. McMillih was then a co-partner. This
was a direct invitation to the co-partners to
deal with them in securing the best price.
The conduct of J. M. for months before, and
during all the negotiations, seems to us, on
this printed testimony, reconcilable only with
the theory that he was interested in the leases
at the date of the contract with the Pittsburg parties. Assuming, however, that, when
he said on the witness stand he was not interested, he told the truth, he did not tell the
truth to the confidants and partners of his
brother when he contracted for himself and
his brother at half price for their interests.
The law cannot undertake to draw a line beas agent for E.
tween his misrepresentation
in his own inA. and his misrepresentation
terest as a stranger to the original associa
And if his declarations and conduct
tion.
misled, as they plainly did, the Pittsburg parties, and induced them to believe him interested with them in a common enterprise, he
is estopped now from denying the truth of
the representations.
On both grounds the bill
is sustained as against him, and both should
account to plaintiffs as prayed for in the bill.
As to the lemark of the court that when the
contract was made the value of the property
was piu-ely speculative, and all parties had
the same opportunity
for forming an opinion, it is certainly an error.
The court must
have overlooked the fact that J. M. McMillln had in his pocket, at the very time he was
sollcitiiig the signatures of the plaintifCs, the
draft of the proposed agreement with Redick, which was to be signed as soon as the
Pittsburg parties had executed their contract,
and which was afterwards, on the same day,
actually execuled by Redick. As concerned
the McMlUins, there was nothing speculative
in their estimate of value. They knew exactly the worth of the property, by knowing
what they were to get for it. Their profit
depended only oh how low they could beat
down the price by methods which some dealers call only shrewd, but which the law pronounces fraudulent, and holds the parties to
a strict accountability.
It is ordered that the decree of the common
pleas be reversed and plaintiffs' bill be reinstated, and further:
(1) That the said E. A.
McMilllD and J. M. McMillin were trustees
ex maleficio for all the owners of said leaseholds in making said contract with Oliver C.
Redick, and that said contract, and all the
rights of the first parties thereunder, are the
property of all the present owners of said
leaseholds, to whom, through their treasurer,
all payments under the same should be made.
(2) That the said E. A. McMillin and J. M.

McMillin

account to the orators for, and pay
all moneys rethe said treasurer,
with
ceived by them under said contract
Oliver C. Redick. (3) That an injunction issue, restraining the said E. A. and J. M. Mc-
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Millin from selling, assigning, incumbering,
or in any manner disposing of said last-mentioned contract.
(4) That an injunction issue,
restraining the Big Meadow Gas Comi)any

any further sum or sums of
money to the said E. A. and J. M. McMilUn
under said last-mentioned contract It Is further ordered that defendants pay the costs.

from paying
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Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Nov. 13,

1888.

On order to show cause why an injunction
shall not issue to restrain the defendant from
taking proceedings to enforce a judgment at
law.
Bill for injunction by George E. Phillips
against Ralph L. PuUen to restrain proceedings to enforce a judgment.

Wm. Y. Johnston and John P. Stockton,
Atty. Gen., foi^ complainant. Geo. O. Vanderhilt, C. H. Beasley, and W. D. Holt, for
defendant.

McGILL,

The judgment in question
Ch.
was recovered in a suit upon an agreement by
the complainant to pay $7,500 in settlement
of an action that had been commenced
against him by the defendant for damages for
debauching the defendant's wife, enticing her
Upon a writ of
away, and harboring her.
error to Mercer circuit court, where the cause
in which the judgment was recovered was
tried, the court of errors and appeals affirmand
ed the judgment of the court below,
thereby confirmed the decision of many of
the questions sought to be again raised by
the bill in this case.
That decision determined that the complainant's attorney had authority to make the agreement sued upon;
that the agreement did not lack consideration; that the consideration of the agreement
was not executory; that there was no abandonment or rescission of the agreement by
the defendant, Pullen; and that proof of the
fraud, which is here alleged, was admissible
in defense in that suit, but that the evidence
of it there offered and admitted, was inadequate to establish It. Phillips v. Pullen, 50
All those matters
N. J. Law, 439, 14 Atl. 222.
must now be considered as settled between
The doctrine is well
the parties to this suit.
settled that this court will not, on the anplication of the defendant in a judgment at law,
who has had a fair opportunity to be heard
upon a defense, over which the court pronouncing the judgment had full jurisdiction,
enjoin the enforcement of the judgment simply on the ground that it is unjust. A court
of equity limits its interference with the enforcement
of a judgment at law to cases
where that appears which clearly shows It to
be against conscience to execute the judgment, and of which the injured party could
not have availed himself in the court of law;
or of which he might have availed himself at
law, but was prevented by fraud or accident,
unmixed with any fault or negligence in himself or his agents. Insurance Co. v. Hodgson, 7 Cranch, 332; Hendrickson v. Hinckley,
17
How. 443; Powers' Ex'rs v. Butler's
Adm'r, 4 N. J. Eq. 465; Vaughn v. Johnson,
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9 N. J. Eq. 173; Moore v. Gamble, Id. 246;
Reeves v. Cooper, 12 N. J. Eq. 223; Holmes
V. Steele, 28 N. J. Eq. 173; Bank v. Manufacturing Co., 33 N. J. Eq. 486, 35 N. J. Eq.
344; Simpson v. Hart, 1 Johns. Ch. 91; 3
Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1361, and note. It is insisted
for the complainant that the contract, upon
which the judgment in question is based, was

grossly unconscionable that this court will
here Interfere, and stay the enforcement of
The action of the court must
the judgment.
depend upon the questions whether the defendant is too late in his application, whether
of the contract
the gross miconscionableness
is a distinct principle of equity which could
not be urged in defense of the suit at law,
and whether in fact the contract was grossly
will consider these quesunconscionable.
tions in the order in which
have stated
them.
The complainant makes his application by
supplemental bill, in which he alleges that by
his original bill he sought to avoid the agreement for fraud, and because it was grossly
unconscionable;
and that he was denied an
Injunction to restrain the suit at law, because the grounds upon which the equity of
his bill rested were good defenses to the ac■tion, at law.
The defendant, by his answer
to the supplemental bill, claims that the decision of the chancellor (Runyon) was based
upon the defendant's denial of the facts upon
which the equity of the complainant's bill
was founded.
No reasons for the chancellor's decision were given.
It appears to me
to be better that
shall assume that the merits of the last two questions under consideration were not passed upon, and that the original application for injunction affords an excuse for the apparent laches of the complainant in asking the aid of this court.
It Is established that for mere inadequacy of consideration, unconnected
with fraud, a court of
equity will not set aside a contract.
Willis v.
Jernegan, 2 Atk. 251; Griffith v. Spratley, 1
Cox, 383; Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 266; Low
V. Barchard, 8 Ves. 133;
Osgood v. Franklin,
2 Johns. Ch. 1; Crane v. Conklin, 1 N. J. Eq.
346; Wintermute's Ex'rs v. Snyder's Ex'rs, 3
N. J. Eq. 489; Weber v. Weitling. 18 N. J.
Eq. 441; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. 251; 2 Pom. Eq.
Jur. § 925. The cases of expectant heirs or
reversioners,
who have bound themselves ia
bargains with respect to their
unconscionable
expectancies,
have been regarded in many
cases as an exception to this rule.
Berny v.
Pitt, 2 Vern. 14; Nott v. Hill, Id. 27; Wiseman V. Beake, Id. 121; Twisleton v. Griffith,
1 P. Wms. 310; Curwyn v. Milner, note c, 3
P. Wms. 292; Barnardiston v. Lingood, 2
Atk. 133; Gwynne v. Heaton, 1 Brown, Ch. 9;
Coles V. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 246; Evans v. Peacock, 16 Ves. 512.
Where, however, such inadequacy of price is so gross that it shocks
the conscience, courts of equity will interfere,
not upon distinct principle, but upon the
so
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that such Inadequacy amounts to conevidence
In Osgood v.
of fraud.
Franklin, 2 Johns. Ch. 18, Chancellor Kent
said: "The doctrine is settled that in setting
aside contracts on account of inadequate consideration,
the ground Is fraud arising from
gross inequality."
In Copis v. Middleton, 2
Madd. 410, the vice-chancellor said: "Mere
inadequacy of price, to invalidate a contract,

ground

elusive

must, per se, be so excessive

as to be demon-

strative of fraud." In Wintermute's Bx'rs
V. Snyder's Ex'rs, 3 N. J. Eq. 489, 496, Chancellor Vroom said:
"Still there may be such
unconscionableness,
such palpable and excessive inequality in a bargain,
as to induce
equitable interference.
But in all such cases
the court goes on the ground of fraud, being
satisfied that gross imposition or undue Influence must have been practiced.
If the inadequacy be such as to shock conscience, it
vfill amount to evidence of fraud, and will be
so considered."
In GifCord v. Thorn, 9 N. J.
Eq. 702, 740, in the court of errors and appeals, Justice Potts uses this language:
"Undoubtedly, if this transaction is to be considered as a matter of bargain and sale, here is
a gross inadequacy of consideration;
such an
inadequacy as raises a violent presumption of
fraud, deception, ignorance
or imbecility.""
In Weber v. Weitllng, 18 N. J. Eq. 441, Chancellor Zabriskie said:
"For mere inadequacy
of consideration equity does not set aside a
deed, unless accompanied by fraud, or unless
the inadequacy is so gross as to imply fraud."
Judge Story, in his work on Equity Jm'isprudence (volume 1, p. 256,) after saying that
is not of itself a
inadequacy of consideration
distinct principle of relief in equity, adds:
"Still, however, there may be such an unconscionableness or inadequacy in a bargain as toi
demonstrate
some gross imposition or some
undue influence, and in such cases courts of
equity ought to interfere upon the satisfactory ground of fraud. But then such unconscionableness, or such inadequacy, should be
made out as would (to use an expressive
phrase) shock the conscience, and amount in
itself to conclusive and decisive evidence of
fraud." Professor Pomeroy, in his work on
Equity .Jurisprudence (section 927) says: "Although the actual cases in which a contract
or conveyance has been canceled on account
of gross inadequacy merely, without other
incidents,
are very few; yet the
equitable
doctrine is settled by a consensus of decisions
and dicta, that, even in the absence of all
other circumstances,
when the inadequacy of
the price is so gross that it shocks the conscience, and furnishes satisfactory and decisive evidence of fraud, it will be a suflicient
ground for canceling a conveyance or contract, whether executed or executory.
Even
then fraud, and not inadequacy of price, Is

the true and only cause for the Interposition
of equity, and the granting of relief."
At this point we are again confronted with
the adjudication already had between the parties to this cause.
Equity can interfere only
upon the ground of fraud; and the question
of fraud in the agreement, as
have stated,
has been heard by a court having fuU jurisdiction over that question, and decided. J"!istice ilagie, who wrote the opinion of the
court of errors and appeals in the case there
between the parties to this suit, disposed of
the suggestion that the price Phillips agreed
to pay is evidence of fraud, in the concluding
sentences of that opinion, as follows:
"In an
action on an undertaking to pay a specific
sum, the rule for measuring damages is compensation, which can only be afforded by a
verdict for that sum, with interest.
No reason why this case should be taken out of that
rule is suggested, but that the agreement was
But, if It
unreasonable
or unconscionable.
might have been avoided in equity upon that
ground, nothing short of fraud will affect it
at law: and fraud would not be ground for
reducing damages, but for defeating recovery.
There is nothing in the stipulated sum
to justify an inference of fraud. The original suit sought to recover damages incapable
of accurate determination.
Had it proceeded
to trial, the quantum of damages must have
been determined by a jury upon the circumstances.
Where the parties, knowing the circumstances,
liquidated
the damages by an
agreement not brought about by deceit or imposition, it cannot be said that such damages
are unconscionable."
If gross unconscionableness of a bargain were a distinct principle upon which equity would relieve, it
■would be impossible
for me to say that the
bargain, in this instance, was of that character.
Lord Thurlow, in Gwynne v. Heaton,
1 Brown,
Ch. 8, said of such bargains:
"There must be an inequality so strong,
gross, and manifest that It must be impossible to state It to a man of common sense,
without producing an exclamation at the inequality of it." If there is nothing in the
sum agreed to be paid that will justify an Inference of fraud in the law courts, It can
hardly be that there Is so much In it here as
to shock the conscience of this court.
The
reasoning of Justice Magie, in which
concurred in the court of errors and appeals, satisfies me that there is nothing in the stipulated sum to manifest gross inequality.
Nor
is there anything in the condition of the parties to make such gross inequality apparent.
Both are farmers. Pullen has property valued at $1,000 or $1,500, and Phillips admits
that he is worth $12,000, while the answer
puts his estate at $40,000.
will discharge
the order to show cause, with costs.

I

I

I

CX)XSTRUCTIVB FRAUD.

EAKBSTRAW
(30 S. B. 735,

v.

LANIER.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

April

Error from superior court,

1897,

13, 1898.

Screven

On September 18,
to in the contract.
Lanier wrote to Rakestraw, at Oliver,
"Under our contract, you are
as follows:
now due me $1,000, which you will pay at
once, or discontinue practice in this place."
Rakestraw refused to comply with this deLanier
mand;
and on October 26, 1897,
brought to the superior court his petition,
setting out the foregoing facts, and alleging that Rakestraw was still engaged in the
practice of medicine, surgery, and obstetrics
in the locality mentioned, contrary to his
contract, in violation of equity and good conscience, and in fraud and damage of petitioner; that by reason of this breach of the
contract, and under the express terms thereof, defendant became Indebted to him In the
sum of $1,000 at the expiration of the year
from the date of the dissolution, and is still
so indebted; that defendant is hopelessly
insolvent; that petitioner has no adequate
remedy at law; and that the injury complained of is continuing in its nature, and
will necessitate a suit at the expiration of
each year, and by reason of the bad faith of
the defendant, and the nature of petitioner's
business, his age, and his circumstances, the
injury is irreparable in damages.
Waiving
discovery, he prayed a judgment against defendant for $1,000, a perpetual injunction,
and, until the final hearing, a temporary injunction, restraining the defendant from engaging in the practice of medicine, surgery,
or obstetrics at the town of Oliver, or any
place within a radius of fifteen miles from
the drug store of petitioner, unless he shall
have first obtained the written consent of
petitioner. The defendant demurred and answered, and, at the hearing of the application for temporary injunction, urged that
the petition set forth no ground for injunction or other relief against him; that the
stipulation in the contract upon which the
petition was based is against public policy
and illegal, and is not valid or enforceable
against the defendant; that It is not a reasonable
or proper stipulation, within the
meaning
of the requirements of the law,
and is unjust, unfair, and against good conscience; that it is without sufficient consideration to support it, and is lacking in mutuality, and does not put the plaintiff under such obligation as would make the agreement of the defendant valid and binding;
and, further, that, under the facts, the plaintiff was not entitled to the injunction or other relief. Defendant denied that he had acted in bad faith, or was inflicting any legal
injury upon the plaintiff. He denied that
he was hopelessly insolvent, but admitted
tljat his assets, which consisted of personal
property only, would not, if sold at public
outcry, net more than enough to pay what
he owed.
He alleged:
Before signing the
plaintiff called his attention to
agreement,
the stipulation in question, and said that it
had been put in by the lawyer as a matter
of form, and that he (plaintiff) doubted Its
ferred

104 Ga. 188.)

coun-

R. L. Gamble, Judge.
Action by A. B. Lanier against Ohauncey
Rakestraw.
Decree for plaintiff.
Defendant brings error. Reversed.
ty;

The following is the official report:
On August 10, 1895, Lanier and Rakestraw, physicians residing in the town of
Oliver, formed a partnership for the pracsurgery, and obstetrics.
tice of medicine,
The articles of co-partnership contained,
among
other stipulations, the following:
"In consideration of the advantages and
benefits that will flow to said Raljestraw by
reason of the formation of said firm and
partnership business, he hereby agrees that
in the event said firm shall at any time
hereafter be dissolved, tliat he will not locate or engage in the practice of medicine,
surgery, or obstetrics at said town of Oliver, or at any place within fifteen miles
radius from the drug store of said Lanier,
unless he shall first have obtained the writAnd, in the
ten consent of said Lanier.
event the said Rakestraw shall violate the
terms of this article, the said Lanier shall
be entitled to sue and recover, as his damages, tbe sum of one thousand dollars annually from said Rakestraw so long as he
shall violate the terms of this article; said
sum of $1,000 being agreed now between
the parties hereto as damages, and not as a
penalty. This partnership shall continue for
the space and term of twelve months from
the date when signed by the parties hereto,
unless sooner dissolved.
This partnership
may be dissolved by either member giving
to the other, in writing, a notice of his intention to withdraw from the partnership;
and, at the expiration of thirty days from
the service of such notice by either member
on the other, said firm shall be dissolved."
On June 3, 1896, Lanier wrote to Rakestraw
as follows:
"Under the provisions of our
contract, a thirty-days notice is required to
dissolve the same; and you are hereby notified that, on the third day of July next,
you may consider the contract between us
in the practice of medicine ended.
This will
enable you to make all collections of your
one-third interest in all accounts now on our
books, or what may become due within thirty days, at which time I shall expect a partner in the practice here.
If you desire, you
can fully withdraw from all office practice
and drug-store duties from date.
I shall expect to abide by the contract in the letter
and In the spirit in which it was written."
The partnership was accordingly dissolved.
After the dissolution, Rakestraw continued
to reside in the town of Oliver, and to practice medicine, surgery, and obstetrics
therein, and within the radius of 15 miles re-
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legality, and gave defendant to understand
that he need not apprehend its enforcement
Before the agreement was entered into, certain residents of the town of Oliver bad advertised in the newspaper that a physician
was needed in the town, and plaintiff, understanding that defendant might locate in Oliver, induced him to sign the contract, with
the purpose of thereby getting rid of defendant's competition.
This purpose was
fraudulent, and vitiated the contract, if othDuring the continuance of the
erwise legal.
partnership, and before any notice of dissolution
was given, plaintiff so conducted
himself with reference to the defendant as
to deprive him of the possibility of gaining
any advantage from the association,
and
made the partnership the means of injuring and damaging defendant, and of efforts
prospects.
to blast his good name
and
Plaintiff, before the notice, clrculatea reports which were untrue and unfounded, reflecting grossly upon the character and life of
defendant, and which are set out in the anPlaintiff did uot comply with his obswer.
He declined
ligations under the contract.
upon different occasions to practice with defendant, declined to recognize notes addressed to the firm in the firm name, and announced that he would not notice any request for a visit that was not addressed to
him personally. While the co-partnership
continued, plaintiff announced that he inand would drive
tended to ruin defendant,
him out of the country. As to these allegations the evidence at the hearing was conflicting. The court, after hearing the evidence, ordered that a temporary injunction
as prayed for be granted, unless a bond with
security, conditioned to pay the eventual
money, should be given by the
condemnation
defendant within 45 days from the date of
Defendant excepted.
the order.
Denmark, Adams & Freeman, for plaintiff
Giquilliat & Stubbs and Oliver &
in error.
Overstreet, for defendant in error.

LIITTLE, J. Counsel for plaintiff in error,
and brief, rests his
both by his argument
case on the proposition that the petition on
which the judge below granted an injunction
in default of bond sets forth no cause for relief, because the contract sought to be enforced is not a legal and binding instrument.
Hence this court is called upon to determine
the question whether the contract which is
set out in the foregoing report is void, as contrary to public policy, or whether the same is
This
valid, and therefore to be enforced.
question is to be settled by the rules of law
made in restraint of
contracts
governing
trade, and, in seelting to make application of
such rules, we find ourselves furnished with
precedents which seem to be authority for all
phases of the question, and rulings distressThe plaintiff in error subingly in conflict.
mits that the terms of the contract render It
invalid, because it is harsh and unreasonable;

It is against public policy; It Is not a reasonable or proper contract, within the meaning or
the requirements of the law; that it is with-

out consideration to support it.
If either one
of these contentions is established, then, as
we understand the law applicable to contracts
of this character, the courts must refuse to
enforce the contract
relied upon, because
agreements which are unlawful, without regard to the manner of execution, never In law
become contracts, although frequently denominated and dealt with under the name of
illegal contracts.
We cannot, within reasonable limits, undertake to reconcile conflicting
opinions in treating of contracts in restraint
of trade, nor cite the authorities which bear
upon the different constituent elements which
render such contracts valid, or the want of
wliich make them void, for the reason that
the first are irreconcilable,
and the latter inharmonious.
It must suffice that we shall in
this case present the njles which we consider
established by the most satisfactorily reasoned cases of other jurisdictions, arid the adjudications of our own court.
Mr. Clark, in his work on Contracts, says,
on authority, that at one time in England it
was considered that a contract was contrary
to public policy if it placed any restraint at
all on a man's right to exercise his trade or
calling, but that, gradually, exceptions were
recognized, until at last the court, in a lead1 P. Wms.
ing case (Jlitchel v. Reynolds,
the rule that a contract in
181), established
restraint of trade, upon consideration, which
shows it was reasonable for the parties to enter into It, is good; "that whenever a consideration appears to make It a proper and
useful contract, and such as cannot be set
aside without injury to a fair contractor, It
By reference
etc.
ought to De maintained,"
to that case, we find the conclusion of the
court to be that "in all restraints of trade,
where nothing more appears, the law presumes them bad; but, if the circumstances
is excluded,
are set forth, that presumption
and the court is to judge of those circumstanand if, upon
ces, and determine accordingly,
them, it appears to be a just and honest contract, it ought to be maintained."
Some
question has arisen as to the proper construction of our Code, which declares that "contracts in general in restraint of trade are
void" (Civ. Code, § 3668), and as to whether
interpretation of these words
the proper
would have the effect to declare that contracts
in general restraint of trade are void, or that
contracts generally in restraint of trade are
void.
Speaking
for myself, I interpret the
language to mean that contracts generally In
restraint of trade are void.
The words of
this section were not codified from any act
of the general assembly, but the same language appeared in our first Code (1863), and
ran without change through successive editions and revisions up to and Including the
Civil Code of 1896, from which
infer that,
if the words were not intended to be accepted
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as written, subsequent codiflers, if not subwould,
by change or
sequent legislatures,
amendment,
more clearly have expressed a
But I take it that the
different meaning.
words "contracts in general in restraint of
trade are void" (meaning that, generally, contracts in restraint of trade are void) were in-

of laws in
corporated
Into the codification
force in this state as expressing a recognized
legal principle sanctioned by the highest authority. In Ross V. Sadgbeer, 21 Wend. 168,
Jlr. Justice Bronson says: "The law starts
that a contract in
out with the presumption
restraint of trade is void." The same rule
is stated In Pol. Cont. side page 311; is recognized in the leading case from 1 P. Wms.,
supra; and the principle laid down in Clark,
Besides, such a construction
Cont. p. 447.
seems to be in harmony with the policy of
To one class of persons
the law in this state.
at least— corporations— contracts of this character are forbidden when they tend to lessen
business
in tlieir respective
competition
(Const. 1877; Civ. Code, § 5800); and various
acts of the legislature seem to indicate such
However this may be, it is
a policy to exist.
in unreasonable
recertain that contracts
straint of trade are contrary to public policy,
and void, because they tend to injure the
parties making them; diminish their means
of procuring livelihoods and a, competency for
their families; tempt improvident persons, for
the sake of present gain, to deprive themselves of the power to malie future acquisitions, and expose them to imposition and oppression;
tend to deprive the public of tha
services of men in the employments and capacities in which they may be most useful to
the community as well as to themselves;
discourage industry and enterprise, and diminish
the products of ingenuity and skill; prevent
competition, and enhance prices, and expose
Clark,
the public to all the evils of monopoly.
Against evils like these, wise
Cont. p. 446.
laws protect individuals and the public by
Alger v.
declaring all such contracts void.
Thacher, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 51.
Since the early
history both of England and this
legislative
country, statutes have been of force looking
to the prevention of monopoly, and the interdiction of restraints upon the exercise of
business, trades, or professions;
and in no Instance has a contract which imposed an unreasonable restraint upon the same, in the eye
of the judiciary, been upheld; and the question of the reasonableness
of the restriction
is one of law for the court.
1 Whart. Cont.
Bish. Cont. § 517; Benj. Sales, § 527;
§ 433;
2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 934; Mallan v. May, 11
Mees. & W. 653; WUey v. Baumgardner,
97
Ind. 66. In determining whether such restriction is reasonable, the court will look
alone to the time when the contract was entered into.
Bannie v. Irvine, 7 Man. & G.
969;
Cook v. Johnson, 47 Conn. 175.
It is,
however, satisfactorily established that, as a
matter of law, such a contract is to be upheld if the restraint Imposed is not unreasona-
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ble, is founded on a valuable consideration,
and is reasonably necessary to protect the interest of the party In whose favor it is imposed, and does not unduly prejudice the inIn
Clark, Cont. p. 446.
terests of the public.
some jurisdictions it is held that a contract in
restraint of trade which is unlimited as to
space is void on its face, and will not be enId. p. 450, and authorities cited.
forced.
On the other hand, it has been held that a
contract restraining the exercise of a trade or
the kingdom or state
business throughout
may be reasonable, and therefore valid. Rousillon v. Rousillon, 14 Ch. Div. S.jl; Beal v.
Chase, 31 Mich. 490; Match Co. v. Roeber,
however,
In determining,
Hun, 421.
35
such a contract is reasonable, the
whether
court will consider the nature and extent of
the trade or business, the situation of the
and
parties, and all the other circumstances;
even if the presumption to which we have before referred does not exist against the validity of such contracts, so as to require persons
seeking to enforce them to show that they
were made upon a sufficient consideration,
and that the restrictions they impose are reasonable (Angler v. Webber, 92 Am. Dec, note
on page 753), yet, in law, all such contracts
are void, if considered only in the abstract,
and without reference to the situation or objects of the parties, or other circumstances
under or with reference to which they were
made; and this, though the pecuniary consideration paid may have been sufficient to
support the contract in any other aspect, or
anj' ordinary contract for a legal purpose, or
even though it may be sufficient in value to
compensate the restraint imposed.
But if,
considered with reference to the situation,
business, and objects of the parties, and in
the light of all the surrounding circumstances
with reference to which the contract was
made, the restraint contracted for appears to
have been for a just and honest purpose, for
the protection of the legitimate interests of
the party in whose favor it is imposed, reasonable as between them, and not specially
injurious to the public, the restraint will be
held valid.
The true test, therefore, of the
validity of such a contract, is whether it is
supported by a sufficient consideration,
and
whether the restraint is reasonable.
The plaintiff In error contends that the contract under review is without sufficient consideration to support it, and that for this reason it is void.
That there must be an actual
valuable consideration to support such a contract,
and such
consideration
should be
shown on the face of the declaration or complaint, although the contract be under seal,
are propositions well established.
Bish. Cont.
iletc. Cont. p. 233; 1 Whart. Cont. §
§ 126;
434; Mitchel v. Reynolds,
1 P. Wms. 181;
Davis V. Mason, 5 Term R. 118; Hutton v.
Parker, 7 Dowl. 739; :^ierce v. Fuller, 8
Mass. 223; Weller v. Hersee, 10 Hun, 431.
That the consideration must thus be shown
is generally said to be the only exception to
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the rule that a contract under seal imports
a consideration
wlilcli the party will not be
permitted to deny.
And
Mete. Cont. § 233.
in earlier times It was held that the consideration must be adequate.
Mitchel v. Reynolds, supra; Gale v. Reed, 8 East, 80; Young
V. Timmins, 1 Tyrw. 226.
The courts, however, long since departed from this doctrine;
and it may now be taken as settled that, if
there is a legal consideration,
it will not be
inquired whether or not it is adequate, or,
in other words, equal in value to the restraint
agreed upon.
cited in note
See authorities
to case of Angler v. Webber, 92 Am. Dec.
754.
As was said by Tindal, C. J., in the
case of Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 Add. & E.
438:
"It Is enough that there is actually a
for the bargain, and that such
consideration
and of
consideration is a legal consideration,
Accordingly, in the case of
some value."
Pierce v. Fuller, 8 JIass. 22?>. one dollar was
held to be a sufficient consideration
for a
covenant not to run a stagecoach between
given points, in opposition
to the plaintiff.
The consideration upon which the defendant
entered into the contract under review as
expressed was the advantages
and benefits
that would flow to him by reason of the "formation of said firm and partnership busiThis, under the authorities cited, is
ness."
in so far as
a sufficient legal consideration,
such contracts are dependent on a consideration to be sustained.
The exact value of the
consideration,
the court ought not, and, in
to
the nature of things, cannot, undertake
There is nothing in the record of
measure.
the case which shows such gross Inadequacy
of consideration as to shock the conscience,
and amount in itself to evidence of fraud.
See Mete. Cont. p. 271.
The remaining objections urged against the
validity of the contract may all be passed
upon in considering the other question upon
which the validity of the contract depends,
namely, Is the restraint which it imposes reaWhile public policy forbids any
sonable?
restrains a
agreement which unreasonably
person from exercising his trade or business,
it is equally true that public policy also requires that the freedom of persons to enter
into contracts shall not be lightly interfered
with. Clark, Cont. p. 447. The contract unimposed a restraint under consideration
limited as to time, but limited as to space.
We are aware that it has been repeatedly
held that, where the restraint is otherwise
that it is Inreasonable, the circumstances
definite as to time will not affect its validity
(1 Whart. Cont. § 432; Mete. Cont. p. 232; Benj.
Sales, § 525; Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 Adol. &
E. 438; Pemberton v. Vaughan, 10 Q. B.
Cook
87; Catt v. Tourle, 4 Ch. App. 654;
V. Johnson, 47 Conn. 175; Bowser v. Bliss,
7 Blackf. 344); and that our court, in more
than one case, which will be presently referNevertheless,
red to, held the same doctrine.
if the test of the validity of the contract Is,
as we have shown It to be, that it must be
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founded on a valuable consideration, and that
the restraint imposed must be reasonable, and
such as is reasonably
necessary to protect
the Interest of the party In whose favor it Is
imposed, and at the same time not unduly
prejudice the interest of the public, It seems
to us that the question of time in the restriction imposed cannot be arbitrarily said
to have no effect on the validity of a contract
which, being reasonable in all other respects
except in point of time, is, from the circumstances, unreasonable
and oppressive as to
the latter.
See Mandeville v. Harman (N.J.
Ch.) 7 Atl. 37; Keeler v. Taylor, 53 Pa. St.
469.
In the case of Hitchcock v. Coker,
supra. Lord Denman, construing a contract
which imposed a restraint on one who, having entered the service of the plaintiff (who
was a druggist), agreed that he would not at
any time after leaving such service engage in
the business of a druggist in that town, said:
"It Is not limited to such time as the plaintiff
should carry on business in Taunton, nor to
any given number of years, nor even to the
life of the plaintiff; but it attaches to the
defendant as long as he lives, although the
plaintiff may have left Taunton, or parted
with his business, or be dead;" and he accordingly held the restraint to be unreasonThat case was reable and oppressive.
versed on writ of error, but the point of
reversal was that a restriction so extensive
in point of time was necessary for the protection of the promisee in the enjoyment of
the good will of his trade; and, as we understand the principle ruled in that case, a restriction so extensive Is reasonable, and not oppressive, when It prevents the destruction of
a property right or interest or the good will
See review of the
of a trade or business.
case in Clark, Cont. pp. 455, 456.
The contrary of this doctrine, however, is directly
held In French v. Parker, 16 R. I. 219, 14

Atl. 870.
With conflicting authorities as to the application of the rules for testing the validity
of contracts In partial restraint of trade, upon which all agree, we think a clear distinction must be taken between the class of
cases binding one who has sold out a mercantile or other kind of business, and the
good will therewith connected, not to again
engage in that business within a given territory, and that class of cases binding one
to desist from the practice of a learned proI can readily perceive that a sucfession.
cessor of a merchant, broker, or shopkeeper
might reasonably expect to retain the former
patronage of the place of business, but fully
concur with the views expressed by the
court in the case of Mandeville v. Harman,
supra, that professional skill, experience,
and reputation are things which cannot be
bought or sold. They constitute part of the
Individuality of the particular person, and
die with him. In that case the court said:
"There can be no doubt, I think, that if the
complainant was the most distinguished phy-
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slcian of the city of Newark, and had by far
the most lucrative practice In that city, and
he should be so unfortunate as to die next
month or next year, it would be impossible
for his personal representative to sell his
good will or practice, as a thing of property
distinct from the office which he had occupied prior to his death, for any price; and
I think it is equally obvious that, if it were
sold in connection with his office, the only
possible value which coiild be ascribed to it
would be the slight possibility that some of
the persons who had been his patients might,
when they needed the services of a physician, go or send there for the next occupant
of the office. The practice of a physician is
a thing so purely personal, depending so
absolutely on the confidence reposed in his
personal skill and ability, that, when he
ceases to exist, it necessarily ceases also,
and after his death can have neither an intrinsic nor a market value. And, if the complainant should make sale of his practice in
his lifetime, it is manifest all the purchaser
could possibly get would be immunity from
competition with him, and, perhaps, his implied approval that the purchaser was fit to
be his successor; but it would be impossible
for him to transfer his professional skill and
ability to his successor, or to induce anybody
to believe that he had."
So far as we have been able to examine,
the cases which have ruled that, if the restraint is reasonably limited as to space, the
fact that It is unlimited as to time will not
render the agreement void, were cases in
which some business or property, or property right, either of goods or good will, had
been sold, and the restriction as to unlimited
unreasonable,
betime was not considered
cause it affected property rights.
Our own
court has considered a number of cases involving contracts in restraint of trade, and
in some of them held that restraints unlimited in point of time did not render the contracts void; but in every one of such cases,
as far as we have examined, a property interest was involved.
The first is that of
In that case
Holmes V. Martin, 10 Ga. 503.
Holmes conveyed to Martin a house and lot
in the town of Lawrenceville, with this restriction in the deed: "That said house and
lot shall not be occupied by the said Martin
or his assignees as a public tavern or hotel,
which right is reserved in said property by
Holmes." In that case the court held this
contract to be good, and that contracts in
partial restraint of trade only may be supported, provided the restraint be reasonable,
and the contract founded on a consideration.
In the case of Mell v. Mooney, 30 Ga. 413,
no question arose which called for a ruling
of the validity of contracts in restraint of
trade, the points in the case relating alone
to pleading.
In the case of Jenkins v. Temples, 39 Ga. 655, it appeared that Jenkins
had bought of Temples an entire stock of
groceries and confectioneries
at very high
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and Temples had agreed that he
would use all of his influence for Jenkins
with his former customers, and bound himself not to deal in any of said articles at
Temples
Spring Place until January, 1869.
The court below
violated the agreement.
held the contract to be void, and this court
ruled, reversing the judge below, that a
party might legally bind himself for a valuable consideration not to conduct a particular trade or business in a particular place
for a reasonable and definite period of time.
In the case of Spier v. Lambdin, 45 Ga. 319,
Lambdin sold to Spier an unexpired lease
of the Barnesville Academy, with the consent of the trustees, for the consideration of
$475, representing that he wished to abandon school teaching, and wovild use his inThe contract v/as
fluence for Spier's benefit.

prices,

In the
held to be good and enforceable.
case of Ellis v. Jones, 56 Ga. 504, Ellis &
Palmer had purchased a stock of merchandise, consisting of dry goods, groceries, etc.,
from Jones & Co., and the store house containing the same, together with their custom and good will.
Jones & Co. having recommenced business in the same place, Ellis
& Palmer filed a bill to enjoin such action.
The injunction was refused.
It does not
satisfactorily appear in the case that Jones
& Co. covenanted not to engage in the same
business.
In the case of Goodman v. Henderson, 58 Ga. 567, the suit was upon a writwhereby Goodman, in conten agreement,
sideration of $100 a month for two years,
and a further money consideration, agreed
to retire from the business of purchasing
green hides, sheep skins, etc., in the Savannah market forever, and that he would use
his influence in favor of the purchaser, and
sold to him the good will of the business.
This court held in that case that the limit
as to time made no difference
if the eontract was limited as to space. In the case
of Brewer v. Lamar, 69 Ga. 656, there was
an agreement to sell a certain proprietary
medicine, and the seller agreed never to use
or permit his name to be used on any preparation for the same class of complaints
for which this medicine was made, and
agreed also to surrender his trade-mark, and
give to the purchasers the exclusive right to
sell and manufacture the same under the
old name.
The consideration of the purchase was $275.
The court held that the
contract was in partial restraint of trade,
and could be enforced.
In the case of Newman V. Wolfson, 69 Ga. 764, Newman sold
to Wolfson a stock of goods, etc., together
with the good will of the business, for $1,466,
and covenanted not to engage in a like business in that city for a period of five years.
The court in this ease held that the contract
was not unreasonable.
In the case of Swanson V. Kirby, 98 Ga. 586, 26 S. E. 71, this
court held that where one has sold out a
given business, and contracted not to again
I carry on the same in a particular locality,
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though unlimited as to time, such a contract,
being reasonable and proper when limited
as to place, and in other respects, was valid.
In this case the consideration paid was
was a
$1,500,
and the property purchased
in the American Ticket Brokmembership
ers' Association, a burglar-proof safe, desk,
typewriter, and other office fixtures. The
covenant was not to open a ticket office in
the city of Atlanta without the consent of
Kirby. In that case the court held that
while contracts in total restraint of trade
were void, where the restraint was partial,
reasonable,
and founded upon a good consideration, the contract would be enforced.
It has never been decided in this state that
a covenant between professional men (where
no property rights were involved in the contract which imposed the restriction) so extensive in duration as that under consideration in the present case is valid. As was
said by the court in the case of Mandeville
V. Harman, supra: "It is one of the natural
rights of every citizen of this state to use
his skill and labor In any useful employment, not only to get food, raiment, and
slielter,
but to acquire property; and I
think it may be regarded as very certain
that the courts will never deprive any one
of this right, or even abridge it, except in
obedience to the sternest demands of justice."

We test this contract by the rules before
referred to, and find it supported by a legal
consideration. Being limited as to space,
although unlimited as to time, we find that
it may properly be classed among contracts
in partial restraint of trade.
When we seek
its terms to a.><(^ertain whether it is reasonable, made to protect the promisee, and not
oppressive on the promisor, we find that no
money was paid by the promisee, and no
property sold by the promisor. We find
that the promisor, by the nature of the contract, must have rendered service for all
the benefits he received.
We find that, under the terms of this contract, if the promisee, the defendant in ei'ror, should remove
from the town of Oliver, from the state of
Georgia;

If

he should

become

permanently
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by disease, from continuing
incapacitated,
the practice of medicine;
if he should die,—
the promisor, in any event, would not be at
liberty to practice his profession in Oliver,
nor within 15 miles radius of that town.
No
matter what the changed conditions might
be, it was so nominated
In the bond that he
should not exercise his calling within the
territory prescribed.
It must be clear, theretore, that the restrictions imposed upon the
promisor in this contract were larger than
were necessary for the protection of the
promisee.
Full protection would have been
afforded to the latter if the time in which
the restraint should apply had been limited
to the life of the defendant In error, or to
the time in which he was engaged In the
practice of his profession In the county of
Had this contract been so limited,
Screven.
It is obvious from the view which we take
of the law that it should be upheld and
But, when the terms
would be enforced.
! of the contract prohibit one party from at
i any time in the future practicing his pro■ fession at a given place, without regard to
| the fact that the other party should not be
business, without
\ engaged in the competitive
i regard to the fact that he may have removed
; from the county and state in which such
territory was located, without regard to the
| fact of the inability of the party, from age
or physical infirmity, to continue his practice, it would seem to be unreasonable,—
not necessary for the protection of the party
in whose favor the restraint was imposed,
oppressive to the party restrained, and opposed to the interests of the public; and,
such being the case, the contract cannot be
enfoi'ced.
If It be said that it would be
the right of the plaintiff in error, under
any of the circumstances
we have mentioned, to pray for a modification or rescission of
such contract, the reply is that we are not
dealing with such question.
We are to construe It as it is written, and, so construing
It, we hold it to be void and of no binding
force and effect.
The judgment of the court
below must be reversed.
All the justices
concurring, except COBB, J., absent for
providential cause.
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7.

CORNELL.

(75 N. T. 91.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 12, 1878.

Appeal from order of the general term of
court in the Third judicial department, reversing a judgment entered upon
the report of a referee.
Plaintiff made a claim against the estate of
I^atham Cornell, of whose vyill defendants
were the executors, for interest upon a promThis
issoi-y note executed by the deceased.
claim was rejected, and was referred by stipulation.
The facts, as stated by the referee, are in
the supreme

substance

as follovys:

Latham Cornell, the deceased, was the
grandfather of Latham C. Strong. He was
possessed of large property, consisting of real
estate and of personal property invested in
stocks, bonds and other securities.
He died
in 1876 at the age of ninety-five.
For four
years prior to his death he was partially
blind. Prom July, 1871, until the time of
his death, his grandson at his request attended to his affairs, writing his letters, looking after his banking business and his rents,
making out his bills, cutting off his coupons,
reading to him, and on occasions going away
from home to transact other business.
In
July, 1871, Cornell gave to Strong a deed of
two adjoining houses in the city of Troy,
valued at about $32,000,
in one of which
houses the grandfather lived until the time
of his death. The grandson moved into the
adjoining house in the spring of 1872, and
resided there until after his grandfather's
During the time that the two thus
death.
lived in adjoining residences, they were in
daily conference upon business matters of the
old gentleman, in the house occupied by the
grandson.
The grandson with his family
consisting of five persons, during all this time
lived at the sole expense of the grandfather,
and claims to have received, in addition to
the note in suit, as gifts from his grandfather, $30,000 in government 'bonds and the
assignment of a mortgage for about $1,700.
At what particular time it is claimed these
gifts were made is not in evidence. Mr. Cornell made his will in 1871, providing a legacy
of $15,000 for air. Strong. In the fall of
1872, Mr. Strong expressed a desire to go into business for himself and to be independent
of his grandfather, and actually was in negotiation with different persons in Troy and
New York with a view of forming business
associations.
Mr. Cornell became uneasy at
the prospect of losing the services of his
grandson and caused him to be written for
Mr. Strong came back to
to come home.
Troy, and his grandfather said to him then,
as he had previously said, that he wanted
him to give up his ideas of leaving and to
devote his whole time to the business of his
grandfather. Mr. Cornell further said that
he had no one else to look after his business,
and frequently said that there was money
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Mr. Strong immefor all of them.
diately abandoned his business projects and
devoted his whole time and attention to his
grandfather's business, until the death of the
latter. After this Mr. Cornell sent for his
legal advisers and proposed to alter his will
his
so as to make provision to compensate
grandson for having devoted himself to his
business.
What provision was intended is
The lawyers
not disclosed by the evidence.
advised that his will be left unaltered, and
that he take some other way of compensating his grandson. Mr. Cornell gave to Mr.
Strong the note in question.
It is as follows:
Troy, April 1, 1873.
"$20,000.
Five years
after date I promise to pay Latham L. C.
Strong, or order, $20,000, for value received,
with interest yearly. L. Cornell."
The note was on a printed form, the name
of the payee being printed "Latham Cornell."
The note was filled up in the handwriting of
the maker, but in striking out with his pen
the name of the payee he left the word
"Latham" and afterwards interlined the full
name, "L. C. Strong."
Annexed to the note
was a stub with some printed forms, on
which Mr. Cornell wrote: "Troy, April 1st,
1873, L. C. Strong, $20,000 at five years, to
make the amount the same as Chas. W.
Cornell." The stub was on the note when it
was delivered to the payee, but was torn off
by him before it was transferred to the plaintiff; and there is no evidence that the plaintiff ever knew of the existence of the stub.
The stub and note were taken from a blank
book which belonged to decedent.
No payment of interest was made upon the note
during the Ufetime of the maker.
The referee found that the note was given for a
valuable consideration.
Mr. Strong sold the
note to the plaintiff for $19,000,
taking his
note, payable in one year after date.
"What
that date was has not been disclosed.
Mr.
Strong testified at the trial that he still held
the note. Mr. Strong was one of the executors.
Further facts are stated in the opinion.
enough

Irving Browne, for appellant

son, for respondents.

John Thomp-

HAND, J. The counsel for respondents
suggested at the close of his argument before us that there was no evidence of a delivery of the note to Strong, the payee, and
the finding of delivery by the referee was
entirely unsupported.
He does not however
make this a point in his printed brief, and
did not present it strenuously or with any
emphasis in his oral remarks.
It is true that the evidence in this respect
was not very satisfactory. Ordinarily the
possession and production of the note by the
payee will raise a presumption of delivery
to him. But this presumption must be very
much
weakened
when the possession
is
shown not to precede, the possession of all
the maker's papers and effects by the payee
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as executor, when the note appears to have
been all in the handwriting of the maker
and to have been taken with a stub attached,
also in his handwriting, from a bank book
belonging to him, and when installments of
interest falling due in the maker's life-time
were not paid and although years elapsed
after they so became due before his death
there is no proof of any demand of them by
the payee or recognition of liability by the
deceased.
am not prepared to say however
that these circumstances absolutely destroy
the presumption from possession and production of the instrument. While some evidence
on the part of the plaintiff, showing that the
in his
note had been delivered to Strong
grandfather's life-time, or at least negativing the idea that Strong found it in the bankbook or among the papers of the deceased
when he took possession of them as executor,
could probably have been easily produced if
consistent with the fact, yet we cannot hold
its absence conclusive against the plaintiff
upon this point, upon the record as it stands.
No motion for judgment or to dismiss was
made on this ground by the respondents although the trial was in other respects treated
by the counsel on both sides as one before a
in the ordinary way to
referee appointed
hear and determine and direct judgment as
In an action, and we cannot say but that if
the plaintiff had been notified of such an objection, the evidence would have been supThe finding of the delivery by the
plied.
referee was not even excepted to, although
there were exceptions to the finding of conwe
Under these circumstances
sideration.
think, assume an acquiescence in the
must,
truth of the finding by the respondents for
reasons known to them, and which if disclosed would probably be entirely satisfac-

I

I

tory.
The majority of the general term put their
reversal of the judgment upon the ground
that it conclusively appeared from the stub
attached that the note was intended as a
In this
gift and was without consideration.

I

am unable

to concur.

The referee's finding that the note was delivered not as a gift but for a valuable consideration has some evidence to support it, in
the proof of the services rendered by Strong
of a
to the deceased, and his abandonment
profession at the request of the deceased, in
the intention expressed by the latter to make
for those services, and
some compensation
had with his counsel not
the conversation
very long before the date of this note, In
which he was dissuaded from making this
by will and advised to do it
compensation
while alive, to which he assented. What appears upon the stub is not in my opinion
conclusive against this result.
There is perhaps difficulty in giving any
entirely satisfactory construction to this
made by the deceased; but the
memorandum
interpretation of the general term seems to
with the known facts
my mind inconsistent
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Strong certainly had had and
the deceased knew that he had had property
of the value of $32,000 given him before the
date of this note, and perhaps $30,000 more
in bonds. The $20,000 note could not have
been therefore as the general term supposes,
a gift to make him equal in gifts with his
cousin
Charles,
to whom only $20,000 had
been given in all.
But not only do the circumstances
show
that the memorandum could not mean that
this gift of the $20,000 to Strong would
make him equal in gifts to Charles, but the
memorandum
itself does not say so. Its
language is "to make the amount the same
as Chas. W. Cornell." While, as has already been said, there is probably insuperall
able difficulty in discovering precisely
that the deceased meant by this expression,
its intrinsic sense is merely that the amount
of this note, $20,000, Is so fixed to make it
the same as an amount possessed in some
way by Charles, and this is consistent with
both amounts being gifts, or the one being
fixed upon in the testator's mind as a fair compensation
for Strong's services and at the
same time equal to an amount he had given
On the whole
or intended to give to Charles.
I think this memorandum was a piece of
evidence to be submitted with the other evidence to be considered by the referee on the
question of fact. His decision upon all this
evidence cannot be disturbed by this court.
The same may be said of the proof of
large gifts to Strong either all before, or
some before and some after the date of the
note.
The reversal by the general term is not
stated to be upon the facts, and on the argument it was conceded by the counsel for the
respondents to be upon the law merely.
It
may be that a finding upon all the evidence
that the note was without consideration
and
a gift would not be disturbed, and would be
held by us as not unauthorized by the evidence. On the other hand, we cannot accede
to the proposition that a finding to the contrary, such as has been made by the referee
here, must by reason of the contents of this
stub or other testimony be reversed as erroneous in law.
It follows that except as bearing upon undue Influence, and the relations of parties
hereafter considered, the inadequacy
of the
services or the extravagance
of the compensation are not material. That was a matter
purely of agreement between Strong and the
deceased, and with which the court will not
ordinary
interfere
under
circumstances.
Earl V. Peck, 64 N. Y. 597; Worth v. Case,
42 N. Y. 362; Johnson v. Titus, 2 Hill, 606.
Although the consideration of a promissory
note is always open to Investigation between
the original parties (and we agree with the
court below that the plaintiff here has no
better position than Strong himself), yet as
pointed out by the chief judge in Earl v.
Peek, supra, mere inadequacy in value of the
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thing bought or paid for is never Intended
by the legal expression,
"want or failure of
consideration." This only covers either total
worthlessness
to all parties,
or subsequent
destruction, partial or complete.
Assuming then, as I think we must, that
there was no error as matter of law in the
finding of the referee that this note was
given for a valuable consideration, and that
the adequacy of that consideration is something with which we have no concern if the
parties dealt on equal terms, the only point
remaining to consider is the relations existing between the deceased and Strong at the
date of the note.
It is insisted strenuously by the learned
counsel for the respendents that these were
such as to call for the application of the doctrine of constructive fraud, and threw upon
the plaintiff the burden of proving not only
that the deceased fully understood the act,
but that he was not induced to it by any undue influence of Strong, and that the latter
took no unfair advantage of his superior influence or knowledge.
The court below were hardly correct in the
suggestion
that the plaintiff conceded this
burden to be upon himself, and for that reason, instead of resting upon the statement of
consideration In the note, gave evidence in
opening his case of an actual consideration;
for this may have been done to show in the
first instance that the note was not a gift
and hence void under the law applicable to
gifts. Indeed it appears from the findings
and refusals to find, and the opinion of the
referee, that such was not the theory upon
which the action was tried or decided.
We return then to the question whether
this case was one of constructive fraud. It
may be stated as universally true that fraud
vitiates all contracts, but as a general thing
it is not presumed but must be proved by
the party seeking to relieve himself from an
obligation on that ground. Whenever, however, the relations between the contracting
parties appear to be of such a character as
to render it certain that they do not deal on
terms of equality, but that either on the one
side from superior knowledge of the matter
derived from a fiduciary relation, or from
overmastering infiuence, or on the other from
weakness, dependence or trust justifiably rein a transaction is
posed, unfair advantage
rendered probable, there the burden is shiftvoid, and it
ed, the transaction is presumed
is Incumbent upon the stronger party to show
affirmatively that no deception was practiced,
no undue infiuence was used, and that all
was fair, open, voluntary and well understood. This doctrine is well settled. Hunt,
J., Nesbit V. Lockman, 34 N. Y. 167; Story,
Bq. Jur. § 311; Sears v. Shafer, 6 N. Y. 268;
Huguenln v. Basely, 13 Ves. 105, 14 Ves.
273, and 15 Ves. 180; Wright v. Proud, 13
Ves. 138;

Harris

v. Tremenheere,

15 Ves.

40;

Edwards v. Myrick, 2 Hare, 60; Hunter v.
Atkins, 3 Mylne & K. 113. And this is

I
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think the extent to which the well-considered cases go, and is the scope of "constructive
fraud."
The principle referred to, it must be remembered, is distinct from that absolutely
forbidding a purchase by a trustee or agent
for his own benefit of the subject of a trust,
and charging it when so purchased with the
trust. That amounts to an incapacity in the
fiduciary to purchase of himself. He cannot
act for himself at all, however fairly or innocently, in any dealing as to which he has
duties as trustee or agent. The reason of
It removes from the
this rule is subjective.
trustee,
with the power, all temptation to
commit any breach of trust for his own benefit But the principle with which we are
now concerned does not absolutely forbid the
dealing, but it presumes it unfair and fraudulent unless the contrary is afllrmatively
shown.

This doctrine, as has been said, is well
but there is often great difficulty in
applying it to particular cases.
The law presumes in the'fcase of guardian
and ward, trustee and cestui que trust, attorney and client, and perhaps physician
and patient, from the relation of the parties
itself, that their situation is unequal and of
the character I have defined; and that relation appearing itself throws the burden upon
the trustee, guardian or .attorney of showing
the fairness of his dealings.
But while the doctrine is without doubt to
be extended to many other relations of trust,
confidence or inequality, the trust and confidence, or the superiority on one side and
weakness on the other, must be proved in
each of these cases; the law does not presume them from the fact for instance that
one party is a grandfather and old, and the
other a grandson and young, or that one is
an employer
and the other an employ^.
The question as to parties so situated is a
question of fact dependent upon the circumstances in each case. There is no presumption of inequality either way from these relations merely.
In the present case it cannot be said that
the fact that the deceased employed Strong
as his clerk to read and answer his letters
and cut off his coupons, and make out his
bills, or as his bailiff to collect his rents, or
that at this time he was old and of defective
vision, or that Strong lived near him and
was his grandson, taken separately or together raise a conclusive presumption of law
that their situation was unequal, and that
dealings between them as to compensation
for these services were between a stronger
and a weaker party, a fiduciary in hac re
and the party reposing
confidence.
These
relations as a matter of fact may have led
to or been consistent with controlling influence on the part of the grandson, or childish
weakness and confidence on the part of the
grandfather, but this was to be shovyn, and
is not necessarily derivable or presumable
settled,
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from the relations themselves, as In the case
of trustee, attorney or guardian.
From these relations and the large gifts
and
shown from the deceased to Strong,
from the extravagant amount of the compensation in the note, it is very possible the
referee might have found as a fact the existence of weakness on the one side, or undue strength on the other, which rendered
applicable the doctrine of constructive fraud,
and threw upon the plaintiff the burden of
disproving such fraud. These circumstances
if not
may have well been of a character,
sufficient to shift the presumption, at least
to authorize a setting aside of a contract
without any decisive proof of fraud, but upon the slightest proof that advantage was
taken of the relation, or of the use of "any
arts or stratagems or any undue means or
the least speck of imposition." Whelan v.
Whelan, 3 Cow. 538, Lord Eldon, L. C; Harris V. Tremenheere, 15 Ves. 40, Lord Brougham; Hunter v. Atkins, 3 Mylne & K. 135.
But the referee not only has not found as
fact any inequality in the situation of the
deceased and Strong, but refused to find as
a matter of law its existence, and there is
really no evidence whatever of any arts or

stratagems or "speck of imposition" on the
part of Strong as to this note.
We are not permitted to supply these findings even if we thought them proper for the
referee to make, nor can we sustain a reversal of the original judgment upon facts
not found and not necessarily inferable from
uncontradicted
evidence in the case, the general term not having in any way interfered
with the findings of the referee.
On the whole therefore we reach the conclusion that there was no good reason for
disturbing the judgment of the referee.
This large claim upon the estate of the deceased is not so clearly justified and explained in the evidence as we could have wished,
and the circumstances
are such as to compgl
this court to look upon the case, if not with
suspicion, certainly with anxiety, yet after
careful examination we can find no material
error in the original decision.
The order granting a new trial must be
reversed and judgment for plaintiff affirmed
with costs.

All

JJ.,

concur,
absent.

except

MILLER

Judgment accordingly.

and

EARL,
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JEWELL.
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506.)

Court of the United States.

Oct.,

1876.

Appeal from the circuit court of the United
for the Eastern district of Michigan.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the
court
States

Alfied Russell, for appellant. A. B. Maynard,

contra.

Mr. Justice

FIELD

delivered the opinion of

the court.

This is a suit brought by the heir at law of
Marie Genevieve Thlbault, late of Detroit,
Mich., to cancel a conveyance of land alleged
to have been obtained from her a few weeks
before her death, when, from her condition,
she was Incapable of understanding thf nature and effect of the transaction.
The deceased died at Detroit on the 4th of
February, 1S64, intestate, leaving the complainant her sole surviving heir at law. For
many years previous to her death, and until
the execution of the conveyance
to the defendant, she was seised in fee of the land in
controversy, situated in tbat city, which she
occupied
as a homestead.
In November,
1863, the defendant obtained from her a conveyance of this property.
A copy of the conveyance is set forth in the bill.
It contains
covenants of seisin aiid warranty by the grantor, and immediately following
an
them
agreement by the defendant to pay her $250
upon the delivery of the instrument; an annuity of $500; all her physician's bills during
her life; the taxes on the property for that
year, and all subsequent
taxes during her
life; also, that she should have the use and
of the house until the spring of
occupation
1864, or that he would pay the rent of such
other house as she might occupy until then.
The property was .then worth, according to
the testimony in the case, between $6,000
and $8,000.
The deceased was at that time
between sixty and seventy years of age, and
was confined to her house by sicliness, from
which she never recovered.
She lived alone,
in a state of great degradation, and was without regular attendance in her sickness.
There
were no persons present with her at the execution of the conveyance, except the defendant, his agent, and his attorney.
The $250
stipulated were paid, but no other payment
was ever made to her; she died a few weeks
afterwards.
As grounds for cancelling this conveyance,
the complainant alleges that the deceased,
during the last few years of her life, was
afflicted with lunacy or chronic insanity, and
was so infirm as to be incapable of transacting any business of importance; that her
last sickness aggravated her insanity, greatly
weakened her mental faculties, and still more
disqualified her for business; that the defendant and his agent knew of her infirmity,
and that there was no reasonable prospect of
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her recovery from her sickness, or of her long
surviving, when the conveyance was taken;
that she did not understand the nature of the
instrument; and that it was obtained for an
insignificant consideration, and in a clandestine manner, without her having any independent advice.
These allegations the defendant controverts,
and avers that the conveyance was taken
that at
upon a proposition of the deceased;
the date of its execution she was in the full
possession of her mental faculties, appreciated the value of the property, and was capable of contracting with reference to it, and of

selling or otherwise dealing with it; that
since her death he has occupied the premises,
and made permanent improvements to the
value of $7,000; and that the complainant
never gave him notice of any claim to the
property until the commencement of this suit.
The court below dismissed the bill, whereThe
here.
upon the complainant appealed
question
presented
for determination is,
whether the deceased, at the time she executed the conveyance in question, possessed sufficient intelligence to understand fully the nature and effect of the transaction; and, if so,
whether the conveyance was executed under
such circumstances as that it ought to be upheld, or as would justify the interference of
equity for its cancellation.
Numerous witnesses were examined in the
case, and a large amount of testimony was
This testimony has been carefully antaken.
and it
alyzed by the defendant's counsel;
njust be admitted that the facts detailed by
any one witness with reference to the condition of the deceased previous to her last illseparately and apart from
ness, considered
the statements of the others, do not show incapacity to transact business on her part, nor
establish insanity, either continued oi temporary. And yet, when all the facts stated by
the different witnesses are taken together,
one is led irresistibly by their combined effect
that, if the deceased was
to the conclusion,
not afflicted with insanity for some years before her death, her mind wandered so near
the line which divides sanity from insanity
as to render any important business transaction with her of doubtful propriety, and to
justify a careful scrutiny into its fairness.
Thus, some of the witnesses speak of the
deceased as having low and filthy habits; of
her being so imperfectly clad as at times to
expose immodestly portions of her person;
of her eatmg with her fingers, and having
Some of them testify
vermin on her body.
to her believing in dreams, and her imagining
she could see ghosts and spirits around her
room, and her claiming to talk with them;
to her being incoherent in her conversation,
passing suddenly and without cause from one
subject to another; to her using vulgar and
profane language; to her making immodest
gestures;
to her talking strangely, and making singular motions and gestures in her
neighbors' houses and in the streets.
Other

314

OOXSTRUCTIVE FRAUD.

witnesses testify to further peculiarities of
life, manner, and conduct; but none of the
singly,
peculiarities mentioned,
considered
show a want of capacity to transact business.
Instances will readily occur to every one
where some of them have been exhibited by
persons
good judgment in the
possessing
management
and disposition of property.
But when all the peculiarities mentioned, of
life, conduct, and language, are found in the
same person, they create a strong impression
that his mind is not entirely sound; and all
transactions relating to his property will be
narrowly scanned by a court of equity, whenever brought under its cognizance.
The condition of the deceased was not imThe testiproved during her last siclniess.
mony of her attending physician leads to the
conclusion
that her mental infirmities were
aggravated by it. He states that he had studied her disease, and for many years had considered her partially insane, and that in his
opinion she was not competent in November,
1863, during her last sickness, to understand
a document
like the instrument executed.
The physician also testifies that during this
month he informed one Dolsen, who had inquired of the condition and health of the deceased, and had stated that efforts had been
made to purchase her property, that in his
opinion she could not survive her sickness,
and that she was not in a condition to make
any sale of the property "in a right way."
This Dolsen had at one time owned and
managed a tannery adjoining the home of
tlie deceased, which he sold to the defendant.
After the sale, he carried on the business as
the defendant's agent Through him the transaction for the purchase of the property was
The deceased understood English
conducted.
Imperfectly, and Dolsen undertook to explain
to her, in French, the contents of the paper
Some attempt is made to show
she executed.
that he acted as her agent; but this is evidently an afterthought. He was in the employment of the defendant, had charge of his
had often talked with him
business,
and
about securing the property; and in his inIf the deceased
terest he acted throughout.
was not In a condition to dispose of the property, she was not in a condition to appoint an
agent for that purpose.
The defendant himself states that he had
seen the deceased for years, and knew that
It
she was eccentric, queer, and penurious.
Is hardly credible that, during those years,
carrying on business within a few yards of
her house, he had not heard that her mind
was unsettled; or, at least, had not inferred
that such was the fact, from what he saw of
her conduct. Be that as It may, Dolsen's
knowledge was his knowledge; and, when he
covenanted to pay the annuity, some inquiry
must have been had as to the probable duraSuch covenants
are
tion of the payments.
not often made without inquiries of that nature; and to Dolsen he must have looked for
Information, for he states that he conversed

with no one else about the
him and with his attorney
house of the deceased, and
the miserable condition in

purchase.
With
he went to the
there witnessed
which she lived,
and he states that he wondered how anybody
could live in such a place, and that he told
Dolsen to get her a bed and some clothing.
Dolsen had previously informed him that she
would not sell the property; yet he took a
conveyance
from her at a consideration
which, under the circumstances, with a certainty almost of her speedy decease, was an
insignificant one compared with the value
of the property.
In view of the circumstances stated, we are
not satisfied that the deceased was, at the
time she executed the conveyance, capable of
comprehending
fully the nature and effect of
the transaction. She was in a state of physical prostration; and from that cause, and
her previous infirmities, aggravated by her
sickness, her intellect was greatly enfeebled;
and, if not disqualified,
she was unfitted to
attend to business of such importance as the
disposition
of her entire property, and the
securing of an annuity for life. Certain it is,
that, in negotiating for the disposition of the
property, she stood, in her sickness and infirmities, on no terms of equality with the defendant, who, with his attorney and agent,
met her alone In her hovel to obtain the conveyance.
It is not necessary. In order to secure the
aid of equity, to prove that the deceased was
at the time Insane, or in such a state of
mental imbecility as to render her entirely incapable of executing a valid deed.
It is sufficient to show that, from her sickness and infirmities, she was at the time in a condition
of great mental weakness, and that there was
gross inadequacy of consideration for the conveyance.
From these circumstances,
imposition or imdue infiuence will be inferred. In
the case of Harding v. Wheaton, 2 Mason, 378,
Fed. Cas. No. 6,051, a conveyance executed by
one to his son-in-law, for a nominal consideration, and upon a verbal arrangement that
it should be considered as a trust for the maintenance of the grantor, and after his death
for the benefit of his heirs, was, after his
death, set aside, except as security for actual
advances and charges, upon application of his
heirs, on the ground that it was obtained from
him when his mind was enfeebled by age and
other causes. "Extreme weakness," said Mr.
Justice Story, in deciding the case, "will raise
an almost necessary presumption of imposition, even when it stops short of legal incapacity; and though a contract, in the ordinary
course of things, reasonably made with such a
person, might be admitted to stand, yet If It
should appear to be of such a nature as that
such a person could not be capable of measuring 'its extent or importance,
its reasonableness or its value, fully and fairly, it cannot be
that the law Is so much at variance with common sense as to uphold it" The case subsequently came before this court; and, in de-
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dding it, Mr. Chief Justice Marstiall, speaking of this, and, it would seem, of other deeds
by the deceased, said: "If these
executed
deeds were obtained by the exercise of undue
influence over a maij whose mind had ceased
to be the safe guide of his actions, it is against
conscience for him who has obtained them to
derive any advantage from them. It is the
peculiar province of a court of conscience to
set them aside. That a court of equity will
interpose in such a case Is among its bestHarding v. Handy, 11
settled principles."
Wheat. 125.
The same doctrine is announced in adjudged
cases, almost without number; and it may be
stated as settled law, that whenever there is
great weakness of mind in a person executing
a conveyance of land, arising from age, sickness, or any other cause, thougn not amounting to absolute disqualification, and the consideration given for the property is grossly inadequate, a court of equity will, upon proper
and seasonable application of the injured paror heirs, interfere
ty, or his representatives
and set the conveyance aside. And the present case comes directly within this principle.
In the recent case of Kempson v. Ashbee, 10
Ch. Cas. 15, decided in the court of appeal in
chancery in England, two bonds executed by
a young woman, living at the time with her
mother and step-father,— one, at the age of
as surety for her step-father's
twenty-one,
debt, and the other, at the age of twenty-nine,
to secure the amount of a judgment recovered
on the first bond,— were set aside as against
her, on the ground that she had acted in the
transaction without independent advice; one
of the justices observing that the court had
endeavored to prevent persons subject to influence from being Induced to enter into transactions without advice of that kind. The principle upon which the court acts in suh cases,
of protecting the weak and dependent, may always be invoked on behalf of persons In the
situation of the deceased spinster in this case,
of doubtful sanity, living entirely by herself,
without friends to take care of her, and conAs well on
fined to her house by sickness.
this ground as on the ground of weakness of
mind and gross inadequacy of consideration,
we think the case a proper one for the interference of equity, and that a cancellation of
the deed should be decreed.
The objection of the lapse of time — six years
—before bringing the suit cannot avail the deIf during this time, from the death
fendant.
of witnesses or other causes, a full presenta-
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tion of the facts of the case had become impossible, there might be force in the objection.
But as there has been no change In this respect to the injury of the defendant, it does
not lie in his mouth, after having, in the manner stated, obtained the property of the deceased, to complain that her heir did not sooner bring suit against him to compel its surThere is no statutory bar in the case.
render.
The improvements made have not cost more
than the amount which a reasonable rent of
and the
the property would have produced,
complainant, as we understand, does not object to allow the defendant credit for them.
And as to the small amount paid on the execution of the conveyance, it Is sufficient to
observe, that the complainant received from
the administrator of the deceased's estate only
$113.42; and there is no evidence that he ever
knew that this sum constituted any portion
A
of the money obtained from the defendant.
decree must, therefore, be entered for a cancellation of the deed of the deceased and a
surrender of the property to the complainant,
but without any accounting for back rents,
being taken as an equivathe improvements
lent for them.
Decree reversed, and cause remanded with
directions to enter a decree as thus stated.
Mr. Chief Justice
STRONG, concur.

WAITE

and Mr. Justice

I

canMr. Justice BRADLEY (dissenting).
not concur in the judgment given in this case.
Were there no other reason for my dissent, it
would be enough that the complainant has
been guilty of inexcusable laches.
He knew
every thing of which he now complains,
in
February, 1864, when the grantor of the defendant died, and when his rights as her heir
vested; and yet he waited until six years and
nine months thereafter before he brought this
suit, and before he made any complaint of the
sale she had made. Meanwhile, he accepted
the money the defendant had paid on account
of the purchase, and he stood silently by, asserting no claim, while the defendant was
making valuable improvements upon the lot,
at a cost of $6,000 or $7,000, a sum about
equal to the value of the property at the time
of the purchase.
To permit him now to assert that the sale was invalid, because the
vendor was of weak mind, is to allow him to
reap a profit from his own unconscionable silence and delay.
cannot think a court of
equity should lend itself to such a wrong.
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GREENE

et al. v.

ROWORTH

et al.

(21 X. E. 165, 113 N. Y. 4(j2.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

April

23, 1889.

Appeal from common pleas of New York
city and county, general term.
Action originally brought by William
Eoworth, to vacate transfers of certain property made by him to his sons, Joseph G. and
John W. Roworth. Pending the decision,
AVilliam Roworth died, and the action was
revived in favor of the present plaintiffs,
A judgment
Emma T. Greene and others.
for plaintiffs was reversed in part and affirmed
in part on appeal to the general term of the
supreme court, and defendants now appeal
to this court.
Thomas Darlington,
(Samuel Jones, of
/. M. & A. U. Van
counsel,) for appellants.
Cott, for respondents.

J.

RuGER, C.
The reversal by the general
term of so much of the judgment of the special term as awarded relief to the plaintiffs
of personal
in respect to the conveyance
property, eliminated from the case all quesupon rulings in relation
tions predicated
This determination left the issues
thereto.
in respect to the validity of the conveyances
of two parcels of real estate as the only subjects of controversy on the appeal to this

court.
The evidence of the exercise of fraud and
undue influence by the defendants Joseph and
John Roworth, in obtaining from their father, William Roworth, deeds of such property,
was quite sufficient to sustain the findings of
The evthe trial court respecting the same.
idence tended to show that for many years
prior to January, 1877, William Roworth
and his son Samuel carried on the business
of manufacturing confectionery at 354 Pearl
street in the city of New York, under the
firm name of Samuel W. Roworth &Co., and

Willhad established a prosperous busmess
iam Roworth was then the owner of a onehalf interest in tlie assets of said firm; of a
three-quarters interest in the lot and building in which the business was carried on ; of
a house and iot in Devoe street, Brooklyn,
and another in Fifth street in the same city;
a mortgage on property in Detroitfor $2,000;'

In Janand deposits in bank of about $500.
uary, Samuel W. Roworth died, devising his
interest in the assets of said firm equally to
the defendants, his two brothers, John and
Between the
Joseph, and to his two sisters.
lime of Samuel's death, in January, 1877,
and March, 1880, the defendants John and
Joseph had obtained from William Roworth,
without consideration except a promise to
pay him a small sum weekly from the partnership business, all of the property possessed
This was effected by transfers and
by him.
conveyances of such property, or its proceeds,
made successively at different times by William Eoworth to one or both of said defendAt the
ants, between the dates aforesaid.
time of the death of Samuel the two defend-
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ants were each upwards of 45 years of age,
and had been unsuccessful in ttie business
operations tlieretofore carried on by them respectively, and were not then possessed of
They were supporting themany property.
selves as workmen, upon a small salary, in
the employ of Samuel W. Roworth & Co. In
1877, William Roworth was 76 years of age,
His
and had become quite infirm in health.
memory had greatly failed, and he was practically incapable of taking an active and responsible part in the management of his business, although he continued for some time
thereafter to attend at the store and factory,
and make entries in the books, draw up bills,
and render other small services which he had
been theretofore accustomed to perform. He
had become very nervous and susceptible,
being frequently overcome by emotion, and
easily affected to tears, and subject to the inHe had
fluence of those surrounding him.
an aged wife, who survived him, and was
The finddependent upon him for support.
ings of fact made by the trial court as the
basis of its judgment with respect to the two
deeds which remain as the subject of controversy on this appeal are substantially the
same, and that one relating to the transfer of
No. 354 Pearl street. New York, reads as
That "the said William Roworth,
follows:
at the time of the execution and acknowledgment of said instrument, did not know or
the legal effect of the said incomprehend
strument, " and that its "execution, acknowledgment, and delivery * * * were procured
by fraud and undue influence, exercised upon
said William Roworth by the said defendants,
Joseph G. Roworth and John W. Roworth,
and by their taking advantage of his age and
infirmities, and his confidence and trust in
them, and his dependence and reliance upon
them; and the signing and delivery of the
same by William Roworth was reckless and
improvident, was done without proper advice
of counsel, ana upon a grossly inadequate
consideration, and while he was acting under the influence of said defendants, unduly
The evidence, as we
exercised upon him."
have said, fully supports this finding, and,
indeed, we are of the opinion that the proof
would not have justified the contrary concluIn the consideration of this case the
sion.
court cannot shut its eyes to the significant
fact that William Roworth has been substantially stripped of all of his property by some
one; and however or to whomever it passed
originally, either the property or its proceeds
found their way to a common end, viz., to
the benefit and possession of the defendants.
Whatever the defendants advanced, if anything, towards the acquisition of any part of
the property, has been for their own advantage, and substantially from funds which
they had received from their father.
The only material question in this case
arises over an alleged inconsistency between
the findings made by the trial court as the
basis of its judgment, and a single one also
found by the court out of 105 spscial requests
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to find on questions of fact submitted by tiie
defendants at the close of the trial.
It is undoubtedly an established rule of tliis court,
where findings of fact, made by the court
or referee, which are material to the deterilQination of the case, are irreconcilably conflicting, that we will be governed by that
finding which is most favorable to the party
appealing; but this rule presupposes such a
difference in the findings. So, far, therefore,
as these findings are conflicting, it is the duty
of the court to endeavor to reconcile them,
and give to each some office to perform.
It
is only when this cannot, by a reasonable
construction, be accomplished, that the court
are bound to accept that finding most favorBennett v. Bates, 94
able to the appellant.
N. Y. 354; Redtteld v. Redfleld, 110 N. Y.
671, 18 N. E. Rep. 373.
It was said in the
latter case that " we have held that, where the
special findings of a judge or referee differ
from the findings formally made as the basis
of the judgment, the appellant has the right
to rely upon such findings as are most favorThose decisions were made at
able to him.
a time when the practice authorized the submission of proposed findings * * * after
the decision of the case was rendered; and
under that practice such findings were passed
and
frequently
upon, generally weeks,
months, after the formal findings had been
And we held tliat where such findmade.
ings differed from the prior findings, and contradicted them, that the appellant had the
right to rely upon them if most favorable to
him. Tompkins v. Lee, 59 N. Y. 662;
Sch winger v. Raymond, 83 N. Y. 192; Bonnell V. Griswold, 89 N. Y. 122. Since those
decisions, the practice has been changed, and
now the proposed findings must be presented
at the submission of the case, and the presumption is that those findings are passed
upon when the case is decided and the formal
Hence, for the purpose of
findings made.
construing the findings, we must look at all
of them, both the general and special findings, and if they are in conflict we must attempt to reconcile them." In accord with
the rule thus stated, we must look at the findings in question, to see how far they are inconsistent.
The formal finding will be found
much broader than the one alleged to be inconsistent llierewith, as it especially finds that
the deed was fraudulently procured, in ignorance of its effect by the grantor, and these
facts are not negatived by any subsequent
There is undoubtedly an apparent
finding.
inconsistency between the additional and
some parts of the formal findings, but upon
examination we think it does not necessarily
nullify the effect of the formal finding. The
additional finding is as follows: "That the
said Joseph G. and John W. Roworth did not,
about said month of April, or at any time,
persuade or influence said William Roworth
to sign said alleged paper, or makeany representations in respect thereto."
We infer
that this finding relates to the deed in question. In the same connection the court re-
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fused to find that the said William Roworth
was not "by reason of bodily infirmities unable and incapacitated from participating in
or taking part in the management and control of his business, property, and affairs," or
that "Joseph G. and John W. Roworth were
* * *
not intrusted by William Roworth
with the exclusive and entire management
" or
and control of his property and business,
that "he was not dependent upon the said
Joseph G. and John W. Roworth for the
proper management and control of his property and business, and was not solely reliant
"
upon their advice in regard thereto, or that
he was cognizant of "the real purpose and
effect of his deed to Joseph G. and John W.
Roworth. " It seems quite evident, by these
refusals to find, that the court did not intend,
by its informal finding, to nullify the general
force and effect of the formal findings.
The
court had, in its original findings, on seven
distinct and separate occasions applying to as
many different transfers of property, reiterated in substance the findings of fraud and
undue influence on the part of these defendants in obtaining such transfers. The several
findings were presumptively passed upon at
the same time, and it is quite improbable that
the court intentionally determined to leave
two findings in the case radically inconsistent
with each other, or to nullify and contradict
its repeated findings, often expressed and confirmed in its previous statement of facts.
We are of the opinion that the court, by
the additional finding, intended only to say
that there was no direct or positive evidence
of any special influence or persuasion with
reference
to the procurement of the deed
in question, but left the judgment to stand
upon the legal presumption of fraud arising upon the facts and circumstances of the
The informal finding was substancase.
tially a finding as to the inferences to be
drawn from the evidence, and not upon an
existing and independent fact itself, and in
that respect was rather a finding upon a
question of law than one of fact. In that
view it may be said to be erroneous, and as
not affecting the judgments rendered.
The
leading facts of the case have been found,
and are not impaired Ijy any contradictory
finding. They were, substantially, that the
deed was secured by parties who had already
obtained the larger portion of the grantor's
property, without any adequate consideration
therefor; that this conveyance left him comparatively destitute of property, and was
made without consideration, in the absence
of any legal adviser, by an aged man, whose
mental and physical condition was much enfeebled, and in ign'^rance of its legal effect,
to persons occupying a confidential relation
towards him, and who had the management
and control of his property and business affairs, and upon whose advice and counsel he
was accustomed to rely.
That these facts
afford sufficient ground to support a finding
of fraud and undue influence, even without
positive or direct proof of persuasion or in-
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fluence, cannot be questioned.
Tliey present a situation from which fraud is legally
imputable to those benefited, and requiring
an explanation from them, which was not
furnished by the defendants.
As was said by Judge Hand in Gowee v.
Cornell, 75 N. Y. 99: "We return, then, to
the question whether this case was one of
constructive fraud. It may be stated as universally true that fraud vitiates all contracts,
but as a general thing it is not presumed,
but must be proved by the party seeking to
relieve himself from an obligation on that
ground. Whenever, however, the relations
between the contracting parties appear to be
of sucii a character as to render it certain
that they do not deal on terms of equality,
but that, either on the one side from superior
knowledge of the matter derived from a fiduciary relation, or from overmastering influence, or, on the other, from weakness, dependence, or trust justifiably reposed, unfair
advantage in a transaction is rendered probable, there the burden is shifted, the transaction is presumed void, and it is incumbent
upon the stronger party to show affirmatively that no deception was practiced, no undue
influence was used, and that all was fair,
The
open, voluntary, and well understood."
remarks of Judge Andbevits in Re Will of
Smitli, 95 N. Y. 516, are so pertinent to the
question that we repeat them here: "Undue
influence, which is a species of fraud, when
relied upon to annul a transaction inter partes, or a testamentary
disposition, must be
proved,

and cannot

be presumed.

But

the

relation in which the parties to a transaction
stand to each other is often a material circumstance, and may of itself, in some cases,
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be sufficient to raise a presumption of its
* * * and, when the situaexistence,
tion is shown, then there is cast upon the
party claiming the benefit or advantage the
burden of relieving himself from the suspicion thus engendered, and of showing, either
by direct proof or by circumstances, that the
transaction was free from fraud or undue influence, and that the other party acted without restraint and under no coercion, or any
pressure, direct or indirect, o* the party benefited.
This rule does not proceed upon a
presumption of the invalidity of the particular transaction, without proof. The proof is
made in the first instance when the relation
and the personal intervention of the party
The genclaiming the benefit is shown,"
eral rule is stated in 1 Story, Eq. Jur.
§ 238:
"The doctrine, therefore, maybe laid down
as generally true that the acts and contracts
of persons who are of weak understandings,
and who are therefore liable to imposition,
will be held void in courts of equity if the
nature of the act or contract justify the conclusion that the party has not exercised a deliberate judgment, but that he has been imposed upon, circumvented, or overcome by

cunning or artifice or undue influence."

If,

therefore, we should give full effect to the
special finding, and come to the conclusion
that the giving of the deed in question was
the voluntary, unrestricted act of the grantor, it would not, under the circumstances
of this case, justify the retention by the grantee of the property conveyed, or furnish a
reason for refusing relief to the improvident
grantor. We are therefore of the opinion
tliat the judgment should be affirmed.
All

concur.
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BROWN
'

A

.'feupreme

(7

V.

PIERCE.

Wall.

205.)

Court of the United States.

Dec,

1868.

Error to the supreme court, Nebraska territory.
Brown filed his bill in September, 1860, in
the court below against three persons, Pierce,
alleging that in the
and Weston,
Morton,
spring of 1857, he settled upon and improved
a tract of land near Omaha; that he erected
a house on the tract and continued to occupy
it until August 10th, 1857, when he entered
the tract under the pre-emption laws of the
United States; that Pierce claimed the land
by virtue of the laws of an organization
known as the Omaha Claim Club; that this
organization, consisting of very numerous
armed men, sought to, and did to a great extent, control the disposition of the public
lands in the vicinity of Omaha in 1857, in defiance of the laws of the United States; that
it frequently resorted to personal violence in
enforcing its decrees; that the fact was notorious in Omaha, and that he. Brown, was
fully advised in the premises; that as soon
as he had acquired title to the land. Pierce,
together with several other members of the
of
club, came to his house and demanded
him a dee'd of the land, threatening to take
his life by hanging him, or putting him in
the Missouri river, if he did not comply with
the demand; that the club had posted handbills calling the members together to take
action against him; and that knowing all
this, and In great fear of his life, he did, on
the 10th of August, 1857, convey the land by
deed to Pierce; that he. Brown, received no
consideration whatever for the conveyance;
that from the date of his settlement upon
said laud, until the time of filing the bill, he
liad continued to keep possession either actually or constructively; that Morton claimed
an interest in the premises by virtue of a
judgment lien, and that Weston also made
some claim.

The prayer was, that the deed might be
declared void, and Pierce be decreed to reconvey, and for general relief.
The bill was taken pro confesso as to all
Morton, who anexcept
the defendants,
swered.
Tills answer, stating that he, Morton, was
not a resident of the territory, and had no
knowledge or information about the facts alleged in the bill, but on the contrary was an
utter stranger to them, and therefore could
not answer as to any belief concerning them,
—set forth that on the 28th August, 1857,
Pierce was "the owner and in possession of,
and otherwise well seized and entitled to, as
of a good and indefeasible estate of inheritance in fee simple," the tract in controversy; that being so, and representing himself to be so, and having need of money in
business, he applied to him, Morton, to borrow the same, and that he, Morton, being in-
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and
duced by reason of the representation,
also by the possession, and believing that he.
Pierce, was the owner, he was thereby induced to lend, and did lend to him $6,000, on
the personal security of him. Pierce; that
before the filing of this bill by Brown, he,

judgment against
Morton, had obtained
Pierce for $3,400, part of the loan yet unpaid; that this judgment was a lien on the
lands; and that as he, Morton, was informed
and believed, if he could not obtain his
money from this land, he would be wholly
defrauded out of it.
The answer further stated that the defendant was informed and believed that Brown,
the complainant, entered upon the lands as
the tenant of Pierce, and that the suit by the
complainant was being prosecuted in violation of the just rights of Pierce, as well as
of him, Morton.
There was no replication. Proofs were
taken by the complainant,
and they showed
to the entire satisfaction of the court that all
the matters alleged in the bill and not denied
by the answers, were true. See 7 Wall. 213.
There thus seemed no doubt as to the truth
of all the facts set out in the bill.
The court below declared Brown's deed
void, and decreed a reconveyance from Pierce
to him, and that neither Morton nor Weston
had any lien on the premises.
Morton now
brought the case here for review.
Carlisle & Woolworth, for appellant.
Redick & Briggs, contra.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
of the complainant were,
Representations
that on the tenth of August, 1857, he acquired a complete title to the premises described in the bill of complaint, under the
pre-emption
laws of the United States, and
that thereafter, on the same day, he was
compelled, through threats of personal violence and fear of his life, to convey the same,
without any consideration,
to the principal
respondent.
Framed on that theory, the bill
of complaint alleged that the first-named respondent was at that time a member of an
unlawful association in that territory, called
the Omaha Claim Club, and that he, accompanied by three or four other persons belonging to that association, came to his house
a few days before he perfected his right of
pre-emption to the land In question, and told
the complainant that if he entered the land
under his pre-emption claim, he must agree
to deed the same to him, and added, that unless he did so, he, the said respondent
and
his associates, would take his life; and the
complainant further alleged, that the same
respondent,
accompanied,
as before, by certain other members of that association, came
again to his house on the day he perfected
his pre-emption
those
claim, and repeated
threats of personal violence, and did other
acts to intimidate him, and induce him to believe that they would carry out their threats
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he refused to execute the deed as required.
Based upon those allegations, the charge is
that the complainant was put in dui'ess by
those threats and acts of intimidation, and
that he signed and executed the deed, and
conveyed the land by means of those threats
and certain acts of intimidation, and through
fear of his life, and without any consideration; and he prayed the court that the conveyance might be decreed to be inoperative
and void, and that the grantee might be required to reconvey the same to the complainant.
Two other persons were made respondents,
as claiming some interest in the land in controversy. Pierce, the principal respondent,
and ^^■eston, one of the other respondents,
were non-residents,
and were served by publication pursuant to the rules of the court
They never
and the law of the jurisdiction.
appeared, and failing to plead, answer, or
demur, and due proof of publication in the
manner prescribed by law having been filed
in court, a decree was rendered as to them,
that tlie bill of complaint be taken as confessed.
Nations v. Johnson, 2-1 How. 201.
Morton, the other respondent, appeai'ed and
filed an answer, in which he alleged tliat the
principal respondent, on the twenty-eighth of
August, 1857, and for a long time before, was
that he
the owner in fee of the premises;
was informed, and believed, that the complainant entered upon the land as the tenant
of the principal respondent, and that he was
prosecuting
this suit in violation of the just
rights of all the respondents;
that the principal respondent wanting to boiTow money,

if

the respondent before the court, loaned
a large sum, and accepted bills of exchange for the payment of the same, drawn
to the order of the bon'ower of the money,
and which were indorsed by the drawer;
that the bills of exchange not having been
paid when they became due. he brought suit
against the drawer and indorser, and recovered judgment against him for three thousand one hundred dollars; that the judgment so recovered is in full force and unsatisfied, aud that the same is a lien on the
premises described in the bill of complaint.
Xo answer, from any knowledge possessed
by the respondent, is made to the allegation
acquired
that the complainant
a complete
title to the land under the pre-emption laws
of the United States, nor to the charge contained in the bill of complaint, that the deed
was procured by threats of personal violence
amounting to actual duress. On the contrary,
the answer alleged that the respondent before
the court was an utter stranger to all those
matters and things, and that he could not
answer concerning the same, because he had
no information or belief upon the subject.
Authorities are not wanting to the efifect,
that all matters well alleged in the bill of
which the answer neither denies
complaint,
nor avoids, are admitted; but the better opinion is the other way, as the sixty-first rule
he,

him
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adopted by this court provides that if no exception thereto shall be filed within the period
therein prescribed, the answer shall be deemed and taken
Young v.
to be suflicient
Grundy,
51; Brooks v. Byam, 1
6 Cranch,
Story, 297, Fed. Cas. No. 1,947.

Material allegations in the bi-ll of complaint ought to be answered and admitted, or
denied, if the facts are within tlie knowledge of the respondent; and if not, he ought
to state what his belief is upon the subject,
if he has any, and if he has none, and cannot
form any, he ought to say so, and call on the
complainant for proof of the alleged facts, or
waive that branch of the controversy; but the
clear weight of authority is, that a mere
statement by the respondent in his answer,

as in this case, that he has no knowledge
that the fact is as stated, without any answer as to his belief concerning it, is not
such an admission as is to be received as full
evidence of the fact.
Warfleld v. Gambrill.
1 Gill & .T. 503.
Such an answer does not make it necessary for the complainant
to introduce more
than one witness to overcome the defence,
and the well-known omissions
and defects
of such an answer may liave some tendency
to prove the allegations
of the bill of complaint but they are not such an admission
of the same as will constitute a suflicient
foundation
for a decree upon the merits.
Young V. Gnmdy, 6 Cranch, 51; Parkman v.

fl'elch, 19 Pick. 234.
Proper remedy for a complainant,

in such a
case, is to e.xcept to the answer for insufficiency within the period prescribed
by the
sixty-tirst rule; but if he does not avail himself of that right, the answer is deemed suflicient to prevent the bill from being taken
pro confesso. as it may be if no answer is
Harris, 7 How. 726;
filed.
Hardeman
v.
Stockton V. Ford, 11 How. 232; 1 Daniell,
Ch. Prac. 736; Langdon v. Goddard, 3 Story,
13, Fed. Cas. No. 8,061.
Attention is called to the fact that no replication was filed to the answer; but the suggestion comes too late, as the respondent proceeded to final hearing in the court below
without interposing any such objection.
Mere formal defects in the proceedings, not
objected to in the court of original jurisdiction, cannot be assigned in an appellate tribunal as error to reverse either a judgment
at law or decree in equity.
Legal efifect of a replication is, that it puts
in issue all the matters well alleged in the
answer, and the rule is, that if none be filed,
the answer will be taken as true, and no evidence can be given by the complainant to
contradict anything which is therein well alleged,
1 Barb. Ch. Prac. 249; Mills v. Pitman, 1 Paige, Ch. 490; Peirce v. West, 1
Pet. C. C. 351, Fed. Cas. No. 10,909; Story,
Bq. PI. 878; Cooper, Eq. PI. 329.
Undenied as the answer is by any replication, it must have its fair scope as an admission; but the court is not authorized to
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what is reasonably
implied from the language employed.
Proofs were taken by the
complainant,
and they show, to the entire
satisfaction of the court, that all the matters
alleged in the bill of complaint, and not denied in the answer, are true, and the conclusion of the court below was, that the complainant acquired a complete title to the land
under his pre-emption
claim, and that the
deed from him to the principal respondent
was procured in the manner and by the
means alleged in the bill of complaint.
Nothing is exhibited in the record to support any different conclusion, or to warrant
any different decree, unless it be found in one
or the other of the first two defences set up
in the answer.
First defence is, that the principal respondent, on the twenty-eighth of August, 1857,
and long before that time, was the owner in
fee of the premises; but neither that part of
supply

the answer, nor any other, denied that the
complainant
acquired a complete title to the
land, as alleged in the bill of complaint, nor
set up any defence in avoidance of those allegations, nor made any attempt to present any
defence against the direct charge, that the
deed under which the respondent claimed title
was procured from the complainant
through
threats of personal violence and by means of
duress.
Indefinite as the allegation of title
is, the answer must be construed as referring
to the title under the deed in controversy,
as
it is not pretended that the respondent ever
had any other, and, if viewed in that light,
it is in no respect inconsistent with the conclusion adopted by the supreme court of the

territory.

Such an indefinite allegation cannot be conany sufficient answer,
sidered as presenting
either to the alleged title of the complainant
or to the charge made in the bill of com-

plaint.
Briefly stated, the second defence set up in
the answer is, that the respondent
was informed and believed that the complainant entered upon the land as a tenant, but the time
when the supposed entry was made is not
alleged, nor are the circumstances
attending
the entry set forth, nor is any reason assigned why the allegations were not made more
definite, nor is there any fact or circumstance alleged which shows or tends to show
that there was any prior owner to the land,
except the United States, nor that the respondent ever pretended to have any other
title to the same than that derived from the
complainant.
Viewed in any light, those allegations must
be regarded as evasive and insufBcient;
and
they are not helped by the omission of the
complainant
to file the general replication.
Those parts of the answer 'being laid out of
the case as Insufficient to constitute
a defence, the conclusion
is inevitable that the
title to the land was in the complainant as
alleged, and that he parted with It through
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threats of personal violence and by duress,
and without any consideration.
Argument to show that a deed or other
written obligation or contract, procured by
means of duress, is inoperative and void, is
hardly required, as the proposition is not deActual violence is
nied by the respondent.
not necessary to constitute duress, even at
m the parent
common law, as understood
country, because consent is the very essence
of a contract, and, if there be compulsion,
there is no actual consent, and moral compulsion, such as that produced by threats to take
life or to infiict great bodily harm, as well as
is everyby imprisonment,
that produced
where regarded as sufficient, in law, to destroy free agency, without which there can
be no contract, because, in that state of the
case, there is no consent.
Duress, in its more extended sense, means
that degree of constraint or danger, either
actually infiicted or threatened and impending, which is sufficient, in severity or in apprehension, to overcome the mind and will of
Chit. Cont.
a person of ordinary firmness.
217; 2 Greenl. Ev. 283.
Text-writers usually divide the subject into two classes, namely, duress per minas and
and that classificaduress of imprisonment,
tion was uniformly adopted in the early history of the common law, and is generally
preserved in the decisions
of the English
2 Inst. 482; 2
courts to the present time.
RoUe, Abr. 124.
Where there is an arrest for an improper
purpose, without just cause, or where there
is an arrest for a just cause, but without
lawful authority, or for a just cause, but for
an unlawful
purpose,
even though under
proper process, it may be construed as duress
of imprisonment; and if the person arrested
execute a contract or pay money for his
release, he may avoid the contract as one
procured by duress, or may recover back the
money in an action for money had and received.
Kichardson v. Duncan, 3 X. H. 508;
Watkins v. Baird, 6 Mass. 511; Strong v.
Grannis, 26 Barb. 124.
Second class, duress per minas, as defined
at common law, is where the party enters
into a contract (1) for fear of loss of life;
(2) for fear of loss of limb; (3) for fear of
maj'hem;
(4) for fear of imprisonment; and
many modem decisions of the courts of that
country still restrict the operations of the
rule within those limits. 3 Bac. Abr. tit.

"Duress," 252.
... .-^.
'They deny that contracts procured by menace of a mere battery to the person, or of
trespass to lands, or loss of goods, can be
avoided on that account, and the reason assigned for this qualification of the rule is,
that such threats are held not to be of a nature to overcome the mind and will of a
firm and prudent man, because it is said that
if such an injui-y is inflicted, sufficient and
adequate redress may be obtained in a suit
at law.
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Cases to the same effect may be found
also in the reports of decisions in this country, and some of our text-writers have adopted the rule, that it is only where the threats
uttered excite fear of death, or of great bodily harm, or unlawful imprisonment, that a
contract,
so procured,
becan be avoided,
cause, as such courts and autliors say. the
person threatened with slight injury to the
person, or with loss of property,
ought to
have sufficient resolution to resist such a
threat, and to rely upon the law for his remedy.
Slieate v. Beale, 11 Adol. & E. 983;
Atlee v. Backhouse, 3 Mees. & W. 642; Smith
V. Monteith, 13 Mees. & A^'. 438; Shep. Touch.
U; 1 Pars. Cont. 393.
On tlie other hand, there are many American decisions, of high authority, which adopt
a more liberal rule, and hold that contracts
procured by threats of battery to the person,
or the destruction of property, may be avoided on the ground of duress, because in such
a case there is nothing but the form of a contract,
Foshay v.
without the substance.
Ferguson, 5 Hill, 158; Bank v. Copeland, 18
2(; X. Y. 12;
-Md. 317; Eadie v. Shmmon,
1
Story, Eq. Jur. (9th Ed.) 2:J1); Harmony v.
Bingham, 12 N. Y. 99; Id., 1 Duer, 220;
Fleetwood v. New York, 2 Sandf. 475; Tutt
V. Ide, 3 Blatchf. 250; Astley v. Reynolds, 2
Strange, 915; Brown v. Peck, 2 Wis. 277;
Oates V. Hudson, 5 Eng. Law & Eq. 469.
But the case under consideration presents
no question for decision which requires the
court to determine which class of those cases
is correct, as they all agree in the rule that
a contract procured through fear of loss of
life, produced by the threats of the other
party to the contract, wants the essential element of consent, and that it may be avoided
for duress, which is sufficient to dispose of
2 Greenl. Ev. 283;
the present conti'oversy.
1 Bl. Comm. 131.
Next question which arises in the case is,
whether the judgment set up by the appellant creates a superior equity in his favor
over that alleged and proved by the appellee.
Before proceeding to examine this question,
it will be useful to advert briefly to the material facts exhibited in the record.
Title was acquired by the complainant un>der the pre-emption laws of the United States,
and on the same day the principal respondent, through threats to take his 'life, if he
refused, compelled him to convey the same to
that respondent, and the record shows that
the respondent before the court, within the
same month, loaned the money to the grantee in that deed, for which he recovered
judgment, although the grantor was then in
possession of the land, and has remained in
possession of the same to the present time.
The judgment is founded upon the bills of
Judgments
exchange received for that loan.
were not liens at common law, but several
of the states had passed laws to that effect
before the judicial system of the United
of
States was organized, and the decisions
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this court have established the doctrine that
congress, in adopting
the processes of the
states, also adopted the modes of process prevailing at that date in the courts of the several states, in respect to the lien of judgments within the limits of their respective
jurisdictions.
Williams v. Benedict, 8 How.
Ward v. Chamberlain,
2 Black, 438;
Bayard v. Lombard, 9 How. 530; Riggs v.
Johnson Co., 6 Wall. 166.
Different regulations, however, prevailed In
different states, and in some neither a judgment nor a decree for the payment of money,
except in cases of attachment or mesne process, created any preference in favor of the
creditor until the execution was issued, and
had been levied on the land.
Where the lien
is recognized, it confers a right to levy on
the land to the exclusion of other adverse interests acquired
subsequently
to the judgment; but the lien constitutes no property or
right in the land itself. Conard v. Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 443; Masslngill v. Downs, 7
How. 767.

Ill;

Such judgments
and decrees were made
liens by the process acts in the federal districts where they have that effect under the
state laws, and congress has since provided
that they shall cease to have that operation
in the same manner, and at the same periods,
in the respective
federal districts, as like
processes do when issued from the state
courts.
Federal judgments and decrees are
liens, therefore, in all cases, and to the same
extent, as similar judgments and decrees are,
when rendered in the courts of the state.
Express decision of this court is, that the
lien of a judgment constitutes no property in
the land, that it is merely a general lien securing a preference over subsequently acquired interests in the property, but the settled
rule in chancery is, that a general lien is controlled in such courts so as to protect the
rights of those who were previously entitled
to an equitable interest In the lands, or in
the proceeds thereof.
Specific liens stand upon a different footing,
but it is well settled that a judgment creates
only a general lien, and that the judgment
creditor acquires thereby no higher or better
right to the property or assets of the debtor,
than the debtor himself had when the judgment was rendered, unless he can show some
fraud or collusion to impair his rights.

Drake, Attach. § 223.
Correct statement of the rule is, that the
lien of a judgment creates a preference over
subsequently acquired rights, but in equity
It does not attach to the mere legal title to
the land, as existing in the defendant at its
rendition, to the exclusion of a prior equitable title in a third person.
In re Howe, 1
Paige, Ch. 128; Ells v. Tousley, Id. 283;
White V. Carpenter, 2 Paige, 219; Buchan v.
Sumner,
2 Barb.
Lounsbury v.
Ch. 18l;
Purdy, 11 Barb. 494; Keirsted v. Avery, 4
Paige, Ch. 15.
Guided by these considerations,
the court
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of chancery will protect

the equitable rights
of third persons against the legal lien, and
will limit that lien to the actual interest
which the judgment debtor had in the estate
at the time the judgment was rendered.
Averill v. Loucks, 6 Barb. 27.
Objection is also made, that the affidavit
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showing that the defendants were non-residents, was hot in due form, and that the order of notice, and the publication of the
same, were insufficient to give the court jurisdiction; but the proposition is not supported by the record, and must be overruled.
Decree

affirmed.
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and Newton imtil his marriage In
Up to the latter date and longer they
and John Leffler "worked" the home farm
and adjoining farms purchased
by their
father. The deeds sought to be set aside are
A deed of 100 acres, exthe following:
ecuted on January 5, 1869, by Robert B. McOhance to Sylvester Wilkinson; a deed of 80
acres, executed on February 16, 1870, by
James A. McChance and his wife to Alonzo
Wilkinson; four deeds executed by Solomon
Wilkinson, all dated May 27, 1873,—one of
133 acres to Sylvester Wilkinson, one of 187
acres to Newton WUkinson, one of 111 acres
to John Leffler, and one of 169 acres to
Frances Leffler; a deed dated May 27, 1873,
executed by said Sylvester to said Alonzo,
conveying one-half of the 160 acres conveyed
to Sylvester by Robert B. McChance; a deed
of 160 acres, dated October 21, 1874, executed by Davis Lowman and wife and
Daniel Bnrge and wife to said Sylvester,
Alonzo, Newton, and John. The first two
1876,

1881.

N. E. 150, 147 111. 370.)

Court of Illinois.

In
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Appeal from circuit court, Stark county;
T. M. Sliaw, Judge.
Bill by Charity Francis and others against
From a deSylvester Wilkinson and others.
cree dismissing the bill, complainants appeal.
Affirmed.
The other facts fuUy appear In the following statement by MAGRXIDBR, J.:
This Is a bill filed on the 2d day of September, A. D. 1886, by Charity Prands, of Kansas, Rachel Gurfman, of Kansas, and Nancy
lU., daughters of
Cox, of Stark county,
deceased, formerly of
WlUdinson,
Solomon
Stark county, HI., against Sylvester Wilkinson, Alonzo Wilkinsoin, and Newton Wilkinson, of said county of Stark, sons of said
Wilkinson, deceased, and Frances
Solomon
Leffler, of said coimty, also a daughter of
said Solomon, and John Leffler, of said county, a son of said Frances Leffler, and grandson of said Solomon, to set aside certain
deeds executed to the defendants by the said
Solomon
in his lifetime, and for partition
of the lands described in said deeds among
Anthe said children of the said Solomon.
swers were filed by said defendants denying
the material allegations
of the bill. Since
the beginning of the suit Rachel Ourfman,
Frances Leffler, and John Leffler have died,
and their representatives
have been made
After hearing had upon testimony
parties.
and upon evidence
oral and documentary,
submitted in the fonn of depositions, the circuit court dismissed the bill for want of
equity, and the present appeal is prosecuted
from said decree of dismissal.
Wilkinson came from Ohio to
Solomon
Stark county, HI., in 1849, being at that time
He brought some money
about 50 years old.
with him, and at onoe purchased a farm of
200 acres, on which he lived until his death.
He died on April 2, 1885, leaving seven children, the four daughters
and three sons
above named, to wit, Rachel, Charity, Nancy,
Frances, Sylvester, Alonzo, and Newton. TTia
The oldest
wife died in the spring of 1871.
daughter, Frances, married in 1850, but her
husband
died in about six weeks, leaving
one child, Jetm Leffler.
She never left her
father, but kept house for him, and managed the household affairs after her mother's death; and she and her son John, who
became of age in 1872, lived with the old
man on the home place until his death.
Charity married in 1853, Rachel in 1856, and
Nancy in 1857 or 1858, each leaving home
It is in evat the date of her marriage.
idence that the lasit three daughters assisted
In the work of the farm up to the dates of
marriages.
Sylvester betheir respective
came of age in 1863, Alonzo in 1865, and
The three sons remained
Newton In 1868.
CO the home farm, Alonzo until his marriage in 1875, Sylvester until his marriage

deeds were recorded on the respective dates
of their execution.
The five deeds executed
on May 27, 1873, were recorded on July 28,
By the above deeds there were con1876.
veyed to Sylvester 253 acres, to Alonzo 200
acres, to Newton 227 acres, to John Leffler
151 acres, to Frances Leffler 169 acres, making 1,000 acres in all.
The evidence showed
that the sons participated in the profits and
produce realized from the business of the
farms, and received their respective shares
of such business up to 1873, or perhaps
1881.

Miles A. FuUer and Frank A. Kerns, for
appellants.
O. O. Wilson and Frank Thomas,
for appellees.

MAGRUDER, J., (after stating the facts.)
The grounds upon which the bill seeks to set
First, want of mental
aside the deeds are:
capacity; second, the exercise of undue InThe three daughters of Solomon
fluence.
Wilkinson who filed the bill do not claim
that he showed any want of mental capacity
until after the death of his wife, in the spring
of 1871.
He was not able to read or write,
but there is no testimony on either side that
he was not a vigorous man, both mentally
and physically, prior to 1871.
Hence the
deed of 160 acres, executed In January, 1869,
to his son Sylvester Wilkinson, by Robert
B. McChance, and the deed executed in February, 1870, to his son Alonzo Wilkinson, by
James A. McChance, cannot be invalidated
because of any want of mental capacity.
Nor are we able to discover that the execution of those deeds was procured by any
kind of fi-aud, deceit, or undue influence.
The two tracts were purchased by Solomon
Wilkinson, but the proof shows that he knew
of and consented to the conveyances of them
to his sons Sylvester and Alonzo, who had
remained with him after reaching the age of
majority, and had assisted him, the one for
six and the other for five years, in his busl-
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ness of farming and stock raising.
OrdiQarily, where a purchase of real property is
made by a father in the name of his legitimate child, no trust results in favor of the
father, but the transaction is presumed to
2 Pom.
be a gift for the benefit of the child.
Eq. Jur. § 1039.
Undue influence -wiU not be
inferred from the relation of parent and child
where the gift is from the parent to the
child, imless the former at the time of the
gift is under the control and dominion of the
latter. Oliphant v. Leversidge, 30 N. B.
Bep. 334, 142 HI. 160; Burt v. Quisenberry,
J. H. Cox,
132 m. 399, 24 N. B. Bep. 622.
the husband of one of the complainaiits, says
that the deceased directed the deed of the
160 acres to be made in 1869 to Sylvester,
because he had then concluded to give each
If such
of his children 160 acres of land.
was his intention at the time, he did not
subsequently carry it out as to the complainThe fact that a grantor, many years
ants.
before making a final distribution of his
property by the execution of deeds, expressed
an intention to divide it equally among his
children, affords no evidence of undue influence, or mental incapacity, where a different disposition of his property is made.

The labor
Butherford v. Morris, 77 HI. 397.
of the sons for their father during a number
of years constituted some consideration foi
the conveyances which were made to them
by his vendors at his direction. Where a
father disposes of property by way of advancement or distribution to his children during his life, instead of disposing of it by
wiU, courts will not be as rigid in considering the adequacy of the consideration paid
as if the transaction was with strangers.
Clearwater v. Kimler, 43 111. 272. The deceased had the legal right to dispose of the
two tracts in question as he pleased, and, if
he saw proper to make his two sons the recipients of his bounty, the other children havt
Id.
no cause of complaint.
But the main contention between the parties is as to the deeds executed by the deceased on May 27, 1873, thereby dividing 600
acres among his sons, his grandson, and his
daughter Mrs. LeflBer.
It is flrst insisted
that these deeds were invalid for an alleged
want of mental capacity in Solomon WilkinWe have frequently deson to make them.
cided that a man has sufficient mental capacity to dispose of his property by wiU or
deed if he is capable of transacting ordinary
business, and of acting rationally in the ordinary affairs of life. Buying and selling
property, settling accounts, collecting and
paying out money, or borrowing or loaning
money, have been mentioned as instances of
what is meant by the transaction of the ordiMeeker y. Meeker,
nary affairs of business.
75 m. 260; Brown v. Biggin, 94 Bl. 560;
Schneider v. Manning, 121 HI. 376, 12 N. B.
Rep. 267; Freeman v. Basly, 117 III. 317, 7
N. E. Bep. 656; Perry v. Pearson, 135 BL
The burden is upon
218, 25 N. B. Bep. 636.
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the complainant who seeks to set aside ad
executed deed for want of mental capacity
or for the exercise of undue influence to prove
the allegations of his bill by a preponderance
English t. Porter, 109 Bl.
of the evidence.
285.

We do not think that there is in this case
of the evidence in favor of
a preponderance
In 1873, Soloa want of mental capacity.
mon Wilkinson was about 72 or 73 years old.
Witnesses for complainants swear that, after

the death of his wife in the spring of 1871,
was much
he showed signs of feebleness,
affected by the loss of his wife, was not as
clear and active in his mind as he had been,
was complaining and despondent, would sometimes shed tears in talking of his wife,
showed the infirmities of age, complained of
not being able to attend to his business as
ho had done, etc.
Some of these witnesses
give It as their opinion, based upon their
conversations with him, that he was not
competent to do biisiness in 1873.
On the
contrary, an equal number of witnesses testi-

fj'ing for the defendants say that they saw
no particular change In him after 1871, except such as was incident to advancing age;
that they saw no difference in his business
capacity; that he seemed to know as much
as he ever did; that, although he fretted
about his wife, "his mind was all right;"
that "he was a very smart old man." One
of the physicians who attended upon him for
eight or ten years before his death and in
his last sickness says that he would sit by
his fireside and talk with him about the common topics of the day, and that he noticed
no failing except what old age would account
for. Another doctor, who was called in as
consulting physician during his last illness,
and had known him and his wife for 30
years, says that he was low-spirited after
her death, but with that exception he noticed
no difference in his mind. All the witnesses
on both sides agree that he was a strong man
physically, and before 1871 was an unusually
competent man as a farmer and stock dealer.
Particular Instances are mentioned where he
transacted
business after 1873.
In 1876 or
1877 he went to Peoria, 25 miles from his
home, and paid a Judgment of about $1,800
which had been obtained against himself
and his son-in-law. Cox, upon a note signed
by him as security for Cox; and the owner
of the judgment states that at that time his
mental condition was good, "his mind was
as strong and reasonable as anybody's," aad
"he was capable of attending to any other
business."
In 1884, the year before his death,
at the age of 83 or 84, he went to the office
of a lumber merchant in Wyoming, distant
about two miles and a half from his house,
and directed an answer to be written to a letter about a pension daim, which he had received from the commissioner of pensions,
dictating the replies to be made to the questions in the letter, listening to each answer
when it was read to him, and approving of

CONSTRUCTIVE

326

In 1878 he
It as being what he wanted.
sold a horse, making the trade himself, and
the party buying the horse from him say*
that "his mind was aU right," and that he
was giving directions about the worli on the
•farm.

A

merchant in Wyoming swears that

he sold him hardware in 1876 and 1878, tto
be used on the farm, and that his mind was
sound, and he was able to transaxst ordinary
business.
Another merchant swears that the
old man did business with him at his store
from 1873 to 1881, and paid the accounts
from 1873 to 1876, and imderstood the nature
of the business he was transacting, and that
there was no impairment of his mind.
The grantor at the time of mailing the deed
must know and comprehend the transaction
in which he is engaged; or, in other words,
the mental capacity to be considered is that
which exists at the time of the execution of
the deed. 1 Redf. Wills, p. 124; Campbell
V. Campbell,
130 111. 466, 22 N. B. Rep. 620.
The notary who wrote the deeds made on
May 27, 1878, and before whom they were
acknowledged,
swears that Solomon Wilkinson came to his office in Wyoming on that
day, in pm^uanoe of a previous appointment;
that he had his title papers with him, arranged and classified, so as to enable him to
know what piece of land he wanted to convey to each grantee; that there was no one
present while he was writing the deeds, although his son Sylvester may have come into
him; that the old man
the office with
seemed to underetand just what he wanted;
that he said he was going to divide a portion of his property; that he would hand
over one package of title deeds and then
another,
and direct how the property described in each should be conveyed;
that
written on that day were
the conveyances
read over to him after they were drawn
up, and were signed by him by his mark;
that he was not especially feeble, except so
far as there was feebleness incident to declining years; that his hands were trembling,
and tears came into his eyes, and he said he
had reached tljat age when he did not feel
able or competent to attend to his business;
that he said he intended to provide for his
other children in some other manner.
While
the evidence shows that on May 27, 1873,
the deceased was somewhat infirm by reason
of old age, and that he was conscious of not
possessing as much vigor as would enable
him to manage his large farms, and attend
to the raising of stock thereon, with the efficiency of former years, yet we think that he
was mentally capable of executing the deeds
signed by him, and of making the division of
property consummated by him on that day.
Old age and loss of memory do not necessarily and of themselves indicate a want of caBmi; v. Quipacity to make a conveyance.
132 lU. 399, 24 N. E. Rep. 622;
senberry,
Pooler V. Cristman, (111. Sup.) 34 N. B. Rep.
There was here no such mental weak57.
ness as wiU justify a court of equity in setting aside the deeds, inasmuch as the grantor
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was not thereby rendered Incapable of understanding and protecting his own interests.
A deed wiU be permitted to stand notwithstanding the fact that the intellectual powers
impaired by age, if it
have been somewhat
appears that the grantor retained a full comprehension of the meaning, design, and effect
of his acts. Perry v. Pearson, supra.
It is next insisted that these deeds were
obtained by the undue influence of the granWilkinson, and
tees therein over Solomon
that for that reason they ought to be set
aside. Undue influence which will justify the
setting aside of an executed deed must have
been of such a nature as to deprive the grantor of his free agency, and thus to render
his act more the offspring of the will of another than of his own will. Rutherford v.
Mon-is, 77 111. 397; Burt v. QuisenbeiTy,
Some of the witnesses for the comsupra.
plainants testify taiat after the death of his
wife in 1871, Solomon Wilkinson left the
management of his business more to his sons
than he had formerly done, while witnesses
for the defendants say that he seemed to exercise no less control after that date than before.
The sons themselves swear that each
of them was given an interest in the proceeds and earnings of the farm after (he became of age, on condition of his remaining
at home and assisting hi« father. But, even
if it be true that the father gave his sons
gi-eater control over his business affairs after
1871 than they had previously had, that fact
alone does not establish such a dependence
upon them that he could not freely exercise
his own will in reference to the disposition
There was money in the
of his property.
bank, which he had a right to draw when he
He came and went as he saw fit.
pleased.
Burt V. Quisenberry, supra. Where the natural position of parent and child is so changed that the former becomes subject to the
dominion of the latter, and where their situation is such that the child has a controlling
influence over the will and conduct and interests of the parent, equity will interpose
its jurisdiction to set aside instruments executed between them, and, under such circumstances, gifts from parents to children will
be set aside, unless most satisfactory evidence is produced that they were not obBurt v. Quisentained by undue influence.
berry, supra; Harvey v. Sullens, 46 Mo. 147;
Brice V. Brice, 5 Barb. 533. But the fraud
or undue influence which will render a will
or deed invalid must be connected with the
execution of the instrument, and operating
when it is made; Pooler v. Cristman, (111.
Sup.) 34 N. E. Rep. 57; Guild v. Hull, 127
m. 523, 20 N. E. Rep. 665;) and although a
father may act imder the advice of his son
in his ordinary affairs, and may be influenced
by that advice, yet such relation and influeince do not tend to prove the exercise of
undue influence in the execution of a conveyance by the former to the latter, (Brownfield V. Brownfield, 43 lU. 148; Rutherford
V.

Morris,

supra,)

We discover

nothing in

CONSTRUCTIVE
the testimony In this case to indicate tliat the
deceased was under any such control as that
he was not able at all times to act freely
and according to his own judgment. The
already detailed in regard to
circumstances
the transaction of May 27, 1873, show that
the execution of the deeds made by the deceased on that day was his own act, and not
the offspring of another's will. He made no
conveyance to Alonzo, but, in addition to the
80 acres conveyed to the latter in 1870, his
brother Sylvester deeded to him 80 of the
160 acres which he obtained
the title to in
1869.
The notary testifies that Sylvester thus
conveyed the 80 acres to his brother Alonzo
at the request of their father, and that such
conveyance was referred to by the father as
a part of his arrangement for the division of
his property. Tlie same considerations already presented apply to the deed made by
Lowman and Bnrge to the sons and grandson in 1874. Bm-ge swears that he made the
deed to the sons and grandson while they
and Solomon
were present;
that Solomon
gave his notes for a part of the purchase
money, and that his mind was perfectly
sound. This conveyance was 'a consummation of the division made in 1873, and, while
it does not appear when the notes were paid,
yet the evidence shows that the land was
paid for out of the proceeds of the farm, as
earned by the labors of the gi'antees in the
deeds. The father may have been influenced
by affection for the three sons and grandson who remained with him and aided him
in managing his farms, and for the widowed daughter, who stayed at his home, and
kept house for him, and managed his household a,ffalrs. "But influence secured through
affection is not wrongful, and therefore, although a deed be made to a child at his solicitation, and because of partiality induced
by affection for him, it wiU not be undue influence" if it is not such as to deprive the
grantor of his free agency. Burt v. Quisenbeny, supra.
The testimony shows that the complainants
and their husbands received from their father from time to time about $2,000 apiece,
. paid in land and money and in the discharge
They had married many
of security debts.
years before their father's death, and had
left home, and reared families, and acquired
property of their own. The husband of one
of the complainants was a witness to the
execution
of the deeds made on May 27,
They knew of those deeds soon after
1873.
their execution, and two of them received
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money from their father a short time thereThe fact that they did not receive as
much as the defendants is no gi'ound for invalidating the deeds to the latter. Inequality in the distribution of the property is not
of itself conclusive evidence of undue influence, although it may be considered as a
tending to establish undue incircumstance
fluence. The grantor or testator may give
one child more than anotlier without invalidating the conveyance or will. Sallsbuiy v.
Aldrich, 118 111. 199, 8 X. E. Rep. 777;
Schneider v. Manning, 121 111. 376, 12 N. E.
Rep. 267; Burt v. Quisenberry, supra; Pooler V. Cristman, supra.
Nearly all the testimony introduced by the
complainants in this case for the purpose of
showing the exercise of undue influence consists of proof of declarations made by Solomon Wilkinson after his execution
of the
deeds herein
attacked.
Those declarations
were to the effect— First, that he had been
persuaded by his sons; second, that he put
the title out of himself in order to keep the
property from being
lost through suits
brought against him on account of his signing notes for his son-in-law.
Cox. But it
is well settled that the declaration of a
grantor when the grantee is not present
cannot be admitted for the purpose of invalidating the deed. Parties making deeds or
wills cannot invalidate them by their own
parol declarations, made previously or subsequently.
Dickie v. Carter, 42 lU. 376; ' Bennett V. Stout, 98 111. 47; Bentley v. O'Bryan,
111 111. 53; Guild v. Hull, 127 111. 523, 20 N.
E. Rep. 665; Burt v. Quisenberry, supra.
There was also some evidence of declarations
made by one or more of the sons of Solomon
Wilkinson, to the effect that he made the
to them in order to keep the
conveyances
property from being swept away by the
debts incurred as security for Cox. If such
declarations made by the father and sons
were properly admissible,
the fraud upon
creditors which they tended to show could
in no way operate to the beneflt of these
complainants,
who sue as heirs of the fraudulent grantor.
The general rule is that voluntary conveyances, although void as to creditors, are valid as to the parties, and cannot be set aside by the gi-antor or his heirs.
1 Story, Eq. .Tur. § 371; Miller v. Marckle,
21 lU. 152;
Harmon v. Harmon, 63 lU. 512;
Rawson v. Fox, 65 111. 200; Campbell v.
Whitson, 68 111. 240; McElroy v. Hiner, 133
m. 156, 24 N. E. Rep. 435. The decree ot
the circuit court is affirmed.

after.
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Supreme Court of California.

Department

2.

(No. 13,341.)

Appeal

Jan.
from

6, 1892.

superior

court, Sonoma county; S. K. Douuhsiuty,
Judge.
Suit by Jaines E. Bosa against John M.
Conway et al. to annul, on the ground of

undue influence, a trust-deed
made by
his mother,
Elizabeth G. Ross, Jor the
benefit of defendants.
Plaintiff had judgment, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.
George D. Collins and George A. JohnBon, (/). M. Delnias, of counsel,) for appellants. John A. Wright, for respondent.

HARRISON, J. The plaintiff, as thesole
heir of his mother, Elizabeth
G. Eoss,
brought this action to cancel and annul
two certain deeds of trust conveying certain real estate in Santa Rosa, executed
by his mother, August 11, 1888, and August 18, 1888, respectively, alleging that at
the time of their execution his mother
was weak in body, and that her mind was
impaired, and that the defendant (Jonway, who was the pastor of the Roman
Catholic church of Santa Rosa, of which
she had been for many years a member,
and who was also her spiritual adviser,
had thereby acquired great influence over
her, and, taking advantage of such influence and of her mental weakness, had
caused her to execute the said deeds of
trust for the benefit of himself and of the
church of which he was the pastor.
The
defendants denied these allegations, and
the cause was tried by the court, a jury
having been called in as advisory to the
court upon certain issues. The verdict of
the jury and the findings of the court
were in support of the allegations of the
complaint, and judgment was rendered in
favor of the plaintiff. A motion for a new
trial having been made and denied, an
appeal has been taken from both the judgment and the order denying a new trial.
The two deeds of trust are substantially
the same, the last one having been executed
merely for the purpose of correcting an
erroneous description in the first. Under
the trust created by the deeds the trustees are directed to sell one of the parcels
of land "as soon as practicable," and out
of the proceeds thereof apply $8,000 in the
improvement of the other parcel, and pay
the remainder of the proceeds to the defendant Conway. Out of the income to
be derived from the parcel to beimproved,
$75 per month was to be paid to the plaintiff, and the remainder monthly "to the
pastor of the Roman Catholic church in
Santa Rosa, to be disbursed by him in
such manner as he may deem charitable. "
upon the
Other provisions contingent
death or change in circumstances of the
plaintiff are unnecessary to be repeated
The issues before the court were, in
here.
substance, whether Mrs. Ross was, at
the respective dates on which the deeds
of trust were executed, of weak mind, or
able to comprehend the provisions of the
instruments; and whether the defendant
Conway used the Influence whicn he had
acquired over her, by virtue of being her
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spiritual adviser, lor the purpose of procuring her to make such disposition of her
property. Upon these Issues there was
much conflicting evidence before the court,
both in the testimony of the witnesses
who were examined, as well as in the circumstances under which the instruments
were executed, and the purposes held by
Mrs. Ross with reference to her son and
to the church. Upon the evidence before
it the court found in favor of the plaintiff. This finding was in accordance with
the verdict of the jury, and upon a motion for a new trial, in which the evidence
was again brought before the court for
consideration,
it adhered to Its former
conclusion.
Under these circumstances
Inaswe cannot disregard its finding.
much, however, as counsel have elaborately argued the facts, we have examined
the record, and are of the opinion that
the evidence fully justifies the findings of
the court.
The court finds that at the dates of the
execution of the deeds of trust Mrs. Ross
was of weak mind, and in a dying condition, and that she died on the 20th of August; tliat the defendant Conway was,
and had for a long time previously been,
the pastor of the Roman Catholic church
at Santa Rosa, and the spiritual adviser
of Mrs. Ross; that a confidence was reposed in him by her, and that there existed on his part an influence and apparent authority over her arising out of his
relation to her as her spiritual adviser,
and that he took an unfair advantage of
this influence, and used this confidence
and authority for the purpose of procuring her to execute the two deeds of trust.
The court also finds that Mrs. Ross had
in December, 1887, executed a will of all
her estate, with the exception of some
minor legacies, in favor of the plaintiff
herein, and that the provision in the deeds
of trust for the defendants, other than the
defendant Conway, were without any
consideration from them, but were made
solely through the influence of Conwa.y.
The rule is inflexible that no one who
holds a confidential
relation
towards
another shall cake advantage of that relation in favor of himself, or deal with
the other upon terms of his own making;
that in every such Iransaction between
persons standing in that relation the law
will presume that he who held an influence
over the other exercised it unduly to his
own advantage; or, in the words of Lord
Langdalb in Casborne v. Barsham, 2
Beav. 78, the inequality between the transacting parties is so great "that, without
proof of the exercise of power beyond
that which may be inferred from the nature of the transaction Itself, this court
will impute an exercise of undue influence;" that the transaction will not he
upheld unless it shall be shown that such
other had Independent advice, and that
his act was not only the result of his own
volition, but that he both understood
the act he was doing and comprehended
its result and effect. This rule finds Its
application with peculiar force in a case
where the effect of the transaction is to
divert an estate from those who, by the
ties of nature, would belts natural recipients, to the person through whose influ-

.
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the 9th of August she had expressed to
Conway a desire to make a testamentary
disposition or her property, ^nd, upon his
suggestion that Mr. Collins was a suitable person, she requested that he would
send him to her at the hospital where she
was lying. He thereupon sought Collins,
and, telling him the wish of Mrs. Ross,
On
accompanied him to the hospital.
their way he told Collins of the mode in
which she proposed to dispose of her
property, and, after their arrival, remained in the room with them while she
was giving directions about the will, going out, however, occasionally, for short
intervals to visit other people in the hospital, and leaving the building before the
will was formally executed. Two days
later he visited Collins at his office, and,
after hearing the will read, he made to
Collins a suggestion of some changes,
and whether a deed of trust would not be
preferable to a will.
An appointment
was then made between him and Collins
to meet that afternoon in theroomof Mrs.
Ross at the hospital. After their arrival
at the hospital, Conway made a suggestion to her that she execute a deed of
trust instead of a will, and also other suggestions in reference to her disposition of
the property. Only him.self and Collins
were in the room during this consultation,
he, however, leaving
it temporarily a
few times during the period over which
the interview extended, but remaining until Collins had received all the directions
that she gave. Assuming that, by virtue
of his relation to her, he had acquired an
influence over her, it must be held that in
the transaction under investigation there
was an undue exercise of such influence;
that by not insisting that she should
have independent advice, and by continuing to remain in her presence during the
interview with the only other person
whom he permitted to see her, he exercised an influence over her actions which,
though unseen and inaudible, was none
the less effective in its results. "The question is," said Lord Eldon in Huguenin v.
Baseley, 14 Ves. 300, "not whether she
knew what she was doing, had done, or
proposed to do, but how the intention
was produced; whether all that care and
providence was
placed round her, as
against tbose who advised her, which
from their situation and relation with respect to her they were bound to exert
on her behalf."
While the contract of
purchase made between the defendant
Conway and the trustees under the instruments sought to be annulled was irrelevant to an.y material issue before the
court, and would have been properly excluded from evidence, we are unable to
see that its admission could in any way
have been prejudicial to the rights of the
appellants.
The judgment and order denying a new trial are affirmed.

est of which he is the representative.
It
has been more frequently applied to transactions between attorney and client or
guardian and ward than to any other
relation between the parties, but the rule
itself has its source in principles which
underlie and govern all confidential relations, and is to be applied to all transactions arising out oE any relation In which
the principle is applicable.
It is termed
by Lord Ei.don " that great rule of the
court that he who bargains in any matter
of advantage with a person placing confidence in him is bound to show that a
reasonable use has been made of that confidence." Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 278. It
was said by Sir Samuel Romilly in his
argiimeiit in Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves.
"
300, that
the relief stands upon a general
principle applying to all the variety of
relations in which dominion may be exercised by one person over another, " — a
principle which was afterwards affirmed
by Lord Cottknham in Dent v. Bennett,
4 Mylne & C. 277, saying that he had received so much pleasure from Iiearing it
uttered in that arauracnt that the recollection of it had not been diminished by
the lapse of more than 30 years.
That the influence which the spiritual
adviser of one who is about to die has
over such person is one of the most powerful that can be exercised upon the human mind, especially if such mind is im
paired by physical weakness, is so consonant with human experience as to need
no more than its statement; and in any
transaction between them, wherein the
adviser receives any advantage, a court of
•jquity will not enter into an investigation of the extent to which such influence
has been exercised. Any dealing between
them, under such circumstances, will be
set a«5ide as contrary to all principles of
equity, whether the benefit accrue to the
adviser, or to some other recipient who,
through such influence, may have been
made the beneficiary of the transaction.
These principles have been so invariably
announced whenever the question has
arisen that a mere reference to the authorities will suffice. Norton v. Relly, 2 Eden,
286; Huguenin
v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 273;
Thompson v. Heffernau, 4 Dru. & War.
291; Dent v. Bennett, 4 Mylne & C. 269;
In re Welsh, 1 Redf. Sur. 246; Richmond's
Appeal, 59 Conn. 226, 22 Atl. Rep. 82; Ford
V. Hennessy,70Mo.580;
Pironiv. Corrigan,
47 N. J. Eq. 135, 20 Atl. Rep. 218; Connor
V. Stanley, 72 Cal. 556, 14 Pac. Rep. 306 ; 1
BigPlow, Fraud, 352; Story, Eq. Jur. § 311.
The finding of the court that Mrs. Ross
did not have any independent advice upon
the subject of making the deeds of trust
is fully sustained by the evidence. It appears from the record that the attorney
who prepared the instruments was introduced to her by Conway, and that the onWe concur: DE HAVEN,
ly persons with whom she had any inter- LAND,
view, or from whom she could receive any
advice respecting the same, were this atHearing in bank denied.
torney and the defendant Conway. On
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TATE

T.

WILLIAMSON.

(2 (Jh. App. 55.)
Court of Appeals in Chancery.

Dec. f7,

1866.

This was an appeal by the defendant,
Robert Williamson, from a decree of Vice
Chancellor Wood, setting aside a sale, on
the ground that the purchaser stood In a
fiduciary relation to the vendor, and did not
make a full disclosure to him of all material
facts within his knowledge relating to the
value of the property. The facts of the case
fully appear in the report of the case before
the vice chancellor (L. R. 1 Eq. 528) and the
judgment of the lord chancellor.
Mr. W. M. James, Q. C, and Mr. Little,
in support of the decree. Attorney General
(Sir J. Rolt), and Mr. Brlstowe, for the appellant.
Solicitors for the plaintiff: Messrs. N. O.
& C. Milne.
Solicitors for the appellant: Messrs. Clowes
& Hickley.

LORD CHELMSFORD, L. C. In this case
the vice chancellor has made a decree that
an agreement for the sale by the Intestate,
William Clowes Tate, to the defendant, Robert Williamson, of the undivided moiety of
an estate called the "Whitfield Estate," in
consisting of mesthe county of Stafford,
suages, lands, and coal mines, ought to be set
aside, upon the ground of the defendant not
all
to the intestate
having communicated
the Information which he had acquired with
reference to the value of the property, and,
in particular, of his not having communicated an estimate of the value of the mines
which was obtained by the defendant pending the agreement.
is
by the appeal
raised
The question
whether any such relation existed between
the defendant and the intestate as to render
It the duty of the defendant to make the
communication.

The jurisdiction exercised by courts of
equity over the dealings of persons standing
in certain fiduciary relations has always been
regarded as one of a most salutary description. The principles applicable to the more
familiar relations of this character have been
long settled by many well-known decisions,
but the courts have always been careful not
to fetter this useful jurisdiction by defining
Wherever
the exact limits of its exercise.
two persons stand in such a relation that,
while it continues, confidence is necessarily
reposed by one, and the influence which naturally grows out of that confidence Is possessed by the other, and this confidence is
abused, or the influence Is exerted to obtain
at the expense of the confidan advantage
ing party, the person so availing himself of
his position will not be permitted to retain
although the transaction
advantage,
the
could not have been impeached if no such
confidential relation had existed.

Did, then, the defendant, R. Williamson,
when he put himself in communication with
the intestate,
clothe himself with a character which brought him within the range
of the principle?
In considering this question, it will be necessary to bear in mind the situation of both
the parties at the time when the agreement
for the sale of the property was entered
into.
The Intestate, when he was quite an infant,
had become possessed of the property in
question
independently
of his father. He
contracted habits of extravagance at the university, and in consequence of some displeasure
which he had occasioned to his
father on the subject of his debts, the father's doors were closed against him. He was
thus thrown upon the world at an early age
without any one to control him, and with
scarcely a friend to counsel him, and towards
the close of his life he became addicted to
drinking and died prematurely at the age
of twenty-four. The defendant is the nephew
of Mr. Hugh Henshaw Williamson, the
great uncle by marriage of the intestate,
who had been the trustee and manager of
the property, and the receiver of the rents,
which latter duty the defendant had for some
short time been deputed to perform for him.
It does not appear that the defendant by
his employment acquired any particular inbut as
formation respecting the property,
he states in his answer that he had "previously" (to his first interview with the into be
testate) "some idea of endeavoring
the purchaser of the estate, in case the same
should come into the market," it is reasonable to suppose that he was not altogether
ignorant of its character,
and must have
formed some Idea of Its value.
I think no stress can be laid upon the circumstance of Mr. H. H. Williamson having
The trusbeen the trustee of the property.
moiety, had
teeship, as to the intestate's
come to an end upon his attaining his majority, in July, 1857. The accounts had been
settled, and Mr. Williamson, in surrendering
his trust, had behaved generously to the intestate. Though he continued after this period to receive the rents and manage the
yet there appears to have been
property,
nothing in the office which he undertook
after his trusteeship expired which would
have prevented
his dealing with the Intestate upon the same terms as a mere stranger. Much less could the mere receipt of
the rents for his uncle have placed Robert
Williamson in a different position from that
of any ordinary purchaser.
But a new and
peculiar relation arose out of the circumstances which afterwards occurred.
In the
year 1859 the debts which the intestate owed
at the university were causing him considerable embarrassment He had been pressed
by Mr. HoUoway, acting for his Oxford creditors, for payment of an amount of fl,(X)0.
He was unable, in consequence of the unfor-
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tunate quarrel with his father, to apply to
him for advice, and, having before experienced the kindness of "Mr. H. H. Williamson, he turned to him again in his difficulties. The letter by which the intestate made
his situation known to Mr. Williamson is
not forthcoming. The defendant, in his answer, says that he was Informed by Mr. H.
H. Williamson that It stated he was again
Involved, and either asked for assistance,
or for advice as to the mode of procuring
assistance.
I should have been glad if we
could have seen the terms of this letter, as
It might have explained the exact nature of
the office which Mr. Williamson was asked
to undertake. In the answer to this letter,
dated the 30th of July, 1859, which is set
out in the bill, in paragraph 52, Mr. Williamson invited the intestate to his house,
and desired him to bring with him "a correct account of his debts, omitting nothing,
and he would see what could be done."
The intestate did not accept the invitation,
and nothing more was heard of the matter
until about the 26th of August following,
when Mr. H. H. Williamson received a list
of the intestate's debts due to Oxford creditors, amounting,
to
as already mentioned,
£1,000. The defendant, In his answer, says
"that the list was given to him by Mr. H.
H. Williamson, and that he, after perusing
tile same, remarked that the charges were
excessive, and that the bills might probably
be settled for half the amount;
that Mr.
H. H. Williamson thereupon requested him
to see the intestate, and ascertain upon what
terms he could be relieved from his debts,
and, if this could bo done for £500 or a
little more, he authorized the defendant to
advance the intestate that amount on further security of the property." The defendant accordingly wrote to the lntesta.te on
the 26th of August, 1859, the letter, which
Is set out In paragraph 58 of the bill, in
1;^'hlch he states that his uncle is not sufficiently well to attend to business; that the
list of debts owing forms a very heavy
amount, which Mr. Holloway expects to have
paid immediately; and adds, "I will meet
you in the course of a few days in London,
upon having a couple of days' notice, and,
after hearing your views on the subject, will
talk over the matter, and see in what way
it can be arranged." The counsel for the
say that his office was merely
defendant
to see whether a compromise
of the debts
could be effected, and that, at the time of
the purchase,
his mission was at an end.
One can hardly believe that his advice and
assistance
could have been understood
to
be of this limited character.
He knew that
Mr. Holloway was pressing for Immediate
payment to the Oxford creditors,
and that
if he refused to reduce the amount the whole
must be paid.
It does not appear that, if
Mr. Holloway had Insisted on a payment
In full, Mr. H. H. Williamson would not have
been disposed to advance a larger sum than
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that which he had mentioned, as the property would have been an ample security for
any amount required to cover the whole
of the debts. And the defendant must have
been perfectly aware that the intestate's
property in Staffordshire was the only fund
out of which the debts could be discharged.
The account of the defendant's Interview
with the Intestate -^e have from the answer
alone.
He states that he offered to negotiate
with the intestate's creditors for an abatement of their claims, telling him "that he
was authorized by his uncle to advance £500
or more If required" (I suppose he must have
added "upon the security of the property"),
"but that the Intestate positively refused to
allow him to ask for any deduction from his
debts, saying that any such application would
injure his character."
The answer then proceeds: "But he at the same time stated that
he was desirous to sell his share of the Whitfield estate."
Mr. Brlstowe, for the defendant, said the instant the intestate refused to
allow any attempt to compromise his debts,
the defendant's office of adviser came to an
end, and from that moment the parties, to use
dealing "at
expression,
were
the familiar
arms' length." I cannot accept this view of
I think that his visit
the defendant's position.
to London was not solely for the compromise,
but generally for the arrangement of the Intestate's debts; that he came with authority
which involved a dealing with the property of
the intestate, as he was to advance his uncle's
money on the security of this property.
And
It may be observed that he had his attention
particularly directed to the mode of satisfying
the debts by a mortgage.
He knew, too, that
if the payment of the debts In full was Insisted upon, and his uncle refused to advance
a larger sum than "£500 or a little more," a
sufficient amount to discharge all the debts
could easily be raised upon the security of the
property, which was subject only to a mortgage for £1,000.
It seems to me that the defendant had placed himself in a position which
rendered it incumbent upon him to give the
best advice to the intestate how to relieve
himself from his debts, and no one can doubt
that if his judgment had been unbiased that
he would have recommended a mortgage, and
not a sale. But It appears, from the defendant's own statement, that he had a reason for
not giving his advice.
As already stated, he
had previously thought of purchasing
the
estate In case it should come Into the market
for sale, "an event," he says, "he thought was
not unlikely to happen."
I asked the defendant's counsel what he understood
by these
words, and was answered that the defendant's
expectation was founded upon the inconvenient nature of property consisting of an undivided moiety. This may have first led the
defendant to expect that he might have an
opportunity of purchasing the property at no
distant period, but his belief in the probability of a sale must have been considerably
strengthened at the time of his interview with
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the intestate, from the knowledge he had of
his embarrassments.
Whether the conversation between the defendant and the Intestate
turned so abruptly from the intestate's refusal
to compromise his debts, to the expression of
his desire to sell his sliare of the Whitfield
estate, as represented by the defendant or not,
it is quite clear to my mind that the confidential relation between the parties had not
terminated when the negotiation for the purchase of the property by the defendant commenced, and that he did not then, or at any
time afterwards, stand in the situation of an
ordinary purchaser.
This being so, the defendant, pending the
agrtcmeut, was bound to communicate all the
information he acquired which it was material
for the intestate to know in order to enable
him to judge of the value of his property.
It
was admitted that the valuation of Mr. Cope
was In the hands of the defendant at the time
he wrote his letter of the 10th September, 1859.
The defendant is charged with making unin that letter. If he had
true representations
done so, it would of course strengthen
the
case against him, but I find nothing In the
letter which amounts to a misrepresentation,
nor anything more than a disparagement
of
the property, not uncommon with a purchaser
when he desires to stimulate the owner of
the property to close with his offer.
Having stated my opinion with regard to
the duty cast upon the defendant to communicate Cope's valuation to the 'ntestate, it seems
unnecessary to pursue the case further. The
fair dealing, in other respects, of the defendand before the
ant during the negotiation,
agreement was signed, becomes almost Irrelevant. The refusal of the solicitors to prounless the young
ceed with the agreement
man had some legal assistance, the recommentliat the intestate
dation of the defendant
should apply to his father for advice, the opportunity afforded him pending the negotiation of consulting any friends who were
capable of advising him, the reference to Mr.
Payne whether merely for the purpose of
completing the agreement, or to afford the intestate an opportunity of obtaining his opinion
are of
as to the value, all these considerations
no consequence, when once It is established
that there was a concealment of a material
fact, which the defendant was bound to disclose.
Nor, after this, Is It of any Importance to
ascertain the real value of the property.
Even if the defendant could have shewn
that the price which he gave was a fair one,
this would not alter the case against him.
The plaintiff, who seeks to set aside the sale,
would have a right to say, "You had the
means of forming a judgment of the value of

the property in your possession, you were
bound, by your duty to the person with whom
you were dealing, to afford him the same opportunity which you had obtained of determining the sufficiency of the price which you
offered;
you have failed In that duty, and
the sale cannot stand." But, in truth, there
are strong grotmds for thinking that the price
agreed to be paid by the defendant
is quite
inadequate to the value of the property, There
Is no occasion to weigh the opposite opinion
of the engineers and survejors, and to form
a conclusion
from them. It is sufficient to
take the valuation of the mines by Cope,
amounting
to £20,000, and the valuation of
the surface by the defendant's own witnesses,
ranging from £10,000 to £11,290, and makhig
every allowance for a reduction of the value
of the intestate's share, in consequence of Its
being an undivided moiety. It will appear
that the value, by the defendant's own shewing, must have been at the least £14,000.
For
this property the defendant agreed to pay
£7,000 apparently about half the value, and
that not at once, but £1,500 was to be advanced to the Intestate, which was to beai'
Interest till the day for the completion of the
purchase, which advance must have been intended to enable the intestate to pay off his
debts immediately; £2,000 was to be paid on
the 25th March, 1860, and the residue by yearly mstalments in the four following years.
It appears to me, upon a careful review of
the whole case, that it would be contrary to
the principles upon which equity proceeds, in
judging of the dealings of persons in a fiduciary relation, to allow the purchase by the defendant, Robert Williamson, to stand.
I am satisfied that the defendant had placed
himself in such a relation of confidence, by his
undertaking the office of arranging the intestate's debts by means of a mortgage of his
property, as prevented him from becoming a
purchaser of that property without the fullest
communication
of all material Information
which he had obtained as to Its value; that
this openness and fair dealing were the more
necessary when he was negotiating with an
extravagant and necessitous young man, deprived at the time of all other advice, eager
to raise money, and apparently careless in
what manner it was obtained;
and the defendant having, by concealment of a valuation which he had privately obtained, procured a considerable
advantage In the price
which the seller was induced to take, and
which even the defendant's witnesses prove
to be grossly Inadequate,
he cannot be permitted so to turn the confidence reposed in
him to his own profit, and the sale ought to
be set aside.
Decree affirmed.
Petition of
appeal dismissed, with costs.
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(1 S.

W.

THOMPSON
408,

et al.

84 Ky. 219.)

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Sept. 14, 1886.

Appeal from circuit court. Barren county.
Tills is an action by appellant for a new
trial in the case of Buford W. Thompson,
etc., against George R. Price, Administrator
The court below
of Joseph Price, Deceased.
From that
refused to grant a new trial.
judgment George E. Price prosecuted this
appeal.
Buford W. Thompson, etc., against
of Joseph
George R. Price, Administrator
Price, was an action to settle the accounts
of said administrator, and sell lands of his
By the commissiondecedent to pay debts.
er's report in said action the administrator
was found to be indebted to the estate in
This report was conthe sum of $295.50.
firmed, and an order entered directing the
administrator to pay said sum to commissioner, in default of which execution issued,
and land belonging to administrator was
levied on and sold. The equity of reaemption was afterwards levied on, but, before
the sale, this action was brought.
W. P. D. Bush, Finlay Bush, and Bales,
Nuckols & Gorln, for appellant, George R.
Price, Adm'r, etc.
W. L. Porter, for appellees, B. W. Thompson and others.

BENNETT, J. The appellee filed his petition in the Barren circuit court against the
and T. M.
appellees, Buford W. Thompson,
Dicliey, the master commissioner of the BarIn his petition
ren circuit court, and others.
he alleges that appellee Thompson filed his

petition in the Barren circuit court against
him, as the administrator of Joseph Price,
deceased, for the purpose of having the decedent's estate settled, and the sale of land
to pay debts, etc.; that appellee T. M. Dickey, to whom the ease was referred as the
master commissioner of the court, reported
that appellant was Indebted to said estate,
as administrator, in the sum of $295.59; that
said report was confirmed without objection,
and appellant was ordered to pay said sum
and in default of which
to the commissioner,
execution was ordered to issue; no payment
having been made, execution issued in the
and by his direcname of the commissioner,
tion, against appellant, which was levied on
a tract of land containing 99 acres, belonging to appellant; that said land was sold at
execution sale for the sum of $250, which
was less than two-thirds of its appraised
The appellee Dickey purchased it.
value.
Afterwards a second execution was issued,
and levied on the equity of redemption in
said land. He alleged that he had paid off
and discharged various just claims and demands against the estate of his decedent,
in amount the sum of $295.56;
exceeding
that he gave the receipts and vouchers evidencing these payments to his attorney, to
file with the commissioner; that said receipts
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and vouchers had been lost, either by his attorney or by the commissioner, after they
had been so given him; that he was not
present when the commissioner's report was
made, or when it was confirmed, or when the
order was made directing him to pay said
sum to the commissioner, nor did he know
that such orders were made, or that his rewere lost, until after
ceipts and vouchers
execution had issued against him. He prayed the court to set aside the report of the
commissioner,
the order and judgment directing him to pay said sum to the commissioner, the sale of his land, and grant him
a new trial, etc. The court granted him an
injunction until further orders, but, on final
trial, dissolved the injunction, and dismissed
his petition. From that judgment he appeals
to this court.
The appellee Dickey made a joint answer
They do not
with the other defendants.
deny that appellant did not know that the
corjmissioner had reported an indebtedness
against him of $295.56, and that the court
had confirmed the report, and ordered him
etc.,
to pay the money to the commissioner,
or that his receipts and vouchers had been
lost, until after execution had been issued
against him. Besides, he swears in his deposition to the same thing.
The evidence,
therefore, as to that matter is conclusive.
The allegation of the petition Is that the
receipts
and vouchers were placed in the
hands of the attorney "to file with the commissioner in making said settlement,
and
they were either lost by said Bales (the attorney) or by said commissioner after they
were given to him."
The answer in refer"They have no
ence to that allegation is:
knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to whether they were placed in
the hands of said Bales to be filed with the
commissioner." So the answer does not
deny that said receipts and vouchers were
filed with the commissioner,
or that "they
had been lost by the commissioner after they
had been given to him."
The commissioner
ceitainly knew whether such was the fact
or not, and his silence is conclusive against
him.
Besides, the attorney.
Bales, swears;
"I placed them, as I now believe, and after
the judgment in the cause was rendered
then believed, in the hands of T. M. Dickey,
master commissioner of the Barren circuit
court.
If I did not so place them, I lost
them; but they were all put together in a
paper, and handed to Dickey, and I find a
part of them allowed, and the others not,
and, as they were not disallowed or rejected,
I took it Mr. Dickey mislaid them." Appellant swears that he did pay said claims
against the estate, which were properly proved, etc.
Mr. Bales also swears that said
claims were properly proved, etc. No witness contradicts them, nor did appellees offer
any evidence at all. So It may be regarded
as conclusively proven (1) that appellant had
paid and discharged said debt; (2) that he
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receipts

and

vouchers

evi-

dencing the payment in the hands of his attorney, to be filed with the commissioner;
(3) that they were placed in the hands of the
commissioner,
and were lost or mislaid, so
that they were not allowed by him in his
settlement, and, by reason thereof, judgment
was obtained against appellant on a demand
which he had already paid.
We understand the general rules of law
governing applications for new trials to be:
for newly-discovered evidence,
(1) When
"the names of the witnesses who have been
discovered;" (2) that the applicant has been
vigilant in preparing his case for ti-ial; (3)
that the new facts were discovered after the
trial, and would be inrportant; (4) that the
evidence discovered will tend to prove facts
which were not directly in issue on the trial,
or were not then liuown, nor investigated
by the proof; (."i) that the new evidence is
not merely cumulative, etc.
Here the evidence was not newly discovered, but was known to appellant before the
trial, and had been prepared by him to be
used on the trial; and, judging from the record, had it been used on the trial, the issue
would certainly have been decided for the appellant.
So the question now is. was the
appellant vigilant in preparing
his case for
trial? Ordinarily, we would say not. Had
the trial of the case been before a jury, or
before the court by depositions, it would have
been his duty to see that his witnesses were
duly subpcenaed to attend court to testify, or
that their depositions were duly taken.
Nor
would it be reckoned proper vigilnnce to leave
these matters in the hands of his attorney to
attend to; for the attorney is but his agent,
and his want of proper vigilance is also that
of the principal. But a different case is presented here. The commissioner is the officer
of the court, — "the hand of the court," — whose
duty it is in such cases to receive all vouchers
presented to him, and preserve them, and, if
properly proven, to allow and report them to
This being his official duty, and the
court.
presumption being that he will discharge his
duty, it cannot be said that after a person
has filed his vouchers with him, properly
proven, that it is his duty to keep a watch
over him, as in the case of a private person,
to see that he discharges that duty by reporting the claim to be allowed by the court.
Had appellant's attorney, with whom he intrusted these vouchers to be delivered to the
commissioner, failed to deliver them, then it
could be truly said that he was wanting in
for in that case his attorproper vigilance;
would be his negligence.
ney's negligence
But his attorney having delivered the vouchers to the officer of the court, — the hand of
the court, in such matters, — properly proven
as vouchers, that was all that was necessary,
That officer having
under the circumstances.
lost them, and appellant not being apprised of
it until after judgment and execution had
been obtained against him, he should have

had a new trial, and the injunction sustained,
and the report of the commissioner charging
him with $295.56 set aside, and the order directing the payment of it to the commissioner
set aside.
Appellant also asks that the sale of his
land under said execution be set aside. It is
contended that this should not be done, for
the reason that the reversal of an erroneous,
not void, judgment does not and cannot set
aside the sale of property made thereunder.
That is, no doubt, the general rule. But in
this case the return of the officer who made
the sale shows that the appellee T. M. Dickey, the master
commissioner,
to whom the
case was referred, was the purchaser of the
property at the execution sale.
It is also
alleged in the petition that he was the purchaser at that sale.
The answer says that
the return of the officer in that regard was
a mistake;
that he was not the purchaser,
but he offers no proof as to tliat matter, and,
the return of the officer being presumptively
correct, the commissioner
must be regarded
as the purchaser.
So the question arises, was
Had he been free from
his purchase valid?
there can be no doubt
a fiducial character,
that his purchase would have been valid;
but, standing in a fiducial relation to decedent's estate, equity devolved upon him the
duty to protect the interest of that estate.
In such cases the fiduciary cannot avail himself of the influence which his position gives,
for the purposes of his own gain or benefit,
to the prejudice or injury of those interests
which it is his duty to protect.
It is a rule
of equity that no man can acquire an interest
where he has a duty to perform inconsistent
The rule which prevents
with that interest.
a person, standing in a fiducial relation, from
acquiring an interest which is inconsistent
with those fiducial duties, stands mainly upon
nor can a
motives of general public policy;
man, standing in such relation with respect
to property, be allowed to purchase the property at a judicial or execution sale, unless
the entire responsibility of obtaining the highest price has been removed or taken out of his
If he continues under the duty of
hands.
seeing the property bring its highest price,
he is incapacitated from purchasing.
These principles apply, not only to trustees
proper, but to all persons invested with fiducial power; such as executors, administrators, assignees of a bankrupt, commissioners
of bankrupts, sheriffs, and judicial officers in
See,
general.
See Kerr, Frauds, 150, 160.
also, Stapp V. Toler, 3 Bibb, 450.
While the same general principle governs
all persons occupying a fiducial character, yet
there are two classes controlled by "different
special rules."
The first class includes all
those Instances in which the fiduciary and
those with whom he stands in that relation
consciously and intentionally deal with each
other, each knowingly taking a part in the
transaction
from which results a contract or
conveyance.
Here the contract is not neces-
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sarlly voidable,— it may be valid; but a presumption of its invalidity arises, and that so
strong that nothing short of clear evidence
of good faith, of full Imowledge, of adequate
consideration,
and of independent
thought,
consent, and action, can overcome it.
The
acting
second class is where the iiduciary,
with reference to his trust, deals with himself in his private or individual character;
as where an agent to sell, sells the property
to himself, or a sheriff buys the property at
his own sale. Such transactions are always
voidable at the suit of the party concerned.
invalid,
They are not merely presumptively
as in the first class, where good faith, full
adequate consideration,
knowledge,
independent thought, consent, and action, may be proved; because the sale or purchase, if made
privately, is not Ijnown, or, if made publicly,
by coercive authority, cannot be controlled.
Therefore the good faith, full knowledge, etc.,
do not control.
For these reasons the presumption of invalidity in the first class is reof invalidity
buttable, and the presumption
in the second clasb is conclusive.
3 Pom. Eq.
These rules being sound,
.Tur. §§ 956, 957.
and so well sustained by authority, this court
does not hesitate to adopt them for the government of all persons occupying a fiduciary
character, whether of a private or a public
nature.

335

Ofiicers whose powers are not merely persuasive, but coercive, ex parte, and arbitrary,
should be held to strict impartiality, fidelity,
and integrity in the discharge of their trusts.
AH temptation to make private gain, to take
directly or indirectly,
advantage,
unfair
The most effective way
should be removed.
to do so is to declare all such transactions
conclusively invalid. The master commissioner, Dickey, was still acting as commissioner
in the case at the time he purchased the land
It was to the interest of
at execution sale.
the estate that the land should bring its full
value.
It was his duty to encourage its bringTherefore, for him to being its full value.
come a bidder for it at the sale antagonized
his private interest with his fiducial duty.
This he had no right to do. For these reasons the injunction should have been sustained, a new trial granted,
the report of the
allowing the $295.56, and the
commissioner
order of court directing its payment, set aside,
and the sale of said land set aside, and appellant allowed credit for any sums proved to
have been paid by him for said estate, not
otherwise allowed.
Wherefore the judgment
of the lower court is reversed, and cause remanded
for further proceedings
consistent
with this opinion.

LEWIS, J., not sitting.

CX3XSXKUCT1VB FRAUD.

336
A,

ELMORE
(32

V.

JOHXSOX

et
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N. E. 413, 143 111. 518.)

Supreme Court

of Illinois.

Oct. 31, 1892.

Appeal from superior court, Cook countj-;
Hawes, Judge.
Bill by Susie K. Elmore against Frank A.
Johnson and Annie O. Johnson to set aside
The bill was dismissed for want
a deed.
Affirmof equity, and complainant appeals.

Kirk

ed.

The other facts fully appear in the following statement by Magruder, J.:
This is a bill filed in the superior court of
Cook county on December 11, 1890, by the
appellant against the appellee and his wife
for the purpose of setting aside a deed made
by the appellant to the appellee on January
IT, 1884, conveying to him the W. % of lots
6, 0, 20, and 23, in the subdivision of S. %
of S. W. Vi of N. W. % of section 22, township 39 N., range 13 E., etc., in Cook county; said west half consisting of 16 of the
32 sublots into which said lots 6, 9, 20, and
Also for the purpose
23 were subdivided.
of requiring Annie 0. Johnson, the wife of
appellee, to convey to appellant the title held
by her to said west half; and also for the
purpose
of taking an account of moneys
paid out by appellee for appellant, and of
by him for her, and of
moneys received
services by her to him and by him to her,
aud of losses alleged to have been caused
by want of diligence and skill and by aletc. The defendants anleged misconduct,
Replications were filed to
swered the bill.
Proofs were taken, and, the
the answers.
cause coming on to be heard in May, 1891,
the bill was dismissed for want of equity,
The present appeal is prosecuted from
etc.
such decree of dismissal.
The deed was executed by appellant to
appellee in payment for his services to her
as her solicitor and attorney in the matter
The bill charges that
hereinafter mentioned.
the defendant Johnson was negligent and
unskillful in the conduct of the complainant's business; that his services were worth
less than the value of the 16 sublots conveyed to him; that the complainant was
without means, and when defendant began
she
to insist upon pay for his services
agreed to pay him $400 if he would obtain
title for her to the 4 lots or 32 sublots; that,
after a decision had been rendered in her
favor, and before the execution of the master's deed to her, the defendant induced
her, by fraudulent representations and false
to convey to him the west half
promises,
of said lots; that she supposed the deed
made by her to be a deed of an undivided
one-half part of the lots when she signed
It; that between the summer of 1883 and
1888, she did certain typevrriting
November,
work for the defendant in his oflBce, for
which he had not paid her; that an execution issued In the attachment suit herein-

after mentioned was returned no part satisfied;
that the executions issued upon the
decree for alimony hereinafter mentioned
that
could have been collected or secured;
a mortgage
suit against the property was
allowed to go by default; that the lots had
that complainant did
been sold for taxes;
not know any of the facts in regard to said
of the mortexecutions, or the abandonment
servgage suit, or the value of defendant's
ices in the chancery case until the day before filing her bill; that she first retained
the defendant
to collect her alimony, and
obtain title to the lots "for a reasonable fee
and reward;" that she did not learn of the
tax sales until "somewhat over a year" before filing her bill; that she first discovered
negligence and
the facts as to defendant's
misconduct,
etc., within a few days before
filing the bill.
The answer of the defendant denies all
the allegations of the bill as to fraud, neglect, or misconduct, and as to the agreement
to take $400 for services, and sets forth a
history of his professional relations with the
and gives his explanation of
complainant,
the various matters referred to in the bill,
and charges laches, etc.
On September 24, 1879, the complainant,
who was then about 33 years old, and had
been divorced from' a former husband named
Elmore, delivered to one Collins Pratt, an
attorney in Chicago, government bonds, owned by her, to the amount of $600, to be by
him converted into money, and loaned out
Pratt used this
upon real-estate security.
money to purchase said lots 6, 9, 20, and 23,
and obtained a deed of the same to himself
He then executed
on September 24, 1879.
his own note, dated October 4, 1879, for $600,
payable in two years, to the order of complainant, with interest at 8 per cent., and
also a trust deed to secure the same, upon
said lots, to one Paul Mackenhaupt, as trustee, and delivered said note and trust deed
to the complainant.
On March 8, 1880,
Pratt, who was at that time engaged to be
married to the complainant, obtained the
note and trust deed from her upon some
representation that it would be necessary to
change the securities in view of their approaching marriage, and applied to Mackenhaupt for a release of the trust deed, which
was executed and delivered to Pratt on said
8th day of March, 1880.
On March 24, 1880,
the complainant and Pratt were married,
and lived together until about May 1, 1880,
when he abandoned her. During said marriage, and on April 13, 1880, Pratt borrowed
$500 of one Elmers, and executed his note
of that date for that amount, payable in two
years, to the order of Elmers, and to secure
said note he and appellant conveyed said
lots 6, 9, 20, and 23 to Charles Thornton,
trustee, by trust deed of same date.
On the
same day, April 13, 1880, there was filed for
record a warranty deed, executed by Pratt,
and purporting to have been also executed
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consideration; that lots 2, 13, 16, and 27
by complainant as his wife, conveying said
lots G, 9, 20, and 23 to one Addle Pratt, a
are of the value of $1,000, and are the only
reputed
property owned by Pratt; that said $600
sister of Collins Pratt, in whose
name subdivision was made of the 4 lots
was not loaned to Pratt, but Intrusted to
into the 32 sublots above referred to. On
him for conversion into real-estate securities
April 80, 1880, the defendant executed his drawing 8 per cent.; that the note and
Mackenhaupt ti'ust deed were obtained from
unsecured note to the complainant for $600,
payable two years after date, with 8 per
her in order to cheat and (Jefraud her, and
cent, interest. This latter note complainant
that the
get a release of the trust deed;
claims to have known nothing about until
Elmers note and Thornton trust deed wevf
or accepted with nolong afterwards, when she was trying to
without consideration,
collect the $600 from Pratt, and he stated
tice of her rights, and with the intent to
The bill offers to
that he h^d given his note therefor.
She
cheat and defraud her.
says that she then examined her trunk and
return and cancel the note of April 30th.
and found the note for the first
papers,
It contains the following averment: "Your
time.
On November 1, 1881, complainant oboratrlx believes, ancl on belief avers the fact
tained a decree of divorce from Collins Pratt to be, that said defendant purchased said
upon the ground of adultery, which decree
real estate (lots 0, 9, 20, and 23) with the
required him to pay her $40 every month
money so intrusted to him as aforesaid, to
as alimony, and changed her name to Susie
sebe invested by him in good real-estate
Iv. Elmore. Mr. John W. Waughop was her
curities."
The bill prays that the release
solicitor iu the divorce suit. Soon after the
deed made by Mackenhaupt may be set
separation between complainant and Pratt,
aside and canceled, and that the trust deed
she employed Mr. Leonard Swett to collect
to him may be declared to be in full force,
the $600 from Pratt, and Jlr. Swett sucand a valid lien upon said lots for the balceeded in obtaining $250 of that amount for
ance of the $600 due from said Collins; and
her.
About the time of the decree of di- for such other relief as the nature of the
vorce, or soon thereafter, Mr. Waughop had
case may require and may seem' meet.
On
made an agreement for her with Pratt, by
March 18, 1882, the bill was amended by
the terms of which Pratt was to pay $500
averring that Pratt was then the owner of
in full discharge of alimony and of the balsaid lots 6, 9, 20, and 23, and held an unance due upon the claim for $G00, said sum
recorded deed, dated February 9, 1882, from
of $500 to be paid at the rate of $5 per
Addie Pratt to himself. On March 10, 1883,
week.
She was paid $5 per week up to
the prayer of the bill was amended as foland until February 18, 1882.
It would ap- lows: "Or that Pratt may be declared to
*
*
*
*
*
*
jn trust,
pear that Mr. Swett received
hold the title
$50 for his
services,
By and may be required to convey the same
and Mr. Waughop nothing.
deed dated .January 7, 1870, one Arnold and
to your oratrlx, and that the said deed
*
*
*
his wife sold and conveyed to Collins Pratt
to said Addie Pratt may be deand Edgar il. Wilson lots 2, 13, 16, and 27 ' Glared null and void, and may be set aside,"
in said subdivision for an expressed conetc. At the April term, 1882, Collins Pratt
sideration of $000; and to secure their note
answered
the bill, alleging that complainfor $500, payable in three years, to order of ant loaned her money upon his note secured
William Fitzgerald, with 10 per cent, inter- by the trust deed to Mackenhaupt, after inest, Pratt and Wilson executed a trust deed,
vestigation and advising with others; that
dated January 21, 1879, conveying said lastsaid trust deed was released in order to bornamed lots to O. T. Hartigan, trustee.
row $500 to buy household fm-niture in view
Such being the condition of affairs, the
of the approaching marriage; that complaincomplainant, about the middle of February,
ant has some of the goods bought with the
1882, applied to the defendant Johnson to
money borrowed of Elmers;
that she acact as her attorney and solicitor in recovercepted the note of April 30th; that he has
ing what might be due to her in money or paid $290, instead of $250; that she fully
property from her former husband, Collins
understood the contents of the deed to Addie
Accordingly, on February 23, 1882,
Pratt.
Pratt.
The answer admits the purchase of
the defendant filed a bill for the complainlots 6, 9, 20, and 23, and the ownership of
ant, as her solicitor, in the circuit court of
an undivided half of lots 2, 13, 16, and 27,
Cook county, against the said ColUns Pratt,
and denies all charges of deception and fraud
Addle Pratt, Elmers, and Thornton.
This or forgery or misrepresentation, and also debill was sworn to by Mrs. Elmore. It sets
nies that he now owns lots 6, 9, 20, and 23,
up the facts hereinbefore stated.
It charges
or holds an unrecorded deed of the same
that the note of April 30th was never defrom Addie Pratt. Addle Pratt also filed
livered to her or accepted by her; that Pratt
an answer to the hill, denying that the deed
obtained the $600 to use for himself, and
to her was without consideration, or obtaindeceived her in respect thereto, and attempted by fraud, or that complainant's signature
ed to defraud her out of the money;
that
thereto was forged, or that defendant had
either her signature to the deed to Addle
made a deed to Collins Pratt; and averring
Pratt was forged, or obtained from her by
that said deed to defendant was executed
fraud and misrepresentation, and without
for a good consideration, and was underHUTOH.& BUNK.EQ.— 22
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by complainant when she signed it.
1882, replications were filed to the
answers. March 17, 1883, the bill was dismissed as to Elmers and Thornton, and the
The
cause placed upon the trial calendar.
hearing took place on November 23 and 27,
by
1883,
the defendants being represented
counsel.
The decision was in favor of the
complainant, and a decree in accordance
with the decision was entered on December
8, 1883.
The decree found that Pratt purchased lots 6, 9, 20, and 23 with complainant's money; that the note to Elmers and
trust deed to Thornton were valid, but that
the $500 borrowed of Elmers was used by
Pratt, and exceeded the amount which had
been paid by him to complainant; that a
resulting trust had therefore arisen in favor
of complainant, and she was entitled to have,
the title acquired by Pratt in said lots conveyed to her; that the deed to Addle Pratt
had been procured by fraud; that the lots
had been sold under decree in favor of Elmers; that the unsecured note of April 30th
had been surrendered
on the hearing; the
decree set aside the deed made by Collins
Pratt to Addie Pratt, and ordered said Collins to execute a deed of the lots to complainant, subject to the right of the purchasee under the foreclosure decree of Elmers, within 30 days, and upon his failing
to do so that the master execute said deed.
On January 16, 1884, the master executed to
the complainant a deed of lots 6, 9, 20, and
-3, and on the next day, .January 17, 1884,
Lomplainant executed and delivered to the
■defendant the deed of the west half of said
lots above referred to. The deed from the
master to her was not recorded until January
Some time in June, 1882, Bimers
17, 1884.
filed a bill to foreclose the trust deed securing his note upon lots 6, 9, 20, and 23. Apof appellant
pellee entered the appearance
in said foreclosure suit, but a decree of sale
was entered therein, and said lots were sold
under said decree on September 3, 1883, to
Elmers, for $670.23.
The certificate of sale
was purchased by appellee and appellant
from Elmers on August 23, 1884, for $731;
one half— $365.50— having been paid by appeUee, and the other $365.50 by appellant.
The certificate was assigned to Mrs. JohnAs soon as the time for redemption
son.
3, 1884,
expired, which was on December
stood

April

13,

the master took up the certificate, and made
a deed conveying the whole of the four lots
Thereupon, on December
to Mrs. Johnson.
8. 1884, Mrs. Johnson and appellee, her husband, united in a deed conveying all their
interest in the east half of the lots to the

appellant.
In addition to the chancery suit, appellee
On March 1, 1882,
took otlier proceedings.
he began an attachment suit to recover
complainant to be the
.$388.38 sworn by the
balance of the .$600 then due to her, charging
that the debt had been fraudulently conwrit was levied
The attachment
tracted.

upuii lots 6. 9, 20, and 23, and also upon lots
2, lo, 16, and 27.
Judgment was rendered
therein on April 5, 1882, and general and
special
execution
15,
issued on November
1882.
No levy, however, was made mider
the execution, but it was returned unsatisfied.
Proceedings
were also commenced to
enforce the decree for alimony,
and to set
aside the agi'eement to settle for $500, payable at the rate of $5 per week.
On March
6, 1882, appellee filed in the divorce suit an
affidavit sworn to by complainant on March
2, 1882, setting up the decree for alimony,
the receipt of $5 per week up to February
18, 1882, the delivery to Pratt of the $600,
the release of the trust deed, etc., and alleging that there was due to her $388.38;
that the settlement for $500 had been made
upon representations
as to Pratt's poverty,
and had never been fully approved of by
her; that she had given notice of her intention not to accept the $500; that Pratt had
purchased lots 6, 9, 20, and 23 on September
29, 1879, for $600, "and affiant is informed
that they are now worth about $3,000, and
are incumbered to the extent of $540 only;"
that Pratt owns lots 2, 13, 16, and 27, incumbered for $600; that he refuses to pay
A rule was en$75 due to her for alimony.
tered by the court after a contest and after
requiring Pratt to
reading other affidavits,
Upon his
pay the $75 within a certain time.
failm'e to do so, an attachment was issued,
and he was arrested for contempt of court,
to appear
and entered into a recognizance
in May. 1882, to answer the charge of conHe did not appear, however, but fled
tempt.
from the state, and went to Dakota, where
During the pehe has remained ever since.
riod from April 8, 1882, to August 21, 1883,
appellee caused six executions to be issued
upon the decree for alimony for the amounts
thereof accruing from time to time, but realized nothing.
On May 6, 1882, Hartigan sold
lots 2, 13, 16, and 27 under the trust deed
to him for default in the payment of the
principal of the note secured thereby, and
thereon, and executed a trustee's
interest
deed to the purchasers, Edgar M. Wilson and
Edward B. Holmes. All the lots were so
sold for $682.43.

James B.
Alex. S. Bradley, for appellant.
Munroe and F. A. Johnson, for appellees.

MAGRUDER, J., (after stating the facts.)
Appellee testifies that the deed made to him
by appellant, conveying to him the west half
of the lots in controversy, was executed by
her in pursuance
of a previous contract
which she had made with him in reference
He swears
to payment for his legal services.
that by the terms of this contract she was
to pay all tne costs, and he was to have a
contingent fee of one-half of what should be
recovered both in the suit for alimony, and
in the chancery suit in regard to the lots.
The evidence shows that this contract was
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made during the pendency of the legal proceedings which the appellee was conducting
for the appellant.
It was not entered into
before or at the time of his original employment, which took place on February 15, 1882,
nor did it exist when he filed the bill on
February 23, 1882.
His answer states that
"early in the spring or summer of 1882
*
*
*
it was * * * mutually agreed
that this defendant should have and receive
oneas a contingent fee for his services
He testifies that he cannot fix the
half."
date of the agreement, but that, to the best
of his recollection, "it was in March or April,
had a
discovered
possibly in May, after
pretty good-sized job on hand, and a good
deal of work to do, and had done a good deal
of work. * * * She claimed to have no
and could
money early in the proceedings,
not pay my fees in money, and that was why
I subsequently made a different aiTangement
with her." Appellant swears that she never
made an agreement with the appellee to give
him one-half of the money or of the land
to be recovered.
The deed to appellee was
also executed while the relation of attorney
and client existed between himself and the
appellant. That deed was made on January
17, 1884, and he concedes that he did not
cease to be appellant's solicitor until some
time thereafter. In England "it is a settled
doctrine of equity that an attorney cannot,
while the business is unfinished in which he
had been employed, receive any gift from his
client, or bind his client in any mode to make
him greater compensation
for his services
than he would have a right to demand if no
contract should be made during the relation."
Weeks, Attys. at Law (2d Ed.) § 364. More
than 50 years ago the English doctrine was
adopted by the supreme court of Alabama
in an able opinion in the case of Leeatt v.
Sallee, 3 Port. 115, where it was held that
"an agreement made by a client with his
counsel, after the latter has been employed
in a particular business, by which the original contract is varied, and greater compensation is secured to the counsel than' may
have been agreed upon when he was first retained, is invalid, and cannot be enforced."
The reason for the doctrine is to be found in
the nature of the relation which exists beThat relation is
tween attorney and client.
one of confidence, and gives the attorney
great influence over the actions and interests
of the client.
In view of this confidential
relation, transactions between attorney
and
client are often declared to be voidable which
would be held to be unobjectionable between
The law is thus strict, "not
other parties.
so much on account of hardship in the particular case as for the sake of preventing
what might otherwise become a public mischief." Lewis V. J. A., 4 Edw. Oh. marg.
p. 599, top p. C22.
"No single circumstance
has done more to debase the practice of the
law in the popular estimation, and even to
lower the lofty standard of professional eth-,

I
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among members of the
ies and self-respect
legal profession itself in large portions of omcountry, than the nature of the transactions,
often in the highest degree champertous, between attorney and client, which are perjudicial
mitted,
and which have received
It sometimes would seem that the
sanction.
fiduciary relation and the opportunity for undue influence, instead of being the grounds
for invalidating such agreements, are practically regarded rather as their excuse and
justification."
3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 960, note
1.
Before the attorney undertakes the business of the client, he may contract with reference to his services, because no confidential relation then exists, and the parties deal
The same
with each other at arm's length.
is true in regard to dealings which take
place after the relation has been dissolved.
But
1 Story, Eq. Jur. (13th Ed.) §§ 810-313.
the law watches with unusual jealousy over
all transactions between the parties which
In the case
occur while the relation exists.
at bar it does not appear that any definite
contract in regard to fees existed between
appellant and appellee prior to the spring of
1882; but, inasmuch as he undertook to manage her legal interest before that time, there
was an implied contract, created by operation of law, which entitled him to receive
such reasonable coinpensation as his services
might be worth. "If the amount of compensation be not fixed by the terms of the
or solicitor
contract by which an attorney
was employed, he would be entitled to be
paid such reasonable fees as have been usually paid to others for similar services."
Leeatt V. Sallee, supra.
The question, then, arises, what was a
reasonable compensation for the services rendered by the appellee to the appellant? He
has introduced no independent evidence upon
this subject.
His only witness is an oflice
companion,
who says that, in his opinion,
appellee's legal services were worth $30 per
day, but does not claim to have full knowledge of the services rendered in the matter
herein involved.
Appellee is unable to state,
except approximately,
the time spent by him
in attending to appellant's matter, but he
says:
"I believe that in the whole matter
*
* •
spent at least forty days." Forty
days' services at ?30 per day would be ?1,200.
We do not think, however, that the
proof establishes $1,200 as the value of the
services.
Mr. W. J. Culver swears that the
customary and usual charge for all the work
done by appellee in the divorce attachment
and "resulting trust" case would be $250 in
money.
Mr. B. F. Richolson, the attorney
for Pratt, swore that appellee's services in
the chancery or "trust" suit in regard to the
land were reasonably worth from $300 to
$350, and he made the following statement:
"If the fee was contingent upon services,
I think he would be justified in charging
somewhat more. I hardly think double that,
because
think the success was so reason-

I

I
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ably

there
was not very much
What was the value of the lots of
In
which appellee was to have one-half?
the iiflldavit filed by appellant in the divorce
proceeding on March 6, 1882, she swore that
she had been informed that the lots were
then worth $3,000, and were incumbered for
.'?.j40, only.
This affidavit was drawn by appellee, and was presented to the court upon
an application to set aside the agreement of
settlement for $500.
We cannot suppose that
in
the value of the lots was exaggerated
order to induce the court to believe that
Pratt was not too poor to pay more than
Taking $3,000 as the estimated value
$500.
of the lots on JIarch 6, 1S82, then, by appellee's agreement for fees, he was to get
property
worth $1,500, less $270 of incumbrance, amounting to $1,230.
This amount
assured

doubt."

compensation
to
exceeded the reasonable
which appellee would have been entitled under the implied contract
under which he
began his services for appellee.
We have
recently held in Jlorrison v. Smith, 130 111.
.•Jl)4, 23 N. E. 241, tliat a sale by a client to
an attorney will be sustained if it is fair and
honest, and in no manner tainted with fraud,
undue influence, or cornjption, and that the
law does not go so far as to hold such a
sale voidable
at the election of tlie client.
In that case the subject-matter of the purchase by the attorney from the client was a
judgment obtained by the former for the latThe judgment debtor was insolvent,
ter.
except as to his ownership of an undivided
interest in land which was subject to a life
The docti-ine of that case is the law
estate.
of this court as applied to such a purchase
by an attorney from a client as is there described.
The litigation had reached the
point where judgment had been obtained.
The judgment was a lien upon a reversionary
Its value could, therefore,
interest in land.
by ascertaining
easily ascertained
be
the
value of the interest in the land subject to
the life estate. But there is a manifest distinction between a purchase by an attorney
from a client and a contract made during
the pendency of a litigation for the conveyance or transfer by tlie client to the attorney
of a part of the property involved in the litigation as a compensation for his legal services therein.
Where a purchase ig proposed,
the seller is always, to a certain extent, put
He knows that it is for the
on his guard.
interest of the buyer to get the property as
He has every motive
cheaply as possible.
to inquire into and learn the value of the
thing to be sold. But, in case of the contract above indicated, the client is at a great
The value of the property in
disadvantage.
litigation depends upon the result of the litigation, and, being unable to understand the
legal aspects of the case, he is unable to
He must
foresee what such result will be.
but upon
rely, not upon his own judgment,
the judgment and statements of his attorney.
he is unable to judge as to the
Moreover,
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value of his attorney's services, because he
cannot know what legal steps are necessary
to be taken in the conduct of the case. The
advantage is overwhelmingly on the side of
the attorney where such a contract is made.
Whatever may be the rule as to a purchase
by an attorney from a client, we think that,
where the title to property is so involved in
litigation that the value of the property depends

upon

the decision

as to such

title,

a

contract made during tlie pendency of the
litigation to compensate the attorney for his
legal services with a part of the property
involved therein should be held to be voidable at the election of the client, irrespective of the fairness or unfairness of the contract,

provided

such

election

is

exercised

within a reasonable time.
Such a rule as
this Is demanded by public policy, and in
the interests of a wholesome administration
of justice.
The distinction here noted is
pointed out In Berrien v. McLane, 1 Hoff.
Ch. 420, where it is said : "A voluntary gift,
made while the connection of attorney and
client subsists, Is absolutely void, and the
property transferred by it can only be held
as security for those charges which the atNext, * * * a
torney can legally make.
transfer of property, made upon an ostensibly valuaole consideration, such as a lease
or sale, is presumptively
void.
The client
has the advantage of driving the attorney to
produce evidence to prove its fairness,
and
to show that the price or terms were as
beneficial as could have been obtained from
*
*
*
And, lastly,
a stranger.
a transfer of a part of the property actually in litigation, or a contract to transfer a part,
*
* * is void, — illegal, — because of the ex*
*
* gueh
isting relation of the parties.
a contract will not be enforced on the application of the attorney;
and, if the client
applies, will be canceled
The above passage from
quoted for the purpose
distinction is recognized

on equitable terms."
the Berrien Case is

of showing that

a

between a sale and
a transfer of a part of the property in litigatioh in payment of fees or a contract to
transfer the same; but we do not go so far
as to hold with the learned vice chancellor
in that case that such a contract or transfer
is absolutely void, but that it is voidable at
the option of the client.
The view here expressed is supported
by the following authorities:
Rogers v. Marshall, 3 McOrary,
76, 9 Fed. 721, and note to the first opinion,
and cases cited in note;
4 Kent, Comm.
(12th Ed.) p. 449, note b; WaUis v. Loubat,
2 Denio, 607;
Lecatt v. Sallee, supra; Pearson V. Benson, 28 Beav. 598;
Newman v.
Payne, 2 Yes. Jr. 199; Wood v. Downes, 18
Ves. 119; Lewis v. J. A., supra;
Starr v.
Vanderheyden,
9 Johns. 253; West v. Raymond. 21 Ind. 305; Simpson v. Lamb, 40
Eng. Law & Eq. 59; Hall v. Hallet, 1 Cox,
134; Hawley v. Cramer, 4 Cow. 717; Weeks,
Attys. at Law, (2d Ed.) § 273; Armstrong
V. Huston's Heirs, 8 Ohio, 552; Gray t. Em-
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mons, 7 Mich. 533; Merritt v. Lambert, 10
Paige, 352; Bolton v. Daily, 48 Iowa, 348;
1 Perry, a?rusts (3d Kd.) § 202.
But even if the rule which applies to a purchase by an attorney from his client should
be held to be applicable in the present case,
the contract and the deed made in pursuance
thereof must be subject to a rigid test. In
case of such a purchase, the transaction is
presumptively fraudulent, and the burden is
on the attorney to show "fairness, adequacy,
He must
Lewis v. J. A., supra.
and equity."
remove the presumption against the validity
of the transaction "by showing affirmatively
the most perfect good faith, the absence of
undue

influence,

a

fair

price,

linowledge,

in-

tention and freedom of action by the client,
and also that he gave his client full informa2 Pom. Eq.
tion and disinterested advice."

In order to sustain the deed
§ 960.
made to appellee on January 17, 1884, it must
received by apappear that the consideration
pellant was "adequate," and that the appellee
paid "a fair price." This involves the determination of the question whether the services
rendered to appellant were worth what the
property was worth on the day of the delivCounsel on both sides have
ery of the deed.
presented this as one of the material issues in
testimony
to
the case, and have introduced
show the value of the lots in January, 1884.
Of appellant's witnesses three swore that the
lots were then worth .$3,200, two that they
were worth $4,000, and two that they were
Of appellee's witnesses two
worth $4,800.
placed the value of the lots at that time at
about $900, one at from $1,000 to $1,400, one
at $1,200, and one at from $1,950 to $2,400.
It is claimed by counsel for appellee that the
valuations of his witnesses are based upon
actual sales, while the valuations proved by

Jnr.

appellant are matters of opinion, formed from
It has been
a general knowledge of values.
well said that "there is no more important
factor in determining the value of particular
property than the sale of similar property in
at about the time in
the same neighborhood
We
Lewis, Em. Dom. § 443.
question."
have held that "actual sales of property in
the vicinity and near the time are competent
evidence, as far as they go."
Culbertson &
Blair Packing & Provision Co. v. City of ChiBut, while such sales may
cago, 111 III. 651.
be the most satisfactory evidence of value,
yet they are only one of the modes of proving
value, and not the only mode.
Railroad Co.
It is true that the witV. Haller, 82 111. 208.
nesses of appellant do not testify to actual
of sales made in the neighborknowledge
hood where these lots are located in the year
1884, or about that time, and that some of the
Purwitnesses of appellee do refer to sales.
chases made in 1879 are not an exact criterion
Nor are forced sales unof values in 1884.
der trust deeds and foreclosure decrees alAfter
ways a correct indication of value.
making allowance for the difference thus indicated between the testimony produced by
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appellee and that produced by appellant, we
are unable to reach the conclusion that the
value of the services rendered to the appellant was equal to the value of the lots conveyed to appellee in January, 1884.
We cannot say, however, after a careful review of the evidence, that the contract for
and the deed made in pursucompensation,
ance thereof, are liable to any other objections than these two: First, they were executed during the existence of the relation of
attorney and client; second, they secured a
larger compensation for legal services than
those services were really worth. We see no
evidence of any undue influence exercised by
the appellee over the appellant, except, perhaps, in the matter of obtaining from her a

In the fall of 1882
renewal of the contract.
appellee seemed to fear that appellant would
make a settlement with Pratt without consulting him, or upon a basis not approved by
hini; and on November 24, 1882, he wrote
her a letter, in which, after referring to her
previously expressed desire that he should

conduct her business "upon a contingent fee
he
50 per cent, of the amount recovered,"
said, "A definite understanding is therefore
necessary before any further action is taken."
He says that after this date she renewed the
contract for one-half of what should be recovered;
and thereafter, in March, 1883, as
the record shows, he amended the bill by
praying that Pratt be declared a trustee, etc.
It was said in Bolton v. Daily, supra: "We
think that where an attorney sets up an express agreement to pay more than an ordinary fee, exacted of a client where the work
was two-thirds done, under a tlireat of withdrawing from the case if the agreement was
not made, nothing but the best of reasons
would be suflicient to uphold the agreement."
Here, however, the implied threat to take no
further action without a definite understanding had reference to reaffirming a contract
already made, rather tlian to the making of
Appellee had
a contract for the first time.
perhaps good reasons for asking for a defiunderstanding.
nite
The appellant had
thrown out intimations of a settlement for
her litigation.
She had shown herself to be
in her humor, and had already
changeable
employed two attorneys
besides appellee in
her lawsuit.
She had repudiated the agreement of settlement entered into with her second husband.
She had made some incorrect
statements to her counsel;
for example, she
had charged that the note to Elmers and the
trust deed to Thornton had been obtained by
fraud, when the evidence overwhelmingly established the fact that those securities represented a bona fide loan, and that she herself
had voluntarily united in the execution of the
trust deed. Aside from the haste with which
appellee secured his deed on January 17.
1884, we are satisfied that the action of appellant in the execution of that deed was free
and voluntary.
She admits
that she was
pleased with the result reached in getting a

of
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decree for tlie lots.
The proof does not sustain her in the claim which she now makes,
—that she thought she was conveying to appellee an undivided one-half of the lots, so
that as cotenant she would have the benefit
of his services in the further management of
the proof
the property.
On the contrary,
shows that the deed was fully explained to
her, and that she well understood it to he a
conveyance of the west half of the lots, and
that she chose the east half in preference to
the west half upon being given her choice.
A^'e think the proof also shows that appellant
was fully advised of all the steps taken in the
suit.
She was acquainted with the value of
the lots, and received information in relation
thereto from the beginning of her troubles,
having accepted a trust deed thereon in 1879,
and having executed a trust deed thereon in
In 1882 she had made an affidavit as
1880.
Afterwards she is
to the value of the lots.
shown to have talked with a number of persons in regard to the future outcome of the
She was a shrewd, capable, busiproperty.
ness woman; had been engaged in business
before she married Pratt; and, though without much ready money, owned a house and
two lots in a suburb called ilelrose.
If appellant had filed her bill within a reasonable time, we are of the opinion that she
would have been entitled to have the deed to
appellee set aside, either upon the ground
that both the deed and the contract which
preceded it were obtained from her while the
relation of client and attorney existed beor upon the
tween herself and appellee,
ground that the property agreed to be given
and subsequently conveyed to appellee as
for his legal services was
compensation
worth more than the reasonable and customBut, inasmuch
ary value of those services.
which appellee could not
as the contract,
have enforced, was fully completed and executed by the conveyance to him of one-half
the property, the question arises whether or
not appellant has not been guilty of laches
in not sooner filing her bill to have the deed
From January, 18S4, when the
set aside.
deed was made, to December, 1890, when the
present hill was filed, a period of almost seven
In connection with the quesyears elapsed.
tion of laches it is a fair subject of inquiry,
under the facts of this case, whether the conduct of the appellant does not show acquion her part.
escence, if not confirmation,
Where bills are filed to set aside contracts or
in a confideeds between parties standing
dential relation to each other, the defense of
laches is not usually regarded with favor.
It has been said that "length of time weighs
less in such a case than in any other," and
that it is "extremely difficult for a confidential agent to set up an available defense
on the laches of his employer."
grounded
Wood V. Downes, 18 Ves. 120, note 1. But
even in cases where it has been held that
such contracts and sales, without reference
to their fairness or honesty, will be set aside

upon the application of the party in interest,
it has at the same time been held that such
application must be made within a reasonable time, to be judged of by the court under all the circumstances of the case. Hawley V. Cramer, 4 Cow. 717; Smith v. Thompson's Heirs, 7 B. Mon. 310; Fox v. Mackreth, 1 White & T. Lead. Gas. Eq. pt. 1 (4th
Am. Ed.) p. 188, § 11.3; Id., p. 257; JlcCormick V. JIalin, 5 Blackf. 509; Williams v.
Reed, 3 Mason, 405, Fed. Cas. No. 17,733.
What is a "reasonable time" cannot well be
defined, but must be left, in large measure,
to the determination
of the court in view of
Equity does not always
the facts presented.
follow the period of limitation fixed by statute and enforced in courts of law. Parties
will be required to assert their rights within a shorter time in states where the valrapidly, and
ues of real estate increase
greater temptations are thereby afforded for
Burr v. Borden, 61 111.
speculative litigation.
389.
But the party who is entitled to set the
transaction aside cannot be charged with deor confirmation,
lay, or with acquiescence
of all the
unless there has been knowledge
Acts
facts, and perfect freedom of action.
which might appear to be acts of acquiescence will not be held to be such if the client
or cestui que trust is ignorant of the circumstances, or under the control of the original
influence, or otherwise so situated as not to
Rogers v. Marbe free to enforce his rights.
shall,
supra; Hawley v. Cramer, supra.
Confirmation may be evidenced by long acquiescence, "as by standing by and allowing
the purchaser to lay out money in the firm
belief that her title would not be contested."
Pearson v. Benson, 28 Beav. 598.
Let us see how the appellant stood related
theretofore pointed out
to the two objections
on January 17, 1884, and for nearly seven
She must be held to have
years thereafter.
known that the property which she conveyed
to appellee was worth more than his services.
She alleges in her bill in this case that
she agreed to pay him $400, and, while that
allegation is not sustained by the proof, she
In her tesmust be held to be bound by it.
timony, after stating that appellee introduced the subject of his fees after Pratt's
arrest, she says:
"I asked him * * *
what would be his fees for attending to all
my business, and making everything perfectly clear and straight for me. * * *
He said there was a great deal of work
about the case, and would probably be a
great deal more, and he would have to have
She swears that she thus knew the
$400."
value of his services as fixed by himself.
On January 17, 1884, with knowledge,
according to her own evidence, that his services were estimated by himself to be worth
only $400, she conveyed to him one-half of
property which she had sworn to be worth
$3,000 in March, 1882, and which was of

greater value in

1884.

With admitted knowl-

edge as to the disparity between

the value

OOXSTRUOTIVB FRAUD.
of the land and the value of the services,
she permitted the appellee to deal with the
west half of the land as his own, and recognized him as the owner thereof, for 6 years
and 11 months, without giving any intimation that she intended to disturb his title.
In December, 1S84, he paid off one half of
the incumbrance held by Elmers, and she not
only permitted him thus to spend his own
money on the property, but furnished him
with the money to pay off the other half of
the Incumbrance for herself. From June 30,
1884, down to the time of filing the present
bill, she paid taxes on the east half of the
property, and suffered him to pay taxes on
the west half; sometimes taking the money
over to the treasurer's office for him, and
paying his taxes for him on the west half.
A little more than a month before filing the
bill she paid $83.35 for an outstanding tax
title against the east half, and he at the
same time, with her consent, paid the same
amount for a tax deed to himself of the
same outstanding title against the west half.
In 1888 and 1889 she made efforts not only
to sell her own lots in the east half, but also
to sell for him the lots in the west half which
she had conveyed to him.
She went out to
the property in 1885, and employed a man to
plant trees for her on the east half, telling
him that appellee owned the west half. In
1886
she had some negotiation with one
Whittemore about selling one of her lots In
the east half to him, and spoke of Johnson
as the owner of the west half by deed from
herself for services.
At another time she was
present when appellee offered to sell his lots
in the west half for $75 a lot, and talked to
the same party about buying her own lots In
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In 1887 she occupied a part
the east half.
of the otfice of a real-estate agent named
Hopson, and proposed to him that he should
seU her lots, referring to appellee as the owner of the adjoining lots, and as being willing
The evidence shows that beto sell them.
tween January, 1884, and December, 1890, a
belt line railroad was built to the west of
these lots, and the Wisconsin Railroad Company laid its tracks in the neighborhood, and
certain locomotive works were located in that
vicinity. On account of these improvements,
the lots, which had been bought for $600 in
1879, had become worth $16,000 in 1890.
It appears from the evidence that the defendant went into the office of the appellee
as a typewriter in 1883, and did the business
of a typewriter for several years.
The appellee and two other attorneys had each a
private room, and a large reception or waiting room.
The appellant was permitted to
use a typewriter belonging to appellee, occupying the reception room for that purpose.
She was allowed the use of the room and of
the typewriter without charge, and, in consideration thereof, she did for appellee such
typewriting as he required.
We cannot see
that the appellee owed her anything for work
done under this arrangement.
While she was
in his office she seems to have done a profitable business as a typewriter for outside parties.
When she procured a typewriter of her
own, and took another office in the same
building, he paid her for the services which
Upon the ground of laches
she rendered.
and acquiescence we think that the court below properly dismissed the bill. The decree
of the superior court of Cook county is affirmed.
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Appeal from judgment entered upon an order reversing a judgment for plaintiff upon
an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint. The judgment of the general term
sustained
the demun-er
and dismissed the
complaint.

The facts appear

in the opinion.

Abram Kling, for appellant
Ivens, for respondents.

William

M.

ANDREWS, J.

The complaint alleges in
that the plaintiff, to induce the defendants to unite with the other creditors of
Newman & Bernhard in a composition of the
debts of that firm, made a secret bargain
with them to give them his negotiable note
for a portion of their debt beyond the
amount to be paid by the composition agreement. He gave his note pursuant to the barsubstance

signed
gain, and thereupon the defendants
the composition.
The defendants transferred
the note before due to a bona fide holder,
and the plaintiff having been compelled to
pay it, brings this action to recover the money paid.
The complaint also alleges that the
plaintiff was the brother-in-law of Newman,
for him a natural love and
and entertained
afCection, and was solicitous to aid him In
effecting the compromise,
and that the defendants knowing the facts, and taking an
unfair advantage of their position, extorted
the giving of the note as a condition of their
becoming parties to the composition.
We think this action cannot be maintained.
The agreement between the plaintiff and the
defendants to secure to the latter payment of
a part of their debt in excess of the ratable
proportion payable under the composition
The
was a fraud upon the other creditors.
fact that the agreement to pay such excess
was not made by the debtor, but by a third
person, does not divest the transaction of its
fi-audulent character.
A composition agreement is an agreement
as well between the creditors themselves as
Bach
between the creditors and their debtor.
creditor agrees to receive the sum fixed by
the agreement In full of his debt. The signing of the agreement by one creditor is often
to the others to unite in it.
an inducement
If the composition provides for a pro rata
payment to all the creditors, a secret agreement, by which a friend of the debtor undertakes to pay to one of the creditors more
than his pro rata share, to induce him to
is as much a fraud
unite in the composition,
upon the other creditors as if the agreement
was directly between the debtor and such
creditor. It violates the principle of equity,
and the mutual confidence as between creditors, upon which the agreement is based,
and diminishes the motive of the creditor
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who is a party to the secret agreement, to ac?
in view of the common interest in makinj;
the composition.
Fair dealing and common
honesty condemn such a transaction. If th«
defendants here were plaintiffs seeking to enforce the note, it is clear that they could nol
recover.
Cockshott v. Bennett, 2 Term R.
763;
Leicester v. Rose, 4 East, 372. The illegality of the consideration upon well-settled
principles would be a good defense.
The
plaintiff, although he was cognizant of the
fraud, and an active participator in it, would
nevertheless be allowed to allege the fraud to
defeat the action, not, it is true, out of any
tenderness for him, but because courts do not
sit to give relief by way of enforcing illegal
contracts,
on the application of a party to
the illegality. But if he had voluntarily paid
the note, he could not, according to the general principle applicable to executed contracts
void for illegality, have maintained an action
to recover back the money paid.
The samo
rule which would protect him in an action to
enforce the note, protects the defendants in
resisting an action to recover back the money
paid upon it. Nellis v. Clark, 4 Hill, 429.
It is claimed that the general rule that a
party to an illegal conti'act cannot recover
back money paid upon it does not apply to
the case of money paid by a debtor, or in his
behalf, in pursuance of a secret agreement,
exacted by a creditor in fraud of the composition, and the cases of Smith v. Bromley, 2
Doug. 696, note; Smith v. Cuff, 6 Maule & S.
IGO; and Atkinson v. Denby, 7 Hurl. & N.
934,—are relied upon to sustain this claim.
In Smith v. Bromley the defendant, being the
chief creditor of a bankrupt, took out a commission against him, but afterward finding
no dividend Ukely to be made, refused to sign
the certificate unless he was paid part of his
debt, and the plaintiff, who was the bankrupt's sister, having paid the sum exacted,
brought her action to recover back the money
Lord
paid, and the action was sustained.
Mansfield in his judgment referred to the
statute 5 Geo. II. c. 30, § 11, which avoids all
contracts, made to induce a creditor to sign
of the bankrupt, and said:
the certificate
"The present is a case of a transgression of a
law made to prevent oppression, either on
the bankrupt or his family, and the plaintiff
is in the case of a person oppressed, from
whom money has been extorted and advantage taken of her situation and concern for
her brother." And again: "If any near relation is induced to pay the money for the
bankrupt, it is taking an unfair advantage
and torturing the compassion of his family."
In Howson v. Hancock, 8 Term R. 575, Lord
Kenyon said that Smith v. Bromley was decided on the ground that the money had been
paid by a species of duress and oppression,
and the parties were not in pari delicto, and
this remark is fully sustained by reference to
Lord Mansfield's judgment. Smith v. Cuff
was an action brought to recover money paid
by the plaintiff to take up his note given to
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the defendant,
for the balance of a debt
owing by the plaintiff, which was exacted by
the latter as a condition of his signing with
the other creditors a composition. The defendant negotiated the note and the plaintiff
was compelled to pay it. The plaintiff recovered.
Lord EUenborough said: "This is not
a case of par delictum; it is oppression on
the one side and submission on the other; it
never can be predicated
as par delictum
where one holds the rod and the other bows
to it."
Atkinson v. Denby was the case of
money paid directly by the debtor to the
creditor. The action was sustained on the
authority of Smith v. Bromley and Smith v.
Cuff.
It is somewhat difficult to understand how
a debtor who simply pays his debt In full
can be considered the victim of oppression or
extortion because such payment is exacted by
the creditor as a condition of his signing a
compromise,
or to see how both the debtor
and creditor are not in pari delicto.
See remark of Parke, B., in Higgins v. Pitt, 4 Exch.
312. But the cases referred to go no further
than to hold that the debtor himself, or a
near relative who out of compassion for him
pays money upon the exaction of the creditor,
as a condition of his signing a composition,
may be regarded as having paid under duress
and as not equally criminal with the creditor.
These decisions cannot be upheld on the
ground simply that such payment is against
public policy. Doubtless the rule declared in
these cases tends to discourage fraudulent
transactions of this kind, but this is no legal
ground for allowing one wrongdoer to recover back money paid to another in pursuance
of an agreement, illegal as against public
policy. It was conceded by Lord Mansfield
in Smith v. Bromley, that when both parties
are equally criminal against the general laws
of public policy, the rule is "potior est conditio defendentis," and Lord Kenyon In Howson V. Hancock, said that there is no case
where money has been actually paid by one
of two parties to the other upon an illegal
contract, both being particeps criminis, an action has been maintained to recover It back.
It Is laid down In Cro. Jac. 187, that "a man
shall not avoid his deed by duress of a stranger, for it hath been held that none shall
avoid his own bond for the Imprisonment or
danger of any one than himself only." And
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in Robinson v. Gould, 11 Cush. 57, the rule
was applied where a surety sought to plead
his own coercion as growing out of the fact
that his principal was suffering illegal imprisonment as a defense to an action brought
upon the obligation of the surety given to seBut the rule in
cure his principal's release.
Cro. Jac. has been modified so as to allow a
father to plead the duress of a child, or a
husband the duress of his wife, or a child the
Wayne v. Sands, 1
duress of the parent.
Freem. 351; Baylie v. Clare, 2 Brownl. & G.
276; 1 Rolle, Abr. 687; Jacob, Law Diet.
"Duress."
We see no ground upon which It can be
held that the plaintiff in this case was not in
par delictum in the transaction with the defendants.
So far as the complaint shows he
was a volunteer in entering into the frauduIt is not even alleged that
lent agreement.
And
he acted at the request of the debtor.
In respect to the claim of duress, upon which
Smith V. Bromley was decided, we are of
opinion that the doctrine of that and the subsequent cases referred to can only be asserted
in behalf of the debtor himself, or of a wife
or husband, or near relative of the blood of
the debtor, who intervenes in his behalf, and
that a person in the situation of the plaintiff,
remotely related by marriage, with a debtor
who pays money to a creditor to Induce him
to sign a composition,
cannot be deemed to
have paid under duress by reason simply of
that relationship, or of the interest which he
might naturally take in his relative's affairs.
The plaintiff cannot complain because the
defendants negotiated the note, so as to shut
out the defense, which he would have had to
It in the hands of the defendants.
The negotiation of the note was contemplated when it
was given, as the words of negotiability
show. It Is possible that the plaintiff while
the note was held by the defendants,
might
have maintained an action to restrain the
transfer, and to compel Its cancellation.
Jackman v. Mitchell, 13 Ves. 581. But it Is
unnecessary
to determine
that question In
this case. The plaintiff having paid the note,
although under the coercion resulting from
the transfer, the law leaves him where the
transaction has left him.
The judgment should be affirmed.

All

concur.

Judgment affirmed.
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HANOVER NAT, BANK OF CITX OF NEW
YORK V. BLAKE.
(37 N.

E.

519,

142

N. T. 404.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

June

5. 1894.

Appeal from supreme com't, general term,
first department
Action by the Hanover National Bank of
the City of New York against Sarah F.
Blake. From a judgment of the general
term (20 N. Y. Supp. 780) affirming a judgat special
ment for defendant rendered
Reversed.
term plaintifC appeals.
The action is brought by the payee of a
promissoi7 note against the indorser. The
facts v?ere not in dispute, and vyere stated
Frederick
by the general term as foUows:
D. Blake and Charles Waterman v^ere partners engaged In the dry-goods business under the firm name of P. D. Blake & Co.
They vyere indebted to various creditors,
Including the plaintiff, and, becoming inof
solvent, •axecuted
a general assignment
all their property to James H. Thorp on the
On the 4th of
24th day of April, 1888.
of P. D. Blake &
.Tune, 1888, the creditors
Co. signed a composition agreement by vfhich
they agreed to take 40 per cent, ol their
respective claims, to be paid by four notes,
made by the members of the firm, each for
10 per cent of the claim; two payable in
and two in 18 and 24
12 months,
6 and
months,— the latter two indorsed by Sarah
F. Blake. The Hanover Bank, desiring to
have the security of Mrs. Blake upon all the
notes, asked that she indoree the first two
as well as the last two, which she did. This
was not known to the other creditors, and
was a security additional to that provided by
agreement.
the terms of the composition
The note in suit is the third of the series,
payable in 18 months, and properly indorsed
by Mrs. Blake, in accordance with the composition agreement.
At the trial both parties moved for judgment, which the court
At the general
directed for the defendant.
term that judgment was affirmed, and the
plaintiff has again appealed to this court.
Thos. S. Jloore, for appellant.
bridge Smith, for respondent.

C. Bain-

GRAY, J. (after stating the facts). In the
of law
general term opinion the question
"Did the secret agreewas stated thus:
the
ment, by which Mrs. Blake indorsed
first two notes, invalidate the whole composition agreement, so that notes given In
of its terms are not enforceable
pursuance
justices,
The learned
by the plaintiff?"
finding no controlling authority in this state,
adversely
to the
the question
determined
plaintiff, and upon the ground, in substance,
that, as the agreement was fraudulent, the
and vitiated the whole
fraud permeated
and disabled the
composition agreement,
creditor from recovering anything under It.
In this view we are not able to agree with

tnem.
It may be true that there was no
decision, in the courts of this state, In Its
features so precisely in point as to compel
adherence to its authority, and it is true that
the view of the general term has support
think,
in decisions
of English couits.
however, that in our state there are expressions of opinion by eminent judges of this
court, and by a former very distinguished
judge of the superior court of the city of
New York, which rather commit us to a
contrary view, and which should commend
themselves to us, as furnishing a wise and
more politic nilo in these cases of composition by an insolvent debtor with his creditors.
The general principle has been long
settled in England and here that a secret
agreement which induces a creditor to agree
by the promise of a prefto a composition
erence, or of some undue advantage,
over
the other creditors,
is utterly repugnant to
agreement,
the composition
and, from its
fi-audulont natm-e, is avoided by the law.
The very essence of a composition
agreement is that all creditors come In upon
terms of equality, and that equality would
be destroyed
if the secret agreement were
given effect.
In Leicester v. Rose, 4 East,
372,
at page 381, Lord EUenborough observed that the principle of all the cases
was "that where the creditors, in general,
for an equality of benefit
have bargained
and mutuality of security, it shall not be
competent for one of them to secm'e any
partial benefit or security to himself." In
Russell V. Rogers, 10 Wend. 474-479, Justice (afterwards chief justice) Nelson said:
"So scrupulous are courts in compelling
creditors to the observance of good faith
towards one another in cases of this kind,
that any security taken for an amount beyond the composition agreed upon, or even
for that sum, better than that which is
common to all, if unknown to the other creditors, is void and inoperative."
It is in the
extent of the operation
of the principle,
which was thus early asserted, that we will
find the divergence of judicial opinions between English judges and those of this state.
It is curious to observe that, though Leicester
V. Rose was relied upon as the basis of authority for their conclusions,
the application of the doctrine of that case has been
different in each country.
Leicester v. xtose
was decided in 1803.
Its facts were that
several creditors of the Insolvent refused to
sign unless collateral security,
which was
to be given for the first two installments
of the composition payment, should also be
given for the last two.
The defendant
agreed to proctire this additional security,
and, not having done so, the action was
brought to enforce his agreement.
Lord
EUenborough
stated
to he
question
the
whether any legal effect could be given to
such an agreement,
which gave to some
creditors a better security than to others;
and he held that it could not, as it was a
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fraud upon the rest of the creditors.
The
case of Howden v. Haigh, 11 Adol. & E.
1033, was decided in 1840, and was a suit
upon composition notes.
By a secret agreement between
the plaintiff and defendant
that the latter should indorse to him a bill
accepted by a third party, in order to give
him a preference beyond the other creditors, the former had been induced to sign
the composition
deed.
It was held that he
could not recover.
Lord Denman, relying
upon Leicester v. Rose and Knight v. Hunt,
5 Bing. 432,
held that every part of the
transaction was avoided by reason of the
deceit upon the other creditors.
Littledale.
J., while agreeing with him that the fraud
ext<!nded
over the whole, remarked,
rather
significantly, "It is possible that the plaintiff
may be entitled to sue for the original debt."
The case of Knight v. Hunt, 5 Bing. 432, referred to by Lord Denman, if we are to re
gard the language of the opinion, did not
expressly decide that the whole transaction
In that case the plaintiff had
was avoided.
of 10
refused to accede to a composition
shillings in the pound until a brother of the
debtor agreed to supply him with coals to
an amount in value equal to half the debt.
The coals were furnished; but the notes reand the plaintiff brought
unpaid,
mained
Best, 0. J., stated the
this suit upon them.
principle that the judgment of the creditors
is influenced by the supposition that all are
to suffer in the same proportion, and briefly
with the remark: "Here the
concluded
plaintiff has had his ten shillings in the
pound in coal, and he cannot have it again
In Mallalieu v. Hodgson, 16
in money."
Adol. & E. (N. S.) 689 (decided in 1851),
Erie, J., held that "where any creditor, in
fraud of the agreement to accept the composition, stipulates for a preference to himself,
Not only
his stipulation is altogether void.
can he take no advantage from it, but he is
also to lose the benefit of the composition."
In this ruling he railed upon Leicester v.
The plaintiff
Rose and Howden v. Haigh.
there was seeking to recover for the balance
of his original debt, after allowing for fhe
amotmt of the composition and the value of
It was his claim that the
a preference.
composition
deed had not released the debt
to him, because he had been induced to believe that he alone was proferred, whereas
some other creditors had also been secretly
preferred. It will be observed that, in Mallalieu V. Hodgson, it was unnecessary to decide whether the plaintiff had lost the benefit of the composition.
The question was
whether the plaintiff could defeat the effect
agreement
of the composition
by the plea
that he had been deceived Into supposing that
he was the only creditor secretly preferred.
As an expression of judicial opinion, it must,
however, be accorded its weight as evidencing the continuance of the authority of Howden V. Haigh.
That case fm-nishes the sole
basis of authority on which subsequent de-
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and text writers have rested the doctrine that the fraud in the secret agreement
with the creditors so vitiates the whole transaction of composition as to disable him from
recovering even the amount of the composiLeake, Cont. 768; Chit. Cont. 094;
tion.
say the sole auWald's Pol. Cont. 239.
thority, because Leicester v. Roso did not
go so far as that, and Howden v. Haigh was
an extension of the principle which was supposed to be justified by Lord Ellenborough's
The doctrine
decision in the former case.
of Howden v. Haigh, it may be observed,
in England,
did not go wholly unquestioned
as may be inferred from the remarks of Lithave quoted,
tledale, J., in that case, which
and of Baron Alderson in Davidson v. McGregor, 8 Mees. & W., at page 763; who
said he was "alarmed at the extent to which
that decision goes."
In this state, with the case of Leicester v.
Rose before him. Judge Duer, In Breck v.
Cole, 4 Sandf. 79, formed quite a different
conclusion as to the extent of the effect of a
secret agreement which attempts to secure to
a creditor an advantage over the other creditBreck v. Cole was an action upon a
ors.
promissory note secretly given to the plaintiff, in addition to the composition' notes, as
an inducement to him to agree to the comJudge Duer, in his opinion, composition.
ments upon the fraudulent natm'e of the
agreement, in its effect upon the other creditors; observing that "it is, in aU. cases, the
concealment of a fact which It was material
for them to know, and the knowledge of
which might have prevented them from as* * * Every
senting to the composition.
composition deed is, in its spirit, if not in its
terms, an agreement between the creditors
themselves, as well as between them and the
flebtor. It is an agreement that each shall receive the sum or the security which the deed
stipulates to be paid and given, and nothing
more, and that upon this consideration the
debtor shaU be wholly discharged from all
the debts then owing to the creditors who
The learned judge then adsign the deed."
verts to the violation of the equality among
creditors worked by secretly giving additional
"Hence,
security, and states this conclusion:
deed itself, » * •
either the composition
which seeks to
or the private agreement,
evade— and, if valid, would defeat— it, must
be set aside; and sound policy and the principles of good faith require that the latter
It is perfectly
course should be followed.
just that every creditor who signs a composition deed should be estopped from setting up
any private agreement repugnant to its terms,
or inconsistent with its intention and spirit,
* * •
and * * * every private agreement
• • •
is of this character, and consequently
an
such
every security which is the fruit of
He reviews
agreement is illegal and void."
the early decisions in the comets of England
and of this state, and concludes that "it Is the
clear and inevitable result of the decisions
cisions

I
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that, wUcre a composition is made with creditors, every security given to a particular
creditor, not provided for in the terms of the
deed, and not disclosed, is void, as a fraud
upon the creditors from whom it is concoaled."
The importance of this expression
of judicial opinion should not, in my judgment, be underestimated.
It was delivered
by one of the ipost eminent judges in this
state, and was conem-red in by his associates,
Judges Mason and Campbell.
It does not appear from the opinion that Howden v. Haigh
was before him, although it had been decided
But, whether his attention
10 years before.
was called to it or not, the learned judge's
opinion was formed after considering the
same early English cases as were considered
by Lord Denman in Howden v. Haigh and by
Judge
Justice Erie in Mallalieu v. Hodgson.
Duer limited the effect of the fraudulent seto the nullification of any
cret agreement
rights or advantages attempted lo oe gained
under it, and resai'ded it as something quite
agreement
from the composition
separable
itself. From all the early cases in England
and in this state, the inference from the deagreecisions is, not that the composition
ment is avoided, but, as Justice Nelson stated
it in Rus'sell v. Rogers, "the security tal-^en
for an amount beyond the composition agi'eed
upon, or even for that sum, better than that
which is common to all, • * * is void and
inoperative." So in Fellows v. Stevens, 2J
Wend. 29-1, .Justice C(jwen held that the law
would set aside "all secret terms made by the
creditors with the debtor, more favorable to
the former tlian is allowed to the other credilsi'ir
itors." It is the secret agreement
Bliss v. Matwhich is fraudulent and void.
teson, 45 N. Y. 22: Harloe v. Foster, 53 N. Y.
And that is all that tJiink Leicester v.
385.
^A'hite v. Kuntz, 107 N. Y.
Rose decided.
518, 14 N. E, 423, is one of the latest cases in
which this court has considered the effect of
In that case the
agreements.
composition
plaintiff had siijned a composition agreement
by which he agreed with other creditors of
the debtors to accept one-third of the indebtedness due them in fom- notes, to be indorsed
To induce the
by the father of the debtors.
plaintifC to sign this agreement, Kuntz, the
father of the debtors, secretly agreed to purchase of him the composition notes within a
specified time, and to pay $10,000; the composition notes aggregating only about $6,000.
This secret agi'cement Kuntz refused to perform, alleging that it was null and void.
plaintiff brought an action, alThereupon,
leging these facts in his complaint, and also
that several other creditors had been induced
to sign by a secret agreement to pay them a
larger percentage than the one-third provided
for in the composition agreement, and, upon
the ground that that agreement was void as
and that
to him. demanded its cancellation,
of the notes delivered under it, and a judgment against the debtors for the amount of
Demun-er to the
the original indebtedness.
complaint was sustained below, and in this
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court the judgment was sustained.
It was
held that the agreement
between plaintiff
and Kuntz, the debtors' father, was fraudulent, and could not be enforced, and that the
composition agreement, as to all the innocent
parties, was avoided.
As the plaintiff was
not an innocent party, but had himself taken
a fraudulent advantage, he could not set up
the fraud of the creditors.
The opinion discusses what were his rights.
It was said
that he had not forfeited all claims upon his
debtors; that "he must have either the composition notes, or his original notes;" that he
could not avoid the composition agreement as
to himself, and enforce his original notes for
their full amount, as that would unjustly result in an advantage over the other creditors,
and "he should be held to the composition."
"His only remedy," it was said, "against the
defendants, is upon the composition notes."
Judge Earl, in delivering the opinion
in
White V. Kuntz, cited the English case of
Mnllalieu v. Hodgson, supra, as an authority
in point; but that he did not adopt the opinion, in all its expressions, is evident, for he
held that there was "no ground upon which
he [the creditor in the case before him] can
It is very plain,
be deprived of all remedy."
from the opinion in White v. Kuntz, that it
Is the secret agreement, by which the creditor
receives an undue advantage, which is deemIt was so considered,
ed to be avoided.
again, by .Judge Andrews, in Meyer v. Blair,
10!i N. y. 000, 17 N. E. 228, who, referring to
A\'hite V. Kuntz as authority for the statement that a collateral agreement is void in
composition cases, which secures to one creditor an advantage over others, said, "The
court refuses to enforce the secret bargain,
and confines the creditor, who is a party to
the fraud, to a remedy to recover the sum
which, by the terms of the composition, he
agi-eed to accept."
In Solinger v. Earle, 82
N. Y. 393, the facts were that a third party
had given his note for a portion of the insolvent's debt to the defendants,
to induce
Having
them to agree to the composition.
paid the note to a transferee
thereof,
ho
brought an action to recover back from the
defendants the money so paid.
It was held
that the action could not be maintained, for,
though the ti'ansactlon was a fraud upon the
other creditors, the parties were in pari delicto. Judge Andrews, remarking that fair
dealing condemned such a transaction, said:
"If the defendants here were plaintiffs seeking to enforce the note. It is clear that they
could not recover."
Inasmuch as the note
sued upon was for an additional amount beyond the amount of the composition
agreement, the remark of the learned judge was in
line with all the authorities.
He held the secret agreement was void, and could not have
been enforced.
The case is in no wise in
conflict with White v. Kuntz or Meyer v.

Blair.

If we should say that the fraud of the secret agreement made by the creditor operated to avoid the whole transaction of compo-
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sition, the result would be to leave him with
the original indebtedness unreleased.
If the
composition agreement, by which the debt
was compromised, is to be deemed nullified
by' the fraudulent transaction, I do not see
why the creditor would not be at liberty to
pursue the original debt; a view which Littledale, J., regarded as possible in Howden
V. Haigh.
It would certainly seem to be the
logical outcome of the proposition asserted
below that, if the composition agreement has
been avoided, it has become inoperative as
an agreement for any purpose.
We assert a
wholesome rule, and one which works a just
result, if we hold that the secret and fraudulent agreement itself is illegal, and is inoperative to confer any rights or advantages
upon the creditor.
Perfect equality is to be
It was
maintained among the creditors.
thought below that the secret agreement and
the composition agreement constituted but a
single and indivisible transaction or agreement.
am not prepared to accede to that
proposition, though it has support in some of
It seems to
the English cases referred to.
me the case falls easily within the rule which
permits a severance of the illegal from the
legal part of the covenant.
Pickering v.
Railway Co., L. R. 3 C. P. 23.5, 250; U. S.
In Mallam v.
V. Bradley, 10 Pet. 343-300.
May, 11 Jlees. & W. 053, the plaintiffs, who

I

were surgeon

dentists,

agreed to take the de-

fendant as an assistant, and to insti-uct him
for a term of yea/s, and he agreed, at the
expiration of thai term, not to practice his
profession "in London, or any of the towns
in, or places in, England or Scotland, where
the plaintiffs might have been practicing."

It

was held that the covenant as to not prac-

ticing in London was valid, and that not to
practice elsewhere was illegal, but that the
valid part was not affected by the illegality
of the other part. Here, the agreement with
other creditors for a composition was lawful
and valid, unless they should elect to rescind
it upon the discovery of the secret agreement,— an element
But the
not present.
agi-eement for, and the giving of, additional
Is there
security, was unlawful and void.
any reason why the bad may not be rejected,
If the alternative
and the good retained?
is, as it presents itself to my mind, that the
composition
agreement shall stand as a release of tlie plaintiff's original demand, or
that it shall fall, and leave the plaintiff at
liberty to recover the original debt,
am for
upholding it, and
fail to see why the legal
part of the transaction had with it cannot
We should
be severed from the illegal part.
be careful, in our desire to punish the harsh
and unscrupulous creditor, who presses his
debtor, and bargains for an advantage over
other creditors, by deprivation of legal rights
and remedies, that we do not go too far, and
lay down a rule which may result unjustly
in other ways. It ought not to be possible
that through his fraud he may be reinstated
In his original position as a creditor for the

I
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The operation of a secret
is such that the other Innocent
creditors may, because of the fraud of their
debtor, elect to refuse to be bound by their
the
agreement of composition with him.
secret agreement is executory, they may not
so elect, and may rely that the creditor secretly seeking to obtain some promise of advantage over them will be prevented from
enforcing it, and from gaining anything by
his fraud. Its illegality is a perfect defense
in the hands of the promisor. The composition agreement is one thing, as an agreement
between all the creditors to release some
part of the insolvent's indebtedness to them,
upon terms equal as to each; and the secret
fraudulent agreement with one or more of
them is a stipulation which, from its inception, was unlawful, and which the law anBliss V. Matteson, 45 N. Y. 22.
nuls.
It was also suggested in the opinion below,
in support of the rule there asserted, that if
it did not obtain there would be an inducement to an unscrupulous creditor to commit
a fraud, for his only rislt would be to lose
his additional security, while assured of the
amount of his composition.
To a certain extent, that may be true; but, on the other
hand, it may be suggested that if it were
the rule the insolvent debtor would have the
to ensnare
inducement
his creditors into
some secret arrangement,
and thus, by trick
and device, to leave them wholly remediless, —
disabled to recover the amount of the composition, and disabled from pursuing the original debt which the composition agreement
It seems wiser simply to regard
released.
the secret agreement as one which the law
avoids for its fraud. The creditor makes it
with the risk of its worthlessness, if repudiated, and the debtor makes it with the peril
tSiat its discovery will fm'nish cause for his
other creditors to avoid the composition
agreement.
The conclusion reached is the result of a careful examination of the authorities, and the doctrine they teach, and it is in
accord with a wiser policy.
It must not be
forgotten that the defendant's contract of indorsement is within the terms of the composition agreement with respect to the note
in suit.
We know nothing of the fate of the
earlier notes, the indorsement
upon which
by defendant was secretly and fraudulently
procured to be added.
She had a perfect defense to the enforcement
of her contract.
We are only concerned now with the question
of whether the plaintiff shall have the
amount of the composition, notwithstanding
it may have been agreed secretly that it
should have some better security for the payment of some of the composition
installments.
This question, for the reasons stated, should be answered
in the affirmative;
and therefore the judgments below should be
be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with
costs to abide the event.
All concur, except
ANDREWS, C. J., and PBCKHAM, J., disJudgments reversed*
senting.
whole sum due.
agreement

If
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BATES, Ch. The case presented for relief
William Chandler, three days before

is this:

his marriage with the complainant Elizabeth
Chandler, while under an engagement of marriage with her, made a voluntary conveyance
of all his estate, real and personal, thereby,
if it be allowed to operate, defeating the
right of dower which otherwise would have
accrued from the marriage, and also withdrawing from his own control the means he
then had, whereby provision mght be made
for his intended wife and the issue of the
marriage, either through a will or by law in
case of his dying intestate.
This conveyance
was made without notice to her, and, as we
must take It, without her knowledge derived
in any way whatever before the marriage.
Yet no misrepresentation
as to his means appears; nor any positive deception as to what
was done beyond simple nondisclosure.
Nor
are we to consider it as an element in the case
that Mrs. Chandler, before the engagement,
knew that Chandler had held this property
or that she had formed any expectations with
regard to it.
We may now take the legal question presented by such a case. ^^111a court of equity
by
relieve against a voluntary conveyance
the husband of all his estate, made pending
an engagement; or, as the English cases term
it, pending a treaty of marriage made without
any disclosure to the intended wife or knowledge on her part, though without any express
misrepresentation
or deception practiced by
This is the general question;
the husband?
but it is to be considered in two forms:
(1) Will equity relieve, at least so far as to
save to the wife her dower in the real estate,
even though the conveyance must stand as it
affects the personal estate and also the real
estate, except as this may be subject to dower?
(2) Will equity go further, and set aside
the deed wholly, thereby admitting to take effect the same consequences
which would
have followed if no such deed had been executed, so that, as Chandler In fact died Intestate, the whole property shall descend or
be distributed as in ordinary cases of Intes-

tacy?
Either form of relief will give Mrs. ChandOn the latter depends her
ler her dower.
claim to a share of the personal estate, and
the claim on behalf of the mfant complainant
as heir at law and distributee.
1. Let us consider the first question.
The
English court of chancery has from the earliest times protected the marital rights of the
husband against a fraudulent settlement by
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the wife pending a treaty of marriage.
It is
considered that he becomes a purchaser of
the wife's property,
in consideration of the
charge he assumes of her maintenance
and
the payment of her debts; that this is a right
upon which fraud may be committed, and
which ought to be protected.
Lord Thurlow,
in Countess of Strathmore v. Bowes, 1 Ves.
Jr. 27. This view has commanded universal
consent from the beginning.
But until a recent date the doubt has been as to what circumstances should be held to render the setfraudulent, — whether there
tlement
must
have been some misrepresentation
or deception practiced upon the husband, such as
amounts to actual fraud, or whether mere
nondisclosure
was sufficient as a fraud in
law to invalidate the settlement; especially,
whether mere nondisclosure
should be fatal
where the husband was at the time of the
marriage ignorant as well of his wife's having held the property as of its having been
disposed of away from him.

The first full examination of this subject
was in Countess of Strathmore v. Bowes (decided in 1789) supra.
That was a bill filed
by Bowes, the husband, to set aside a settlement made before marriage by his wife, the
Countess of Strathmore.
There \, ,..; also a
cross bill filed by the wife to set aside a deed
revoking the settlement, on the ground of
duress by the husband in obtaining it from
her. First, upon an issue directed to inquire
whether the deed of revocation was obtained
by the duress, and, a verdict so finding, that
deed was set aside. 2 Brown. Ch. 345. Then
the cause came to be heard upon the bill to
set aside the settlement, before Justice Buller, sitting for the lord chancellor.
He decreed in favor of Lady Strathmore.
Upon a
rehearing before Lord Chancellor Thurlow,
the decree was affirmed;
and, finally, it was
affirmed again on appeal to the house of
lords.
The argument before Justice BuUer
and his opinion are reported in 2 Cox, Ch. 28.
The rehearing before the lord chancellor, with
his opinion, are reported both in Cox, Ch.
and In 1 Ves. Jr. 22. Upon the rehearing the
arguments are best reported in Ves. Jr., but
the opinion of Lord Thurlow, in Cox, Ch. As
a decision the case is of no importance upon

the question before us, since the settlement
made by Lady Strathmore was not a fraud
upon the marital rights of her husband under
any— the most liberal— construction of fraud.
It was made before she knew Bowes, her
future husband, even pending a treaty of marriage with another man, and with his consent; and her marriage to Bowes was Itself
obtained by a gross fraud on his part. But
the case is valuable as containing a full review of all the prior decisions. Justice Buller considered that the decisions had gone
only so far as to relieve the husband in
cases of some actual fraud practiced upon
him, and he so lays down the rule. The result, he says, is "that, if the wife is guilty of
any fraud, and holds out to the husband that
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there is nothing to interfere with his rights,
then any deed executed by her in prejudice
of such representation shall be Toid." Bare
concealment
he held not to be sufficient. 2
Oox, Ch. 30. Lord Thurlow, though it did not
affect the result of that case, seems to have
held to the more
liberal construction of
frauds, which includes concealment as well
as positive misrepresentation.
In his opinion
"If a woman, during
(1 Ves. Jr. 28) he says:
the course of a treaty of marriage with her,
makes, without notice to the intended husband, a conveyance of any part of her property, I should set it aside, though good prima
facie, because affected with that fraud." It
is true, according to Justice BuUer's view,
that the early decisions were upon cases of
actual misrepresentation or deception, but it
is also true that the distinct question whether
bare concealment was itself fraud had never
before been raised; and therefore the cases
prior to that of Strathmore v. Bowes are to
be considered rather as presenting examples
of fraud as they occurred in fact, than as deciding in what fraud on marital rights must
consist so as to limit the construction of it.
Lord Thurlow must so have regarded them in
laying down his view of fraud in terms more
than Justice BuUer had done,
comprehensive
embracing in his definition mere concealment,
which Justice Buller had expressly excluded.
The later decisions in England and America
have sanctioned the view of Lord Thurlow.
The first of these is Goddard v. Snow, 1
Russ. 485, decided by Lord GifCord, master
of the rolls, in 1826.
In that case, the wife,
ten months before her marriage, settled to
her separate use for her life, and subject to
her appointment after her deatih, two sums
of money, £900 in all, being not the whole
of her estate.
Her intended husband was
ignorant both of her possession of the funds
and of the settlement made of them, and
so continued until after her death, when he
filed his bill to set aside the settlement as
one made in fraud of his marital rights.
No actual misrepresentation was alleged,
nor deception other than was implied in the
concealment.
Here the precise question was
presented whether bare concealment was in
itself a fraud.
In the argument and decision of this case. Countess of Strathmore v.
Bowes was fully reviewed, and the opinions

of Justice Buller and Lord Thurlow considered.
Concealment alone was held to be a
fraud, and the settlement was set aside.
Next is a case in which the subject is considered by Lord Brougham, though the decision went upon other grounds. St. George
V. Wake, 1 Mylne & K. 610.
Lord Brougham raises the question, and upon a review
of the cases says that in none, except Goddard V. Snow, had there been a positive decision avoiding a settlement by the wife
on the mere ground of want of knowledge
by the husband. "Yet," he proceeds to say,
"it is certain that all the cases in which the
subject is approached treat the principle as
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one of undoubted acceptance in this court;
and it must be held to be the rule of the
court, to be gathered from a uniform current of dicta, though resting upon a very

slender foundation of actual decision touchThis was in 1833.
ing the simple point."
In England v. Downs (1840) 2 Beav. 522,
in which the question concerned the validity
of a settlement made by a widow upon children of a former marriage before a second
marriage, the master of the rolls. Lord Langdale, considered it not sufficiently proved
that the settlement was made pending a
treaty of marriage; or, if so, that it was
concealed up to the time of the marriage;
and on these grounds he sustained the setBut he states the law quite fully
tlement.
on the point before us, and clearly in accordance with Goddard v. Snow, that mere
is sufficient to avoid an anteconcealment
nuptial settlement by the wife.
He adds a
qualification, not necessary to be here considered, viz. that the concealment is evidence of fraud, rather than fraud per se,
and therefore is open to explanation; so
that cases may occur in which noncommunication would not be held fraudulent.
Next is Taylor v. Pugh (1842) 1 Hare, 608.
In this case, a settlement made before marriage, to the exclusion of the husband, was
sustained on the special ground that the
husband had previously seduced the woman, thus putting her in a situation in
which she must submit to a marriage without being able to stipulate for a settlement
out of her own property. In his opinion,
the vice chancellor. Sir James Wigram, notices, with strong disapproval, the argument,
that to avoid such an antenuptial settlement
by a wife, without the intended husband's
knowledge, actual fraud or deception must be
proved; and he cites as the true rule a statement from 2 Ropers, Husb. & Wife, 162, that
"deception will be inferred if, after the commencement
of the treaty for marriage, the
wife should attempt to make any disposition of her property without her intended
husband's knowledge or concurrence."
It is true that the eases cited subsequent
to that of Goddard v. Snow give only the
dicta of judges in support of the rule of that
case; but they show at least a concurrent
judicial opinion, from that case down, in
favor of the rule which holds mere concealment to be at least evidence of fraud.
The real doubt has been whether the concealment should, in all cases, per se avoid
the settlement, or whether a settlement not
disclosed to the husband might, nevertheless, be sustained upon such equitable considerations as the meritorious character of
the objects provided for, such as children of
a former marriage (Hunt v. Matthews, 1
Vern. 408; King v. Cotton, 2 P. Wms. 675);
so the poverty of the husband and his inability to make any settlement upon his
wife (King v. Cotton, supra; St. George v.
Wake, 1 Mylne & K. 610); so the fact that

:^o2

CX)NSTKrCTIVE FRAUD.

the settlement Is of part only of the wife's
proiierty, which was the ground in De Manneville v. Crompton. 1 ^'eas. ir B. 354.
The only equitable consideration relied upon in the pending case was that Mrs. Chandler, as we must assume, had no knowledge
that William Chandler had held the property in controversy; and hence the expectation of it could not have been an induceBut this circumment to the marriage.
The true
stance is certainly immaterial.
ground of relief is not the disappointment
of an expectation,
but fraud upon a legal
right; that is, the right to a marriage without any secret alteration of the circumstances of the parties as they stood at the
time of the engagement.
The husband's
ignorance of the property settled, though
urged in Goddard v. Snow and Taylor v.
Pugh as a ground for sustaining the settlement, was expressly overruled and was disapproved in England v. Downs. In tlie latter case Lord Langdale says: "If both the
property and the mode of its conveyance
pending the marriage treaty were concealed
from the intended husband, as was the case
in Goddard v. Snow, there is still a fraud
practiced on the husband. The uonacquisition of property of which he had no notice
is no disappointment;
but still his legal
right to property actually e.xistiuK is defeated, and the vesting and continuance of a
separate power in his wife over property
wliich ought to have been his, and which is,
witliout his consent, made independent of
his control, is a suiprise upon him, and
uii^ht, if previously known, have induced
liirn to abstain from the marriage." In Taylor V. Pugh the same consideration was rejected by the vice chancellor; and he reasoned with great force that no equitable
considerations arising out of the circumstances of the particular case, such as those
before referred to, shall excuse a concealment from the husband, or sustain a settlement made without his knowledge.
In this country the ignorance of the husband of a settlement bj- the wife pending a
treaty of marriage has of itself been uniformly held fatal to the settlement, though
no actual misrepresentation or deceit might
The cases are collected in 1 White
appear.
& T. Lead. Cas. Eq. 317. See, especially. Linker V. Smith, 4 Wash. 0. C. 224, Fed. Cas.
No. 8,373; Tucker v. Andrews, 13 Jle. 124;
Logan V. Simmons, 3 Ired. Eq. 487; Spencer
V. Spencer, 3 Jones, Eq. 404, 409; Poston v.
Gillespie, 5 Jones, Eq. 258; Ramsay v. Joyce,
1 Mcllul. Eq. 236 (in which latter case an
issue was directed to the single question
whether the husband had knowledge of the
settlement);
and Manes v. Durant, 2 Rich.
Eq. 404. In North and South Carolina the
whole subject of fraud on marital rights
has been examined in a series of cases conwith the later English decitemporaneous
sions, and without reference to them, but
reaching the same conclusion, viz. that no

antenuptial settlement by the wife can be
valid If made without the husband's knowledge; it matters not how meritorious may
be the objects provided for by the wife, or
what may be the circumstances of the husband.
He is considered as having rights
springing out of the treaty of marriage, not
to be controlled by any equitable considerations between the wife and third person.
And in North Carolina the result reached by
frequent investigations of the subject has
been to establish a rule requiring, in order
to sustain a settlement by the wife, not only
that the husband have general knowledge of
her intention to make one, or that she has
done so, but requiring his consent to the
very act or instrument by which the settlement is made.
Spencer v. Spencer, 3 .Tones,
Eq. 409; Poston v. Gillespie, 5 .Jones, Eq.
202.

We see, then, both in England and in this
country, since the decision of Countess of
Strathmore v. Bowes, and the cases prior to
it, the course of judicial opinion has tended
more and more to strengthen the protection
of marital rights against settlements made
to their prejudice (1) by enlarging the
ground of invalidity.
This originally was
only actual fraud, evidenced by positive misrepresentation or deceit, but now it includes
also constructive fraud, such as arises from
mere nondisclosure; and (2) by excluding all
the exceptions founded on equitable considerations in the particular ease, which were
originall.^' allo^\•ed to support such settlement;
thus making in all cases the husknowledge, at least, and in some
band's
courts his positive assent, essential to the
validity of a conveyance or settlement made
after an engagement to marry.
Now, wishing to lay down a rule only for
the case presented, it Is enough to say that
this court will protect a husband against a
voluntary conveyance or settlement by the
wife of all her estate, to the exclusion of her
husband, made pending
an engngement of
marriage, without his knowledge, prior to the
marriage, even in the absence of express
misrepresentation
or deceit, and whether the
husband knew of the existence of the property
or not. The concealment of what it is the
right of the husband to know, and what it
is the duty of the wife to disclose, is itself
fraud in law. It is a doctrine of equity, not
so fully developed at the date of Strathmore
V. Bowes as now, that the concealment,
to the
prejudice of another party with whom one
is dealing, of facts which, if known to him,
might affect his decision, and which there is
an obligation arising out of the transaction
to disclose, is a fraud. It is so treated in
equity without respect to the motive of the
party In the concealment, being what is termed a "constructive fraud." But whether
a
conveyance or settlement made under the circumstances I have stated is always void, or
whether It may be sustained upon sucn equitable considerations
as were admitted in the
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earlier English cases, and in St. George v.
Wade, 1 Mylne & K. 610, such as the reasonableness of its proTisions as being made for
children of a former marriage, or its embracinu only a part of the wife's estate, or such
as the husband's inability to malse a settlement upon the wife,
leaye as questions open
in this state until they arise judicially.
We now reach a question which was discussed with much earnestness and ability on
both sides: Will equity extend to the wife
the lilxe protection
against an antenuptial
conveyance by her husband which we have
seen it affords to the husband against her?
After a patient examination of the argument and authorities, I find no just ground
of discrimination against the wife. First,
dower is a right of property, and, as such, a
proper subject of protection; indeed, a right
above all other rights of property favored.
Again, dower is a marital right, as well as
is the husband's interest in the wife's property. Protection, maintenance, and dower are
the rights inuring to her from the marriage;
and, though her dower is inchoate only until
the husband's death, it is none the less, in
his lifetime, a legal right, vested and indefeasible, except by her own act. This is so
far recognized that a release of it by the wife
is held a sufficient consideration to support a
postnuptial settlement upon her, and to make
it available, if bona fide, against the husband's
creditors.
Ath. Mar. Sett. (27 Law Lib.) 1G2;
Bullard v. Briggs, 7 Pick. 533.
Again, the
wife is a purchaser of her marital rights, as
much so as is the husband.
She takes them
for a consideration,
rendered by her in the
mari'iage, — a consideration
not, indeed, the
same in kind as that rendered by the husband for bis marital rights, but, considering
all the consequences involved in marriage,
what the wife surrenders is in value or measure more, certainly not less, than what she
receives.
She surrenders
person, hei'
her
sei-vices, her self-control,
her means of selfsupport;
and, as to property, far more than
the interest she acquires.
However, it should
be said that whether the wife's dower,
as
well as the husband's interest in her estate,
is to be protected against fraud, depends not
at fill upon such considerations as the comparatiie value of the consideration rendered by
eM<iii, or the value of their respective
rights,
but solely upon the fact that there exists a
marital right, which, in common with all
legal rights, is a proper subject of legal protection, whether it be itself of more or less
value, or whether it spring from a larger
or less consideration rendered. If there could
be any ground,
in addition to the mere existence of a right defrauded, to evoke a
swifter interposition for one sex rather than
the other, it would be the consideration
that
the wife, being of the weaker sex, the more
needs legal protection.
It was argued by the defendant's counsel
that in England dower is not protected as a
marital right against a conveyance by the
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even though
husband before the marriage,
made on the eve of marriage and expressly to
exclude the wife, that under the English de^
cisions, the husband and wife, in this respect,
stand on a different footing. There is no
decision upon the precise question, but the
weight of opinion is in favor of the position
taken.
Prior to the statute of uses, estates
were largely held in trast; and it was, from
the beginning, considered that dower did not
attach to a use, even when it was one reserved
to the husband under a conveyance made by
himself.
Whether a conveyance with a use
reserved to himself by the husband, made on
and with the express
the eve of marriage,
purpose of barring dower, was, at that period,
held to be effectual, does not appear by any
decided case. The case Ex parte Bell, 1 Glyn
& J. 282, cited in 1 Roper, Husb. & Wife (32
Law Lib.) 3.54u, that a voluntary settlement
made by the husband, though set aside as
creditors,
his
prevents
fraudulent against
wife's right of dower, cannot be taken as a
decision upon the question, since it does not
appear whetheithe settlement
was made
pending a marriage treaty.
The dicta on
this point are conflicting. Lord Chief Baron
Gilbert is reported to have said that such a
conveyance
would be fraudulent as to the
wife. 4 Cruise, Dig. 410; 1 Roper, Husb. &
Wife (32 Law Lib.) 3o4n. In 1 Crusie, 411,
and in 4 Cruise, 416, it is laid down that a
secret conveyance by the husband, in trust
before marriage,
to defeat dower, is void,;
and the whole doctrine as to antenuptial settlements by the wife is expressly
applied to
conveyances by the husband made under like
circumstances.
hand,
On the other
Lord
Hardwicke, in Swannock v. Lyford, Co. Lift.
208a, note 1, also reported fully in Park, Dower, 382, treats it as admitted "that if a man,
before marriage, conveys his estate privately,
without the linowledge of his wife, to trustees
in trust for himself and his heirs in fee, that

will prevent dower." Upon this authority.
I'ark,

Dower,

236, so lays down the rule.
Washb. Real Prop. 161. Afteithe statute of uses, which converted all uses
into legal estates, and so admitted dower to
attach to them, another mode of avoiding
the inconveniences of dower was resorted to
by tJie practice of settling jointures in lieu
of dower. By a statute of Henry VIII., which
was passed to remedy the inconvenient effect
of the statute of uses as to dower, the husband was authorized
to settle upon his intended wife, before the marriage, a jointure,
which, if reasonable, was held effectual as an
equivalent
for dower, and barred it, even
though made without the wife's privity, the
courts of equity reserving the power to relieve the wife against a jointure unfair or
illusory.
merely
Such, after much controversy was the construction
finally given to
this statute in Earl of Buckingham v. Drury,.
3 Brown, Pari. Cas. 492, cited in 1 Roper,,
Husb. & Wife, 477. The effect was that
dower, under the English system, became a
So, also, does 1
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precarious, and, In the case of large estates, children by a former marriage, was declared
an infrequent mode of provision for tlie wife; void so far as it affected the wife's dowand licnce its value as a marital right, and the er in the real estate. It was a case of fraud
importance of protecting it, was the less ap- in fact, very gross In its circumstances,
bepreciated.
Marriage was not presumed to have ing in violation of express representations
been contracted in expectation
of it, unless made to the wife before marriage, in order
upon I'epresentations
consent.
This case, like
to the wife that she to induce her
would become entitled to it. This may ac- Swaine v. Ferine, decides nothing as to the
count for what otherwise must ajipear as an effect of mere concealment.
It is, however,
unjust discrimination made by the English In one of Its features, a valuable recognition
courts of equity in withholding from the wife of the meritorious character of dower as a
such protection as is given to the husband marital right, and of its claim to legal proagainst secret antenuptial settlements.
Such tection; for the wife was relieved upon a
a reason is suggested in the note to 1 Roper, bill filed in her husband's lifetime, while her
Husb. & Wife, 354.
But In this country, dower was inchoate only, the deed being adclearly the same reasons do not apply. Her judged void, lest it should, through delay,
dower is the only provision made by law for become an impediment to her right of dowthe wife out of the husband's
real estate. er in the event of her surviving the husband.
Practically it is a most important resource,
Now, although, in Swaine v. Ferine and
and the only form of provision out of real Petty V. Fetty, relief was given against
estate enjoyed by her, except under wills. fraud in fact, yet in weighing the effect of
It does, in fact, to a large extent, enter into these decisions upon the case before us this
They recognize the
the wife's expectations
in contracting mar- Is to be considered.
riage, and properly so. It, therefore, ought wife's dower to be a rdarital right, and as
to receive all the protection accorded to any such a proper subject of protection in equity
marital right. To refuse it would, in this against a fraudulent antenuptial conveycountiy, A^'here jointures are unknown, ren- ance, placing it upon an equal footing In
der the right of dower precarious,
if not this respect with the husband's marital
Then, with respect to the sort of
rights.
wholly illusory.
In none of the American cases has this fraud against which she should be relieved;
subject been thoroughly examined;
but so whether it must be only what is termed
far as they have gone they treat the wife's fraud "in fact," or whether she should be
protected against "constructive fraud," such
marital rights and their claim to protection
as being on the same footing with those of as bare concealment, the same rule must apIn Swaine v. Ferine, 5 Johns. ply In her favor which we have already
the husband.
Oh. 482, a conveyance was made by a hus- seen has become settled for the husband's
protection, viz. that constructive, as well as
band before marriage, with a view to defeat
the wife's
dower.
The deed was to his actual, fraud will invalidate an antenuptial
for many conveyance.
daughter,
was kept concealed
Two cases, at least, have carried the proyears, and possession
did not go with it.
After the husband's death the widow filed tection of the wife thus far. One is Cranier bill for dower, and it was decreed to som V. Cransom, 4 Mich. 230. A husband,
her; the deed being adjudged fraudulent as two weeks before his marriage, made a volagainst her. It is true, that in a previous untai-y conveyance of his lands to his sons,
his intended
suit, the deed had been held void as against with the design to exclude
There was no misrepresentation to
a mortgagee claiming under a mortgage sub- wife.
It was a
sequent in date to the deed; hut the widow the wife; no positive deception.
The deed was
was admitted to her dower not at all in con- case of mere concealment.
previously made, held void on two distinct grounds, viz. the
sequence of the decree
that the deed was void as against the mort- absence of a sufficient delivery, and also
gagee.
It was expressly declared to be that, "being executed secretly, for the purand she pose of cutting ofC the wife's dower, it was
fraudulent as against her also;
would have been relieved quite as certainly, a fraud in law upon her rights accrued dihad there been no previous controversy be- rectly from the marriage." The other case
tween the husband's representatives and an- of this class is Smith v. Smith, 6 N. J. Eq.
A husband, on the day of the marother party touching the deed. It is also 515.
true that this was treated by the chancellor riage, but before it, without the wife's
as a case of fraud in fact. It is, then, an knowledge, settled property upon himself
authority for the relief of the wife against and a daughter by a former marriage, with
Intent to defeat dower. Actual misrepresenan antenuptial conveyance by the husband,
fraudulent in fact; but whether she should tation was alleged by the bill, but denied by
on the the answer.
No proof to that effect apbe relieved against a conveyance
ground of mere nondisclosure is a question pears, and the decision does not rest upon
any such feature; but the chancellor asnot decided in Swaine v. Ferine.
To the same extent precisely is the ruling sumes the broad ground that "a voluntary
of Fetty V. Petty, 4 B. Mon. 215. In that conveyance by a man on the eve of marcase a settlement by the husband, on the eve riage, unknown to the Intended wife, and
of marriage, of all his property, upon his made for the purpose of defeating the In-
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tereSt which she would acquire by the marriage in his estate, is fraudulent as against
I see no sound distinction," he adds,
her.
"between this case and the like conveyance
by a woman under the like circumstances."
In 1 Scrib. '^ower, 561, there are cited, to
the same point,
Littleton v. Littleton, 1
Dev. & B. 327, and Rowland v. Rowland, 2
Sneed, 543; but these cases
have not seen.
Scribner refers to the American decisions as

I

"not being entirely uniform";
and In 1
Washb. Real Prop. 175, it is said that "the
cases are singularly conflicting."
On examination of the cases, I find no conflict
whatever as to the power of a court of equity to relieve the wife. It is only in courts
of law, where a legal seisin is essential to
dower, that the claim to it against the husprior to marriage has
band's conveyance
been denied; as in Baker v. Chase, 6 Hill,
482.
The other case cited in Washburn as
against the doctrine of Swaine v. Ferine is
Jenny v. Jenny, 24 Vt. 324. I have examined this case, and think it not relevant to
the question, though, not having It by me, I
cannot state its circumstances. The rule to
be derived from the equity decisions is that
the wife's dower will be protected against a
voluntary conveyance of the husband, made
pending a marriage engagement, under precisely the same circumstances in which the
husband is relieved against an antenuptial
settlement by the wife.
I am therefore of opinion that Mrs. Chandler is entitled to dower out of the real estate described in the deed of trust, notwithstanding the execution of the deed before
her marriage, together with one-third of the
rents and profits accrued since her husband's death.
It appears from the answer
that part of the real estate— a lot in Wilmington—has been sold by the trustees for
$400, its value. Assuming, as it is proper to
do, that the purchaser was a bona fide pm-chaser, without notice, the court will not
follow this lot into his hands; but the
entitled, as against
widow is nevertheless
the defendants, to an assignment of such a
share of the remaining real estate as she
would have taken if the lot had remained
in their hands; and therefore, in assigning
the dower, although it will be assigned only
out of the remaining real estate, yet in estimating her share of that, the whole real estate, including the lot sold, will be considered.

2. It now remains to consider briefly the
claim of the complainants to relief beyond
the allowance of dower to the widow. The
prayer is that the trust deed be declared
wholly void, so that the real estate may descend under the intestate law, and the personal estate be distributed precisely as if no
This relief the
deed had been executed.
court cannot decree.
A court of equity will not interfere to set
aside a voluntary conveyance, because the
disappoints hopes or expectaconveyance
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however just and reasonable; not
it violates obligations, if they
are only natural or moral ones. Courts of
equity, as well as of law, protect only legal
rights, and enforce legal obligations; legal,
I mean, as distinguished from such as are
merely natural or moral. For example, a
pi'omise, however solemnly made and binding in morals, if without a consideration, is
not enforced in equity any more than at
law; nor is the obligation of a parent to
provide for children after his death.
So a
conveyance
will be set aside on the ground
of fraud only when it is in fraud of some
legal right, and one existing at the time it is
Now, in tbis case, we may waive the
made.
fact that, as to the infant complainant, he
was not in esse at the execution of the trust
deed.
It is a consideration decisive of the
whole of this branch of the case that, even
had William Chandler not conveyed his estate, his marriage would have vested no
rights in it, nor have restricted his absolute
control of it beyond the wife's dower in the
real estate.
He could, after marriage, have
effectually disposed of his whole personal
estate and of the inheritance of his real estate by just such a trust deed as this. It
follows that his control of the property
could not be less absolute before the marriage than after it; for, otherwise, an engagement to marry would be of more force
than marriage itself. Besides, as any disposal of property before marriage, which he
could as freely have made after marriage,
defeated no right, but removed only a bare
chance that the complainants might succeed
to it if Chandler should continue to hold it
and die intestate, the loss of such a chance
cannot be treated as the disappointment of
a just and reasonable expectation in marriage, nor as so altering the circumstances
of the husband as to have influenced the
decision of the intended wife. Again, it is
clear that this deed would have stood
against any attempt by Chandler to dispose of the personal estate and the inheritance of the real estate by another deed or
by will.
That he made no such attempt,
but died intestate, so that, as it happened,
these complainants would have succeeded
to the whole property but for this deed,
cannot affect the deed. A conveyance can
be set aside only for causes affecting it
when it is made, as for fraud then committed, or for the protection of rights then
existing. Its validity cannot be held in suspense, to be determined by future contingencies.
This would subject titles to a distressing uncertainty.
But it was argued for the complainants
that the deed, being fraudulent in respect to
dower, is, therefore, wholly void, passing no
title whatever; so that the heir at law may
succeed
to the real estate, and the distributees to the personal estate, as a consequence of the fraud on the right of dower,
though they themselves might have no equitions,

even because
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ty to set the deed aside. Such would be the
effect If the deed were Illegal; as where it
violates the provisions of a statute which
avoids the deed itself. It is then a nullity,
and stands in the way of no claim which
otherwise would be valid. And so, where a
conveyance is tainted with fraud in fact, in
which the parties claiming under it are implicated, such a conveyance is wholly void;
for no effect whatever can be given to an
instrument actually fraudulent; and therefore it is that, although a conveyance which
is merelj' voluntary, and not fraudulent in
fact, is invalid only against existing creditors, and not against subsequent
creditors.
Yet, if the conveyance is tainted with actual
fraud, it is void . altogether, and subsequent
creditors are let in. But such is not the effect of constructive fraud. The object of
the doctrine of constructive fraud is to protect some right or interest whicb, in equity,
ought to be preserved, against the effect of
a conveyance
which is in other respects
valid; and therefore equity does not avoid
the deed altogether, but saves against it the
rights or interests which are to be protected.
A deed containing some provisions or hav-

ing some operation forbidden by statute or
public policy, or contrary, as in this case, to
some equity, is held invalid only so far as
the statute or policy or equity requires, upon the principle "ut res magis valeat quam
pereat." Bredou"s Case, 1 Coke, 76; Shep.
Touch. 68; Doe v. Pitcher, 6 Taunt. 359;
Darling v. Rogers, 22 Wend. 483. Thus a
voluntary conveyance, if not fraudulent in
fact, passes the title to the grantor, but subject to the rights of existing creditors,
which are preserved by raising an implied
trust in the grantor. See 1 Story, Eq. .lur.
So in this case the trust deed is
§ 371.
effectual
between
the parties, but equity
preserves
the right of dower against the
real estate in the hands of the grantees.
Precisel.v as at law, dower follows real esby the husband after the
tate conveyed
though the conveyance is othermaiTiage,
wise good. It does not seem accurate to
say that a deed is void for constructive
fraud. The deed is valid; title under it
passes, but subject in equity to those rights
which are affected by the fraud.
Decree for complainant, Mrs. Chandler, in
accordance with the foregoing opinion.
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Appeal from supreme court, general term,
first departmemt.
Action by Elizabeth B. Hutelilns, as executrix, etc., against Abraham Van Vecliten, to
have adjudged that defendant held certain
real property, and tihe proceeds arising from
the possession thereof, in trust for the joint
and equal benefit of himself and plaintiff's
From a judgment of the general
testator.
term (20 N. Y. Supp. 751) afiarming a judgAfment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
firmed.

Matthew
S. Hutchins
spondent.

Hale,

for appellant

Augustus
for re-

and Charles N. Moi'gan,

O'BIUPjN, X The judgment in favor of
plaintiff in the courts below adjudges
that the defendant, under a deed of conveyance to him by Reuben E. Penton on the 2::!d
day of December, 1870, of certain lands in
then became and
the county of Chautauqua,
the

was, and ever since has been, seised and
possessed thereof, and of the proceeds, rents,
issues, and profits, in trust for Waldo Hutchins, the plaintiff's testator, to the extent of
an equal undivided one-half part thereof, as
It appearing that the
tenants in common.
of the
defendant, before the commencement
action, had sold the land, the title to which
lie held in his own name, an accounting concerning the proceeds and the rents and profits was directed before a referee designated
in the judgment. There is little, if any, dispute with reference to the facts, and practically the only question presented by the appeal is whether the trust impressed by force
of the judgment upon the defendant's title
was sufficiently or legally established. The defendant relies upon the provisions of the statute of frauds concerning tnists of this character, and it therefore becomes necessary to
determine whether the plaintiff's proofs are
The English
such as that statute requires.
statute on this subject, (29 Car. II. c. 3,) in its
essential features, was enacted in this state
by the act of February 26, 1787, the twelfth
section of which provides that "all declarations or crentions of ti-usts of any lands shall
be manifested and proved by some vsTiting
signed by the party entitled by law to deThus the law stood for
clare the trust."
about 40 years, until the general revision of
the statutes, when it was changed, and made
to read as follows: "No estate or interest In
lands, other than leases for a term not to
exceed one year, nor any trust or power over
or eonoerning lands, or in any manner relating thereto, shall hereafter be created,
or declared,
granted, assigned, surrendered
unless by act or operation of law, or by a
deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by
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granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his
lawful agent thereuntoi authorized by writing." 2 Rev. St. p. 135, § 6. After the revision a trust of the character claimed by the
plaintiff in this case could not be created or
except by a deed or conveyance
established
in writing. But by chapter 322 of the Laws
of 1860 the legislature restored the law to
its original condition by an amendment to
the seventh section substantially providing
that a declaration of trust in lands might be
by the
by any writing subscribed
proved
party declaring the same. It is. not necessary now to produce a deed or a formal
writing intended for the purpose in order to
prove the trust, but letters or informal memoranda signed by the party, and even admissions in a pleading in another action between
other parties, if signed by the party with
Unowledgvs of its contents, will satisfy the reof the statute, if they contain
quirements
and
enough to show the nature, character,
Forster v. Hale,
extent of the trust interest.
Fisher v. Fields, 10 Johns. 494;
3 Ves. 696;
Wright V. DouKlass, 7 N. Y. 564; Cook v.
BaiT, 44 N. Y. 156; Loring v. Palmer, 118
U. S. 321, 6 Sup. Ct. 1073; 2 Story, Eq. Jur.
126 N. Y. 597,
§ 972; McArthur v. Gordon,
27 N. E. 1033; Urann v. Coates, 109 Mass.
the party creating,

581.

The evidence produced in behalf of the
plaintiff was sufficient, within this rule, to
establish an interest in the lands by her testator at the time of his death, which occurred
The conon the 9th day of February, 1891.
veyance to the defendant was shown by the
production of the deed, which appeared to
have been recorded in the proper clerk's ofThe plaintiff pro3, 1875.
fice December
duced and put in evidence three papers found
in an envelope in the safe of Mr. Hutchins
after his death, and which vs^re shown to
have been in his possession during his life:
(1) A power of attorney under the hand and
seal of the defendant to John H. Piatt, who
was at the time of its execution the law
partner of the deceased, bearing date June
before a notary public
5, 1873, acknowledged
in the city of New York, who also became a
subscribing witness thereto. This instrument
authorized and conferred full power upon
Piatt to sell the land for $8,000, payment to
be made in the manner and as specified
therein.
(2) A letter in the defendant's handwriting, and bearing his signature, of the
adsame date as the power of attorney,
dressed to Piatt, in which, after referring
to the power of attorney, and giving instructions permitting him to take certain notes
for the pm'chase price of the land, the defendant says:
"Whatever is realized, you
will understand that it belongs to Waldo
Hutchins and myself, jointly and equally;
and any further instructions Mr. Hutchins
may give you, you may comply with."
(3)
Another paper, unsigned, but whoUy in the
defendant's handwriting, describing the land
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conveyed to hJm by Fenton.
It begins with
the statement that the "deed from Fenton to
me is a waiTanty deed, with full covenants,"
and, after the description, ends with the
statement
that "the above is the description of the property as contained in a deed
to me; nothing about our being entitled to
COO Inches."
The plaintifE also produced
several
letters written by the defendant
to the deceased and one of his sons, after
the execution
of the power of attorney,
in regard to taxes on the land; also, a letter written by the defendant
to E. H.
Fenton, then a tenant of a portion of the
land, bearing date Febmaiy
14, 1SS7,
in
which the defendant states that, "although
the title of the whole property is in me, there
is another party who has an interest.
expect to go to New York some time next week,
will see him, and let you know what
when
It is decided to do."
It is not necessary to
the plaintiff's case to show that the trust
was created by, or originated in, a writing.
The statute enacts a rule of evidence, and is
satisfied if the trust is manifested or proved
by a writing, however it originated, whether
by parol arrangement
or otherwise.
Ci"ane
V. Powell, 139 N. X. 379, 34 N. E. 911.
The
defendant's letter to Piatt refers to the power
of attorney, and that refers to the deed under which the title was held; giving its
date, and tiie parties to it.
Both are sisned
by the defendant, and reading them together,
as they .should be, the subject-matter
and
extent of the trust is sufficiently defined and
specified, even without the unsigned paper
and other letters.
This proof is sufficient to
sustain the findings of the learned trial judge,
to the eflrect that the defendant took and
held the title to the land in his own name,
but in trust for the benefit of liimself and the
plaintiff's testator, in equal shares, as tenants in common.
It was not, of com'se, one
of the express trusts authorized by statute,
but one arising under the forty-seventh section, which, in equity, entitled the deceased
to a beneficial interest, and vested in him an
estate of the same quality and diu'ation as
such interest
Ellwood v. Northrop, 106 N.
Y. 172-179, 12 N. E. 590.
We agree with the learned counsel for the
defendant that a trust cannot be impressed
upon what appears by the deed alone to tie
without
an absolute title in the defendant,
clear proof showing a beneficial interest in
another, as well as its natiu-e, character, and
extent, and that a failure to execute or deliver the necessary legal evidence to qa-illfy
Wadd v.
the title is fatal to such a claim.
Hazelton, 137 N. Y. 215, 33 N. E. 143; Van Cott
With
V. Prentice, 104 N. Y. 45, 10 N. E. 257.
this point clearly in view, we have carefully

the very able argument of counsel
in behalf of the defendant, mainly devoted
to the proposition that the proof in this case
does not come up to the standard which the
law demands in such cases. But we think
that the written evidence produced at the
trial is not fairly open to any construction
except that given to it by the learned trial
judge, and is consistent only with the theory
that the deceased had in fact a beneficial
interest in the lands. The defendant stated
under his own signatm'e, when authorizing
his attorney in fact to seU the property, that
he was entitled to one-half the price, and
directed the attorney to consult with him in
regard
to the execution
of the agency.
There is nothing in the case to warrant the
belief that this division of the proceeds of
the sales, when made, referred to compensation as a broker, or to anything else, save
an interest in the property to be sold. That
is the natm-al conclusion which the judicial
mind must reach upon reading the letters
and papers in the light of all the circumstances. The trust, it is true, must be established wholly by a writing sufficient within the statute; but, when the writing is prolike all other
duced, it must be interpreted,
contracts and written insti'uments, according
to the intention of the parties, ascertained
from the language used, and aU the surrounding circumstances.
The fact that no
proof was given by the plaintiff of payment by the testator of any part of the
consideration
is not material. It is not always possible, after the death of the party
interested, to give such proof, and it is not
essential to the process of establishing the
trust.
A writing without any consideration
whatever affords sufficient proof that the title
conveyed by the deed is for the benefit of
another.
The unsigned paper and the letters of the defendant bearing date subseand the
quent to the power of attorney,
letter which accompanied it, relating to the
taxes on the land, and the nature of the
defendant's
interest therein, were properly
admitted in evidence. They were all in the
defendant's handwriting, presumptively sent
or delivered by him to the deceased; and they
explained, and tended to confirm, what the
defendant had stated in the first letter in regard to the interests of the parties in the
considered

I

I
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land.

There are some other exceptions in the
record, but it is not necessary to refer to
them in detail.
It is sufficient to say that
we have examined them aU, and have found
nothing in them that would warrant us in
disturbing the judgment, and it should therefore be affirmed, with costs. All concur, except PECKHAM, J., not sitting.
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Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Marcli, 1872.

A. conveyed to B. certain land by an absolute conveyance, B. agreeing orally to hold
in trust for A. after satisfying claims he held
against A. At B.'s death the following writing was found among his papers.
"Boston, July 21, 1865. I, Benjamin Rand,
having purchased the estate of Isaac P.
Rand, of Roxbury, said estate being situated
partly in Roxbury and partly in Dorchester,
in the state of Massachusetts, for his deed delivered to me on July 21, 1865, do hereby
agree and bind myself and my heirs to pay
over to tha said Isaac P. Rand whatever balance shall remain over and above the amount
necessary to discharge my original claims
against Isaac P. Rand, and the charges
against the said estate, which by my purchase of the same have become vested In me,
the said payment to be made when ail such
claims and charges shall have been fully
liquidated and discharged. • * • And also
in all charges and expenses which have been
or shall be incurred by me or my heirs in discharging the above claims and charges and
in carrying on the estate. Benjamin Rand."
This was followed by the memorandum
which is given la the opinion. The plaintiff,
who is the assignee of A., brings this action
against the heir and administrator of B. to
recover the balance remaining after the satisfaction of the claims of B.
H. F. French & J. E. Maynadler, for plaintiff. E. D. Sohier & C. A. Welch, for defendants.

COLT, J. The bill

charges that Benjamin
Rand held the land conveyed to him by the
absolute deed of Isaac P. Band, upon trust to
apply the avails of it to the payment of certain incumbrances and debts due him, and
to account for any surplus to Isaac P. Rand,
the grantor, to whose right the plaintiff, as
assignee, has
succeeded.
The writings by
which it is claimed that this trust is declared are fully set forth, and it is alleged
that under the trust sales have been made
of more than enough to pay all demands and
charges, leaving a surplus, to which the plain-

tiff is entitled.
The defendants file a plea denying that
Benjamin in his lifetime held the land upon
any such trust, or that any trust was devolved upon them, as his representatives, by
The purpose, no doubt, is to obhis death.
tain first the decision of the court upon the
question whether, upon the facts disclosed,
any trust is raised which can be enforced;
for, if no trust shall be found to exist, then
acthe investigation of long and detailed
This is the point
counts will be avoided.
which was argued at the bar, and we proceed
to Its consideration without regard to suj)^sed irregularities in the pleadings.
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The land In question was conveyed by an
absolute quitclaim deed, dated on the 15th,
but delivered on the 21st day of July, 1865,
to Benjamin, who then held large demands
against Isaac P. Band, secured by mortgage
on the same premises.
The evidence sufficiently proves that Benjamin orally agreed,
at and before the time of the delivery of the
deed of the equity, and as part of the transaction, that any surplus over and above his
claim tlmt might remain of the estate or its
proceeds should belong to Isaac P. No written memorandum of the agreement was made
before the delivery of the deed, but it was
suggested at the time that Benjamin should
put it in the shape of a memorandum, safely
deposited, in case anything should happen to
him . And Benjamin
afterwards Informed
Isaac P. that soon after the transaction he
No
made a memorandum of the agreement.
such paper was ever dellvei-ed to, or came
into the possession of, Isaac P., but after the
death of Benjamin a writing of that description was found safely deposited in his bank
trunk. By the terms of this writing, he
agreed to pay over any balance of the estate
remaining, substantially in accordance with
It was signed by Benjathe oral agreement.
min, and dated July 21, 1865; and underneath the first signature was an additional
statement, also signed, in these words: "This
is made by me for the use of
memorandum
my executor or administrator only. Neither
Isaac P. Rand, nor those claiming under him,
have any legal or equitable claim against me
or my estate; but upon the payment of my
debt, interest, and all charges, as above mentioned, any balajice shall enure to the benefit of Isaac P. Rand and those claiming un-

der him."
We are of opinion that this writing is sufficient as a declaration of trust, within the
meaning of our statute.
It is much more
formal and particular in its statement than
declarations of this description by letter, by
answer in chancery, affidavit, recital in bond
or deed, or in pamphlet, which have aU been
held sufficient, and with reference to which
it is held to be no objection that they were
drawn up for another purpose and not addressed to, nor intended for the use of, the
cestui que trust. See cases cited in Browne,
St. Frauds, §§ 98, 99.
It is not essential that the memorandum relied on should have been delivered to any
one as a declaration of trust. It Is a question
of fact. In all cases, whether the trust had
been perfectly created;
and upon that question the delivery or nondelivery of the instrument is a significant fact, of greater or less
weight according to the circumstances.
K
the alleged trust arises from mere gift, delivery of the writing by which it is declared
is not always required as proof that the gift
was perfected, for the court will consider all
the facts bearing upon the question of intention, and It has been held that if a party execute a voluntary settlement,
and the deed

.ir.o
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recites that It Is sealed and delivered, it will
be binding on the settlor, even If he never
parts with it and keeps it in his possession
until his death. Bunn v. Winthrop, 1 Johns.
Ch. 329; Perry, Trusts, § 103, and cases cited.
It must always, however, appear that the
fiduciary relation is completely established,
and not left as a matter of executory agreement only, regard being had to the situation
of the property, the relations of the parties,
and the purposes and objects had in view.
In this case the verbal agreement in which
the trust originated was made in consideration of the conveyance by Isaac P. of his interest in the real estate, and the trust is
founded on a good consideration. The fact is
of weight in aiding the court to carry out the
and the want of a
intentions of the parties;
delivery of the memorandum becomes of less
significance.
The law as thus laid down is to be found
mainly in decisions under the words of the
English statute, which requires that all declarations and creations of trust shall be manThese were the
ifested or proved in writing.
words of our earlier law (St. 1783, c. 37, § 3),
and they remained until the first general revision of the statutes; the requirement of the
present statute being that the trust shall be
Gen. St c.
created or declared in writing.
The same change has been made
100, § 19.
in other states; and in those in which the
the
has been incidentally before
question
courts the tendency is to rule that this abbreviation in the words does not change the
or declared" are
law, and that "created
equivalent to "manifested or proved." Trusts
may be created In the first instance in writing. They more commonly originate In the

oral agreements and transactions of the parties, and are subsequently declared In writing. Our statute embraces both descriptions.
It had been settled by repeated decisions under the old statute, when this change was
made, that an express trust was sufficiently
declared if shown by any proper written evidence disclosing facts which created a fiduciary relation.
Under this construction, the
additional words of the old statute seemed
immaterial, and are omitted. And we are of
opinion that no change in the meaning or efPerry,
fect of it was intended or made.
Trusts, § 81, and cases cited.
In view of the law thus stated, the fact
that there was no delivery of the memorandum in this case is not of controlling importance.
It is impossible to account for its
unless there
existence and safe preservation,
was an intention that it should be used. If
necessary, to prove a trust. The statement
that it is made for the use of the executor or
administrator of the trustee implies this. The
cestui que trust was informed of its existence;
and by its terms a perfect trust is declared.
It is, Indeed, declared that neither Isaac P.,
nor those claiming under him, have any legal
or equitable claim against the maker or his
estate. But this statement, if such was its
Intention, cannot control the effect of the
memorandum in establishing the trust. That
results, as matter of law, from the proof.
We are IncUned to think that its intention
was not to defeat an equitable claim to the
proceeds of the estate conveyed, but only to
protect the maker against personal responsibility beyond the actual receipts in administering the trusts.
Decree for the plaintiff.
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In 1847 one Kennedy gave
Bates and his brother Thomas,
the plaintiff, a bond conditioned for the conveyance of certain parcels of land (estimated
at about two hundred and fifty acresj upon
payment of the obligee's notes. In 1851, before the maturity of all the notes, an adjustment was made, by which, in satisfaction of
the bond, he made conveyances of the bonded
land in two separate parcels, — one to Wm. W.
Bates, a third brother, and the other to Nicholas, who (with Wm. W. and the plaintiff)
subscribed and delivered to Kennedy a receipt indorsed upon the bond, setting forth
that he had received the deed of his portion,
"for himself and in trust for his brother
Thomas Bates, according to what the said
Thomas has or may pay towards the same
real estate, which amounts at present to seventy-flve dollars."
The price of the parcel
to Nicholas was $450, and
thus conveyed
Nicholas seems to have admitted a resulting
trust in favor of the plaintiff to the amount
of one-sixth of the purchase, which was binding upon him and all claiming under him
with notice.
Indeed the writing subscribed by Nicholas
Bates seems to be tantamount to a declaration of an express trust, so as to satisfy Rev.
St. c. 73. § 11.
The words "created and declared" in that
statute seem to be construed by the courts
to be synonymous with "manifested and
proved" as they stood in the original seventh section of the statute of frauds,— 29 Car.
II. c. 3. Forster v. Hale, 3 Ves. 707, 5 Ves.
308; Unitarian Society v. Woodbury, 14 Me.
281; Barrel! v. Joy, 16 Mass. 221; Pinnock
to Nicholas

Clough, 17 Vt 508.
Prom the cases just cited and numerous
or
others we see that a letter, memorandum,
recital subscribed by the trustee, whether addressed to or deposited with the cestui que
trust or not, or whether intended, when made,
to be evidence of the trust or not, will be sufficient to establish the trust when the subject,
object, and nature of the trust, and the parties and their relations to it and each other,
appear with reasonable certainty.
The existence of a trust in favor of the
plaintiff, which he may enforce against Nichand all
olas Bates and his representatives,
claiming under him with notice of the trust,
may be regarded as established.
Nicholas Bates mortgaged the property to
Kennedy to secure a balance of the purchase
V.
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money, and subsequently made two other
mortgages thereon to Philip M. Stubbs, the
scrivener who drew the conveyances from
Kennedy and wrote the indorsement upon the
bond containing the declaration of the trust.

Both of these last-named mortgages were
assigned to Prince Thompson, who had no
knowledge of the trust, and has given notice
of foreclosure, but has never been in possession of the property.
Nicholas Bates died in January, 1866, leaving a widow, Keziah M. Bates, now Keziah
M. Hurd, who is one of the respondents, and
who took out letters of administration on his
estate, inventoried the land as subject to the
mortgage to Prince Thompson, "and being
also held as a trust estate for Thomas Bates
This sum is
to the amount of about $140."
apparently the amount of the $75 originally
paid in by the plaintiff towards the purchase
money, with interest up to the time of the
making of the inventory. The widow continued in possession of the land, receiving
the rents and profits until November, 1868,
when she made sale thereof by license from
the probate court, without making mention
of the trust, to Daniel Day, who mortgaged
It back to her for part of the purchase money,
The widow married
and took possession.
George Hurd, the other respondent, and on
took a quitclaim deed
9, 1870,
September
'
from Day, and since then the two defendants
have occupied or had the exclusive use, income, and profit of the premises.
The plaintiff does not claim any rights as
The heirs of Nichagainst the mortgagees.
olas Bates are no longer Interested, as the
sale by the administratrix devested them of
all right and title in the premises.
The administratrix, In her Inventory, admitted the plaintiff's rights, and is fully
chargeable
with notice of them.
The other
respondent, her husband, seems to have occupied only under her. But a joint reception
by them of the rents and profits Is admitted
in the agreed statement He is therefore responsible to the plaintiff on this score with
her. The testimony establishes the fact that
the plaintiff made a claim upon the administratrix for his Interest, and that there was
more or less negotiation between them looking to an adjustment
It Is unfortunate for
both that an equitable adjustment could not
be reached without litigation.
In the hands of these respondents it Is obvious that the property Is subject to the
trust which the plaintiff seeks to enforce.
They object that he might have had an adequate remedy at law by a suit for his share
of the income. But cases of trust are, under
our statute, specially made the subject of
remedies In equity, and, moreover, it might
be desirable for him to have the decree to
which he Is entitled In equity as against
them, in view of the possibility of a redemp-

tion.
Unless

the

parties can

agree

as

to

the

:?G2
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proper sum to be allowed for the past rents
and profits, a master must be appointed to ascertain them.
Bill sustained.
Estate declared subject, In
the hands of these respondents, to the trust

Masasserted.
Costs for the complainant.
ter to be appointed at nisi prius, If required.

APPLETON, C. J., and WALTON, DANFORTH, and PETERS, JJ., concurred.
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It declares
a rule of evidence.
that the existence of an express trust of lands
shall be proved by nothing but written evidence and rigorously excludes all other evidence as a means of establishing the fact of
the existence of such a trust, but it does not
inhibit the creation of a trust of this kind by
parol.
It has accordingly been held that a
valid express trust of land may be created
by parol, provided it is subsequently declared
and manifested in the manner directed by the
ly prescribes

Eq. 47.)

of New Jersey.
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and B. A. Quayle, for comTheodore Little, for defendant.

VAN FLEET, V. C. This suit is brought
to enforce an express trust. Prior to April
2, 1879, the complainant was the owner of a
lot of land in Morristown.
On that day he
conveyed it to his son John, who on the same
day conveyed it to the coinplainant's wife.
Both deeds were voluntary. The complainant's wife continued to hold the title until
November 26, 1883, when she and complainant conveyed it to their daughter Celia, the
defendant In this suit. Celia, on the same
day, and as part of the transaction by which
she became invested with title, made a deed
to the complainant. The object of the two
conveyances
was to change the title from
the wife to the husband.
No consideration
Celia, at the time of this
was paid for either.
transaction, was a minor, being only 19
years of age. Her deed, therefore, while not
void, was voidable.
No acts, in confirmation
of her deed, performed since she attained full
age, are either alleged or proved.
Since attaining full age, she has refused to execute
a deed in confirmation of the one she made
while a minor, but now insists that that deed,
by reason of her minority, is of no effect,
and that the title to the land still remains in
her, and that she is under no duty to convey
it to the complainant. The complainant, on
the contrary, insists that the defendant took
title subject to a trust, the trust being that
she should convey the land to him, and having thus far failed to execute it effectually,
and now refusing to do so, the court should
compel her to execute it.
There can be no doubt about the fact. The
circumstances attending the transfer of the
title to the defendant render It conspicuously
clear that the purpose of all persons concerned in the transaction was to change the title
It is obvious
from the wife to the husband.
It
that the transaction had no other object.
is clear, therefore, that the defendant took
title subject to a trust, and that the trust
was an express one. The only question
which the case presents is. Is the trust manifested In such manner that equity can take
cognizance of it and enforce it? The existence of such a trust can be proved by nothThe direction
ing short of written evidence.
of the statute of frauds upon this subject is
imperative. It declares that all declarations
and creations of trust of lands shall be manifested and proved by some vfriting signed
by the party enabled to declare the trust, or
else they shall be utterly void and of no
Revision, 445, § 3. This statute mereeffect.

statute.
In Smith v. Howell, 11 N. J. Eq. 349, the
trust sought to be enforced was not declared
by writing until more than 16 years after its
creation, and yet the court decreed its execution.
Chancellor Williamson in that case
said the statute does not require that the
trust shall be created by writing, but that it
shall be manifested and proved by writing.
And he also held that where the integrity of
a trust not put in writing at the time of its
creation, but subsequently declared by writing, was assailed, parol evidence was competent to show whether or not it had in fact
been created at the time the conveyance was
"A question
made.
On this point he said:
of fraud— that is, whether the trust was really created at the time of the execution of the
instrument or deed to which the manifestation of the trust refers— is always an open
question.
Suppose a judgment or some other
lien has attached to the property in the interval between the execution of the deed
and the declaration of the trust, it would be
necessary, in order to defeat such lien, to
show that the trust was bona fide created at
the time of the execution of the deed. This
may, however, be done by parol evidence, because the statute does not require that the
trust shall be created, but only manifested
by writing."
The doctrine of this case was
fully approved by the court of errors and appeals in Jamison v. Miller, 27 N. J. Eq. 586.
Parol evidence was admitted in this case to
establish the fact that a trust had been crewith the
ated by parol contemporaneously
execution of the deed by which the title was
made to the trustee.
The trust was declared, some time subsequent to its creation, by
several writings, one of which was the defendant's answer.
The court said: "The
writings [meaning the declaration of trust]
are but evidence;
the trust is anterior and
independent;
and the rights which the court
regards are those that spring from the creation, not the mere proof of the trust."
The
rule must be considered settled that a valid
parol trust of land may be created by parol,
but the existence of the trust cannot be provThe written
ed except by written evidence.
evidence, however, may be made long subsequent to the creation of the trust
The only written evidence or manifestation
of the trust which the complainant has offered in this case is that which is contained in
The bill alleges that the land
the pleadings.
in question was conveyed by the complain-
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ant and his wife to the defendant for the sole
inirpose and with the express understanding
that the defendant should, immediately after
acquiring title, convey it to the complainant.
The defendant was required to answer under
oath, and has done so.
By her answer she
says

that

she has no reason to doubt the
above allegation of the bill.
Does this constitute
such evidence of the
trust as to render it proper for the court to
decree its execution?
The proof of the trust,
in my judgment, is complete.
The declaration is in writing; it is signed by the trustee;
it was made after she became competent to
declnre a trust; it is verified by her oath;
and its terms are plainly stated.
The prin^
eiple is settled that an answer to a bill in
equity may be sufficient, as a declaration of
a trust, to justify the court in decreeing its
execution.
Chancellor A^room, in Hutchinson
V. Tindall, 3 X. J. Eq. S.j", held that, where
a complainant flies a bill, alleging that a
deed made to the defendant is subject to a
trust in his favor, and praying that it may
be so decreed, and the defendant answers,
admitting the trust, the defendant's answer
will constitute sufficient evidence of the trust
to waiTaut the court in decreeing its execution.
And the same efficacy was given by
llie court of errors and appeals to an answer
in chancery, even in case where the declaration was volunteered, or rather was not made
in response to the bill. Jamison v. Jliller, 27
X. J. Eq. 586.
It is wholly unimportant on
what part of the declaration of trust the trustee signs his name.
He may sign it at the
bottom, at the top, at the side, or in the middle. He may sign by simply making his
initials. Wherever or in whatever form his
signature may be made, it vrill be sufficient
within the meaning of the statute, if what he
does is done for the purpose of giving authenticity to the instrument.
Smith v. Howell,
11 X. ,T. Eq. 349.

truth

of the

The defendant in this case signed the affidavit to her answer, not only for the purpose
of authenticating the answer, but also for the
purpose of verifying its contents.
It must
therefore be held that a valid trust in the
land in question in favor of the complainaut
has been proved by evidence of the kind required by the statute.
This being so, the
complainant now stands invested with a full
and complete estate In equity in the laud in
question.
The land, in equity, belongs to the
complainant,
and the defendant simply holds
the dry, naked legal title in trust for the
complainant.
In this condition of affairs, the
defendant
cannot defeat the complainant's
right to a conveyance by showing that the
land was conveyed to her, or to her grantor,
in fraud of creditors.
Ownes v. Ownes, 23
X. J. Eq. 60, is decisive against the validity
of such a defense. Chaucellor Zabriskie in
that case said: "I Ivuow of no case in which
a court of equity has refused to enforce a
trust, actually declared and vested, on account of fraud in the conveyance to the trustee who declared the trust."
The fraud here
charged is against the conveyance by which
title was put in the wife. The defendant
says that the complainant put the title to the
land in controversy in his wife to defraud his
creditors.
The proof in support
of this
charge is of the most meager character.
But
suppose it be admitted that that conveyance
was fraudulent as to the complainant's creditors, there can be no doubt that it was good
against him, nor that it gave to his wife as
full and complete dominion over the land,
against everybody except his creditors, as an
honest conveyance
would have given. As
against everybody except creditors her title
was unimpeachable,
and she consequently
might, as against all the world except the
creditors of her husband, make a valid conveyance of it in trust or otherwise.
The complainant is entitled to a decree.
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VAN FLEET, V. C. The complainant is
the widow of David G. Danser. She seeks
to have a parol trust established and enforced against the defendant. She alleges
that her husband, some months before his
death, assigned the bond and mortgage in
controversy to the defendant, upon a parol
trust or understanding that he would forthwith, or by a short day, transfer them to her.
The transfer to the defendant was intended
to be merely a step in vesting her with title.
The assignment to the defendant bears date
February 1, 1875, and Danser died on the
13th day of the following September.
The
bond and mortgage were in Danser's possession at the time of his death, and have since
then been constantly In the possession of tlie
complainant. The defendant has never asked for them, nor attempted to get possession of them. A month or six weeks prior
to Danser's death, the defendant directed an
assignment to be drawn to the complainant,
stating to the person to whom he gave the
direction that he must draw it for Danser,
who would pay him. He, at the same timo,
said it was right that the old lady — referring
to the complainant — should have the bond

Danser, at this time, was
and mortgage.
prostrated by the disease which shortly afterwards caused his death. The defendant
did not remain to execute the assignment,
but said he would return soon and do so.
He did not return that day. He was subsequently informed, on two or three different
occasions, while Danser was living, that the
assignment had been drawn and was ready
On each occasion he said he
for execution.
Jiad forgotten or neglected to execute it, but
would call soon and do so. He never fultilled his promise. Two or three weeks after
Danser's death, he called for the assignment
Danser had made to him, and which he had
left when he gave direction for the draft of
the one to the complainant, and stated that
he meant to do what was right about the
matter, but he would not execute the assign
meut to the complainant until things were
lixed up; Danser owed him. He took both
papers, and has never executed the assignment to the complainant.
This narrative comprises only those facts
which are not disputed by either party.
The defendant denies that the mortgage
was transferred to him subject to a trust,
but says, on the contrary, that the assignment was made to satisfy a promissory note
he held against Danser, upon which there
was due $2,000 of principal and a year and
six or seven months' interest His explana-
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tion of the preparation, by his direction, of
an assignment to the complainant, is this:
He says, some time after the execution of
the assignment to him, he ascertained that
the person who made the mortgage had no
title on record for the mortgaged premises;
that he went at once to Danser, and told
him he had swindled him, and that if he did
not take the mortgage back he would make
him. He says that Danser replied that the
mortgagor's title was all right, but if he was
dissatisfied he would pay him his debt, or
give him another security, and he could then
reassign the mortgage.
He further says that
it was ultimately arranged that Danser
should have two mortgages, which were the;i
liens on his lands, canceled, and execute a
mortgage thereon to him, and he was then
to assign the mortgage in controversy to tlie
complainant. He says it was after this
scheme had been agreed upon that he ordeied the assignment to the complainant to be
drawn.
These statements present the question of
fact to be decided. The counsel of the de
fendant, however, insists that, as a matter
of law, the bill in this case must be dismissed, regardless of what the evidence demonstrates the truth to be in respect to the trust
alleged, his contention being that the trust
set up by the complainant is one which cannot be established except by written evidence. The trust, it will be observed, affects
personal property, and not lands. The sub
ject of it is a debt. That part of the statute
of frauds which enacts that all declarations
and creations of trust shall be manifested
by writing, and signed by the party creating
the same, or else shall be void and of no
effect, applies only to ti-usts of lands, and
has no application to trusts of personal property.
A valid trust of personalty may be
created verbally, and proved by parol evidence. A trust of personal property, almost
precisely like the one under consideration,
and which had been created by mere spoken
words, and was supported by only parol
evidence, was upheld by Chancellor Williamson in Hooper v. Holmes, 11 N. J. Eq. VS2;
also KimbaU v. Morton, 5 N. J. Eq. 26; Sayre
V. Fredericks, 16 N. J. Eq. 205; Eaton v.
Cook, 25 N. J. Eq. 55; 2 Story, Eq. Jur.
§972; 1 Perry, Trusts, § 86. A valid trust
of a mortgage debt may be created by parol ;
for, though a trust thus created cannot embrace the laud held in pledge, yet it is good
as to the debt, and will entitle the cestui
que trust to sufficient of the proceeds of
sale, when the land is converted into money,
to pay the debt. Sayre v. Fredericks, supra;
Benbow v. Townsend, 1 Mylne & K. 506;
Childs V. Jordan, 106 Mass. 321.
It must be held, then, that the trust alleged in this case is valid, and if it has
been sufficiently proved, the complainant is
entitled to have it established and enforced.
The question then is, has it been proved? A
high degree of evidence should be required.

EXPRESS TRUSTS.

366

Before the court ingrafts a trust upon a
written instrument, absolute on its face, it
should require the most cogent proof. Such
proof,
think, has been furnished in this
ease. The undisputed facts make a strong
case against the defendant. He attempts to
explain and moderate the force of the one
having the greatest weight. I refer, of course,
to the fact that he had an assignment drawn
to the complainant, and that when he gave
the order he said it was right that she should
have the bond and mortgage.
His attempted
explanation has, however, resulted in a series
of contradictions which utterly destroy his
testimony.
By his answer, which is under oath, he
says that after he sent his assignment to
Ocean county for record, he was informed
that the mortgagor had no title on record f 5r
the mortgaged
premises, and that he went
at once to see Danser, and that an arrangement was then made by which Danser \\ms
either to pay his debt or substitute another
security, and he was then to reassign the
moi'tgage.
His assignment was not lodgnd
for record until October 23, 1875. Danser
had then been dead more than a month, so
that the arrangement, at the time stated,
was unquestionably a fabrication. AN'hen the
defendant came to testify, he swore that, before he lodged his assignment for record, he
had heard, from one George P. Conover, that
the mortgagor had no title, and he went at
once to see Danser. But it is perfectly clear,
from the evidence, that Uonover could not
liave given this information until long after
Danser's death; for he did not have it himself. Conover obtained his information from
and the mortgagor swears
the mortgages,
that he first obtained it from a search male
in December, 187G. The defendant was subsequently recalled and re-examined, against
the complainant's objection, and without an
order for that purpose, and then swore that
one Edward P. Jacobus first informed him
that the mortgagor had no title, and that
this information was given to him very soon
after the assignment was made to him. But,
upon the examination of Jacobus, it was
shown that the search from which he obtained his information was not made until after
Danser had been dead more than a month.
So it is perfectly clear that the information
which the defendant says led to his interview with Danser did not come to him until
after Danser was dead, and the conclusion
is therefore unavoidable that no such inter-

I

view as he describes took place. The tergiversation of the defendant upon this point
renders his testimony unworthy of credit.
I find it impossible to believe him.
It must also be remarked that the defendant's conduct in relation to the custody of
the bond and mortgage,
as portrayed by
himself, shows very clearly that he did not
believe they were his property. He says
the bond and mortgage
were delivered
to
liim, with the assignment, on the day of the
date of the assignment, and that he took
them to a hotel, in which he and Danser
were jointly interested, and which was under the management
of Danser, and threw
them in a desk in the bar-room.
He retained the assignment.
He gave them no further
care or attention, but carried the assignment
to his house, and placed it in his safe. He
does not know when or how Danser got possession of the bond and mortgage.
So far as
appears, he has never tried to find out. Danser did not live in the hotel, but occupied a
dwelling in the village where the hotel was
located.
The defendant says, that while
Danser was sick, on the occasion of his last
visit to him, Danser told the complainant to
get the bond and mortgage and give them
to him, but that she refused to do so, and,
to repeat his own words, "she was just as
cross to me as she could be." He did not
ask Danser why he had taken them from
the desk, nor did he insist upon their being at once surrendered. He never asked
for them after Danser's death, nor did he
make any attempt to obtain possession of
them. Every phase of his conduct evinces
a consciousness
that he had no right to
them, and that any attempt to take them
from the possession
of the complainant
would be met by a resistance which he knew
was grounded in right and truth. The evidence, in my opinion, fully establishes the
trust alleged.
The defendant also insists that the trust
upon which the complainant's
action is
founded should not be enforced, because it
was concocted to cheat and defraud Danser's creditors. It is enough to say of this
contention that no such defence is presented by the answer, and that the complainant's right to a decree cannot be defeated
by a defence she has had no opportunity to
meet and disprove.
There must be a decree establishing the
trust, and requiring the defendant to execute it. The defendant must pay costs.
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Action to recover dower and mesne profits. Defendant pleaded a provision by will
in lieu of dower, and failure of the widow
to elect. There was a judgment for plaintiff, from which defendant appealed.
T. W. Dwight,
for
Tracy, for respondent.

appellant.

Charles

DAVIS, J. The testator not having declared in express terms that the provisions
made by his will for his widow are given in
lieu of dower, she is not put to her election
unless the devises of the will "be so repugnant to the claim of dower, that they cannot
stand together." Lewis v. Smith, 9 N. Y.
002; Church v. Bull, 2 Denlo, 430; Jackson
V. Churchill, 7 Cow. 287; Savage v. Burnham, 17 N. Y. 562. This rule is a familiar
one, and needs no further citation of authority.

In this case the provisions made
will and codicil for the widow are
lows: 1. The will gives her all the

S67

them, with full power and authority to rent,
lease, repair and insure any portion of the
estate during any period of time the same

KETCHUM.

of New York.
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hold furniture and jewelry of every kind in
use by her and the testator,
or either of
them. 2. One-third of the net income of all
the real estate belonging to the testator,
after payment of all taxes, assessments and
interest due thereon, to commence to be paid
to her six months after the testator's decease, and to be paid to her every six months
thereafter, during her life. The codicil adds,
"a suitable provision in money," "to be paid
to her during the first six months, till the
payment of her provisions under the will
shall commence," and the use during her
natural life of the apartments in the house
No. 615 Fourth street, New York, as occupied by her and her husband, as a residence
at the date of the codicil, with the election
to have such other suitable residence in any
other house belonging to him at the time
of his decease that she might prefer.
After making these provisions the will disposes of all the "rest, residue and remainder
of the estate," by directing in substance that
it be divided equally among his surviving
children and the children of his deceased
children. If any there should be, six months
after the death of his widow.
executors,
and
The will then nominates
clothes them "with full power and authority
to carry out all the provisions of the will,"
and if they deem it necessary or proper to a
fair division of the property among the parties entitled thereto, to sell either at public
or private sale the personal and real estate,
or any portion thereof, and execute deeds
thereof, and to divide the proceeds as thereinbefore directed; but no sale to be made
till six months subsequent to the death of
the testator and his wife. It also clothes
"the survivor or survivors of
the executors,

may remain unsold or undivided."
In Savage v. Burnham, 17 N. Y. 561, the
testator devised and bequeathed all of his
to trustees; the
estate, real and personal,
real estate upon trust to sell after the death
of his wife. The will provided that during
her life, the widow should "receive and take
to her own use one-third part of the clear
yearly rents and profits of the real estate,
and that the residue of the clear yearly rents
and profits should be deemed a part of the
personal estate, and subject to the dispositions of the will concerning the personal estate."
The entire estate, with all its income, except the one-third of the rents and profits
of the land, was given (through the trusts)
to the testator's children and the children of
his daughters.
It was held that a claim of
dower could not stand consistently with
these provisions, and that the widow was
put to her election.
Upon the authority of that case, if the
will in question creates a trust and vests the
entire legal estate in the trustees, the provision made for the widow is inconsistent
with the right of dower, and she was bound
to elect. In that case her claim of dower,
if allowed, would inevitably defeat the
scheme of the will, for it would prevent the
trustees from holding the legal title of the
whole estate, and receiving the entire rents
and profits for the purpose of paying taxes,
assessments, interest, repairs and Insurance,
and ascertaining the net income, of which
one-third is to be paid to the widow, and the
residue ultimately to the other beneficiaries.
The first question then is, are the executors, under this will, made trustees of an express trust? The word "trust" or "trustee"
is not used in the will, but that is only a
circumstance to be noted in considering the
question.
"It is by no means necessary that
the donee should be expressly directed to
hold the property to certain uses or in trust,
or as a trustee. * * * It is one of the fixed rules of equitable construction, that there
is no magic in particular words; and any expressions that show unequivocally the intention of the parties to create a trust will have
that effect It was said by Lord Eldon, that
the word 'trust* not being made use of, is a
circumstance to be alluded to, but nothing
more; and if the whole frame of the will
creates a trust, the law is the same though
the word 'trusf is not used."
Hill, Trustees
(3d Am. Ed.) 99; (Orig. Ed. 65) and cases
there cited.
We are in this case to determine the question by the authority conferred and the duties imposed.
The executors
are clothed
"with fuU power and authority to rent, lease,
repair and insure" the estate "during any
period of the time it shall remain unsold
and
undivided."
That period is, at all
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events, to last tmtil six months after tbe
decease of the widow. They are also ia
general language dothed "with full power
and authority to carry out aU the provisions
of this will." It is apparent that the "net
income of all the real estate" is to be ascertained by some person or persons once in six
months during the life of the widow, "after
all taxes, assessments and interest due thereon are paid." One-third of this net income
is to be paid to the widow. By whom is
this duty to be performed? It is clearly impracticable for the various tenants of the
estate to perform it; neither collectively nor
individually have they the means of determining the facts upon which the net income
and it would be extremely
is ascertained,
embarrassing so to frame leases that each
tenant should be subject to pay to the widow
an amount of his rent that should discharge
the proportion his rent bore to the net income of the whole estate, after payment of
all taxes, assessments and interest due on the
whole. Collating the power to rent, lease,
repair, and insure, with the duty that rests
somewhere to pay aU taxes, assessments and
interest, and then to pay to the widow onethird of the net income after such payment,
in dethere seems to be no embarrassment
termining where the duty rests. To my
mind it is apparent that the scheme of this
vriU requires that the whole income, rents
and profits of the real estate shall be received by the executors until the sale and
division provided for; and that they are the
persons on whom the duty to pay one-third
of the net Income to the widow is imposed.
They are to maJie the ultimate division, and
consequently
to retain for that pui'pose the
income not paid semi-annually to the widow.
The rents and profits of all the real estate
are given to them for several purposes:
1.
To keep down taxes, assessments and interest by paying them; 2. To ascertain the "net
income" by deducting from the gross receipts the amount paid for those purposes;
3. To pay one-third
of the net income thus
ascertained to the widow every six months;
4. To repair and Insure the premises out of
the residue; and 5. To retain the balance
for division, and finally divide it among the
daughters or their children after the decease
of the widow. The imposition of these various duties by the will make the acting executors trustees for their performance to the
same extent as though declared to be so by
The authority
the most explicit language.
to sell the real estate and execute deeds
thereof, as given by the will, standing by
itself, would confer nothing but a power;
but coupled as it is with the various provisions for leasing, repairing and insuring,
with the obligation to give to the widow a
residence as she may elect in any of the
houses of the testator, it goes far to show
that it was the testator's intention to vest
But
the fee of the estate in the trustees.
however that may be, it is well settled that

trustees take the legal estate whenever they
are clothed with the authority which the
foregoing construction of the will gives to
the executors in this case.
"If land be devised to three persons and
their heirs in trust to permit A. to receive
the net profits for her life for her own use,
and after her death to permit B. to receive
the net profits for her life, ete., it has been
held that the legal estate is in the trustees,
for that they are to receive the rents and
thereout pay the land tax and other charges
on the estate, and hand over the net rents
only to the tenant for life." Lewin, Trusts,
2i8; Baker v. Greenwood, 4 Mees. & W. 421;
White V. Parker, 1 Bing. N. C. 573.
In White v. Parker, the trustees were to
permit the testator's wife and daughters to
receive the clear rents of three parts and his
son the clear rent of one part— the trustees
to pay all outgoings, to repair and let the
premises.
It was held that the legal estate
In the note to 2
vested in the trustees.
Wms. Saund. 11, the rule is thus laid down:
"Where something is to be done by the trustees which makes it necessary for them to
have the legal estate, such as payment of
the rents and profits to another's separate
use, or of the debts of the testator, or to pay
rates and taxes, and keep the premises in
repair, the legal estate is vested in them,
and the grantee has only a trust estate."
In Birmingham v. Kerivan, 2 Schoales &
L. 444, Lord Redesdale said that a direction
to keep a house in repair applied to the
whole house, and could not be considered
an obligation on a person claiming dower.
When therefore the testator authorized his
executors to repair, he did not expect that
they would control two-thirds of the estate
and the widow one-third, but that they would
manage the entire property.
The authority to rent and lease, to repair
and to insure, by necessary implication vests
the trustees with the legal title. They must
not only execute leases, but enforce them,
put in tenants and dispossess them, the proper performance of which requires the title
of the estate. So to repair there must be
such a right of entry and control in the trustees as gives them complete dominion; and
to insure involves the necessity of ownership,
for the policy must be taken in the name of
But to repair and to insure
the trustees.
necessarily involve expenses chargeable upon the rents and profits; and an executor
who is authorized to lease, repair and insure
by necessary implication may so lease that
rents will come to his hands out of which
to pay repairs and insm-ance, and if a net
income is to be paid out of such rents, the
executor becomes the party whose duty it is
to ascertain and pay it In Leggett v. Perkins,
2 N. Y. 297, the testator constituted his executors trustees of the estate devised to his
daughters for Ufe, and authorized them to
take charge of, manage and improve the
same, and pay over to them from time to

EXPRESS
time the rents, Interest and income thereof.
It was held to be "very obvious that the legal estate in the premises was necessary to
enable the trustees to discharge their duties," and that the trust was a valid one
under the third subdivision of section 55 of
the statutes of uses and trusts (1 Rev. St.
729), and that by section 60 of the same statute, the whole estate in law and equity vested in the trustees.
In Brewster v. Striker, 2 N. X. 19, the testator devised his real estate to his grandchildren, and then provided that the lands
should not be sold or alienated, but that his
executors should lease or rent the same and
pay the rents, issues and profits to his said
grandchildren, etc.; it was held that the
executors were' trustees for the purposes of
the will, and took, by implication, the legal
estate during the lives of the grandchildren.
to be
These
authorities are conceived
abundant to establish the proposition that
the authority to lease, rent, repair, insure,
pay taxes, assessments and interest, and pay
net income to devisees, carried the legal title
to the executors in this case, and created a
trust in them valid under the statute.
It follows therefore from the decision of
this court in Savage v. Burnham, that a
claim of dower is totally inconsistent with
the provisions of the will, and the. plaintiff
was not at liberty to take both the provisions of the will and dower.
In the language of Gomstock, J., in the
case cited: "During
her life she was to
liave one-third of the clear rent and profits,
and the other two-thirds were to go into a
general fund for distribution. The entire es-
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tate, with all its income, except the one-third,
is given in the clearest possible terms, to the
testator's
children and the children of his
It is therefore impossible for her
daughters.
to receive any part of it, except what is expressly given to her, without subverting the
will to that extent."
The circuit judge erred in directing a ver-

dict for plaintiff.

I

have considered the question as to the
effect of the alleged release of dower. In
my opinion, the instrument was not designed
for any such purpose as a release of dower,
Its oband ought not to be so construed.
jects are apparent on its face; to-wit, to dispose of the vexed question as to her rights
under the provision of the will directing
moneys to be paid to her for her suitable
support the first six months, and protecting
the executors on paying her a sum which
might prove larger than was designed by the
surrogate's decree, and the instrument ought
to be construed accordingly.
I am not embarrassed by the question of
parties, nor the form of the judgment
The
Code authorizes all persons having confiicting claims to be made pai-ties. Code, § 118.
The defendants who appeared and answered,
admitted the receipt of the rents and profits
putting nothing
as alleged in the complaint,
but the amount In issue. They are the heirs
at law, and the statute authorizes the verdict for rents and profits against them.
The judgment below should be reversed,
and new trial ordered, costs to abide event.
All the judges concurring, the judgment
was reversed and a new trial ordered.
Judgment reversed.
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WARNER
(98

Supreme

Judicial

V.

Jl!iss.

BATES.i
274.)

Court of Massachusetts.

Nov., 1867.

Bill in equity filed September 4, 1865, by
a son of Sarah I. Bates, deceased, seeking
for a decree to enforce performance by tlie
respondent, his stepfather, of a trust created
by her will.
The bill aUegod that on December 12, 1833,
being a widow, having a
the deceased,
daughter and two sons, of whom the complainant was one, and owning property to
the amount of more than $100,000, was married to the respondent, and her property secured by a settlement from any marital right
or claim which otherwise he might have
thereto;
that thereafter, until her death on
May 17, 1859, she and the respondent, with
these childr.}n, and with another daughter,
the Issue of this marriage, lived together as
one family in her hoiise, where she and her
children had formerly resided; that the expenses of maintaining the family in a liberal
style suitable to their circumstances were
defrayed chiefly from the income of her
having but little
property,
the respondent
property of his own, but acting as the head
of the family, having the general care thereof, and managing the funds for its maintenance;
and that she left a will of which
she named the respondent sole executor, and
an estate of which there was a large residue
after paying her debts.
This will was set forth in the bill; bore
1857;
date of December
30
was indorsed
with the approval of the respondent under
date of October 1, 1858; was amended by a
codicil dated April 14, 1859, in particulars
and disposed of
not needful to be recited;
the estate during the respondent's life as fol-

lows:

"I

give and bequeath unto my husband,
Bates aforesaid, the use, income and
improvement of all the estate, real, personal
and mixed, of which I shall die seised and
possessed, for and during the term of his
natural life, in the full confidence that upon
my decease he will, as he has heretofore
done, continue to give and aflord my children" (enumerating them) "such protection,
comfort and support as they or either of
them may stand in need of."
Upon the death of the respondent, it gave
one half of the estate to the complainant
and his brother; and the other half to three
by name, "and to the
persons designated
survivors or survivor of them, their or his
executors, administrators or assigns, to have
and to hold the same upon and for the uses,
trusts and purposes mentioned and expressed
" and then set
of and concerning the same
forth minutely certain trusts for the benefit
of the two daughters.
The bill further alleged that, after the
George

1 Argued

November, 1866.
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death of the testatrix, the respondent, under
the clause of the will first above quoted,
took possession of the estate remaining after
payment of the debts; that the complainant
with his brother and unmarried sister continued to reside in the house as before, and
to receive from the respondent, without payment or charge therefor, the benelits and
privileges which childi-en of their condition
usually receive in their own families, until,
on or a.bout April 1, 1863, the respondent, in
the complainant's absence, removed the complainant's effects from the house, and ever
since forbade and prevented him from coming into it, and neglected and refused to give
him the said benefits and privileges which
he had before enjoyed,
or make him any
thereof;
compensation
instead
reasonable
that in 1850 the complainant became and
ever afterwards was a clerk in a counting
room in Boston; that up to the time of his
mother's death his salary had never exceedT^hich
fact she well
ed $400 per annum,
knew; that In 1858, 1859 and 1860, it was at
that rate, but from 1860 to 1864 did not in
any year exceed $200; that from 1864 until
the filing of this bill it was at the rate of
$600 per annum; that at the time of his exclusion from the house in 1863 he had saved
from his salary of previous years only $250;
that afterwards, during that year. In order
to obtain means for his support, he sold for
$700 his reversion of some land belonging to
his mother's estate; that these two sums,
together with his salary, included all his
means of support, except such provision as
was made for him in the will, and were and
are wholly inadequate thereto; thai he stood
in need of such support as he had been accustomed to receive in Ms mother's lifetime:
and that the respondent, though well aware
thereof, and often requested therefor, refused to give It.
The respondent filed a general demurrer;
and the case was reserved by Chapman, J.,
for the consideration of the full court.
G. O. Shattuck and J. B. Thayer, for complainant. B. D. Sohier and C. A. Welch, for
respondent.

BIGEIX)W, C. .T. We see no sufilcient
ground for calling in question the wisdom
or policy of the rule of construction uniformly applied to wills in the courts in England and in most of the United States, that
or wish,
words of entreaty, recommendation
addressed by a testator to a devisee or legatee, will make him a trustee for the person
or persons in whose favor such expressions
are used, provided the testator has pointed
out with clearness and certainty the objects
of the trust, and the subject-matter on which
it is to attach or from which it is to arise
and be administered. The criticisms which
have been sometimes applied to this rule by
textwriters and in judicial opinions will be
found to rest mainly on its applications in
particular cases, and not to involve a doubt
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the correctness
of the rule itself as a
principle of construction. Indeed, we
cannot understand the force or validity of
the objections urged against it, 11 care is
taken to keep it in subordination to the primary and cardinal rule that the intent of the
testator is to govern, and to apply it only
where the creation of a trust will clearly
subserve that intent. It may sometimes be
difficult to gather that intent, and there is
always a tendency to construe words as
obligatory in furtherance of a result which
accords with a plain moral duty on the part
of a devisee or legatee, and with what it
may be supposed the testator would do if he
could control his action. But difficulties of
this nature, which are inherent in the subject-matter, can always be readily overcome
by bearing in mind and rigidly applying in
aU such cases the test, that to create a trust
it must clearly appear that the testator intended to govern and control the conduct of
the party to whom the language of the will
is addressed, and did not design it as an expression or indication of that which the testator thought would be a reasonable exercise of a discretion which he intended to reIf the objects
pose in the legatee or devisee.
of the supposed trust are certain and definite; if the property to which it is to attach
is clearly pointed out; if the relations and
situation of the testator and the supposed

oC

sound

que trustent are such as to indicate
a strong interest and motive on the part of
the testator in making them partakers of his
hounty; and above all if the recommendatory or precatory clause is so expressed as to
warrant the inference that it was designed
to be peremptory on the donee,— the just and
reasonable interpretation is, that a trust is
created, which is obligatory and can be enforced in equity as against the trustee by
those in whose behalf the beneficial use of
1 Jarm. Wills, 333;
the gift was intended.
Id. § 43; 2
1 Redf. Wills, § 17, els. 11-13;
Story, Bq. Jur. §§ 1068-1070; Malim v.
Keighley, 2 Ves. Jr. 333, 529; Bernard v.
MinshuU, Johns. Bug. Oh. 287; Williams v.
Williams, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 358; Bouser v. Kinnear, 2 GifC. 195;
Knight v. Boughton, 11
€lark & F. 513, 551; Harrison v. Harrison's
Adm'x, 2 Grat. 1; Coate's Appeal, 2 Pa. 129;
McKonkey's Appeal, 13 Pa. 253; Erickson v.
Willard, 1 N. H. 217; Van Amee v. Jackson,
^5 Vt. 173.
The doctrine was recognized as
an established
rule of construction by this
<;ourt in Whipple v. Adams, 1 Mete. 444, and
Homer v. Shelton, 2 Mete. 194, 206.
Turning now to the clause of the will
which is the subject of the present controversy, it seems to us that it does not leave the
support of the children of the testatrix to the
discretion of the respondent, to be afforded
or withheld at his pleasure, but that the devise to him was made on the trust that he
should furnish such support so long as he
lived and received the income of h^r property.
The objects of the tnist are distinctly named.
•cestuis
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The nature and extent of the trust is clearly
It was such a sum of
stated and defined.
money as might be necessary to the comfort
and support of each one of the children of
Nor is the amount of the benethe testatrix.
or without a
ficial interest left indefinite
It is
standard by which it can be measured.
to be such comfort and support "as they or
The
either of them may stand in need of."
extent of such a beneficial interest can be
by suitable proascertained
and enforced
Thorp
ceedings either at law or in equity.
610;
Sanderson's
2 Hare, 607,
Owen,
V.
Trust, 3 Kay & J. 497-507; Farwell v. JaIn the last case, it was
cobs, 4 Mass. 634.
held by this court that an action at law
would lie against an executor who was directed by the testator to furnish support to
a person
in whose behalf the suit was
But in the present case the phrase
brought.
"comfort and support" is made more definite
and certain by an express reference in the
of a
terms of the gift to the continuance
previously existing state of things in the family of the testatrix and her husband, in which
the children of the former had resided and
Nor is it
received support during her Ufe.
to be overlooked that the language addressed
to the respondent in the clause of the will
under consideration is not confined to words
only,
expressive of a wish or recommendation
but the property is given to the respondent
"in the full confidence" that he will afford
to the children of the testatrix adequate supAlthough these words would not necport.
essarily create a trust in a case where a different intent is clearly indicated, they are
strong and significant to show
nevertheless
that such was the purpose of the testatrix,
with other facts
when taken in connection
which have a like tendand circumstances
Wright V. Atkins, 17 Ves. 255, 258,
ency.
261; Meredith v. Heneage, 1 Sim. 542, 556.
We think it also worthy of remark in that
connection that it is not left to the respondent to determine the amount or extent of the
support which he was to afford to the children.
The gift to him is not in the confidence that he will give them such support as
he may think proper, or as in his judgment
they may need, but to such an extent as they
shall in fact "stand in need of."
It was to
be measured, not by the exercise of his discretion in the matter, but by the actual wants
of the children.
The view which we have taken of the construction of the clause ,of the wiU by which
the property of the testatrix Is given to the
respondent for his life Is greatly strengthened
when we take into consideration the relations
of all the parties toward each other, the nature and condition of the property which was
the subject of the gift, and the ultimate disposition which was made of It by the will
after the death of the respondent.
The objects for whose comfort and support the testatrix was aiming to provide were her own
children, three of them by a former husband,
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her daughters for their respective shares of
lier estate, of which they are to have the entire income after the death of her husband,
she does not use words of entreaty, request

it,

and recommendation,
but apt and technical
words by which to establish a trust in their
behalf.
But we think this suggestion is not
entitled to much weight.
She might weU express herself in a different language when
addressing her husband from that which she
would use toward strangers, and at the same
time intend a similar result.
Words of confidence, entreaty and recommendation
were
natural and appropriate when used to express
the will of a testatrix who Intended to direct
and control the conduct of her husbaud in a
matter in which tlie right to give directions
In such a
and to control belonged to her.
case, the words used by Lord Loughborough
"Where a person recommends
are applicable:
to another who is Independent of him, there
but if he recommends
is nothing imperative;
that to be done by a person whom he has a
the mode is only civilright to order to do
ity." Malim v. Keighley, ubi supra.
of the case,
careful consideration
After
we are of opinion that the will creates
trust
our
in favor of the complainant, which
duty, sitting as
court of equity, to enforce.
Decree accordingly.
a

is

it

a

They had aland one by the respondent.
A\ays lived in the family of the testatrix and
lier husband, and received all needful support as members thereof. They had no property of their own; and, if they were deprived after her death during the life of the respondent of all benefit of the estate of their
mother, from which the support of the family
had been chiefly drawn during her life, they
would not only lose the support which they
had previously enjoyed, but would be in danger of being left without adequate means of
support, and without habits or abilities which
To
would enable them to obtain a livelihood.
these children she gives the entire beneficial
interest in her whole estate after the death
Is it reasonable to suppose
of her husband.
that under such circumstances she intended
that these children, who were so clearly the
chief objects of her bounty, should be left
during the lifetime of her husband without
any such right or interest in her estate as
would enable them to enforce a claim for
support in the event that, from alienation of
feeling. Imbecility of mind, or any other like
cause, the respondent should be unwilling or
unable to comply with her wish or to exercise
a discretion in their behalf?
It is suggested that in other clauses of the
will, in which she creates a trust in favor of
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(114 Mass. 56.)
Supreme

Judicial

Court of
Nov.. 1873.

Massachusetts.

Bill in equity by Charles Hess and August Eiler, executors of the will of George A.
Kramer, to which all the persons interested
in the estate were made parties defendant,
to obtain the directions of the court.
The bill alleged that Matthias Kramer, the
father of George A., died having devised his
property
by a will, the material parts of
which were as follows:
"All the rest, residue and remainder of all
my estate and property, real, personal and
may be
mixed; including all of which
seised, and to which I may be entitled at the
give to my son George
time of my decease,
To have and to hold the same
A. Kramer:
to him, his heirs and assigns forever, to his
and their own use, but subject however to
the following charges: namely: To pay to and
for the use, support and maintenance of my
wife, Polly Kramer, for and during her natural life, at the rate of fifteen dollars a week:
and to pay to or for the use of my sister
Singler, for and during her natGenevieve
ural life, at the rate of twelve dollars and a
half a month.
"I hereby authorize the executor or executors acting under this will, or my said son,
to purchase annuities for the abovementioned
Hospital Life
payments at the Massachusetts
Insurance Company, or at some other secure
office, in favor of my said wife and my said
sister, at any time or times, and by and upon
such purchases the said charges upon the estate and property given to my said son shall
cease and be discharged.
"It is my will, and hereby direct the executor or executors acting under this will to
expend. In addition to the above provision
for my wife, any and all sums of money
which may be necessarily
incurred in or
about the proper nursing and taking care of
my wife In any sickness or sicknesses with
which she may be visited or aflBicted, whether for medical attendance, medicines, nursing
or other necessary or proper attentions to her
or for her comfort in sickness; it being my
intention to provide for the suitable and comfortable support, care and maintenance of my
wife (who is subject to mental derangement)
during ber natural life; and the provision
which
have thus made for her is intended
by me to be in lieu of and in full and in the
stead of any dower or right to dower or
thirds or interests in my estate or property.
"I hereby signify to my said son my desire and hope that he will so provide, by wUl
or otherwise, that in case he shall die leaving
no lawful issue living, the property which be
will take under this will shall go in equal
shares,— to the children of my late brother
Melchior Kramer, one share; to the children
Singler, includof my said sister Genevieve
ing any she may have after the date of this

I
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will, one share; to my cousin John Kramer,
of Liverpool, in the state of Ohio, one share;
to my cousin Matthias Kramer, of said Liverpool, one share; and to my cousin Crescenz
Kramer, of said Boston, one share."
The bill then alleged that the greater portion of the estate devised by George A.
Kramer, of whose will they were executors
(a copy of the will being set forth), was that
devised to him as the residuary devisee under
the will of his father, and that the children
of Genevieve Singler, the surviving children
of Melchior Kramer, and John Kramer, Matthias Kramer and Crescenz Kramer, mentioned in the will of Matthias Kramer, contendof that wiU
ed that by the true construction
they were entitled to a greater proportion of
the estate than had been devised to them by
the will of George A. Kramer, and denied the
plaintiffs' authority to sell the real estate according to the authority given by the will of
George A. Kramer.
The answer of those claiming under the
will of Matthias Kramer alleged that George
A. Kramer died leaving no lawful issue living, and alleged that they were entitled to
the residue and remainder of the estate of
Matthias Kramer, the son George A. Kramer having taken it subject to the trust that
in the event of his dying without lawful issue
it should go to them respectively in the
shares provided In the will.
The other defendants admitted the allegations of the bill.
The case was heard and reserved by Ames,
J., on the bill and answers.

B. H. Abbot & L. A. Jones, for those claiming under the will of Matthias Kramer. D.
Foster and G. W. Baldwin & J. F. Colby,
for those claiming under the will of George
A. Kramer.

GRAY, C. J. It Is a settled doctrine of
courts of chancery that a devise or bequest
by words exto one person, accompanied
pressing a wish, entreaty or recommendation
that he will apply It to the benefit of others,
may be held to create a trust. If the subject
and the dbjects are sufficiently certain.
Some
of the earlier English decisions had a tendency to give to this doctrine the weight of
an arbitrary rule of construction.
But by the
later cases, in this, as in aU other questions
of the interpretation of wills, the intention of
the testator, as gathered from the whole will,
controls the court; m order to create a trust,
it must appear that the words were intended
by the testator to be imperative; and when
property Is given absolutely and without restriction, a trust is not to be lightly imposed,
and conupon mere words of recommendation
fidence.
Warner v. Bates, 98 Mass. 274, 277;
Spooner v. Lovejoy, 108 Mass. 529; In re
Pennock's Estate, 20 Pa. 268; Van Duyne v.
Van Duyne, 14 N. J. Eq. 397; Knight v.
Knight, 3 Beav. 148, 172, s. c. nom. Knight
V. Bough ton, 11 dark & F. 518; Lambe v.
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L. R.

1 Spence,

Eq. Jur. 04-70.

Eq. 207, s.
Eq. Jur. 43'J,

10

c.
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499 ;

6 Ch.
2 Spence,

lu the case at bar, the testator devises aud
bequeaths the residue of his estate to his
son, "to have and to hold the same to bim,
his heirs and assigns forever, to his and their
own use, but subject however to the following charges:"
These charges are first, the payment of specified sums yearly to the testator's
wife and sister for their respective lives, unless discharged by the purchase of annuities
In their favor by the executors (of whom the
son is one) under the authority given them
by the will; second, the further payment,
which the testator expressly "directs" the executors to make, of all the wife's expenses in
case of sickness, in lieu of her right to dower
Subject to these
or thirds in his estate.
charges during the lives of the testator's wife
and sister, the son is given, by the fullest,
clearest and most formal words, an absolute
estate In fee.
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By the further clause of the will, the testator merely signifies to his son his "desire
and hope that he will so provide, by will or
otherwise,
that in case he shall die leaving
no lawful issue living, the property which he
will take under this will shall go in equal
shares" to certain nephews, nieces, and cousins of the testator.
This clause, if construed
as creating a trust, leaves nothing to the
discretion of the son, tiut amounts to an executory devise over. In case of his death
leaving no issue, to the persons named, in
definite amounts.
To give it that construction would be inconsistent with the principal
Intention of the testator, as previously manifested, to give the son an absolute title, as
well as with the desciiption of the estate in
this very clause as "the property which he
will take under this will."
It follows that the son had full power to
dispose of the estate by will, unfettered by
the supposed trust, and that there must be a
decree for the son's devisees.
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June

8, 1897.

Appeal from supreme

court, general term,
department.
Action by George S. Clay and otliers against
Lucretla M. Wood and otliers for partition,
and Incidentally to construe the will of William W. Clay, deceased. A judgment dismissing the complaint on the merits was affirmed by the general term (36 N. Y. Supp.
Afiirmed.
317), and plaintiffs appeal.

First

This action was brought for the partition of
real property, and it involves the construction of the will of William W. Clay, deceased.
By that will the testator, after directing the
payment of his debts and funeral expenses,
and particularly an indebtedness secured by
mortgage upon his house and lot, in the second
clause gave to his wife, Lucretia, "and to her
heirs and assigns, forever," the house and lot
mentioned, and also his household goods and
personal effects in said house, "to have and to
hold the said house and lot to her, my said
wife, Lucretia M. Clay, and to her heirs and
assigns, forever, and to have and to hold the
said household goods, etc., unto her, my said
wife, Lucretia M. Clay, and to her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, forever."
He also gave to her the sum of $20,000.
In
the third and fourth clauses he gave legacies
to his brothers, to a sister, to nephews, and
providing at the same
to an adopted daughter;
time that none of those legacies should be a
charge upon the house and lot and household
goods, etc., which he had given to his wife.
By the fifth clause he gave all the residue of
his estate to his wife, and "to her heirs, executors, administrators,
and assigns, forever,"
and then stated as follows: "And It is my desire and request that my said wife do sustain,
provide for, and educate Lucretia M. Wood,
the daughter of my said adopted daughter,
Josephine M. Wood. And it Is my further desire and request that my wife do make the
said Lucretia M. Wood, Josephine M. Wood,
and my nephews and nieces, the children of
my brothers, Caleb S. Clay and George Clay,
joint heirs after her death in the said estate
have bequeathed to my
which by this will
said wife." The question in this case arises
upon the effect to be given to that concluding
The plainsentence of the fifth paragraph.
tiffs, who are the nephews and nieces referred
to therein, claim in their" complaint that a trust
was thereby created in favor of the persons
named, anu that Lucretia M. Clay, the widow
of the testator, having died, those persons had
become tenants in common of the property,
or entitled thereto under the trust alleged. It
appears that Mrs. Clay died, leavmg a will
whereby she gave the property equally to Josephine M. Wood and Lucretia M. Wood.

I

John

F. Dillon, lor

6ishop, for respondents.

appellants.
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GRAY, J. (after stating the facts). Upon
reading this will, we can infer some conflict
in the mind of the testator vrith respect to the
ultimate disposition which he should malie of
It was as to how he might benehis property.
fit the persons named in the fifth clause, aftei
his widow's death. He could have created, in
terms, a life estate in his wife, with a remainder over in their favor, in which case
there would be a certainty with respect to
their interest; or he could have created a power of appointment in their favor, with a like
or he could take the course which
certainty;
he did, namely, of desiring that his wife should
The mental confiict
make them "her heirs."
was not serious respecting the superior claims
of his wife, as we seem clearly to see from
the careful and elaborate provisions of his
will; but it appears when we read liis expressions of desire and of request, addressed to his
wife, respecting a disposition of the estate
which he had given to her, and which she
might well have heeded. What was the dominant intention of Mr. Clay in making his will
as he did? To discover that, we must take
the whole scheme of the
into consideration
will, and weigh the expressions which he has
made use of when defining the interest of his
was
wife. Whether the will in question
drawn with the aid of a lawyer, or by a lay
hand, we are not informed.
The language is
somewhat inartificial, and yet it is so plain
and emphatic as to leave little room for doubt
in the mind as to what was the principal purpose of the testator. His general scheme was
to give everything to his wife upon his death,
except the legacies which he gave by the third
and fourth clauses. That was the simple
plan which he evidently had in mind, and the
question is whether the disposition which he
made resulted in vesting in her the full beneficial interest In, and in absolute right of disposal of, the property, or whether, as the appellants claim, a trust was created with respect to that property, or a power of trust imperative in its nature. It is very earnestly and
ably argued in behalf of the appellants that
by force of the last clause in the fifth paragraph of the will, while the widow took a
legal estate in fee. It was subject, as to the
real and personal property, to a trust, or to a
power in trust, in favor of the persons and the
classes of persons named therein;
and they
base the argument upon the proposition, substantially, that the provision is couched In such
precatory words as to fulfill all the conditions
named by the authorities as requisite to create a trust, in that the words used exclude
any option or discretion in the wife, and the
subject of the request and the objects of the
bounty are definitely pointed out. Thty argue,
too, that the relations sustained by the persons named to the testator are such, and are
shown by other parts of the will to be such,
as to indicate a strong interest on his part to
make the gift. If, however,
the conclusion
must be reached that the testator Intended an
absolute gift to his wife of his real and per-
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Tlio testator, it must be admitted, was very
emphatic in the use of language when defining the nature of the holding by his wife of
When he
the estate devised and bequeathed.
gave to her the house and lot where he resided, he added the words, "and to her heirs and
forever." In the same paragraph
assigns,
where he had so given her the house and lot,
and also all of his household goods and effects, he repeats that she was "to have and to
hold the said house and lot to her, * • •
and to her heirs and assigns, forever"; and
he states with reference to the personal effects that she was to have and to hold them
"unto her, * * * and to her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, forever."
This repetition of language, indicating completeness and perpetuity of ownership, ai'rests
It will be obsei'ved, too, that
the attention.
there was discrimination in the employment
of language defining her holding, in tlie use of
in speakwords which would be appropriate
ing of the succession to either class of pi'opin the first
crty.
He had been particular,
clause, to direct that In the payment of his
debts the mortgage upon the house and lot
should be discharged, and he was equally particular, in the promotion of the interests of his
wife, in directing, in the fourth clause, that
the legacies given should not be a charge upon either the house and lot, or the personal
When he disposes of his
effects mentioned.
residuary estate, in the fifth clause, he Is
again emphatic in defining the estate which
his wife shall talje therein, by givmg it to her,
"and to her heirs, executors, administrators,
and assigns, forever." Again, in expressing
his desire and request as to the disposition to
be made by his wife in that clause, he refers
have
to "the said estate which by this will
It is hardly
bequeathed to my said wife."
conceivable that the intention of a testator
that his wife should have the absolute title
to, and the completest right of disposal of, the
estate given could be stated in more forcible
The words which have been somelanguage.
times used, and which the counsel for the appellants think would be more appropriate to
to make an absolute
express the intention
gift to the wife, such as "with full power of
disposal," or "for her sole use and benefit,"
would not be any stronger, and, indeed, would
seem to be more appropriately used when providing for the case of a married woman, and
acts.
to protect her against her husband's
Where there is an absolute gift of real or personal property, in order to qualify it, or to
cut it down, the latter part of the will should
show an equally clear intention to do so, by
the use of words definite ia their meaning,

and byexpressions
which must be regarded as
imperative.
That is a general rule, and can
it be said of the concluding clause of this
fifth paragraph that it stands the test? We
cannot think so.
It undoubtedly contains the
desire and request of the testator that his
wife should make the persons named her
"joint heirs" after death; but, in view of the
very emphatic and precise language which he
had seen fit to employ in defining the estate
which his wife should take in his property, it
would be going too far in the effort to give effect to the testator's desire to hold that It
dominated his previous expressions of intention, and affected their legal force and sigIn Phillips V. Phillips, 112 N. Y.
nificance.
197, 19 N. E. 411,— a case upon which much
reliance is placed by the appellants, — Judge
Finch observed of the testator's will. In the
course of his opinion, "that in the gift to his
wife he does not add words that could seem
inconsistent with a subsequent charge upon
as for her own use and benefit, or to her
and her heirs, forever, but leaves the path to
so far as
trust or a charge unobstructed
That case differed from the prespossible."
ent one in that the testator "wished" his wife,
always
who was his executrix, "if she finds
convenient," to pay to his sister and brother
during their lives the interest on $10,000. In
that case tliere was no cutting down of his
being seen
wife's fee to a life estate; but.
gift was made, dependent only upon
that
the fact of ability to do so, a precatory trust
was deemed to have been created with reThe very words of
spect to the annuities.
pointed out by Judge Finch are
distinction
In Re Gardner, 140 N. Y. 122,
present here.
35 N. E. 439, the testator gave the residue of
his estate to his wife, to have and to hold the
same, to her and her assigns, forever, providing that what should remain unexpended or
undisposed of at her death he gave to his son
and his heirs. The testator added this clause:
expect and desire that my said wife
"And
will not dispose of my said estate by will in
way that the whole that might remain
such
at her death shall go out of my own family
It was held that "the
and blood relation."
estate of the wife was not qualified by the
and that they
precatory words mentioned,"
were "merely the expression of an expectation
or desire."
The construction of a trust was
refused by us upon the ground that the words
of the will in the first instance clearly indicated a disposition in the testator to give the
entire interest, use, and benefit to the donee.
In Re Hamilton [1895]
Ch. 370, which is relied upon in the prevailing opinion at the genused: "I
eral term, the following language
give, bequeath, and appoint to my dear nieces
the sum of £2,000 apiece, for their
sole and separate use, and to be independent
wish them to beof their husbands, and
queath the same equally between the families
of my nephew Silver Oliver and my dear
niece Mrs. Packenham in such mode as they
shall consider right" It was held that the
it,

power.
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a

property, carrying with It an absolute
right of disposal, then it will become unnecessary (or us to consider questions of trust or of
power in trust; for the existence of an absolute and beneficial estate In fee in the widow
would be equally destructive of the claim of a
trust, or of the claim of an imperative trust
sonal
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guage, In which the testator expresses his denieces took absolutely, and a construction
of
sire and request, in the light of the emphatic
the words was refused which should implylanguage previously used in the will, and, as
that the ladies took for life only, instead of
so read, award to it the force of a suggestion
absolutely.
and of an expectation, which, however strongWe are referred to many cases on the one
ly phrased, were only morally binding upon
side and on the other, but precedents in will
the widow.
Within the case of Oolton v. Oolcases are not very satisfactory aids in reaching a conclusion in the work of interpretation;
ton, 127 U. S. 300, 8 Sup. Ot. 1164, where the
for each will will differ in its scheme, as in
testator gave to his wife all of the real and
its forms of expression.
At most, they fur- personal estate of which he should die seised,
possessed, or entitled to, with a recommendanish illustrations of the application of those
general rules of construction which have been
tion to her as to the care and protection of his
mother and sister, and with a request to her
laid down in the decisions of the courts.
to make such gift and provision for them as
Whether the precatory words in a will shall
in her judgment would be best, the present
be accorded such force as to deprive the donee
case might be said to be within the exception
of the absolute right of disposal, and thereby
qualify the benellcial interest in the gift, must
there recognized.
It was there held that the
be determined in connection with what may I language of the bequest was sufficient to convey to the testator's wife the whole estate
be gathered from the rest of the will as an
absolutely, if it stood alone, but that nevertheintention which would be reconcilable with
less, as it did not stand alone, and did not
the idea of a trust imposed upon the legal
"contain any expressions which necessarily
estate.
Where to impose such a trust would
anticipate or limit any subsequent provisions
be to nullify previous expressions in the will,
affecting it," the bequest was affected by the
and to create a repugnancy between its difPrecisely that did occur in the will
request.
ferent parts, then the rules of construction
forbid the attempt, and this is not disputed
under consideration,
as we view it, and the
Their contention I language of the devise and bequest to the wife
by the appellants' counsel.
in that respect is that that principle of con- i did contain such expressions as to anticipate
and limit the possible effect of the subsequent
struction has no application
to the present
provision. The cases of Dominick v. Sayre,
case, because of the absence of words showing that the wife was to have the whole bene3 Sandf. 555, and Smith v. Floyd, 140 N. X.
337, 35 N. E. 606, related to devises for life,
ficial interest.
Thus we see that the pivotal
point of construction is as to the significance
with a power, in the one ease, and with a
"right and privilege," in the other case, of
of the expressions used by the testator when
disposal by will in favor of certain persons,
giving hjfi estate to his wife, and the inferences to be drawn therefrom.
In our view, and we do not perceive how they affect the
conclusions we have reached.
they are unmistakable,
and create an atmosWe have sufficiently expressed our views upon the quesphere about the instrument of an entire subtions presented by this appeal, and they lead
jection of the claims of others upon his bounty
to an affirmance of the judgment. The judgto the paramount
claim of his wife, and to
her ultimate testamentary
disposition.
In ment should be affirmed, with costs. All conJudgment affirmed.
cur.
the present case we can only read the lan-
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upon this subject I take to be very clears
and, with the exception of two cases which
11.)
have been referred to (Richardson
v. RichChancery Division. April 16, 1874.
ardson and Morgan v. Malleson), the decisions are all perfectly consistent
with that
Demurrer. The bill filed by Edward Benrule. The one thing necessary to give validQetto Richards, an infant, by his next friend,
ity to a declaration of trust— the indispenstated:
That John Delbridge, deceased, was
sable thing—
take to be, that the donor, or
possessed of a mill, with the plant, machingrantor,
or
he may be called,
whatever
ery, and stock-in-trade thereto belonging, in
should have absolutely parted with that Inwhich he carried on the business of a bone
terest which had been his up to the time
manure merchant,
and which was held unof the declaration,
should have effectually
der a lease dated the 24th of June, 1863.
changed his right In that respect, and put
That on the 7th of March, 1873, John Delleast in
bridge indorsed upon the lease and signed the property out of his power, at
the way of interest."
March,
following
"7th
the
memorandum:
The two first mentioned cases are wholly
1873.
This deed and all thereto belonging
soi, I
give to Edward Bennetto Richards from opposed to the two last That being
am not at liberty to decide the case otherthis time forth with all the stock-in-trade.
in accordance with the decision
John Delbridge." That the plaintifC was the wise than
It is true the judges
of
the court of appeal.
person named In the memorandum,
and the
appear to have taken different views of the
grandson of John Delbridge, and had then
but
construction of certain expressions,
for some time assisted him in the business.
am not bound by another judge's view of
That John Delbridge, shortly after signing
the construction of particular words; and
the memorandumv delivered the lease on his
there is no case in which a different prinbehalf to Elizabeth Ann Richards, the plainciple is stated from that laid down by the
tifC's mother,
who was still in possession
Moreover,
if it were my
court of appeal.
Delbridge
April,
in
died
thereof.
That John
duty
for
the first time,
the
matter
to
decide
having executed several testamentary
1873,
I should lay down the law In the same way.
instruments which did not refer specifically to
The principle is a very simple one. A man
the said mill and premises, but he gave his
may transfer his property, without valuable
furniture and effects, after his wife's death,
consideration,
in one of two ways: he may
to be divided among his family. That the
acts as amount in law to a
either
do
such
testator's widow, Elizabeth Richards, took
conveyance
or assignment of the property,
out administration to his estate, with the
and thus coihpletely
divest himself of the
testamentary papers annexed. The bill, which
legal ownership,
in which case the person
was filed against the defendants Elizabeth
who by those acts acquires the property
Delbridge, Elizabeth Ann Richards, and the
takes it beneficially, or on trust, as the case
testator's two sons, who claimed under the
may be; or the legal owner of the property
instruments, prayed a decsaid testamentary
may, by one or other of the modes recoglaration that the indorsement upon the lease
as amounting to a valid declaration
by John Delbridge and the delivery of the nized
trust, constitute himself a trustee, and,
of
Richards
created
a
lease to Elizabeth Ann
without an actual transfer of the legal title,
valid trust in favor of the plaintifC of the
may so deal with the property as to deprive
lease and of the estate and interest of John
himself of its beneficial ownership, and deDelbridge in the property therein comprised,
clare that he will hold it from that time
and in the good will of the business carried
other person. It
and stock- forward on trust for the
on there, and in the implements
words, "I declare
is
not
the
true
he
need
use
The dein-trade belonging to the business.
myself a trustee," but he must do somefendants demurred to the bill for want of
thing which is equivalent to it, and use exequity.
for,
pressions
which have that meaning;
Fry, Q. C, and Mr. Phear, in support of however anxious the court may be to carry
W. R. Fisher (Mr. Southgate,
the demurrer.
out a man's intention, it is not at liberty
Q. C, with him), and T. D. Bolton, for plain- to construe words otherwise than according
tiff. Gregory, Rowcliffes & Rawle, for de- to their proper meaning.
fendants.
The cases in which the question has arisen
are nearly all cases in which a man, by docJESSEL, M. R. This bill is waiTanted by uments insufficient to pass a legal interest,
in Richardson v. Richardson, has said: "I give or grant certain property
the decisions
L. R. 3 Eq. 686, and Morgan v. Malleson, to A. B." Thus, In Morgan v. MaUeson, L.
L. R. 10 Eq. 475, but, on the other hand, R. 10 Eq. 475, the words were: "I hereby
we have the case of MUroy v. Lord, 4 De give and make over to Dr. Morris an India
bond"; and in Richardson v. Richardson,
Gex, F. & J. 264, before the court of appeals,
and the more recent case of Warriner v. L. R. 3 Eq. 686, the words were, "grant
In both cases the
and assign."
Rogers, L. R. 16 Eq. 340, 348, in which Vice convey,
Chancellor Bacon said: "The rule of law judges held that the words were effectual
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declarations of trust. In the former case,
Lord Romilly considered that the words were
the same as these:
"I undertake to hold the
bond for you," which would undoubtedly
have amounted to a declaration of trust.
The true distinction appears to me to be
plain, and beyond dispute; for man to make
himself a trustee there must be an expression of intention to become a trustee, whereas words of present gift shew an intention to
give over property to another, and not retain it in the donor's own hands for any
purpose, fiduciary or otherwise.
In MUroy v. Lord, 4 De Gex, P. & J. 264,
274, Lord Justice Turner, after referring to
the two modes of making a voluntary settlement valid and effectual, adds these words:
"The cases, I think, go further, to this extent: That if the settlement is intended to
be effectuated by one of the modes to which
I have referred, the court will not give effect
to It by applying another of those modes.
If it is intended to take effect by transfer,
the court will not hold the intended transfer to operate as a declaration of trust, for
then every Imperfect instrument would be

made

effectual

379

by being converted Into

a

perfect trust."

It appears to me that that sentence conIf the
tains the whole law on the subject.
decisions of Lord Romilly and of Vice-Chancellor Wood were right, there never could
be a case where an expression of a present
gift would not amount to an effectual declaration of trust, which would be carrying
the doctrine on that subject too far. It appears to me that these cases of voluntary
gifts should not be confounded with another
class of cases in which words of present
transfer for valuable consideration are held
to be evidence of a contract which the court
Applying that reasoning to
will enforce.
cases of this kind, you only make the imperfect Instrument evidence of a contract of a
voluntary nature which this court will not
enforce;
so that, following out the principle
even of those cases, you come to the same
conclusion.
must, therefore, allow the demurrer; and,
though
feel some hesitation, owing to the
conflict of the authorities,
think the costs
must follow the result

I
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I
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of New York.

1880.

Appeal from judgment of the general term
of the supreme court, in the Third judicial
reversing a decree of ttie surrodepartment,
gate of the county of Sullivan upon the accounting of plaintiff, as administrator of the
estate of Joseph Young, deceased.
Upon such accounting the administrator
claimed that certain United States and town
coupon bonds belonged to himself and to his
The surrogate disbrother, John N. Young.
allowed the claim, and charged him with
said bonds.
These bonds, upon the death of the intestate, were found in two paclsages inclosed in
envelopes, upon which were indorsed memoranda signed by him, one dated March 14,
the other March 14, 1874, each of which described the bonds Inclosed by numbers, and
stated that certain of them belonged to William H. Young, that the others belonged to
John N. Young. Then followed a statement
of the indorsements, of which the following
is a copy:
"But the inst. to become due
thereon is owned and reserved by me for so
long as I shall live; at my death they belong absolutely and entirely to them and
their heirs." The other was similar.
The circumstances under which the memoranda were made, and the further material
facts, are set forth in the opinion.

Hezeliiah Watson, for appellant.
A. Nelson, for "-espondent.

Homer

RAPALLO, J. The intention of Joseph
Young, deceased, to give the bonds in controversy on this appeal to his son, WUliam
H. Young, reserving to himself only the interest during his life-time, was so clearly
manifested, that we have examined the case
with a strong disposition to effectuate that
intention and sustain the gift, if possible.
The transaction is sought to be sustained
First, as an actual executed
In two aspects:
gift, and secondly, as a declaration of trust.
These positions are antagonistic to each other, for it a trust was created, the possession of the bonds, and the legal title thereto,
In that case there
remained in the trustee.
was no delivery to the donee, and consequently no valid executed gift; while If
there was a valid gift, the possession and legal title must have been transferred to the
As each
donee, and no trust was created.
of these theories thus necessarily excludes
the other, they must be separately considered.

To establish a valid gift, a delivery of the
subject of the gift to the donee or to some
person for him, so as to divest the possession and title of the donor, must be shown,
and the first question which arises under
the peculiar circumstances of this case is,
whether it is practicable to make a valid

TRUSTS.

gift In prsesenti of an Instrument securing
the payment
of money, reserving to the
donor the accruing interest, and If so, by
what means this can be done. The puipose
of such a gift may undoubtedly be accomplished by a proper transfer to a trustee and
perhaps by a written transfer delivered to
the donee, but the question now Is, can it
be done in the form of a gift, without any
written transfer delivered to the donee, and
without creating any trust? T can conceive
of but one way in which this is possible, and
that is by an absolute delivery of the security which is the subject of the gift, to the
donee, vesting the entire legal title and possession in him, on his undertaking to account
to the donor for the interest which he may
collect thereon.
But If the donor retains
the instrument under his own control, though
he do so merely for the purpose of collecting the interest, there is an absence of the
complete delivery which is absolutely essential to the validity of a gift. A gift cannot
be made by creating a joint possession of
donor and donee, even though the intention
be that each shall have an Interest in the
chattel, especially where, as in this case, the
line of division between these interests is
The reservation of the
not ascertainable.
interest on the bonds to the donor was for
that Is, during his lifean uncertain period;
time, and until his death it was impossible
to determine the precise proportion of the
money secured by the bonds, to which the
donee was entitled.
If therefore the donor retained the custody of the bonds for the purpose of collecting the accruing interest, or even If they
were placed in the joint custody or possession of himself and the donee, there was no
sufficient delivery to constitute a gift. But
if an absolute delivery of the bonds to the
donee, with intent to pass the title, was
made out, the donor reserving only the right
to look to the donee for the interest, the
transaction may be sustained as an executed

gift.

Doty

WiUson, 47 N. Y. 580.
to an examination of the
evidence.
The written memoranda attached
by the donor to the envelopes containing the
bonds, evinced his intention to make a present gift to the respondent of an interest in
the bonds, and shows that the disposition
was not intended to be of a testamentary
character.
He declares that the bonds are
owned by William H. Young, but the interV.

This brings us

est to become due on the same is owned and
reserved by the donor for so long as he shall
live, and that at his death the bonds are
owned by the donee "absolutely and entirely" in one case, and "wholly and entirely" in the other. There are some verbal differences in the two memoranda, but the purport of both is the same. They both express in the same words that the Interest to
become due on the bonds is "owned and
reserved" by the donor for so long as he
shall live, and that the bonds are not to be-
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long "wholly" or "absolutely" to the donees
till after his death.
The exhibition of these memoranda to the
wife of the donee, and the declarations of
the donor, show that what he had thus done
was in pursuance of a settled purpose, and
that he believed that he had made a valid
disposition of the bonds according to the
memoranda,
but they do not satisfy the requirement of an actual delivery.
The evidence touching the point of delivery is that the deceased for several years
before his death resided at the house of his
son, William H. Young, where there was a
safe which had formerly belonged to the deceased, but which he is said to have presented to his grandson, James C. Young, a son
of William H., reserving to himself the right
to use the safe, and in fact using it as a
place of deposit for his valuable papers.
That William H. Young also kept papers In
the same safe, but rarely went to it himself,
the deceased being in the habit of depositing
therein for him such things as he desired,
and removing them for him at his request.
The upper part of this safe was divided
into pigeon-holes,
where the deceased usually kept his papers and was in the habit, up
to the time of the transaction now in question, of keeping the bonds in controversy.
The lower part of the safe was divided into
larger open compartments, one of which had
been appropriated as the receptacle of the
papers of William H. Young.
After affixing to the two envelopes In
which the bonds were contained, the memoranda showing the dispositions in favor of
his sons William H. Young and John N.
Young, and after exhibiting these memoranda to the respective wives of the donees,
the deceased replaced the two packages of
bonds in this safe, and after his death they
were found, not in the pigeon-hole where
they had formerly been kept, but in the
compartment where William H. Young's paAfter the memoranda had
pers were kept.
been made, the bonds were generally kept in
but the deceased had been
that compartment,
seen by William H. to put them in the
pigeon-holes and take them out with the indorsements on.
On the occasion of exhibiting the packages
of bonds and the indorsements to Mrs. William H. Young, the deceased asked her to
take them in her hands and see what he
But this was not Inhad written on them.
tended as a delivery to her, for she asked
him whether he wanted her to take them
and put them up, and he said, "No."
After
having thus exhibited them he took them
back and placed them in the safe. The memoranda were made on the 14th March, 1874.
In
The testator died November 12, 1875.
the meantime installments of Interest on the
The deceased cut off
bonds became due.
the coupons, and on some occasions William
H. Young assisted him in so doing, but William H. testified that he never asserted any
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ownership over the bonds as against his
father. And the testimony shows that they
were at all times under the control of the
deceased, although William H. Young and
his son, James C. Young, also had access to
Those three however were the
the safe.
only persons having access to the safe, and
it does not appear that John N. Young, the
other donee named in the memoranda, ever
had any control over the bonds or access
thereto.
It was also shown that after the
alleged gift, when solicited for a loan, the
he might
deceased said that he supposed
with the boys' consent take some of their
Also that he called the attention of
bonds.
his grandson, James C. Young, to the memohave done
randa and said, "you see what
with them." That he declared to a witness,
Benjamin Grant, that what he had left he
That in
had given to William and Newton.
September, 1875, he took from one of the
being one of
envelopes a bond of $1,000,
indorsed
those stated in the memorandum
to belong to John N. Young, and gave it
to a third party, but it also appeared that
making the memorandum,
he had, before
presented John N. Young with $1,000.
This is the substance of aU the testimony
by which a delivery to the donee is sought
to be established.
It shows that the deceased at no time parted with the possession or control of the bonds, but merely
confirms the intention expressed in the memoranda.
The change of the position of the
bonds in the safe where they were kept,
from the pigeon-hole to the compartment,
might have been significant had William H.
been the only donee, and had the intended
gift been unaccompanied
by any reservation. But under the existing circumstances
it cannot be construed into a delivery of the
bonds.
In the first place, part of the bonds
were stated In the memoranda to be given
to William H., and part to John N. Young.
The intention of the donor toward each of
his sons was the same. Yet no attempt appears to have been made to efCect any soi-t
of delivery to John N. Moreover, the form
of the intended gift shows that no immediate delivery could have been contemplated
by the deceased. The memorandum on each
envelope
says that the interest to become
due on the bonds is "owned and reserved"
by the donor.
This interest, up to the dates
of the maturity of the bonds respectively,
was represented by coupons attached to the
bonds.
It clearly could not have been intended to deliver them, for so many of them
as might become due during the life of the
donor were reserved from the gift, as the
interest was expressly declared
to
be
"owned" by the donor, and not parted with.
The possession of these coupons was necessary to enable him to collect the interest,
and he availed himself of it for that purpose from time to time.
No intention was
manifested to deliver up these vouchers and
look to the donees for the interest
No divi-
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elon of the coupons could be made, for the
period
of the donor's life was uncertain;
and further, If all the coupons were retained
by the donor, they might not represent the
entire interest reserved by him.
The bonds
matured In 1887 and 1888, and some were
redeemable earlier; and if he had lived untU the maturity of the bonds, or until the
United States bonds were called In by the
government,
as they were liable to be, the
donees would not then have been entitled
to the possession of the bonds or their proceeds.
The reservation accompanying the
gift would entitle the donor to possession of
the fund.
The intention of the donor, as
deducible from the memoranda and the evidence, was, not to part with his title to the
accruing interest, but to keep the bonds and
collect the interest for his own use till he
should die; and that then, and not before,
his sons should have possession of them and
own them absolutely. That although he
meant that their right to this interest in
remainder should be vested and irrevocable
from the time of the supposed gift, yet that
at no time during his life did the donees have
exclusive possession of the bonds or the legal right to such possession.
The declarations of the donor that he had
given the bonds to his sons must be understood as referring to the qualified gift which
There is nothing to
he intended to make.
indicate that he ever relinquished his right
to the Interest, and all the circumstances of
the case show that he could not have Intended to admit that he had made an absolute gift, free from the qualification exThe cases of
pressed in the memoranda.
Grangiac v. Arden, 10 Johns. 295; Davis v.
Davis, 8 Nott & McC. 226, and kindred cases,
consequently have no application. The principle of those cases was applied in the late
case of Trow v. Shannon, 78 N. Y. 446, but
in that case the gift was intended to be absolute.
No qualification was attached to it,
and the bonds were placed where they were
accessible to the donee, and he had himself
collected the interest for his own use. There
was nothing inconsistent with a f uU delivery,
but there was no direct evidence of such delivery, and the admissions of the donor that
she had given the bonds and they belonged
to the donee, were received, and weight given
to them, as some evidence from which the
jury might infer that the gift had been completed by an absolute delivery.
It is impossible to sustain this as an executed gift, without abrogating the rule that
deUvery is essential to gifts of chattels inter
It is an elementary rule that such a
vivos.
gift cannot be made to take effect in posses-

sion in futuro. Such a transaction amounts
only to a promise to make a gift, which Is
Pitts v. Mangum, 2 Bailey,
nudum pactum.
There must be a delivery of possession
588.
with a view to pass a present right of property. "Any gift of chattels which expressly
reserves the use of the property to the donor
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for a certain period, or (as commonly appears
in the cases which the courts have had occasion to pass upon) as long as the donor
shall live, is ineffectual." 2 Schouler, Pers.
Prop. p. 118, and cases cited; Vass v. Hicks,
3 Murph. (N. C.) 494. This rule has been applied even where the gift was made by a
written instrument or deed purporting to
transfer the title, but containing the reservation. Sutton's Ex'r v. HalloweU, 2 Dev. 186;
Lance v. Lance, 5 Jones Law, 413.
The only question remaining therefore Is
whether a valid declaration of trust is made
out.

The trust contended for. If put Into word^,
would be that the donor should hold the
bonds and their proceeds for his own benefit during Ms life and to the use of the donees
from the time of his own death.
Of course no trust was created of the interest for the donor's own life, for he was the
legal owner of the Income of the bonds, and
never parted with this right— nor could he be
at the same time trustee and cestui que trust
The trust then would be to hold to the use of
the donees an estate in remainder in the
bonds, which should vest in possession in the
donees, at the time of his death.
The difficulty In establishing such a trust
is that the donor did not undertake or attempt to create it, but to vest the remainder
directly in the donees. Assuming, for the
purposes of the argument, that he might have
created such a trust in himself, for the benefit of his sons, and, further, that he might
have done so by simply signing a paper to
that effect and retaining it in his own possession, without ever having delivered it to the
donees, or any one for them, yet he did not do
so. He simply signed a paper certifying that
the bonds belonged to his sons. He did not
declare that he held them in trust for the
donees, but that they owned them subject to
the reservation, and were at his death to
have them absolutely. If this instrument had
been founded upon a valuable consideration,
equity might have interfered and effectuated
Its intent by compelling the execution of a
declaration of trust, or by charging the
bonds, while In his hands, with a trust in
favor of the equitable owner. Day v. Roth,
18 N. Y. 448.
But it is well settled that equity will not interpose to perfect a defective
gift or voluntary settlement made without
If legally made, it will be upconsideration.
held, but it must stand as made or not at
all. When therefore it is found that the gift
which the deceased attempted to make failed to take effect for want of delivery, or a
sufficient transfer, and it Is sought to supply
this defect and carry out the intent of the
donor by declaring a trust which he did not
himself declare, we are encountered by the
rule above referred to. Story, Eq. Jur. 706,
787, 793b-793d;
Antrobus v. Smith, 12 Ves.
39, 43; Edwards v. Jones, 1 Mylne & C. 226;
7 Sim. 325; Price v. Price, 8 Eng. Law &
Bq. 281; Hughes v. Stubbs, 1 Hare, 476. It
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Is established as unquestionable
law that a
court of equity cannot by its authority
render that gift perfect which the donor has
left imperfect, and cannot convert an Imperfect gift into a declaration of trust, merely
■on account of that imperfection.
Heartley v.
Nicholson, 44 L. J. Ch. 279. It has in some
cases been attempted to establish an exception in favor of a wife and children on the
ground that the moral obligation of the donor
to provide, for them constituted what was
called a meritorious consideration for the
gift, but Judge Story (2 Eq. Jur. § 987, and 1
Eq. Jur. § 433) says that that doctrine seems
now to be overthrown, and that the general
principle is established that in no case whatever will courts of equity interfere In favor
of mere volunteers, whether It be upon a
voluntary contract, or a covenant, or a settlement, however meritorious may be the consideration, and although the beneficiaries
stand In the relation of a wife or child. Holloway T. Headington, 8 Sim. 325; Jeffreys v.
Jeffreys, 1 Oraig & P. 138, 141.
These positions are sustained by many authorities. To create a trust, the acts or words
relied upon must be unequivocal. Implying
that the person holds the property as trustee
for another. Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134,
per Church, C. J. Though it is not necessary
that the declaration of trust be in terms explicit, the donor must have evinced Ijy acts
which admit of no other interpretation, that
such legal right as he retains is held by him
as trustee for the donee. Heartley v. Nicholson, 44 L. J. Ch. 277, per Bacon, V. C.
The settler must transfer the property to a
trustee, or declare that he holds it himself in
trust Mib-oy v. Lord, 4 De Gex, P. & J. 264,
per Lord Knight Bruce. In cases of voluntary settlements or gifts, the court will not
impute a trust where a trust was not in fact
The distinction bethe thing contemplated.
tween words importing a gift and words creating a trust is pointed out by Sir Geo. Jessel
in Richards v. Delbridge, L. R. 18 Eq. Cas.
"The making a man trustee
11, as follows:
involves an intention to become a trustee,
whereas words of gift show an intention to
give over property to another, and not to retain it in the donor's hands for any purpose,
fiduciary or otherwise."
The words of the donor In the present case
are that the bonds are owned by the donees,
but that the interest to accrue thereon Is
owned and reserved by the donor for so long
as he shall live, and at his death they belong
absolutely to the donees. No intention is here
expressed to hold any legal title to the bonds
In trust for the donees. Whatever interest
was intended to be vested in them was transferred to them directly, subject to the reservation In favor of the donor during his life,
and free from that reservation at his death.
Nothing was reserved to the donor, to be held
In trust or otherwise, except his right to the
accruing Interest which should become payable during his life. It could only be by re-
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forming or supplementing the language used,
that a trust could be created, and this, as
has been shown, will not be done in case of
a voluntary settlement without consideration.
There are two English cases where indeed
the circumstances were much stronger In
favor of the donees than in the present case,
which tend to sustain the position that a settlement of this description may be enforced
In equity by constituting the donor trustee for
the donee. They are Morgan v. Malleson,
L. R. 10 Eq. Cas. 475, and Richardson v.
Richardson, L. R. 3 Eq. Cas. 686. In the first
of these cases, Morgan v. Malleson, L. R. 10
Eq. Cas. 475, the intestate signed and delivered to Dr. Morris a memorandum In writing:
"I hereby give and make over to Dr. Morris
one India bond," but did not deliver the
bond.
Sir John Romilly sustained this gift
as a declaration of trust. The case is referred to by Church, C. J., In Martin v. Funk as
an extreme case. In Richardson v. Richardson, an instrument purporting to be an assignment, unsupported by a valuable consideration, was upheld as a declaration of trust
In speaking of these cases in Richards v.
Delbridge, L. R. 18 Eq. Cas. 11, Sir Geo. Jessel, M. R., says: "If the decisions of Lord
Romilly (in Morgan v. Malleson), and of
Wood, V. C. (in Richardson v. Richardson)
were right, there never could be a case where
the expression of a present gift would not
amount to an effectual declaration of trust."
And it may be added that there never could
be a case where an intended gift, defective
for want of delivery, could not, if expressed
in writing, be sustained as a declaration of
trust. Both of the cases cited are now placed
among overruled cases. Fisher, Ann. Dig.
In Moore v. Moore,
(1873 and 1874) 24, 25.
43 L. J. Ch. 623, Hall, V. C, says: "I think
it very important indeed to keep a clear and
definite distinction between these cases of
imperfect gifts and cases of declarations of
trust; and that we should not extend beyond
what the authorities have already established, the doctrine of declarations of trust, so as
to supplement what would otherwise be mere
imperfect gifts." If the settlement is intended to be effectuated by gift, the court will
not give effect to it by construing it as a
trust If It Is Intended to take effect by
transfer the court will not hold the intended
transfer to operate as a declaration of trust,
for then every imperfect Instrument would
be made effectual by being converted into a
perfect trust. MUroy v. Lord, 4 De Gex, F. &I

J.

264.

The case of Martin v. Funk and kindred
cases cannot aid the respondent.
In all those
cases there was an express declaration of
trust. In the one named the donor delivered
the money to the bank, taking back its obligation to herself in the character of trustee
for the donee; thus parting with all beneficial interest In the fund, and having the legal title vested in her in the character of trustee only. No interposition on the part of the
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court was necessary to confer that character
upon her; nor was it necessary, by construction or otherwise, to change or supplement
the actual transaction. None of the difficulties encountered
in the present case stood
in the way of carrying out her intention.
It was capable of being executed in the form
in which it was expressed.
The question whether a remainder in a
chattel may be created and given by a donor
by carving out a life estate for himself and
transferring the remainder, without the intervention of a trustee, is learnedly discussed in
the appellant's brief; but the views we have
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expressed
render It unnecessary
to pursue
that inquiry. We are satisfied that it is impossible to hold that the facts as they appear
establish a valid transfer of any interest in
the bonds in question to the donee, and that
the attempted gift cannot be sustained as a
declaration of trust. It follows that the judgment of the general term must be reversed
and the decree of the surrogate affirmed.
Costs of all the parties in this court and in
the supreme court to be paid out of the estate.

All

concur.

Judgment reversed.
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CROCKETT, J. The claim of the father
and sisters of the deceased to the fund in controversy can be sustained, if at all, on no
other ground than that, by the two letters of
the deceased to his sisters, he created and
declared a present trust, to the effect that he
held the policy of insurance in trust for his
father and sisters.
The transaction cannot
be upheld merely as a donation inter vivos.
There was no assignment or delivery of the
policy to the father and sisters, and treated
simply as a donation, it would fail for that
reason.
But a person intending to make a
donation to another, and who clearly declares
his purpose and transfers the title, need not
necessarily part with the possession, provided he declares himself, in proper form, to
be a trustee, holding possession for the donee.
In such a case, he would thenceforth hold the
property as a trustee and not in his own
right. That such a trust, when properly declared, even in favor of a volunteer, is valid,

and will be enforced, is established
by numerous authorities.
"Where there is no valuable consideration,
yet, if the settler, by a
duly executed,
clear and explicit declaration,
and intended to be final and binding upon
iiim, makes himself a trustee, courts of equity
will enforce the trust." Perry, Trusts, § 96.
"If the trust is perfectly created, so that the
donor or settler has nothing more to do, and
the person seeking to enforce it has need of
no further conveyances from the settler, and
nothing is required of the court but to give
effect to the trust as an executed trust, it will
be carried into efCect, although it was withoxTt
consideration,
and the possession of the property was not changed.
Whether the trust is
perfectly created or not is a question of fact
in each case, and the court, in determining
the fact, will give effect to the situation and
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relation of the parties, the nature and situation of the property, and the purposes or objects which the settler had in view making
the disposition." Id. §§ 98, 99.
In such cases the point to be determined
is, whether the trust has been "perfectly
created;" that is to say, whether the title has
passed and the trust been declared, and the
trust being executed nothing remains for the
court but to enforce it. In discussing this
question the court say, in Stone v. Hackett,
12 Gray, 227:
"It is certainly true that a
court of equity will lend no assistance toward
perfecting a volimtary contract or agreement
for the creation of a trust, nor regard it as
binding so long as it remains executory.
But
it is equally true that if such an agreement
or contract be executed by a conveyance of
property in trust, so that nothing remains to
be done by the grantor or donor to complete
the transfer of title, the relation of trustee
and cestui que trust is deemed to be established,
and the equitable rights and interests
arising out of the conveyance, though made
without consideration,
will be enforced in
chancery."
The same proposition is announced, and the authorities fully collated
and examined, in Kederick v. Manning, 1 De
Gex, M. & G. 176.
To the same effect are
Jones V. Lock, L. R. 1 Ch. 25, and Wason v.
Colburn,

99 Mass. 342.

We think these cases announce the correct
rule, and are decisive of the present conti'Oversy.
The letters from the deceased to his
sisters did not purport and were not intended
to be an assignment
of the policy, the title
to which remained in the deceased.
It was
not an executed trust, but at most nothing
more than a voluntary executory agreement
to create a trust in futuro, and such agreements cannot be enforced in equity.
This
view of the case renders it unnecessary for us
to decide whether the probate court had jurisdiction to enforce the trust, if it had been
established.

Judgment reversed
for a new trial.

McKINSTRY, J.,
ion.

and

cause

did not express

remanded

an opin-

EXPRESS

386

MARTIN
(75 N.

T.

y.

TRUSTS— VOLUNTARY TRUSTS.

FUNK.
134.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

Not.

Nehemlah Millard, for appellants.
Divine, for respondent

12, 1878.

M. W.

CHURCH, C. J. The facts in this case
are substantially undisputed,
as found by
the judge before whom the case was tried.
The intestate Mrs. Boone, in 1866, deposited
in the Citizens' Savings Bank $500, declaring at the time that she wanted the account
to be in trust for Lillie Willard, who is the
plaintiff. The account was so entered, and
a pass-book delivered to the intestate, which
contained
these entries: "The Citizens' Savings Bank in account with Susan Boone, in
trust

for

Lillie Willard.

1866,

March

23,

$500."
A deposit of the same amount and in the
same manner was made in trust for Kate
Willard, now Mrs. Brown. This money belonged to the Intestate at the time of the deposits. The plaintiff and Mrs. Brown are
sisters, and were at the time of the age respectively of eighteen and twenty, and were
distant relatives of the intestate, their mother being a second cousin. The intestate retained possession of the pass-books until her
death in 1875, and the plaintiff and her
sister were ignorant of the deposits until
after that event. The money remained in
interest until
the bank with its accumulated
except that she
the death of the intestate,
drew out one year's interest. Mrs. Brown
assigned to the plaintiff her interest in the
deposit purporting to have been made for
her benefit, and the action is brought against
and the
the administrator of the Intestate
bank for the delivery of the pass-books and
the recovery
of the money. The question
involved has been very much litigated, and
may be found in the
many refinements
Many cases have
books in respect to it.
been found difficult of solution, not so much
on account of the general principles which
should govern, as in applying those prinIt is
ciples to a particular state of facts.
clear that a person sui juris, acting freely
has the power to
and with full knowledge,
make a voluntary gift of the whole or any
part of his property, while it is well settled
that a mere intention, whether expressed or
not, is not sufficient, and a voluntary promise to make a gift is nudum pactum, and of
no binding force. Kekewich v. Manning, 50
Eng. Ch. 175, and cases cited. The act constituting the transfer must be consummated,
and not remain incomplete, or rest in mere
Intention, and this is the rule whether the
gift is by delivery only, or by the creation
of a trust in a third person, or in creating
Enough must
the donor himself a trustee.
be done to pass the title, although when a
trust Is declared, whether in a third person
or the donor, it Is not essential that the property should be actually possessed by the ces-

tui que trust, nor is it even essential that the
latter should be informed of the trust. In
Milroy v. Lord, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 264, Lord
Chief Justice Turner, who adopted the most
rigid construction of trusts, in delivering an
opinion against the validity of the trust in
that case, laid down the general principles
as accurately perhaps as is practicable.
He
said:
"I take the law of this court to be
well settled, that in order to render a voluntary settlement valid and effectual the settler must have done every thing which according to the nature of the property comprised in the settlement was necessary to be
done in order to transfer the property, and
render the settlement binding upon him. He
may of course do this by actually transferring the property to the persons for whom
he intended to provide, and the provision will
then be effectual, and it will be equally effectual if he transfer the property to a trustee for the purpose of the settlement, or declare that he himself holds it in trust for
those purposes, and If the property be personal, the trust may I apprehend be declared
either in writing or by parol."
The contention of the defendant Is that
the transaction did not transfer the property, and that there was no sufficient declaration of trust and that by retaining the
pass-books the intestate never parted with
the control of the property.
If what she
did was sufficient
to constitute herself a
trustee, it must follow that whatever control she retained would be exercised as trustee, and the right to exercise it would not
be necessarily inconsistent with the completeness of the trust. The question involving substantially the same facts has been
several times before different courts of the
state, and in every instance the transaction
has been sustained as a good gift.
The Case of Wetzel before Surrogate Bradford, and Millspaugh v. Putnam, 16 Abb.
Prac. 380, were deposits in the same form,
and in the former the cestui
que trust
had no notice of the deposit, and in both
cases the gift was held effectual.
In Smith
V. Lee, 2 Thomp. & C. 591, money was deposited with the defendant, and a note taken
payable to the depositor for another person,
and it was held that the depositor constituted himself a trustee.
The case of Kelly
V. Manhattan Inst, for Savings (not reported) was a special term decision of the New
York common pleas before Robinson, J.,
where precisely such a deposit was made as
in this, and it was upheld as an absolute
gift. These decisions although not controlling upon this court are entitled to respect,
and they show the tendency of the judicial
mind to give these transactions the effect
which on their face they import So in
Minor v. Rogers, 40 Conn. 512, a similar deposit was upheld as a declaration of trust.
Park, J., noticed the point urged there as
here of the retention of the pass-book, and
said: "She retained possession therefore be-
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cause the deposit was made in her name as
trustee, and not because she had not given
the beneficial interest of the deposit to the
plaintifE," and in that case the depositor had
drawn out the deposit, and the action was
sustained against her administrator. So In
Ray V. Simmons, 11 R. I. 266; the facts
were precisely like the case at bar, except
that the cestui que trust was informed of
the gift, and the court held the trust valid.
But the supreme court of Massachusetts
in two cases (Brabrook v. Boston Five Cent
Sav. Bank, 104 Mass.
and Clark v.
228,
Clark, 108 Mass. 522) seem to hold a difCerent doctrine.
In the first case the circumstances were deemed controlling, adverse to
an intent to create a trust, and in the last,
which was similar in its facts to this, the
court express the opinion that the trust was
not complete, but without giving any reasons for the opinion.
The last decision, although entitled to great respect, is exceptional to the general current of authority in

this country.
In the English

I

courts
do not find any
case where these precise facts appeared, but
the cases are numerous
where the general
principles have been elaborately discussed
and applied to particular facts. It is only
deemed necessary to refer to a few of them.
In Richardson v. Richardson, L. R. 3 Eq.
Cas. 684, it was held that an instrument
executed as a present and complete assignment (not being a mere contract to assign
at a future day) is equivalent to a declaration of trust. Morgan v. Malleson, L. R. 10
Eq. Cas. 475, was decided upon this principle, and is an extreme case in support of
a declaration trust.
It appeared that the
testator gave to his medical attendant the
following
memftrandum:
"I hereby give
and make over to Dr. Morris, an Indian
bond No. D 506, value £1,000, as some token
for all his very kind attention to me during
my illness." This was held to constitute the
testator a trustee for Dr. Morris of the bond
which was retained by him. These cases
upon, and the latter someare commented
what criticised in Warriner v. Rogers, L. R.
16 Eq. 340, but Sir James Bacon, in delivering the opinion, substantially adheres to the
general rule before stated.
He requires only "that the donor or grantor, or whatever
he may be called,
should have absolutely
parted with that interest which had been
his up to the time of the declaration— should
have effectually changed his right in that
respect, and put the property out of his power, at least in the way of interest." This
case was decided against the validity of the
trust, mainly upon the ground that the
produced were upon their face
memoranda
In Pye's Case,
testamentary
in character.
18 Ves. 140, money
was transmitted to an
agent in France to purchase an annuity for
a lady.
Owing to circumstances which the
agent supposed prevented its purchase
in
uer name, he purchased
it in the name of
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the principal. When the latter learned this
fact, he executed and transmitted to the
agent a power of attorney to transfer the
annuity, but before its arrival the principal
died. Lord Eldon held that a declaration of
trust was established.
Wheatley v. Purr, 1 Keen, 551, is quite
analogous
to the case at bar. A testatrix
directed her brokers to place £2,000, in the
joint name of the plaintiffs, and herself as a
trustee for the plaintiffs. The sum was
placed to the account of the testatrix alone,
as trustee of the plaintiffs, and a promissory note was given by them to her as such
The note remained in her possestrustee.
sion until her death, when her executor received the money. It was held that the
transaction amounted to a complete declaration of trust.
Mr. Hill, in his work on Trustees, after
saying "that it is extremely difficult, in the
present state of authorities, to define with
accuracy
the law affecting this very intricate subject," lays down the following as
the result: "When the author of the voluntary trust is possessed of the legal interest in the property,
a clear declaration of
trust contained in or accompanying
a deed
or act which passes the legal estate will create a perfect executed trust, and so a declaration or direction by a party that the
property shall be held in trust for the object
of his bounty, though unaccompanied
by a
deed or other act divesting himself of the
legal
estate, is an executed
trust." Hill,
Trustees, 130.
If there is a valid declaration of trust,
that is sufficient of itself,
apprehend,
to
transfer the title, but the difficulty is in determining what constitutes such a declaration, and whether a mere formal transfer of
the property, as In the case of the medical
attendant,
Is sufficient, is a question upon
which there is some difference of opinion.
No particular form of words is necessary to
constitute a trust, while the act or words
relied upon must be unequivocal.
Implying
that the person holds the property as trustee
for another.
Let us now consider the case in hand. In
form at least the title to the money was
changed from the intestate individually to
her as trustee.
She stated to the bank that
she desired the money to be thus deposited.
It was so done by her direction, and she took
a voucher to herself in trust for the plaintiff. Upon these facts what other intent can
be imputed to the intestate than such as
her acts and declarations imported, and did
they not import a trust? There was no contingency or uncertainty in the circumstances, and
am unable to see wherein it was
incomplete.
The money was deposited unqualifiedly and absolutely in trust, and the
intestate was the trustee.
It would scarcely have been stronger if she had written in
the pass-book:
"I hereby declare that I have
deposited this money for the benefit of the

I

I
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plaintiff and

I

hold

the same as trustee for

her."

This would have been a plain declaration
of trust, and accompanied as it was with a
formal transfer to herself in the capacity of
trustee, would have been deemed sufficient
under the most rigid rules to be found in
any of the authorities. It seems to me that
this was the necessary legal intendment of
the transaction, and that it was. sufficient to
pass the title. The retention of the passbook was not necessarily inconsistent with
this construction. She must be deemed to
have retained it as trustee.
The book was
not the property, but only the voucher for
the property,
which after the deposit consisted of the debt against the bank.
There are many cases where the instrument creating the trust has been retained
by the author of it until his death, especially
when he made himself the trustee, and yet
Exton v. Scott, 6 Sim.
the trust sustained.
31; Fletcher v. Fletcher, 4 Hare, 67; Souverbye V. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 240; Bunn v.
circumstance,
Id.,
Winthrop,
329.
This
among others, has been considered upon the
question of intent, but is never deemed decisive against the validity of the trust Id.
Hill, Trustees, supra. Some confusion
See,
has been created by judicial expression, that
the author of such a trust must do all in
his power to carry out his intention, that the
nature of the property will admit of. This
general proposition requires some qualification.
In this case the intestate might have
notified the objects of her bounty, but this
is not regarded as indispensable by any of
and she might have made
the authorities,
the deposits in their name, and delivered to
them the books, or delivered to them the
money.
The rule does not require that the
gift shall be made in any particular way, it
only requires that enough shall be done to
transfer the title to the property, and one of
the modes of doing this is by an unequivocal
declaration of trust. In Richardson v. Richardson,
supra, the court, in noticing this
point, said: "Reliance is often placed on the
that the assignor has done all
circumstance
he can, and that there is nothing remaining
for him to do, and It is contended that he
must in that case only be taken to have made
assignment.
a complete and effectual
But
that is not the sound doctrine on which the
case rests; for if there be an actual declara-

tion of trust, although the assignor has not
done all that he could do, for example, although he has not given notice to the assignee, yet the interest is held to have effectually passed as between the donor and
donee. The difference
must be rested simply on this: aye or no, has he constituted
himself a trustee."
As notice to the cestui que trust was not
necessary, and as the retention of the passbooks was not inconsistent with the completeness of the act, the case is peculiarly
one to be determined by this test: did the
intestate constitute herself a ti-ustee? After
a careful consideration
of the case in connection with the established rules applicable
to the subject, and the authorities, I think
this question must be answered in the affirmative. It was not done in express formal terms, but such is the fair legal import
of the transaction. I have considered the
case thus far upon what appears from the
face of the transaction, without evidence aliunde, bearing upon the intent
It is not
necessary
to decide that surrounding circumstances may not be shown to vary or explain the apparent character of the acts, and
the intent with which they were done. The
facts developed may not be so unequivocal

as to be regarded as conclusive.
It is sufficient to say that there is no finding of an
intent contrary to the creation of a trust,
and the facts found do not establish such an
adverse intent.
But looking at the evidence
it Is fairly inferable that the intestate designed that the plaintiff and her sister should
have the benefit of these deposits, and there
are some circumstances
from which an inference may be drawn that she regarded the
gifts as fixed and complete.
The circumstance that she did not intend that the objects of her bounty should know of her gift
until after her death is not inconsistent with
it, and the most that can be said is that she
may have believed that the deposits might
be withdrawn during her life, and the money converted to her own use. It is not clear
that she entertained such a belief, but if she
did, it would not change the legal effect of
her acts.
The judgment must be affirmed.
concur except MILLER
absent at argument
Judgment affirmed.

All

JJ.,

and EARL,
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X. Y.

Court of Appeals of New York.

et

al.i

421.)

Nov. 26, 1889.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,
third department.
The action was commenced by the plaintiff ,
as executrix of Asiel G. Beaver, against the
Ulster County Savings Institution, to recover
certain deposits amounting to the sum of
$2,800 or thereabouts, standing to his credit
The administraon the books of the bank.
tors of John 0. Beaver claiming the money
as part of his estate, they were substituted as
defendants in place of the bank, the money
having been brouglit into court. The question litigated was whether the money represented by the deposits and the accumulations
had been vested in Asiel G. Beaver, as a gift
f lom John O. Beaver. The account with the
bank consisted of twodeposits, — one July 5,
1866, of $854.04, and one of October 5, 1866,
of $145.96,— making in the aggregate $1,000,
and the accumulations thereon.
It is undisputed that the deposit of $854.04 was made
in person by John O. Beaver, and that the
money deposited belonged to him.
The only
evidence to sustain the claim that it was given
by him to Asiel Q. Beaver is found in the relations between them and the circumstances
attending the deposit.
Asiel G. Beaver was
the son of John O. Beaver, and in 1866 was
17 years of age, and resided with his father,
as one of a family of 13 children.
John O.
Beaver made the deposit of July 5, 1866, in
the name of Asiel.
The rules of the bank required that on making the first deposit the
depositor should subscribe a declaration of
his assent to the by-laws of the institution,
and his promise to abide by them.
John O.
Beaver, at the date of the first deposit, signed
in his own name a declaration presented to
him by the treasurer of the bank, commencing with the words: "I, Asiel G. Beaver, of
Esopus, Ulster county, hereby request the
officers of the Ulster County Savings Institution to receive from me $854, and open an
account with me," etc. At the same time
the savings bank entered on its books an account beginning, "Dr., Ulster County Savings Bank, in account with Asiel Beaver,"
and crediting said Asiel with the deposit of
Under the name of Asiel Beaver were
$854.
originally written the words, "Payable to
John 0. Beaver." The bajik also at the same
time issued and delivered to John 0. Beaver
a pass-book, with a similar entry as in the
account on the books of the bank, containing
also, as originally written, the words, "Paya"
ble to John O. Beaver.
These words in the
account and in the pass-book were in the
handwriting of the treasurer of the bank, and
were written at the same time and by the
same hand as the other part of the entries.
But before the delivery of the pass-book the
words "Payable to John O. Beaver" were
erased therefrom, and the same erasure was
'Reversing

6 N.

Y.

Supp. 586.
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made in the account on the bank-books. How
the interlineation came to be made in the first
instance does not appear, nor does it appear
at whose suggestion or under what circumstances theerasures were made.
Subsequently, on October 5, 1866, another depo.sit of
$145.96 was made to the account, and credited on the pass-book.
There are no facts, except as above stated,
tending to show a gift of the money deposited
to Asiel.
On the other hand, many circumstances were shown which are claimed to be
inconsistent with a gift by the father to the
son of the money deposited.
The son married a few years after the deposit was made,
and died in 1886, 20 years after the date of
the deposits, being then of the age of 37 years,
leaving a wife, but no children, surviving.
John O. Beaver, the father, died in 1888.
The father retained possession of the passbook at all times until his death.
In April,
1867, he drew $27.29 from the account, and
signed a receipt therefor in the pass-book in
his own name.
No other sum was ever
drawn from the account.
Prom time to time
John O. Beaver presented the pass-book to
the bank to have the iiiterest credited, and
the bank officers had no dealings with any
other person in respect to the account.
There
is no evidence that Asiel G. Beaver ever had
the pass-book in his possession, or knew of
the deposits.
In May, 1870, Asiel opened an
individual account at the bank in his own
name, which continued until March, 1886,
when he drew out $1,818.56, in full of the account. It appears that John O. Beaver had
eight or nine pass-books in the bank, representing deposits made in the names of other
He left at his death real estate of
persons.
the value of $12,000 to $15,000, and more
than $20,000 in personal property. One of the
rules of the bank provides that "drafts may
be made personally, or by the order in writing of the depositor, (if the institution have
the signature of the party,) or by letters of
attorney, duly authenticated, but no person
shall have the right to demand any part of

his principal

or interest without

producing

the original book, that such payment may be
entered thereon, " and another declares that,
"although the institution will endeavor to

prevent fraud or impositions, yet all payments
to persons presenting the pass-books issued
by it shall be valid payments to discharge the
institution. " The rules were printed on the
pass-books of the bank.
A. T. Clearwater, for appellants. F. L.
Westbrook, for respondent.

J., (after stating the facts as
is
found that the money with
above.)
which John O. Beaver made the deposit of
$854.04, July 5, 1866, belonged to him. The
inference that the deposit of $145.96, made
October 5, 1866, was also made by him, from
his own means, does not admit of reasonable
question. The pass-book was at all times in
his possession.
Concurrently with the last
deposit the amount was entered therein. It
Andrews,

It
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is affirmatively shown that Asiel, who was
then a minor, lived with his father, and had
no money of his own, and the circumstances
are quite satisfactory to show that he never
at any time during his life knew of the bank
account. The question in the case turns
upon the legal effect of the deposit, made in
connection with the attendant and subseIf they established
quent circumstances.
either a trust in favor of Asiel as to the
.$854.04, deposited July 5, 1866, or a gift of
the fund deposited, then, clearly, the subsequent deposit would, in the absence of explanation, be impressed with the same character, and be governed by tlie same rules.
On the other hand, if the first deposit was
not affected with any trust, and was not a
gift, neither is the last one. Both were the
property of John O. Beaver, or both the property of the son, either by a beneficial or legal
title. The trial court seem to have sustained
the transaction as a gift, but at the same
time refused to find that there was no trust.
There is no warrant, under the decisions
of this court, to uphold the deposit of July 5,
1866, asatrust. The caseof Martin v. Funk,
75 N. Y. 134, established a trust in favor of
the claimant in that case, in respect to a fund
deposited by another iti a savings bank to his
own credit, in trust for the former; the latter taking from the bank at the time a passbook in which the account was entered in the
same way.
The court applied the doctrine
that the owner of a fund may, by an unequivocal declaration of trust, impress it
with a trust character, and thereby convert
his absolute legal title into a title as trustee
for the person in whose favor the trust is deThere was no declaration of trust in
clared.
this case, in terms, when the deposit of July
5, 1866, was made, nor at any time afterwards, and none can be implied from a mere
deposit by one person in the name of another. To constitute a trust tliere must be
either an explicit declaration of trust, or cirwhich show beyond reasonable
cumstances
doubt that a trust was intended to be creIt would introduce a dangerous instaated.
bility of titles if anything less was required,
or if a voluntary trust inter vivos could be
established in the absence of express words,
by circumstances capable of another construction, or consistent with a different intention.
See Young v. Young, 80 N. Y. 438, and
cases cited.

The plaintiff's title to the fund must depend, therefore, upon the question of gift.
The elements necessary to constitute a valid
gift are well understood, and are not the subject of dispute. There must be on the part
of tlie donor an intent to give, and a delivery
of the thing given, to or for the donee, in
pursuance of such intent, and on the part of
The subject of the
the donee acceptance.
gift may be chattels, choses in action, or any
form of personal property, and what constitutes a delivery may depend on the nature
and situation of the thing given. The delivery may be symbolical or actual, by act-
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ually transferring the manual custody of the
chattel to the donee, or giving to him the
In case
symbol which represents possession.
of bonds, notes, or choses in action, the delivery of the instrument which represents
the debt is a gift of the debt, if that is the
intention; and so, also, where the debt is
that of the donee, it may be given, as has
been held, by the delivery of a receipt acWesterlo v. De Witt,
knowledging payment.
36 X. Y. 340; Gray v. Barton, 55 N. Y. 72;
2 Schouler, Pers. Prop. § 66 et seq.
The acceptance also may be implied where the gift,
otherwise complete, is beneficial to the donee.
But delivery by the donor, either actual or
constructive, operating to divest the donor
of possession of and dominion over the thing,
is a constant and essential factor in every
transaction which takes effect as a complete
gift. Anything short of this strips it of the
quality of completeness which distinguishes
an intention to give, which alone amounts to
nothing, from the consummated act, which
The intention to give is
changes the title.
often established by most satisfactory eviInstruments
dence, although the gift fails.
may be even so formally executed by the
donor, purporting to transfer title to the
donee, or there may be the most explicit declaration of an intention to give, or of an actual present gift, yet, unless there is delivery,
Several cases of
the intention is defeated.
this kind have been recently considered by
this court. Young v. Young, supra; Jackson V. Railway Co., 88 N. Y. 520; In re
Crawford, 113 N. Y. 560, 21 N. E. Eep. 692.
We are of opinion that there is lacking in
this case two of the essential elements to
constitute a gift by John O. Beaver to his
son of the money deposited July 5, 1866, viz.,
an intent to give, and a delivery of the subThe only evidence
ject of the alleged gift.
relied upon to establish an intent on the part
of the father to make a gift to his son is the
transaction at the bank on the day the deposit was made, in connection with the relaThere is no proof
tion between the parties.
of any oral statement made by the father on
that occasion disclosing an intention to make
a gift, and not a scintilla of evidence that
afterwards, during the 20 years which elapsed
before the son's death, the father made any
declaration or in any way recognized that the
money belonged to the son, or had been given
to him.
Evidence offered on the part of the
defendant of declarations of John O. Beaver,
made on the day of the deposit and afterwards, inconsistent with the theory of an intent to give the money to Asiel, were excluded, on the objection of the plaintiff.
The
acts of John 0. Beaver after the account was
opened tend strongly to negative the claim
that the money was deposited with intent to
The drawing out of the
give it to the son.
interest by John O. Beaver on one occasion;
his retention of the pass-book for 22 years,
and procuring it to be written up from time
to time; the fact that the son, so far as appears, never was informed of the existence
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of the account,— are strong indications that
John O. Beaver did not make the deposit in
the son's name, with intent to make a present gift of the mgney. The father dealt
with the account as his own, and, if the control he exercised over it during the minority
of Asiel could be reasonably explained on the
theory that he acted as the natural guardian
of the son, no such explanation is possible as
to the 16 years of the life of the son after he
reached his majority.
The trial court having found that there
gift, which, of course,
was a consummated
includes a finding of an intent to give, this
court is concluded from reviewing the finding, if there was any competent and sufficient evidence to support it. The form of
the account is the essential fact upon which
the plaintiff relies. It may be justly said
that a deposit in a savings bank by one person, of his own money to the credit of another, is consistent with an intent on the
part of the depositor to give the money to
But it does not, we think, of itthe other.
self, without more, authorize an affirmative
finding that the deposit was made with that
intent, when the deposit was to a new account, unaccompanied
by any declaration of
intention, and the depositor received at the
time a pass-book, the possession and presentation of which, by the rules of the bank,
known to the depositor, is made the evidence
of the right to draw the deposit.
We cannot
close our eyes to the well-known practice of
persons depositing in savings banks money
to the credit of real or fictitious persons, with
no intention of divesting themselves of ownership. It is attributable to various reasons,
— reasons connected with taxation, rules of
the bank limiting the amount which any one
individual may keep on deposit, the desire to
obtain high rates of interest where there is a
discrimination based on the amount of deposits, and the desire on the part of many
persons to veil or conceal from others knowlIn most
edge of their pecuniary condition.
cases where a deposit of this character is
made as a gift, there are contemporaneous
facts or subsequent declarations by which the
intention can be established, independently
of the form of the deposit. We are inclined
to think that to infer a gift from the form of
the deposit alone would, in the great majority
of cases, and especially where the deposit
was of any considerable amount, impute an
intention which never existed, and defeat the
The relation
real purpose of the depositor.
of father and son does not in this case, we
It
think, strengthen the plaintiff's case.
may be true that, as between parent and
child, a presumption of a gift may be raised
from circumstances where it would not be
implied between strangers. Kidgway v. EnLaw, 409. But where a deglish, 22 J^.
posit is made in the name of another, without any intention on the part of the depositor
to part with his title, he would be quite likely to select a member of his own family to
represent the account, and in this case thi3
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is the natural explanation of the transaction.
The circumstances of the erasure in the
declaration signed by John 0. Beaver, and
also in the account on the books of the bank,
of the words, "Payable to John O. Beaver,"
throw no light upon the actual intention.
If they were originally inserted at the suggestion of John 0. Beaver, it would seem to
imply that when he came to make the deposit he did not intend to part with the control of the money, and it is scarcely presumable that he changed his intention at the very
If the words
time of making the deposit.
were inserted by the treasurer without authority, he may have erased them so as to
leave no evidence of an intent to evade the
law or the rules of the bank in respect to deposits, or he may have done it for some other
Again, it is possible
unexplained reason.
that John O. Beaver desired that the fund
should be placed so that it could be drawn on
presentation of the pass-book, without the
necessity of a written order, and the erasure
In short, the reawas made for this reason.
son for the insertion of the words, and the
subsequent erasure, is matter of speculation
merely, and does not aid in the interpretation of the main transaction. There was not
only a failure to prove an intent on the part
of John O. Beaver to make a gift, but the
case is, we think, equally defective on the
The declaration and reproof of delivery.
quest drawn by the treasurer ran in the name
of Asiel, as did the promise recited to abide
But it was signed
by the rules of the bank.
by John O. Beaver in his own name, and
not as agent for Asiel, and in law was his
John O. Beaver
request and his promise.
took and retained possession of the passbook on which the rules were printed.
The
rules prescribed the undertaking of the bank,
and the conditions to be observed by depositors in requiring payment.
Under these
rules, John O. Beaver had the exclusive dominion over the account, and the exclusive
right to draw upon it so long as he retained
the pass-book.
It wms his signature that the
bank had, and not that of Asiel, and the rule
authorizing drafts by the depositor only apBut
plies when the bank has his signature.
the rule also prescribed that "no person shall
have the right to demand any part of his
principal or interest without producing the
original book, that such payments may be
entered thereon," and also that "all payments to persons producing the pass-books
shall be valid payments to discharge the institution." Under these rules, Asiel was
never in a situation to control the account,
while John O. Beaver had complete authority over the fund at all times.
If John O.
Beaver had delivered the pass-book to Asiel
with intent to give him the deposit, there
would have been a constructive delivery of
the subject of the gift.
In re Crawford,
supra. But he never did this, or any equivalent act.
We think, for the reasons stated, that the
plaintiff failed to establish a gift, or to justify
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The question of gifts, in
a finding of a gift.
connection with deposits in savings banlis,
has of late years been frequently considered
The preby the courts in various states.
ponderance of authority seems to be in favor
of the views we have expressed. See Robinson V. Ring, 72 Me. 140; Burton v. Bank, 52
Conn. 398; Marcy v. Amazeen, 61 N. H. 131;
Scliick V. Grote, 42 N.
Eq. 352, 7 Atl.
Rep. 852; Scott v. Bank, 140 Mass. 157, 2 N.
E. Rep. 925; 8 Amer. &Eng. Cyclop. Law, tit.
"Gifts," and notes. The cases of Howard v.

J.
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Bank. 40 Vt. 597; Blasdel v. Locke, 52 N.
H. 238; Gardner v. Merritt, 32 Md. 78,— go
the furthest towards sustaining transactions, similar to the one in question, as
gifts, of any we have noticed, but they are
distinguishable in material respects from
this. Our conclusion is that the cause of action in this case was not made out, and the
judgment should therefore be reversed, and
All concur, except
a new trial ordered.
DANFOETHi J., dissenting, and Finoh, J.,
not voting.
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HATIIORN

et al.

88 Me. 122.)

Court of Maine.

June

7,

1895.

Report from supreme judicial court, Sagadalioc county.
This was a bill of interpleader brought by
the Bath Savings Institution against the defendant Hathoru, as administrator of the
Wallier, deceased,
estate
of Henry
and
against Alice B. Files, to determine the title
to a certain deposit in that institution.
The course of procedure adopted by agreement between
all parties was this: Each
defendant filed an answer, and then, by
agreement, a decree of inteiiileader was filed,
and by further agreement it was stipulated
that the answers should be taken as the
pleadings in the case, and the cause set down
for hearing on bill, answers, and proof, and
that Miss Files be regarded as plaintiff in
It thus bethe continuance of the suit.
came, practically, a suit in equity by Alice
B. Files against the administrator of Henry
Walker's estate. The facts in the case were
practically undisputed.
It appeals that Henry Walker died October
leaving neither wife nor children,
2, 1891,
his wife having died nearly six years before.
Their home was in Woolwich, opposite Bath,
and Miss Files, who was a second cousin
of Mrs. Walker, frequently visited there, and
Mr. and Mrs. Walker often visited the Files
family in Winslow, the two families being in
close and Intimate relations. On July 1,
1882, Mr. Walker deposited the sum of $700
In the Bath Savings Institution in his own
name, but "in trust for Alice B. Files," and
took out a depositor's
book in that form.
At the time of making the deposit he had a
conversation with the treasurer of the bank
as to its form, and the treasurer told him
that if he put the book in any one's name,
in trust for any one, it would go to that person at his decease; and Mr. Walker said he
wished it to, that he wished it to go to Miss
Files. In accordance with his direction, the
signature book, which all depositors are required to sign, was signed by Mrs. Potter,
then a clerk in the bank, in the same form,
"Henry Walker, in trust for Alice B. Files,
of Woolwich."
Mr. Walker retained the
bank book in his possession ever after, but
never drew any part of the principal or interest therefrom, but took the book to the
bank occasionally to have the accrued dividends added.
On one occasion, very soon
after the deposit was made. Miss Piles' sister, now Mrs. White, was visiting at his
house, and saw the book, among some other
papers that he happened to be examining.
She took it up, and looked at it, saw the
form of entry, and he told her then, "Yes,
that is for Alice at my decease, and the next
will be for you," and Mrs. White communicated this information to Alice, her sister,
immediately on her return home from the
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visit, who expressed her satisfaction thereat.
Mrs. Trott, who was in the family as housekeeper for about six years, going there before Mrs. Walker's death, saw the book on
occasions,
three different
and Mr. Walker
explained to her, also, when she spoke of its
being in trust, that the book was for Alice;
and again, just a few months before his
death, after he had the July dividend added,
he was examining the book, spoke of it as
Alice's bank book, and asked Mrs. Trott to
guess how much it had gained.
She told
him she supposed it was between ten hundred and eleven hundred dollars, and his reply was: "You are pretty good f(jr guessing.
You guessed pretty nearly right; and that
will be a great help to Alice, won't it, Mrs.
Trott?" Decree against estate.
Orville D. Baker and I/eslie C. Cornish, for
Alice B. Files. Charles W. Larrabee, for defendant Hathorn.

HASKELL, J. Henry Walker, of Woolwich, died, solvent and intestate, October 2,
1S91, leaving brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces, but neither wife nor children.
His wife died January 1, 1886. She was a
cousin to the father of plaintiff, Alice B.
Files, of Winslow, who knew the old people
as uncle

and aunt,

and seems to have

been

always welcome at their house and a favorite
with them.
On July 1, 1882, Mr. Walker deposited in
the Bath Savings Institution $700 "in trust
for Alice B. Files," saying, in substance, that
he wished it to go to her at his decease.
That deposit remained intact during Mr.
Walker's life, and at his death amounted to
something over $1,000.
He always retained
the book, and it was found among his papers by his administrator, the defendant,
who now claims the deposit as a part of his
estate.
The evidence shows that Mr. Walker
intended the deposit for Alice at his decease,
but never communicated his intention to her.
The authorities all say that a gift inter
vivos must be complete.
The donor must
divest himself of all dominion over the thing
given, and the title to it must pass absolutely
and irrevocably to the donee.
Northrop v.
Hale, 73 Me. 66; Dale v. Lincoln, 31 Me. 420;
Robinson v. Ring, 72 Me. 140; Bank v. Fogg,
82 Me. 538. 20 Atl. 92.
A voluntary trust is an equitable gift, and,
like a legal gift inter vivos, must be complete.
A declaration of trust as effectually
passes the equitable title of the fund to the
cestui as a gift inter vivos passes the legal
title to the donee. The distinction between
them is of a technical nature.
In a trust,
the real title vests in the donee, but the legal
title, perhaps, carrying control of the property, may be placed elsewhere; while in a
gift both the real and legal title instantly
fall to the donee. It is not necessary, therefore, that he who declares a trust should divest himself of the legal title, if, perchance,
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he so does it as to transfer the real or equitable title to the cestui; for then he creates
an estate really no longer his own. He may
retain the legal title, giving him the control,
but for the benefit of the cestui, according
to the terms of the trust. His control becomes subject to the direction of courts of
equity, that always supervise the administration of trusts. They are the children of
equity. They spring from it, and cannot survive without its aid and control.
The trustee is merely an agent to administer them,
and nothing more.
An express trust of lands can only be created by some writing signed by the party or
his attorney (Rev. St. c. 73, § 11), but a trust
of personal property may be created or declared by parol.
It is necessary, however, to
clearly establish the terms of it, and show
an executed gift, so that the equitable title
shall have passed to the donee as effectually
as a sift inter vivos.
Gerrish v. Institution,
128 JIass. 159; Dresser v. Dresser, 46 Me. 48.
Says Lord Cranworth:
"If a man chooses
to give away anything which passes by delivery, he may do so, and there is no doubt
that, in the absence of fraud, a parol declaration of trust may be perfectly good, even
though it be voluntary. If I give any chattel, that of course passes by delivery ; and if
expressly or impliedly say
constitute myself trustee of such and such personal property for a person,' that is a trust executed,
and this court will enforce it, in the absence
of fraud, even in favor of a volunteer.
♦ * * The authorities all turn upon the
question whether what took place was a declaration of trust, or merely an imperfect attempt to make a legal transfer of the property.
In the latter case, the court will afford no assistance to volunteers; but when
the court considers that there has been a
declaration of trust, it is a trust executed,
and the court will enforce it, whether with
or without consideration." Jones v. Lock, 1
Ch. App. 25.
In this case, the deposit is in the name of
Standing
the donor, "in trust for the donee."
alone, this entry does not work an absolute,
indisputable gift in the form of a dry trust,
— that is, a trust without limitation or condition, that may be terminated at the will
of the cestui; but extrinsic evidence is comBrabrook v.
petent to control its effect.
Bank, 104 Mass. 228; Clark v. Clark, 108
Mass. 522; Powers v. Institution, 124 Mass.
377; Stone v. Bishop, 4 Cliff. 593, Fed. Cas.
No. 13,482; Northrop v. Hale, 72 Me. 275.
The evidence discloses that, at the time the
donor made the deposit, he expressed a desire
that the donee should have the money at his
death. That certainly shows no Intent to part
with the legal title at an earlier day. He is
said to have subsequently made talk of the
same purport; but he neither informed the
donee of the deposit, nor made any effort or
did any act to apprise her of it, or of his intention concerning it. The deposit on his part
was both voluntary and secret. Information

I

I
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of It may have been communicated to her
by others, but never at his request or witli
his knowledge. What evidence, then, operates to pass the equitable title in the deposit
to her? He had consummated
no contract
with her. His intentions were kept in his
own breast.
He could have withdrawn the
money at any time, and have made a new
disposition of it, and she may not have been
the wiser, so far as he knew. It is just as
essential,
to establish the trust sought to
be set up here, to prove some act on tlie part
of the donor that shall operate to pass the
equitable title to the donee, as it is to ijrove
delivery in a gift inter vivos.
Both require
In both, some title
the same essentials.
must pass from the donor, differing only in
A gift must be executed by delivdegree.
ery; a trust, by declaration.
In Bank v. Fogg, 82 Me. 538, 20 Atl. 92,
the donor deposited a sum of money in the
name of the donee, subject to his own order,
with intent that, at his death, it should go
to the donee.
No trust was claimed
or
shown. It was an unexecuted purpose, an
Ineffectual attempt at testamentary disposition.

In Parcher

v. Institution, 78 Me. 470, 7
a depositor caused to be entered
upon the bank ledger words, in substance,
"Payable also to Mrs. Leavitt in case of my
death," and it was held no gift.
In Curtis v. Bank, 77 Me. 151, the entry
of "Subject also to" the donee was held to
constitute no gift, but that a subsequent delivery of the bank book completed the gift.
In Barker v. Fi-ye, 75 Me. 29, a deposit in
the name of the donee, subject to the order of
the donor during life, afterwards changed by
erasing words giving the donor any control of
the fund, and after notice to the donee of the
change and that the bank book would be
delivered to him the first time they met, and
after his reply requesting that the book be
sent to him, which the court says "was an
acceptance of the gift," it was held that the
gift was complete.
The same doctrine is held in Northrop v.
Hale, 73 Me. 66; Robinson v. Ring, 72 Me.
140; Drew v. Hagerty, 81 Me. 231, 17 Atl.
63; Parkman v. Bank, 151 Mass. 218, 24 N.

Atl.

E.

266,

43.

All of our

cases require something
more
than a mere intention to give, a promise to
give, or an expectation to give. Benevolence
alone will not do. There must be beneficence
also.
The mystery sometimes supposed to
exist about a trust cannot change the nature
of a transaction. A voluntary trust is a gift,
and requires all the essentials of a plain gift
to sustain it.
In Dresser v. Dresser, supra, a writing specifying the terms of a voluntary trust, and a
delivery of the trust property so that the
dominion of the donor over it was thereafter lost. Is a good example of a trust of
this sort.
In Alger v. Bank, 146 Mass. 418, 15 N. B.
916, the donor made a deposit similar to the
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one under consideration. It was in his own
name, as trustee for the donee, his house-,
keeper, who claimed the deposit as a payment for her services.
It was shown that,
shortly before his death, he told her, "I put
it iu for you;" "that money is yours;" and
the court held that the judge, who tried the
case, was authorized to find a perfected gift,
if he chose to do so.
Some of the cases are in conflict concerning
the question now under consideration, more
in the application of the law to the evervarying facts in the numerous cases than
otherwise; but our own cases are all consistent, and squarely hold to the doctrine
that a trust in personal property may be
created by parol, and that a deposit in bank
in the name of another may be explained or
controlled by evidence outside the written
terms of the deposit. In this case, the terms
of the deposit clearly show an intended trust
in favor of the donee, but may be controlled
or limited by extrinsic evidence.
This evidence confirms the trust, showing that it
should cease at the death of the donor, and
that the legal title should then pass to the
cestui.
When the deposit was made, the
treasurer of the bank told the donor that,
at his decease, the money would go to the
donee, and the donor replied that was his
wish. All the subsequent acts and declarations of the donor show the same intent. The
gift cannot be upheld as an absolute gift
inter vivos, nor as a gift causa mortis, for
these gifts require a delivery of the res, a
complete transfer of title. They diflfer from
a gift in trust in that they purport to, and
must, pass the whole title, so that the donor
can have no dominion or control over them.
But a gift in trust withholds the legal title
from the donee. It may be transmitted to
a third person, or It may be retained by the
donor, but in either case the equitable title
has gone from him, and unless the declaration of trust contains the power of revocation, or the wide discretion of chancery attaches (Coutts V. Acworth, L. R. 8 Eq. 558;
Wollaston v. Tribe, L. R. 9 Eq. 44; Everitt
V. Everitt, L. R. 10 Eq. 405; 7 Ch. App. 244;
15 Ch. Div. 570; Lister v. Hodgson, L. R. 4
Eq. 30; Sharp v. Leach, 31 Beav. 491; Anderson V. Blsworth, 3 Giff. 154; Toker v.
Toker, 31 Beav. 629; Phillips v. Mullings,
7 Ch. App. 247; Smith v. IlifCe, L. R. 20 Eq.
666; Welman v. Welman, 15 Ch. Div. 570,
578, 579; Prideaux v. Lonsdale, 1 De Gex,
J. & S. 433), it leaves him powerless to extinguish the trust. Of course, the trust must
be established by proof, and the fact that
no evidence of a voluntary trust once created
remains, or can be shown, does not alter the

Many rights fall of enjoyment
principle.
from the lack of evidence that might once
So, a secret trust may be valid
be adduced.
when it can be proved; but if the donor conceals the evidence of it, and later appropriates the fund to his own use, it is simply
a wrong on his part, that prevails becavise
of his perfidy, and goes unpunished and un-
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noticed because unknown. The cestui's rights
are the same, although his remedy may have
been destroyed.
In the case of In re Smith's Estate, 144 Pa.
St. 428, 22 Atl. 916, a lad of 3 years went to
live with his uncle.
When the lad was 12
the uncle placed $13,000 in bonds in an envelope, on which he had written and signed
a declaration that he held
them for his
nephew.
The bonds remained in the uncle's
possession until his death, and the court held
a completed gift in trust for the nephew.
In Bank v. Albee, 64 Vt. 571, 25 Atl. 487,
the court says: "A completed trust, although
voluntary, may be enforced in equity.
It is
not essential that the beneficiary should have
bad notice of its creation or have assented to
it.
The owner or donor of personal property
may create a perfect or complete trust by
his unequivocal declaration in writing, or by
parol, that he himself holds such property in
The trust is
trust for the purposes named.
equally valid whether he constitutes himself
or another person the trustee."
In that case a father deposited money in a
savings bank in the name of his son, naming
himself trustee.
It appeared that one motive of the father was to avoid taxation; but,
said the court, "that fact does not negative
the idea that he also intended to create a
trust for the benefit of his son. It is perfectly consistent with it, and the retention of the
pass book is not inconsistent with such a purpose.
He must have retained it a« trustee."
Ray V. Simmons, 11 R. I. 266, is in point.
One Bosworth deposited money in a savings
bank in his own name as trustee for a stepdaughter.
He did not tell her what he had
done, nor show her the pass book.
He kept
that himself. After his death, the court held
that the stepdaughter
was entitled to the
money,— that the transaction constituted a

trust in her favor.
So is Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134.
Susan
Boone deposited $500 in a savings bank "in
trust for Lillie Willard." Susan kept the
pass book, and Lillie had no knowledge of it
until after Susan's death. Want of notice to
Lillie, and the retention of the pass book by
Susan, were urged in defense; but the court
held a gift in trust complete.
This is an exhaustive case, and contains a review of authorities by Chief Justice Church prior to
1878.

So is Minor v. Rogers, 40 Conn. 512.
A
widow deposited $250 in her own name, "as
trustee of William A. Minor," the child of a
neighbor.
The child knew nothing of the
deposit until after the depositor's death, and
meantime did not have possession of the pass
book; and the court held the trust complete,
and allowed a recovery of the money from

the depositor's executor.
So is Re GafiCney's Estate, 146 Pa. St. 49, 23
Atl. 163.
It appeared that Hugh GafCney deposited $560 in his own name, as trustee for
Polly Kim, and the court held the entiy itself
prima facie evidence of the trust, and, unexplained, sufficient to uphold it
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In Gerrish v. Institution, supra, the court
says: "No particular form of words is required to create a trust in another, or to
make the party himself a trustee for the benefit of another;
that it is enough for the latter purpose if it be unequivocally declared in
writing,— or orally, if the property be personal; that it is held in trust for the person
named; that when the trust is thus created,
it is effectual to transfer the beneficial interest, and operates as a gift perfected by delivery."
The same case holds that notice to the beneficiary is unnecessary where the transaction
is clear; but when ambiguous, or susceptible
of different interpretations, it removes the
doubt, and is decisive of the purpose of the
donor.
Some of the earlier Massachusetts
cases seem to hold notice to the beneficiary
essential to the validity of a trust, but, when

TRUSTS.

considered in the light of this case, rather
consider the notice a controlling than an essential element in the creation of a voluntary
trust. The prevailing doctrine now is that
notice is unnecessary, but, when shown, has
controlling effect.
In this case, the entry "in trust for" is of
clear and unmistakable Import, and suflicient
to create a prima facie trust.
It might have
been controlled by evidence that would have
shown a contrary intention,
but such eviMoreover, all the
dence is wholly wanting.
declarations,
acts, and conduct of the donor
are consistent with the presumption arising
from the entry itself, and show that it expresses the true import rf the transaction,
and creates a completed trust in favor of the
donee.
Decree accordingly, with costs against the
estate.
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it

a

a

is

*

if

it

2

749.

In those cases where the legal fee is not
will, of course, in the
vested in the trustee,
absence of
devise prevailing to the contrary, vest in the heir at law. And there are
also cases in which,
having been the duty
of the trustee to convey to the heir at law,
will be presumed, after the lapse of considerable time, that such conveyance
has
Hill, Ti-ustees (4th Am. Ed.) 401;
been made.
Perry. Trusts,
350; Gibson v. Rees, 50 111.
383; Pollock v. Alaison, 41 111. 516.
But
Is not claimed, nor could
be, that there

is it

it

a

a a

(i.

It is said in Perry on Trusts (section 300) :
"Although it is probable that it was the ine., of uses) to convert
tent of the statute
all uses or trusts into legal estates, yet the
convenience to the subject of being able to
keep the legal title to an estate in one person, while the beneficial interest should be in
another, was too great to be given up altogether, and courts of equity were astute in
finding reasons to withdraw a conveyance
Three
from the operation of the statute.
principal reasons or rules of construction
were
were laid down whereby conveyances
First, where
excepted from such operation:
use; second, where
use was limited upon
copyhold or leasehold estate, or personal
property was limited to uses; third, where
such powers or duties were imposed with the
was necestate upon a donee to uses that
essary that he should continue to hold the

it

er, supra.

a

be sustained.

The rule is, undoubtedly, as claimed by
appellees' counsel, that trustees must be presumed to take an estate only commensurate
with the charges or duties imposed on them;
but this, however, is subject to the qualification that such presumption shall be consistent with the intention of the party creating the trust, as manifested by the words
employed in the instrument by which it is
SheUey v. Edlin, 4 Adol. & El. 582created.
Cadogan v. Ewart, 7
^89, 31 B. C. L. 143;
Adol. & El. 630, 666; Davies v. Davies, 1
Adol. & El. (N. S.) 430, 41 E. C. L. 611.
Under the statute of uses, which is in
force here, where an estate is conveyed to
one person for the use of or upon a ti'ust for
another, and nothing more is said, the statute immediately transfers the legal estate to
the use, and no trust Is created, although
Perry,
words of trust are used.
express
Trusts, § 298. And so we have expressly
held.
Witham v. Brooner, 63 lU. 344; Lynch
V. Swayne, 83 111. 336.
But this, it will be observed, has reference
only to passive trusts, or what are sometimes termed simple or dry trusts; and in
such cases the legal estate never vests in the
feoffee for a moment, but is instantaneously
transferred to the cestui que use as soon as
2 Bl. Oomm.
the use Is declared.
(Sharswood's Ed.) 331, 332; and Witham v. Broon-

it

therefore,

it

J. In this form of action,
legal title must control, we
think it sufficient to show that title is not in
appellees, and the judgment below cannot,
SOHOLFIBLD,

since the naked

it

Alex. J. P. Garesche and E. Lane, for apJames M. Truitt qnd Rice & Miller,
pellant.
for appellees.

a

Appeal from circuit
couuty; Charles S. Zane, Judge.

1880.

Montgomery

a

Jan. Term,
court,

§

Court of Illinois.

a

Supreme

legal title in order to perform his duty or
In all of these three inexecute the power.
stances courts, both of law and equity, held
that the statute did not execute the use, but
that such use remained as
was before the
statute, a mere equitable interest to be administered in a court of equity." And again,
in section 305,
is said:
"The third rule of
construction is less technical, and relates to
special or active trusts, which were never
within the purview of the statute.
Therefore, if any agency, duty or power be imposed on the trustee, as, by
limitation to
trustee and his heirs to pay the rents, or
to convey the estate, or if any control is to
be exercised or duty performed by the trustee in applying the rents to a person's maintenance, or in making repairs, or to preserve
contingent remainders, or to raise
sum of
money, or to dispose of the estate by sale, in
all these and in other and like cases, the
operation of the statute is excluded, and the
trusts or uses remain mere equitable estates.
So, if the trustee
to exercise any discretion in the management of the estate, in the
investment of the proceeds or the principal,
or in the application of the income, or if the
purpose of the trust is to protect the estate
given time, or until the death of some
for
* *" And again,
one, or until division.
in regard to enlarging and extending estates
given to trustees, the same author, in sec"So, if land is devised to
tion 315, says:
trustees without the word heirs, and a trust
is declared which can not be fully executed
but by the trustees taking an inheritance,
the court will enlarge or extend their estate
into
fee simple to enable them to can'y out
Thus, if land is
the intention of the donors.
conveyed to trustees without the word heirs,
in trust to sell, they must have the fee, otherwise they could not sell. The construction
would be the same
the trust was to sell
part, for no purchasers would
the whole or
be safe unless they could have the fee, and
trust to convey or to lease at discretion
would be subject to the same rule. A fortiori, if an estate is limited to trustees and
their heirs, in trust to sell or mortgage or to
lease at discretion, or if they are to convey
the property in fee, or to divide
equally
among certain persons, for to do any or all
of these acts requires
legal fee." See, also,
to the same effect. Hill, Trustees (4th Am.
Mees. & W.
Ed.) 376; Rees v. Williams,
a

et al.

a

COX

a

V.

(94 111. 400.)

it
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auy foundation for such presumption in tlie
facts found in this record.
In Harris v. Cornell, 80 111. 67, it was said,
referring to Hardin v. Osborn, Sept. Term,
1875, that it had been held the purposes
of
a trust having been accomplished,
the owner
of the trust became, by operation of law, reinvested with the legal title and could sue
in ejectment.
This was unadvisedly said.
A rehearing was granted in Hardin v. Osborn, and the opinion therein referred to was
withdrawn.
In McNab v. Young, 81 111. 11,
language of like Import as that used in Harris V. Cornell, supra, was used upon the authority of the same case, although it is therein erroneously referred to as being reported in
60 111., at page 93.
The case there reported,
of that name, does not discuss that or any
kindred question.
The true doctrine in regard to active trusts,
and that adhered to by this court. Is expressed in Vallette v. Bennett, 69 111., at page
636, that where the legal title is vested in the
trustee, nothing short of a reconveyance can
place the legal title back in the grantor or
his heirs, subject, of course, to the qualification that, under certain circumstances, such
reconveyance will be presumed without direct
proof of the fact.
The language of Walsh's will is: "As to
uiy worldly estate, all the real, personal and
mixed, of which I shall die seized and pos-

I

* * *
sessed,
hereby grant, devise, convey and confirm unto" (naming the trustees),
"in trust," etc.
He then directs his said
trustees to assume and take entire control of
his estate;
to collect all outstanding
dues,
rents, profits and interests of whatever character, derived therefrom, and to govern and
control all such interests as may accrue and
arise to said estate from time to time;
to
make such disposal of said estate as shall
in their judgment benefit and increase the
value of said estate; that said trustees "shall
pay, or cause to be paid, out of said estate,"
Mary Lucy, "such installto his daughter,
ments of money as in the judgment of said
trustees shall be deemed proper and sufficient
to meet her current expenses, and provide her
an ample and comfortable
support;"
that
said trustees should transfer his estate to his
said daughter upon her reaching the age of
35 years, she being then unmarried,
but if
then married, they are directed to transfer
the estate to her only upon the contingency
that they should deem her husband a person
in whom confidence might be placed; but if
the trustees should deem the husband an incompetent and unfit person to have the care
and control of the estate, they are directed to
continue to make payments to his daughter,
"in such amounts and at such times as in
their judgment they may think proper," and
and station of his
that the circumstances
that in the event of
daughter may demand;
the death of his daughter without issue, certain specific legacies, amounting to some $2,-

in the aggi-egate, are given, and the balance of his estate is to be divided equally between the House of the Good Shepherd, Saint
Joseph's Male Orphan Asylum, and Saint
Ann's Infant Asylum; and he then exempts
his trustees from liability for all losses occur600

ring without their fault.
This very clearly gave the entire control
and management of the estate to the trustees
until Mary Lucy should arrive at the age of
35 years— being unmarried;
and she having
died before she reached that age, the control
and management of the estate continued to
devolve upon them.
The language employed
so plainly conveys this idea that it can admit of no controversy.
The power "to make such disposal of the
estate as shall," in the judgment of the trustees, "benefit and increase the value of said
estate,"— as also the duty of paying Mary
Lucy "such installments of money as in the
judgment of said trustees shall be proper and
sufficient to meet her current expenses and
support,"
provide an ample and comfortable
imply the power to sell the
—necessarily
lands and convert them into money or interfor this might well, in
est bearing securities;
the judgment of the trustees, benefit and increase the estate, and be essential to make
payment of the sums directed to be paid to
Mary Lucy. The power Implied to sell, is to
sell the whole title,— and to this is essential
the power to convey that title, requiring, as
a condition precedent, a fee-simple
estate in
the trustees.
The property Is devised to the trustees to
sell and convey, if they deem it advisable, or
to hold and control until it is to be transferred as directed;
and in the contingency that
has arisen, it was intended that it should
be the duty of the trustees to make the equal
division of the property between the corporaand convey it accordingly;
tions designated
for the grant to these corporations is in severalty, and not as tenants in common, and
their title must necessarily rest on the conveyance of the trustees.
Whether the corporations can hold or not
The words of the deis not now material.
vise show the intention of the testator that
the trustees should take a fee, whether he
was mistaken in the law as respects the objects of his intended bounty or not. The only
candifference would be, if the corporations
not take, the trustees, instead of holding the
legal title in trust for them, hold it in trust
for the heirs at law. Hill, Trustees (4th Am.

Ed.) 208, 209.
The legal title, then, being in the trustees,
the heirs at law could not maintain ejectPerry, Trusts, §§ 17, 328, 520; Hill,
ment.
Trustees
(4th Am. Ed.) 422, 423, *274; Id.
*317;
Id. 672, *428; Id. 784, *503;
482,
Bull. & T. Trusts & Trustees, p. 811.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed.

Judgment reversed.
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of New York.

lawful

et al.

Feb. 28, 1882.

Appeal from judgment of the general term
of the supreme, court, in the Second judicial
department,
entered upon an order made the
which
1881,
second Monday of December,
afQrmed a judgment in favor of plaintiff, entered upon a decision of the court on trial at
Reported below, 25 Hun, 574.
special term.
This action was brought to obtain a construction of the will of John Walsh, late of
the city of New York, deceased. The clauses
of the will as to which there was any controversy are as follows:
"Thirdly. I give, devise, and bequeath unto
my said son James, during his natural life,
all the rents, issues, and profits of my real
estate, and in case he married and has lawful
issue, then and in the last-mentioned event
give, devise, and bequeath
and thereupon
to my said son James all and singular my
to
real estate, whatsoever and wheresoever,
have and to hold, the same to my said son,
his heirs and assigns forever.
"Fourthly.
desire my executors to keep
the buildings on my real estate insured
against loss or damage by fire, and in repair,
and to pay all taxes, assessments, and other
charges thereon, and also the Interest on inand, if
cumbrances by mortgage thereon;
necessary, they are authorized to receive sufficient of the rents to enable them so to do;
and in case of damage or loss by fire they
are to receive the avails of the insurance,
and to repair or rebuild; but this clause of
my will is only to have efEect until my said
and
son James shall have lawful issue;
also authorize my said executors, until that
event, to raise, by mortgage of my real estate, or any part thereof, whenever and as
often as shall be necessary, a similar amount
as is now on mortgage of my said estate,
wherewith to discharge the present mortgage

I

I

I
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necessary.

"Fifthly. In

case of the death of my son
James without ever having had any lawful
desire my executors who shall then
issue,
be surviving, or the last survivor, to sell all
my real estate, and to distribute the proceeds
thereof amongst my next of kin as personal
estate, according to the laws of the state of

I

New York for the distribution of intestate
aupersonal estate; and for that purpose
thorize my said surviving executors or the
last survivor to execute good, valid, and sufin the law to transfer
ficient conveyances
said estate, and vest the same in the purchaser and purchasers in fee simple.
"Liastly. I appoint my beloved wife, and
my beloved son James, and my friend Tighe
Davey to be the executors of this my last
will and testament."
The testator died in 1836, leaving, surviving him, his son James, one nephew, the
James
and four nieces.
plaintiff herein,
died in 1880, unmarried, and having had no

I

Issue.
The two other executors died
before him, as did also the four nieces of
The defendants are the chilthe testator.
dren of said nieces.

John W. GofC, for appellant McCormack.
Luke F. Cozans and J. Woolsey Shephard, for
appellants Walker et al. John R. Kuhn, for
respondent.

FINCH, J. The testator gave to his son
James the whole of his real estate for life,
and absolutely and in fee, in case the son
married and had issue; but if he died without having had lawful issue, the testator directed his executors who should then be surviving, or the last survivor of them, to sell
his real estate and distribute the proceeds
among the testator's "next of kin, as personal estate, according to the laws of the
state of New York, for the distribution of
The executors
personal
intestate
estate."
named
were the testator's wife, his son
James, and his friend Tighe Davey; all of
whom are dead.
James died without having had lawful issue. At testator's death his
next of kin were his son James, four nieces,
and a nephew, who is the present plalntifi:.
The four nieces died during the lifetime of
James, but leaving children who are defendants here, and claim an interest in the proceeds of the real estate, or In the real estate
itself. At the date of the death of James
the plaintiff was the sole next of kin of the
testator, and claiming the entire proceeds of
the real estate, brought an action for a construction of the will and the appointment
of a trustee to carry out its unexecuted provisions. The trial court determined that it
had jurisdiction to appoint a trustee,
and
and that the plainmade such appointment,
tiff was entitled to the entire proceeds of the
real estate after payment of the liens thereon.
That judgment was affirmed, and the
children of two of the nieces bring this appeal.

It is contended in their behalf that the devise to James, before marriage and the birth
of issue, was but a life estate; that the remainder in fee vested at the death of testator in his heirs at law; that the four nieces
and plaintiff took such remainder in fee as
tenants in common, subject to be divested
by the marriage of James and birth of lawful issue; that this contingency not having
occurred the fee was not divested; and that
it cannot be divested by a sale of the real
estate and disposition of the proceeds as personalty because the power of sale given to
the executors was a mere naked power, not
coupled with any interest; died with the donees to whom it was given; and cannot be
executed by a court of equity.
It might prove to be the better opinion
that James took a base, or determinable fee,
subject to be divested upon his death without having had lawful issue, so that during
his life there was no fragment of the estate

•too
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upon his heirs at law, but the
character of his Interest need not be particularly discussed if the power of sale survived
the death of the executors, and the real estate is to be distributed as personalty. That
is the vital point in the case, and the appellant's view of it is sought to be sustained by
a reference
law,
to the rule at common
which, it is said, the Revised Statutes have
not seriously changed, but have omitted any
provision, express or implied, which gives
the court authority to appoint a trustee to
execute a naked power.
The argument turns
in the end upon the single inquiry whether
the authority given to the executors to sell
is a mere naked power, or a power in trust
and its execution imperative. The statutory
provisions must control and determine the
result, and render unnecessary any discussion or examination of the cases previously
decided, which were not always harmonious
and in some instances not easily reconciled.
They were very ably and patiently examined
in Dominick v. Sayre, 3 Sandf. 555, resulting
in a general conclusion that the statutory revision substantially followed and adopted the
rules of the common law, departing from
them only to remove doubts and secure greatBut in any event
er accuracy and precision.
the statutes must furnish the rule by which
we are to be guided to a conclusion, for they
provision abolbegin with a comprehensive
ishing all powers as then existing by law,
and making their creation, construction and
to descend

execution to be governed by the succeeding
enactments.
1 Rev. St. pt. 2, c. 1, tit. 2, art.
A power is there defined to be "an
3, § 73.
authority to do some act in relation to lands,
or the creation of estates therein, or of charges thereon, which the owner granting or reserving such power might himself lawfully
perform."
The authority here
Section 74.
given to the executors of John Walsh to sell
the lands and distribute the proceeds in the
event of the death of James without having
had issue was clearly a power within the
statutory definition.
It was also a general
and not a special power, for the former exists where the authority permits the alienation in fee by means of a conveyance, will
or charge of the lands embraced in the power
to any alienee whatever (section 77), and the
latter when the alienation must be to designated persons, or of a less estate or Interest
than a fee. Section 78. A distinction Is
then drawn between cases In which no person other than the grantee of the power has
any Interest in Its execution, in which case
the power, whether general or special, is debeneficial (section 79), and cases
nominated
in which the grantee has no interest In its
execution, but holds It for the benefit of oth-

A general power is In trust "when any
ers.
person or class of persons, other luan the
grantee of such power, is designated as entitled to the proceeds, or any portion of the
proceeds, or other benefits to result from the
alienation of the lands according to the pow-

er." Within this definition the general power conferred upon the executors to sell the
lands and distribute the proceeds to testator's next of kin was a power In trust. In the
execution of which the grantees had no interest, for, although James was one of them,
the power, by its terms, was to be exercised
upon his death, and in an event which left
him without any interest In Its execution.
These statutory definitions seem to us entirely accurate and clear and scarcely need, at
least for present purposes, the "authoritative
exposition" invoked. A power to be exercised by the grantee, not at all for his own
benefit but wholly and entirely for the benefit of some other person or class of persons,
is necessarily exercised by such grantee in a
trust capacity.
The element of trust inheres
in its substance and is its essential and vital
characteristic. The statutes then provide
that every trust power shall be imperative,
and impose a duty upon the grantee, the
performance of which may be compelled in
equity, unless In a case where its execution
or non-execution is made expressly to depend
upon the will of the grantee, and does not
cease to be such even though he may have
the right to select some and exclude others
from among the objects of the trust. Sections 96, 97.
So far, It is determined for us,
that the authority granted to the executors
of John Walsh Is a general power in trust,
and imperative.
Being such, a further provision, reaching the emergency of the death
of the grantees, becomes applicable.
It is
enacted (section 102) that the provisions of
sections 66 to 71 of article 2, relating to express trusts, shall apply to powers In trust,
and section 68 of that article confers upon
the court, upon the death of the surviving
trustee, his powers and duties, and permits
them to be exercised by some person appointed for that purpose under the direction
of the court. The statutes therefore answer
the whole argument of the appellants.
The
power in trust conferred upon the executors
did not die with them, but survived and
vested In the courts of equity having full
power to compel the execution of the trust.
If In Catton v. Taylor, 42 Barb. 578, there
Is any thing to the contrary, which seems to
be the fact, it was decided without reference
to the statutes and does not alter or modify
our conclusion.
The power in this case was
general, In trust and Imperative.
It was not
of a character personal to the trustees as involving the exercise of their individual choice
and discretion, and might as well be executed
by persons other than themselves.
Probably
It would have survived before the Revised
Statutes,
but certainly remains and Is enforceable

since.

Assuming then the validity of the trust
power and the jurisdiction of equity to provide for its exercise, the appellants still contend that the "next of kin," to whom the
proceeds of the real estate were to be distributed, are the persons or their representa-
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who were such at the date of the
of the testator, and not those who
were such at the date of the death of James.
There is no question here of the suspension
of the power of alienation, for the sale and
distribution awaited only the termination of
a single life; but nevertheless the argument
of the appellants proceeds, and must necessarily proceed, upon the idea that the next
of kin of the testator at his death took vested interests in a legacy, payable in the future,
since otherwise the right of each would lapse
and nothing would pass to their representaBut there is no gift to the next of
tives.
kin, and no language importing such gift, except in the direction to convert the real estate into money and then make distribution;
and in such case the rule is settled that time
is annexed to the substance of the gift and
Much more is that
the vesting is postponed.
true where the gift is only to vest upon the
happening of a future contingency,
until the
occurrence of which it is uncertain whether a
gift will be made at all. Warner v. Durant,
Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer.
76 N. Y. 136;
387;
Smith v. Edwards, 88 N. Y. 92. Here
a future condition or contingency attached
to the substance of the gift.
It was conditioned upon the death of James without hav-

death
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ing had lawful issue, so that the vesting was
plainly postponed and the gift was future.
There is the further and important fact that
at the death of James the land was to be converted into personalty and be distributed as
such, and the very subject of the gift was
until the prenot to come into existence
Vincent v. Newhouse,
scribed contingency.
83 N. Y. 511; Hoghton v. Whitgreave, 1 Jac.
& W. 145.
The case therefore falls within
the rule that where the gift is money, and the
direction for the conversion absolute, the legacy given to a class of persons vests in those
who answer the description and are capable
of taking at the time of distribution. Teed
Adding to these
V. Morton, 60 N. Y. 506.
considerations the incongruity of a construction which would include James himself
among the next of kin in the testator's mind
and intention, we are entirely clear that the
courts below correctly decided that the next
of kin entitled were those who answered
that description at the date of the distribution.
We discover therefore no error in the
disposition of the case.
The judgment should be affirmed, with
costs.

All

concur.

Judgment affirmed.
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Bill In equity by the executor of the will
of Francis Jackson, of Boston, for instractions as to the validity and efCect of the following bequests and devises:
"Article 4th. I give and bequeath to William Lloyd Garrison, Wendell Phillips, Edmund Quincy, Maria W. Chapman, L. Maria
Child, Edmund Jackson, William I. Bowditch, Samuel May, Jr., and Charles K. Whipple, their successors and assigns, ten thousand dollars; not for their own use, but in
trust, nevertheless, for them to use and expend at their discretion, without any responsibility to any one, in such sums, at such times
and such places, as they deem best, for the
preparation and circulation of books, newspapers, the delivery of speeches, lectures, and
such other means, as, in their judgment, will
create a public sentiment that will put an
end to negro slavery in this country; and I
hereby constitute them a board of trustees
for that purpose, with power to fill all vacancies that may occur from time to time by
death or resignation of any member or of
any ofllcer of said board. And I hereby appoint Wendell Phillips president, Edmund
Jackson treasurer, and Charles K. Whipple
Other
secretary, of said board of trustees.
bequests, hereinafter made, will sooner or
My
later revert to this board of trustees.
desire is that they may become a permanent
organization; and hope and trust that they
will receive the services and sympathy, the
donations and bequests, of the friends of the

I

slave.

I

give and bequeath to the
"Ai-tlcle 5th.
board of trustees named in the fourth article
of this will, their successors and assigns, two
thousand dollars, not for their own use, but
in trust, nevertheless, to be expended by them
at their discretion, without any responsibility
to any one, for the benefit of fugitive slaves
who may escape from the slaveholding states
of this infamous Union from time to time.
"Disregarding the self-evident declaration
of 1776, repeated in her own constitution of
1780, that 'all men are bom free and equal,'
Massachusetts has since, in the face of those
solemn declarations, deliberately entered into
a conspiracy with other states to aid them
in enslaving millions of innocent persons.
have long labored to help my native state out
of her deep iniquity and her barefaced hypocrisy in this matter. I now enter my last
her injusprotest against her inconsistency,
tice, and her cruelty, towards an unoffending people. God save the fugitive slaves that
escape to her borders, whatever may become

I

of the commonwealth of Massachusetts!
give and bequeath to Wen"Article 6th.
dell Phillips of said Boston, Lucy Stone,
formerly of Brookfield, Mass., now the wife

I

of Henry Blackwell of New York, and Susan
B. Anthony of Rochester, N. Y., their sucdollars,
cessors and assignjs, five thousand
not for their own use, but in trust, nevertheless, to be expended by them, without any
responsibility to any one, at their discretion,
in such sums, at such times, and in such
places, as they may deem fit, to secure the
passage of laws granting women, whether
married or unmarried, the right to vote; to
hold oflice; to hold, manage, and devise property; and all other civil rights enjoyed by
men; and for the preparation and circulation of books, the delivery of lectures, and
such other means as they may judge best;
and I hereby constitute them a board of trustees for that Intent and purpose, with power
to add two other persons to said board if they
deem it expedient.
And I hereby appoint
Wendell Phillips president and treasurer, and
Susan B. Anthony secretary, of said board.
I direct the treasurer of said board not to
loan any part of said bequest, but to invest,
and, if need be, sell and re-invest, the same
in bank or railroad shares, at his discretion.
I further authorize and request said boai-d
of trustees, the survivors and survivor of
them, to fill any and all vacancies that may
occur from time to time by death or resignation of any member or of any oflicer of said
board.
One other bequest, hereinafter made,
will, sooner or later, revert to this board of
My desire is that they may become
trustees.
organization, until the rights
a permanent
of women shall be established equal with
those of men; and I hope and trust that said
board will receive the services and sympathy,
the donations and bequests, of the friends of
human rights. And being desirous that said
board should have the immediate benefit of
said bequest, without waiting for my exit,
I have already paid it in advance and in full
to said Phillips, the treasurer of said board,
whose receipt therefor is on my files.
"Article 8th. I now give to my three children equally the net income of the residue of
my estate, during the term of their natural
lives, in the following manner, namely: After
the payment of my debts and the foregoing
gifts and bequests, I give, bequeath and devise one undivided third part of the residue
of my estate, real, personal and mixed, to
my brother Edmund Jackson of said Boston,
his successors
and assigns, not for his or
their own use, but in trust, nevertheless,
with full power to manage, sell and convey,
invest and re-invest, the same at his discretion, with a view to safety and profit;" and
"the whole net Income thereof shall be paid
semi-annually to my daughter Eliza P. Eddy,
during her natural life;" and at her decease,
one-half of such income to be paid seml-annuaUy "to the board of trustees constituted
in the sixth article of this will, to be expended by them to promote the intent and purpose therein directed," and the other half to
Lizzie F. Bacon, her daughter, during her
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life; and at the decease of both
mother and daughter, "to pay and convey the
whole of said trust fund to said board of
trustees constituted in the sixth article of this
will, to be expended by them in the manner,
and for the Intent and purpose, therein directed."
By article 9th, the testator gave another undivided third part of the said residue to his
brother Edmund, his successors and assigns,
in trust, with like powers of management and
Investment, "and the whole net income thereof shall be paid semi-annually to my son
James Jackson, during the term of his natural life; at his decease,
direct said trustee,
or whoever may then be duly qualified to execute this trust, to pay semi-annually onehalf part of the net income thereof to the
board of trustees constituted in the fourth
article of this will, and the other half-part
of said net income shall be paid semi-annually to his children equally, during their
natural lives; at the decease of all his children, if they survive him, I direct said trustee, or whoever shall then be duly authorized
to execute this trust, to pay and convey the
whole of said trust fund to said board of
trustees constituted in said fourth article in
this will, to be expended by them for the intent and purpose directed in said fourth article; but, in case my said son James should
leave no child living at the time of his decease, then, at his decease,
direct said trustee, or whoever shall then be duly authorized to execute this trust, to pay and convey
the whole of said trust fund to said board
natural

I

I

of trustees constituted in the fourth article
of this will, to be expended by them for the
intent and purpose therein directed."
By article 10th, the testator made a similar
bequest and devise of the remaining undivided third part of said residue to his brother
George Jackson, his successors and assigns,
and in trust to pay the whole net income
thereof semi-annually to the testator's daughter Harriette M. Palmer, during her natural
life, and at her decease, one half of such income "to the board of trustees constituted in
the fourth article of this will, to be expended
by them in the manner and for the Intent
and purpose therein directed;" and the other
half, in equal proportions, to all her children
that may survive her, during the term of their
natural lives; and, at their decease, to pay
and convey the whole of said trust fund to
said board of trustees; "but, in case my said
daughter Harriette M. Palmer should outlive
direct
all her children, then, at her decease,
said trustee, or whoever shall then be duly
authorized to execute this trust, to pay and
convey the whole of said trust fund to the
board of trustees constituted in said fourth
article In this will, to be expended by them
as aforesaid."

I

G.
S. E. Sewall, for one of the trustees.
S.
W. Phillips, for others of the trustees.
Bartlett and J. G. King, for certain heirs at
law.
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GRAY, J. This case presents for decision
many important and interesting questions,
which have been the subject of repeated discussion at the bar and of much deliberation
The able and
and reflection by the court.
elaborate arguments of counsel have necessarily involved the consideration of the fundamental principles of the law of charities,
and of a great number of the precedents from
which they are to be derived; and have disclosed such diversity of opinion upon the extent and application of those principles, and
the just interpretation and effect of the adjudged cases, as to require the principles in
question to be fully stated, and supported by
a careful examination of authorities, in delivering judgment.
I. By the law of this commonwealth, as by
the law of England, gifts to charitable uses
are highly favored, and will be most liberally construed in order to accomplish the inand trusts
tent and purpose of the donor;
which cannot be upheld in ordinary cases, for
various reasons, will be established and carried into effect when created to support a gift
to a charitable use.
The most important distinction between charities and other trusts is
in the time of duration allowed and the degree of definiteness required.
The law does
not allow property to be made inalienable, by
means of a private trust, beyond the period
prescribed
by the rule against perpetuities,
being a life or lives in being and twenty-one
years afterwards; and if the persons to be
benefited are uncertain and cannot be ascertained within that period, the gift will be adjudged void, and a resulting trust declared for
the heirs at law or distributees.
But a public
or charitable trust may be perpetual in its duration, and may leave the mode of application
and the selection of particular objects to the
discretion of the trustees.
Sanderson
v.
White, 18 Pick. 333; Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen,
5, 6, and authorities cited; Saltonstall v. Sanders, 11 Allen, 446; Lewin, Trusts, c. 2.
Each of the bequests in the will of Francis
Jackson, which the court Is asked in this case
to sustain as charitable, is to a permanent
board of trustees, for a purpose stated In general terms only.
The question of the validity of these trusts is not to be determined by
the opinions of individual judges or of the
whole court as to their wisdom or policy, but
by the established principles of law; and does
not depend merely upon their being permitted
by law, but upon their being of that peculiar
nature which the law deems entitled to extraordinary favor because It regards them as
charitable.
It has been strenuously contended for the
heirs at law that neither of the purposes declared by the testator Is charitable within the
intent and purview of St. 48 Eliz. c. 4, which
all admit to be the principal test and evidence
of what are in law charitable uses. It becomes necessary
therefore to consider the
spirit in which that statute has been construed and applied by the courts.
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The preamble of the statute mentions three
classes of charitable gifts, namely, First: For
the relief and assistance
of the poor and
needy, specifying only "sick and maimed soldiers and mariners," "education and preferment of orphans," "marriages of poor maids,"
"supportation, aid and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons decayed,"
"relief or redemption of prisoners and captives," and assistance of poor inhabitants in
paying taxes, either for civil or military objects.
Second:
For the promoting of education, of which the only kinds specified in the
statute (beyond the "education and preferment of orphans," which seems more appropriately to fall within the first class) are those
"for maintenance of schools of learning, free
schools, and scholars of universities." Third:
For the repair and maintenance of public
buildings and works, under which are enumerated "repair of ports, havens," and "seabanks," for promoting commerce and navlgar
tion and protecting the land against the encroachments of the sea; of "bridges," "causeways" and "highways," by which the people
may pass from one part of the country to another; of "churches," in which religion may
be publicly taught; and of "houses of correction."

It is well settled that any purpose is charitable in the legal sense of the word, which is
within the principle and reason of this statute, although not expressly named in it; and
many objects have been upheld as charities,
which the statute neither mentions nor distinctly refers to. Thus a gift "to the poor"
generally, or to the poor of a particular town,
parish, age, sex, race, or condition, or to poor
emigrants, though not falling within any of
of poor in the statute, is a
the descriptions
Saltonstall v. Sanders,
good charitable gift.
Magill v.
11 Allen, 455-461, and cases cited;
Brown, Brightly, N. P. 405, 406; Barclay v.
Maskelyne, 4 Jur. (N. S.) 1294; Chambers v.
St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543. So gifts for the promotion of science, learning and useful knowledge, though by different means and in different ways from those enumerated under the
second class; and gifts for bringing water into a town, for building a town-house, or otherwise improving a town or city, though not alluded to in the third class; have been held
to be charitable. American Academy v. Harvard College, 12 Gray, 594; Drury v. Natick,
By
10 Allen, 177-182, and authorities cited.
modem decisions in England, gifts towards
payment of the national, debt, or "to the
of the exchequer for the
queen's chancellor
time being, to be applied for the benefit and
advantage of Great Britain," are legal charities. Tudor, Char. Trusts (2d Ed.) 14, 15, and
Sergeant Maynard, long before,
cases cited.
gave an opinion that a bequest "to the public
use of the country of New England" was a
good disposition to a charitable use. 1 Hutch.
Hist. Mass. (2d Bd.) 101, note. And it may
be mentioned as evidence of the use of the
word "charitable" by the founders of Massa-

chusetts, that it was applied by the Massachusetts Company in 1628, before they crossed
the ocean, to "the common stock" to be
"raised from such as bear good affection to
the plantation and the propagation
thereof,
and the same to be employed only in defrayment of public charges, as maintenance
of
ministers,
transportation of poor families,
building of churches and fortifications, and all
other public and necessary occasions of the
plantation."
1 Mass. Col. Rec. 68.
No kind of charitable tnists finds less support in the words of St. 43 Eliz. than the large
class of pious and religious uses, to which the
statute contains no more distinct reference
than in the words "repair of churches."
Such
uses had indeed been previously recognized
as charitable, and entitled to peculiar favor,
by many acts of parliament, as well as in the
courts of justice.
St. 13 Edw. I. e. 41; 17
Edw. II. c. 2; 23 Hen. VIII. c. 10; 1 Edw.
VI. c. 14; Anon., And. 43, pi. 108; Pitts v.
James, Hob. 123; Cheney's Case, Co. Litt.
342; Gibbons v. Maityard, Poph. 6, Moore,
594; Coke's note to Porter's Case, 1 Coke, 26a;
Bruerton's Case, 6 Coke, lb, 2a; Barry v. Ley,
Dwight, Char. Cas. 92. In the latest of those
acts, the "erecting of grammar schools for the
education of youth in virtue and godliness, the
and
further augmenting of the universities,
better provision for the poor and needy,"
were classed with charities for the maintenance of preachers, and called "good and godly uses;" and grammar schools were considered in those times an effectual means of forwarding the progress of the Reformation. St.
1 Edw. VI. c. 14, §§ 1, 8, 9; Attorney General
Boyle, Char. 7, 8>
V. Downing, Wilm. 15;
Sir Francis Moore, who drew St. 43 Eliz., indeed says that a gift to maintain a chaplain
or minister to celebrate divine service could
not be the subject of a commission under the
statute;
but "was of purpose omitted in the
penning of the act," lest, In the changes of
opinion in matters of religion, such gifts
might be confiscated in a succeeding reign as
superstitious.
Yet he also says that such a
gift might be enforced by "the chancellor by
his chancery authority;" and cites a case in
Duke, Char. Uses
which it was so decreed.
(Bridgman's Ed.) 125, 154. And from very
soon after the passage of the statute, gifts for
the support of a minister, the preaching of
an annual sermon, or other uses connected
with public worship and the advancement of
religion, have been constantly upheld and carried out as charities in the English courts of
Anon., Gary, 39; Nash, Char.;
chancery.
Dwight, Char. Cas. 114; Pember v. Inhabitants of Knighton, Heme, Char. Uses, 101,
Toth. (2d Ed.) 34; Duke, Char. Uses, 354,
Tu356, 381, 570, 614; Boyle, Char. 39-41;
dor, Char. Trasts, 10, 11.
So in this commonwealth, trusts for the support of public worship and religious Instruction, or the spreading of religion at home or abroad, have always been deemed charitable uses. 4 Dane,

Abr. 237; Bartlet

V.

King,

12

Mass. 536; Go-
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Ing V. Emery, 16 Pick. 107; Sohler v. St.
Paul's Church, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 250; Brown
243; Earle v. Wood, 8
V. Kelsey, 2 Cush.
It Is not necessary in this connecCush. 445.
tion to speculate whether the admission
of
pious uses Into the ranlc of legal charities in
modern times is to be attributed to the influence of the civil law; to their having been
mentioned in the earlier English statutes; to
a more liberal interpretation, after religion
had t)ecome settled in England, of the words
or, possibly,
of the
"repair of churches,"
clauses relating to gifts for the benefit of education, in St. 43 Bliz. ; or to the support given by the court of chancery to public charitaIt
of any statute.
ble trusts, independently
is sufficient for our present purpose to observe
that pious and religious uses are clearly not
within the strict words of the statute, and can
only be brought within its purview by the
largest extension of its spirit.
The civil law, from which the English law
of charities was manifestly derived, considered wills made for good and pious uses as
privileged testaments, which were not, like
other wills, void for uncertainty in the objects, and which must be carried into effect
even if their conditions could not be exactly
observed;

and

included

among

such

uses

(which it declared to be in their nature perpetual) bequests for the poor, orphans, widof
ows, strangers, prisoners, the redemption
of clergymen, the
captives, the maintenance
benefit of churches, hospitals, schools and colleges, the repairing of city walls and bridges,
the erection of public buildings, or other orof a city.
Poth.
nament
or improvement
Pand. lib. 30-32, Nos. 57-62; Code, lib. 1, tit.
2, cc. 15, 19; Id., tit. 3, cc. 24, 28, 42, 46, 49,
57; Godol. Leg. pt. 1, c. 5, § 4; 2 Kent, Comm.
(6th Ed.) 257; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 1137-1141;
McDonough v. Murdoch, 15 How. 405, 410,
414.

Charities are not confined at the present day
to those which were permitted by law in England in the reign of Elizabeth. A gift for the
advancement of religion or other charitable
purpose in a manner permitted by existing
laws is not the less valid by reason of having
such an object as would not have been legal
at the time of the passage of the statute of
charitable
charitable uses. For example,
from the established
trusts for dissenters
church have been uniformly upheld in England since the toleration act of 1 Wm. & M.
the legal disabilities under
c. 18, removed
Attorwhich such sects previously labored.
ney General v. Hickman, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 193,
W. Kel. 34; Loyd v. Spillet, 3 P. Wms. 344,
2 Atk. 148; Attorney General v. Cock, 2 Ves.
And in this country since the RevoSr. 273.
lution no distinction has been made between
charitable gifts for the benefit of different religious

sects.

Gifts for purposes prohibited by or opposed
to the existing laws cannot be upheld as charitable, even if for objects which would othei-wlse be deemed such. The bounty must, in
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the words of Sir Francis Moore, be "according to the laws, not against the law," and
"not given to do some act against the law."
Duke, Char. Uses, 126, 169. So Mr. Dane
defines, as undoubted charities, "such as are
calculated to relieve the poor, and to promote
such education and employment
as the laws
of the land recognize as useful." 4 Dane,
Upon this principle, the English
Abr. 237.
courts have refused to sustain gifts for printing and publishing a book inculcating the
absolute and inalienable supremacy of the
pope in ecclesiastical matters; or for the support of the Roman Catholic or the Jewish
religion, before such gifts were countenanced
by act of parliament.
De Themmines v. De
Bonneval, 5 Russ. 288; Tudor, Char. Trusts,
21-25, and cases cited. And a bequest "towards the political restoration of the Jews
to Jerusalem and to their own land," has
been held void, as tending to create a political revolution in a friendly country.
Habershon v. Vardon, 4 De Gex & S. 467. In a free
republic, it is the right of every citizen to
strive in a peaceable manner by vote, speech
or writing, to cause the laws, or even the
under which he lives, to be reconstitution,
formed or altered by the legislature or the
people. But it is the duty of the judicial department to expound and administer the laws
as they exist. And trusts whose expressed
purpose is to bring about changes in the laws
or the political institutions of the country
are not charitable in such a sense as to be
entitled to peculiar favor, protection and perpetuation
from the ministers of those laws
which they are designed to modify or subvert.
A precise and complete definition of a legal
charity , is hardly to be found in the books.
The one most commonly
used in modern
cases, originating in the judgment of Sir
William Grant, confirmed by that of Lord
Eldon, in Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9
Ves. 405, 10 Ves. 541— that those purposes
are considered charitable which are enumerated in St. 43-Eliz. or which by analogies
are deemed within its spirit and intendment
—leaves something to be desired in point of
certainty, and suggests no principle. Mr. Binney, in his great argument in the Girard Will
Case, 41, defined a charitable or pious gift
to be "whatever is given for the love of God,
or for the love of your neighbor, in the catholic and universal
sense — given from these
motives, and to these ends— free from the
stain or taint of every consideration
that is
personal, private or selfish."
And this definition has been approved by the supreme
court of Pennsylvania. Price v. Maxwell, 28
Pa. St. 35. A more concise and practical
rule is that of Lord Camden, adopted by
Chancellor Kent, by Lord Lyndhurst, and by
the supreme court of the United States— "A
gift to a general public use, which extends
to the poor as weU as the rich." Jones v.
Williams, Amb. 652; Coggeshall v. Pelton, 7
Johns. Ch. 294; Mitford v. Reynolds, 1 Phil.
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191, 192;
Perln v. Carey, 24 How. 506. A
charity, In the legal sense, may be more fully
defined as a gift, to be applied consistently
with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence
of education or religion, by relieving their
bodies from disease, suffering or constraint,
by assisting them to establish themselves in
life, or by erecting
or maintaining public
buildings or works or otherwise lessening the
burdens
of government.
It is immaterial
whether the purpose is called charitable in
the gift itself, if it is so described as to show
that it is charitable in its nature.
If the words of a charitable bequest are
they are to be
ambiguous
or contradictory,
so construed
as to support the charity. If
possible.
It is an established maxim of interpretation, that the court is bound to carry
the will into effect, if it can see a general
consistent
with the rules of law,
intention
even if the particular mode or manner pointed
out by the testator
is illegal.
Bartlet v.
King, 12 Mass. 543; Inglis v. Sailor's Snug
Harbor, 3 Pet. 117, 118. If the testator uses
a word which has two meanings, one of which

will

effect and the other defeat his object,
the first is to be adopted.
Saltonstall v. Sanders, 11 Allen, 455. When a charitable intent
appears on the face of the will, but the terms
used are broad enough to aUow of the fund
being applied either in a lawful or an unlawful manner, the gift will be supported, and
its application restrained within the bounds
of the law. The most frequent illustrations
of this In the English courts have arisen
under St. 9 Geo. II. c. 36 (commonly called
the "Statute of Mortmain"), prohibiting devises of land, or bequests of money to be
laid out in land, to charitable uses. In the
leading case. Lord Hardwicke held that a
direction to executors to "settle and secure,
by purchase of lands of inheritance, or otherwise, as they shall be advised, out of my personal estate," two annuities to be paid yearly
forever for charitable objects, was valid, because it left the option to the executor to
in personal property,
make the investment
which was not prohibited by the statute;
and said, "This bequest is not void, and there
is no authority to construe it to be void. If
by law it can possibly be made good," or
(according to another and perhaps more accurate report) "no authority to construe It
to be void by law, if It can possibly be made
Sorresby v. Hollins, 9 Mod. 221, 1
good."
Coll. Jurid. 439. The doctrine of that case has
as sound law.
ever since been recognized
Attorney General v. Whitchurch, 3 Ves. 144;
Curtis V. Hutton, 14 Ves. 539; Dent v. Allcroft, 30 Beav. 340; Mayor, etc., of Faversham V. Ryder, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 353; Edwards V. Hall, 11 Hare. 12, 6 De Gex, M. &
G. 89. In a like spirit the house of lords
recently decided that a bequest to erect buildings for charitable purposes If other lands
should be given was valid, and could not be

held to be Impliedly prohibited by St. » Geo.
II. Philpott V. St. George's Hospital 6 H.
L. Cas. 338. The rule stated in Attorney General V. Williams, 2 Cox, Oh. 388, and Tatham
V. Drummond, 11 L. T. (N. S.) 325, upon
which the heirs at law rely, that "the court
will not alter its conception of the purposes
of a testator, merely because those intentions
happen to fall within the prohibition of the
statute of mortmain," shows that no forced
construction
of the testator's language Is to
be adopted
to avoid illegality, but does not
affect the principle that a bequest which according to the fair meaning of the words may
Include a legal as well as an illegal application is to be held valid.
In the light of these general principles, we
come to the consideration of the language of
the different bequests In this will.
II. The first bequest which Is drawn In question Is that contained in the fourth article
of the will, by which the sum of ten thousand
dollars Is given in trust to be used and expended at the discretion of the trustees, "in
such sums, at such times and such places as
they deem best, for the preparation and cirthe delivery
culation of books, newspapers,
of speeches, lectures and such other means
as In their judgment will create a public sentiment that will put an end to the negro
slavery in this country;" and the testator
expresses a desire that they may become a
organization,
permanent
and a hope "that
they will receive the services and sympathy,
the donations and bequests, of the friends of
the slave."
Among the charitable objects specially designated in St. 43 Eliz. Is the "relief or redemption of prisoners
and captives." And
this was not a peculiarity of the law of
England or of that age. The civil law regarded the redemption of captives as the highest of all pious uses— in the words of Justinian, causa pilssima — ^and not only declared
that no heir, trustee or legatee should infringe or unjustly defeat the pious Intentions of the testator by asserting that a legacy or trust for the redemption
of captives
was uncertain, and provided for the appointment of a trustee when none was named in
the will, and for Informing him of the bequest, but even authorized churches to alienate their sacred vessel and vestments for this
one purpose, upon the ground that It was
that the souls or lives of men
reasonable
should be preferred to any vessels or vestments whatsoever — "Quoniam non absurdum
est animas hominum quibuscunque
vasis vel
preferrl." Code, lib. 1, tit. 2, c.
vestimentis
22; Id., tit. 3, cc. 28, 49; Id., lib. 8, tit. 54,
c. 36; Nov. 7, c. 8; Id., p. 115, c. 3; Id., p.
120, c. 10; Id., p. 131, c. 11; Godol. Leg. pt.
1, c. 5, § 4.

The captives principally contemplated in St.
Eliz. were doubtless Englishmen taken
and held as slaves in Turkey and Barbary.
And the relief of our own citizens from such
captivity was always deemed charitable in
43
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Massachusetts,
found in the

an Illustration

of which

is

records of the governor and
council in 1693, by whom a petition of the
relations of two inhabitants of the province,
"some time since taken by a Salley man of
war, and now under
'^rkish captivity and
slavery," for permission "to ask and receive
the charity and public contribution of well
disposed persons for redeeming them out of
their miserable suffering and slavery," was
granted;
"the money so collected to be employed for the end aforesaid, unless the said
persons happen to die before, make their escape, or be in any other way redeemed; then
the money so gathered to be improved for
the redemption of some others of this province, that are or may be in like circumstances,
as the governor and council
shall direct."
Council Rec. 1693, fol. 323. But there is no
more reason for confining the words of the
statute of Elizabeth to such captives, than
for excluding from the class of religious charities gifts for preaching the gospel to the
heathen, which have uniformly been sustained
as charitable,
here and in England. Boyle,
Char. 41; Bartlet v. King, 12 Mass. 536.
Indeed It appears by Sir Francis Moore's
reading upon the statute, that even in his
time the word "captives" might include captive enemies. Duke, Char. Uses, 158.
It was argued that the slave trade was fostered and rewarded by the English government in the reign of Elizabeth, and therefore gifts for the relief of negro slaves could
not be deemed within the purview of the
statute of charitable uses. The fact Is undoubted; but the conclusion does not follow.
The permission of slavery by law does not

prevent emancipation from being charitable.

A commission of manumission, granted by

Queen Elizabeth, twenty-seven years before
the statute, recites that In the beginning God
created all men free by nature, and afterwards the law of nations placed some under
the yoke of slavery, and that the iqueen believed it would be pious and acceptable to
God and according to Christian charity —
"pium fore credimus et Deo acceptabile
Christianseque charitati consentaneum"— to
wholly enfranchise the villeins of the crown
on certain royal manors. 20 Howell, St. Tr.
See, also. Bar. Ob. (5th Ed.) 305, 308.
1872.
The spirit of the Roman law upon this point
is manifested by an edict of Constantine,
which speaks of those who with a religious
sentiment In the bosom of the church grant
their slaves that liberty which is their due
—Qui religiosa mente in ecclesise gremio servls suis meritam concesserint libertatem."
Code, lib. 1, tit. 13, c. 2. That the words of
the statute of charitable uses may be extended to negro slaves of English masters is
clearly shown by the decision of Lord Cottenham, when master of the rolls, applying for
the benefit of negroes in the British colonies
In the West Indies the accumulations of a
bequest made In 1670 "to redeem poor
slaves." Attorney General v. Gibson, 2 Beav.
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In dealId., cited Craig & P. 226.
ing with such a question, great regard is to
be had to the favor which the law gives to
liberty, so eloquently expressed by Chief Justice Portescue:
"Crudelis enim necessario
judlcabitur lex, quae servitutem augmentat et
minult libertatem. Nam pro ea natura semper Implorat humana. Quia ab homine et
pro vltio Introducta est servitus. Sed libertas a Deo hominis est indita naturae. Quare
ipsa ab homine sublata semper redire gllscit,
ut facit omne quod libertati natural! privatur. Quo ipse et crudelis judicandus est,
qui libertati non favet. Hsec considerantia
Anglise jui^a in omni casu libertati dant favorem." Fortes. De Laud. c. 42.
But the question of the lawfulness of this
gift, if falling within the class of charitable
usee, depends not upon the laws and the public policy of England at the time of the passage of the statute, but upon our own at the
time of the death of the testator.
It was seriously argued that, before the recent amendment of the constitution of the United States,
"a trust to create a sentiment to put an end
to negro slavery, would, having regard to the
constitution and laws under which we live,
be against public policy and thus be void;"
but the court is unable to see any foundation
for this position in the constitution and laws,
either of the United States or of this commonwealth.
The law of Massachusetts has always been
peculiarly favorable to freedom, as may be
shown by a brief outline of its history. The
"rights, liberties and privileges," established
by the general court of the colony in 1641, to
be "impartially and inviolably enjoyed and
observed throughout our jurisdiction
forever," declared: "There shall never be any
bond slavery, villenage or captivity amongst
us, unless it be lawful captives taken in just
wars, and such strangers as willingly sell
themselves
or are sold to us. And these
shall have all the liberties and Christian
usages which the law of God established in
Israel concerning such persons doth morally
require. This exempts none from servitude
who shall be judged thereto by authority."
The last proviso evidently referred to punishment for crime. Body of Liberties, art. 91.
This article, leaving out the word "strangers"
in the clause as to slaves acquired by sale,
was included in each revision of the laws of
the colony. Mass. Col. Laws (Ed. 1660) 5; Id.
(Ed. 1672) 10; 4. Mass. Col. Rec. pt. 2, p. 467.
It Is worthy of observation, that the tenure
upon which the Massachusetts Company held
their charter, as declared in the charter itself,
was as of the manor of East Greenwich in
the county of Kent; that no one was ever born
a villein in Kent (Y. B. 30 Edw. I, p. 168 ; Pitzh.
Abr. "Villenage," 46; 3 Seld. Works, 1876);
and that the Body of Liberties contained articles upon each of the principal points distinctive of the Kentish tenure of gavelkind
— freedom from escheats on attainder and execution for felony, the power to devise, the
317, note;
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age of alienation, and descent to all the sons
Charter, during the period of which all acts
|
together— adopting some and modifying othof the general court were required to he
ers. Body of Libei-tles, arts. 10, 11, 53, 81; 2
transmitted to England for approval. Earlier
Bl. Comm. 84.
ordinances which had not been so approved
In the laws of Europe, at the time of the were hardly recognized by the English govfoundation of the colony, descent was namernment as of any force.
The policy of Enged first among the sources of slavery. The
land restrained the colonists from abolishing
common law, following the civil law, repeatthe African slave trade, and the number of
ed "Servi aut nascuntur aut fiunt," and difslaves (which had been very small under the
comparatively Independent government of
fered only in tracing it through the father,
instead of the mother; and each system recthe colony) was much increased.
The pracognized that a man might become a slave by
tice of a whole people does not always concapture in war, or by his own consent or conform to its laws. Thousands of negroes were
held as slaves in England and commonly sold
fession in some form.
Just. Inst. lib. 1, tit.
In public at the very time when Lord Mans3; Bract 4b; Fleta, lib. 1, c. 3; Eedes v. Holfield and other judges decided such holding
badge. Act. Can. 393; Swinb. Wills, pt. 2, §
7; Co. Litt 117b. And such was then the esto be unlawful.
Sommersett's Case, 20 Howell, St. Tr. 72, 79, Loftt, 17; Quincy, 97, note;
tablished law of nations.
Gro. De Jure B. lib.
The Slave Grace, 2 Hagg. Adm. 105, 106.
2, e. 5, §§ 27, 29; Id. lib. 3, c 7. In parts af
Enghind, hereditary villenage would seem to
While negro slavery existed In Massachusetts, It was In a comparatively mild form.
have still existed in fact; and it was allowed
The marriages of slaves were protected by
by law until since the American Revolution.
Pigg V. Daley, Noy, 27; Co. Litt. 116-140; 2 the legislature and the courts; according to
the opinion of Hutchinson and of Dane,
Inst. 28, 45; 2 Rolle, Abr. 732; Smith v.
Brown, 2 Salk. 666, Holt, 495; Smith v. slaves might hold property; they were adGould, 2 Salk. 667, 2 Ld. Raym. 1275; Treblemitted as witnesses,
even on capital trials
of white persons, and on suits of other slaves
cock's Case, 1 Atk. 633; The King v. Ditton,
4 Doug. 302.
Lord Bacon, in explaining the
for freedom; they might sue their masters
maxim, "Jura sanguinis nulla jure clvlli dlfor wounding or immoderately beating them;
rimi possunt," with a coolness which shows and indeed hardly differed from apprentices
or other servants except in being bound for
that in his day and country the Illustration
life.
See authorities and records cited in
was neither unfamiliar nor shocking, says,
"If a villein be attainted, yet the lord shall Quincy, 30, 31. note; 2 Dane, Abr. 313. The
annual tax acts show that before the Declahave the issue of his villein born before or
they were usually
ration of Independence
after his attainder; for the lord hath them
taxed as property, always afterwards as perjure naturte but as the increase of a flock."
sons.
The general court In September 1776
Bac. Max. reg. 11.
forbade the sale of two negroes taken as
The Massachusetts Body of Liberties, as
prize of war on the high seas and brought
Governor Winthrop tells us, was composed
into this state, and resolved that any negroes
by Nathaniel Ward, who had been "formerly
so taken and brought in should not be allowa student and practiser in the course of the
ed to be sold, but should be treated like othcommon law." 2 Winthrop's Hist. New Enger prisoners.
Res. Sept. 1776, c. 83.
land, 55. In view of the other laws of the
It was In Massachusetts, by the first article
time, the omission, in enumerating the legal
of the declaration of rights prefixed to the
sources of slavery, of birth, the first mentioned in those laws, is significant. No in- constitution adopted In 1780, as immediately
by this court, that
afterwards interpreted
stance is known In which the lawfulness of
hereditary slavery In Massachusetts under the fundamental axioms of the Declaration of
Independence— "that all men are created
the charter of the colony or the province was
equal; that they are endowed by their Creaaffirmed by legislative or judicial authority;
tor with certain Inalienable rights; that
and it has been denied in a series of judgamong these are life, liberty, and the purments of this court, beginning in the last
century. In each of which It was essential to suit of happiness" — first took at once the form
and the force of express law; slavery was
the determination of the rights of the parties.
Littleton v. Tuttle, 4 Mass. 128, note; Lanes- thus wholly abolished in Massachusetts; and
borough V. Westfield, 16 Mass. 74; Edgax- it has never existed here since, except so far
town V. Tisbury, 10 Cush. 408. The case of as the constitution and laws of the state were
held to be prevented by the constitution and
Perkins v. Emerson, 2 Dane, Abr. 412, did
laws of the United States from operating upnot touch this question; but simply deterCaldwell v. Jennison,
mined that a person received into a house as on fugitive slaves.
Rec. 1781, fol. 79, 80; Jennlson's Petition,
a slave of the owner was not received "as an
inmate, boarder or tenant," so that notice Jour. H. R. June 18, 1782, fol. 89; Com. v.
Jennison, Rec. 1783, fol. 85; Parsons, C. J.,
of the place whence such person last came
In Winchendon v. Hatfield, 4 Mass. 128; 4
must be given to the selectmen under Prov.
Mass. Hist. Coll. 203, 204; Com. v. Aves, 18
St. 10 Geo. II.; Anc. Chart. 508. No doubt
Pick. 208, 210, 215, 217; 2 Kent, Comm. (6th
many children of slaves were in fact held as
slaves here, especially after the Province
Ed.) 252; Betty v. Horton, 5 Leigh, 623.
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The doctrine of our law, upon this subject,
as stated by Chief Justice Shaw in delivering the judgment of the court in Com. v.
Aves, just cited, is that slavery is a relation
founded in force, contrary to natural right
and the principles of justice, humanity and
sound policy; and could exist only by the
effect of positive law, as manifested either
by direct legislation or settled usage.
The
same principle has been . recognized by Chief
Justice Marshal and Mr. Justice Story,
speaking for the supreme court of the United
States.
The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 120, 121;

Prigg

V. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 611.
The constitution of the United States uniformly speaks of those held in slavery, not
as property, but as persons;
and never contained anything inconsistent with their peaceable and voluntary emancipation.
As between master and slave, it would require the
most explicit prohibition by law to restrain
the right of manumission.
M'Cutchen v.
Marshall, 8 Pet. 238.
We cannot take judicial notice of the local laws of other states of
the Union except so far as they are in proof.
Knapp V. Abell, 10 Allen, 488. But it appears
by cases cited at the bar that bequests of
manumission were formerly favored in Virginia; and that it was more recently decided
in Mississippi that a trust created by will for
paying the expenses of transporting the testator's slaves to Africa and maintaining them
in freedom there was lawful.
Charles v.
Hunnicutt, 5 Call, 311; Wade v. American
A
Colonization Soc, 7 Smedes & M. 663.
state of slavery, in which manumission was
wholly prohibited, has never been known
among civilized nations.
Even when slavery
prevailed throughout the world, the same
common law of nations, jus gentium, which
justified its existence, recognized the right
of manumission as a necessary consequence.
Just. Inst. lib. 1, tit. 5.
We fully concur with the learned counsel
for the hell's at law that if this trust could
not be executed according to the intention
of the testator without tending to excite servile insurrections in other states of the
Union, it would have been unlawful; and
that a trust which looked solely to political
agitation and to attempts to alter existing
laws could not be recognized by this court
as charitable. But such does not appear to
us to be the necessary or the reasonable interpretation of this bequest. The manner
stated of putting an end to slavery is not
by legislation or political action, but by creating a public sentiment, which rather points
to moral influence and voluntary manumisare the usual
specified
sion. The means
means of public instruction, by books and
Other
speeches and lectures.
newspapers,
means are left to the discretion of the trustees, but there is nothing to indicate that
they are not designed to be of a kindred
Giving to the bequest that favorable
nature.
construction to which all charitable gifts are
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entitled,
the just inference Is that lawful
means only are to be selected, and that they
are to be used in a lawful manner.
It was further objected that "to create a
public sentiment" was too vague and indefinite an object to be sustained as a charitable use. But
"a public sentiment" on a
moral question is but another name for public opinion, or a harmony of thought — idem
sentire.
The only case cited for the heirs at
law in support of this objection was Browne
V. Yeall, 7 Ves. 50, note, in which Lord Thurlow held void a perpetual trust for the purchase and distribution in Great Britain and
its dominions of such books as might have a
tendency to promote the interests of virtue
and religion and the happiness
of mankind.
was
But the correctness of that decision
doubted
by Sir William Grant and Lord
Eldon in Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9
Ves. 406, 10 Ves. 534, 539; and it is inconauthorities,
sistent with the
more
recent
here and in England. The bequest now before us is quite as definite as one "for the
of Christian
improvement
increase
and
knowledge and promoting religion," and the
purchase from time to time of such bibles
and other religious books, pamphlets and
tracts as the trustees should think fit for
that purpose, which was upheld by Lord
Eldon in Attorney General v. Stepney, 10
Ves. 22; or "to the cause of Christ, for the
benefit and promotion of true evangelical
piety and religion." through the agency of
trustees, to be by them "appropriated to the
cause of religion as above stated, to be distributed in such divisions and to such societies and religious charitable purposes as
they may think fit and proper," which was
sustained by this court in Going v. Emery,
16 Pick. 107; or "for the promotion of such
religious and charitable enterprises as shall
be designated by a majority of the pastors
composing the Middlesex Union Association,"
as in Brown v. Kelsey, 2 Cush. 243; or to be
distributed, at the discretion of trustees, "in
aid of objects and purposes of benevolence
or charity, public or private," as in Saltonstall V. Sanders, 11 Allen, 446; or "for the
cause of peace," to be expended by an unincorporated
society, whose object, as defined

in its constitution, was "to illustrate the inconsistency
of war with Christianity,
to
show its baleful Infiuence on all the great
interests
of mankind, and to devise means
for insuring universal and permanent peace,"
as in Tappan v. Deblois, 45 Me. 122; or to
found "an establishment for the increase and
diffusion of knowledge among men;" or "for
the

benefit

and

advancement

and

propaga-

tion of education and learning in every part
of the world, as far as circumstances will
permit;" as in Whicker v. Hume, 7 H. L.
Cas. 124, 155, and President of U. S. v.
Drummond, there cited. See, also, McDonough V. Murdoch, 15 How. 405, 414.
The bequest itself manifests its immediate
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purpose to be to educate the whole people
upon the sin of a man's holding his fellowman in bondage; and its ultimate object, to
put an end to negro slavery in the United
States; in either aspect, a lawful charity.
It is universally admitted that trusts for
the promotion of religion and education are
charities. Gifts for the instruction of the
public in the cure of the diseases of quadrupeds or birds useful to man, or for the prevention of cruelty to animals (either by publishing newspapers
or by
on the subject,

killing
providing
establishments
where
them for the market might be attended
with as little suffering as possible), have
London
been held charitable in England.
University v. Yarrow, 23 Beav. 159, 1 De
Gex & J. 72; Marsh v. Means, 3 Jur. (N. S.)
790; Tatham v. Drummond, 11 L. T. (N. S.)
325.
To deliver men from a bondage which
the law regards as contrary to natural right,
humanity, justice and sound policy, is surely
not less charitable than to lessen the sufferings of animals. The constitution of Massachusetts,
which declares that all men are
born free and equal, and have the natural,
essential and unalienable rights of enjoying
and defending their lives and liberties, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property,
of seeking and obtaining their safety and
happiness;
ilso declares that a frequent recurrence
to the fundamental principles of
the constitution, and a constant adherence
to those of piety and justice, are absolutely
necessary to preserve the advantages of liberty and to maintain a free government; that
of arts and sciences,
'"the encouragement
and all good literature, tends to the honor of
God, the advantage of the Christian religion,
and the great benefit of this and the other
United States of America:" and that "wisas well as virtue, difdom and knowledge,
fused generally among the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of
their rights and liberties, and as these depend on spreading the opportunities and adin the various parts
vantages of education
of the country, and among the different orders of the people, it shall be the duty of legin all future peislatures and magistrates,
riods of this commonwealth," besides cherishing the interests of literature and the
and inculcate the
sciences, "to countenance
principles of humanity and general benevolence, public and private charity," "and all
and generous sentiments
affections
social
Declaration of Rights,
among the people."
arts.

1, 18; Const.

Mass.

c.

5.

This

bequest

directly tends to carry out the principles
thus declared in the fundamental law of the
commonwealth. And certainly no kind of
education could better accord with the religion of Him who came to preach deliverand taught that you
ance to the captives,
should love your neighbor as yourself and
do unto others as you would that they should
do unto you.
The authorities already cited show that the

peaceable
redemption
slaves in any manner
is a charitable object.

or

manumission

of

not prohibited by law
It falls Indeed within
the spirit, and almost within the letter, of
many clauses in the statute of Elizabeth.
It would be an anomaly in a system of law,
which recognized as charitable uses the relief of the poor, the education and preferment of orphans, marriages of poor maids,
handiof young tradesmen,
the assistance
craftsmen and persons decayed, the relief of
prisoners and the redemption of captives, to
exclude the deliverance of an indefinite number of human beings from a condition in
which they were so poor as not even to own
themselves, in which their children could not
be educated, in which marriages had no sanc-

tion of law or security of duration, in which
all their earnings belonged to another, and
they were subject, against the law of nature,
and without any crime of their own, to such
an arbitrary dominion as the modern usages
of nations will not countenance over captives taken from the most barbarous enemy.
III. The next question arises upon the beof fugitive
quest in trust for the benefit
slaves who might from time to time escape
from the slaveholding states of the Union.
The validity of this bequest must be determined according to the law as it stood at
the time when the testator died and fi-om
which his will took effect. It is no part of
the duty of this court to maintain the constitutionality, the justice, or the policy of
the fugitive slave acts, now happily repealUnited
ed.
But the constitution of the
States, at the time of the testator's death, declared that no person held to service or labor
in one state should be discharged therefrom
It may safely be
by escaping into another.
assumed that, under such a constitution, a
bequest to assist fugitive slaves to escape
from those to whom their service was thus
recognized to be due could not have been
upheld
and enforced as a lawful charity.
The epithets with which the testator accompanied this bequest show that he set his
own ideas of moral duty above his allegiance
to his state or his country; and warrant the
conjecture
that he would have been well
pleased to have the fund applied in a manner inconsistent with the constitution and
laws of the United States. But he has used
no words to limit its use to illegal methods,
and has left his trustees untrammelled as to
the mode of its application.
Whether this bequest is or is not valid, Is
to be ascertained from a fair construction of
its language, in the light of the maxims of
interpretation stated in the earlier part of this
opinion, by wliich the court is bound to carry
into effect any charitable bequest in which
can be seen a general intention consistent
with the law, even if the particular mode
pointed out is illegal; and there is no authority to construe it to be void if It can be applied in a lawful manner consistently with
the intention of the testator as manifested ic
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the words by which It is expressed.
One illustration of these maxims may be added in

this connection.
In Isaac v. Gompertz, Amb. (2d Ed.) 228,
note, the will contained one bequest for the
support and maintenance
of a Jews' synagogue; and another bequest of an annuity
"to the gabas of the- said synagogue," who
were found, upon inquiry by a master, to be
treasurers of the synagogue, whose office It
was to collect and receive the annual subscriptions for the support of poor Jews belonging to the synagogue, and to apply the
same to the expenses of supporting the synagogue and to the maintenance of such poor
Jews. This last bequest was upheld, and referred to a master to report a scheme, although the support of the synagogue was adjudged to be an unlawful use; and thus a
bequest manifestly intended for the benefit
of persons professing a religion not tolerated
by law, and which might, according to its
terms, be applied either in an unlawful or
a lawful manner, was sustained as charitable, and its application confined to the lawful
mode.
A bequest for the benefit of fugitive slaves
Is not necessarily unlawful. The words "re-

lief or redemption of prisoners and captives"

have always been held in England to include
those in prison under condemnation for crime,
as well as persons confined for debt; and
to support gifts for distributing bread and
meat among them annually, or for enabling
with
poor imprisoned debtors to compound
their creditors. Duke, Char. Uses, 131, 156;
Attorney General v. Ironmongers' Co., Coop.
Prac. Cas. 285, 290; Attorney General v.
Painterstainers' Co., 2 Cox, Oh. 51; Attorney
General v. Drapers' Co., Tudor, Char. Trusts,
591, 592, 4 Beav. 67; 36th Report of Charity
Commissioners to Parliament, pt. 6, pp. 856868.
It would be hardly consistent with charity or justice to favor the relief of those un-

dergoing punishment for crimes of their own
committing, or imprisonment for not paying
debts of their own contracting; and yet prohibit a like relief to those who were In equal
need, because they had withdrawn themselves from a service Imposed upon them by
local laws without their fault or consent.
It was indeed held In Thrupp v. Collett, 26
Beav. 125, that a bequest to be applied to purchasing and procuring the discharge of persons committed to prison for non-payment
of fines under the game laws was not a lawful charity. But such persons were convicted offenders against the law of England, who
would by such discharge be wholly released
from punishment. A fugitive slave was not
a criminal by the laws of this commonwealth
or of the United States.
To supply sick or destitute fugitive slaves
with food and clothing, medicine or shelter,
or to extinguish by purchase the claims of
those asserting a right to their service and
labor, would in no wise have tended to Impair the claim of the latter or the operation
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of the constitution and laws of the United
States; and would clearly have been within
the terms of this bequest. If, for example,
the trustees named in the will had received
this fund from the executor without question,
and had seen fit to apply it for the benefit of
fugitive slaves in such a manner, they could
not have been held liable as for a breach of
trust.
This bequest therefore, as well as the previous one, being capable of being applied according to its terms in a lawful manner at the
time of the testator's death, must, upon the
settled principles of construction, be held a
valid charity.
It is hardly necessary to remark that the
direction of the testator that his trustees
shall not be accountable to any one is simply
void.
No testator can obtain for his bequests
that support and permanence which the law
gives to public charities only, and at the same
time deprive the beneficiaries and the public
of the safeguards which the law provides for
their due and lawful administration.
As the trustees named In the will are not a
corporation established by law, and these two
bequests are unlimited In duration, and by
their terms might cover an Illegal as well as
a legal appropriation. It is the duty of the
court, before ordering the funds to be paid
to the trustees, to refer the case to a master
to settle a scheme for their application in a
lawful manner.
Isaac v. Gompertz, Amb.
Attorney General v. Stepney, 10
228, note;
Ves. 22; Boyle, Char. lOO, 217.
IV. It Is quite clear that the bequest In
trust to be expended "to secure the passage
of laws granting women, whether married or
unmarried, the right to vote, to hold office, to
hold, manage and devise property, and all
other civil rights enjoyed by men," cannot
be sustained as a charity.
No precedent has been cited in Its support.
This bequest differs from the others In aiming directly and exclusively to change the
laws; and its object cannot be accomplished
without changing the constitution
also.
Whether such an alteration of the existing
laws and frame of government would be wise
and desirable is a question upon which we
cannot, sitting in a judicial capacity, properly express any opinion.
Our duty is limited
to expounding the laws as they stand.
And
those laws do not recognize the purpose of
overthrowing or changing them, In whole or
in part, as a charitable use. This bequest
therefore, not being for a charitable purpose,
nor for the benefit of any particular persons,
and being unrestricted in point of time, is
inoperative and void.
For the same reason, the gift to the same
object, of one third of the residue of the testator's estate after the death of his daughter
Mrs. Eddy and her daughter Mrs. Bacon,
Is also invalid, and will go to his heirs at law
as a resulting trust.
It Is proper to add that the conclusion of
the court upon this point, as well as upon tJie
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gift to create a public sentiment which would
put an end to negro slavery in the United
States, had the concurrence of the late Mr.
Justice Dewey, whose judicial experience and
large acquaintance with the law of charitable
uses give great weight to his opinion, and
whose lamented death, while this case has
been under advisement,
has deprived us of
his assistance in determining the other questions in controversy.
V. The validity of the other residuary bequests and devises depends upon the law of
perpetuities as applied to private trusts. The
principles of this branch of the law have
been so fully considered by the court in recent
cases as to require no extended statement.
The general rule is that If any estate, legal
or equitable, is given by deed or will to any
person in the first instance, and then over to
another person, or even to a public charity,
upon the happening of a contingency which
may by possibility not take place within a
life or lives in being (treating a child in its
mother's womb as in being) and twenty-one
years afterwards, the gift over is void, as
tending to create a perpetuity by making the
estate inalienable; for the title of those taking the previous interests would not be perfect, and until the happening of the contingency it could not be ascertained who were
entitled.
Brattle Square Church v. Grant, 3
Gray, 142; Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen, 5, 7. If
therefore the gift over is limited upon a single
event which may or may not happen within
the prescribed period, it is void, and cannot be
made good by the actual happening of the
event within that period.
But if the testator distinctly makes his gift
over to depend upon what is sometimes called an alternative contingency, or upon either
one of which may be
of two contingencies,
too remote and the other cannot be, its validity depends upon the event; or, in other
words, if he gives the estate over on one
contingency which must happen, if at all,
within the limit of the rule, and that contingency does happen, the validity of the distinct gift over in that event will not be affected by the consideration that upon a difwhich might or might
ferent contingency,
not happen within the lawful limit, he makes
a disposition of his estate, which would be
The authorities upon
void for remoteness.
Longhead v.
this point are conclusive.
Phelps, 2 W. Bl. 704; Sugden and Preston,
arguendo, in Beard v. Westcott, 5 Barn. &
Aid. 809, 813, 814; Minter v. Wraith, 13 Sim.
52; Evers v. Challis, 7 H. L. Cas. 531; Armstrong V. Armstrong, 14 B. Mon. 338; 1 Jarm.
Wills, 244; Lewis, Pei-p. c. 21; 2 Spence,
Eq. Jur. 125, 126.
By the ninth and tenth articles of the will,
the income of one third of the residue of the
testator's estate, real and personal, is to be
paid to his son James and to his daughter
Mrs. Palmer, respectively, during life. Each
of these articles contains a distinct direction
that, in case such son or daughter shall die

leaving no child surviving, the principal of
his or her share shall be paid and conveyed
to the board of trustees named in the fourth
article, to be expended for the intent and purpose therein directed.
As the first tenant for
life in each bequest is living at the death of
the testator, the event of such tenant's dying,
leaving no child then living, must happen
within the period of a life in being, if at all ;
and,

if it

does happen,

the

gift

over to the

charity will be valid. Neither James Jackson nor Mrs. Palmer therefore is entitled to
But as
a present equitable
estate In fee.
James, though now unmarried, may marry
and have children who survive him, and as
Mrs. Palmer's children niny survive her, in
either of which cases hall' of the income of
the share would by the will go to such children during their lives and the bequest over
to the charity be too remote, the validity and
effect of that bequest over cannot be now determined. If the contingency upon which it
Is valid should hereafter occur, namely, the
redeath of the testator's son or daughter,
spectively, leaving no children surviving, the
whole remainder of the share will then go
to the charity established by the fourth article, and be paid, after the settlement of a
scheme for its lawful application, to the trustees therein named.
VI. By the thirteenth amendment of the
constitution of the United States, adopted
since the earlier arguments of this case, it is
declared that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted,
shall exist within the United
States or any place subject to their jurisdiction." The effect of this amendment upon
the charitable bequests of Francis Jackson is
to be determined;
the remaining question
and this requires a consideration of the nature and proper limits of the doctrine of cy
pres.

It is contended for the heirs at law, that
the power of the English chancellor, when a
charitable trust cannot be administered according to its terms, to execute it so as to
carry out the donor's intention as nearly as
possible — ey pres— is derived from the royal
prerogative or St. 43 Eliz. and is not an exthat, whether
ercise of judicial authority;
this power is prerogative or judicial, it cannot, or, if it can, should not, be exercised by
this court; and that the doctrine of cy pres,
even as administered in the English chancery, would not sustain these charitable bequests since slavery has been abolished.
Much confusion of ideas has arisen from
the use of the term "cy pres" in the books to
describe
two distinct powers exercised by
the English chancellor in charity cases, the
one under the sign manual of the crown, the
other under the general jurisdiction in equity;
as well as to designate the rule of construction which has sometimes been applied to
executory devises or powers of appointment
to individuals, in order to avoid the objec-
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tlon of remoteness.
It was of this last, and
not of any doctrine peculiar to cliarities, that
Lord Kenyon said, "The doctrine of cy pres
goes to the utmost verge of the law, and we
must take care that it does not run wild;"
and Lord Eldon, "It is not proper to go one
step farther."
Brudenell v. Elwes, 1 East,
451,

7

Ves.

390;

1

jarm. Wills,

261-263;

Powers, c. 9, § 9; Coster v. Lorillard,
14 Wend. 309, 348.
The principal, if not the only, cases in
which the disposition of a charity is held to
be in the crown by sign manual, are of two
classes;
the first, of bequests to particular
uses charitable in their nature, but illegal, as
for a form of religion not tolerated by law;
and the second, of gifts of property to charity generally, without any trust interposed,
and In which either no appointment is provided for, or the power of appointment is
delegated to persons who die without exercising it.
It is by the sign manual and in cases of
the first class, that the arbitrary dispositions
have been made, which were so justly condemned by Lord Thurlow in Moggridge v.
Thackwell, 1 Ves. Jr. 469, and Sir William
Grant in Gary v. Abbot, 7 Ves. 494, 495; and
which, through want of due discrimination,
have brought so much discredit upon the
whole doctrine of cy pres.
Such was the
case of Attorney General v. Baxter, in which
a bequest to Mr. Baxter to be distributed by
him among sixty pious ejected ministers, (not,
as the testator declared, for the sake of their
nonconformity, but because he knew many of
them to be pious and good men and in great
want,) was held to be void, and given under
but the
the sign manual to Chelsea College;
upon the
decree was afterwards reversed,
ground that this was really a legacy to sixty
1 Vern. 248;
2
individuals to be named.
Vern. 105; 1 Bq. Cas. Abr. 96; 7 Ves. 76.
Such «Iso was the case of Da Costa v. I>e
Pas, in which a gift for establishing a jesuba
or assembly for reading the Jewish law was
applied to the support of a Christian chapel
at a foundling hospital. Amb. 228; 2 Swanst.
1 Dickens, 258; 7 Ves. 76, 81.
489, note;
This power of disposal by the sign manual
of the crown in direct opposition to the declared intention of the testator, whether it is
to be deemed to have belonged to the king as
head of the church as well as of the state,
"intrusted and empowered to see that nothing be done to the disherison of the crown or
the propagation of a false religion" (Rex v.
Portington, 1 Salk. 162, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 96);
or to have been derived from the power exercised by the Roman emperor, who was sovereign legislator as well as supreme interpreter of the laws (Dig. 33, 2, 17; 50, 8, 4; Code,
lib. 1, tit. 2, c. 19; Id., tit. 14, c. 12); is clearly a prerogative and not a judicial power, and
could not be exercised by this court; and it
is difficult to see how It could be held to exist at all in a republic, in which charitable
bequests
have never been forfeited to the
Sugd.

1413

use or submitted to the disposition of the gov4
ernment, because superstitious or illegal.
Dane, Abr. 239; Gass v. Wilhite, 2 Dana,
176;
Methodist Church v. Remington, 1

Watts, 226.
The second class of bequests which are disposed of by the king's sign manual is of gifts
to charity generally, with no uses specified,
no trust interposed,
and either no provision
made for an appointment,
or the power of
appointment delegated to particular persons
who die without exercising it. Boyle, Char.
Attorney General v. Syderfen, 1
238, 239;
Vern. 224, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 96; Attorney General V. Fletcher, 5 Law J. Ch. (N. S.) 75.
This too is not a judicial power of expounding and carrying out the testator's Intention,
but a prerogative power of ordaining what
the testator has failed to express.
No Instance Is reported, or has been discovered in
the thorough investigations of the subject,
of an exercise of this power in England before the reign of Charles n. Moggridge v.
Thackwell, 7 Ves. 69-81; Dwight's Argument
in the Rose Will Case, 272.
It has never, so
far as we know, been introduced into the
practice of any court In this country; and, If
It exists anywhere here. It is in the legislature of the commonwealth as succeeding to
the powers of the king as parens patriae.
4
Kent, Comm. 508, note; Fontain v. Ravenel,
17 How. 369, 384; Moore v. Moore, 4 Dana,
365, 366; Witman v. Lex, 17 Serg. & R. 93;
Attorney General v. Jolly, 1 Rich. Eq. 108;
Dickson v. Montgomery, 1 Swan, 348; Le.
page V. Macnamara, 5 Iowa, 146; Bartlet v.
King, 12 Mass. 545; Sohier v. Massachusetts
General Hospital, 3 Cush. 496, 497.
It certainly cannot be exercised by the judiciary of
a state whose constitution declares that "the
judicial department shall never exercise the
legislative and executive powers, or either of
them: to the end it may be a government of
laws and not of men." Declaration of Rights,
art. 30.
The jurisdiction of the court of chancery to
superintend the administration and decree
the performance of gifts to trustees for ehaiitable uses of a kind stated in the gift stands
upon different grounds; and is part of its
equity jurisdiction
over trusts, which is
shown by abundant evidence to have existed
before the passage of the statute of charitable uses.
Sir Francis Moore records a case
in which a man sold land to another upon
confidence to perform a charitable use, which
the grantor declared by his last will that the
grantee should perform; "the bargain was
never enrolled, and yet the lord chancellor
decreed that the heir should sell the land to
be disposed according to the limitation of the
use; and this decree was made the 24th of
Queen Elizabeth, before the statute of charitable uses, and this decree was made upon
ordinary and judicial equity In chancery."
Symon's Case, Duke, Char. Uses, 163.
About
the same time the court of chancery entertained a suit between two parties, each claim-
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ing to be trustee, to determine how bequests
lor the weekly relief of the poor of certain
towns, for the yearly preferment of poor children to be apprentices, and for the curing of
divers diseased people lying by the highway's side, should be "employed and bestowReade v.
ed according to the said will."
A decree in 16
Silles (27 Eliz.) Act. Can. 559.
Ellz., confirming a report of the master of
the rolls and others to whom a suit for enforcing a charitable trust founded by will
had been referred, is cited in 1 Spence, Eq.
Jur. 588, note. For years before St. 43 Eliz.,
or the similar act of 39 Eliz., suits in equity
by some In behalf of all of the inhabitants of
a parish were maintained to establish and
enforce bequests for schools, alms or other
charitable purposes for the benefit of the parish, which would have been too indefinite to
Parker v.
be enforced
as private trusts.
Browne (12 Eliz.) 1 Cal. Pro. Ch. 81, 1 Mylne
& K. 389, 390; D wight, Char. Cas. 33, 34; in
which the devise was in trust to a corporation Incapable at law of taking. Parrot v.
I'awlet (21 Eliz.) Gary, 47; Elmer v. Scot (24
Eliz.) Cho. Cas. Ch. 155; Matthew v. Marow
(32-34 Eliz.); and Hensman v. Hackney (38
Eliz.) D wight. Char. Cas. 65, 77; in which the

decrees approved schemes settled by masters
in chancery.
Many other examples are collected in the able and learned arguments, as
separately printed in full, of Mr. Binney in
the Case of Girard's Will, and of Mr. Dwight
in the Rose Will Case. And the existence of
such a jurisdiction anterior to and independent of the statute Is now generally admitted.
Vidal V. Girard, 2 How. 194-196, and cases
cited; Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 501; MaglU
V. Brown, Brightly, N. P. 346; 2 Kent, Comm.
286-288, and note; Burbank v. Whitney, 24
Pick. 152, 153; Preachers' Aid Soc. v. Rich,
45 Me. 559; Derby v. Derby, 4 R. I. 436;
Urmey v. Wooden, 1 Ohio St. 160; Chambers
V. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543; 1 Spence, Bq. Jur.
588; Tudor, Char. Trusts, 102, 103.
The theory that St. 43 Eliz. enlarged the
discretion of the chancellor to depart from
the expressed intention of the founder of a
charity is refuted by the words of the statAfter reciting that many gifts
ute itself.
and appointments for the charitable purposes
therein named "have not been employed according to the charitable Intent of the givers
and founders thereof, by reason of frauds,
of trust, and negligence in those
breaches
that should pay, deliver and employ the
same;" It then, for redress and remedy thereof, authorizes the lord chancellor or lord
keeper to make such decrees that the property "may be duly and faithfully employed
to and for such of the charitable uses and Intents before rehearsed respectively for which
they were given, limited, assigned or appointed by the donors and founders thereof;"
which decrees, "not being contrary or repugnant to the orders, statutes or decrees of the
donors or founders," shall "stand firm and
good, according to the tenor and purpose

and shall be executed accordingly,"
until altered by the lord chancellor or lord
keeper upon complaint by any party aggrieved; and upon such complaint the chancellor
or keeper may "by such course as to their
wisdoms shall seem meetest, the circumstances of the case considered, proceed to the examination, hearing and determining thereof;
and upon hearing thereof shall and may annul, diminish, alter or enlarge" the decrees
of the commissioners as "shall be thought to
stand with equity and good conscience, according to the true intent and meaning of
the donors and founders thereof."
These
last qualifications are specially marked by
Lord Coke, who was attorney general at the
passage of the statute and for some time before and after, and who adds, by way of
note to the final clause, "This is the lapis
duetitlus, whereby the commissioners
and
2
chancellors must institute their course."
Inst. 712. See, also, Duke, Char. Uses, 11,
thereof,

156,

In

169,

372,

619.

cases of bequests to trustees for charitable uses, the nature of which is described
in the will, the chancellor acts in his equity
jurisdiction over trusts; and the prerogative
of the king finds its appropriate exercise
through his attorney general in bringing the
case before the court of chancery for a judicial determination. This has been well explained by Lord Eldon. "It is the duty of
a court of equity, a main part, originally
almost the whole, of its jurisdiction, to administer trusts; to protect not the visible
owner, who alone can proceed at law, but the
individual equitably, though not legally, entitled.
From this principle has arisen the
practice of administering the trust of a public charity: persons possessed of funds appropriated to such purposes are within the
general rule; but, no one being entitled to
an immediate and peculiar Interest to prefer
a complaint, who is to compel the performance of these obligations, and to enforce
their responsibility?
It is the duty of the
king, as parens patriae, to protect property
devoted to charitable uses; an4 that duty
is executed by the officer who represents
the crown for all forensic purposes.
On this
foundation rests the right of the attorney
general In such cases to obtain by information the interposition of a court of equity."
Attorney General v. Brown, 1 Swanst. 291,
1 Wils. 354.
To the like effect are the opinions of Lord Redesdale in Attorney General
V. Mayor, etc., of Dublin, 1 Bligh (N. S.) 347,
348, and Corporation of Ludlow v. Greenhouse, Id. 48, 62; of Lord Keeper Bridgman
in Attorney General v. Newman, 1 Ch. Cas.
158; of Su: Joseph Jekyll In Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 2 P. Wms. 119; and of Lord Hardwlcke in Attorney General v. Middleton, 2
Ves. Sr. 328; which also state that the jurisdiction of the court of chancery over charities was exercised on such Informations before St. 43 Eliz.
See, also. Attorney General T. Carroll, Act Can. 729; D wight's Ar-
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gument In the Rose Will Case, 259-268. This
duty of maintaining the rights of the public,
and of a number of persons too indefinite
to vindicate their own, has vested in the
commonvrealth,
and is exercised here, as in
England, through the attorney general.
Going V. Emery, 16 Pick. 119; County Attorney V. May, 5 Cush. 338-340;
Gen. St. c. 14,
It is upon this ground that, in a suit
§ 20.
instituted by the trustees of a charity to obtain the instructions of the court, the attorney general should be made a party defendant, as he has been by order of the court in
this case. Harvard College v. Society for
Promoting Theological Education, 3 Gray,
280; Tudor, Char. Trusts, 161, 162.
The
power of the king or commonwealth, thus
exercised, is simply to present the question
to a court of justice, not to control or direct
its judicial action.
A charity, being a trust in the support and
execution of which the whole public is concerned, and which is therefore allowed by
the law to be perpetual, deserves and often
requires the exercise of a larger discretion
by the court of chancery than a mere private trust; for without a large discretionary
power, in carrying out the general intent of
the donor, to vary the details of administration, and even the mode of application, many
charities would fail by change of circumstances and the happening of contingencies
which no human foresight could provide
against; and the probabilities of such failure would Increase with the lapse of time
of the heirs from the
and the remoteness
original donor who had in a clear and lawful
manner manifested his will to divert his estate from his heirs for the benefit of public
charities.
It is accordingly well settled by decisions
of the highest authority, that when a gift is
made to trustees for a charitable purpose,
the general nature of which is pointed out,
and which is lawful and valid at the time of
the death of the testator, and no intention
is expressed to limit it to a particular institution or mode of application, and afterwards, either by change of circumstances
the scheme of the testator becomes impracticable, or by change of law becomes illegal,
the fund, having once vested in the charity,
does not go to the heirs at law as a resulting
trust, but is to be applied by the court of
chancery, in the exercise of its jurisdiction
in equity, as near the testator's particular
directions as possible, to carry out his general charitable intent. In all the cases of
charities which have been administered in
the English courts of chancery without the
aid of the sign manual, the prerogative of
the king acting through the chancellor has
not been alluded to, except for the purpose
of distinguishing it from the power exercised by the court in its inherent equitable
jurisdiction with the assistance of its masters in chancery.
At the time of the settlement of the Mass-
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achusetts Colony, this power was most freely exercised by the court of chancery, either
on information by the attorney general, or
under the
by commission
on proceedings
statute of charitable uses. Attorney Gen-

Warwick (1615, 1638) Dwight, Char.
141, West, Ch. 60, 62; Bloomfield
V. Stowemarket (1619) Duke, Char. Uses,
In the last case, lands had been given
644.
before the Reformation to be sold, and the
proceeds applied, one half to the making of
a highway from the town in which the lands
were, one fourth to the repair of a church
in that town, and the other fourth to the
priest of the church to say prayers for the
souls of the donor and others; and Lord
Bacon decreed the establishment of the uses
for making the highway and repairing the
church, and directed the remaining fourth
(which could not, by reason of the change in
religion, be applied as directed by the donor)
to be divided between the poor of the same
town, and the poor of the town where the
eral

V.

Cas.

donor

140,

inhabited.
the Case of Baliol College, this doctrine
was enforced by successive decrees of the
the
English chancellors between
greatest
English Revolution and our own, which have
been recently confirmed by the unanimous
Attorney Gendecision of the house of lords.
eral V. Guise, 2 Vern. 166; Attorney General V. Baliol College, 9 Mod. 407; Attorney
General v. Glasgow College, 2 Colly. 665, 1
H. L. Cas. 800. The case is of such importance and reported at different stages in
so many books and at such length, that it
may be well to state it. John Snell, an
Episcopalian, who made his last will and
died in 1679, while the form of religion established by law in Scotland as well as in
England was Episcopal, gave lands in trust
to apply the income for the maintenance and
at the university of Oxford of
education
Scotchmen to be designated by the vice chancellor of that university and the heads of
certain colleges therein, and who should, upgive security to enter
on their admission,
into holy orders and to be sent into Scotland
and there remain. After the Revolution of
Presbyterianism was reestablished
in
1688,
Scotland by act of parliament; and in 1690
an information was filed by the attorney general, at the relation of the vice chancellor
and heads of colleges named In the will,
against the testator's heiress at law, suggesting a pretence by her that as Episcopacy and
Prelacy had been abolished In Scotland, and
the Presbyterian form of worship established
instead, the testator's Intentions could not be
carried into effect, the devise became void,
and the property reverted to her. But the
lords commissioners of the great seal, by a
decree passed in 1692, established the devise
against her, ordered an account, and reserved all directions for the establishment of the
charity. 2 Vern. 267, note; 2 Colly. 665-670,
In 1693 the
1 H. L. Cas. 802-804, 820, 822.
cause came on for further directions before
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'>ord Keeijer Somers, who, acting upon the
doctrine that it was within the province of
a court of equity to administer the trust upon the principle of cy pres, ordered the estate to be conveyed to the six senior fellows
of Baliol College, one of the colleges named
in the will, to maintain a certain number of
Scotch scholars at that college, and, in consideration of the privileges enjoyed by such
scholars, to apply the surplus income to its
library; and this decree was made subject to
such alteration and disposition as the court
should from time to time make, upon the application of any person concerned, for the
better and more effectual
execution of the
trust, as near as could be to the testator's
will and Intentions. 2 Vem. 267, note; 2
Colly. 670, 671, 1 H. L. Cas. 804, 805, 824.
In 1744 Lord Hardwiclje, in the execution of
the directions in the decree of Lord Somers,
referred the cause to a master to approve of
a scheme "for the better establishment and
regulation of the charity, and carrying the
same into effect for the future as near to the
will and Intention of the testator as the alsince the making
teration of circumstances
of the will would admit;" and upon his report, and against the exceptions of the heads
of colleges in Oxford, confirmed a scheme
which did not impose any condition of the
taking holy orders— thus cari-ying
scholars
out the general intention of the trust so far
as to educate Scotch scholars at Oxford, alultimate object that
though
the testator's
they should be educated in the Episcopal form
of church government to take part in the
established religion in Scotland could not, by
reason of the change of law since his death,
oe eflfected. 9 Mod. 407; 1 H. L. Cas. 805,
In 1759 Lord Keeper Henley
806, 825-827.
(afterward Lord Northington) varied the
scheme in other particulars, but declined to
vary It In this; and further orders were aftei-wards made in chancery as the revenues
2 Colly. 672-674, 1 H. L. Cas.
increased.
Upon a
806, 807, 825, 826; 3 Ves. 650, note.
new information filed at the relation of some
Scotch Episcopalians, the house of lords In
1848, reversing an order of Vice Chancellor
Knight Bruce, held that the charity must
continue to be administered according to the
1 H. L. Cas. 800.
earlier decrees.
In another case. Queen Elizabeth, by letters patent, established a hospital for forty
lepers, and made the inmates a corporation.
After leprosy had become almost extinct in
England, and the members of the corporation
reduced to three, an information was filed,
alleging that the corporation was dissolved,
and praying for a new application of the
revenues agreeably to the letters patent and
the donor's intention, or as near thereto as
circumstances would permit and the court
should direct. Lord Eldon held that neither
the donor's heirs at law nor the crown took
the land discharged of the charity; referred
the case to a master to report a scheme; and
confirmed the report of the master, approv-

ing a scheme for the application of the revenues to a general
infirmary, reserving a
preference
to all lepers
who might offer
Attorney
themselves.
General v. Hicks,
Highm. Mortm. 336-354, 3 Brown, Ch. 166,
note.

Sir John Romilly, M. R., afterwards made
holding that a gift made in
1687 of land (for which in 1774 other land
had been substituted by leave of parliament)
in trust out of the income to keep it ready
for a hospital and burial place for patients
sick of the plague, was a present gift for
charitable purposes, and valid, although the
plague had not reappeared
in England for
more than one hundred and eighty years;
and, after alluding to a class of cases, cited
for the heirs at law in that case, as they
have been in this, in which the charitable bequest could never have taken effect, added,
"But who can say, when this deed was executed or the act passed, that this was not a
charitable trust, capable of being performed;" "and if it were ever wholly devoted to
charity, those cases do not apply." Attorney
(General v. Craven, 21 Beav. 392, 408.
The principle that a bequest to trustees for
charitable purposes indicated in the will,
which are lawful and capable of being carried out at the time of the testator's death,
will not be allowed to fail and result to the
heirs at law upon a change of circumstancas.,
but will be applied by the court according t«
a scheme approved by a master to carry cut
the intent of the testator as nearly as possible, has been affirmed
and acted on in
many other English cases. Attorney General V. Pyle, 1 Atk. 435; Attorney General v.
Green, 2 Brown, Ch. 492; Attorney General
v. Bishop of London, 3 Brown, Ch. 171; Moggridge v. Thackwell, Id. 517, 1 Ves. Jr. 464;
Attorney General v. Glyn, 12 Sim. 84; Attorney General v. Lawes, 8 Hare, 32; Attorney General v. Vint, 3 De Gex & S. 705.
The dicta of Lord Alvanley, upon which the
heirs at law much rely, do not, in the connection in which they were uttered, substantially differ from the general current of authority. Attorney General v. Boultbee, 2 Ves.
Jr. 387, 388; Attorney General v. Whitchurch, 3 Ves. 143, 144; Attorney General v.
MinshuU, 4 Ves. 14.
By the opinion of Lord Eldon, formed after
great doubt and hesitation, the principle has
been held to extend to the case of a bequest
of property to a person named. In trust for
such charitable purposes, not otherwise described, as he should appoint.
Moggridge v.
Thackwell, 7 Ves. 96, 13 Ves. 416; Paice v.
Archbishop of Canterbury, 14 Ves. 364; Mills
V. Farmer, 19 Ves. 483, 1 Mer. 55.
Such a
trust has been held valid in this commonwealth, so far as to vest a title in the trustee
as against the next of kin. Wells v. Doane,
3 Gray, 201. Whether, in case of his death,
it could properly be administered by a court
of chancery, without the aid of the prerogative power, need not be considered In this

a like decision,
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case. See Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How. 387,
388; Moore v. Moore, 4 Dana, 366. i
In most of the cases cited at the argument,
in which the heirs at law were held to be entitled to the property, the charitable gift never took effect at all; either because it could
not be carried out as directed, without violating the mortmain act of 9 Geo. II., as in
Jones V. WUliams, Amb. 651; Attorney General V. Whitchurch, 3 Ves. 141, and Smith v.
Oliver, 11 Beav. 481; or because the testator
had in terms limited it to a special object
which could not be accomplished at the time
of his death; as in the case of a bequest to
build a church in Wheatley, which could not
be done without the consent of the bishop,
and he refused (Attorney General v. Bishop
of Oxford, 1 Brown, Ch. 444, note; Id., cited
2 Cox, Ch. 365; 2 Ves. Jr. 388; and 4 Ves.
431, 432); or of a direction to contract with
the governors of a hospital for the purchase
of a presentation of a boy to that charity, if
the residuary assets should prove sufficient
for that purpose, and they proved to be insufficient (Cherry v. Mott, 1 Mylne & C.
123).

In Marsh v. Means, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 790, the
testator gave a legacy, after the death of his
wife, "for continuing the periodical published under the title of 'The Voice of Humanity,' according to the objects and principles
which are set forth in the prospectus contained in the third number of that publication." "The Voice of Humanity" had been
published quarterly by an association for the
protection of animals, but no number had
appeared for nearly a year before the date
of the will. Upon the death of the widow
twenty years later. Vice Chancellor Wood
held that the gift was not to support the
principles of the publication, but only the
publication itself, and, the publication having ceased and the association perished, that
the legacy lapsed.
But he added, "It would,
I thinli, have fallen within the description of
charity, if this periodical had been subsisting
at the date of the will, and afterwards ceased.
That would be simply a case where, the
particular intention having failed, the general
intention must be carried out."
Two striking cases upon this subject have
arisen in England under charities for the redemption of captives.
In the Case of Betton's Charity, Thomas
Betton in 1723 bequeathed the residue of his
in
estate
to the Ironmongers' Company,
trust, "positively forbidr'ing them to diminish
the capital sum by giving away any part, or
that the interest and profit arising be applied
to any other use or uses than hereinafter
mentioned and directed," namely, one half
of trie income yearly unto the redemption of
British slaves in Turkey or Barbary, one
fourth unto charity schools in the city and
suburbs of London where the education is
according to the church of England, and one
1 See, also,

Lorings v. Marsh,

HUTCH.& BUNK.EQ.-27

6

Wall.

337.
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fourth "unto necessitated decayed freemen
of the company, their widows and children."
The first half of the income of the fund
greatly accumulated, few such slaves having
been found for a century. Lord Brougham,
reversing the decree of Sir John Leach, M.
R., held that the court had jurisdiction to
apply the surplus income of this moiety and
its accumulations as near ns might be to the
Intentions of the testator; living regard to
and
the bequest touching British captives,
also to the other charitable bequests in the
will; and that the case should be refen-ed
back to the master to approve a proper
Attorney Genscheme for such application.
eral V. Ironmongers' Co., 2 Mylne & K. 576.
Sir Christopher Pepys, M. R. (afterwards
Lord Cottenham,) accordingly ordered it to
On the return of the master's
be so referred.
a
report. Lord Langdale, M. E., approved
scheme to apply the whole fund to the second and third purposes declared in the will.
2 Beav. 313.
Lord Chancellor Cottenham on
appeal reversed this decree; and upon the
ground that the testator had not limited the
first charity, like the others, to persons in
London, ordered the first moiety to be applied to supporting and assisting charity
schools in England and Wales, and referred
it back to the master to settle a scheme for
Craig & P. 208. And this dethat purpose.
cree was affirmed in the house of lords with
of Lord Chancellor Lyndthe concurrence
hurst, and Lords Brougham, Cottenham and
In that case,
Campbell.
10 Clark & F. 908.
though there were differences of opinion as
to the details of the scheme, the jurisdiction
of the court of chancery to frame one in such
a case was thus affirmed by the deliberate
judgments of five law lords; and all agreed
that, for the purpose of ascertaining what
was cy pres to the particular object which
had failed, the court might look at all the
charitable bequests in the will; applying in
this respect the principle upon which Lord
Bacon had acted more than two centuries
before in the case of Bloomfleld v. Stowemarket, above cited.
But the case most like that now before us
is that of Lady Mico's Charity, Lady Mico,
by her will made in 1670, gave a thousand
pounds "to redeem poor slaves in what manner the executors should think most convenient." This charity was established by
Upon an indecree in chancery
in 1686.
formation filed in 1827, after the fund had
accumulated a hundred fold, it was referred
to a master to approve of a scheme for the
application of the income according to the
will of the testatrix, or, if he should find that
it could not be executed according to her will,
then as near the intent of the will as could
be, regard being had to the existing circumstances and to the amount of the fund.
The
master, by his general report in 1835, stated
that the relators had laid before him a
scheme for applying the fund to the enfranchisement
of slaves in the British Colonies
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who were too poor to purchase
their own
freedom;
which application, in consequence
of St. 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 73, abolishing slavery
(which took effect in 1834), had become impracticable; that he was of opinion that the
testatrix by her will contemplated
the redemption of poor slaves in the Barbary
States, but that intention could not be carried into effect; and he approved a scheme
to apply the capital and income in purchasing
and building schcol-houses
for the education
of the emancipated apprentices and their issue, qualifying teachers, paying the salaries
of masters and other expenses, and to apply
the surplus rents to the support of any other
schools, and generally in promoting education in the British Colonies.
Sir Christopher
Pepys, M. R., confirmed this scheme by a decree; and, after he had become lord chancellor, stated the reasons to have been that
"in this there was no restriction as to the
description of slaves, or the countries in
which the slaves were to be looked for;" that
upon the reference to the master "it appeared
that there were not within any part of the
British dominions any poor slaves to be redeemed, but that there were in the colonies
many thousands
of human beings from
whom the odious appellation of slaves had
been removed, but whose state was very far
short of that of freemen, from whose bodies
the chains of slavery had been struck, but
whose minds and morals were still in that
state of degradation which is inseparable
from the unfortunate situation from wliich
they had recently been in part rescued; it
was proposed to the master to apply, and he
approved of a scheme for the completion of
that holy work, by assisting in the education
If, before the slavery
of those poor beings.
abolition act, these funds could properly have
of
been applied to procuring the redemption
slaves in the colonies, the proposed applicawas
tion for the benefit of the apprentices
cy pres to the intention of the
doubtless
And his reason for not applying
donor."
Betton's Charity in the same manner was
that It was in terms limited to slaves in Turkey or Barbary. Attorney General v. Gibson,
2 Beav. 317, note; Attorney General v. Ironmongers' Co., Craig & P. 226, 227.
There is no adjudication of this question
by the supreme court of the United States.
The dicta of Chief Justice Marshall in Baptist Ass'n V. Hart's Ex'rs, 4 Wheat 1, were
based upon an Imperfect survey of the authorities, were not required by the decision,
and are hardly reconcilable with the more
recent judgments of the same court; and that
case, as well as Wheeler v. Smith, 9 How. 79,
VIdal v.
arose under the law of Virginia.
Glrard's Ex'rs, 2 How. 192; Perln v. Carey,
24 How. 501; Bartlett v. Nye, 4 Mete. (Mass.)
380; American Academy of Arts & Sciences
College, 12
V. President, etc., of Harvard
In Fontain
Gray, 593; 2 Kent, Comm. 287.
V. Ravenel, 17 How. 369, the testator authorized his executors or the survivor of them

to dispose of the residue of his estate "for
the use of such charitable institutions in
Pennsylvania and South Carolina, as they or
he may deem most beneficial to mankind,"
and they died without appointing; and it was
held that the title did not vest In the executors as trustees, and that according to the
English law the disposition would have been
in the crown by sign manual.
As Mr. Justice McLean, delivering the opinion of the
court, said: "Nothing short of the prerogative power, it would seem, can reach this
case.
There is not only uncertainty in the

beneficiaries of this charity, but behind that
is a more formidable objection. There is no
expressed will of the testator.
He intended
to speak through his executors or the survivor of them, but by the acts of Providence
this has become impossible.
It is then as
though he had not spoken.
Can any power
now speak for him, except the parens patriae?" The further remarks about the power
of cy pres, if intended to cover a case in
which the charitable purposes were described
or indicated in the will, were upon a question
not before the court.
The separate opinion
of Chief Justice Taney in Fontain v. Ravenel
was but his own, based mainly upon that of
Chief Justice Marshall in Baptist Ass'n v.
Hart's Ex'rs. And it is impossible to avoid
the Inference that the impressions of both of
those eminent magistrates were derived from
the laws of Maryland and Virginia in which
they had been educated, and by which St. 43
Ellz. has been expressly repealed, and charities are not recognized
as entitled to any
favor, either in duration or construction, beyond other trusts. DashleU v. Attorney General, 5 Har. & J. 392; Gallego v. Attorney
General, 3 Leigh, 450.
In North Carolina,
the supreme court once declared that It had
all the powers exercised by the English chancellor, either In the equity jurisdiction or under the sign manual; and since, rebounding
from that extreme opinion, seems to have
adopted the view of Maryland and Virginia.
Griffin v. Graham, 1 Hawks, 96; McAuley v.
Wilson, 1 Dev. Eq. 276; Holland v. Peck, 2
Ired. Eq. 255. There is a dictum to a like
So
effect In Carter v. Balfour, 19 Ala. 830.
in New York, the court of appeals, after
some division and vacillation of opinion in
the course of the frequent changes in the
composition of the court, has recently adjudged that In that state the English law of
charitable uses has been wholly abrogated
by statute, and that charities are within the
rule against perpetuities, and have no priviBascom v. Alleges about private trusts.
bertson, 34 N. Y. 584.
On the other hand, the court of appeals of
Kentucky, In an able judgment delivered by
Chief Justice Robertson, marked the distinction between the power exercised under the
sign manual, and that Inherent in the equity
jurisdiction; and, after speaking of the former as not judicial, added: "The cy pres doctrine of England is not, or should not be, a
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judicial doctrine,

except in one kind of case;
and that is, where there is an available charity to an identified or ascertainable object,
and a particular mode, inadequate, illegal or

inappropriate, or which happens to fail, has
been prescribed. In such case, a court of equity may substitute or sanction any other
mode that may be lawful and suitable and
will effectuate the declared intention of the
donor, and not arbitrarily and in the dark,
presuming on his weakness or wishes, declare an object for him. A court may act judicially as long as it effectuates the lawful
intention of the donor." Moore v. Moore, 4
Dana, 366. See, also, Gass v. Wilhite, 2 Dana,
177; Curling v. Curling, 8 Dana, 38. The
power of cy pres, which was declared by
the supreme court of Pennsylvania in Methodist Church v. Remington, 1 Watts, 226, and
Witman v. Lex, 17 Serg. & R. 98, not to exist in that state, was the power exercised under the sign manual in case of a gift to superstitious uses, or of an expression of general
intention to devote a sum to charitable purposes not designated.
In a very recent case,
the same court said: "The rule of equity on
this subject seems to be clear, that when a
definite charity is created, the failure of the
particular mode in which it is to be effectuated does not destroy the charity; for equity
will substitute another mode, so that the substantial intention shall not depend r_ion the
formal intention." "And this is the doctrine
of cy pres, so far as it has been expressly
adopted by us"— "a reasonable doctrine, by
which a well defined charity, or one where
the means of definition are given, may be
enforced in favor of the general intent, even
where the mode or means provided for by
the dlanor fail by reason of their inadequacy
Philadelphia v. Girard, 45
or unlawfulness."
Like principles have been
Pa. St. 27, 28.
maintained in South Carolina and Illinois.
Attorney General v. Jolly, 1 Rich. Eq. 99, 2
Strob. Eq. 395; Gilman v. Hamilton, 16 111.
231.
The existence of a judicial power to administer a charity cy pres where the expressed intention of the founder cannot be
exactly carried out has been either countenanced or left an open question in all the
New England states except Connecticut
Burr V. Smith, 7 Vt. 287, 288; Second Congregational Soc. V. First Congregational Soc,
14 N. H. 330; Brown v. Concord, 33 N. H.
296; Derby v. Derby, 4 R. I. 439; Tappan v.
Deblois, 45 Me. 131; Howard v. American
Peace Soc, 49 Me. 302, 303; Treat's Appeal,
See, also, 2 Redf. Wills, 815,
30 Conn. 113.
McCord v. Ochiltree, 8 Blackf. 15;
note:
Beall V. Fox, 4 Ga. 427; Chambers v. St.
Louis, 29 Mo. 590, 592; Lepage v. Macnamara,
5 Iowa, 146; Mclntyre v. Zanesville, 17 Ohio

St

352.

The narrow doctrines which have prevailed
in some states upon this subject are inconsistent with the established law of this comOur ancestors brought with
monwealth.
them from England the elements of the law
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of charitable uses, and, although the form of
proceeding by commission under St. 43 Eliz.
has never prevailed in Massachusetts, that
statute, in substance and principle, has always been considered as part of our common
law. 4 Dane, Abr. 6, 239; Earle v. Wood, 8
Cush. 445. Under the Colony charter, charities wej-e regulated and administered, according to the intent of the donors, under the direction of the general court, the court of assistants, and the county courts; and under
the Province charter, although no court was
charitable
vested with equity jurisdiction,
bequests were not the less valid. Anc. Chart.
52; Drury v. Natick, 10 Allen, 180, 181, and
authorities cited; Winslow v. Trowbridge,
The English
stated in 11 Allen, 459, 460.
mortmain act of 9 Geo. II. c. 36, did not extend to Massachusetts; and the similar provision in Prov. St. 28 Geo. II. c. 9, was repealed immediately after our Revolution by
St 1785, c. 51. Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen, 6.
Charities are held not to be within the common rule limiting perpetuities and accumulations. Defxter v. Gardner, 7 Allen, 243; Odell
V. Odell, 10 Allen, 1.
Charitable bequests to
an unincorporated society here, to a foreigL
corporation or society, or to a particular religious denomination in a certain county,
have been carried into effect, even where no
Buitrustees have been named in the will.
bank v. Whitney, 24 Pick. 146; Bartlett \.
Nye, 4 Mete. (Mass.) 378; Washburn v. Se
wall, 9 Mete. (Mass.) 280; Universalist Sec. v..
Fitch, 8 Gray, 421. See, also. Wells v. Doane,
3 Gray, 201; Saltonstall v. Sanders, 11 Allen,
446.

The intention of the testator is the guide,

or, in the phrase of Lord Coke, the lodestone,
of the court; and therefore, whenever a char
itable gift can be administered according to
his express directions, this court, like the

court of chancery in England, is not at liberty to modify it upon considerations of policy or convenience.
Harvard College v. So
ciety for Promoting Theological Education,
3 Gray, 280; Baker v. Smith, 13 Mete. (Mass.)
34; Trustees of Smith Charities v. Inhabitants
of Northampton, 10 Allen, 498. But there are
several cases, where the charitable trust
could not be executed as directed in the will,
in which the testator's scheme has been varied by this court in such a way and to such
an extent as could not be done in the case
of a private trust Thus bequests to a particular bible society by name, whether a corporation established by law or a voluntary
association, which had ceased to exist before
the death of the testator, have been sustained, and applied to the distribution of bibles
through a trustee appointed by the court for
the purpose. Winslow v. Oummings, 3 Cush.
358; Bliss V. American Bible Soc, 2 Allen,
334.
At a time when the general chancery
jurisdiction of this court over trusts was
limited to those arising under deeds and wills,
the legislature by a special statute authorized it to hear and determine in equity any

420

TRTTST— PTTBLIC

and all matters relating to a certain gift to a
Bcientific corporation, to be invested in a certain manner, and paid in premiums for discoveries or improvements on heat or light
published in America within two years before each award. Upon a bill being filed, and
it appearing that it had become impracticablo
to carry out the intent of the donor in the
mode prescribed. Chief Justice Shaw authorized a different investment of the fund ; and,
in accordance with a scheme reported by a
master, authorized the corporation to apply
the surplus income, after paying such premiums, to purchasing books, papers and philosophical apparatus, and making such publications or 1 ocuring such lectures, experiments or investigations as should facilitate
and encourage the making of such discoveries
and improvements; and said: "Whenever it
appears that a general object of charity is
intended,
and the purpose is not unlawful
and void, the right of the heir at law is di"It is now a settled rule in equity
vested."
that a liberal construction is to be given to
charitable donations, with a view to promote
and accomplish the general charitable intent
of the donor, and that such intent ought to be
observed, and when this cannot be strictly
and literally done, this court will cause it to
be fulfilled as nearly in conformity with the
intent of the donor as practicabla Where
the property thus given is given to trustees
capable of taking, but the property cannot
be applied precisely in the mode directed,
the court of chancery interferes, and regulates the disposition of such property under
on the subject of
its general jurisdiction
trusts, and not as administering a branch of
the prerogative of the king as pai-ens patriae." "What is the nearest method of carrying Into effect the general intent of the
donor must of course depend upon the subject matter, the expressed intent, and the
other circumstances of each particular case,
upon all of which the court is to exercise its
American Academy v. ECarvard
discretion."
College, 12 Gray, 582. The same principle
was also recognized or assumed in 4 Dane,
Abr. 242, 243, in Sanderson v. White, 18 Pick.
Baker v.
333, and other cases already cited.
Smith, 13 Mete. (Mass.) 41; Harvard College
V. Society for Promoting Theological Education, 3 Gray, 282, 298; Trustees of Smith
Charities v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 10
Allen, 501, 502.
By Gen. St. c. 113, § 2, this court may
hear and determine in equity all suits and
proceedings for enforcing and regulating the
execution of trusts, whether the trusts relate
to real or personal estate, "and shall have
full equity jurisdiction, according to the usage and practice of courts of equity, in all
other cases, where there is not a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law." The
powers usually exercised by the court of chancery in the course of its jurisdiction In equity
have thus been expressly conferred upon this
The authority of adcourt by the legislature.

OR CHARITABLE.
ministering a charitable trust according to
the expressed intention of the donor, and,
when that cannot be exactly followed, then
as nearly as possible, is a part of this jurisdiction, which the court is not at liberty to
decline. The only question is, whether the
facts of the case show a proper occasion for
its exercise according to the settled practice
in chancery.
In all the cases cited at the argument, in
which a charitable bequest, which might have
been lawfully carried out under the circumstances existing at the death of the testator,
has been held, upon a change of circumstances, to result to the heirs at law or residuary
legatees, the gift was distinctly limited to
particular persons or establishments.
Such
was Russell v. Kellett, 3 Smale & G. 264,
in which the gift was of five pounds outright to each poor person of a particular description in certain parishes, and Vice Chancellor Stuart held that the shares of those
who died before receiving them went to the
residuary legatees. Such, also, was Clark v.
Taylor, 1 Drew. 642, in which it was held
that a legacy to a certain orphan school by
name, which ceased to exist after the death
of the testator, failed and fell into the residue of the estate; and which can hardly be
reconciled with the decisions in Incorporated
Soc. V. Price, 1 Jones & L. 498, 7 Ir. Eq.
260; In re Clergy Society, 2 Kay & J. 615;
Marsh v. Attorney General, 2 Johns. & H.
61; Winslow v. Cummings, 3 Cush. 358, and

Bliss V. American Bible Soc, 2 Allen, 334.
So in Easterbrooks v. Tilllnghast, 5 Gray,
limited, not only
17, the trust was expressly
in object, but in duration, to the maintenance
of the pastor of a certain church of a specified faith and practice in a particular town,
"so long as they or their successors shall
maintain the visibility of a church in said
faith and order;" and could not have been
held to have terminated,
had it not been so
limited. , Attorney General
v. Columbine,
Boyle, Char. 204, 205; Potter v. Thurston,
7 R. I. 25; Dexter v. Gardner, 7 Allen, 243.
The charitable bequests of Francis Jackson
cannot, in the oi.inion of the court, be regarded as so restricted
in their objects, or
so limited in point of time, as to have been
terminated and destroyed by the abolition of
slavery in the United States. They are to a
board of trustees for whose continuance careful provision is made in the will, and which
the testator expresses a wish may become a
permanent organization and may receive the
services and sympathy, the donations and bequests, of the friends of the slave. Their
duration is not in terms limited, like that
of the trust sought to be established in the
sixth article of the will, by the accomplishment of the end specified. They take effect
from the time of the testator's death, and
might then have been lawfully applied in
exact conformity with his expressed Intentions. The retaining of the funds in the custody of the court while this case has been
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under advisement

cannot

affect

the question.

The gifts being lawful and charitable, and
having once vested, the subsequent change
of circumstances before the funds have been
actually paid over is of no more weight than
if they had been paid to the trustees and
been administered
by them for a century before slavery was extinguished.
Neither the immediate purpose of the testator—the moral education of the people; nor
his ultimate object— to better the condition of
the African race in this country; has been
fully accomplished by the abolition of slavery.
Negro slavery was recognized by our law as
an infraction of the rights inseparable
from
human nature; and tended to promote idleness, selfishness and tyranny in one part of
the community, a destruction of the domestic
relations and utter debasement In the other
part. The sentiment which would put an end
to it is the sentiment
of justice, humanity
and charity, based upon moral duty, inspired
by the most familiar precepts of the Christian religion, and approved by the constitution of the commonwealth.
The teaching and
diffusion of such a sentiment are not of temporary benefit or necessity, but of perpetual
obligation.
Slavery may be abolished;
but
to strengthen
and
confirm
the sentiment
which opposed it will continue to be useful
and desirable so long as selfishness, cruelty,
the lust of dominion, and indifference to the
rights of the weak, the poor and the ignorant,
have a place in the hearts of men. Looking
at the trust established by the fourth article
of this will as one for the moral education
of the people only, the case is within the
principle of those, already cited, in which
charities for the relief of leprosy and the
plague were held not to end with the disappearance of those diseases;
and is not essentially different from that of Attorney General V. Baliol College, In which a trust for the
education at Oxford of Scotch youths, to be
sent into Scotland to preach Bpiscopalianism
in the established church there, was applied
by Lords Somers and Hardwicke and their
successors to educate such youths, although,
by the change of faith and practice of the
Church of Scotland, the donor's ultimate object could no longer be accomplished.
The intention of Francis Jackson to benefit
the negro race appears not only in the leading clause of the fourth article, and in his
expression of a hope that his trustees might
receive the aid and the gifts of the friends
of the slave, but in the trust for the benefit
of fugitive slaves In the fifth article of the
will, to which, according to the principle established by the house of lords in the Case of
Betton's Charity, resort may be had to ascertain his intent and tiie fittest mode of carrying it out. The negroes, although emancipated, still stand in great need of assistance and
education.
Charities for the relief of the poor
have been often held to be well applieil to
Bishop of
educate them and their children.
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Hereford v. Adams, 7 Ves. 324; Wilkinson
Malin, 2 Cromp. & J. 636, 2 Tyrw. 544;
Anderson v. Wrights of Glasgow, 12 Li T.
(N. S.) 807. The Case of Mico Charity is
directly to the point that a gift for the redemption of poor slaves may be appropriated,
after they have been emancipated by law, to
educate them; and the reasons given by Lord
Cottenham for that decision apply with no
less force to those set free by the recent
in the United
amendment of the constitution
V.

States, than to those who were emancipated
by act of parliament in the West Indies.
The mode in which the funds bequeathed
by the fourth and fifth articles of the will
may be best applied to carry out in a lawful
manner the charitable intents and purposes
of the testator as nearly as possible must
be settled by a scheme to be framed by a
by the court before
master and confirmed
the funds are paid over to the trustees. In
doing this, the court does not take the charity
out of the hands of the trustees, but only
declares the law which must be their guide
in its administration. Shelf. Mortm. 651-654;
Boyle, Char. 214-218. The case is therefore
to be referred to a master, with liberty to
the attorney general and the trustees to submit schemes for his approval; and all further
directions are reserved until the coming Id
of his report.
Case referred to a master.

The case was then referred to John Codman, Esquire, a master in chancery for this
county, who, after notice to the trustees and
the attorney general, and hearing the parties,
made his report, the results of which were
approved by the attorney general; and upon
exceptions to which the case was argued by
W. Phillips for himself and other excepting
trustees, and by J. A. Andrew in support
of the master's report, before Gray, J., with
the agreement
that he should consult the
whole court before entering a final decree.
No account was asked by any party of sums
already expended by the trustees.
As to the bequest in the fifth article, the
master reported that the unexpended balance
(amounting to $1049.90) was so small that it
was reasonable that It should be confined to a
limited territory; and that it should therefore be applied by the trustees, in accordance
with their unanimous recommendation, to the
use of necessitous persons of African descent
in the city of Boston and its vicinity.
This
scheme was approved and confirmed by the
court, with this addition: "Preference being
given to such as have escaped from slavery."
As to the sum bequeathed in the fourth article of the will, the master reported that a
portion had been expended by the trustees
before any question arose as to its validity;
and that but two schemes had been suggested to him for the appropriation of the residue,
namely, first, (which was approved by four
of the seven trustees who had accepted the
trust,) in part to the support of the AntI-
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Slavery Standard, and in part to the New
England Branch of the American Freedmen's
Union Commission; or, second, (which was
approved by the remaining trustees,) that the
whole should be applied to the last named object.

The master disapproved of the first of these
and reported that the Anti-Slavery
Standard was a weekly newspaper published
in the city of New York with a circulation of
not more than three thousand copies, which
was established nearly thirty years ago for
the purpose of acting upon public opinion in
favor of the abolition of slavery; that in his
opinion, since the abolition of slavery, and
acts of conthe passage of the reconstruction
gress, "the support of a paper of such limited circulation as hardly to be self-sustaining
would do very little for the benefit of the colored people in their present status, and its
direct influence would be almost imperceptible on the welfare of that class most nearly
corresponding to those whom the testator had
In view in making this bequest;" and that the
argument, that it was evidently the intention
of the testator to accomplish the object Indicated in the fourth article of his will by
means of which a newspaper like this might
be considered an example, was answered by
the fact that the object for which these means
were to be used had been already accomplished without them.
The master returned
with his report a few numbers of the AntiSlavery Standard, (taken without selection as
■they were given to him by the chairman of
the trustees,) by which it appeared that it was
in large part devoted to urging the passage of
laws securing to the freedmen equal political
rights with the whites, the keeping of the
southern states under military government,
the impeachment of the president, and other
political measures.
The master reported that he was unable to
any better plan than the second
devise
scheme suggested;
that this mode of appropriation was in his opinion most in accord^vre with the Intention of the testator as ex-

schemes;

pressed In the fourth article of the will, because the Intention nearest to that of emancipating the slaves was by educating the
emancipated slaves to render them capable of
self-government; and this could best be done
by an organized society, expressly intended
and exactly fitted for this function, and which,
if the whole or any part of this fund was to
be applied to the direct education and support of the freedmen, was admitted at the
hearing before him to be the fittest channel
for the appropriation. The master returned
with his report printed documents by which
it appeared that the object of the American
Freedmen's
Union Commission, as stated in
Its constitution, was "the relief, education and
elevation of the freedmen of the United
States, and to aid and cooperate with the people of the South, without distinction of race
of their condior color. In the improvement
tion, upon the basis of industry, education,
and that
freedom and Christian morality;"
the New England and other branches of the
commission were now maintaining large numbers of teachers and schools for this purpose
throughout the southern states.
The master accordingly reported that what
remained
of the fund bequeathed by the
fourth article of the will should be "ordered
to be paid over to the New England Branch
of the Freedmen's Union Commission, to be
employed and expended by them In promoting
the education, support and Interests generally
of the freedmen (late siaves) In the states of
this Union recently in rebellion." And this
scheme was by the opinion of the whole court
accepted and confirmed, modified only by directing the executor to pay the fund to the
trustees, to be by them paid over at such
times and in such sums as they in their discretion might think fit to the treasurer of the
branch commission;
and by substituting for
the words "recently in rebellion" the words
"in which slavery has been abolished, either
by the proclamation of the late President Lincoln or the amendment of the constitution."
Final decree accordingly.
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ALLEN
(55 N.

STEVENS

et al. v.

E.

568,

161

et

al.

N. Y. 122.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 5, 1899.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, Fourth department.
Action by Benjamin G. Allen and others
against Charles E. Stevens and others, as
executors and trustees under the will of
Nathan F. Graves, deceased, to obtain a construction of the will. From an order of the
appellate division (54 N. Y. Supp. 8) reversing a judgment in favor of defendants (49
N. Y. Supp. 431), they appeal.
Reversed.

This action was brought for the purpose
of obtaining a construction of the will of
Nathan F. Graves, deceased, and particularly the tenth clause thereof, devising and
bequeathing the residuary real and personal
estate in trust for the purpose of founding,
erecting, and maintaining Graves Home for
the Aged, to the effect that the said provisions of the tenth clause be adjudged void
and invalid, and also that it be adjudged and
determined tliat the said will is void and invalid so far as it devised and bequeathed
more than one-Half of the real and personal
property of the testator to benevolent, charitable, literary, scientific, religious, and missionary societies, associations,
or corporations, in trust or otherwise, and that the surplus of such one-half part be distributed and
conveyed to the plaintiffs, who are next of
kin of the testator. The special term decided that the will was In all respects valid, and
Tlie appelrendered judgment accordingly.
late division, by a divided court, held that
the tenth clause was invalid, and reversed
the judgment.
From the order and judgment

entered

thereon,

appeals

have

been

taken to this court.
The will read as follows:
"I Nathan F. Graves, of the city of Syracuse, in the state of New York, being of
sound mind and memory, do make, ordain,
publish, and declare this to be my last will
and testament; that is to say:
"First. After all my lawful debts are
paid and discharged, I give, devise, and bequeath unto Catharine H. Graves, my wife,
all of the furniture, beds, and bedding of
every kind, including paintings, pictures,
vases, and statuary of every kind, with all
kitchen utensils, in the dwelling house where
we now live, the horses, harnesses, carriages,
wagons, sleighs, sleds, cows, chickens, and
everything appertaining thereto and connected therewith, including feed of every
kind, to have and to hold the same to her
heirs and assigns, forever.
also give and
bequeath to the said Catharine H. Graves
the rents, issues, and profits of all of my
houses, tenements, and stores south of James
street, in Syracuse, to be paid to her monthly, subject only to the necessary repairs and
taxes for and during her natural life.
also give and bequeath to the said Cathar-

I

I
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ine H. Graves all dividends that may be declared by the New York State Banking Company on all the stock standing in my name,
to be paid to her when declared and due,
payable to her immediately, for and during
her natural life.
"Second. I give and bequeath to the Oneida Cemetery Association, called 'Glenwood
situate in the town of Lenox,
Cemetery,'
near the village of Oneida, In iladlson county, in the state of New York, the sum of
five hundred dollars, to be received and held

in trust by the trustees thereof, or other
representatives of said Cemetery Association, to be invested on first bond and mortgage or mortgages, the interest, or so much
thereof or so much of the same as may be
necessary, be expended in keeping the family burial lot in good order, grading, mowing, enriching, and all other things that may
be needed.
The lot is known as lot number one in section S In said cemetery, the
title of which Is in Nathan P. Graves and
Catharine H. Graves, his wife. The said
money may be deposited
in any savings
bank in Madison or Onondaga county when
Any
not invested in bond and mortgage.
part of the interest or principal may be used
to repair any injury to the monument
or
headstones
caused by any casualty
or by
lapse of time.
"Third. I give and bequeath to the General Synod of the Reformed Church In America, also known as the General Synod of
Church In America, the sum of ten thousand
dollars, for the speclflc purpose of founding
and maintaining an annual course of lectures on missions (the choice of the lecturer
and the details of the lectureship to be under the direction of the professors in the
seminary at New Brunswick, New Jersey,
and the corresponding secretary of the board
of foreign missions of the Reformed Church
of America, or his successor), payable after
the death of my wife, Catharine H. Graves;
but the sum of five hundred dollars a year
is to be paid by my executors, at such times
as the same may be needed to sustain the
lecture course, during the life of my wife.
"Fourth. I give and bequeath to the Syracuse University, situated in the city of Syracuse, in the state of New York, ten thousand
dollars, for the specific purpose of founding
and maintaining an annual course of lectures
on missions (the choice of the lecturer and
the details of the lectureship to be under the
direction of the chancellor of the University), payable after the death of my wife,
Catharine H. Graves; but the sum of five
hundred dollars a year is to be paid by my
executors, at such times as the same may* be
needed to sustain the lecture course, during
the life of my wife.
"Fifth. I give and bequeath to Hope College, situated at Holland, in the state of
Michigan, ten thousand dollars for the specific purpose of erecting a fireproof building,
to be used as a library.
The sums that I
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have advanced
or may hereafter advance
during my life will be deducted from the
I also give and bequeath
above amount.
to said Hope College my miscellaneous library in the dwelling house in Syracuse
where I now reside.
The library will not
be delivered to said Hope College during the
life of Catharine H. Graves, my wife, unless
she consents to the removal in writing.
"Sixth. I give and bequeath to the Syracuse Home Association, situate .at the corner
of Townsend and Hawley streets, in Syracuse, to the Onondaga County Orphan Asylum, in Syracuse, and the St. Joseph's Hospital, situate on Prospect avenue, corner Union street, in Syracuse, each one thousand
dollars, payable after the death of Catharine H. (iraves, my wife.
"Seventh.

I

give and bequeath unto the con-

sistory of the Reformed Church, situated on
.lames street, in Syracuse, in the state of
Xew York, the sum of two thousand dollars
in trust for the specific purpose hereinafter
named, which sum may be invested in first
mortgage or mortgages;
the interest to be
used in the payment of the rent of a pew in
said church, and the balance of interest, if
any, to be given to the board of foreign misThe iiew desiguated by
sions of said church.
the consistory may be used by the pastor of
the church and his family when needed for
that purpose, and, when not so needed, to be
used as the consistory shall from time to ti.^\e
determine.
"Eighth. I give and bequuath to my executors the sum of fifteen hundred dollars, but
in trust to be used for the purpose of placing
in the Reformed Church in Syracuse a memorial window for wife, Catharine H. Graves,
The sum may be used for that
and myself.
purpose, or so much thereof as may be necessary.
The memorial window may be omitted, and a memorial tablet be placed on the
wall inside of the church. In either case the
consent and approval of the consistory must
first be obtained.
"Xiuth. I give and bequeath to Francis H.
Loomis, the son of my sister Achsah H.
Loomis,
give and
one thousand
dollars.
bequeath to Helen A. Graves, the daughter
of my brother Benjamin S. Graves, one thouI give and bequeath to Benjasand dollars.
min G. Allen, the son of my sister Mary A.
Allen, one thousand dollars.
I give and bequeath to Helen 11. Hiclis, Charles Sterling
Graves. William Shaw Graves. Nathan Francis Graves and Mary Elizabeth Graves, the
children of my brother Sterling P. Graves,
give and beeach one thousand dollars.
queath to Abial S. Graves, my brother, one
thousand dollars; to Mary B. Strong, Elizabeth and Benjamin S. Graves, his children,
one thousand dollars each. 1 give and bequeath to Helen Breese Graves, daughter of
Maurice A. Graves, one thousand dollars.
give and bequeath to Nathan B. Graves ten
I give and bequeath to
thousand dollars.
Augustus C. Stevens, son of Charles E. Stevens, my law Ubrary and my mahogany book

I

I

I

I

paper case.
give and bequeath to
Maurice A. Graves my three black-walnut
book cases, now in my library room where I
also, my library table.
I give
now reside;
and bequeath to my brother the portrait of
unto Sterling P.
myself, painted by Elliatt;
and

Graves.

I

give

and

bequeath

unto

Nathan

Francis Graves my watch and chains.
"Tenth. I give, bequeath, and devise all
the rest and residue of my property of every
kind,

personal

and real, wherever

situate,

to

mj' trustees hereinafter named, for the purerecting, and maintaining
pose of founding,
Graves Home for the Aged, to be located in
the city of Syracuse, in the state of New
York. It is intended as a home for those
who by misfortune

have become incapable

of

providing for themselves, and those who have
The institution
slender means of support.
to be known as the Graves Home for the
Aged.
I hereby appoint Charles E. Stevens,
Rasselas A. Bonta, and Maurice A. Graves for

I

the trustees to execute the above trust.
hereby authorize and empower my executors,
or the survivor of them, to rent or sell any
part or all of my real estate that I may own
They are authorat the time of my death.
ized to employ a pei'son or- persons to have
charge of the real estate, to collect rents
and make repairs, and to pay such sums for
compensation
as they may deem reasonable
After my executors have exeand proper.
cuted their trust, and paid all the legatees
provided for in this will, they are authorized
and directed to convey to the said trustees
above named the balance and remainder of
my property of every kind, to be applied for
the purposes above provided;
and the said
trustees, or the survivor, are authorized
to
rent or sell all or any part of my real or personal property, and to employ such agents as
they may deem proper to take charge of the
as
same, and pay them such compensation
they deem best.
"Eleventh. My executors
or my trustees
are authorized to retain my stock and shares
in the New York State Banking Company,
and continue the business of banking for a
term of years, at their discretion, but may
sell the same or any part thereof at any time;
but the same is not to be continued, nor any
portion of my property held, longer than the
lives of Catharine Graves Roby, daughter of
Sidney B. Roby, of Rochester,
and Helen
A.
Graves,
Breese
daughter
of Maurice
Likewise, I make, conGraves, of Syracuse.
stitute, and appoint Charles E. Stevens, Rasselas A. Bonta, and Maurice A. Graves to be
executors of this, my last will and testament,
hereby revoking all former wills by me made.
"In witness whereof, I have hereunto subscribed my name and affixed my seal the fifteenth day of September, in the year of our
Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninetythree.
Nathan F. Graves.
[Seal.]"

Augustus C. Stevens, for appellant execuCharles 0. Cook, for appellant Syracuse
Home Ass'n. Frank Hiscock, for appellant

tor.
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attorney general.
0. B. Stevens, for appellant
First Reformed Church. Joseph W. Sutphen,
for appellant General Synod. William G. TraC. Oarscy, for respondents Allen and others.
kadden, for respondent Breese.

PARKER, C. J. (after stating the facts).
Under the law of this state, prior to the enactment of chapter 701 of the Laws of 18J>3,
the tenth clause of the will in question would
First, behave been void upon two grounds:
cause of the indeflniteness of the beneficiaries
(Bascom v. Albertson. 34 N. Y. ."iSO; Tilden v.
Green, 130 N. Y. 29, 28 N. E. 880, 14 L. R. A.
33); and, siecond, because, although intending
charity, the testator
to found a permanent
did not direct the formation of a corporation
witliin two lives In being to talie over the
trust property. Burrill v. Boardman, 43 N.
Y. 254; CruilvShanls v. Home for the Friendless. 113 N. Y. 337, 21 N. E. 64, 4 L. R. A. 140;
People v. Simonson, 126 N. Y. 299. 27 N. E.
380.
The question now presented is whether
the act of 1893 has so far amended the law
relating to the subject of charitable bequests
as to malvO it possible for the charitable inBetentions of this testator to be executed.
fore examining the statute, which was coucededly intended to affect in some wise the
law upon tlie general subject, it will not be
out of place to have in mind the situation of
such law. No one disputes that it was the
intention of the legislature to change in substantial respects the law as it had been setThe controtled by the courts of this state.
versy is as to the extent of the changes intended by the legislature, and upon the question of intent some light will be thrown by
a very brief reference to the early state of
the law in this state upon the subject of charitable uses, and the changes from time to time
This
which finally resulted in its overthrow.
subject was exhaustively considei'ed
in an
opinion written by .Judge Deuio in the case of
Williams v. Williams, 8 N. Y. 52,5. In that
case the opinion declared that according to
the law of England as It existed at the time
of the American Revolution, and as it still
exists, devises and bequests in sui)port of
charity and religion, although defective for
want of such grantee or donee as the rules of
law require in other cases, would nevertheless
be supported in the courts of chancery;
that
such pints of the common law had become
incorporated into our system of jurisprudence
prior to the adoption of the constitution, by
force of the provisions, of which it became a
In
part, of the common law of this state.
answer to the claim that the law of charitable
uses was created by the statute 43 Eliz. c. 4,
and hence was abrogated by the repeal in tMs
state of the statute of Elizabeth (Laws 1788,
c. 46, § 37), the court asserted that the doctrine of charitable uses was a creation of
chancery, and had been regarded as an important part of its jurisdiction long prior to
the enactment of the statute of Elizabeth,
and such system having become ingrafted upon
the common law, and the practice thereof
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having Deen undertaken and carried on by
the court of chancery in this state, that it
was not affected by the repeal of the statute
of Elizabeth; that the provisions of the Revised Statutes did not affect property given in
perpetuity
for religious or charitable purposes; and hence that the bequest of $6,000
V. Oakley and other individual
to Zophar
trustees, with power to perpetuate their successors, as a perpetual fund for the education
of children of the poor who should be educated in the academy in the village of Huntington, with directions to accumulate the fund
up to a certain point, and apply the income
to the education of children whose parents'
names were not upon the tax list, was valid.
If that case had continued to be the law of
this state, there would have been no opportunity for questioning the validity of the
That detenth clause of this testator's will.
cision, it would seem, should have settled the
question in this state, but the struggle between the advocates of a liberal policy towards charities and the opponents of such a
In
policy did not stop with that decision.
Levy V. Levy, 33 N. Y. 97, Judge Wright challenged the position taken by the court in the
"R'illiams Case, and discussed anew the question whether the English doctrine of trusts
for charitable uses was the law of this state.
The discussion was continued in Bascom v.
Albertson and Burrill v. Boardman,
supi-a;
and in Holmes v. Mead, 52 N. Y. 332, it was
finally decided that the system of charitable
uses, as recognized in England prior to the
Revolution, has no existence in this state, and
that such uses are not exempt from the provisions of the statute abolishing all uses and
trusts except such as are authorized thereby.
Efforts in the interest of upholding important
charitable bequests have from time to time
been made to persuade the courts to reopen
the subject to a limited extent, without other
result than an approval of the case of Holmes
V. Jlead, as in HoUaud v. Alcock, 108 N. Y.
312, 16 N. E. 305, where the court felt called
upon to point out that "charity, as a great
interest of civilization and Christianity, has
suffered no loss or diminution in the change
which has been made. The law has been
simplified, and that is all."
So the fact seemed to be at the time of such writing, and so it
may have been, except as to that class of
charities which, for convenience, we may call
original charities, as where a person desires
to found an institution to carry on a charity
that will bear his name and be a monument
to his memory, or wishes to benefit a class of
unfortimate persons in his own community, in
Many a testawhom he may be interested.
tor has attempted to provide by his last will
and testament for such a charity, but, so far
as the decisions show, nearly every such attempt has come to naught, because the courts,
in applying the rules resulting from the flual
overthrow of the Williams Case, have been
obliged to hold that the language employed by
the testator was either indefinite as to beneficiaries, or in violation of the law against
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perpetuities.
Holmes v. Mead, 52 N. Y. 332;
Prlchard v. Thompson, 95 N. Y. 76; Cottman
V. Grace, 112 N. Y. 299, 19 N. E. 839, 3 L. B.
A. 145; Read v. Williams, 125 N. Y. 560, 26
N. E. 730; Fosdlck v. Town of Hempstead,
125 N. Y. 581, 26 N. B. 801, 11 L. R. A. 715;
Tilden v. Green, 180 N. Y. 29, 28 N. E. 880,
14 L. R. A. 33; Booth t. Church, 126 N. Y.
215, 28 N. E. 238.
Our attention has not
been called to, nor have we discovered, any
case in the books, since
the decision of
Holmes V. Mead, where an attempt to create
an original charity has survived the test of an
application by the courts of the rules of law
to the language employed by the testator.
Among the last, if not the very last, of the
successful attempts in that direction, was in
respect to the will of James H. Roosevelt, deceased, which was before the court In Burrill
V. Boardman,
In that case the
43 N. Y. 254.
court declined to decide the question whether
the peculiar system of charitable uses as it
existed in England has ever had foothold in
this state. The decision of this court, holding that will to be valid, made Roosevelt
Hospital a possibility. As these statements
seem to make their own comment, we pass to
the position of the legislature in 1893, which
had its attention sharply drawn to the suLjeet by a comparatively
recent decision of
this court, the effect of which was to deprive
the public of a great charity, in which Samuel
J. Tilden sought to employ the bulk of his
fortune, aggregating millions. Looking back
over the 20 years that had elapsed since the
decision of the court in Holmes v. Mead, the
legislature could discover nothing but wrecks
of original charities, — charities that were dear
to the hearts of their would-be founders, and
the execution of which would have been of
Further back
mestlmaoie value to the public.
of that period, however, it found that in Williams V. Williams, supra, the court had declared it to be the law of this state that charitable devises and bequests were not subject to
the statute against perpetuities, nor subject to
strangulation by the rule against indefinite
beneficiaries;
for the court, having equitable
jurisdiction, claimed the right to administer
uses.
Our legislature
the law of charitable
not only saw that a great wrong had been and
was being done to the public by the loss of
many devises and bequests for the purpose of
founding original charities, but it further saw
that the remedy could alone be furnished by
it.
It perceived that its repeal of the statute
of Elizabeth furnished the foundation for the
decisions of the courts, and did away with
the law of England upon that subject, as well
as with the practice In this country in that
regard which had been founded upon such
law, so it set about making a change in the
law; and the statute which it enacted, together with the title, reads as follows:
"An act to regulate gyfts for charitable purposes.
"Section 1. No gift, grant, bequest or deeducational, charitable,
or
vise to religious,
benevolent uses, which shall, in other respects

be valid under the laws of this state, shall or
be deemed invalid by reason of the indefiniteness or uncertainty of the persons designated
as the beneficiaries thereunder in the instrument creating the same. If in the instrument
creating such a gift, grant, bequest or devise
there is a trustee named to execute the same,
the legal title to the lands or property given,
granted, devised or bequeathed for such purposes shall vest in such trustee.
If no person be named as trustee then the title to such
lands or property shall vest In the supreme
court.
"Sec. 2. The supreme court shall have control over gifts, grants, bequests and devises
in all cases provided for by section one of this
shall represent the
act. The attorney-general
beneficiaries in all such cases and it shall be
his duty to enforce such trusts by proper proceedings in the court."
Laws 1893, c. 701.
Reading
the statute in the light of the
events to which reference has been made, it
seems to me very clear that the legislature Intended to restore the law of charitable trusts
as declared in the Williams Case; that having discovered that legislative enactment had
operated to take away the power of the courts
of equity to administer
trusts that were indefinite as to beneficiaries, and had declared a
permanent charity void unless the devise in
trust was to a corporation already formed,
or to one to be created, it sought to restore
thiit which had been taken away through another enactment.
This is markedly indicated,
not only by the absence of details in the statute, which is broadly entitled "An act to regulate gifts for charitable purposes," but also
in the brevity of the statute, which confers
all power over such trusts and trustees on
the supreme court, and directs the attorney
general to represent the beneficiaries in cases
within the purview of the statute, as was the
practice in England. Practical effect can be
given to the provision that no devise or bequest shall be deemed invalid by reason of the
indeflniteness or uncertainty of the persons
only by treating
designated as beneficiaries
it as a part of a general scheme to restore to
the courts of equity the power formerly exercised by chancery in the regulation of gifts
for charitable purposes; for, in order to ascertain the class of persons who were entUled to the benefits of the trust, the rule formerly in force must necessarily be invoked, by
which the court ascertained as nearly as possible the intention of the testator, , by decree
adjudged who were intended to be the beneficiaries of the trust, and directed its administration accordingly.
Fowler, in his work on Charitable Uses, in
speaking of the act of 1893, says: "It must
be very obvious that the act of 1893 has seriously affected those decisions of the courts
of New Y'ork which require great certainty
or a vested interest in the beneficiaries of a
charitable
trust.
The act, in this respect
only, is designed to restore the ancient law
pertouching charitable
uses for uncertain
sons, and to this extent to relieve charitable
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trusts from the narrow boundaries prescribed
by the Revised Statutes for private uses in
lands." While that learned author expresses
the opinion that the act does not relieve charitable or public uses from the application of the
rules relating to perpetuities, which, be says,
"have no reference to public trusts," he asserts
that, bad that been done, the ancient law would
have been almost revived by the legislature.
That he is right in saying that the legislature "designed
to restore the ancient
law
touching
charitable uses for uncertain persons" seems unquestionable,
and it appears
to be reasonably clear, from a reading of the
entire act, that the legislature designed to restore the law governing the administration
of such trusts as well. And, if such was the
design of the legislature,
then effect must be
given to it, though such a construction seems
contrary to the letter of the statute.
Smith
V. People, 47 N. Y. 330.
As this statute is
remedial
in its character,
it should be liberally construed with a view to the beneficial
end proposed.
Hudler v. Golden, 36 N. Y.
446.
The statute provides that, if there is a
trustee named to execute the trust, the legal
title to the property shall vest in such trustee,
and, further, that, if no person be named as
trustee, the title shall vest in the supreme
That there might be no opportunity
court.
for questioning the authority of the supreme
court In such matters, the second section provides that the supreme court shall have control over all gifts, grants, bequests, and devises in all cases provided by section 1 of
this act. Under the provisions of the act a
testator may name a corporation as trustee, or
provide that a corporation to be founded shall
act as trustee, or the trustee named may be
an individual; but, if he name none of these,
the statute provides, in effect, that the trust
shall not fail, but the title to the property
devised or bequeathed In trust shall vest in
the supreme court, which shall have control
over gifts, grants, bequests, and devises proIf the contention be
vided for by the act.
well founded that It was not the intention of
the legislature to revive the ancient law as
to the administration of such trusts by the
supreme court, and to do away with the rule
requiring the formation of a corporation for
such purpose, then no permanent charity can
be administered by the supreme court, notwithstanding the title to the trust property is
by the command of the statute vested in the
supreme court when no trustee is named by
It is insisted that It cannot be,
the testator.
because the trust term is not measured by
Neither is a corporation, which may,
lives.
as a trustee, execute a permanent trust for
charity. But, it is answered, the law has
created an exception to the general rule in faTrue, and the lawmakvor of corporations.
ing power had the right to create other exand it
ceptions, or change the law altogether;
has changed the law as to all cases within
the scope of the act, "to regulate gifts for
so that now the sucharitable purposes,"
preme court must execute such a trust, if the
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title to the trust property vests In It under
the statute, and shall have control over the
administration, if a trustee be named by the
A construction of this statute altestator.
lowing the supreme court to execute a permanent charity when the title to the real estate
is vested in it, and at the same time declaring that, where such property is devised to a
trustee named, the devise Is void, would be
absurd.

The learned counsel for the respondent
points out that it is not all gifts and devises
to religious, educational, charitable, or benevolent uses that shall not be deemed invalid
by reason of indeflniteness as to beneficiaries,
but only such as "shall in other respects be
valid under the laws of this state," and, with
signal ability, seeks to persuade us that, in
order to give these words effect, it must be
held that a trust is not within the protection
the law
of the statute if it contravenes
against perpetuities, and, as a necessary sequence, that if the devise in trust be not to
or provision be not made for
a corporation,
within a pethe formation of a corporation,
riod measured by two lives in being, to take
over the trust estate, then the devise or bequest is invalid, and this statute is without
effect in such case. It will be observed that,
if this contention be well grounded, the authority attempted to he conferred upon the
supreme court to take title and execute a
trust of 'a permanent character when no trustee is nnmed is practically of no effect, and
the statute itself is limited in its application
to a case of the type of Prichard v. Thompson, 95 N. Y. 76, which Is the single case
brought to our attention where the only ob
jection to the validity of the trust was that
In the light
the beneficiaries were indefinite.
of the destruction of so many original charities, as shown by the decisions, the thought
cannot for a moment be indulged in that the
legislature had in view this case only, and
sought to furnish a remedy for just such cases in the future, and for none other.
We are thus led to inquire whether this
clause in the statute may not have been Intended to serve some other purpose than to
require the continuance of the practice of the
formation of corporations
for the administration of permanent, charitable trusts, — a result apparently in conflict with the other provisions of the statute providing for the execution of trusts by trustees or by the supreme
court.
In the attempt to ascertain the intention of the legislature, it Is a just rule,
always to be observed, that the court shall
assume that every provision of the statute
was intended to serve some useful pm^pose;
and, in obedience to that rule, we now inquire whether this clause of the statute does
not have a useful place therein, and yet is
not In conflict with the letter and spirit of
the rest of the statute.
It is so obvious that
it has, that we need cite but one instance
for the need of such a provision, and that Is
suggested by one of the contentions made In
this case. A., having a substantial estate,
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justification.
We are thus conducted to an examination
of the tenth clause of the will. It reads as
give, bequeath, and defollows:
"Tenth.
vise all the rest and residue of my property,
of every kind, personal and real, wlierever
situate, to my trustees hereinafter named,
for the purpose of founding, erecting, and
maintaining Graves Home for the Aged, to
be located in the city of Syracuse, in the state
home for
of New York. It is intended for
those wlio by misfortune have become incapable of providing for themselves, and those
who have slender means of support. The institution to be known as the Graves Home
hereby appoint Charles 0.
for the Aged.
Stevens, Rasselas A. Bonta, and Mam'ice A.
Graves for the trustees to execute the above
hereby authorize and empower my
trust.
executors, or the survivor of them, to rent or
sell any part or all of my real estate that
They are
may own at the time of my death.
a

person or persons to
authorized to enlploy
have charge of the real estate, to collect rents
and to make repairs, and to pay such sum
for compensation as they may deem reasonAfter my executors have
able and proper.
executed their trust, and paid all the legatees
provided for in this will, they are authorized
and directed to convey to the said trustees
above named the balance and remainder of
my property, of every kind, to be applied for

it

it

the purposes above provided;
and the ssiiil
trustees, or the survivor, are authorized
to
rent or sell all or any part of my real or personal property, and to employ such agents as
they may deem proper to take charge of the
same, and pay them such compensation
as
they deem best."
While tlie place where "Graves Home for
the Aged" is to be located is stated, and
the general object of the charity is clearly
given, namely, to provide a home for the
aged who by misfortune have become inis
capable of providing for themselves,
still indefinite as to the territory from which
such aged people may be accepted at the
But for the statuti^ tliat we have
home.
this trust would fail bebeen considering,
of the beneficause of the indefiniteness
ciaries; but the practice that
revives
necessary for the supreme court,
makes
when properly moved by the attorney general, representing the beneficiaries,
to ascertain, as nearly as may be, the intention of
the testator as to the method of selecting
those aged persons who are to be the beneficiaries of the home, and to make such intention efficacious by decree. It seems to
have been the opinion of the appellate division that tlie power of alienation of the
bank shares and the real estate south of
James street was, under the terms of the
will, suspended during three lives in being
after the death of the testator, but to us
it seems that this is not so. It Is true that
by the first clause of the will the trustees
«'ere directed to pay to testator's wife, during life, the dividends on the bank stocks,
when declared, and the net income from the
real estate, after making payments for necessary repairs and taxes, while by the eleventh provision of the will the testator authorized ];is executors
and trustees to retain his shares in the New York State Banking Company for a term of years, at their
discretion, "but may sell the same, or any
part thereof, at any time; but the same is
not to be continued, nor any portion of my
property held, longer than the lives of Catharine Graves Roby, daughter of Sidney B.
Roby,
of Rochester,
and
Helen Breese
Graves, daughter of Maurice A. Graves, of
Syracuse."
It will be observed, therefore,
that the will operated to vest the title of
the estate in the trustees, in trust for the
purposes outlined by the testator, as of the
date of the latter's death;
and they were
directed to pay to the widow certain rents
and dividends for life, unless she survived
two persons upon whose lives the trust estate was expressly limited.
The next question is whether this trust
is to be executed by the trustees named in
the will, or by the supreme court.
It is
the next question because we have already
reached the conclusion that a corporation
is not necessary for the execution of such
trust, since the adoption of the statute, but
that the supreme court, in a proper case,
must take upon itself such execution, over

it

(i.

and desiring to provide suitably for the support of his wife and two brothers during their
lifetime,
for which he deemed the income
amply sufficient, devised his estate In trust
to a trustee during the lifetime of his wife
and brothers, directing
that the income be
apportioned between the cestuis que trustent
during their lives, and that after the death
of the last survivor of them the property be
vested in the supreme court as a permanent
trust, the income to be used towards the support and maintenance of the Syracuse Hospital.
Such a trust would, of comse, be in
direct violation of the statute of perpetuities
and void: for by it the testator would design to do what the statute aims to preventfrom being done, namely, to tie up the estate
for the benefit of his family for a period longe. three lives
er than two lives in being
in being), before the trust for charitable purThis clause
poses could go into operation.
therefore seems to constitute a very useful
and, because
feature, indeed, of the statute;
tliis is so, all excuse is talcen away for an argument that it was intended to serve as such
an obstruction to a practical operation of the
of no substantial
statute as would render
value to the pui)lic. and it eliminates all opwas the InIiortunity for questioning that
tention of the legislature to restore the ancient law as to gifts for charitable purposes,
because exiDerience has shown that, as to original charities, far better results were obtained under it, from the public point of view,
more decent regard for the wishes
and with
of testators, who do not always love their
distant relatives, — occasionally, perhaps, with

a

■i-2S

TRUSTS— PUBLIC OR OHARITABI/E.
which It shall have control where a trustee
Is not named for the purpose.
In this case
trustees were named, and, as the eleventh
clause of the will expressly prohibits the
trustees from holding any portion of the
testator's property longer than the lives of
the two persons in being therein named, it
must be held that the trustees are charged
with the management
and conduct of the
trust until the expiration of a period measured by the two lives in being, at which time
the title to the trust property will vest in
the supreme court under the statute.
The plaintiffs claim that the tenth provision of the will is void as to one-lialf of the
remainder of the testator's estate under section 1, c. 360, of the Laws of 18(50, which
reads as follows:
"Section 1. Xo person
having a husband,- wife, child or parent,
shall, by his or her last will and testament,
devise or bequeath to any benevolent, charitable, literary, scientific, religious or missionary society, association or corporation,
in trust or otherwise,
more than one-half
part of his or her estate, after the payment
of liis or her debts (and such devises or
bequests shall be valid to the extent of onehalf and no more)."
The testator gives
about .$2.5,0(X) or less than one-seventh of
his estate, to organizations that are within
the description of the statute, and in addition to that the residuary devises and bequests are charitable, and therefore within the general description of the statute;
but as such devises and bequests are not
to a "society, association or corporation in
trust or otherwise," but, instead, to trustees,
they are not within its prohibition. The
maxim, "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius," is applicable; for it is a man's general
right, in this state, to do as he wislies with
his own. He may now, as in the past, disinherit his relatives for the benefit of strangers; and this statute was not designed to affect that right, except indirectly.
It was recognized, perhaps, that, in the fear of death,
men who have never exhibited a charitable
impulse suddenly awaken to the fact that
behind them are lost opportunities for usefulness that in some way ought to be made
good; and in order to balance the account
they look about for an opportunity to do
good with their money, and find at once a
man interested in promoting the fortunes of
some religious or charitable institution, who,
without hesitation, begins to play, and with a
skill acquired by long experience, upon their
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fears and hopes. Given such a man and
such a situation, it was reidily conceived
that, in his thought of self, the just demands of wife or child or parent might be
temporarily lost sight of, and his all devoted to religious or charitable purposes,
through some of the many societies, associations, and corporations which are to be
Hence the design of
found on every hand.
the framers of the statute was to place a
limitation upon the power of a person thus
moved, to dispose of more than one-half
of his property by will to such organizations,
to the end that he should have an opportunity to measui'e the claims of his kindred upon
him as to the remaining half, unembarrassed
by the importunities of those whose business
it is to get money for the societies, associations, or corporations they represent; and
this it was thought would be substantially
accomplished by an act prohibiting him from
giving more than one-half of his property to
the societies, associations,
and corporations
But, except as
most likely to be considered.
thus restrained by the statute, he may still
disinherit his kindred by disposing of his
property in such manner and for such purpose as he may desire; and so this testator, in
devising his property to trustees in trust
for the uses and purposes described in the
will, was not within the prohibition of the
statute.
The result thus reached in this
case in no way thwarts the general purpose of the legislature, for the only person
who stood in such relation to the testator
as to benefit by the statute in any case was
the testator's wife, who was over 80 years
of age at the time of his de.ath, was amply
provided for by the will, and has since died.
The amount of costs awarded seems to be
out of all proportion to the work done, and so
large that it is not at all surprising that several lawyers have appealed from nearly all
except their own; but the suallowances
preme court had the power in this suit,
lirought as it was on the equity side of the
court, to award costs to each of the parties;
and the question of amount, also, was in the
discretion of that court, and not subject to
review here, so long as the allowances did not
exceed the limitations provided by statute,
and this they did not do. The judgment of
the appellate division should be reversed, and
that of the special term affirmed, with costs
to the appellant trustees and to the attorney
general.

GRAY, J.,

dissents.
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SHELDON, J.

This was a hill in chanby the heirs at law of Esther S.
Chapman, deceased, against the attorney
general of the state and the executors of the
will of the decedent, to have a certain portion of the estate left by her declared to be
intestate, and to belong to the complainants,
The will,
as heirs at law of the decedent.
executed March 15, 1883, after making sundry bequests to rurious persons other than
with this rethe complainants, concluded
siduary clause:
"All the residue of my estate I devise and bequeath unto the legatees
hereinbefore named, in equal proportions,
excepting said Oakwood seminary and said
Subsequently,
on
Sylvester M. Chapman."
April 5, 1885, the testatrix executed a codicil
"All
which contained this residuary clause:
the rest and residue of my estate, including
that which may lapse for any cause, I direct
to be invested or loaned upon the best terms
possible,
so as to produce the largest income, and said income to be distributed
among the worthy poor of the city of La
Salle, in such manner as a court of chancery
Executors of the will were
may direct."
The decedent left both real and
appointed.
personal estate.
The bill alleges that the city of La Salle
is situated in the town of La Salle, and includes but a small portion of the territory
of the town; and that there is not now, nor
has there ever been, in said city, any organization or association, voluntary or othervrise,
for the distribution of charity to the poor of
the city; and that the municipal authorities
have no duties imposed upon them to provide for the poor; and claims that the residuary clause of the codicil is incapable of
by reason of the uncertainty of
execution
the beneficiaries intended by the testator,
and void, and that, in consequence, all the
rest and residue of the estate, both real and
personal, after the payment of the general
and specific legacies, was intestate estate.
A demurrer to the bill was interposed by the
attorney general and the executors, which
was overruled by the court, whereupon the
denying the invalidity
answered,
executors
of the residuary clause of the codicil, or that
it was incapable of execution, and setting
up that, even if such were the case, the rest
and residue of the estate must be distributed
in accordance with the residuary clause of
Thereupon the bill was amended
the will.
by making the residuary legatees specified in
cery

filed

Subwill additional parties defendant.
sequently a hearing was had upon pleadings
and proofs, and a decree was entered finding that the residuary clause of the codicil
was InefEectual to dispose of the property,
but that it nevertheless revoked the residuary clause of the will, and declaring that
the real estate of which the testatrix died
seised belonged to the complainants as her
heirs at law, and directing that the rest and
residue of the personal estate should be distributed to the complainants as intestate esFrom this decree the attorney gentate.
eral, the executors, and a portion of the legatees specified in the residuary clause of the
will have prosecuted this appeal.
There is in American courts much diversity of decision upon the subject of charitable
In express private trusts there is
trusts.
not only a certain trustee who holds the legal estate, but there is a certain specified
or made
cestui que trust clearly identified,
capable of identification, by the terms of the
instrument erecting the trust. It is an essential feature of public or charitable trusts
that the beneficiaries are uncertain,— a class
of persons described in some general language, often fiuctuating, changing in their
individual numbers, and partaking of a quasi
public character. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1018.
In some of the states the equitable system
of distinctively charitable trusts is not recognized, and the courts apply only the rules
applicable to express private trusts. In other states the "statute of charitable uses" of
43 Eliz. c. 14, has been adopted or repealed,
and thereby decisions have been influenced.
And in other cases local legislation, or supposed local policy, to more or less extent,
In another, and,
enters into adjudications.
as believed, the larger, portion of the states,
the system of charitable trusts as adminisin
tered in the English court of chancery,
the exercise of its ordinary judicial power,
prevails, with variation in regard to the
element of certainty in the trustee and the
object of the charity. A classification of the
decisions in the several states will be found
in 2 Perry, Trusts, § 748, in note, and 2 Pom.
Bq. Jur. § 1029, and note. The prerogative
power of the crown, exercised through the
lord chancellor as the representative of the
king, as where there is a gift to charity
generally, without appointment of a trustee,
and the bounty is devoted to some particular
charity, or where there is a gift to a particular charitable piu-pose which cannot be
effectuated, and it is applied to some other
charitable use, cy-pres the original purpose,
is regarded not as a judicial, but a ministerial, prerogative function.
This prerogative power courts in this counti-y do not asthe

simie

to exercise.

Were this subject of charitable trusts a
new question with us, there would be opened
up a wide and Interesting field of discussion,
in order for the establishment of the proper
rule in this regard. But we are saved labor
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In this respect, from the ground having heretofore been gone over by this court, and the
rule applicable to charitable trusts having
been established to be that vsrhich is administered In the court of chancery in England,
in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction as
a court of equity.
This was done in the
case of Heuser v. Harris, 42 111. 425, and
where it was recognized that the statute of
43 Eliz. c. 4, had been adopted in this state.
The entire contention in this case arises
upon the construction, validity, and efEect of
this residuary clause of the codicil. It is
insisted this clause is void for uncertainty
as to the beneficiaries.
This is not a bequest to charity generally,
or to the poor generally, but to the worthy
poor of the city of La Salle.
The class here
is definite, — the worthy poor of the city of
La Salle, — but the individuals of the class to
whom the bounty is to be distributed are
uncertain. There is always this uncertainty
as to individuals, in the case of public charities, and it is this feature of uncertainty
which distinguishes public charities from
private charities; charitable trusts from
private trusts; and to hold charitable gifts
to be void because of such uncertainty is to
reject this whole distinctive doctrine of charitable trusts. 2 Redf. Wills, 544, (66.)
In the case of a charitable bequest it is
immaterial how vague, indefinite, and uncertain the objects of the testator's bounty may
be, provided there is a discretionary power
vested in some one over its application to
those objects.
Domestic & F. M. Soc.'s Appeal, 30 Pa. 425; Perry, Trusts, § 732.
It
is denied that there is any such discretionary power here given, and White v. Fisk, 22
Conn. 31, is cited in support of such denial.
The bequest in that case was: "Any surplus
income that may remain, to the extent of
per annum, I direct to be expended
$1,000
by my said trustees for the support of indigent, pious young men preparing for the
ministry in New Haven." The decision was
that the gift was void, as the objects of the
benefaction were indefinite, and that no power was conferred on the trustees to make
them definite by selection.
This case, though
meeting with seeming approval In Grimes'
Ex'rs V. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198, has been disapproved
by other high authorities.
See
Perry, Trusts, §§ 713, 720, 748, note 1; 2
Redf. Wills (2d Ed.) p. .541, note; Hesketh v.
Murphy, 36 N. J. Eq. 304. The latter case
especially speaks of White v. Fisk as a case
not likely to be followed.
In Hesketh v. Murphy the testator's will
empowered and directed the trustees to employ the annual income of the fund "for the
relief of the most deserving poor of the city
of Paterson aforesaid, forever, without regard to color or sex; but no person who is
known to be intemperate, lazy. Immoral, or
undeserving, to receive any benefit from the
It was objected that the gift
said fund."
could not be applied to its objects and was
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void, because the will did not confer upon
any one the power of ascertainment of the
individuals who should receive the benefit of
the bequest.
But the court held that the
power given the trustees by the will to distribute the fund carried with it, by necessary implication, the power to select the
beneficiaries from the designated class, and
upheld the bequest. We entirely agree with
the criticism there made by Chief Justice
Beasley upon the case of White v. Fisk, that
there was a mistaken assumption on the
part of the court in that case that there was
no povjer to select the objects of the charity
lodged by the testator in the trustee; that
when a power is conferred on the trustees to
distribute the fund to members of a class,
such members having certain qualifications
which can be ascertained only by the exercise of judgment and discretion, as the act
of distribution cannot be performed except
after such ascertainment of the particular
beneficiaries,
the principal power to distribute the moiieys carries with it the incidental
and necessary power of selection;
and this,
upon the ordinary doctrine that, when one
act Is authorized to be done by a trustee or
other agent, every authority requisite to the
doing of such act is, by intendment of law,
comprised
in such grant of power.
See
Pickering v. Shotwell, 10 Pa. St. 23, that the
power in the trustee to act at its discretion
need not be expressly given, if it can be implied from the nature of the trust. In the
later case of Erskine v. Whitehead, 84 Ind.
357, the decision in Grimes v. Harmon does
not seem to be approved in its full extent.
In Heuser v. Harris, supra, the bequest
of money was "to the poor of Madison county," the interest only to be used, with no
appointment of a trustee.
As the county
court of Madison county was charged by
law with the support of the paupers in the
county, it was held in that particular case
that the poor of the county were its paupers,
and that the fund should be held by the
county court to be applied for the latter" s
support.
It is not to be the inference from
that case that a charitable bequest to the
poor necessarily means to paupers, and that
the trust is only to be executed by somebody charged by law with the support of
paupers.
"A bequest in trust for the poor
inhabitants of a particular place, parish, or
town is a charitable trust for the poor not
receiving parochial or municipal aid and relief as paupers, on the ground that the charity Is for the poor, and not for the rich, and,
if it was applied to the maintenance of those
supported by the parish, town, or county, it
would relieve wealthy tax-payers from their
taxes, and not materially
aid the poor."
Perry, Trusts, § 698.
It is said in Redf. Wills (2d Ed.) 805, that
some of the American cases have gone great
lengths in carrying into effect the intention
of the testator when there was great indefiniteness In the objects of the trust; "that
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the want of a tnistoe in such cases is never
any obstacle in tbe way of a court of equity
laiT.viug into effect any trust, and more especially oue of a charitable cbaracter." Mr.
Pomeroy, in speakinii of the distinguishing
features between
charitable and private
trusts, says that, in case of the former, "not
only may the beneficiaries be uncertain, but
that even when the gift is made to no certain trustee, so that the trust, if private,
would wholly fail, a court of eiiuity will
carry the trust into effect either by appointing a trustee, or by acting itself in place of
102ij.
a trustee.
2 I>om. Eq. .Jur. §§ 102.j,
2i3;
And see Brown v. Kelsey, 2 Cusb.
W ashburn v. Sewall, 9 Mete. 280.
There can be no question of the general
rule.
But it is said it does not apply in a
as to
case A^'here there is such indefiniteness
Numerous are the inbeneficiaries
as here.
stances which might be cited where there
was the want of a trustee, and the court executed the trust in cases of equal indefiniteness as here as to the objects of the trust,
15,
S Blackf.
—as in JlcCord v. Ochiltree,
where the legacy was for the education of
the pious indigent youths; in Bull v. Bull,
8 Conn. 47, where the executors were to dispose of the residue of the estate "among our
brothers and sisters and their children as
they shall judge shall be most in need of the
same. — this to be done according to their
best discretion,— and the executors died never
having exercised the power, nor executed the
trust; in Williams v. Pearson, 38 Ala. 2!J!J,
named were "all the
where the beneficiaries
paupers and poor children of two designated
'lieats,' whose parents were not able to support them;" in Howard v. American Peace
.Soc, 49 Me. 288, where the gift was to the
suffering poor of the town of Auburn.
Where a legacy is given to tri;stees to distribute In charity, and they all die in the
life-time of the testator, yet the legacy will
2 Story, Eq. .Jur. §
be enforced in equity.
An extended collection of eases on the
1166.
general subject may be found in note to
Hesketh v. Murphy, 35 N. .1. Eq. 23, and in
1 Jarm. Wills, 403, in note.
ilr. Perry sums up, as the result of the
principles and authorities, that "a bequest
*
* * or to the
for charity generally,
poor generally, or to charity generally, with
will not be carried
no trustees appointed,
into effect by the courts in this cotmtry."
PenT, Trusts, § 729.
That "if a testator
makes a general and indefinite bequest to
charity, or to the poor, or to religion, and
appoints no trustee, but plainly refers such
appointment to the court, there would seem
to be no impropriety in the court appointing
a trustee according to the plain intent of the
donor, leaving such trustee to find his power
But if a testator
in the will of the donor.
makes a vague and indefinite gift to charity,
and names no trustee, and gives no power
to the court to appoint one, there is no power in the American courts to administer such

an inchoate and imperfect gift."
Id. § 731.
Tliat "it is immaterial how uncertain the
beneficiaries
or objects are, if the court, by
a true construction of the instrument, has
power to appoint trustees to exercise the discretion or power of making the beneficiaries
as certain as the nature of the trust requires
them to be."
Id. § 732. See, also, 2 Story,

Eq. Jur.

In

§ 1169.

the present case the testatrix appoints
no trustee to distribute the fund, but expressly refers its distribution to a court (,
chancery.
The power of distribution, in our
opinion, carries with it the power to select
the individuals to whom distribution shall be
made.
The trustee appointed by the court
to make the distribution will have the incidental power to select the beneficiaries,
so
that the case stands the same as if the testatrix herself had appointed a trustee to distribute the fund. The trustee to be appointed by the court will, in effect, be a trustee
of her appointment made through the coiu't
of chancery.
Courts incline strongly in favor of charitable gifts, and take special care to enforce
As obsei-ved by ilr. Perry (section
thom.
are said to come
087), charitable bequests
v\ithin that department
of human affairs
where the maxim ut res magis valeat quam
pereat has been, and should be, applied; and,
further (section (190), that until the statute of
distributions (22 Car. II. c. 13) was enacted,
the ordinary was obliged to apply a portion
of every intestate estate to charity, on the
ground tliat there was a general principle of
piety and charity in every man. This shows
the favor in which charity is held in the
law. There is to be the most liberal construction of the donor's intention in support
of a charitable donation.
Charities have always received a more liberal construction
than the laAv will allow in gifts to individuals. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § llf;5.
The charity here is not A'ague and indefinite, but quite specific,— to the worthy poor
of the city of La Salle.
Individuals of the
class named will ever be readily found to
whom the fund may be distributed.
The
trust is not difficult of execution according
to the intention of the testatrix. Instead of
herself naming a trustee to make the distribution of her bequest, the testatrix preferred that the distribution should be made
by a court of chancery, whose peculiar province it is to effect the administration of
trusts, and especially
trusts.
charitable
There can be no doubt that the execution of
the trust by such court would be to effectuate the donor's Intention, the aim which Is
always sought to be accomplished.
Under the principles and the strong current of authorities which are properly applicable, we are fully satirried that the bequest
in question is a valid charitable gift, and
that it should be carried into effect by a
court of chancery, as the testatrix expressly
The residuary
willed that it should
be.
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clause of the codicil being held valid, it follows that the complainants take nothing as
heirs at law, and are not entitled to maintain their bill. The decree of the circuit
court will be reversed, and the cause remanded to that court with directions to dismiss the bill. Decree reversed.

SCHOLFIELD, J. (dissenting).
I do not
concur in this opinion.
I hold that courts of
equity in this state exercise no prerogative
powers, but, as contradistinguished therefrom, only judicial powers; that, not exerHUTCH.& BUNK.BQ.— 28
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cising prerogative powers, the court could
not, by the act of the individual, be, and
here is not, invested with a power not judicial, namely, that of selecting or designating the "worthy poor" to be the recipients of
the testatrix's bounty; and that, since it has
not been and could not be invested with such
power, it cannot appoint and invest a trusI concede the testatrix
tee with such power.
might have invested a trustee with such
power, leaving and directing the court to appoint the trustee; but that is a very different

case.
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SKBLLENGER'S

EX'RS v. SKELLENEX'R.

GBR'S

(32 N.

J.

Eq. 659.)

Court of Chancery

of New
Term, 1880.

Jersey.

May

Alfred Mills, for complainants.
George T.
Wert and George W. Forsyth, for next of
kin. Edward C. Lyon, for executor of Hannah

Skellenger,

deceased.

THE VICE CHANCELLOR. This is a bill
for direction.
The complainants,
as the executors of Daniel Skellenger,
deceased, ask
direction as to what they shall do with certain moneys belonging to their testator, not
disposed of by his will.
His estate consisted
entirely Of personalty. By his will, he first
gave all his estate to his wife, except his
moneys and securities
for the payment of
money, and then gave all the residue of his
estate to his executors, "to have and to hold
upon and subject to the following trusts, to
wit: upon trust to invest the same at interest, on good security, and the interest and
income thereof, after payment of taxes and
expenses attending investments,
annually to
pay to his (my) wife during her natural life,"
and, witliin six months after her death, to
pay from and out of the residue so directed
to be invested upon trust, several pecuniary
legacies of fixed amounts.
Xo other or further disposition of the residue is made. The
They never
testator's widow survived him.
had a child.
The widow is now dead. She
left a will. The complainants, after paying
all the legacies directed to be paid, have still
in hand over $1,700.
The will makes no disposition of the beneficial interest in this sum.
The legal title to it was given to the complainants to enable them to perform certain
trusts, but, the trusts having been fully performed without it, the question arises, what
shall be done with it, or who Is entitled to it?
There are three different claimants: first,
the executors, who claim the whole to the
second, the next of
exclusion of all others;
kin of the testator, who also claim the whole
in exclusion of the executors, and likewise
of the
to the exclusion of the representative
widow, and, third, the representative of the
widow, who claims a moiety of the fund.
At common law, an executor, by virtue of
is entitled to the whole of
his appointment,
the personal estate, and if, after the payment
of debts and legacies, any surplus remains,
2 Wms. Ex'rs,
it vests in him beneficially.
But this rule has never
1475, marg. note.
On the conprevailed in the United States.
trary, it has uniformly been held in this country that, if any part of the personal estate
happens to be undisposed of by the will, the
'
executor takes it, as trustee for those who
are entitled under the statute of distribution.
Story, Eq. Jur. §
1 Terry, Trusts, § 155;
1208.

No doctrine of equity jurisprudence is more
firmly established than that where personal
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is given by will to a trustee, upon
certain trusts, and the purposes of the trust
do not exhaust the whole estate, or tlie ti-usts
fail, either in whole or in part, by lapse or
otherwise, the trustee shall not take the surplus for his own benefit, unless such appears
to have been the intention of the testator,
but a trust results in favor of those who are
entitli^d under the statute of distribution as
Hill, Trusthe nait of kin of the testator.
tees, 113, mai'g. note; 1 Perry, Trusts, § 152;
2 Wms. Ex'rs, 1475, marg. note.
Where the
gift is made to the donee as trustee, or in
trust, without any words indicating an intention to confer a beneficial interest upon him,
the form of the gift will be considered conclusive against his right to take for his own
estate

benefit.

Hill,

Trustees,

114,

marg.

note;

1

Perry, Trusts, § 158. These authorities dispose of the claim of the complainants.
Technically, the testator did not die intesHe gave
tate as to any part of his estate.
the legal title of the whole to his executors.
They would have taken it anyhow, in virtue
of their office, if the will had contained no
But he did die intestate
express gift to them.
as to the beneficial interest in this fund. No
disposition was made of that.
This interest
is an equitable estate, and, as such, is entitled, in equity, to be considered, to all inSuch
tents and purposes, as a legal estate.
estates, in equity, are subject to the same
incidents,

properties

and

consequences

that

similar legal estates are at law, and are transGushing v.
missible in the same manner.
Blake, 30 N. J. Eq. 695. The income of this
fund passed by the will, but no beneficial interest in the corpus itself. As to that the
will is silent and inoperative, and it therefore
stood, on the testator's death, in exactly the
same condition that it would if he had left
As to that it must be declared, as
uo will.
a matter of law, that he had no will.
This being so, it would seem to follow, as
a necessary sequence, that the widow was
As
entitled to participate in its distribution.
a general rule, the right of the distributees
on the death of the intesvests immediately
tate.
But it is contended that our statute
was intended to regulate distribution only
in cases of total intestacy, and has no application to a case of partial intestacy. This
argument, however, proves too much, for, if
sound, it will exclude the next of kin quite
as effectually as the widow.
The right of
distribution is not a common-law right, but
Originally the ordidepends upon statute.
nary took the whole surplus for pious uses.
To cure this wrong, parliament took away
the right of the ordinary, and gave it, by
statute, to the widow and next of kin. They
hold under the same grant, and one cannot
In the words
take unless the other does also.
of Chief Justice Shaw, uttered in a case
identical in all material points with the one
under consideration,
"the same provision in
the statute of distribution which gives property not disposed of by will, where there is

RESULTING
a win, to the next of kin, gives a distributive
share to the wldov?." Nlekerson v. Bowly,
8 Mete. (Mass.) 430.
It Is also Insisted that the widow should
not be permitted to take any part of this
fund, because It is apparent, upon the face
of the will, that the testator Intended she
should not. This Intention, it is said, must
be Inferred from the fact that he gave her
the use of the whole during her life, and he
could not, therefore, have intended that she
should take a part absolutely. In other
words, having given her a part by express
words, it must necessarily be Inferred that he
did not intend she should have any more.
This argument, it will be observed, proceeds
upon the assumption
that the right of distribution Is to be regulated by the intention
of the testator.
But this, I think, is a mistalkie.
The Intention of the testator is to
govern only so far as he has declared it by
his will. With regard to that part of his
property which his will did not pass, it must
be declared he had no will, and therefore
the court cannot know his intention concerning It. The next of kin cannot take until
intestacy is found, and then they take, not
in pursuance of the testator's intention, but
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by force of law, regardless of what Ms InUpon this point. Chief Justentions were.
tice Shaw, in the case already cited, says:
"If It were thought Important to Inquire into
the intent of the deceased, when he has made
a will, but left property undisposed of, either
in terms or by implication, as every man Is
presumed to know the law. It may reasonably be inferred as his intention that the
residue should be disposed of according to
law."
The rule upon this subject Is settled.
It
has recently been adjudged by this court that
where a testator dies intestate as to part of
his estate, in consequence of the lapsing of
a legacy, his vyidow is entitled to a distributive share of It, though she had accepted the provision made for her in lieu of
dower, by the will.
Handy v. Marcy, 28 N.
J. Eq. 59. The other pertinent authorities
are Davers v. Dewes, 3 P. Wms. 40; Dicks
V. Lambert, 4 Ves. 725; Oldham v. Carleton,
2 Cox, 399; Ex parte Kempton, 23 Pick. 163;
Dale V. Johnson, 3 Allen, 364.
The decree will direct the complainants to
pay one moiety of the fund to the representative of the widow, and the other to the next
of kin of the testator.
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BOND

et al. v.

MOORE

et al.

(90 N. C. 239.)

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Feb. Term,

1884.

Civil action tried at fall term, 1883, of
superior court,
Chowan county; Avery,
Judge.
John M. Jones, owning the lot of land in
the town of Edenton described in the complaint, and the recovery of possession of which
is the object of this action, on February 9,
1866, conveyed
the same by deed executed
by himself of the first part, Thomas W.
Hudglns of the second, and Martha A. Jones,
his wife, of the third part, to the said Thomas W. Hudgins in fee upon the following declared trusts:
1. That the said trustee shall at any time
to such
convey the said lot and Improvements
person as the said party of the third part
shall direct in writing attested by one witness.

2. That he will convey said lot and improvements to such person as the said party
of the third part shall give or devise the
same to, by last will and testament, or by
an appointment in the nature of one, which
iwwer to make a will or appointment in the
nature of one is expressly conferred upon the
said party of the third part, notwithstanding
her coverture.
3. Upon the death of the party of the first
part, he will convey the said lot and improvements
to the said party of the third
part.
4. Upon the death of the party of the third
part without having made a last will and
in the nature of
testament or appointment
one, he will convey the said lot and improvements to the party or parties entitled by the

laws of North Carolina.
0. The party of the first part shall occupy
or rent out the lot and improvements for his
own use during the joint lives of himself
and the party of the third part, unless the
same shall be sooner sold by her order.
These
declarations
of the trusts upon
which the trustee was to hold are preceded
by recitals in the deed, which in substance
state that the said Martha A. had theretofore united with her said husband in the
sale and conveyance
of certain lots owned
by her previous to her marriage, the purchase money whereof he had received, under an arrangement
by which he agreed to
convey the lot herein described "to a trustee for the use of the party of the third part
and upon the trusts hereinafter declared."
The said Martha died before her husband,
without heirs, having made no disposition of
the estate under the forms conferred in the
deed, by deed, will or other writing.
John M. Jones, her survivor, died In 1879,
leaving a will, wherein the plaintiff Bond is
named executor and the other plaintiffs are
the devisees.
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The trustee died In 1872, Intestate, and the
defendants, other than the defendant Jloore,
who is in possession of the lot, are his heirs
at law.
The defendant Moore claims the lot by virtue of a judgment against the university, an
execution Issued thereon, a sale and a sheriff's deed to him.
The relief demanded is a recovery of the
possession and damages for detention against
Moore, and a judgment against the other defendants requiring a conveyance of the legal
title.
The defendants demur to the complaint,
and the demurrer being overruled and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs they appeal.
Pruden & Bunch, for plaintiffs.
for defendants.

W. A.

Moore,

O. J. (after stating the case).
The
to be decided arises from the construction of the deed, and is whether au
equitable estate in remainder vests In the
plaintiffs, entitling them to demand a conveyance of the legal estate from the heirs at
law of the trustee and possession from the
defendant Moore.
It is not important to consider the force
and effect of the terms used in the declaration of the trust in favor of the wife, and the
necessity of words of inheritance to enlarge
an estate for life into a fee.
This trust is,
as are the otliers, executory, and not an executed trust,— created by a direction to the
trustee to convey,— not itself a conveyance;
and the same technical rules of construction
do not prevail in interpreting both. When the
trustee is required to act in execution of the
trust, in order to effectuate the expressed
purpose of the instrument, that purpose is
ascertained by employing the ordinary rules
of inteiT3retation; and a direction to convey
the lot in the absence of restriction or qualifying words, when applied to instructions
given to the trustee, is a direction to convey
the full estate vested in him, and the trust
consists in the right to have it performed.
In the latter case the intent is ascertained
by giving a fair and reasonable meaning to
the language in which it is expressed, and in
this sense the trust is enforced.
This is the
distinction taken in Levy v. Griffls, 65 N. 0.
236, and is warranted in Holmes v. Holmes,
86 N. C. 206.
But it is a settled rule in the interpretation of written Instruments to look to other
provisions for light to guide in arriving at
the meaning of any doubtful clause.
In applying the rule, we think It plainly appears
that a life estate only was intended to be
secured to the wife, associated with a power
of disposition of the whole estate, by a written
instrument in the form prescribed.
The recitals in the deed show that it is drawn in
of the agreement between Jones
pursuance
and his wife, and in precise fulfillment of its

SMITH,

question

RE&ULTING
terms; for it declares the promise to liave
been to convey tlie lot to a trustee for her
use "upon the trusts hereinafter declared."
Among the trusts enumerated, the third undertakes to provide for the contingency of the
death of the wife without having exercised
the power conferred, clearly contemplating a
remainder and limiting her estate under a
clause for the term of her life.
preceding
Nor is it material whether this final limitation of the trust estate is effectual or inoperative by reason of an insufficient description of the party to take under it. In either
case the clause subserves the same purpose
in showing the character and extent of the
estate secured to the wife.
Her death, then, without her having exercised, the dispositive power, her husband still
being alive, and his estate also becoming extinct, which endured only during their joint
upon
lives, presents
the very contingency
whose happening the trustee is required to
convey "to the party or parties entitled by
the laws of North Carolina." Who is the
party meant?
The plaintiffs appropriate this
designation to the grantor, the defendants to
the heirs of the wife, and there being none,
to the university substituted in their place under the law of escheat.
In our opinion, the words do not and were
not intended to point out any particular persons to take the inheritance remaining, but
to leave it to pass under the law as undisThey show such estate,
posed of property.
depending on a contingency, to have been in
the mind of the grantor as capable of subsisting beyond the life of the wife and of his
own, and to place it under the control of the
law.
of the
This being the proper construction
principles, the
clause upon well established
undisposed of remainder was freed from the
intervening life estate in the wife, became
united with the then expiring life estate of
the .husband, and he became the equitable
owner of the entire inheritance.
"Another form in which a resulting trust
"is
says Mr. Justice Story,
may appear,"
where there are certain trusts, created either
by deed or will, which fail in whole or part,
or which are of such an indefinite nature that
courts of equity will not carry them into
effect, or which are illegal in their nature or

TRUSTS,

437

character,
or which are fully executed and
In all
residuum.
yet leave an unexhausted
such cases there will arise a resulting trust
to the party creating the trust, or to his heirs
as the case may reor legal representatives,
quire." 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1106a; Lewiu,
Trusts, 175; Mosely v. Mosely, 87 N. 0. 69;

Robinson v. McDiarmid, Id. 455.
But the defendants contend that inasmuch
as the husband was permitted to receive the
purchase money of the wife's land, under his
agreement to convey his lot in trust for her,
of
this money constitutes the consideration
his deed and the trust arises to her. The
rule which raises a trust in favor of one
whose money was used in payment for land
bought, has no application to the facts of the
present case. The deed to which she consents in becoming a party contains all the
trusts, and, in the very form he agreed to
make and secure to her, the full fruits of his
He stipulates to make precisely
contract.
such a conveyance, and with such declaration
of trusts as are found in the present deed.
This exhausts her equity in the premises.
Her money is the consideration of, and given
for, the interests and benefits secured to her
in its provisions, and for no other portion of
the trust estate.
The land was her husand whatever estate reband's, not her's;
mains after all the trusts in her behalf have
This
been executed, must be vested in him.
does not belong to the class of cases in
which the purchase money of one party has
been used and the title to the land conveyed
to auQther.

"The doctrine," remarks the same author,
"is strictly limited to cases in which the purchase has been made in the name of one

money has been
person and the purchase
paid by another." 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1201a.
The authorities cited in the argument sustain this view of the law. Unless the constructive trust was raised in such case, a
successful fraud would be perpetrated by the
King v. Weeks, 70 N. C. 372; Cungrantee.
ningham V. Bell, 83 N. 0. 328; Kisler v. Kisler, 27 Am. Dec. 308.
We therefore affirm the judgment overruling the demurrer, and remand the cause to
be proceeded with in the court below.
No error.

Affirmed.
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GOULD

V.

LTXDE

et ai.

(114 Mass. 366.)

Supreme

Court

of Massachusetts.

Jan. Term,

1874.

W.

P.

Sweetser

T.
Harding, for defendants.
& W. B. Stevens, for plaintiff.

H.

ENDICOTT, J. It is conceded by the plaintiff that there was no express trust upon
which the conveyances were made, the alleged

agreement

between

the

parties

being

oral; but it is claimed, that a resulting trust
to the plaintiff arises out of the transaction.
The rule that on a voluntary conveyance
without consideration a trust results to the
grantor was confined to common law conveyances, and does not apply to modern conveyances in common form, with recitals of consideration, to the use of the grantee and his
heirs.
Such deeds to a stranger, and a fortiori when the purpose of the grant is to convey to a wife, exclude any resulting trust to
the grantor.
The distinction between such a conveyance
and a conveyance to a third party where another furnishes the money to whom a trust

TRUSTS.
results, he not
and covenants
lished by our
tion.
Walker

being estopped by the recitals
of the deed, is too well estabauthorities to require illustrav. Locke, 5 Gush. 90; Whitten
V. Whitten, 3 Gush. 191; Bartlett v. BarUett,
14 Gray, 277; Titcomb v. Morrill, 10 Allen, 15;
Blodgett V. Hildreth, 103 Mass. 484; Cairns
V. Colburn, 104 Mass. 274; Peirce v. Colcord,
113 Mass. 372; Perry, Trusts, §§ 161, 162, and
cases cited.
The subsequent agreement, or attempt by
the wife to convey, does not affect the question, as a trust must result, if at all, the inBarnard v. Jewett, 97
stant the deed passes.
Mass. 87.
The wife therefore held the estate, subject
to no trust for the use and benefit of the
plaintiff, and the respondents cannot be called upon to release and assign to him any title
they may have therein, as her heirs at law.
The statute is peremptory that no conveyance of real estate by a married woman shall
be valid without the assent of her husband in
writing, or his joining with her In the conveyance.
Gen. St. c. 108, § 3. As the plaintifC's wife made the deed to Wiley without
such assent or joinder no title passed.
Demurrer sustained; bill dismissed.

RESULTING
BOTSFORD
(2

V.

Johns. Ch.

BURR.
405.)

Court of Chancery of New York. 1817.
The bill, filed March the 9th, 1815, stated,
that the plaintiff, on the first of May, 1813,
applied to the defendant for the loan of 900
dollars, to which the defendant agreed, provided he was permitted to purchase in a
farm of the plaintiff, bought by him of S.
Skidmore, subject to a mortgage given by
Skidmore to J. Bogardus, and which was advertised
for sale under that mortgage, as
security for the payment of the loan. That
the defendant accordingly purchased
the
farm. That the plaintiff had made an agreement to purchase
of Peter Blmendorf, lot
No. 3, lying opposite to the farm of the plaintiff, for 3,C00 dollars; that the defendant
consented to assume this contract, and become responsible
to Elmendorf for the purchase money.
That this lot was accordingly
who executed a
conveyed to the defendant,
mortgage
to Elmendorf, to secure the purchase money.
That part of the purchase
money, being 500 dollars, was to be paid
down, to make up which sum, the plaintiff
advanced to the defendant 90 dollars; that
he also endorsed to the defendant a note of
Edmund Bruyn, dated 10th of March, 1809,
for 1,150 dollars, as security for the plaintiff's advances and responsibilities; and the
amount of which note the defendant afterwards recovered.
That the defendant has
since sold the property for 7,000 dollars.
The bill prayed for an account, and that the
defendant might be decreed to pay over to
him the balance, after deducting his advances, &c. and that he assigii over to the plaintiff the securities taken, &c.
The defendant,
in his answer,
admitted
that the plaintiff applied to him for a loan
of about 900 dollars to pay off the mortgage
on his farm, then advertised for sale.
The
defendant refused to lend the money, but
offered to purchase the farm, and that if the
plaintiff repaid the money and Interest, and
the costs and charges. In one month thereafter, the defendant would reconvey to him
the farm, but on no other condition whatever. That on the 20th of May, 1813, he purchased the property (the Bogardus farm) at
auction,
being the highest bidder, for 930
dollars, which he paid to the mortgagee, and
He admitted the verbal
received his deed.
agreement between the plaintiff and Elmendorf, but the plaintiff being embarrassed, Elmendorf applied to the defendant to purchase
the lot No. 3, and he accordingly made the
purchase, for 3,600 dollars, with a view to
secure to himself certain advantages for pine
timber and a mill dam, &c. essential to the
Bogardus farm, and for no other object or
benefit, and without any understanding,
express or implied, with the plaintiff.
The
deed was dated 1st of May, 1818, but executed the 28th of .Tune; that to make up
500 dollars to be paid to Elmendorf, the de-
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fendant borrowed of the plaintiff 90 dollars,
AAhich was not understood
to be any part of
the purchase money, or to give the plaintiff
any interest
in the purchase, which was
benefit, and
made solely for the defendant's
or implied,
without any trust, expressed
whatever. For the residue of the pm-chaae
money, he executed a mortgage to Elmendorf, which had been paid off.
That the
plaintiff' was insolvent, and had committed
waste on the premises;
that in the fall of
to have
1813,
the plaintiff being desirous
some part of the property,
tlie defendant
told him, if he would pay 100 dollars monthly, he would convey to him some part of the
Bogardus farm, in proportion to the money
paid; but that if the plaintiff failed, the deThat
fendant would enter on the premises.
on the 30th of December, 1813, the plaintiff
formally assigned to the defendant, the note
of E. Bruyn, as an Indemnity for the waste
committed, and for boards of the defendant
sold by the plaintiff, and agreed to pay 100
dollars a month, and if he failed to do so,
The
there was to be an end of the business.
defendant recovered the amount of the note;
but the plaintiff never paid a single sum according to the agreement.
The assignment
of the note expressed the consideration to be
the amount of the note paid by the defendant to the plaintiff.
That on the 31st of
January, 1814, he contracted
to sell the
whole property, on both farms, for 7,000 dollars, but no conveyance had been executed;
and he sold it in his own right, and for his
own use, without any reference to the plaintiff, or any agreement with him.
The material parts of the evidence are
stated in the judgment of the court.
R. Tillotson, for plaintiff.

Mr. Sudam, for

respondent.

THE CHANCELLOR.
The bill proceeds
on the assumed fact that the defendant purchased the Bogardus farm, and the Blmendorf lot, as trustee for the plaintiff, and took
the deeds in his own name, by agreement
between them, for his better security and
indemnity, as he was obliged to advance, or
become bound for nearly the whole of the
consideration money.
The defendant is,
therefore,
called on, as trustee, to account
for the proceeds of the subsequent sale of
the lands, after being credited for the advances which he has been obliged to make,
together with a reasonable allowance for his
services as the plaintiff's agent.
But as the defendant purchased, at public
auction, what is called the Bogardus farm,
and took the deed in his own name, and paid
his own money;
and as he purchased,
at
private sale, the Elmendorf lot, and paid
part of the purchase money, principally with
his own funds, and gave his bond and mortgage for the residue; and as both these purchases were made with the knowledge and
assent of the plaintiff. It will be somewhat

uo
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difficult to raise a trust In favour of the
plaintiff, witbout violating the statute of
frauds.
The statute (session 10, c. 44, §§
12, 13) declares,
"That all declarations, or
creations
of trusts, or confidences of any
lands, &(■., shall be manifested
and proved
liy some writing signed by the party, vyho is,
or shall be, by law, enabled to declare such
trust, or else they shall be utterly void."
The statute, however, excepts the case where
"any conveyance shall be made of any lands,
&c., by which a trust, or confidence, shall
arise, or result, by implication or construction of law."
It is well settled that such a resulting trust
may be established
This
by parol proof.
point was fully considered in Boyd v. llcI^ean, 1 Johns. Ch. .':>82. The only real doubt
or controversy,
in this case, is, whether the
facts make out a resulting trust under the
If A. purchases an estate with his
statute.
own money, and takes the deed in the name
of B., a trust results to A., because he paid
The T\hole foundation of the
the money.
trust is the payment of the money, and that
"\\'illis v. Willis. 2
must be clearly proved.
Atk. 71. If, therefore, the party who sets
up a resulting trust made no payment, he
cannot be permitted to show, by parol proof,
that the purchase was made for his benefit, or
on his account.
This would be to overturn
the statute of frauds, and so it was ruled by
Lord Keeper Henley, in the case of Bartlett
v. Pickersgill, 4 l>:ast, 577, note; Hughes v.
Moore, 7 Cranch, 17(i.
The plaintiff does not pretend, in this case,
to have paid any part of the consideration,
for the purchase by the defendant, at auction,
The defendant purof the Bogardus farm.
chased that farm for 930 dollars, and paid the
without any advance from
money himself,
the plaintiff. There is then no pretext for setting up a resulting trust here, and all parol
The
proof, for that purpose, is inadmissible.
conveyance by Bogardus, the mortgagee, and
the payment of the purchase money by the
completed the contract;
and no
defendant,
parol proof of parol declarations, inconsistent
with the deed, can be received. To admit it,
would be repealing the statute of frauds, and
would endanger the security of real property
resting on title by deed. Nor would a subsequent advance of money to the purchaser,
after the purchase is thus complete and endIt might be evidence of a
ed, alter the case.
new loan, or be the ground of some new
agreement, but it would not attach, by relation, a trust to the original purchase; for the
tmst arises out of the circumstance that the
moneys of the real, and not of the nominal
purchaser, formed, at the time, the consideration of that purchase, and became converted
into the land.
The only money that the plaintiff alleges he
advanced was 90 dollars, at the time of the
purchase of the Elmendorf lot, and this, he
says, was part of the 500 dollars paid by the
It is
defendant on receiving the conveyance.
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not pretended, that any further payment was
made by the plaintiff at the time of the purchase, though it is alleged, that, some time
afterwards, he assigned over to the defendant
the note of Edmund Bruyn, in furtherance of
the same object.
A doubt has been suggested In the books,
whether a resulting trust can be sustained,
where only a part of the consideration
was
paid by the party claiming to be cestuy que
Lord Hardwicke held that it could not,
trust.
according to the case of Crop v. Norton, 2
Atk. 74, 9 Mod. 2a;!.
He there said, that
where the purchase money was paid by one,
and the conveyance taken in the name of another, there was a resulting trust for the person who paid the money, but that this was
where "the whole purchase money" was paid
by one person, and that he never knew it to
be so, where the consideration
moved from
He, accordingly,
several persons.
held, that
as only part of the consideration, in that case,
moved from N., there was no resulting trust
in him.
I doubt whether this case is to be
understood to apply;
and it cannot be received as correct, where only a single individual claims the benefit of the trust; for the
cases recognize the trust where the money
of A. formed only a part of the consideration
of the land purchased in the name of B. The
land, in such case, is to be charged pro tanto.
This seems to be the language of the case of
Ryal V. Ryal, 1 Atk. 59, Amb. 413, and of
Bartlett v. Pickersgill, already referred to.
So, also, in Lane v. Dighton,
Amb. 409, only
part of the consideration
of the purchase
arose from trust moneys, and yet the decree
followed the money into the land. This is the
most reasonable application of the rule; and,
in the late case of Wray v. Steele, 2 Ves. &
B. 388, the vice chancellor held, that there
might be a resulting trust by a joint advance,
by two or more, upon a purchase in the name
of one, and that there was no reason for confining the advance to a single individual, to
constitute a resulting trust.
He did not believe that Lord Hardwicke, ever used the dictum imputed to him in Crop v. Norton, 2 Atk.
74, 9 Mod. 233.
We will now examine the proof of the payments charged to have been made by the

plaintiff.
The defendant, in his answer, admits the
loan of the 90 dollars, to make up the first
of the 500 dollars to Elmendorf.
payment
He says, it was simply a loan, and not advanced as a payment by the plaintiff of any
part of the consideration.
The plaintiff's
vntnesses,
Hixson
and
Couch, say, that these 80 dollars, or 90 dollars, were advanced by the plaintiff, on account of the purchase under the mortgage
sale; one of them says, he was present at
the sale under the mortgage, and that the
defendant then told him that the plaintiff had,
on that day, advanced him the 80 dollars on
account of the purchase.
It will be recollected, that this sale, under the mortgage of the
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Bogardus farm, was on the 12th of May, and
the purchase from Blmendorf, on the 28th of
June, and that the plaintiff charges, and the
defendant admits, that the advance of the 80
dollars, or 90 dollars, was at the latter purchase. None is pretended to have been made
at the former purchase, and yet these witnesses fix, with so much precision, the advance at that time.
This is a remarkable instance of the inaccuracy and fallacy of parol
testimony, and shows the great danger there
is of giving much latitude to these imphed
trusts, founded on naked declarations,
in opposition to the solemnity and certainty of
written documents.
Another witness (Wm. Doll) says, he heard
acknowledge
the defendant
the receipt
of
from 80 to 100 dollars from the plaintiff, "on
This is too loose
account of their contracts."
Henry
and general to be of much weight.
Upham is the only witness who directly supports the allegation in the bill. He says the
defendant told him, in the autumn of 1803,
that "he had received 80 dollars of the
plaintiff, towards purchasing the Elmendorf
lot." Here is an inaccuracy in this witness:
for both parties admit, that the sum advanced in aid of that purchase, was 90 dollars;
but the question still arises, was the money
or as
advanced as a loan to the defendant,
a payment, pro tanto, by the plaintiff to the
have stated
vendor.
The testimony which
as to this point (and it is all there is) is exThere was, no doubt, an
tremely imperfect.
advance by the plaintiff of 90 dollars, at the
time of the purchase of the Elmendorf lot,
but whether it was advanced to accommodate
the defendant, or as payment of so much by
the plaintiff to the vendor, through the agency of the defendant, is a point not clearly asAll the proof seems to consist of
certained.
yet those conconfessions of the defendant;
fessions will, most of them, apply as well to
He
the pretence on one side as on the other.
received 90 dollars of the plaintiff towards
paying for the Elmendorf lot; but it is still
uncertain whether it was considered as an
advance by the plaintiff towards the purchase, on his own, or on the defendant's account.
It is dangerous to trust to such inaccurate witnesses, as those who testify conof
The observation
cerning this payment.
Sir Wm. Grant, 10 Ves. 517, is very applicable to this case, and he was speaking on a
"The witness swears to no
similar point.
fact or circumstance, capable of being investigated or contradicted, but merely to a naked
declaration of the purchaser, admitting that
the purchase was made with the trust money.
That is, in all cases, most unsatisfactory evidence, on account of the facility with which
it may be fabricated, and the impossibility
Besides,
the slightest
of contradicting it.
mistake or failure of recollection, may totally
alter the effect of the declaration."
The situation of the parties, at the time,
is sufficient to throw doubt on the suggestion,
that the 90 dollars were advanced by the
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plaintiff, as part payment of a purchase actually made on his account.
He was, at the
time, absolutely insolvent, and could not pay
a debt of 50 dollars, which he owed to anHe had not been able, a few
other person.
to redeem a
weeks before that purchase,
farm, with its mills, for 930 dollars, but suffered the same to be purchased by the dewithout any payment on his part.
fendant,
The Elmendorf lot was then purchased for
3,600 dollars, and of which sum 500 dollars
The plaintiff
were to be paid immediately.
was utterly unable to engage in this purchase.
Is it then probable that, under all these circumstances, 90 dollars would be seriously considered, by either party, as paid by the plaintiff on his own account, or that the purchase
was made for his benefit?
But the plaintiff, on the 30th of December,
after the pur1813, which was six months
chase of the Elmendorf lot, assigned to the
defendant a note against Edmund Bruyn;
and this is put forward as a payment of
part of the purchase money, from which the
resulting trust was to arise.
The bill charges, that the note was en"as a security for
dorsed to the defendant,
the advances and responsibilities entered into by the defendant for the plaintiff';" and
it says, afterwards, that it was "for the
purpose of procuring a reconveyance
or assignment of the said farm, so bid off at
public auction by the defendant, and of the
lot No. 3, purchased of Elmendorf."
It is not easy to reconcile these distinct
reasons, stated in the bill, for the assignment of the note; but if we adopt either of
them as the true reason. It does not appear
that the note was assigned, truly and distinctly, as a part payment, by the plaintiff,
of the purchase money belonging to the vendor, upon either of the sales.
The note affords no ground for a resulting trust springing out of the purchase of either farm by
the defendant, because such a trust arises
only from the paj'ment, originally, of the
purchase money (or, at least, a part of it)
by the party setting up the trust. The assignment of this note was an after thought
and transaction: and, according to the latter
in the bill, it was made
reason mentioned
for the purpose of procuring a reconveyance,
a matter entirely distinct from the trust we
are considering.
The answer of the defendant puts the assignment of the note on other
ground.
It was made "as an indemnity for
the waste committed on the property by the
plaintiff, and for the boards belonging to the
defendant (which had been sold by the
plaintiff), and in order to induce the defendant to give to the plaintiff the only opportunity he required of making some payment,
so as to induce the defendant voluntarily to
convey to him some part of the tract purchased under the mortgage sale."
The plaintiff's witnesses who speak of this
note, give a different reason for the assignment, and one not exactly consistent with
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the allegations of either party.
Hixsan says,
it was assigned "on account of moneys advanced by the defendant for the plaintiff,
on the purchase of both the farms."
It does
not appear how the witness came to the
Icnowledge of this fact; and considering his
great Inaccuracy on another point, as
have
already shown, we cannot place much reliance upon the correctness of this assertion,

I

unaccompanied with any reason or authority
for making it. But assuming the fact as
stated (and we may do it with the more
safety, since Upham. another witness, testifies to the same fact, as coming to him
from the repeated acknowledgments of the
defendant) the assignment of the note, even
for such a purpose, cannot raise a trust out
of either of the conveyances to the defendant.
The trust must have been coeval with
the deeds, or it cannot exist at all. After
a party has made a purchase with his own
tender, or
moneys or credit, a subsequent
even reimbursement, may be evidence
of
some other contract, or the ground for some
other relief, but it cannot, by any retrospective effect, produce the trust of which
we are speaking.
There never was an instance of such a trust so created, and there
never ought to be, for it would destroy all
the certainty and security of conveyances of
real estate. The resulting trust, not within
the statute of frauds, and which may be
shown without writing, is when the purchase is made with the proper moneys of
the cestuy que ti'ust, and the deed not taken
in his name.
The trust results from the
original transaction, at the time it takes
place, and at no other time; and it is founded on the actual payment of money, and on
no other ground.
It cannot be mingled or
confounded with any subsequent dealings
whatever. They are to be governed by different principles, and the doctrine of a resulting trust would be mischievous and dangerous, if we once departed from the simplicity of this rule. It is a very questionable
doctrine, in the view of policy, even under
this limitation; and it has been admitted
with great caution, as is manifest from the
cases which were reviewed in Boyd v. McLean, 1 Johns. Ch. 582.
But there is an objection to the parol
proof, in respect to the assignment of the
It was assigned to the defendant by
note.
a very formal instrument under seal, and,
as the Instrument stated, "in consideration
of the said sum of money now due on said
note, and to him in hand paid by the deThe parties were concluded by
fendant."
this deed from setting up a different consideration, except upon the allegation of
fraud, mistake, or surprise. 1 Johns. Ch. p.
429.
On no other ground can a deed be contradicted by parol proof. We must take the
consideration to be what it is stated to be
in the assignment, except so far as the defendant has admitted, in his answer, a differand that admission in
ent consideration;
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this case, even if we join with it the admission of the plaintiff, is of no use as to
the charge of a resulting trust.
We are, then, brought to this conclusion,
that the defendant was not, in any respect,
a trustee to the plaintiff in the purchase of
the Bogardus farm; and that he was not a
trustee in the purchase of the Elmendorf
lot, unless in a very small degree, or in the
ratio that 90 dollars bear to 3,600.
If the
payment of part of the consideration raises
a trust, it, certainly, cannot raise it beyond
the proportion of the money paid.
It can
only be a charge, as one of the cases expresses it, pro tanto; and in this case the
trust, even if admitted, is to so inconsiderable an amount, as not to be worth contending for. The difference between the 90 dollars with interest, considered as a loan, and
a rateable proportion of the price for which
the Elmendorf lot was sold by the defendant, is very immaterial.
But if the plaintiff is entitled to pursue that sum into the
land, the smallness of the demand will not
be an obstacle.
The proof of the payment
of the 90 dollars by the plaintiff, as a part
of the purchase money, is not, however, satisfactory; and if it was, there is evidence
that the plaintiff afterwards discharged the
trust. It is well settled that parol evidence
is admissible to rebut a resulting trust.
If
the plaintiff, by his bill, sets up an equity
founded on parol proof, it may be rebutted,
put down, or discharged,
by parol proof.
Walker v. Walker, 2 Atk. 98; Lake v. Lake,
Amb. 126; Roe v. Popham, Doug. 24. There
may be a parol waiver even of a written
agreement.
Price v. Dyer, 17 Ves. 356.
Now, in this case, it is in proof that after
the sale of the Elmendorf lot by the defendant, the plaintiff disclaimed any right or
title to It. He declared to Wm. Tremper,
"that the defendant had sold the land to
Hendrickson and others, and made something by it. That the whole was the defendant's, and he had nothing to do with
It.
That he had failed in every one of his
contracts with the defendant; and that he
had no Interest in either of the said tracts
of land. That the defendant did with it as
he pleased, and that he had no claim on
the defendant,
unless the defendant chose
to give him something."
I am, accordingly, of opinion, that the
plaintiff has failed in charging the defendant as a trustee, in the purchase of either
of the tracts of land mentioned in the bill.
The defendant Is, therefore, bound to account for the 90 dollars, with interest, and
for the amount of the note assigned to him,
with Interest.
This is what he offered to
do by his answer.
But he claims likewise
the benefit of the consideration, for which
he admits the note to have been assigned,
and which was for waste committed on the
lands between the time of the purchase by
the defendant and the assignment of the
note, and for boards
of the defendant's
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which the plaintiff sold.
It appears, also,
hy the testimony of two of the witnesses
(Hixson and Upham), that after the purchase of the Elmendorf lot by the defendant, and before the sale by him, the plaintiff had made beneficial improvements upon
it; and as It appears that the plaintiff was
suffered
to continue in possession,
under
some indistinct encouragement
held out by
the defendant, that he might eventually become interested in the lands, it is equitable,
imder all the circumstances of this case, that
the plaintiff should have a reasonable allowance made him, for such beneficial and permanent improvements as he may have made
on the lands, between the time of the purchase and sale of the defendant,
as stated
in the pleadings.
I shall, accordingly, direct a reference to
a master, to take and state an account between the parties upon the following prin-
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That he compute the amoimt of
viz.
the loan of 90 doUars, and of the note assigned, with interest; that he ascertain, by
proof, the damages, if any, arising from
waste, committed by the plaintiff, or by his
direction, on any part of the lands, between
the time of the purchases and the sale thereof by the defendant; also the amount of
boards belonging to the defendant upon the
said lands, and sold, or otherwise converted
by the plaintiff; and that he further ascertain the value of the beneficial and lasting
if any, made by the plaintiff
improvements,
on either of the tracts of land, during the
also, what would be a
period aforesaid;
reasonable allowance to the defendant for
the use and occupation of the said lands by
All
the plaintiff, during the same period.
further questions are reserved until the coming in of the report.
Decree accordingly.
ciples,
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DYER

V.

DYER.

2 Cox, Ch. 92.
Nov. 27, 1788.
Court of Chancery.
In 1737 certain copyhold premises holden
of the manor of Heytesbury, in the county
of Wilts, were granted by the lord, according to the custom of that manor, to Simon
Dyer (the plaintiff's father), and Mary, his
wife, and the defendant William (his other
son), to take in succession
for their lives,
and to the longest liver of them. The purchase money was paid by Simon Dyer, the
father. He survived his wife, and lived until 1785, and then died, having made his
will, and thereby devised all his interest in
these copyhold premises (amongst others) to
the plaintiflf, his younger son. The present
bill stated these circumstances, and insisted
that the whole purchase money being paid
by the father, although, by the form of the
grant, the wife and the defendant had the
legal interest in the premises for their lives
in succession, yet in a court of equity they"
were but trustees for the father, and the bill
therefore prayed that the plaintiff, as devisee
of the father, might be quieted in the possession of the premises during the life of the
defendant.
The defendant insisted that the insertion
of his name in the grant operated as an advancement to him from his father to the extent of the legal interest thereby given to
him. And this was the whole question in
the cause. This case was very fully argued
by Mr. Solicitor General and Ainge for plaintiff, and by Burton & Morris, for defendant. The following cases were cited, and
very particularly commented on: Smith v.
Baker, 1 Atk. 385; Taylor v. Taylor, Id. 386;
Mumma v. Mumma, 2 Vern. 19; Howe v.
Howe, 1 Vern. 415; Anon., 1 Freem. Ch. 123;
Benger v. Drew, 1 P. Wms. 781; Dickinson
V. Shaw, before the lords commissioners in
1770; Bed well v. Froome, before Sir T.
Sewell, on the 10th May, 1778; Row v. Bowden before Sir L. Kenyon, siting for the lord
chancellor; Crisp v. Pratt, Cro. Car. 549;
Scroope

v. Scroope,

1 Ch.

Cas. 27;

Elliot

v.

Elliot, 2 Ch. Cas. 231; Ebrand v. Dancer, Id.
26; Kingdon v. Bridges, 2 Vern. 67; Back
Bundle v. Bundle, Id.
V. Andrew, Id. 120;
264; Lamplugh v. Lamplugh, 1 P. Wms.
Stileman v. Ashdown, 2 Atk. 480; Pole v.
Pole, 1 Ves. Sr. 76.

Ill;

LORD CHIEF BARON, after directing the
cause to stand over for a few days, delivered
the judgment of the court.
The question between the parties in this
cause Is whether the defendant is to be
considered as a trustee for his father in respect of his succession to the legal interest
of the copyhold premises in question, and
whether the plaintiff, as representative of
the father, Is now entitled to the benefit of
intimated my opinion of the
that trust.
question on the hearing of the cause, and
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then Indeed entertained very little doubt
upon the rule of a court of equity, as applied to this subject; but as so many cases
have been cited, some of which are not In
print, we thought it convenient to take an
opportunity of looking more fully Into them,
in order that the ground of our decision may
be put in as clear a light as possible, especially in a case in which so great a difference of opinion seems to have prevailed at
have met with a case in adthe bar. And
dition to those cited, which is that of Rumboll V. Rumboll, 2 Eden, 15, on the 20th
April, 1761. The clear result of all the cases,
without a single exception. Is that the trust
of a legal estate, whether freehold, copyhold,
or leasehold; whether taken in the names
of the purchasers and others jointly, or in
the name of others without that of the purchaser; whether in one name or several;
whether jointly or successive,— results to the
man who advances the purchase money.
This is a general proposition, supported by
all the cases, and there is nothing to contradict It; and it goes on a strict analogy
to the rule of the common law that, where a
feoffment is made without consideration, the
It is the estabuse results to the feoffer.
lished doctrine of a court of equity that this
resulting trust may be rebutted by circumThe cases go one step
stances in evidence.
further, and prove the circumstance of one or
more of the nominees, being a child or children of the purchaser, is to operate by rebutting the resulting trust; and It has been
determined in so many cases that the nominee, being a child, shall have such operation
that we
as a circumstance of evidence,
should be disturbing landmarks if we suffered either of these propositions to be called
in question, namely, that such circumstance
shall rebut the resulting trust, and that it
shall do so as a circumstance of evidence.
I think it would have been a more simple
doctrine if the children had been considered
as purchasers for a valuable consideration.
Natural love and affection raised a use at
common law. Surely, then, it will rebut a
trust resulting to the father. This way of
considering it would have shut out all the
circumstances of evidence which have found
their way into many of the cases, and would
have prevented some very nice distinctions,
Conand not very easy to be understood.
sidering it as a circumstance of evidence,
there must be, of course, evidence admitted
on the other side. Thus It was resolved into
a question of intent, which was getting into
a very wide sea, without very certain guides.
In the most simple case of all, which is that
of a father purchasing In the name of his
son, it is said that this shews the father intended an advancement, and therefore the
resulting trust is rebutted; but then a circumstance is added to this, namely, that
the son happened to be provided for. Then
the question is, did the father intend to advance a son already provided for? Lord Not-
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tlngham could not get over this, and he
ruled that in such a case the resulting trust
was not rebutted; and in Pole v. Pole, 1
Ves. Sr. 76, Lord Hardwicke thought so too;
and yet the rule in a court of equity as recognized In other cases is that the father is
the only judge as to the question of a son's
provision. That distinction, therefore, of
the son being provided for or not, is not
very solidly taken or uniformly adhered to.
It is then said that a purchase in the name
of a son is a prima facie advancement, and,
indeed, it seems difficult to put it in any
way. In some of the cases some circumstances have appeared which go pretty much
against that presumption, as where the father
has entered and kept possession, and taken
the rents; or where he has surrendered or
devised the estate; or where the son has
given receipts in the name of the father.
The answer given is that the father took the
rents as guardian of his son. Now, would
the court sustain a bill by the son against
the father for these rents? I should think it
pretty difficult to succeed in such a bill. As
to the surrender and devise, it is answered
that these are subsequent acts; whereas the
intention of the father in taking the purchase in the son's name must be proved by
concomitant acts; yet these are pretty
strong acts of ownership, and assert the
right, and coincide with the possession and
enjoyment. As to the son's giving receipts
in the name of the father, it is said that, the
son being under age, he could not give reown this
ceipts in any other manner; but
reasoning does not satisfy me. In the more
complicated cases, where the life of the son
is one of the lives to take in succession, other
distinctions are taken. If the custom of the
manor be that the first taker might surrender the whole lease, that shall make the
other lessees trustees for him; but this cuson the legal estate, not on
tom operates
the equitable interest; and therefore this is
not a very solid argument. When the lessees are to take successive, it is said that,
as the father cannot take the whole in his
own name, but must insert other names in
the lease, then the children shall be trustees
for the father; and to be sure, if the circumstance of a child being the nominee is
not decisive the other way, there is a great
deal of weight in this observation. There
may be many prudential reasons for putting
in the life of a child in preference to that
of any other person; and if in that case it
is to be collected from circumstances whether an advancement was meant, it will be
difficult to' find such as will support that
idea. To be sure, taking the estate in the
name of the child, which the father might
have taken in his own, affords a strong argument of such an intent; but where the
estate must necessarily be taken to him in
succession,
the inference is very different.
These are the difficulties which occur from
considering the purchase in the son's name
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a circumstance of evidence only. Now,
it were once laid down that the son was
to be taken as a purchaser for a valuable
consideration, all these matter of presumption would be avoided.
It must be admitted that the case of Dickinson v. Shaw is a case very strong to support the present plaintiff's claim. That came
"A copyon in chancery, on 22d May, 1770.
hold was granted to three lives to take in
succession,
the father, son, and daughter.
The father paid the fine. There was no
custom
stated. The question
was whether
the daughter and her husband were trustees
during the life 'of the son, who survived
the father. At the time of the purchase the
son was nine and the daughter seven years
old. It appeared that the father had leased
the premises from three years to three years
On this case
to the extent of nine years.
Lords Commissioners Smythe and Aston
were of opinion that, as the father had paid
as

if

the purchase money, the children were trustees for him." To the note I have of this
case it is added that this determination was
contrary to the general opinion of the bar,
and also to a case of Taylor v. Alston, in
this court. In Dickinson v. Shaw there was
some little evidence to assist the Idea of its
being a trust, namely,
that of the leases
made by the father.
If that made an ingredient in the determination, then that case
is not quite in point to the present;
but I
rather think that the meaning of the court
was that the burthen of proof laid on the
child; and that the cases which went the
other way were only those in which the
estate was entirely purchased in the name
of the children. If so, they certainly were
not quite correct in that idea, for there had
been cases in which the estates had been
taken in the names of the father and son.
have been favoured with a note of Rumboll V. RumboU, before Lord Keeper Henley
on the 20th April, 1761, where a copyhold
was taken for three lives in succession, the
father and two sons. The father paid the
fine, and the custom was that the first taker
might dispose of the whole estate (and his
lordship then stated that case fully). Now,
this case does not amount to more than an
opinion of Lord Keeper Henley, but he
agreed with me in considering a child as
a purchaser for good consideration of an
estate bought by the father in his name,
though a trust would result as against a
stranger.
It has been supposed that the
case of Taylor v. Alston in this court denied
the authority of Dickinson v. Shaw. That
cause was heard before Lord Chief Baron
Smythev myself, and Mr. Baron Burland,
and was the case of an uncle purchasing
In the names of himself and a nephew and
It was decided In favour of the nephniece.
ew and niece, not on any general idea of
but on the result
then: taking as relations,
of much parol evidence, which was admitted on both sides, and the equity on the
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Side of the nominees
was thought to preponderate.
Lord Kenyon was In that cause,
and his argument went solely on the weight
of the parol evidence. Indeed, as far as the
circumstance of the custom of the first taker's right to surrender, it was a strong case
in favour of a trust. However, the court
determined
the other way on the parol evidence. That case, therefore, is not material.
Another case has been mentioned, which is
not in print, and which was thought to be
materially applicable to this (Bed well v.
Froome, before Sir T. Sewell) ; but that was
materially distinguishable from the present.
As far as the general doctrine went, it went
against the opinion of the lords commissioners.
His honour there held that the copyholds were part of the testator's personal
estate, for that was not a purchase in the
name of the daughter.
She was not to have
the legal estate. It was only a contract to
add the daughter's life in a new lease to
be granted to the father himself. There could
be no question about her being a trustee,
for it was as a freehold in him for his
daughter's life. But in the course of the
argument his honour stated the common
principles as applied to the present case,
and ended by saying that, as between father
and chUd, the natural presumption was that
a provision was meant.
The anonymous
very
case in 1 Freem. Ch. 123, corresponds
much with the doctrine laid down by Sir
T. Sewell, and It observes that an advanceas done for
ment to a child is considered
not only against the
valuable consideration,
Kingdon v.
father,
but against creditors.
Bridges, 2 Vem. 67, is a strong case to this
point,— that is, the valuable nature of the
consideration arising on a provision made
for a wife or for a cUld; for there the question arose as against creditors.
I do not find that there are in print more
than three cases which respect copyholds
where the grant is to take , successive, — Rundie v. Rundle, 2 Vern. 264, which was a case
perfectly clear; Benger v. Drew, 1 P. Wms.
was made partly
781, where
the purchase
with the wife's money; and Smith v. Baker,
1 Atk. 385, where the general
doctrine as
but the
applied to strangers was recognized;
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case turned on the question whether the InTherefore, as far
terest was well devised.
as respects this particular case, Dickinson
v. Shaw is the only case quite In point; and
then the question Is whether that case Is
to be abided by. With great reverence to
the memory of those two judges who decided
it, we think that case cannot be followed;
that it has not stood the test of time, or the
opinion of learned men; and Lord Kenyon
has certainly Intimated his opinion agamst
it. On examination of its principles, they
seem to rest on too narrow a foundation,
namely, that the inference
of a provision
bsiug Intended did not arise, because the
purchase could not have been taken wholly
This, we
in the name of the purchaser.
think, is not sufficient to turn the presumption against the child. If it Is meant to
be a trust, the purchaser must shew that
intention by a declaration of trust; and we
do not think it right to doubt whether an
estate In succession is to be considered
as
an advancement,
when a moiety of an estate in possession certainly would be so.
If we were to enter into all the reasons that
might possibly influence the mind of the
purchaser,
many
might perhaps occur in
every case upon which it might be argued
that an advancement was not intended. And
own it is not a very prudent conduct of
a man just married to tie up his property
for one child, and preclude himself from
providing for the rest of his family. But
this applies equally In case of a purchase
in the name of the child only, yet that case
is admitted to be an advancement;
Indeed,
If anything, the latter case is rather the
strongest,
for there it must be confided to
one child only. We think, therefore,
that
these reasons partake of too great a degree
of refinement, and should not prevail against
a rule of property which Is so well established as to become a landmark, and which,
whether right or wrong, should be carried

I

throughout
This bill must therefore be dismissed; but,
after stating that the only case in point on
the subject Is against our present opinion,
It certainly will be proper to dismiss It without costs.
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et al. v.
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et al.

135 111. 499.)

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan.

21,

Errorto circuit court, McDonough
ty ; Charles J. Schofield, Judge.

1891.

coun-

Bill by Hannah C. Cook and others,
heirs of William L. Stinson, (alias Stevenson,) deceased, against Charles Patrick,
Oeorgetta Patrick, and others, t& establish title to certain real and personal propComplainants bring error.
erty.
Smith & Helmer and Prentiss & Baily,
for plaintiffs in error. TuanicliO & Tunnicliff and C. F. Wheat, for defendants in error.

Baker, J. In 1820. a .young man, who
was known in the community as William
L. Stevenson, was living and keeping hotel at a place called Downingsville, in the
state of Kentucky. He subsequently removed to Lexington, in that state, and
was there engaged in the boot and shoe
business for a number of .years.
He was
married at Lexington, on May 4, 1834,
to one Catherine B. Patrick, and four children were born of the marriage.
A few
years after the birth of these children he
failed in business, and became insolvent;
and then his wife and two of the children
died. In 1856 he removed, taking his two
remaining children with him, to Colchester, in the state of Illinois, where several
brothers of his deceased wife were living,
and were engaged in merchandising.
He
was at first a clerk in the store of John
Patrick, then a clerk in the store of William Patrick, and then took charge of the
store of the latter. Subsequently he was
engaged in a partnership business with
Charles Patrick, one of the defendants
herein, who was son of another brother
of his deceased
wife. His other two
daughters, Ellen and Mary, died without
issue, in 1856 and 1857, respectively.
In
the years 1859, 1860, 1861, 1863, 1865, 1866,
1869, and 1874, said William L. Stevenson
bargained
for and purchased various
tracts of land and town lots, and paid for
the same with his own money, and at the
time of the purchase of each of said several
premises the deeds therefor were by his
special direction made to Martha P. Patrick, (now Ringen,) Charles Patrick, and
Georgetta Patrick, the defendants in error, respecti vely ; some of said conveyances
being made to one and some to another
of said three persons. These conveyances
were delivered to Stevenson, were not recorded until after his death, and were held
and retained in his possession until after
or shortly before his decease. Upon the
delivery of each of said deeds to Stevenson
he took possession of the premises in each
deed desci'ibed, and used and controlled
the same, and received the rents, Issues,
and profits thereof, and repaired and
built housefj thereon, with his own money,
or with money received from rents, and
paid all taxes thereon out of his own
moneys, but taking receipts lor such taxes
in the names of the several grantees mentioned in each of said respective deeds,
severally.
Said Stevenson
also loaned
various sums of his own money to different
persons, and other persons became other-
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wise indebted to him in various amounts,
and for such loans and other indebtedness
Some of these
he took promissory notes.
notes were made payable to himself, and
others, by his special direction, made payable to Georgetta Patrick ; and many of
these latter notes were secured by mortgages on real estate, and the mortgages,
by his direction, made to said Georgetta.
These notes and mortgages were delivered
to said Stevenson, and retained in his possession, and he collected all the accrued
interest tliereon which was paid prior to
his death. Said Stevenson died intestate
at Colchester on April 6, 1881, being some
80 or 90 years of age, and leaving surviving him no widow
or descendants.
Charles Patrick was appointed administrator of his estate. The deeds to said
Charles Patrick and to Martha C. Patrick
(now Ringen) and Georgetta Patrick were
placed upon record by them, and they
thereupon severally claimed the absolute
ownership of the tracts of land and town
lots deeded to them respectively, and took
possession of the same, and collected and
appropriated the rents, and made sales
and conveyances to other persons of various parcels thereof.
The present bill in chancery was exhibited in the McDonough
circuit court by
the plaintiffs in error, Hannah C.Cook and
others, against Charles Patrick and his
two sisters and the purchasers of real
estate from them. It is claimed in the bill
that the man commonly called William
L. Stevenson, who died intestate at Colcliester on the 6th day of April, 1881, was
in truth and in fact one William L. Stinson, a son of one Robert Stinson, of Bodenham, in the state of Maine, and that they
(plaintiffs in error) are the heirs at law of
the said William L. Stinson, deceased.
It
is also claimed in the bill that the deeds
to the Patricks were not delivered to
them in the life-time of the Intestate, and
that the latter, when he died, was the real
owner of all the real estate described in
said deeds; and that the notes and mortgages taken by the intestate remained in
his possession and control during his lifetime, and were his property at the time of
his death. The prayer of the bill, succinctly stated, is that the real estate and
personal property in question be decreed
to be the property of the plaintiffs in erroi , that all conveyances made bj' the
Patricks of said real estate be set aside;
and that the Patricks account for all
monej's collected from notes, bonds, accounts, and sales of said property. Answers were filed and issues formed, and
upon the hearing of the cause the court
found that the promissory notes which
were made payable to W. L. Stevenson
were not given by said Stevenson in his
life-time to Georgetta Patrick so as to invest her with the title to them or the proceeds thereof;
and that said Georgetta
had, under claim of ownership, and since
the death of said Stevenson, collected
$547.47 on said notes ; and that said $547.47.
and the unpaid notes which had been
made payable to said Stevenson, belonged
and were due to the estate of said Stevenson.
It was ordered and decreed that
said Georgetta pay said S547.47 collected
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by her, and deliver the residue of tlie
notes so payable to Stevenson, within 60
days to the administrator, and that the
administrator account to the estate for
said money and notes. The court further
found that plaintiffs in error were not entitled to any other or further relief in the
premises than that above mentioned, and
as to all other and further matters the
bill was dismissed.
Plaintiffs in error are dissatisfied with
the limited measure of relief that was decreed to them upon their bill of complaint,
and bring the record to this court.
We
deem it unnecessary to consider in detail
the various assignments of error. There
are several matters in controversy which
may be disposed of quite briefly.
We are
inclined to think that the evidence sufficiently shows the identity of the man
commonly called William L. Stevenson,
who died at Colchester, in this state, in
1S81, with the William L. Stinson of Bodenham, in the state of Maine, who left
that state early in the present century for
the purpose of avoiding the vengeance of
he had
the brother of a girl whom
wronged.
We will also assume for the
purposes of the decision that the allegations of the bill and the proofs introduced
at the hearing make it manifest that
plaintiffs in error are heirs at law of said
It is
William L. Stinson, deceased.
claimed that by plaintiffs in error there
was no such delivery of the deeds to the
grantees named therein as would pass to
them the titles to the lands. It would
seem that, in order to divest the several
grantors in said deeds of their titles, it is
essential to the claim made by said plaintiffs in error that the deeds should be regarded as properly delivered. But, waiving this, and waiving any consideration
of the testimony tendingto show an actual
delivery of the conveyance by Stevenson,
Hlias Stinson, to Georgetta Patrick for
said grantees, we think that a sufficient
delivery of the deeds and acceptance of the
same by the several grantees named thereStevenson,
in appears from the evidence.
in making the purchases and taking the
deeds, assumed to be acting as agent of
the nominal purchasers mentioned in the
respective deeds, although he was in fact
acting without their knowledge. At the
times of the various purchases the grantors in theseveral deeds delivered the same
to Stevenson, the supposed agent, absolutely and unconditionally, and for the
express purpose of divesting themselves of
their respective titles and vesting such titles in the grantees named in said several
conveyances.
Subsequently said grantees
accepted and approved the acts of the selfconstituted agent, and fully ratified and
confirmed
the same by accepting the
deeds, and having the same recorded, and
claiming title under them. If a deed is deMvered to one who has no authority from
Ihe grantee to receive it, yet the grantee
may ratify the act of acceptance, and the
delivery will be good, even In cases vphere
the deed is nj^ade without the grantee's
Morrison v. Kelly, 22 111. 610;
knowledge.
Eawson v. Fox, 65 111. 200; Crocker v.
Lowenthal, 83 111. 579; Bryan v. Wash, 2
Oilman. 557; Byars v. Spencer, 101 111. 429.
The grantors In the several deeds parted
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with all dominion over them when they
delivered them to Stevenson, alias Stinson, and, as the latter was not a grantor
in any of the deeds, it was not essential
that he should deliver them or any of
them to the grantees, or that there should
be a delivery of them to such grantees
in his life-time. The absolute delivery of
the deeds to Stevenson, and the acceptance
of them by him, and the subsequent ratification by the grantees of
such acts of acceptance, were amply sufficient to invest such grantees with title.
We do not regard the cases cited by plaintiffs in error, where the deeds were not
delivered by the grantors, and did not pass
from their control and dominion in their
life-times, and where it was held thatthere
was no divestiture of the titles of such
grantors, as here in point.
We think the material questions in the
ease whether or not there were resulting
trusts in favor of Stevenson, alias Stinson, and, if so, in respect to the nature,
character, and extent of such trusts.
It
is suggested by counsel that if Stinson
bought the lands, and paid for them wifh
his own money, then he was the equitable
owner of such lands, although the deeds
were made to third persons. It is a principle of the law that where one buys property and pays the purchase money with his
own funds, and has the title placed in the
name of another person, a resulting trust
arises in favor of him who has so paid
the purchase money, and he is regarded
as the equitable owner of the property
But to this doctrine of implied
bought.
trusts there are various exceptions, quailfications, and limitations. Such a trust is
a mere creature of equity, founded upon
presumptive intention, and designed to carry that intention into effect, not to defeat
it. Itit is not the intention that the estate
shall vest in him who pays the purchase
price, then no resulting trust in his favor
attaches to the property ; and there may
be a resulting
trust as to a part of the
property, or a part of the interest therein,
and not as to the residue, according to the
intent existing in such particular case.
In 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1202, it is said:
"There are other exceptions to the doctrine of a resulting or implied trust, even
where the principal has paid the purchase
money ; or, perhaps, more properly speaking, as the resulting or implied trust is, in
such cases, a mere matter of presumption,
it maybe rebutted by other circumstances
established
in evidence, and even by
parol proofs, which satisfactorily contradict it. And resulting and implied trusts
In such cases may, in like manner, be re
butted, as well to part of the land as to
part of the interest in the land purchased
Thus, where A.
in the name of another.
took a mortgage in the name of B., declaring that he intended the mortgage to bo
for B.'s benefit, and that the principal,
after his own death, should be B.'s, and
A. received the interest therefor during
his life-time, it was held that the mortgage
belonged to B. after the death of A. " In
Lewin, Trusts, p. 169, § 15, it is said : "As
the trust results to the real purchaser by
presumption of law, which is merely an
arbitrary implication in the absence of
proof to the contrary, thf
reasonable
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nominal purcliasei- is at liberty to rebut
the preHumption
by the production of
parol evidence showing the intention of

conferring
the beneficial
interest.
And
as he may repel the presumption
id toto,
so he may in part; as, by proving the
purchasers' intention to permit the legal
tenant to enjoy beneficiall.y for life." See,
also, 1 Perry, Trusts, § 139; 2 Pom. Eq.
.lur. § 1040. and note 1; and Bisp. Eq. §
63, p. 94.
Benbow v.Townsend,! Mylne &
K. 506, was in many respects like the case
at bar. It was there held that, where land
was purchased with the money of A. in the
name of B., the resulting trust to A. may
be rebutted as to part of the land or part
of the interest in the land ; and also
held that, where A. took a mortage in the
name of B., declaring that the principal
sum should be for the benefit of B., and
received the interest during his life, it was
held that the property, after the death of
A., will belong to B. by force of the parol
declaration.
The master of the rolls
there said: "In the case of Lloyd v. Spillet, 2 Atk. 148, and also in the case of
Lane v. Dighton, 1 Amb. 409. it is expressly decided that a resulting trust may be
rebutted as to part of the land comprised
in a deed, and prevail as to the remainder; and if it can be rebutted as to a
part of the land, there can be no reason
why it may not be rebutted as to a part
of the interest in the land. But in this
case, the trust being of personal estate,
the case is not within the statute of
frauds or the doctrine of resulting trusts
under that statute, but the property will
belong to the brother after the testator's
death, by force of the testator's declarapounds
tion that the t",'o thousand
should, after his death, be the property
"
of his brother Job.
It appears from the
report of the case that the brother, Job,
knew nothing of the transaction of the
taking of the mortgage, etc. It also appears therefrom that the same point was
there made in argument that seems to be
made in the case at bar, — that the equitable title raised by the parol evidence must
be exactly commensurate with the legal
title on the face of the instrument.
From the conclusion reached it is manifest that it was considered that it was
competent for A., who loaned the money,
to reserve a portion of the equitable interest in the mortgage to himself, giving
the remainder of it, as well as the legal
title, to his brother.
See. also, Maddison
v. Andrew, 1 Ves. Sr. 58.
In Rider v. Kidder, 10 Ves. 360, while the case was the reverse in respect to the interests retained
and donated, the principle was the same;
and Lord Chancellor Ei-i)ON said: "Upon
the evidence, the utmost intended was to
secure to her [meaning the nominal purchaser] an income; and, if that only was
intended, it by no means destroys the existence of trust, for, if the intention was to
give to her an estate for life, not dependent upon his will, still the capital would
be his." Emmons v. Moore, 85 111. 304, is
an authority in this state which fully recognizes the principle that, where a person
buys land and pa.ys the consideration
money, and takes the deed in the name of
another, parol evidence is admissible to
show that the real purchaser Is not in-
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tenaea to be the beneficiary of the resulting trusts, and to indicate who is the
donee of the beneficial interest under such

trust.
It only remains to apply the rules of equity above recited to the facts of the present case.
William L. Stinson abandoned

the home of his boyhood, and left behind
him his relatives and the friends of his
youth. He went to another and a distant
state, changed his name, and formed other
and different attachments.
He married,
and a family of children were born to him.
Then, one b.y one, his wife and all four of
his chidren died. It is manifest from the
evidence that after the last of his own immediate famil.y he was more intimate with
the relatives of his deceased wife than
with any one else, and that he was particularly attached to the nephews and the
nieces of his deceased wife, who are the
Shortly after the
defendants
herein.
death of his last surviving child he commenced bu.ying real estate, paying therefor
with his own money, and taking conveyances of the propert.v bought, some in the
name of Charles Patrick, the nephew, and
some in the name of Martha P. Patrick,
now Ringen, one of the nieces. He persisted for more than 10 years in making
such purchases and taking such deeds. He
also, from time to time, loaned money belonging to himself, and took notes and
therefor, and had the notes
mortgages
made payable to the other of said nieces,
Patrick, and had the mortUeorgetta
gages executed to him as mortgagee.
He
retained possession of the deeds, notes,
mortgages.
and
He also took and retained
possession of the lands and lots purchased, and received the rents of the same,
and repaired and built houses thereon, and
paid the taxes levied on the same. He
was always particular, however, to have
the tax receipts made out in the names of
the respective grantees to whom the particular lot or tract of land had been deeded.
He also collected and used, as he
saw fit, the interest moneys falhng due on
th 3 notes and mortgages.
He expressly
directed the deeds to be made as they were
made. He refused to accept conveyances,
made to himself as grantee, and insisted
that the deeds should name one or another
of the Patrick children as grantee.
He
frequently announced to different vendors,
borrowers, and others that he was buying the property, or loaning the money,
as the case might be, for the Patrick children, or the Patrick girls.
He often spoke
of the property as Mattie's, Charley's, or
George's. He frequently spoke of having
bought property, and of having caused
the deeds to be made to said children ;
and said that when he got through with
the property Charley and the girls should
have it. He often said that he intended
the property should go to the Patrick children ; that Charley and the girls should
have it ; that no one else had an.y right to
it, or should touch it; thathehad it fixed,
— had it all arranged; and that no one
else could do anything with it. From
these facts, and from numerous other circumstances that appear in the record, it is
evident that when William L. Stinson,
alias William L. Stevenson, made his various purchases of real estate, and took
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deeds in the name of one or another of the
defendants in eri'or, he, as well as the sev-

eral vendors, fully intended to vest in said
several defendants in error the legal titles
to such real estate; and that when he
loaned money and took notes and mortgages in the name of Georgetta Patrick
he intended to vest in her the legal title to
said ra(jney and mortgages; and that he
also fully intended to reserve and retain
to his own use a life-estate in the equitable
interest in said realty, notes, and mortgages, and to give to defendants in error,
respectively, and to vest iu them, several-

TRUSTS.
ly, the remainder and residue of the equitable interest, estate, and title in such real

estate, notes, and mortgages, respectiveSuch was the manifest intention of
the intestate.
There is no rule of law or
of equity that will operate to prevent such
intention from being earned into effect.
The means that were adopted by the intestate for the purpose of accomplishing
the disposition he desired to make of his
own property were such as violate no rule
of law, and such as the rules of equity
recognize and enforce. The decree of the
circuit court is affirmed.
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V.

POWERS.

(72 N. W, 771, 103 Iowa, 593.)
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Oct. 29, 18&7.

Appeal from district court, Union county;
W. H. Tedford, .Tudge.
Plaintiff states as his cause of action that
in December, 1873, he purchased from Joseph
Shaw a certain quarter section of land in
Adair county, with his own property and
funds, and caused the same to be conveyed to

his then wife, Mary E. Hagan, by reason of
which she thereafter held the title as trustee
for plaintiff;, that she received said trust, and
agreed to safely hold said land for plaintiff's
benefit; that at the purchase the land was unimproved;
that plaintiff improved it, and has
ever since controlled it; that Mrs. Hagan died.
Intestate,
without issue, October 10, 1894,
leaving the defendant as her only surviving
parent;
that defendant claims an undivided
one-half of said land by inheritance through
said Mary E. Hagan, but that, in truth and
in fact, said Mary B. Hagan did not own said
land at the time of her death, but held it as
trustee, as aforesaid.
Plaintiff prays that he
may be decreed to be the owner in fee simple
in said premises, and that he be quieted in
his title as against the claims of the defendant.
The defendant answered, admitting that
the title was in Mary E. Hagan, but denying
that the plaintiff paid for the land with his
own money or property, and denying that Mrs.
Hagan held the same in trust for the plaintiff,
or ever recognized
such trust; admits
the
death of Mrs. Hagan, and that he is her only
surviving parent.
He avers that Mary B.
Hagan had owned and controlled said land
since December,

1873,

and that her possession

and claim of ownership were adverse to the
claim of the plaintiff, and that the claim of
the plaintiff is barred.
He prays for decree
awarding him the ownership of an undivided
one-half Interest in said land. The action was
brought in Adair county, where the land is
situated, but, by stipulation of parties, was
transferred to and heard in the district court
of Union county, by which a decree was entered in favor of the plaintiff as prayed, from
which the defendant ap])ealed. Affirmed.
D. W. Higbee, for appellant.
Winter, for appellee.

Maxwell

&

GIVEN, J. 1. A consideration of the questions involved renders it necessary that we
first determine the facts.
There is no dispute
that the plaintiff purchased the land in conti'oversy in 1873, it being then unimproved;
that he caused the title to be conveyed to his
wife, who continued to .hold the same until
her death October 10, 1894, when she died,
intestate, and without issue, leaving the deDuring
fendant her only surviving parent.
these years the plaintiff and his wife resided
upon an adjacent farm in Union county, and
the plaintiff improved, controlled, and used the
Plaintiff, being
land in question as his own.
somewhat addicted to the use of strong drink,
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and not always prudent in the management
of his financial affairs, caused the deed for
this land to be made to his wife, without her
knowledge, intending that she should hold it In
trust for him; and thereafter, when informed
of the fact, Mrs. Hagan acquiesced in it, and
said
repeatedly
and uniformly throughout
years acknowledged
that the land was the
Appellant states
property
of her husband.
his contention as follows: "The matters necessary to be proven in order to create the resulting trust claimed by appellee (neither fraud
nor mistake being claimed) are: (1) Payment
by appellee with his own money;
(2) intention on the part of appellee at time of conveyance to create a trust; (3) conveyance to deceased; (4) knowledge on the part of deceased
of appellee's intention to create a trust, and
assent or failure to dissent after that knowledge."
The claim of the plaintiff that he paid
for said land with his own money is denied,
and the defendant contends that after the contract of purchase from Shaw, and prior to the
'
execution of the deed or payment of the purchase price, appellant promised appellee that,
in consideration of a promise on the part of
the appellee that he would place the title in
the name of Mrs. Hagan, appellant would furnish him help in various ways, to the amount
of the cost of the land, and that appellant did
so furnish such help by contributnig
horses
and other property at various times.
Upon
this issue of fact, we think, the appellant 'has
failed to support his contention.
It is true,
he did furnish to the plaintiff and his wife
horses and other property at various times, but
it was mostly before this land was contracted
for, and without reference thereto.
It fairly
appears that in every instance that money or
property was received from appellant it is accounted for as having been a gift without coqdltion, or as being settled for otherwise than
on account of the purchase of this land. That
appellee paid for the land, and caused the conveyance to be made to deceased, with the
intention to thereby create a trust, and that,
after knowledge of these facts, deceased assented thereto, we think, is abundantly proven.

2. It is contended on behalf of the defendant
that much of the evidence from which these
facts are found is incompetent, because it relates to communications
between
husband
and wife, and communications
and transactions with the deceased Mrs. Hagan.
In Dysart V. Furrow, 90 Iowa, 59, 57 N. W. &44, it
is said: "If the transaction or communication
was personal, it must be known alike to both,
and therefore edther may deny. * * * personal transactions
as
and communications,
contemplated by the statute, are communications between the parties of which both must
have had personal knowledge."
This rule is
approved in the later cases of Cole v. Marsh,
92 Iowa, 379, 60 N. W. 659, and Martin v.
Shannon, 92 Iowa, 375, 60 N. W. 645.
The
purchase, payment,
and conveyance of the
land were exclusively
transactions
between
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it
tde piaintiir and tne venaor, Mr. snaw.
was not until after the transaction was completed by the making of the conveyance that
Mrs. Hagan learned that the conveyance was
to her, and assented thereto, as shown by a
number of witnesses other than appellee. Thi;
only evidence appearing in the record that
comes within the objection is the statement of
the plaintiff, as follows: "I then told her
had deeded to her, to take ca:re of it for me,
"
This statement
and she said, 'I can do it.'
is clearly incompetent, and must therefore be
disregarded.
3. We now inquire whether, under the facts
as we find them, the law raises a resulting,
or, as It is sometimes called, a presumptive,
trust in favor of appellee. In Cotton v. Wood,
25 Iowa, 44, the familiar rule Is thus announced: "Where, upon the pm'chase of property, the consideration is paid by one, and the
legal title conveyed to another, a resulting
tiTist is thereby raised, and the person named
in the deed will hold the property as trustee of
In Perthe party paying the consideration."
ry on Trusts (section 124) it is said: "The
general foundation of this kind of trusts is the
natural equity that arises when parties do
Thus, if one pays the purcertain things.
chase money of an estate, and takes the title
deed in the name of another, in the absence of
all evidence of intention the law presumes a
trust from the natural equity that he who pays

I
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the money for property ought to enjoy the
beneficial interest."
The parties to this transaction being husband and wife, another rule
requires consideration.
In Cotton v. Wood ii
is further said: "But if the person to whom
the conveyance is made be one for whom the
party paying the consideration is under obligation, natural or moral, to provide, the transaction will be regarded prima facie as an advancement, and the burden will rest on the one
who seeks to establish the trust for the benefit of the payee of the consideration to overcome the presumption
in favor of the legal
title by suflicient evidence."
In the absence
of the obligation to provide, it could not be
questioned that the law would raise a trust
in favor of appellee from the facts established.
We think appellee has fully overcome the
presumption of advancement, by his own evidence as to his intention, by evidence of repeated admissions of ilrs. Hagan that the
land was his, and his continued occupation
and improvement
of it. This being a trust
ra.ised by operation of law, and not by reason
of any declaration or creation of the parties,
section 1935 of the Code of 1873 does not apply.
The facts in this case are in many respects the same as those alleged in Cotton v.
Wood, supra, and the rulings in that case
support our conclusion in this.
We think the
decree of th'e district court is correct.
Affirmed.

CONSTRUCTIVE

FERRIS

V.

VAN VECHTEN.

(73 N.

Court of Appeals

Y.

113.)

of New York.

Charles A. Fowler, for appellants.
ton Fiero, for respondent.

1878.

J.

New-

ALLEN, J. This is, I think, a case of the
iirst Impression, but it is sought to be brought
within the principle of equity by which, at
tlie instance of a cestui que trust, trust
funds which have been misappropriated by
the ti'ustee may be followed and reclaimed,
so long as they can be traced and identified,
and any property or choses in action into
which they have been converted impressed
with the same trusts as those upon which the
original funds were held.
The claim of the plaintiff briefly stated is,
that moneys realized from real estate sold
under a power of sale for the payment of
the surdebts, and held by Van Vechten,
viving executor, in trust for the plaintiff, a
creditor, have been wrongfully and in violation of the trust applied to the payment of
charges and incumbrances upon the lands
of the testator described in the complaint,
and which were devised to the executors in
trust, to receive the rents, issues and profits
thereof, and pay the same to the wife of a
son of tlie testator, to be applied by her to
the support of the family of such son, and'
upon her death to convey the same to the
children of said son. The relief demanded by
the plaintiff is in substance, although not so
stated, that she be subrogated to the rights
of the creditors and lienors, whose incumbrances have been pro tanto discharged as
against the lands to the amount paid thereon
from the trust funds. The funds can hardly
be said to have been invested in the lands, or
in the mortgages, or other charges paid by
There was no pm-chase of
the executor.
either, but the incumbrances were partially
The lands were relieved from cersatisfied.
tain charges by the diversion to that purpose
of funds held in trust for creditors, as alleged, and it is sought to revive the liens by
subrogating the plaintiff to the rights of the
original creditors.
Whether a cestui que
trust can be subrogated to the claims of creditors, to the payment of whose debts the
trust fund has been misapplied, need not be
determined.
See Winder v. Diffenderffer, 2
Bland, 198.
Regarding the payments by Van Vechten
as investments in the lands, in relief of
which they were made, the primary question Is whether in that view a case was
made upon the evidence for the relief deIt must be conceded that trust
manded.
moneys may be followed into lands to the
purchase of which they have been applied,
and the cestui que trust may elect whether
to hold the unfaithful tnistee personally responsible,
or claim the lands, the fruits of
the misappropriation of the funds, or cause
the lands to be sold for his indemnity, and
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Lane
look to the trustee for any deficiency.
V. Dighton, 1 Amb. 409, per Lord EUenboiough; Taylor v. Plumer, i! Maule & S. oij'2;
Thornton v. Stokill, 19 Jur. 751; Oliver v.
Piatt, 3 How. 333, per Story, J.; Story, Eq.
Jur. § 1258 et seq.; Shepherd v. McEvers,
4 Johns. Ch. 136, 8 Am. Dec. 561; Dodge v.
Manning, 1 N. Y. 298.
To follow money Into lands, and impress
the latter with the ti-ust, the money must be
distinctly traced and clearly proved to have

While money,
been invested In the lands.
as such, has no ear-mark by which, when
once mingled in mass, it can be traced, it is,
nevertheless, capable under some circumstances of being followed to, and identified with,
the property into which it has been converted;
but the conversion of the trust money ' specifically, as distinguished from other money
of the trustee into the property sought to be
subjected to the trust, must be clearly shown.
It does not sufiice to show the possession of
the trust funds by the trustee, and the purchase by him of property—that is, payment
for property generally by the trustee does
not authorize the presumption that the purchase was made with ti'ust funds.
The product of, or substitute for, the original trust
fund follows the nature of the fund as long
as it can be ascertained to be such; .and if
a trustee purchase
lands with trust money,
a court of equity will charge them with a resulting trust for the person beneficially interested.
But it must be clear that the lands
have been paid for out of the trust money.
This is Illustrated by Perry v. Philips, 4 Ves.
108.
There a ti'ustee for the purchase of
land died without personal assets, but having
purchased lands, the estates purchased were
held not liable to the trust, the circumstances affording no presumption that they were
purchased in execution of the trust.
If the purchase of land with the trust
moneys could not be presumed
when such
purchase would be in execution of the trust,
a fortiori it should not be presumed when
it would be a violation of the trust. The
right of following the trust property, in the
new form which has been given to It, or in
the property substituted for it, ceases only
when the means of ascertainment fail,
"which of course is the case when the subject-matter is turned into money and mixed
and confounded in a general mass of property of the same description." 2 Story, Eq.
Jur. § 1259, and note 4. When the purchasemoney, paid by a trustee for lands purchased, corresponds very nearly with that of
the trust fund to be invested, that with other
circumstances, as the coincidence
of the
time of the receipt and disbursement, may
suffice to show that the property was actually purchased with trust funds. Lowden v.
Lowden, 2 Browne, Ch. 583; Price v. Blakemore, 6 Beav. 507.
The money paid by the
trustee for lands or other property, or for
choses in action sought to be subjected to
the original trust, must be identified as trust
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luonpys;
and this Is clearly recognized in all
the eases, and in very many of them this has
been the difficult question of fact upon which
they have hinged, and the principle to be deduced from them is, that when the trust
fund has consisted of money, and been mingled with other moneys of the trustee in one
mass, undivided and undistinguishable, and
the trustee has made investments generally
from moneys in his possession, the cestui que
trust cannot claim a specific lien upon the
property or funds constituting the investHill, Trustees, m. p. 522. This is
ments.
consistent
with the cases cited and relied
upon by the counsel for the plaintiff, and
the doctrine is recognized and applied in each
case, and as the facts were proved to exist
in them respectively.
In Moses v. ilurgatroyd, 1 Johns. Ch. 119, 7 Am. Dec. 478, the
property held in trust was readily and certainly traced.
In Kip v. Bank, 10 Johns. 63,
the money, the subject-matter of the trust,
was kept separate and distinct, and deposited
as such.
The court say the only check to
the operation of the rule now under consideration is when the property is converted
into cash, and has been absorbed in the general mass of the estate so that it cannot be
followed or distinguished. It is the difficulty of tracing the trust money, which has
no ear-mark, that prevents the application of
also, Hutchinson v. Reed,
See,
the rule.
Hoff. 316, and cases by Asst. V. Ch., 2 Kent
623,
624; Trecothick v. Austin, 4
Comm.
Mason, 29, Fed. Gas. No. 14,164.
as against
There can be no presumption
the defendants whose property is sought to
be affected by the trust, which attached to
the moneys realized by A'an A'echten from
the sale of lands under the power.
So far
as appears they are innocent of all wrongdoing, and have not colluded or combined
with the executors to violate the trust, and
it is not found that they assented to or had
any knowledge of any misapiiropriation of
the fund, and if made trustees in virtue of
their ownership of the lands they are made
so, not by reason of any act of theirs, but as
the legal result of the fact that trust moneys
have been misapplied by a trustee of the
fund to relieve of a burden their lands, held
in trust for another purpose by the same
The fact should be clearly, at least
trustee.
satisfactorily proved.
This principal fact,
upon which the right of the plaintiff to any
relief in this action depends, is only alleged
argumentatively in the complaint by the
statement that it appeared in the account of
the executors filed with the surrogate that
large sales of real estate of the testator had
been made by the executors, on account of
large
sums
of
which they had realized
money, and that it also appeared that large
amounts of money arising therefrom were
issued and applied in keeping the homestead
farm in repair, and large sums were paid
out for interest and taxes on said farm.
There was no proof that one dollar of the

moneys received for lands, and which constituted the trust fund, was paid or applied
to any of the purposes mentioned, nor is the
fact of such misappropriation of the trust
moneys found, nor was any fact proved or
found from which such diversion and misappropriation of si^ecific trust moneys can be
legitimately inferred. The only proof given
upon this branch of the case consisted of the
proceedings before and the decree of the surrogate upon the settlement of the accounts
of the executor.
If these proceedings were
competent evidence for any purpose, or to
establish any fact as against the defendants,
the present appellants, they were only competent m respect of the matters then in issue, and which were determined by the surrogate.
The questions before that tribunal
related solely to the accounts of the executors and their liability to the creditors, and
those entitled under the will of the testator.
The executors were charged with tlie amount
of the inventory of the personal estate of the
deceased, together with the amounts received
The moneys
upon the sale of real estate.
realized from the sale of lands were the primary fund for the payment of debts, and
creditors had the first claim to be paid from
those moneys, and the first liability of the
executors In respect of such moneys was to
creditors.
Such liability was discharged by
proof of payment to creditors, whether made
from the identical moneys received by the
executors, or from other moneys of their own,
or subject to their control.
The moneys realized from lands sold in excess of the debts
of the testator belonged to the present appellants, as devisees of the land subject to
the power of sale, and the liability of the
executors to them was discharged by like
proof of payment to them or for their use,
from any moneys of the executors, whether
received for lands sold under the power or
from other sources.
Upon proof of the plaintiff's debt she was
of course entitled to a decree for Its payby the executors in
ment on the admission
their filed account of the moneys received
by them properly applicable to its payment.
Proof of payment to or for the use of the
devisees of the lands was no discharge of
the liability to the plaintiff, and the fact that
payments to or for the devisees were set up
In discharge
of the plaintiffs claim was
wholly unimportant. It was unimportant
upon that accounting whether Van Vechten,
the surviving executor, had the money In his
own pocket, or had disposed of it to some
third person.
His liability to the plaintiff
upon that accounting was the same, and the
decree was necessarily the same In either
event.
In no aspect of the case was the surrogate called upon to trace and Identify the
money received by the accounting executor
on the sale of lands.
The charges against the
executors consisted of the gross receipts, and
the discharges of the gross amount of the
several payments and disbursements as al-
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lowed by the surrogate, and the decree was
for the payment of a gross amount, and was
a general judgment against a surviving executor for a general balance due, not for a
surrender or paying over of specific moneys
or securities, and as between the plaintiff, a
creditor, and the appellant's devisees it was
adjudged that payment claimed to have been
made by the executor to or for the latter did
not discharge the obligation to the former,
and such payments were merely disallowed as
credits claimed by the executor.
It was not
found upon the trial of the present action by
the court, as a fact, that the specific moneys
received by the executors for lands sold, and
which were trust moneys for the payment
of debts, were In any way paid to or applied
for the use of the devisees in payment of the
incumbrances upon the homestead farm, although the general forms of expression, to a
limited extent, seem to imply the fact. The
learned judge did not intend to so find and
does not seem to have regarded it as Important.
He merely spealis of the moneys
which the executor used as, or in place of,
the trust moneys and in discharge of his obligation, as ti'ust moneys; but that does not
make them the specific trust funds received.
It Is found ill general terms that moneys to
an amount stated were received
from the
sale of real estate under the power, and that
the executors
had paid various sums for
principal and interest upon mortgages upon
and repairs of the farm to the amount in the
aggregate stated, but the times and amounts
of the various receipts, or of the several payments, are not found, nor is it f oimd that the
payments were made from the moneys received, or that the moneys were misapplied

If reference is had to
to these payments.
the accounts and schedules filed by the executors with the surrogate as the basis of the
accounting, which Is the only evidence of the
dates and amounts of the several receipts
and disbursements, there is nothing by which
the moneys received for lands sold can be
traced and identified as the moneys paid for
the improvement of the homestead farm, or
in discharge of incumbrances upon it. There
is neither coincidence in the times or amount
of the receipts and disbursements of moneys
upon the account, and for the purposes mentioned, to connect the one with the other and
lead to a presumption that the money received from the one source was the same
money that was paid out.
The Inference
would rather be that the moneys, when received, were mingled with other moneys of
the executors and used as occasion required,
either for purposes connected with the administration of the estate or the individual
purposes
of the executor.
Whatever presumptions might be indulged in favor of the
equities of the plaintiff as a creditor against
the defaulting trustee or his representatives,
were he or they the holders and claimants of
the property sought to be realized, none can
be indulged as against the present appellants
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who are innocent of any participation In the
If, upon the
wrongful acts of the executor.
statement of the accounts by and before the
surrogate, the evidence in this case and the
findings of fact by the judge, the principle
contended for by the plaintiff could be so
far extended as to authorize a lien upon the
lands in aid and relief of which payments
were made by the executor for the benefit of
the plaintiff as a cestui que trust, there would
be no difficulty in giving every cestui que
trust, as creditor having a debt of a fiduciary
character, a preference in respect to the general assets and creditors at large of the trustee or debtor, a lien upon property which the
trustee or debtor might have purchased during the existence of the trust or other fiduciary relations. This might be convenient
and in furtherance of a general equity in
favor of one class of creditors, but would be
an unauthorized extension of the equitable
doctrine invoked by the plaintiff, which demands for its application that the trust fund
or money shall be traced and identified as
existing in the new form into which it has
In no other way can the
been converted.
equitable title of a cestui que trust to specific property be established.
This question, which is decisive of this appeal, is fairly raised by the exception to the
admission, as evidence generally in the case,
of the proceedings before the suiTogate over
the objection of the appellants that they were
immaterial and incompetent, and also by the
exceptions to the conclusions of law and the
judgment of the court upon the trial. It is
proper to say that in passing only upon this
one question we do not intend to intimate an
opinion upon any of the other questions made
and ably argued by the learned counsel for
the respective parties.
The case bristles with
interesting and difficult questions, but as the
one considered is decisive of this appeal, and
the other questions may not re-appear or be
obviated by evidence upon another trial, we
do not deem it necessary to consider them.
Upon another trial it may be shown by competent evidence that the moneys
received
upon the sale of lands were kept separate
from all other moneys, and specifically applied to the payment of the charges and incumbrances upon the homestead farm, and if
so the difficulty which the plaintiff now encounters will be obviated. The equities are
clearly with the plaintiff, but they cannot
override the legal rules of evidence, or be enforced by an unauthorized enlargement and
extension of the equitable doctrine which lies
at the foundation of the action.
There is in
truth no competent proof as against the appellants other than Van Vechten, that the
payments claimed to have been made by him
in relief of the homestead were ever made.
The proof consists of the accounts unverified
filed with the surrogate by the executors;
in which they credit themselves with these
payments,
and the decree of the surrogate
disallowing them, and adjudging an amount
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stated to be due the estate from the said
executors,
and In their hands properly applicable to the payment of the plaintifiE's
claim, wliich was less than one-half in
amount of the sum decreed to be in the
The surrogate merehands of the executors.
ly held and decided that if the payments had
been made as claimed, they could not be allowed to the executors upon that accounting.
This is the extent of the decree.
It is possible, although we do not intend
to intimate an opinion upon the subject for
the reason that parties have not been heard,
and tlie question is not before us, that the
plaintiff may have relief in the present action without tracing and identifying the trust
moneys as now being invested in the homestead farm, and by treating this complaint
as a' creditor's bill, filed upon the return of
an execution against Van Vechten unsatisUpon proof that Van Vechten had
fied.

made the payments
alleged, under circumstances which would give him as a trustee a
lien upon the trust estate for the benefit of
which they were made. It may be that the
court would deem it a proper case to enforce
tlie lien for the benefit of the plaintiff— that
is, apply a debt due the judgment debtor to
the satisfaction of the judgment. Such a
claim in favor of a judgment debtor would
not be beyond the reach of a creditor's bill.
As Van Vechten's account as trustee of
the homestead farm has not been settled,
there would arise none of the questions made
upon the last trial as to the effect of the
statute of limitations as affecting the claim
of the plaintiff, upon the theory upon which
the case was tried.
But without considering
this suggestion farther, the judgment must
for reasons stated be reversed, and a new
trial had. All concur.
Judgment reversed.
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Smith, trustees, against Josepli H. Chadwick, the Koxbury Institution tor Savings,

and others.
George E. Smith, for defendants.
Horace G. Allen and Wm. R. Howland, for
Roxbury Institution for Savings.
G. Ai.LEN, J. The executor and trustee
under the -will of Mrs. Williams, having assigned his property in trust for the benefit
of his creditors, the annuitants under that
will seek to establish a trust in that property, and to obtain a decree that .¥10,000
be set apart by the assignees, and appropriated to secure and raise the annuities.
It was, however, found at the hearing
that none of the property so conveyed was
charged with any such trust, and this finding appears to be the only one that the
evidence would warrant. There is nothing
to show that there was ever any distinct
trust fund in the hands of Williams, the
executor and trustee, which was represented by any specific property. He was also
the residuary legacee, and nearly oiie-iiii,ii
of the assets of the estate consisted of a
debt due from himself. The rest was chiefly
There was
notes secured by mortgages.
no real estate. The moneys received by
Williams from the estate were mixed with
his own. He paid the debts and other legacies, and rendered a,n account, called
"final," in which he charged himself with
"balance of this account retained to pay
annuity of .f600 per annum to Charles Bug"
It was his duty to set apart
bee, 110,000.
this sum, and to keep it separately investThe settlement
ed, but he did not do so.
of the account merely showed that he was
held responsible for that sum ; and, if he
had set it apart, as he ought to have done,
the trust would have attached to the property thus set apart. But, since this was
never done, the trust was never impressed
upon any specific property or money held
by Williams. There was merely an indebtedness or liability on his part to account
for that sum. This indebtedness or liability might itself be the subject of a trust,
just as if it has been the indebtedness of
another person. The trust, however, in
such case, attaches merely to the indebtedness, and to whatever may be realized from
it, and not to anj' particular property held
The view most favorable
by the debtor.
to the annuitants that could be taken is
that Williams had the sum of $10,000 in
money in his hands, which was retained
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for the purpose of raising the annuities.
The evidence shows that this was not the
But assume that it was, the
case.
trust would then attach to it as long as
the money could be identified or traced,
but no longer. When trust money becomes so mixed up with the trustee's individual funds that it is impossible to trace
and identify it as entering into some speThe court
cific property, the trust ceases.
will go as far as it can in thus tracing and
following trust money; but when, as a
matter of fact, it cannot be traced, the equitable right of the cestui que trustto follow it fails. Under such circumstances, if
the trustee has become bankrupt, the
court cannot say that the trust money is
to be found somewhere in the general esHe
tate of the trustee that still remains.
may have lost it with property of his own.
And in such case the cestui que trust can
only come in and share with the general
The Attorney General v. Brigcreditors.
ham, 142 Mass. 248,7 N. E.Rep. 851; Howard v. Fay. 138 Mas.s. 104: White V. Chapin, 134 Mass. 230; Bresnihan v. Sheehan,
125 Mass. 11; Harlow t. Dehon, 111 Mass.
195, 198, 199; Andrews v. Bank, 3 Allen,

LeBretonv.Peirce,2Allen,8,13; John11 Pick. 173, 181, 182; Trecothick V. Austin, 4 Mason, 16. 29;> Ferris
V. Van Vechten, 73 N. Y. 113; Frith v. Cartland, 2 Hem. & M. 417; Holland v. Holland, L.E.4Ch.449; Isaacson v. Harwood,
L. E.3 Ch. 225; Perry, Trusts, §§ 345, 836842; Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 1258, 1259; Lewin,
Trusts, (8th Ed.) 241,857,892. Thereis nothing to the contrary in Bank v. Insurance
Co., 104 U. S. 54, 66-71, and In re Hallett's
Estate, 13 Ch. Div. 696, 708-721, which are
chiefly relied on by the annuitants. In
Wisconsin a majority of the court has declared that it is not necessary to trace the
trust fund into any specific property in order to enforce the trust, and that, if it can
be traced into the estate of the defaulting
McLeod
agent or trustee, this issufBcient.
V. Evans, 66 Wis. 401, 409, 28 N. W, Eep.
173, 214.
But this seems to us to be stated
too broadly.
In the present case, there is no such thing
as tracing the $10,000 into any particular
313;

son V. Ames,

covered by the assignment by Williams for the benefit of his
creditors.
The most that can be said is
that he had this money, and also other
moneys of his own, and used all the moneys together, as his own, for several years,
in buying, building, and selling, and that
he finally failed.
There is no means of ascertaining, as a matter of fact, that the
trust money, if it ever was trust money,
is now represented by any property in the
hands of the assignees. Decree affirmed.
pieces of property

1 Fed.

Cas. No. 14,16<,
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1893.

Bin in equity by "WiUiam A. Slater and another against the Oriental MUls and others
to establish a charge in favor of the Forestdale Manufacturing Company, of which complainants are stockholders,
on the assigned
estate of the Oriental MiUs. Defendant filed
a demiuTer to the bOl. Demurrer sustained.
Joseph 0. Ely and James M. Ripley, for
complainants.
James TiUinghast and William G. RoeUier, for respondents.

STINESS, J. The question raised by the
demurrer to the biU is whether the Forestdale Manufacturing Company, of which the
complainants are stockholders, has a preferassignee of
red claim upon the respondent
the Oriental Mills, an insolrent corporation,
for funds wrongfully taken from the former
company and used to pay liabilities of the
latter company, and otherwise, by persons
who were officers in control of both companies. The rule is clear that one has an
right to follow and reclaim his
equitable
property, which has been wrongfully appropriated by another, so long as he can find
the property, or its substantial equivalent
if its form has been changed, upon the
ground that such property, in whatever foi-m,
with a trust in favor of the
is impressed
If the trustee has mingled it with
oAxner.
his own. he will be deemed to have used
and so
his own, rather than another's,
to leave the remainder under the trust;
identification for
and this is a sufficient
But in this case we are asked
the owner.
to go further, and to hold that, where
one's property has been wrongfully applied
and dissipated by another, a charge remains
upon the estate of the latter for the amount
thus wrongfully taken, upon the ground that
his estate is thereby so much larger, and
that the trust property is reaUy and clearly
there, in a substituted form, although it cannot be directly traced. This view is pressed
with much skiU and some authority, but we
are unable to adopt it. While one who has
been wronged may follow and take his own
property, or its visible product, it is quite
a different thing to say that he may take
else. The genthe property of somebody
eral property of an insolvent debtor belongs
to his creditors, as much as particular trust
property belongs to a cestui que trust. Creditors have no right to share in that which
is shown not to belong to the debtor, and,
conversely, a claimant has no right to take
from creditors that which he cannot show
to be equitably his own. But right here
comes the argument that it is equitably his
own because the debtor has taken the claimant's money and mingled it with his estate, wiiereby it is swelled just so much.
But, as applicable to all cases, the argument
is not sound. Where the property or Its

substantial equivalent remains, we concede
its force; but, where it is dissipated and
gtne, the appropriation of some other property in its stead simply takes from creditors
that which clearly belongs to them. In the
former ease, as in Pennell v. DefCell, 4 De
Gex, M. & G. 372, and In re Hallett's Estate,
(KnatchbuU v. Hallett,) 13 Ch. Div. 696, the
illustration may be used of a debtor mingling trust funds witih his ovsm in a chest or
bag. Thotigh the particular money cannot
be identified, the amount is swelled just so
much, and the amount added belongs to the
But in the latter case
que trust.
cestui
there is no swelling of the estate, for the
money is spent and gone; or, as respondent's
counsel pertinently suggests, "Knight Bruce's
Shall we
bag— is empty."
chest— -Jessel's
therefore order a like amount to be taken
out of some other chest or bag, or out of
estate? Suppose
general
the
the debtor's
estate consists only of mills and
general
machinery acquired long before the comUpon
plainants' money was appropriated.
wliat principle could that property be taken
them? But the complainants
to reimburse
say: "Otu" money has been misappropriated
by the debtor without our consent and without our fault Why should we not be reimUndoubtedly, it
bursed out of his estate?"
is right that every one should have his own;
but, when a claimant's property canmot be
found, this same principle prevents the taking of property which equitably belongs to
creditors of the trustee to make it up. The
creditors have done no wrongful act, and
should not be called upon, in any way, to
of .their debtor.
atone for the misconduct
It is an ordinary case of misfortune on the
part of claimants,
whose confidence
In a
trustee or agent has been abused.
In examining the question upon authority we think it is equally clear that there
relief except in cases
can be no equitable
where the fund clajmed is in some way apparent in the debtor's estate. Of the cases
only four go to
cited by the complainants,
the extent of holding that a cestui que trust
is entitled to a lien for reimbursement on
the general estate of the trustee where the
trust fund does not, in some form, so appear. These are Plow Co. v. Lamp, 80 Iowa,
722, 45 N. W. Rep. 1049;
McLeod v. Evans,
66 Wis. 401, 28 N. W. Rep. 173, 214;
Francis
V. Evans, 69 Wis. 115, 33 N. W. Rep. 93;
Bowers v. Evans, 71 Wis. 133, 36 N. W.
Rep. 629. In the first of these cases the
court lost sight of the distinction, which we
desire to make clear, between
funds remaining in the estate, which go to swell the
assets, and funds which, having been dissipated or used in the payment of debts, do
not remain in the estate, and so do not
sweU the estate. Upon the former fact, as
we have stated above, we concede the right
to relief. But the court in the Iowa case
seems to ignore this very important distinction, and in so doing overthrows the foundation on which its decision is based, for it
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"The creditors, tf permitted to enforce
their claims as against the trust, would secure the payment of their claims out of
trust moneys." Now, how can this be so if
the trust moneys, or their substantial equivalent, are not there? The court assumes that
the payment of debts is the same thing as
an increase of assets, or perhaps that it
works the same result to a creditor by increasing his diyidends. But this Is not so.
How the satisfaction of a debt by incurring
another of equal Amount either decreases
one's liabilities or increases his assets can
only be comprehended
by the philosophic
mind of a Micawber. If a debtor is solvent,
it is aU right either way, because he will
have enough to pay everything he owes;
but, if he is insolvent, the injustice of the
doctrine of the Iowa court is made almost
painfully plain by the following illustration
from the dissenting opinion of Taylor and
Gassoday, JJ., in Francis v. Evans, supra:
"Suppose that an insolvent debtor, D., has
only $1,000 of property, but is indebted to
the amount of $2,000, one-half of which is
due to A., and the other half to B. In this
condition of things D.'s property can only
pay fifty per cent, of his debts. By such distribution A. and B. would each be equitably
entitled to $500. Now, suppose D., while In
that condition, collects $1,000 for P., but instead of remitting the money, as he should,
he uses it in paying his debt in full to A.
By so doing, D. has not Increased his assets a penny, nor diminished his aggregate
indebtedness
a penny.
The only difference
is that he now owes $1,000 each to B. and
F., whereas he previously owed $1,000 each
to A. and B. Now if F. is to have preference
over B., then his claim will absorb the entire amount of D.'s property, leaving nothing whatever for B. In other words, the
$500 to which B. was equitably entitled from
his insolvent debtor, upon a fair distribution
of the estate, has, without any fault of his,
been paid to another, merely in consequence
of the wrongful act of the debtor." It is
impossible to state the case more clearly.
The illustration demonstrates that the mere
fact that a trustee has used the money does
not show that it ihas gone into his estate.
If used to pay debts, he has simply turned
it over to a creditor, thereby giving him a
preference, while his own estate and indebtSuppose
edness remains exactly as before.
he had stolen the money, and turned it over
to somebody from whom it could not be reclaimed.
Can any one say .the owner shotdd
have an equitable lien upon the thief's insolvent estate in preference to his creditors?
They and the owner are equally innocent,
and each must bear his own misfortune.
There seems to be some confusion, also, upon the ground that, because there might be
an equitable lien upon the trustee's property

says:
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in his own hands, the same lien must follow
it into the hands of the assignee, because
he has no greater rights than the assignor.
The assignee is primarily a trustee for creditors; yet it is indeed true that he has
no greater right than the assignor to specific
property. But suppose, after a creditor had
attached property in possession of a debtor,
a complainant should seek an equitable lien
upon it for the reason that the debtor had
misappropriated property which belonged to
the complainant, and of which the attached
property was in no way a part. We see no
When
ground upon which he could succeed.
the creditor seeks to establish his lien for
his debt he stands equal in equitable right
with a claimant who can show no peculiar
equitable claim to the property in question.
The fact that the cestui que trust has not
entered into the relation of debtor and creditor with the trustee does not affect the
question.
So long as he seeks to recover
what he can show to be his own, he is in
the position of an owner; but when he cannot do this, and seeks to recover payment
out of the trustee's general estjite, he Is in
Substantially the
the position of a creditor.
same criticisms are applicable to the Wisconsin cases, with the additional remarks
that tliey are decisions of a court nearly
evenlj^ divided, and that, in our opinion, the
better reason and weight of authority are
with the dissentient .iudges.
In support of the views we have expressed,
it is sufficient to select the following cases:
Little V. Chadwick, 151 Mass. 109, 23 N. E.
Rep. 1005; National Bank v. Insurance Co.,
105 N. Y.
104 U. S. 54; Gavin v. Gleason,
256, 11 N. E. Rep. 504; Englar v. Offiutt, 70
Md. 78, 16 Atl. Rep. 497; Thompson's Appeal, 22 Pa. St. 16; Bank v. Armstrong, 3»
Fed. Rep. 084. The question whether any
of the property of the Forestdale Company
has gone into the hands of the assignee in
form, whereby the
original or substituted
assets are so much larger, is a question of
fact. As to the sum of $149.39 on deposit
in the Columbian National Bank of Boston,
no question being made that it was a part
of the funds of the Forestdale Company,
it may, according to National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54, be claimed by the
owner; but that question cannot be determined in tMs suit, as the money is not in
the hands of the assignee, and the bank is
not a party to the suit. As to the $3,103.33
invested in cotton, and made into manufactured goods, following the doctrine of the
cases cited, the court wiU attribute ownership in such goods, if any such came to the
assignee, to be m the cestui que trust to
This being
tlie amount or value disclosed.
a question of fact, it must stand for hearhig, and the demurrer to the biU, upon the
jioints argued, must be overruled.
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-NONOTUCK
(58 N.

Supreme Court

SILK
W.

CO.

v.

FLANDERS.

383, 87 'NMs. 237.)

of Wisconsin.

March

16,

1894.

Appeal from circuit court, Bayfield count.v;
K. Parish, Judge.
The Nonotuck Silk Company filed a claim
against the estate of A. C. Probert, an insolvent, and procured an order to show cause
why said claim should not be declared preferred. On the hearing the claim was so de-

J.

clared,

and the assignee

appeals.

Reversed.

The other facts fully appear in the followinu statement by CASSODAY, J.:
It appears from the record that for several years prior to June, 1893, the defendant's
assignor, A. C. Probert, conducted a banking
business at ^^'ashbm•n under the name of the
Bank of Washbm-n;
that May 24, 1893, the
plaintiff, a corporation at Chicago, sent a
draft for $99.07, on one Lemke, to the Bank
of Washbm-n
for collection; that June 2,
1S93, the draft was presented to Lemke, and
paid by his check ou the Banlc of Washburn
on the same day;
that June 3, 1893, the
Bank of Washburn issued its draft on the
Union National Bank, its Chicago coiTespondent, for the proper amount, and forwarded the same to the plaintiff; that the
plaintiff did not receive the draft until June
9, 1893,

and deposited

the same immediately

in the Fu-st National Bank of Chicago; that
that bank presented the draft to the Union
National Bank June 10, 1893, but payment
thereof was refused;
that the Union National Bank then had no money to the credit of
the Bank of Washburn, but did have collatto protect overerals, left there expressly
drafts, more than enough to protect the di-aft
in question, as well as all other drafts issued
upon that bank by the Bank of Washburn;
that June 7, 1893, the Bauk of Washburn
closed its doors. Probert having failed; that
June 26, 1893, Probert perfected an assignment for the benefit of his creditors, and on
that day the defendant, his assignee, took
possession of all his property, including the
Bank of Washburn and its effects; that Probert's assets at the time of such assignment
and his liabilities
to $261,716.31,
amounted
to $236,492.31; that such assets consisted of
paper, secured and unsecured,
commercial
stocks, real estate, etc.; that no money whatever came Into the hands of said assignee,
except a few pennies and a $2.50 gold piuce;
that all money in the Bank of Washbm'n on
and after June 1, 1893, was used in paying
checks drawn against deposits, and in paying clerk hire or employes of the Bank of
Washburn; that none of the moneys of Probert, and none of the proceeds of the collection made for the plaintiff, was used in acquiring other property or invested in other
property of any kind, but that all money in
the possession of Probert at and after receiving said check of Lemke for the plaintiff
was used in paying the debts of Probeii, so
that no money, or the proceeds of the mon-

ey, in the Bank of Washburn, or the plaintiff's collection, or the proceeds of said collection, ever came into the hands of said assignee in the shape of property of any kind
whatsoever;
that September 18, 1893, the
plaintiff filed its claim against said estate;
that October 17, 1893, the plaintiff procured
an order to show cause why Its said claim
should not be declared preferred; that on
the final hearing of that application, December 6, 1893, it was ordered by the court that
said claim be, and the same was thereby, declared a preferred claim, and the money and
effects upon which the same was fomided
were thereby declared to be trust funds, and

the said assignee was thereby ordered to pay
said claim of $99.42, in full, out of any moneys in his hands belonging to said estate, in
preference of all claims against said estate
together with costs and disnot preferred,
bursement
of such hearing, taxed at $20.
From that order the defendant brings this
appeal.

Lamoreux, Gleason, Shea & Wright, for
Warden & Alvord, for respond-

appellant.
ent.

CASSODAY, J. (after stating the facts).
The amoimt involved is small, but the case
ia important by reason of others dependent
upon it, and the nature of the question involved.
It appears that A. C. Probert was
the sole owner of the Bank of Washburu;
that June 7, 1893, he failed, and his bank
closed its doors; that June 26, 1893, he made
a voluntary assignment
of all his property
to the defendant for the benefit of his creditors.
There is some force in the suggestion
that the receiving of Lpmke's check in payment of the plaintiff's draft on him, held by
Probert's bank for collection, and the sending to the plaintiff of a draft made by Probert's bank on the Chicago bank for the
amount of such collection, four days prior
to such failm-e, was nothing more than the
substitution on the books of Probert's bank
of a credit to the plaintiff, or to the Chicago
bank, for the amount, in lieu of the former
credit for the same amount to Lemke. But
it appears that, at the time of giving the
check, Lemke had funds in Probert's banlc
to the amount of the check, and hence the
transaction would seem to be substantially
the same as though
Lemke had actually
drawn the money on the check, and then immediately handed the same back in payment
of the draft on him in favor of the plaintiff,
and then held by Probert's bank for collection; and that Probert's bank then retained
the money so paid in by Lemke, and In lieu
thereof sent to the plaintiff its draft on the
Chicago bank, as mentioned in the foregoing
statement.
As therein indicated, the money
so represented by the check was, with o'ther
moneys, used up in paying the debts of Probert, so that no part of that money or the
proceeds of that collection,
either in the
shape of money or of property of any kind.

CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS.
ever came into the hands of the defendant,
as such assignee.
Such being the facts, it is
manifest that the plaintiff is not here re-

claiming his own property intrusted to Probert's bank, nor the avails or the proceeds
thereof,
but is here claiming a preference
over other creditors out of other assets and
property of Probert received by the defendant by virtue of such assignment.
Certainly,
there is no statute in this state giving any
such preference,
nor any authorizing an insolvent debtor, by way of a voluntary assignment, to give such preference.
Laws 1883, c.

349; Laws 1885, c. 48; sections 1693a, 1693c,
Sanb. & B. Ann. St. It follows that, if the
plaintiff is entitled to such preference
at
all, it must be by virtue of some established
principle of equity or the common law.
The early English cases only went to the
extent of holding, in effect, that the owner of
property intmsted to an agent, factor, bailee,
or other trustee could follow and retake his
property from the possession of such trustee, or others in privity with him, and not a
bona fide purchaser for value, whether such
property remained in its original form, or in
some different or substituted form, so long
as it could be ascertained
to be the same
property, or the product or proceeds thereof,
but that such right ceased when the means
of ascertainment failed, as when the subject
of the tmst was money, or had been converted into money, and then mixed and confounded in a general mass of money of the
same description, so as to be no longer divisible or distinguishable. This is apparent
from the opinion of Lord Ellenborough, G.
J., written nearly 80 years ago, reviewing
the adjudications prior to that date. Taylor
But the more
V.' Plumer, 3 Maule & S. 575.
recent rule in England as to following trust
moneys is broader, and goes to the extent of
holding, in effect, that "if money held by a
though not
person in a fiduciary character,
as trustee, has been paid by him to his account at his banker's, the person for whom
he held the money can follow it, and has a
in the ' inker's
charge
on the balance
hands;" that "if a person who holds money
as a trustee, or in a fiduciary character,
pays it to his account at his banker's, and
mixes it with his own money, and afterwards draws out sums by checks in the oi'di* * * the drawer must be
nary manner,
taken to have drawn out his own money,
In re
in preference to the trust money."
Hallett's Estate (Knatchbull v. Hallett), 13
Ch. Div. 696, overruling some former English cases. In that case there was no dispute but what the money received by the
contrustee
for the property wrongfully
verted was deposited with his bankers to
the credit of his account, and that the same
"remained at his banker's, mixed with his
own money, at the time of his death." But
in the leading opinion, by Jessel, M. R,, in
that case, and by way of quoting Mr. Justice

Fry approvingly, it is said: "The guiding
principle is that a trustee cannot assert a
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title of his own to trast property. If he destroys a trust fund by dissipating it altogether, there remains nothing to be the subject of the trust. But, so long as the trust
property can be traced and followed int»
other property into which it has been converted, that remains subject to the trust."
Id. p. 719.
That case is as favorable to the
claim of the plaintiff as any in the English
courts;
the
and yet it nowhere sanctions
proposition that the owner of the property
or money intrusted is entitled to a preference over other creditoi-s of an insolvent estate out of property or assets to which no
part of th^ trust fund, or the proceeds thereof, is traceable.
All such cases turn upon
the question of fact whether the trust property or fund, or the proceeds thereof, are
traceable into any specific' property or fund.
Ex parte Hardcastle (In Re Mawson), 44
Law T. 524. Thus, in Re Gavin v. Gleason,
105 N. Y. 256, 11 N. E. 504, it was held that,
"to entitle the trust creditor to such a preference, it must, at least, be made to appear
that the fund or property of the insolvent,
remaining for distribution, includes proceeds
of the trust estate."
To the same effect, Atkinson V. Printing Co., 114 N. Y. 168, 21 N.
E. 178; Holmes v. Gilman, 138 N. Y. 376, 34
N. E. 205.
In Little v. Chadwick, 151 Mass.
110, 23 N. E. 1005, the coittt said: "When
trust money becomes so mixed up with the
trustee's individual funds that it is impossible to trace and identify it as entering into
some specific property, the trust ceases. The
court will go as far as it can in thus tracing
and following tmst money; but when, as a
matter of fact, it cannot be traced, the equitable right of the cestui que trust to follow
it fails." To the same effect are Goodell v.
Buck, 67 Me. 514; Steamboat Go. v. Locke,
Englar v. OfiCutt, 70 Md. 78, 16
73 Me. 370;
Atl. 497; Thompson's Appeal, 22 Pa. St. 16;
Columbian Bank's Estate, 147 Pa. St. 440,
23 Atl. 625, 626, 628; Appeal of Hopkins
(Pa.) 9 Atl. 867; Bank v. Goetz, 138 111. 127.
27 N. E. 907; Neely v. Rood, 54 Mich. 134,
13 N. W. 920; Sherwood v. Bank, 94 Mich.
78. 53 N. W. 923; Elevator Co. v. Clark (N.
T>.) 53 N. W. 175; National Bank v. Insurauce Co., 104 U. S. 54, 68; Peters v. Bain,
133

U. S. 670, 693, 10 Sup. Ot. 354;

Eq. Jur.

2 Story,

Pom. Eq. Jur. §
1 Lewin, Trusts (1st Am. Ed.) 241.
1058;
In speaking of following trust moneys into other property, it is stated in one of the
New York cases cited that "the right has its
basis in the right of property."
It never
was based upon the theory of preference by
reason of an unlawful conversion.
This is
made clear by a recent and well-considered
opinion by the supreme
court of Rhode
Island.
Slater v. Oriental Mills (R. I.) 27
Atl. 443.
It follows that the mere fact that
Probert's bank used the plaintiff's money
towards paying its indebtedness, before making the assignment, did not authorize a preference to the plaintiff, over Probert's other
creditors,
out of his other property and as§§

1258,

1259;

2
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This Is made plain, by an Illustration
having judicial sanction in the case last
cited: "Suppose that an insolvent debtor, D.,
has only $1,000 of property, but Is indebted
to the amount of $2,000, one-half of which is
In this
due to A., and the other half to B.
condition of things, D.'s property can only
By such
pay fifty per cent, of his debts.
distribution, A. and B. would each be equiNow, suppose D.,
tably entitled to $500.
while in that condition, collects $1,000 for F.,
but instead of remitting the money, as he
should, he uses it in paying his debt in full
By so doing, D. has not increased his
to A.
assets a penny, nor diminished his aggregate
The only difference
a penny.
indebtedness
is that he now owes $1,000 each to B. and
P., whereas he previously owed $1,000 each
Now, if F. is to have preferto A. and B.
ence over B., then his claim will absorb the
entire amount of D.'s property, leaving nothing whatever for B. In other words, the
$500 to which B. was equitably entitled from
his insolvent debtor, upon a fair distribution
of the estate, has, without any fault of his,
been paid to another, merely in consequence
Id., and
of the wrongful act of the debtor."
See, also,
dissenting opinion in 69 Wis. 123.
McClure v. Board (Colo. Sup.) 34 Pac. 763.
We must hold that the plaintiff has no legal
right to a preference over Probert's other
creditors In the distribution of his estate in
the hands of the defendant, as assignee, and
into which no part of the plaintiff's money
sets.

has been traced.
This is not a mere question of practice,
nor the construction of a local statute long
acqmesced in, but is a question of general
equity jurisprudence; and it Is very Important to the people of the state that this
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coui-t should, at least on such questions, adhere to the principles of the common law so
well esrablished as to become elementary.
It Is especially essential that the state and
federal courts, on such questions, should be
in harmony. In so far as McLeod v. Evans,
66 Wis. 401, 28 N. W. 173, 214; Francis v.
Evans, 69 Wis. 115, 33 N. W. 93; and Bowers V. Evans, 71 Wis. 133, 36 N. W. 629,—
are in conflict with the rules above Indicated,
The
as overruled.
they must be regarded
order of the circuit court Is reversed, and the
cause Is remanded for further proceedings
in accordance with this opinion.

ORTON, C. J. (dissenting).
This case is
ruled by McLeod v. Evans, 66 Wis. 401, 28
N. W. 173, 214; Francis v. Evans, 69 Wis.
115, 33 N. W. 93; and Bowers v. Evans, 71
It was a case of a
Wis. 133, 36 N. W. 629.
It was
special deposit or trust or agency.
the employment
of the bank to collect a
draft. It ought not to make any difference
that the bank embezzled the proceeds. The
plaintiff was clearly entitled to be a preferred
creditor.
this was the first case of the
kind,
might not dissent.
respectfully
dissent on the ground that the decision in
this case overrules three well-considered
and
In the
reconsidered decisions of this court.
long history of this court, there have been
very few overruled cases. The interests of
by the stathe public are best subserved
bility of decisions. If former cases are to
be overruled by every change of the personality of the bench, we may soon have no
line of decisions on important questions, to
which the business of the country has been
long adapted and adjusted, and everything
will become unsettled.

I
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SUGAR-REPINING

N. E.

FANCHER.
206.

145

CO. v.

N. Y. 552.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 9,

1895.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,
First department.
Action by the American Sugar-Refining
Company against Cliarles H. Fancher, assignee.
From a judgment of the general
term (30 N. Y. Supp. 482), reversing a judgment
for plaintifC, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.

Charles E. Hughes, for appellant.
B. Dill, for respondent.

James

O. J.
This case presents a
of considerable practical importance.
It relates to the equitable jurisdiction of the
court, under special circumstances,
to foUov^
proceeds of personal property in the hands
of a fraudulent vendee or his genei-al assignee for the benefit of creditors at the suit
of a defrauded vendor, who by false pretenses was induced to part with the property

ANDREWS,

question

upon
credit,
proceeds
sought
the
to be
reached being the sums due from subvendees
of the fraudulent purchaser arising on resales by him made before the discovery by
the plaintiff of the fraud. The facts upon
which the question arises are substantially
conceded and are free from complication.
Between the 20th day of September, 1892,
and the 20th day of October following, the
plaintiff sold and delivered to the mercantile
firm of O. Burkhalter & Co., doing business
in the city of New York, sugars of various
qualities on credit for the price in the aggregate of $19,121.41, no part of which has been
paid, the last sale having been made October 19, 1892.
On the next day the firm,
being insolvent and owing debts greatly in
excess of its assets, made a general assignment to the defendant for the benefit of its
Among the assigned assets were
creditors.
a portion of the sugars sold by the plaintiff
to the firm, which he replevied from the assignee; but the firm, prior to the assignment,
had sold to numerous persons, customers of
the firm, in the ordinary course of trade, portions of the sugars on credit, and claims held
by the firm against the subvendees arising
out of such sales, exceeding in the aggregate the sum of $10,000, were among the asThese
sets which passed by the assignment.
claims were collected by the assignee after
the assignment, and (excepting a small sum)
after notice had been served by the plaintiff
on the assignee that it rescinded the original
sale for fraud, which notice was accompanied
by a demand for the sugars then in the possession of the assignee, and for an accounting and the delivery to the plaintiff of the
outstanding claims against the customers of
Burkhalter & Co. in their hands for the
sugars sold by the firm as above stated. The
assignee declined to accede to the demand
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On the trial the parties by stipulation
fixed the amount of the claims for sugara
sold which had come to the hands of th«
assignee, and which had been collected by
him.
The fraud of Burkhalter & Co. was
It was shown that the
not controverted.
sales were induced by a gross misrepresentation in writing made by one of the members
of the firm to the plaintiff as to the solvency
of the firm, made on or about September 20,
1892, within 30 days before the assignment,
and when the firm was owing several hundred thousand dollars more than the value of
its whole assets.
The case presented is singularly free from
any unceiiainty in respect to the facts upon
which the equitable jurisdiction to follow the
They are
proceeds of the sugars is claimed.
definite and ascertained,
but it is insisted
that the court is impotent to give relief by
way of subjecting the choses in action or their
proceeds, representing
the sugars, to a lien
in favor of the defrauded vendor, or to adjudge that they shall be applied in partial
recompense and restitution for the property
wrongfully
so
as
is
because,
obtained,
claimed, such relief is not in any such case
within the scope of the powers of courts of
equity as heretofore defined and exercised,
and for the further reason that new rights
have intervened by reason of the assignment.
The fraud of Burkhalter & Co. was, as we
have said, admitted. They are hopelessly
insolvent, and were so at the time they took
They disposed of a
the plaintiff's goods.
large part of the sugars before the plaintiff
became cognizant of the fraud.
The plaintiff
was only apprised of it after the assignment
was made.
The remedy at law upon the contract against the fraudulent and insolvent
purchaser is, under the circumstances,
ineffectual.
Tlfe pursuit of the property, except
the small part of it which was unsold and
passed to the assignee, is impracticable.
If
it could yet be found unconsumed and capable of identification, the multiplicity of suits
which would be rendered necessary to reclaim it would make the remedy expensive,
burdensome,
and inadequate.
The identification of the proceeds sought to be reached
Is complete and unquestioned.
It is not
claimed that the credits or tlie money into
which they have been converted are not the
very proceeds of sugars of which the plaintiff
was defrauded.
The jurisdiction of a court of equity to follow the proceeds of property taken from the
true owner by felony, or misapplied by an
agent or trustee, and converted into property
of another description, and to permit the true
owner to take the property in its altered state
as his own, or to hold It as security for the
value of the property wrongfully taken or misapplied, or, in case the original property or
its proceeds have been mingled with that of
the wrongdoers in the purchase of other property, to have a charge declared in favor of the
person injured to the extent necessary for his
made.
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iademuity, so long as the rights of bona fide
has been fredo not intervene,
purchasers
quently exerted, and is a jurisdiction founded
upon the plainest principles of reason and justice. The case of Xcwton v. Porter, 69 N. Y.
of this
1.33, is an illustration of the application
principle in a case of the larceny of negotiable
bonds, sold by the thieves, in which the court
subjected securities in which they invested
the money, and which they had transferred
with notice to third persons as security for
services to be rendered, to a charge in favor
of the owner of the stolen bonds. The cases
upon this head are very numerous,
where
there has been a misapplication of trust funds
by trustees, or persons standing in a fiduciary
relation, and the money or property misapplied has been laid out in land or converted inThe court in
to other species of property.
such cases lays hold of the substituted property and follows the original fund, through all
the changes it has undergone, until the power of identification
is lost or the rights of
stop the pursuit, and
bona fide purchasers
hclds it in its grasp to indemnify the innocent
And even in case of
victim of the fraud.
mnney, which is said to have no earmark, its
identity will not be deemed lost, though it is
mingled with other money of the wrongdoer,
if it can be shown that it forms a part of the
general mass.
Pennell v. Deffell, 4 De Gex,
M. & G. 372; In re Hallett's Estate, 13 Oh.
Div. 696; Holmes v. Oilman, 138 N. Y. 369,
34 N. E. 205.
In the cases of stolen property,
or of misapplication by a trustee or agent of
the funds of the principal or cestui que trust,

the title of the real owner of the property
has been in most cases lost, without his consent, and the court, by a species of equitable
substitution,
repairs, as far as practicable,
the wrong, and prevents the wrongdoer from
profiting by his fraud.
And, indeed, courts of law, borrowing the
equitable principle, in cases of misappropriation by agents, vest in the principal at his
election the legal title to a chattel or security
in the hands of the agent, purchased exclusively by the application of the embezzled
Taylor v. Plumer,
fund.
or misappropriated
It is at this point that
3 Maule & S. 562.
the controversy in the present case commences, and the divergence arises which has led
to this litigation. It is claimed, on behalf of
the defendant, that courts of equity in commercial cases, where the claim of the plaintiff
originates in a fraud in the sale of personal
prciperty, do not undertake to follow proceeds in the hands of the wrongdoer, but that
the defrauded party, having consented to part
with his title, is remitted exclusively to such
legal remedies as are given for the redress of
The jurisdiction of courts of equithe wrong.
ty in cases of trust or agency, or cases of like
character, it is insisted, is founded upon the
ancient jru-isdiction of these courts over trusts
and fiduciary relations, and has not been and
ought not to be extended beyond these cases.
It is very true that trusts and trust relations

are peculiarly cognizable in equity, and have
been so cognizable from the earliest period of
equitable jurisprudence. But it is to be said
that these are hut branches of the larger jurisdiction over frauds, which equity, abhors,
and of which it has cognizance admittedly in
many cases not connected
with technical
trusts or agency.
It cannot be denied that
the protection of cestuis que trustent against
frauds of the trustee is an object of pecuUar
They, in
solicitude in the courts of equity.
many cases, are incapable, by reason of age,
inexperience, or other incapacity, from looking
out for themselves, and the court stands in
the attitude of guardian of their interests.
But, as has been said, a court of equity does
not restrict its remedial processes to the aid
of the helpless or the ignorant. It embraces
within its view the general claims included
within what are called quasi trusts, and intervenes to prevent violations of equitable duty
by whomsoever committed or whoever may
suffer from the violation.
It goes altogether
outside of trust relations in many cases to
prevent fraud, or to compel a restoration of
The exercise
property
obtained by fraud.
of the jurisdiction to set aside fraudulent
transfers of real or personal property made
in fraud of creditors is familiar. And the jurisdiction is most beneficially invoked in cases
of private fraud to rescind transfers of real
estate procm'ed by fraudulent representations,
and to restore to the defrauded vendor the
It often
title of which he has been defrauded.
happens in cases of transfers of real estate
procured by fraud that, before the action is
brought or the plaintiff is apprised of the
fraud, the fraudulent vendee has disposed of
the land in whole or in part, or has created
liens thereon in favor of the bona fide purchasers for value.
In such cases the court
will mold the relief to suit the circumstances,
and will, at the election of the plaintiff, rescind the contract and compel a reconveyance
of the part of the land still remaining in the
hands of the vendor, and compel the wrongdoer to account for the proceeds of the land
sold, or award compensation
in damages.
The court in many cases resorts to the fiction
of a trust, and, by construction, adjudges that
the proceeds in the hands of the wrongdoer
are held by him as trustee of the plaintiff.
This was the exact nature of the relief granted in the case of Trevelyan v. White, 1 Beav.
589, as appears by the recital of the decree
In the opinion of the master of the rolls, where
part of the estate had been sold by the fraudIn Cheney v. Gleason, 117
ulent vendee.
Mass. 557, a bill was filed by the defrauded
vendor of real estate to reach a mortgage taken by the vendee on the land on a resale by
him, and the court sustained the bill and
granted the relief. In Hammond v. Peimock,
61 N. Y. 145, the court rescinded, at the instance of the plaintiff, a contract for the exchange of real and personal property, owned
by the plaintiff, for a farm of the defendant
ui Michigan, which had been consummated
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on the plaintiff's part by a conveyance and
transfer, the contract and conveyance having
been obtained by the defendant by fraudulent

representations; and the defendant having,
after the conveyance to him, conti-acted to sell
part of the land conveyed to him by the
plaintiff, the court adapted the relief to the

circumstances,
and rescinded the conveyance
so far as practicable,
and adjudged that the
defendant account for the proceeds of the personal property included in the sale.
If the jurisdiction exercised by courts of
equity in respect to undoing fraudulent conveyances
of real estate, and following the
proceeds in the hands of the
fraudulent
grantee, appertains in like manner and degree to sales of personalty,
it would seem
that the plaintiff in the present case was entitled to relief. The fact that, before the
action was brought, Burkhalter &. Co. had
made a general assignment for the benefit
of creditors to the defendant is no obstacle
to the relief, if, except for the assignment,
the
court would have interposed,
on the
prayer of the plaintiff, its preventive
and
other remedies, to have enabled the plaintiff
to reach the unpaid claims against the subvendees.
An assignee for creditors is not a
purchaser for value, and stands in no other
or better position than his assignor as respects a remedy to reach the proceeds of the
sales by Burkhalter & Co. Goodwin v. WertKeimer, 99 N. Y. 149, 1 N. E. 404; Barnard
V. Campbell, 58 N. Y. Y6; Eatcliffe v. Saiigton, 18 Md. 383; Bussing v. Rice, 2 Cush. 48.
It is claimed that the general creditors of
the firm will be prejudiced if the plaintiff is
allowed to prevail, and that he will thereby
acquire a preference over the other creditore of the insolvent firm. But general cred■itors have no equity or right to have appropriated to the payment of their debts the
property of the plaintiff, or property to which
it is equitably entitled as between it and

Burkhalter & Co.
They, so far as appears, advanced nothing,
and gave no credit on the faith of the firm's
possession of the sugars, assuming that that
element would have had any bearing on the
case.
If the sugars had existed in specie
in the hands of the assignee, it cannot be
doubted that the plaintiff on rescinding the
sale would have been entitled to retake them,
and the general creditors are in no worse
position, if the plaintiff is awarded the proceeds, than they would have been if the
iluch was said
sugars had remained unsold,
on the argument upon the difference
between a trespasser taking and disposing of
the property of another and the case of a
sale of personal property to a vendee induced
by fraud.
It is the law of this state, as in
England, that title passes on such a sale to
the fraudulent vendee, notwithstanding that
the crime of false pretenses is Included in
the statute definition of a felony, but which
was
not such at common law. Barnard
V. Campbell, supra; Wise v. Grant, 140 N. Y.
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N. E. 1078; Benj. Sales (6th Ed.)
Fassett v. Smith, 23 N. Y. 252; Benedict V. Williams, 48 Hun, 124.
But a purchase procured by fraud is in no sense, as
between tne vendor and vendee, rightful.
It
was wrongful, and, while a transfer so induced vests a right of property in the vendee
until the sale is rescinded, the means anfi
act by which it was procured was a violatioii
of an elemental principle of justice. But the
rule is that a sale of personal property induced by fraud is not void, but is only voidable
on the part of the party defrauded.
"This does not mean that the contract is
void until ratified; it means that the contract
is valid until rescinded."
When a contract
of sale infected by fraud of the vendee is
593,

35

§ 433;

consummated,
and the property
delivered,
the vendor on discovering the fraud may pursue one of several courses.
He may affirm
the contract,
and an omission to disaflirm
within a reasonable time after notice of the
fraud will be deemed a ratification. He may
elect to rescind it, and thereby his title to
the property is reinstated as against the purchaser and all persons deriving title from
him, not being bona fide purchasers for value,
and a purchaser is not such who takes the
propertj' for an antecedent debt, or who purchased the property on credit, and has not
paid the purchase money or been placed in a
position where payment to a transferee of
the claim cannot be resisted.
Barnard v.
supra; Dows v. Kidder, 84 N. Y.
Campbell,
121;
Matson v. Melchor, 42 Mich. 477, 4 N.
W. 200; 1 Benj. Sales, p. 570, note.
Upon rescission the vendor may follow and
retake the property wherever he can find
it, except in the case mentioned, or he may
sue for conversion.
When these legal remedies are available and
clearly
adequate,
there is no ground for going to a court of
equity.
The legal remedies in such case are
and ought to be held exclusive.
But in a
case like the present, where there is no adequate legal remedy, either on the contract
of sale or for the recovery of the property in
specie, or by an action of tort, is the power
of a court of equity so fettered that where it
is shown that the property has been converted by the vendee, and the proceeds, in
the form of notes or credits, are identified
beyond question in his hands, or in possession of his vohintary assignee, it cannot impound such proceeds for the benefit of the
defrauded vendor? The only reason urged
in denial of this power which to our minds
has any force is based on the assumption
that it would be contrary to public policy to
admit such an equitable principle into commercial transactions. But with the two limitations adverted to, and which ought strictly
to be observed, (1) that it must appear that
the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law,
either in consequence of insolvency, the dispersion o-f the property, or other cause, and
(2) that nothing will be adjudged as proceeds except what can be specifically identi-
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fieil as such, business interests will iiave ad- i granted the Injunction.
The ease of Oavin
Indeed, the disturbance | V. Gleason, 105 N. Y. 256, 11 N. E. 504, was
equate protection.
would be much less than is now permitted
an attempt to fasten upon the estate of an
in following the property from hand to hand
insolvent a preferential lien for money put
until a Ixjna fide purchaser is found.
into his hands by the plaintiff for the purchase of a mortgage for her, and which he
The case of Small v. Attwood, Younge, 507,
applied, without authority, to the payment of
is a very instructive case, which involved a
large amount, was argued by eminent counhis debts before the assignment, with the
sel, and received great consideration. It supexception of a small sum ($30), which went
The court
ports, we think, the equitable jurisdiction
Into the hands of the assignee.
invoked in the present case. It was an acheld that the money, which the insolvent had
tion by the purchaser to rescind a contract
used to pay debts prior to the assignment,
for the sale of mines and mining property
was not a perferred debt, but sustained her
and
right to be paid the small sum which the
induced by fraudulent representations,
belonging
to' tlie
trust.
to recover the purchase money paid to the
assignee
received
The court found
amount of about £200,000.
This case points the distinction. The charThe
the fraud and rescinded the contract, and
acter of the debt gave it no priority.
On a supmade a decree for an accounting.
fund had been dissipated, and could not be
There
assets.
plemental bill being filed, showing that the
traced among the assigned
purchase money paid had been invested by
was no equitable ground of prefei-ence except for the small sum mentioned.
the seller in public securities in his name,
Upon the whole case, we are of the opinion
which he afterwards caused to be put in the
name of his mother, and that the purchaser
that the judgment on the report of the referee
had no otl»er means adequate to repay the purwas correct, and the order granting a new
chase money, the chancellor, on an application
trial should thc'»;fore be reversed, and the
judgment on the report of the referee aflSirmfor an Injunction restraining the transfer of
Judgment accordingly. All
ed, with costs.
the securities, held that tha money paid could
and
be followed into the stock purchased,
concur.
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J. B. Gleason, for appellant.
son, for respondents.

April

19, 1887.

W. H. John-

ANDREWS, J. It may properly be conceded that the $3,000, received by White from
the petitioners on the third day of January,
1883, for investment in the Gould mortgage,
constituted in his hands a quasi trust fund,
which White was bound to use for the specific purpose contemplated, and which he could
not divert to any other use without committing a breach of trust. The securities which
formed the greater part of the fund were immediately convertible into money, and authority in White to make such conversion
was implied, but only as a means of realizing
the money with which to make the mortgage
loan.
The securities, while in the hands of
White, remained the property of the petitioners; and, when converted by him, their title
attached
to the proceeds of the converted
property. White collected the securities actually or constructively. He collected the notes
against third persons, and drew the money
deposited in the Delaware National Bank.
The two certificates of deposit issued by himself, amounting in the aggregate to $780, he
accepted as money.
It is material to a proper understanding of
the question presented, to state a few other
facts which appear in the record. White was
On the fifth of January,
a private banker.
1883, two days after the transaction with the
petitioners to which we have alluded, he was
taken sick, and on or about the ninth of January a run commenced on the bank, and on the
twelfth of January he made a general assignment to the defendant, Gleason, for the benefit of creditors, having at the time on hand in
cash assets only the sum of $64.75.
The
Gould mortgage was never procured by White,
and he made no investment for the petitioners of the $3,000 received on the third day of
January.
On the contrary, it was found by
the judge at special term that White, after
receiving and collecting the securities, and

prior to the eleventh day of January, in violation of his trust, used the entire fund of $3,000 excepting the sum of $30, which came to
the hands of the assignee. In paying his perBut on the elevsonal debts and liabilities.
enth of January, the day prior to the making of the assignment, for the purpose of securing the claim of the petitioners, he transferred to them a land contract, from which
and other sources the petitioners have realized sufficient to reduce their claim to the
sum of $877.27. It was admitted on the hearing of the petition, which took place in January, 1885, that the assignee had then on hand
proceeds of the assigned estate sufficient to
pay the said sum of $877.27, but it was con1

Modifying 39 Hun,
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ceded by the petitioners that the assigned estate was insufficient to pay in full the debts
of the assignor.
The special term granted the prayer of the
petitioner, and made an order directing the
assignee to pay the claim of the petitioners
out of the money in his hands, and this order
The order
was affirmed by the general term.
in effect appropriates out of the assigned estate the sum of $877.27 to the payment of the
claim of the petitioners, in preference to the
claims of the general creditors.
The petitioners, to maintain the order in
question, rely upon the rule in equity that, as
between cestui que trust and trustee, and all

parties claiming under the trustee otherwise
than by purchase for valuable consideration,
without notice, all property belonging to a
trust, however much it may be changed or
altered in its nature or character, and all the
fruit of such property, whether in its original or altered state, continues to be subject
to or affected by the trust. Pennell v. DefCell,
4 De Gex, M. & G. 387, Turner, L. J. This
settled doctrine of equity has its basis in the
right of property.
The owner of personal
property which, by the wrongful act of his
agent or trustee, lias been changed and converted into chattels of another description,
may elect to treat the property into which the
conversion has been made as his own.
Upon
such election the title to the substituted property is vested in him as fully as if he had
originally authorized the wrongful act, which
title he may assert in a legal action to the
same extent as he could have asserted title
in respect to the original property. The reason of the doctrine is stated by Lord Ellenborough in the leading case of Taylor v.
Plumer, 3 Maule & S. 562, in language often
quoted: "For," he says, "the product or substitute for the original thing still follows the
nature of the thing itself, so long as it can be
ascertained
to be such, and the right only
ceases when the means of ascertainment
fail."
The question in that case involved the
legal title to certain stock and bullion which
an agent of the defendant, intrusted by his
principal with money to invest in exchequer
bills, had wrongfully misapplied to the purchase of the stock and bullion, intending to
abscond with it and go to America, and the
court sustained the defendants' title.
Courts go very far to protect rights of property as against a wrong-doer.
They follow It
through whatever changes and transmutations it may undergo in his hands, and as
against him, transferred to the changed and
altered product the original title, however
much the original property has been increased in value by his labor or expenditure,
provided only that the prodnct is still a chattel, and is composed of the original materials.
Silsbury v. McCoon, 3 N. T. 379.
But a court
of law, as a general rule, deals only with the
legal title; and when the legal identity of the
property is destroyed, or the property cannot
be traced specifically into another thing, it is
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powerless to give relief, except by action for
damages agaiust tbe wrong-doer.
The language of Lord EUenborough, already quoted,
that the right to follow property only ceases
when the means of ascertainment fail, is illustrated by what follows, "which," he adds,
"is the case when the subject is turned into
money and mixed and compounded in a general mass of the same description."
It is not important to inquire whether later
decisions have not established,
even in respect to strictly legal actions, a somewhat less
stringent limitation upon the right of pursuit
than that Indicated in the language just quoted.
But it is unnecessary to pursue this inquiry here. It is clear that in this case the
trust fund has been dissipated and lost by
the act of the trustee.
It is neither specifically in the hands of the trustee or of his assignee, nor it is represented by other property into which it has been converted.
The
fund, according to the finding, (with the exception of the sum of $30,) was paid out on
the debts of White before the assignment
Plainly, there is no room for any contention
that the petitioners have legal title to any of
the assigned property.
The sole inquiry Is
whether a case is made for equitable intervention in favor of the petitioners in the administration of the insolvent estate.
It is
clear, we think, that, upon an accounting in
bankruptcy or insolvency, a trust creditor is
not entitled to a preference over general creditors of the insolvent, merely on the ground
of the nature of his claim; that is, that he is
a trust creditor as distinguished from a general creditor.
We know of no authority for
such a contention.
The equitable doctrine
that, as between creditors, equality Is equity, admits, so far as we know, of no exception founded on the greater supposed sacredness of one debt, or that it arose out of a violation of duty, or that its loss involves greater apparent hardship In one case than another, unless it appears, in addition, that there
Is some specific recognized equity founded on
some agreement, or the relation of the debt
to the assigned property, which entitles the
claimant, according to equitable principles, to
preferential payment If it appears that trust
property specifically belonging to the trust is
included in the assets, the court doubtless
may order It to be restored to the trust
So,
also. If it appears that trust property has been
wrongfully converted by the trustee, and constitutes, although in a changed form, a part
of the assets, it would seem to be equitable,
and in accordance with equitable principles,
that the things Into which the trust property
has been changed, should, if required, be set
apart for the trust, or. If separation is impossible, that priority of lien should be adjudged
in favor of the trust-estate for the value of
the trust property or funds, or proceeds of the
trust property, entering into and constituting
This rule simply asserts
a part of the assets.
the right of the true owner to his own property.
But It Is the general rule, as weU In a court

of equity as In a court of law, that, in order
to follow trust funds, and subject them to the
operation of the trust, they must be Identified.
A court of equity, In pursuing the inquiry and in administering relief, is less hampered by technical
difficulties than a court
of law; and it may be sufficient, to entitle a
party to equitable preference In the distribution of a fund in insolvency, that it appears
that the fund or property of the insolvent remaining for distribution includes the proceeds
of the trust-estate, although it may be impossible to point out the precise thing in which
the trust fund has been invested, or the precise time when the conversion
took place.
The authorities require at least this degree of
distinctness In the proof before preference can
be awarded.
See Van Alen v. American Nat.
Bank, 52 N. Y. 1; Newton v. Porter, 69 N. Y.
133; Ferris v. Van Vechten, 73 N. Y. 113;
Pennell v. Deffell, supra; Frith v. Cartland,
2 Hem. & M. 417.
The facts in this case fall short of the proof
required within any case which has come to
our notice.
The trust fund, with the single
exception mentioned, was misappropriated by
White to the payment of his private debts
prior to the assignment
It cannot be traced
Into the property
in the hands of the assignee, for the plain reason that It is shown
to have gone to the creditors of White in satisfaction of their debts.
The courts below
seem to have proceeded upon a supposed equity springing from the circumstance that, by
the application of the fund to the payment of
White's creditors, the assigned estate was relieved pro tanto from debts which otherwise
would have been charged upon it and that
thereby the remaining creditors, if entitled
to distribution without regard to the petitioner's claim, will be benefited.
We think this is
quite too vague an equity for judicial cognizance, and we find no case justifying relief
upon such a circumstance.
In a very general
sense, all creditors of an insolvent may be
supposed to have contributed to the assets
which constitute the residuum of his estate.
The case of People v. City Bank of Rochester, 96 N. Y. 32, seems to have been misunderstood.
The question considered
in this
case was not raised there, and it was not
claimed in that case that the proceeds of the
checks of Sartwell, Hough & Co., the petitioners, had not gone into the general fund of the
bank, or that they had not passed in some
form to the receiver.
The court did not decide that the petitioners would have been entitled to a preference in case the proceeds of.
the checks had been used by the bank, and
were not represented
In Its assets In the
hands of the receiver.
For the reasons stated, we are of opinion
that the orders of the special and general
terms should be modified by reducing the sum
directed to be paid by the assignee to the
sum of $30, with Interest from April 19, 1883,,
but without costs to either party.
All concur.
Ordered accordingly.
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Action to recover proceeds of stolen bonds.
There was a judgment for plaintiff, from
which defendants appealed.
M. Goodrich, for appellants.
ters, for respondent.

M. M. Wa-

ANDREWS, J. This is an equitable action
brought to establish the right of the plaintiff
the proceeds of stolen
to certain securities,
bonds, and to compel the defendants to account therefor.
In March, 1869, the plaintifE was the owner
of $13,000 of government bonds, and of a railroad bond for $1,000, negotiable by delivery,
which, on the 12th of March, 1869, were stolen from her, and soon afterward $11,500 of
the bonds were sold by the thief and his confederates, and the proceeds divided between
them.
William Warner loaned a part of his
share in separate loans and took the promisGeorge
sory notes of the borrower therefor.
Warner invested $2,000 of his share in the
purchase of a bond and mortgage, which was
assigned to his wife Cordelia without consideration.

In January, 1870, William Warner, George
Warner, Cordelia Warner and one Lusk were
upon the charge
arrested
of stealing the
bonds, or as accessories to the larceny, and
were severally indicted in the county of Cortland. The Warners employed the defendants,
who are attorneys, to defend them in the
criminal proceedings, and in any civil suits
which might be instituted against them in respect to the bonds, and to secure them for
their services and expenses, and for any liabilities they might incur in their behalf; William Warner transferred to the defendants
Miner and Warren promissory notes taken on
loans made by him out of the proceeds of the
stolen bonds, amounting to $2,250 or thereabouts, and Cordelia Warner, for the same
purpose, assigned to the defendant Porter the
bond and mortgage above mentioned.
The learned judge at special term found
that the defendants had notice at the time
they received the transfer of the securities,
that they were the avails and proceeds of the
stolen bonds, and directed judgment against
them for the value of the securities, it appearing on the trial that they had collected or disposed of them and received the proceeds.
The doctrine upon which the judgment in
this case proceeded, viz.: that the owner of
stolen and afterward
negotiable
securities
sold by the thief may pursue the proceeds of
the sale in the hands of the felonious taker
or hia assignee with notice, through whatever
changes the proceeds may have gone, so long
as the proceeds or the substitute therefor can
be distinguished or identified, and have the
proceeds or the property in which they were
invested subjected, by the aid of a court of
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equity, to a lien and trust in his favor for
the purposes of recompense and restitution, is
founded upon the plainest principles of justice and morality, and is consistent with the
rule in analogous cases acted upon in courts
It is a general principle
of law and equity.
of the law of personal property that the title

of the owner cannot be divested without his
The purchaser from a thief, howconsent.

ever honest and bona fide the purchase may
have been, cannot hold the stolen chattel
against the true proprietor, but the latter may
follow and reclaim it wherever or in whosesoever hands it may be found. The right of
pursuit and reclamation only ceases when its
identity is lost and further pursuit is hopeless; but the law still protects the interest of
the true owner by giving him an action as for
the conversion of the chattel against any one
who has interfered with his dominion over
it, although such interference may have been
innocent in intention and under a claim of
right, and in reliance upon the title of the felonious taker. The extent to which the common law goes to protect the title of the true
owner has a striking illustration in those
cases in which it is held that where a willful
trespasser converts a chattel into a difCerent
species, as for example, timber into shingles,
wood into coal, or corn into whisky, the product in its improved and changed condition belongs to the owner of the original material.
Silsbury v. McCoon, 3 N. Y. 380, and cases
The rule that a thief cannot convey a
cited.
good title to stolen property has an exception
securities
in case of money or negotiable
transferable by delivery, which have been put
into circulation and have come to the hands
The right of the owner
of bona fide holders.
to pursue and reclaim the money and securities there ends, and the holder is protected in
his title. The plaintiff was in this position.
The bonds, with the exception stated, had, as
the evidence tends to show, been sold to bona
fide purchasers, and she was precluded from
following and reclaiming them.
The right of the plaintiff in equity to have
the notes and mortgage while they remained
in the possession of the felons or of their assignees with notice, subjected to a lien and
trust in her favor, and to compel their transfer to her as the equitable owner, does not,
we think, admit of serious doubt The plaintiff, by the sale of the bonds to bona fide
purchasers,
lost her title to the securities.
She could
not further follow them.
She
could maintain an action as for a conversion
of the property against the felons.
But this
remedy in this case would be "fruitless, as
they are wholly insolvent.
Unless she can
elect to regard the securities in which the
bonds were invested
as a substitute, pro
tanto, for the bonds, she has no effectual
remedy.
The thieves certainly have no
claim to the securities in which the proceeds
of the bonds were invested as against the
plaintiff.
They, without her consent, have
disposed of her property, and put it beyond
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lier reach.
If the avails remained in their
hands, in money, the direct proceeds of the
sale, can it be doubted that she could reach
it? It is not necessary to decide that in the
case supposed she would have the legal title
to the money, but if that question was inAolved in the case I should have great hesitation In denying the proposition. That she
could assert an equitable claim to the money
I have no doubt. And this equitable right
to follow the proceeds would continue and
attach to any securities or property in which
the proceeds were invested, so long as they
could be traced and identified, and the rights
of bona flde purchasers had not intervened.
In Taylor v. Plumer, 3 Maule & S. 562, an
agent, intrusted with a draft for money to
buy exchequer bills for his principal, received the money and misapplied it by purchasing American stocks and bullion, intending to abscond and go to America, and absconded, but was arrested before he quitted
England, and surrendered the securities and
bullion to his principal, who sold them and
It was held that the
received the proceeds.
principal was entitled to withhold the proceeds from the assignee in bankruptcy of the
agent, who became bankrupt on the day he
Lord
received and misapplied the money.
Ellenborough, in pronouncing the opinion in
that case, said: "1 makes no difference, in
reason or law, into what other form different from the original the change may have
been made, whether it be into that of promissory notes for the security of money produced on the sale of the goods of the principal, as in Scott v. Surman, Willes, 400, or into
as in Whitecomb v. Jaother merchandise,
cob, Salk. 160, for the product or substitute
for the original thing still follows the nature of the thing itself so long as it can be
to be such, and the right only
ascertained
ceases when the means of ascertainment
fails."
If, in the case now under consideration,
the plaintiff had intrusted the Warners with
the possession of the bonds, and they had
sold them in violation of their duty, for the
purpose of embezzling the proceeds, and Invested them in the notes and mortgage in
question, the plaintiff could, within the authority of Taylor v. Plumer, have claimed
them while in their hands, or in the hands
of their assignees with notice, and would be
adjudged to have the legal title.
In courts of equity the doctrine is well
settled and is uniformly applied that when
a person, standing in a fiduciary relation,
misapplies or converts a trust fund Into another species of property, the beneficiary will
be entitled to the property thus acquired.
The jurisdiction exercised for the protection
of a party defrauded by the misappropriation of property, in violation of a duty, owing by the party making the misappropriation,
sive.
most

is

exceedingly

broad

and

comprehen-

The doctrine is illustrated and applied
frequently in cases of trusts, where

trust moneys have been, by the fraud or
violation of duty of the trustee, diverted
from the purposes of the trust and converted
into other property. In such case a court
of equity will follow the trust fund into the
property into which it has been converted,
and appropriate it for the indemnity of the
beneficiary.
It is immaterial in what way
the change has been made, whether money
has been laid out in land, or land has been
turned into money, or how the legal title to
Eqthe converted property may be placed.
uity only stops the pursuit when the means
of ascertainment fail, or the rights of bona
fide purchasers
for value without notice of
the trust, have intervened.
The relief will
be moulded and adapted to the circumstances of the case, so as to protect the interests and rights of the true owner.
Lane v.
Dighton, Amb. 409; Mansell v. Mansell, 2
P. Wms. 670; Lench v. Lench, 10 Ves. 511;
Lewis V. Madocks, 17 Ves. 56; Perry, Trusts,
§ 829; Story, Eq. Jur. § 1258.
It is insisted by the counsel for the defendants that the doctrine which subjects property acquired by the fraudulent misuse of
trust moneys by a trustee to the influence of
the trust, and converts it into trust property
and the wrong-doer into a trustee at the election of the beneficiary, has no application to
a case where money or property acquired by
felony has been converted into other property. There is, it is said, in such cases, no
trust relation between the owner of the stolen property and the thief, and the law will
not imply one for the purpose of subjectiui;
the avails of the stolen property to the claim
of the owner. It would seem to be an anomaly in the law if the owner who has been deprived of his property by a larceny should
be less favorably situated in a court of equity, in respect to his remedy to recover it,
or the property into which it had been converted, than one who by an abuse of trust
has been injured by the wrongful act of a
trustee to whom the possession of trust property has been confided. The law in such a
case will raise a trust in invitum out of the
transaction, for the very purpose of subjecting the substituted property to the purposes
of indemnity and recompense. "One of the
most common cases," remarks Judge Story,
"in which a court of equity acts upon the
grourl of implied trusts in invitum, is when
a party receives money which he cannot conscientiously withhold from another party."
Story, Eq. Jur. § 1255.
And he states it to
principle that "whenever the
be a general
property of a party has been wrongfully
misapplied, or a trust fund has been wrongfully converted into another species of property, if its identity can be traced, It will be
held in its new form liable to the rights of
the original owner, or the cestui que trust."
Id. § 1258. See, also, Hill, Trustees, p. 222.
We are of opinion that the absence of the
conventional
relation of trustee and cestui
que trust between the plaintiff and the War-
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ners is no obstacle to giving the plaintiff
benefit of the notes and mortgage,
or
proceeds In part of the stolen bonds.
Bank of America v. Pollock, 4 Edw. Oh.

It

the
the
See
215.

is however strenuously Insisted that the
defendants had no notice when they received
the securities that they were the avails or
proceeds of the bonds.
That if they had notice they would stand in the position of their
assignors, and that the property in their
hands would be affected by the same equities as if no transfer had been made, is not
Murray v. Ballon, 1 Johns. Oh. 566;
denied.
Hill, Trustees, p. 259. The learned judge at
special term found as has been stated, that
had notice of the larceny of
the defendants
the bonds, and the use made of the money
arising from their sale, at the time they reThe duty of
ceived the notes and mortgage.
this court upon the question of notice is
limited to the examination of the case, with
a view of ascertaining whether there was
evidence to support the finding of fact. If
such evidence exists, the finding of the trial
judge is conclusive.
We have examined with much care the
voluminous record before us, and are of opinion that the finding is sustained by the evidence.
The testimony was conflicting. The
circumstances under which the defendants
took the transfer of the securities were certainly unusual, and the facts then known by
the

defendants

were

calculated

to create

a

strong presumption that the notes and mortof the stolen
gage came from investments
property. It was for the trial court to weigh
and in the light of all the
the testimony,
facts developed on the trial, to determine
It would be a usethe question of notice.
less labor to collate the testimony on this
subject, and we content ourselves with stating our conclusion, that the finding was warranted by the evidence.
The objection to the evidence, under a commission issued to William Jessup of Montrose, Pennsylvania, and which was executed by William H. Jessup as commissioner
In supwas, we think, properly overruled.
port of the objection, one of the defendants
testified that he resided at Montrose in 1858,
and that at that time two attorneys resided
there, named respectively William and William H. Jessup, and an offer was made to
prove that the judge who granted the order
for the commission consulted a register of at-
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torneys in which both names appeared, and
selected the name of William Jessup, and inThe commission was
serted it In the order.
executed two years and a half before the
trial. It does not appear at what time It
was returned to the clerk, but the presumption is that it was returned within a reasonThe objection
able time after its execution.
that the commission was not executed by
the person intended was not made until the
evidence taken under it was offered on the
trial. That the defendants were apprised of
the facts upon which
the objection was
founded before the trial is quite evident.
Prima facie a commission directed to a
person, omitting any mention of a middle
name, and returned executed by a person of
the same name, with the addition of a middle name, is executed by the person named
in the order. Franklin v. Talmadge, 5 Johns.
84.
The ruling of the judge, in respect to
the objection made to the commission, was
clearly in furtherance of justice. The defendant had ample opportunity to raise the
objection to the commission before the trial
by a motion to suppress, and it should not
be permitted that a party may lie by, and
spring an objection of this kind on the trial
for the first time, when the other party may
be unable to meet It by proof, and when
there is no opportunity to issue a new com
mission, or sen(f it back to be executed by
It is we think a wholethe proper person.
some rule that objections to the execution
of a commission where the party has an opportunity to make them before the trial,
should be raised by motion, and if not raised
in that way when such opportunity exists,
they should be deemed to have been waived.
Whether such objection is to formal defects
merely, or as in this case goes to the right
of the person who executed the commission
makes, we think,
to act as commissioner,
no difference in the application of the rule.
If the fact of disqualification is known to
the party who seeks to exclude the evidence
a sufficient time before the trial, to enable
him to make his motion.
See Kimball v.
Davis, 19 Wend. 438; Sturm v. Atlantic Mut.
Ins. Co.. 63 N. Y. 77; Drury v. Foster, 2
Wall. 33; Sheldon v. Wood, 2 Bosw. 267;
Zellweger v. OafCe, 5 Duer, 100.
The judgment should be affirmed.

All

concur.

Judgment affirmed.
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Court of Appeals of New York. May 21, 1874.
Appeal from judgment of the general term
of the supreme court in the First judicial deaffirming a judgment in favor of
partment,
defendant, entered upon decision of the court
Reported below, 61 Barb.
at special term.
310.

This action was brought to have certain
leases, obtained by the defendant during the
existence
of a copartnership between him
and plaintiff, for terms to commence at its
termination, of premises leased and occupied
by the firm, declared to have been taken for
the partnership, and to have it adjudged that
the defendant held them as trustee for the
partnership. The facts found were substantially as follows:
The plaintiffs were copartners, conducting
and carrying on the Hoffman House, in the
city of New York.
The copartnership, by its
terms, expired May 1, 1871; it owned various leases of premises which were used for
the partnership business.
All of the leases
expired at the same time with the copartnership.
The firm had spent large sums of
and
money in making valuable improvements
In fitting up the leasehold premises so thai
they could be benefleially used in connection,
and also in fixtures and futaishing, and by
their joint efCorts had built up a profitable
business, and largely enhanced the rental valIn 1869 the defendant,
us of the premises.
without any notice of his intent to apply
therefor, and without the knowledge of plaintiff, procured renewal leases, in his own name,
of the premises, for terms commencing at the
termination of the partnership leases and of
the partnership, which, upon discovery thereof having been made by plaintiff, defendant
claimed were his property exclusively, and
refused to recognize or acknowledge that the
partnership or plaintiff had any right or inOther facts appear in the
terest therein.
opinion.
The court found as conclusions of law that
Read was the sole owner of
the defendant
the leases executed to him as aforesaid, and
that the plaintiff had no right, title, nor interest in or to them, or either of them, and
that the defendants have judgment accordingly, to which plaintiff duly excepted.
Judgment was rendered accordingly.
The plaintiff commenced this action soon
after he ascertained that the defendant had
taken the new leases, to wit, in March, 1870,
and the cause was brought to trial in February,

1871.

A. J. Vanderpoel and J. B. Burrill, for appellant. John K. Porter and Willard O. Bartlett, for respondents.

EARL,

O.

The relation of partners with

other is one of trust and confidence.
Each is the general agent of the firm, and is

each

bound to act in entire good faith to the other.
The functions, rights and duties of partners in a great measure comprehend
those
both of trustees and agents, and the general
rules of law applicable to such characters
are applicable to them.
Neither partner can,
in the business and affairs of the firm, clandestinely stipulate for a private advantage
to himself; he can neither sell to nor buy
from the firm at a concealed profit to himEvery advantage which he can obtain
self.
in the business of the firm must inure to the
benefit of the firm.
These principles are elementary,
and
not
Story,
are
contested.
Partn. §§ 174, 175; Colly. Partn. 181, 182.
It has been frequently held that when one
partner obtains the renewal of a partnership lease secretly, in his own name, he will
be held a trustee for the firm as to the renewed lease.
It is conceded that this is the
rule where the partnership is for a limited
term, and either partner takes a lease commencing within the term; but the contention is that the rule does not apply where
the lease thus taken is for a term to commence after the expiration of the partnership by its own limitation, and whether this
contention
is well founded
is one of the
grave questions to be determined
upon this
appeal.
It is not necessary, in maintaining the right
of the plaintiff in this case to hold that in
all cases a lease thus taken shall inure to the
benefit of the firm, but whether,
upon the
facts of this case, these leases ought to inure to the benefit of this firm
will briefly
allude to some of the prominent features of
this case. These parties had been partners
for some years; they were equal in dignity,
although their interests differed. The plaintiff
was not a mere subordinate in the firm, but
so far as appears, just as important and efliThey
cient in its affairs as the defendant.
procured the exclusive control of the leases of
the property, to terminate May 1, 1871, and
their partnership was to terminate on the
They expended many thousand
same day.
dollars in fitting up the premises, a portion
thereof after the new leases were obtained,
and they expended a very large sum in furnishing them.
By their joint skill and influence they built up a very large and profitable business,
which largely enhanced the
rental value of the premises.
More than
two years before the expiration of their
leases and of their partnership, the defendant secretly procured, at an increased rent,
in his own name, the new leases, which are
Although the plaintiff was
of great value.
in daily intercourse with the defendant, he
knew nothing of these leases for about a
year after they had been obtained.
There
is no proof that the lessors would not have
leased to the firm as readily as to the defendant alone
The permanent fixtures, by
the terms of the leases at their expiration,
belonged to the lessors.
But the movable
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fixtures

and furniture were worth vastlymore to be kept and used in the hotel than
to be removed elsewhere.
Upon these facts
1 can entertain no doubt, both upon princi-

ple and authority, that these leases should
be held to inure to the benefit of the firm.
If the defendant can hold these leases, he
could have held them if he had secretly obtained them immediately after the partnership commenced, and had concealed the fact
from the plaintiff during the whole term.
There would thus have been, during the
whole term, in making permanent improvements and in furnishing the hotel, a conflict
between his duty to the firm and to his selfinterest. Large investments and extensive
furnishing would add to the value of his lease,
and
defendant
would be under constant
temptation to make them.
While he might
not yield to the temptation,
and while proof
might show that he had not yielded, the law
will not allow a trustee thus situated to be
thus tempted,
and therefore disables him
from making a contract for his own benefit.
Terwilliger v. Brown, 44 N. Y. 237, and cases
cited.
It matters not that the court at special term found upon the evidence that the
improvements
were judicious and prudent for
the purposes of the old term. The plaintiff
was entitled to the unbiased judgment of the
unindefendant as to such improvements,
fluenced by his private and separate interest.
But, further, the parties owned together a
large amount of hotel property in the form of
exceedfurniture and supplies, considerably
Assuming
ing, as I infer, $100,000 in value.
that the partnership was not to be continued
after the 1st day of May, 1871, this property
was to be sold, or in some way disposed of
for the beneflt of the firm, and each partner
owed a duty to the firm to dispose of it to the
best advantage.
Neither could, without the
violation of his duty to the firm, place the
property in such a situation that it would be
sacrificed, or that he could purchase it for
Much
his separate benefit, at a great profit.
of this property, such as mirrors, carpets, etc.,
was fitted for use in this hotel, and it is quite
manifest that all of it would sell better with
a lease of the hotel, than it would to be reIt is clear that one or both
moved therefrom.
of these parties could obtain advantageous
leases of the hotel for a term of years, and
hence, if the parties had determined to dissolve their partnership, it would have been a
of ordinary prudence to have obmeasure
tained the leases and transferred the property with the leases as the only mode of realThis was defeated by the act
izing its value.
of the defendant, if he is allowed to hold these
leases, and thus place himself in a position
where the proprty must be largely sacrificed
or purchased by himself at a great advantage.
This the law will not tolerate. The language
of Lord Eldon, in Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick, 17 Ves. 311, a case in many respects
He says:
resembling this, is quite in point.
"If they [the defendants] can hold this lease
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and the partnership stock Is not brought to
sale, they are by no means on equal terms.
The stock cannot be of equal value to the
plaintiff, who was to carry it away and seek
some place in which to put it, as to the defendants who were to continue it in the
place where the trade was already established, and if the stock was sold the same construction would give them an advantage over
In effect they would have sethe bidders.
cured the good-will of the trade to themselves
For these reain exclusion of their partner."
of the consideration that
sons, independently
the leases themselves had. a value to which
the firm was entitled upon other grounds and
upon authorities to be hereafter cited, the
plaintiff, who commenced his suit about one
year before the term of the partnership expired, was upon undisputed principles and authorities applicable to all trustees and persons holding a fiduciary relation to others,
entitled to the relief he prayed for.
It has long been settled by adjudications,
that generally when one partner obtains the
renewal of a partnership lease secretly, in
his own name, he will be held a trustee for
the firm, in the renewed lease, and when the
rule is otherwise applicable, it matters not
that the new lease is upon different terms
from the old one, or for a larger rent, or that
the lessor would not have leased to the firm.
The law recognizes the renewal of a lease as
a reasonable expectancy of the tenants in possession, and in many cases protects this exwill briefly
pectancy as a thing of value.
notice a few of the cases upon this subject.
In Holridge v. Gillespie, 2 Johns. Ch. 30,
Chancellor Kent says:
"It is a general principle pervading the cases, that- if a mortgagee,
executor, trustee, tenant for life, etc., who
has a limited interest, gets an advantage by
being in possession, 'or behind the back' of
the party interested in the subject,
or by
some contrivance
or fraud, he shall not retain the same for his own benefit, but hold
it In trust." That was a case where a lease
was assigned as security, and the assignees
surrendered it to the lessor and took a new
lease for an extended term of years.
In

I

Phyfe V. Warden, 5 Paige, 268, Chancellor
Walworth lays down the general rule: "That
if a person who has a particular or special interest in a lease obtains a renewal thereof
from the circumstance of his being in possession as tenant, or from having such particular interest, the renewed lease is in equity
considered as a mere continuance of the original lease, subject to the additional charges
upon the renewal, for the purpose of protecting the equitable rights of all parties who had
any interest, either legal or equitable, in the
old lease."
That case was followed in Gibbes
V. Jenkins, 3 Sandf. Ch. 131, where it was
held that one purchasing a leasehold which
was subject to a mortgage and contained no
covenant of renewal, could not escape the lien
of the mortgage by suffering the lease to expire and afterward obtaining a new lease of
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the premises; that the new lease in such case,
though not a renewal, was a continuance of
the original lease for the purpose of protecting
the rights of the parties interested in the original lease, both legal and equitable.
In these
two cases church leases were involved, and
some stress was laid upon that fact, as the
continuance of such leases was expected as a
matter of course, without any covenant of
renewal.
But the fact that they were church
leases could make no real difference in the
principle upon which the decisions were based.
The fact that a renewal or continuance of a
lease is more or less certain can make no difference with the principle; that springs from
the fact that the party obtained a new lease
from the position he occupied, being in possession and having the good-will which accompanies that, or being connected with the
old lease in some way, and thus enabled to
take an inequitable advantage of other parties also interested, to whom he owed some
duty.
In Struthers v. Pearce, 51 N. Y. 357, it was
held that when during the existence of a
continuing copartnership of undetermined duration, three or tour copartners, without the
knowledge of the other, obtained a new lease
in their own names, of premises leased and
used by the firm, the same became partnership property, and upon dissolution the other
partner was entitled to his proportion of the
value.
In that case the defendants Intended
as early as Auto dissolve the copartnership
gust, and gave written notice on the 18th day
of September, 1865, for the dissolution on the
On the 11th
31st day of December following.
day of September, the defendants secretly obtained a new lease, in their own names, of
the same premises, for a term of five years,
I think that case
to commence May 1, 1866.
It is true that a
is fairly decisive of this.
period for a dissolution of the partnership had
not been fixed when the new lease was taken,
but negotiations were pending for its dissolution, and a few days after the new lease was
taken, a time for its dissolution was fixed by
But it can make no differa written notice.
ence that the partnership might have been
continued by the parties until after the new
So it might here, if the
term commenced.
parties had so willed. There they had the
right to dissolve it at any time. The principle
which lies at the foundation of the decision
of that and all similar cases must be the one
above stated, that the defendants in possession took advantage of their position to procure the new lease, and thus deprived the
plaintiff of a benefit to which he, with them,
In a note to Moody v.
was equally entitled.
Matthews, 17 Ves. (Sumn. Ed.) 185, the learned editor says, as a deduction from adjudged
cases, that "with a possible exception in favor
of a bona fide purchaser, it seems to be an
vmiversal rule that no one who is in possession of a lease or a particular interest in a
lease, which lease is affected with any sort of
equity in behalf of third persons, can renew

the same for his own use only; but such renewal must be construed as a graft upon the
old stock."
In Clements v. Hall, 2 De Gex
& J. 173, where one partner In a mining partnership died in 1847, and the surviving partner thereafter
worked the mine without a
new lease thereof, claiming to do so for his
own benefit, until 1850, when the lessor gave
him notice to quit in March, 1851, when he
entered into new negotiations with the lessor
for a new lease, and obtained one of the
greater part of the mine, on terms much more
burdensome than those of the old tenancy, it
was held that those who claimed under the
will of the deceased partner were entitled to
In
a share of the benefit of the new lease.
Clegg V. Fishwick, 1 Macn. & G. 294, one of
partners working a mine under a
several
lease died, and the firm business was thereafter carried on for several years between the
surviving partners and the plaintiff, widow of
Finally the old lease
the deceased partner.
expired, and some of the partners took a new
lease of the mine without the privity of the
plaintiff.
It was held that the estate of the
deceased partner was interested in the new
The lord chancellor says:
lease.
"The old
lease was the foundation of the new lease,
and the tenant's right of renewal arising out
of the old lease giving the partners the benefit
of this new lease; at least, the law assumes
it to be so.
Without saying at all what circumstances there may be to Interfere with
that ordinary right, we know that the rule of
equity is that parties interested jointly with
others in a lease cannot take to themselves
the benefit of a renewal to the exclusion of
the other parties interested with them."
In
Clegg V. Edmondson, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 787,
the managing partnei-s of a mining partnership at will gave notice of dissolution to the
rest, and intimated their intention, after the
dissolution, to apply for a new lease for their
own exclusive benefit, and did so and obtained a lease, and it was held to inure to the
benefit of the partnership. See, also, the leading cases of Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick, 17
Ves. 298, and Keech v. Sandford, 2 Eq. Cas.
Abr. 741, and notes to the latter case in 1
Lead. Cas. Eq. 32, where the whole doctrine
is discussed, and .conclusion reached in harmony with the views above expressed.
I
therefore conclude that it makes no difference
that these leases were obtained for a term to
commence after the partnership,
by its own
limitation, was to terminate.
can find no
authority holding that it does, and there is no
principle sustaining the distinction claimed.
The defendant was in possession as a member
of the firm, and the firm held the good-will
for a renewal, which ordinarily attaches to
By his occupancy, and the
the possession.
payment of the rent, he was brought into intimate relations with the lessors;
he became
well acquainted with the value of the premises, and he took advantage of his position,
during the partnership, secretly to obtain the
new leases.
He must hold them for the firm.
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am therefore of opinion that the judgment should be reversed, and new trial granted, costs to abide the event.

DWIGHT, C. The question at issue in this
case is, whether a member of a commercial
partnership, during its continuance, and without the consent or knowledge of his associate,
can take a renewal of a lease of property
used in the business, In his own name and
for his own benefit, the partnership having a
definite termination, and the renewal lease
commencing at its expiration.
The general power of a partner to take a
lease of such property for his own benefit
must be considered as settled in this court
by the decision in Struthers v. Pearce, 51 N.
Y. 357. In that case the lease was taken
during the existence of the partnership, which
was of indefinite duration.
No notice had been
given of its termination when this lease was
taken.
The facts presented the case of a
lease taken during the existence of the partduring
nership, and to begin in enjoyment
that time.
The court expressely distinguished
it from the present case, which had then
been decided in the supreme court. Page 362.
The only point now open for discussion is,
whether the fact that when Read took the
renewal of the lease the partnership had a
precise limit, and was to terminate before
is material.
Before
the lease commenced,
'considering that point, it may fairly be claimed that this case comes within the precise
decision in Struthers v. Pearce, on a ground
Read,
in the argument.
mentioned
not
though his lease was not to commence in possession until after the expiration of the original lease, acquired an immediate interest by
way of an interesse termini. This precise
point was decided in Smith v. Day, 2 Mees.
& W. 684, 699 ; 2 Piatt, Leas. 60. This, it is true,
Still it is the
is not an estate, but a right.
subject of grant before entry.
1 Steph.
Comm. 268; Burt. Real Prop. 18, pi. 61; 2
Crabb, Real Prop. 227.
If the partnership
had acquired this interesse termini, it might,
as the facts of the case show, have been disIf the
posed of for a large sum of money.
doctrine of Struthers v. Pearce establishes
that the partner cannot acquire a lease in his
own behalf, to commence while the partnership lasts, by parity of reasoning he cannot
obtain an interesse termini under the same
circumstances.
If however this view is not correct, the
main question must be disposed of.
Can a
partner take a lease for himself, to commence
in possession after the partnership has expired? In order to settle this point It is
essential to give the subject a more full examination than was requisite in Struthers v.
Pearce, and to consider more at large the principles on which this branch of the law rests.
It grows out of the relation of trust and confidence between partners, and is a branch of
the rule that a trustee cannot profit from the
It largely has its
estate for .which he acts.
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roots in a principle of public policy, as shown
Keech v. Sandin one of the early decisions.
ford, Sel. Cas. Ch. 61; Griffin v. Griffin, 1
The
Schoales & L. 352, per Lord Redesdale.
general rule is so well settled that it would
be a waste of time to refer to authorities.
The text-writers on the law of partnership,
without exception, assert the applicability of

this rule of law to partnership transactions.
Lindl. Partn. 495; Story, Partn. §§ 174, 175;
Parsons, Partn. §§ 224-226; CoUy, Partn. §§
281,

282.

The special rule that a trustee cannot take,
for his own benefit, a renewal of a lease
which he holds In trust, is enforced in a great
number of cases. The principle on which it
rests is nowhere more fully or clearly stated
than in the argument of Sir Francis Hargrave in Lee v. Vernon, 5 Brown, Pari. Cas.
(10th Eng. Ed.) 1803. Although the passage is

somewhat long, it is quoted aa shedding much
light on a subject, the principle of which has
in course of time, become somewhat obscure.
He said: "It has long been an established
practice to consider those who are in possession of lands under leases for lives or years
as having an interest beyond the subsisting
term, and this interest is usually termed the
tenant right of renewal, which though according to language and ideas strictly legal, is
not any certain or even contingent estate;
but only a chance, there being no means of
compelling a renewal, yet is so adverted to in
all transactions relative to leasehold property, that it influences the price in sales, and
is often an inducement to accept of it in
mortgages and settlements.
This observation
is more especially applicable to leases from
the crown, the church, colleges or other corporations, and indeed from private persons,
where the tenure is of ancient date. • * ♦

This 'tenant right' of renewal as it is termed,
however imperfect or contingent in its nature, being still a thing of value, ought to
be protected by the courts of justice, and
when those who are entitled to its incidental
advantages, whether by purchase or other derivation, are disappointed of them by fraud,
imposition, misrepresentation,
or unfair practice of any kind, it is fit and reasonable that
this injury should have redress.
Accordingly
courts of equity have so far recognized the
tenant right of renewal as frequently to interpose in its favor by decreeing that new or
reversionary leases gained by means or supposition of the tenant right of renewal should
be for the benefit of the same persons as
were interested in the ancient lease, and those
who procured such new leases and were legally possessed of them, should be trustees
for that purpose.
There is a great variety of
authorities on this head, but the cases which
have hitherto occurred have been principally
of two kinds, some being cases of persons
not having any beneficial interest in the old
lease, as guardians and executors, and others
being cases of persons having only partial
and limited interests, as tenants for life, mort-
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gagees and mortgagors, and In cases of both
descriptions
those who have procured a new
lease in such situations have been uniformly
declared trustees for the persons beneficially
Interested in the ancient lease, either wholly
or in part, according to the particular circumstances, the court ever presuming
that the
new lease was obtained by means of a connection with and a reference to the Interest
in the ancient one, without in the least regarding whether the persons renewing intended to act as trustees, or for their own emolument."
From this exposition so luminous and judicial in Its tone, which is fully sustained by
the autliorities, it is clear that the rule under consideration is not confined to crown,
church or college leases, but embraces those
of every kind. The same principle appertains to all. The cestui que trust has a right
Though this is
to the chance of renewal.
termed a "tenant right" as between the lessee and the landlord, that is a mere phrase.
It is a hope, an expectation, rather than a
right. Such as It is the trustee shall not
take it to himself, but if it results in any
substantial benefit he shall hold it for his
beneficiary. Phyfe v. Wardell, 5 Paige, 26S;
Bennett v. Van Syckel, 4 Duer, 162; Glbbes
V. Jenkins,
3 Sandf.
Ch. 130; Davoue v.
Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252; Armour v. Alexander, 10 Paige, 572; Dickinson v. Codwise,
1 Sandf. Ch. 226.
Some of these were Instances of church or other corporation leases,
and others were not.
In no case has it been
held that the rule is confined to these, as It
cei-tainly cannot be on principle.
The whole doctrine is extended to the case
of partners in Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick,
17 Ves.
29S;
Clegg
v. Edmondson,
8 De
Gex, M. & G. 787; Clements v. Hall, 2 De
Gex & J. 173; Clegg v. Fish wick, 1 JIacn.
&, G. 294; Struthers v. Pearce,
supra.
The principle cannot depend on the fact
whether the lease is made to begin during
the continuance of the partnership or at its
close.
Once admit the general
principle,
ajid it must result in this. While the relation lasts, one partner cannot clandestinely
and exclusively profit by the trust relation.
There may perhaps be cases where the act
is openly done by the trustee and acquiesced
In by the beneficiary that woiild admit of
different considerations.
It is not now necessary to decide that in no case can a partner take a lease for his own benefit.
What
Is now to be decided is, whether he can do
so behind the back of his associate and withThe bad consequences of
out his consent.
making any such distinction as the defendant seeks to maintain In the present case is
easily shown by a reference to the relation
of a guardian' and his ward. A guardian,
we may suppose, holds a lease in his official
character which is to expire at his ward's
majority. While the relation of guardian
and ward exists, he takes a lease to himself
to commence at the termination of the ex-

isting lease.
Could that be sustained? Has
he not profited by the trust relation?
When
he takes a lease to himself, can a tenable
distinction be taken between one commencing immediately and one beginning at a
future day, even though that day be postponed until the trust relation expires? The
sound rule is that he cannot make any profit
to himself from a secret transaction initiated while the relation of trustee and cestui
que trust exists, no matter when it springs
into active operation.
It must never be forgotten that on general principles of the law
of contracts his right to the lease, as between
him and his landlord, commences as soor
as he has made his agreement for it.
Thi&
is an immediate subject of sale, and If the
trustee can hold it he will be allowed to
profit by the trust relation which, as has
been shown, he cannot do.
The cestui que
"All the value
trust may accordingly say:
of this lease you hold in trust for me. Grant
that it is not yet an estate but only a rightmake it over to me in tlie condition in which
you hold it."
While no case has been found
presenting the precise facts in the case at
bar, the principles which should govern it
may be derived from the result in Featherstonhaugh V. Fenwick, supra, Clegg v. Edmondson, and Clegg v. Fishwick, supra.
In the first of these cases the partnership
was for an indefinite period, and might be
dissolved at the pleasure of either party, on
It was dissolved November 22, 1804,
notice.
the day on which the lease expired.
Two of
the partners, without communication with
the plaintiff, had applied for a renewal of the
lease, and obtained It before giving notice of
the dissolution of the partnership.
The new
lease was to run for eight years from the
expiration of the old one. On October 19
they gave notice to dissolve the partnership.
The court held that the new lease belonged
to the partnership and was assets of the
firm. Much stress was laid on the fact that
the transaction was a clandestine one, and
the court thought if notice had been given
the case might have admitted of different
consideration. The case is not in all respects
parallel in its facts with the case at bar,
for at the time the lease was taken the period for the termination of the partnership
had not been fixed, and only became subsequently ascertained by notice.
In the case of Clegg v. Edmondson, which
was also an instance of a partnership to be
dissolved at the pleasure of the parties, the
effect of a notice to dissolve, preceding the
execution of the renewal lease, came before
the court.
In that case five managing partners had determined to dissolve their partnership, and had communicated their intent
in June, 1846, and their determination to
take a renewal to themselves.
To this two
other partners objected, claiming that the
renewal should be for the benefit of all. Formal notice of dissolution was given In July,
to take effect on September 30. On the sue-

CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS.
ceeding 11th of December a new lease was
executed for twenty-one years to the managing partners, to take effect from September 29, 1846.
The defendants endeavored to
distinguish this case from that of Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick, on the ground of the
openness
and fairness of the transaction.
The court however held that the mere communication of an intent on the part of the
managing partners to apply for a lease for
their own benefit was not sufficient to give
This case, on
them an exclusive right to it.
the point of time, is stronger than the case
at bar, for the new lease was taken after the
partnership was dissolved, though some
stress was laid upon a point which does not
appear here, that the act was that of managing partners.
On principle, in many cases, it is of but little consequence whether the partnership is
dissolved or not before the renewal, since, if
the former partners become tenants in common, the result is the same.
Clements v.
Hall, 2 De Gex & J. 173; Van Home v.
Fonda, 5 Johns. Ch. 388; Baker v. Whiting,
The case of
3 Sumn. 475, Fed. Cas. No. 787.
Clegg V. Fishwick is still nearer to the one
under consideration. In this instance, the
renewal lease was obtained during the existence of the partnership, and the lease commenced at its expiration.
This lease was declared to be held in trust for the firm.
Without further collation of authorities,
the fair deductions from the principles on
which they rest may be summed up as follows:
1. A trustee holding a lease, whether corporate or individual, holds the renewal as a
trustee, and as he held the original lease.
upon any right
2. This does not depend
which the cestui que trust has to the renewal, but upon the theory that the new
lease is, in technical terms, a "graft" upon
the old one; and that the trustee "had a facility," by means of his relation to the estate,
for obtaining the renewal, from which he
shall not personally profit.
to commercial
3. This
doctrine extends
partnerships, and one of several partners
cannot, while a partnership continues, take
a renewal lease clandestinely, or "behind the
backs" of his associates, for his own benefit
It is not material that the landlord would not
have granted the new lease to the other partners, or to the firm.
whether the
4. It is of no consequence
partnership is for a definite or an indefinite
period.
The disability to take the lease for
individual profit grows out of the partnership relation. While that lasts, the renewal
cannot be taken for individual purposes, even
though the lease does not commence until
after the expiration of the partnership.
that
5. It cannot necessarily be assumed
the renewal can be taken by an individual
member of the firm, even after dissolution.
The former partners may still be tenants in
common; or there may be other reasons, of
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a fiduciary nature, why the transaction cannot be entered Into.
The authorities cited on behalf of the defendant do not disprove these conclusions.
In Lee v. Vernon, supra, there was no
trust. The question arose between a stranger to the lease and the claimant. The point
made by the plaintifE was that the "tenant
right" of renewal had become strictly a right,
so that even a stranger could not take a reIt
newal and hold it for his own benefit.
claim, having no
was an extraordinary

foundation in principle, and was rejected.
In Van Dyke v. Jackson, 1 B. D. Smith,
419, the party had made a special contract
with his partner to abandon the place where
the business was carried on. The case turned on the special contract to leave the business in the hands of the other party.
Musselman's Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 81, does not
raise the question. It was not sought there
to charge a partner with the value of a renewal lease which he had taken to himself
during the existence of the partnership, but
rather with that of the good-will as it existIn
ed after the partnership was dissolved.
fact the place where the business was carried on was sold for the benefit of the firm,
and it was held, in substance, that the goodwill had been realized in the enhanced value
of the property sold.
It is said, in the present case, that Read
was not authorized, by the articles of partnership, to contract for Mitchell after the expiration of the firm; and that therefore
Mitchell cannot take advantage from the renewal lease.
The answer is that he madi'
the contract while the firm was in existence,
and Mitchell may adopt and ratify it. The
objection also proves too much, as it applies
to all the cas'es in which the partner, acting
clandestinely, has been declared a trustee.
In Phillips V. Reeder, 18 N. J. E'q. 95, one
of the partners, R., prior to the partnership,
owned the lease, exclusively, of certain stone
quarries. He entered into a partnership with
P. for three years, and so much longer as R.
should continue lessee of the quarries. In
the lease, there was a covenant of renewal
at the option of R. He having declined to
renew, it was held that the pai-tnership expired; or, in other words, that R. was under no obligation to renew, and thus to continue the partnership.
There could be no
pretense in this case that the doctrine under
the review applied, since the original lease
did not itself belong to the firm. It was the
private property of one of the partners,
which he was under no obligation to preserve
for the firm's benefit.
In Achenson v. Fair, 3 Dru. & War. 512,
the i)oint decided was, that the doctrine was
not to be extended to additional lands purchased by trustee; in other words, the rule
was fully recognized, but nothing was to be
by it except that which could be
governed
fairly regarded as a graft on the former
lease.
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In Nesbitt
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v. Tredennick, 1 Ball
a mortgagee, not In possession,
a renewal, the original lease having
feited, both In law and equity, for
ment of rent.
Here there was no

& B. 29,

obtained
been fornonpayviolation
of trust The rule under discussion was fully recognized, but its application to the existing case denied.
The court said: "'In all
the cases upon this subject, either the party,
by being in possession, obtained the renewal,
or it was done behind the back, or by some
contiivance in fraud of those who were Interested in the old lease; and there was either a remnant of the old lease, or a tenant
right of renewal, on which a new lease could
be engraited."
There could be no plainer
recognition of the general principle maintained by the plaintiff.
In Munsell v. O'Brien, 1 Jones, Ir. 184, the
facts were, that there was an under-tenant
who took a new lease from the original landlord without advising his own immediate
landlord. The court held that there was no
fiduciary relation between these parties.
The principle was fully admitted, but the
facts did not raise a case for its application.
Joy, C. B., said: "It is admitted that there
is no authority which can be produced where
such a lease as the present has been declared
to be a trust; and that we are now called
upon to go further than any decision has
ever gone before, and to make an authority
We are called upon to
for future decisions.
do this on what are called the principles of a
court of eauity; namely, that where a person is clothed with a fiduciary character, and
in that character becomes possessed of an interest in land, held under a determinable
lease, any acquisition by him of a new interest in those Jands is a continuation of the old
This however
lease, and a 'graft' upon it.
is the first time that I have heard It asserted
that If an under-tenant obtains a lease of his
lands from the head landlord without consulting his own immediate landlord that
lease Is a trust for his immediate landlord,
because that person had a tenant right of
renewal. But there is no fiduciary character
imposed on an under-tenant. In reference to
his landlord, by the creation of the relation
of landlord and tenant, which would entitle
the plaintiff to the relief he seeks, on the
ground of his having a tenant right of renewal. A cestui que trust is entitled to the
benefit of a new lease, obtained by a trustee
by means of a tenant right of renewal, which
the latter became entitled to as trustee, but
there Is no such person in the present case.'"
This language plainly shows that the court
was but following In the wake of Lee v.
Vernon; and holding that the doctrine of
tenant right of renewal, and that the new
lease is a graft on the old stock, are not to
be extended to strangers, but confined to persons acting in a fiduciary character.
The only other case that wUl be noticed Is
Anderson v. Lemon, 8 N. Y. 236, which holds,
that one partner may In good faith purchase
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and hold, for his own use, the reversion of
real estate occupied by the copartnership, under a lease for years, with the qualification
that if he secretly makes such purchase in
his own name while the other partner with
his concurrence Is negotiating with the owner to obtain the property for the use of the
firm, the purchaser will be declared a trustee.
This decision carefully admits the genera)
doctrine, but considers it not applicable to
the case where one of the pai'tners purchases
in good faith the landlord's Interest as distinguished from taking a new lease.
It Is
simply a case of an exception to a general
rule.
It can scarcely be considered as a decision m favor of a partner's right to purchase, since he was, under the circumstances,
a trustee.
Should the question be distinctly
presented,
it will deserve consideration
whether the view In Anderson v. Lemon,
that one partner may even in good faith buy
There
the reversion for himself, is correct.
is a great cogency In the remarks of Sir William Grant, that the partner may in this way
intercept and cut off the chance of future renewals and consequently make use of his
situation to prejudice the interests of his asRandall v. Russell, 3 Mer. 190, 197.
sociates.
There appears to be no direct decision allowing the partner thus to purchase, and the
right to do so is treated as doubtful by approved text-writers. 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. (3d.
Am. Ed.) 43, 44, marg. paging.
The application of the principles discussed
In this opinion to the case at bar Is obvious.
The plaintiff and defendant were owners,
as partners, of a lease of premises In the city
of New York, on which a hotel business was
carried on, yielding a large profit.
These
consisted of Nos. 1111, 1113, 1115 Broadway
and Nos. 1 and 3 West Twenty-fourth street
The leases of the Twenty-fourth street property were made directly to them, November
17, 1866.
The Broadway property, through
a series of transactions not necessary to be
detailed, becames vested, according to the
fair construction of the various agreements
respecting it, in the partnership. The leases
expired on the same day. May 1, 1871, when
the partnership terminated. While the partnership continued, both parties thought it
necessary to provide a place for a bar-room,
and with this view the premises No. 3 West
Twenty-Fourth street were connected with
the rear of the premises fronting on Broadway, known as the "Hoffman House," and
the first story fitted up and used for that
A considerable expenditure was
purpose.
made with this view, and large profits were
realized, as the course taken was judicious.
While all of the leases owned by the firm
were still in existence, viz. April 20, 1869,
and on January 21, 1869, the owners of tJie
hotel property made leases to the defendant,
to commence from May 1, 1871, and to continue as to part of the property for five
years, and as to another portion for ten years
from that date, at specified rents. The leases
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were obtained by Read without notice to tlie
plaintiff, and he now claims that they are
his exclusive property.
They are of great
value, and the hotel at the commencement
of the action, March, 1870, was still in operation.
The furniture, fixtures, stock, etc.,
were valuable, and the business carried on
was profitable.
The case has in it -every element of the
equity which has been already considered.
The partnership is undisputed; the leases
were in existence when the renewal was
made.
The act of renewal was clandestine,
or occurred "behind the back" of the plaintiff. It took place while the partnership was
The right to renewal was immein force.
diate and vested in Read during the partnership's continuance. The property belonging
to the firm, ajid which will be prejudiced by
the prospect of disposing of it at a sacrifice
at the close of the existing lease, is large and
valuable.
Common justice and a due regard to rules
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of public policy demand that the renewal
should be declared to belong to the
firm, and that the defendant should be required to account to the plaintiff for his portion of its value. The clauses in the leases
to Read that there shall be no assignment
without the consent of the landlord do not
stand in the way of the plaintiff's relief.
This does not consist in an assignment in
the ordinary sense of that term.
On the contrary, the ground of relief is that the defendant acted inequitably when he entered into
the contract; that he must therefore be considered as a trustee, while the assignment to
the firm simply follows as an incident to the
giving complete effect to the trust relation
declared by the court to exist between the
parties. Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick, supra.
The judgment must be reversed, and a new
lease

trial ordered.
All concur; REYNOLDS, C, not sitting.
Judgment reversed.
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DA VIES, C. J. This action was tried by
a referee who held as matter of law, that
unless the agreement set out In the complaint
in relation to the purchase by the defendant
at the master's sale of the premises in question, or some note or memorandum
thereof,
expressing the consideration be in writing,
the same was void, and created no interest
in the plaintiffs in said premises, and could
not be enforced against said defendant in
law or equity.
And he further reported, as
matter of fact, that no proof was made or
offered on said trial by or in behalf of the
plaintiff of any such agreement in writing,
or of any note or memorandum
in writing
of such an agreement, or of any deed, conveyance or instrument in writing subscribed
by the defendant or his lawful agent, creating or declaring any trust or interest in said
premises in favor of said plaintiffs, and that
no proof was made or testimony or evidence
The
offered on the part of the defendant.
judgment entered for the defendant upon
the report of the referee was affirmed at the
general term, and the plaintiffs now appeal
to this court.
We are at liberty to assume from this finding, that the agreement set out in the complaint was proven on the trial before the
referee.
To ascertain what that agreement
was, we must have reference to the complaint and the offer made by the plaintiffs
The plaintiffs averred in the
on the trial.
complaint that the plaintiff Michael Ryan,
being seized of certain lands in the town
of Seneca, made and executed a mortgage
thereon In the year 1839, to secure the sum
thereof,
of $800, part of the purchase-money
and that in the month of October,
1841,
said plaintiff Ryan conveyed to the said Nevins, the other plaintiff, an equal undivided
that plaintiffs
half of the said premises;
being unable to pay the installments on said
mortgage as they became due, the said mortgage was foreclosed, and said plaintiffs procured of one Lewis the sum of $300, which
was paid on account of said judgment of
foreclosure,
and a portion thereof, to the
extent of $300, was assigned to said Lewis
as his security for such advance; that said
Lewis becoming importunate for his money,
and the plaintiffs being unable to raise the
same for him, Lewis proceeded to advertise
for sale on the 12th day of
said premises
October, 1843, for the purpose of raising said
sum of about $300, while said premises were
The complaint
worth the sum of $4,000.
further averred that while said premises
were thus advertised for sale, and before the
day of sale had arrived, the plaintiffs being
men of limited means, and unable to raise

the money which would be needed to stop
the said sale, and to pay up the amount due
on the said decree for the debt and the costs
which had accrued, applied to the defendant
Dox, reported to be a man of ready money,
and who had always professed to be interested in their behalf, and asked him to assist
them, and aid them to raise the money to
pay the amount due on said decree and save
the said
premises
from being sold away
from them, and from being sacrificed for the
small amount, compared with their value,
which was claimed upon said decree. That
said Dox did then profess and declare a willingness to help said plaintiffs for such purpose, and did then and there agree with
the said plaintiffs that on the day of said
sale, he, the said Dox, would attend the
same and bid off and purchase the said
premises
at such sale, upon the express
agreement
and understanding, between the
plaintiffs and said Dox, that such bidding
and purchase, if made by the said Dox,
should be for the benefit and advantage of
these plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs upon such
agreement
and understanding agreed that
they would not find any other one to go
their friend at the said sale, and to bid in
and purchase
the said premises for them;
and that it was expressly understood and
agreed between the plaintiffs and said Dox,
that if he became the purchaser of said premises at said sale he should take the deed of
the same from the said master in his own
name, but only by way of and as security
to himself for what money he should have
to advance and pay on such purchase, and
with the agreement, promise and undertaking between said Dox and these plaintiffs,
that whenever these plaintiffs should repay
him the amount which he should pay to procure and effect such purchase and to get
the deed therefor, with the interest thereon, and a reasonable
compensation
for his
services therein, he, the said Dox, should convey the said premises to these plaintiffs and
again vest the title thereto in them, and
should in the mean time hold the said premises in his own name as security only for
the said moneys, and always subject to the
above agreement and defeasance.
That in
pursuance
of said agreement, said Dox attended said sale and bid off the same for
the sum of $100, he being the only bidder at
said sale, and the same was strutk off to him
and he received the deed therefor. That at
said sale it was talked about and understood
by those present thereat, that said Dox was
bidding for the benefit of these plaintiffs,
and that said premises were struck off to
him only as security to him for the repayment to him by these plaintiffs of the moneys
he should advance and pay for the same
thereon, and
and interest
his reasonable
charges for his attention thereto.
And the
plaintiffs averred that such was the fact,
and that In truth said Dox did bid off and
purchase the said premises for these plain-
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tiffs, and to save the same for them, and
took the deed In his own name, only as such
security as aforesaid, and that in consequence of such understanding other persons
from bidding on said premises,
Rbstained
and the same was struck oft to said Dox
without any opposing bid, although the plaintiffs aver that the same were then worth
$4,000 and upwards. And the plaintiffs also
averred that if they had not relied upon said
agreement, promise and undertaking of said
Dox, they would not have allowed the said
premises to have been struck off for the
said sum of $100, but would have found
other persons to have purchased the said
premises, and saved the same from sacrifice,
but that as said agreement was made more
than a month before said sale, these plaintiffs relied upon it and made no other effort
of
to procure the money, or the assistance
friends to save and buy said premises.
That at the time of said sale these plaintiffs were in the possession of said premises,
and continued in possession thereof and made
payments on account of the incumbrances
thereon until ■some time in the year 1849,
with the knowledge, privity and consent of
said Dox. And that during all that time
said Dox never exercised any acts of ownership over said premises, or interfered with
the ownership, use, occupation or possession
thereof by the plaintiffs, and that during all
that time the assessments and taxes thereon were paid by the plaintiffs, with the
privity and assent of said Dox.
knowledge,
That in the year 1849, the said plaintiffs
were induced by said Dox to surrender the
possession of said premises to him, and in
the year 1851 he refused to come to a settlement with the plaintiffs, and denied that
he held the said premises for their benefit,
or that they had any interest therein.
The
referee

excluded

such evidence,

and decided

that he would not receive any parol evidence to establish,
or tending to establish,
the said agreement, and that upon the case
made by the pleadings, assuming there was
uo agreement in writing as stated in the answer, there can be no recovery by the plaintiffs. To this decision and ruling, the plaintiffs' counsel duly excepted.
This exception presents the main question
for consideration and decision upon this appeal, and the referee in his report states the
ground or reason of his decision to be that
unless the agreement mentioned,
or some
note or memorandum thereof expressing the
consideration be in writing the same was
void, and could not be enforced against the
If the referee was right in this
defendant.
conclusion, then the plaintiffs were properly
nonsuited, and the judgment for the defendIf in error then it
ant should be aflBrmed.
follows that there must be a reversal and a
new trial. The Revised Statutes declare that
no estate or interest in lands, nor any trust
or power over or concerning lands, or in
any manner relating thereto, shall be created,
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granted or declared, unless by act or operation of law, or by a deed or conveyance in
writing, subscribed by the party creating,
granting or declaring the same. 1 Rev. St.
p. 134, § 6. It is manifest that the referee
had this provision before him, and that his
decision was based upon the assumption of
its applicability to the case in hand. In arriving at this conclusion he entirely ignored
all consideration of fraud or of part performance, as elements of the transaction. Section
10 of the same title declares
that "nothing
in this title contained shall be construed to
abridge the powers of a court of equity to
performance of agreecompel the specific
ments in cases of part performance of such
agreements."
1 Rev. St. p. 135, § 10.
It is
well settled that courts of equity will enforce a specific performance of a contract
within the statute when the parol agreement
2
has been partly carried into execution.
Story, Eq. Jur. § 759.
And the distinct
ground upon which courts of equity interfere
in cases of this sort is, that otherwise one
party would be enabled to practice a fraud
upon the other, and it could never be the
intention of the statute to enable any party
Into commit such a fraud with impunity.
deed fraud in all cases constitutes an answer
to the most solemn acts and conveyances,
and the objects of the statutes are promoted
instead of being obstructed by such a jurisdiction for discovery and relief.
And
when one party has executed his part of the
agreement in the confidence that the other
party would do the same, it is obvious that
if the latter should refuse it would be a
fraud upon the former to suffer his refusal
to work to his prejudice.
In Fonblanque's Equity it is said: "If the
contract be carried into execution by one of
the parties, as by delivering possession, and
such execution be accepted by the other, he
that accepts it must perform his part, for
when there is a performance the evidence
of the bargain does not lie merely upon the
words but the facts performed, and it is
unconscionable that the party that received
the advantage should be admitted to say that
such contract was never made." Fonbl. bk.
1, p. 181, c. 338.
And the universal rule la
correctly enunciated by Brown on Frauds,
when he says: "The correct view appears
to be that equity will at all times lend its
aid to defeat a fraud, notwithstanding the
Brown, St. Frauds, §
statute of frauds."
In the present case we are to assume
438.
that the agreement was made as set out in
the complaint, and performed on the part of
We then
the plaintiffs as therein stated.
have a distinct and unequivocal agreement
established,
and performance by one party
of all that was to be done in pursuance of it
on his part
We find the other party, by
reason of the acts and omissions of this party, obtaining the possession and title to a
large amount of real estate for a trifling sum
compared to its actual value, and refusing
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He Into fulfill the agreement on his part.
terposes the statute of frauds as a shield,
thus using a statute designed to prevent
frauds as an instrument whereby one can be
perpetrated
with impunity. This a court of
equity cannot tolerate.
Wetmore v. White,
2 Gaines, Gas. 87, was an action brought in
chancery to compel the specific performance
of a contract by parol relating to lands. The
chancellor dismissed the bill, but the court
of errors unanimously reversed his decree.
Thompson, J., in delivering the opinion of the
court, says:
"The appellant's claim resting
altogether upon parol contract, It becomes
necessary to examine whether any obstacle
to relief is interposed by the statute for the
prevention
of fraud.
think there is not.
It is an established rule in equity that a
parol agreement in part performed is not
within the provisions of the statute. Citing
1 Fonbl. Eq. 182, and cases there noted. To
allow a statute having for its object the prevention of frauds to be interposed in bar of
in
the performance of a parol agreement
part performed,
would evidently encourage
the mischief the legislature Intended to prein purdelivered
vent. * * * Possession
suance of an agreement is such a decree of
performance as to take a contract out of the
statute." The same doctrine was reaffinned
in Pai-khurst v. Van Gortlandt, 14 Johns. 15,
In Lowry v. Tew, 3 Barb. Ch. 407,
35, 36.
413, the chancellor said the principle upon
which courts of equity hold that a part performance of a parol agreement is sufficient
to take a case out of the statute of frauds is,
that a party who has permitted another to
perform acts on the faith of an agreement
shall not be allowed to insist that the agreement is invaUd, because it was not in writing, and that he is entitled to treat those acts
with
in compliance
as if the agreement,
which they were performed, had not been
In other words, upon the ground of
made.
fraud in refusing to execute the parol agreement after a part performance thereof by
the other party, and when he cannot be placed In the same situation that he was before
See, also,
such part performance by him."
Phillips v. Thompson, 1 Johns. Gh. 131; Mur-

I

ray

V.

Jayne,

8

Barb.

612.

Hodges t. Tennessee Marine & Fire Ins.
Go., 8 N. Y. 416, this court held that in equity parol evidence was admissible to show
that a deed absolute on its face was in fact
a mortgage, and so intended by the parties
And in Despard v. Walbridge, 15
thereto.
N. y. 374, this court also held that an assignment of a lease, absolute on its face, was
in fact made for the purpose of securing a
debt, and that such debt had been fully paid;
and that under the Gode of Procedure, parol
evidence is admissible to show that such assignment, though absolute In its terms, was
Intended as a mortgage.
The case of Brown v. Lynch, 1 Paige, 147,

In

Is so like to that now under consideration
that it may be profitable to refer to it at

length.
A mortgage upon a farm was foreclosed In chancery and advertised for sale
by a master.
Before the sale, Brown, the
defendant, made an arrangement with the
plaintiffs, the Lynches, whereby he agreed
to purchase the farm in for their benefit,
for which he was to receive a stipulated
compensation.
The mortgagee, In order tx)
favor the Lynches, agreed with Brown that
he might bid off the property for about half
Brown, at the
the amount of the mortgage.
sale, prevented others bidding by representing that he Intended to buy for the Lynches,
and he purchased the farm at the master's
sale for $1,500, about $1,000 below Its value.
Afterward Brown refused to convey the farm
to the Lynches, or to accoimt to them for
to him
the value, although they tendered
the amount of his bid, with interest, and the
And It was
sum agreed for his services.
held by the court of chancery that Brown
was a trustee for the Lynches, and had no
other Interest in the farm than that of mortof the purgagee to secure the repayment
chase-money, and of the payment of the sum
agreed to be allowed him for his services.
And that the court of chancery would relieve against a fraud by converting the person guilty of It into a trustee for those who
Bmott, vice
been injured thereby.
have
chancellor, decreed for the plaintiffs, holding
the defendant had committed a fraud upon
for
the plaintiffs by agreeing to purchase
their benefit, when, in truth, he meant to
purchase for himself, and that he had committed a fraud upon the plaintiffs, by his
in preventing bidacts and representations,
ding at the sale. And he proceeds to show,
by the citation of numerous authorities, that
a court of equity can provide adequate relief by declaring the purchaser a trustee for
And he quotes with
the person defrauded.
approbation the remarks of Lord Eldon, In
Mestaer v. Gillespie, 11 Ves. 626, where he
says:

"Upon the statute of frauds, though declaring that interest shall not be barred except by writing, cases in this court are perfectly familiar, deciding that a fraudulent
when
use shall not be made of that statute;
this court has Interfered against a party
meaning to make It an instrument of fraud,
and said he should not take advantage of
his own fraud, even though the statute has
do
declared that in case these circumstances
not exist, the Instrument shall be absolutely
void." The chancellor affirmed the decree,
and observed, that the Lynches had an Interest in the premises which they had a right
to protect and preserve, and It would have
been a gross fraud for any one to hold out
that he
to them, under such circumstances,
was bidding off the property for their benefit, when he in fact Intended to appropriate
If the appellant did in fact
It to his own use.
bid It off for them, under the agreement,
he held It in trust for them, and had no
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other Interest In It than that of a mortgagee, to secure the repayment of the purchase-money and the $60 agreed to be paid
him for his trouble. But If he had no such
intention, and did not in fact Bid off the
property In trust for them, he was guilty of
a fraud which the court will relieve against
The cases referred to by the circuit judge
fully establish the principle
(vice-chancellor),
that this court has power to relieve against
such fraud, and the means to be employed
is to convert the person who has gained an
advantage by means of his fraudulent act,
into a trustee for those who have been injured thereby."
This case was cited with
approbation In Anderson v. Lemon, 8 N. Y.
239, and the principle of it adopted by this
court in that case.
Its principle was also adopted and approved of in Sandford v. Norris, decided at
special term of supreme court in May, 1859,
and affirmed at general term in the First
4 Abb. Dec. 144.
In
district in June, 1861.
that case, certain premises were owned by
the plaintiff's husband, and he made an assignment thereof, and his assignees adverThe plaintiff was
tised the same for sale.
anxious to purchase them in at the sale, and
made an arrangrement with the defendant,
Norris, by which he agreed to attend the
sale and bid them off in his name for the
plaintiff, and on payment of the sum bid
In conseconvey the same to the plaintiff.
quence of this arrangement, the plaintiff refrained from bidding at the sale, and the
premises were struck ofl: to the defendant
for the sum of $20, subject to the prior incumbrances.
The defendant subsequently
sold the premises so purchased for the sum
of $2,000, of which the plaintiff had received
one-half, and the action was brought to reIt was held that the
cover the residue.
plaintiff was entitled to recover, and that the
defense of the statute of frauds, interposed
by the defendant, was no bar to the relief
sought by the plaintiff; that the agreement
was established beyond controversy, and the
defendant was bound as well by sound
principles of law to
morals as established
On the hearing of
the performance of it
that case, the opinion of Mr. Justice Emott,
in the case of Bergen v. Nelson (not reported), was read, distinctly affirming the docThe case
trine of Brown v. Lynch, supra.
of Osborn v. Mason, before the vice-chancellor of the first circuit (not reported), also
affirming the doctrine of that case, was also
•cited.

Mason in that case agreed with Osborn to
attend a sale of certain premises, Osborn beincuming either owner or a subsequent
Mason also having a claim upon
brancer.
Mason
the premises as an incumbrancer.
agreed to bid in the premises at the sale,
and then to let Osborn have them for the
amount at which they stood him in, includ-

ing his own incumbrance. Mason bid off the
premises and then refused to fulfill his agree-
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The vice-chanment which was by parol.
cellor held that the statute of frauds was no
bar to the suit for a specific performance of
the agreement which was decreed, and on
appeal to the chancellor the same was affirmed.
Voorhies v. St John was argued
and decided in this court in December, 1863.
It was an action brought to recover moneys
received by the defendant on a sale of a
house and lot in the city of New York, and
a leasehold estate in two buildings on other
lots therein, and for an account of the rents
The propand profits received therefrom.
erty had formerly belonged to the husband
of the plaintiff, and consisted of three parcels, and upon a sale thereof by his assignees, the plaintiff requested two of her
friends to attend the sale and bid off two
of said parcels for her benefit They subsequently, at her request, transferred their bids
to the defendant,
St John, and he took the
conveyance therefor to himself, and paid the
assignee for the same, declaring at the time
that the plaintiff wished him to buy that
property for her. At the sale of the other

parcel, St. John attended the assignee's sale
and bid off the same himself, and the assignments of the two bids and the titles to
aU the three pieces of property made out
AU these
to him together in his own name.
acts were done by St John for Mrs. Voorhies, at her request and for her benefit.
The referee reported in favor of the plaintiff,
and the judgment thereon was affirmed at
the general term of the First district, on the
authority of Sandford v. Norris, supra.
On
appeal to this court, that judgment was affirmed in December, 1863, and distinctly on
the ground that the statute of frauds was no
bar to the performance of the agreement.
We must hold this case as decisive of that
The same docnow under consideration.
trine has frequently been affirmed in other
cases.
In Cox V. Cox, 5 Rich. Eq. 365, the ovraer
of land, in danger of being summarily dispossessed by a sheriff's sale, agreed with his
brother, the defendant, that the latter should
bid off the land and pay the bid and make
a reconveyance
on repayment.
This agreement was declared to the bystanders at the
sale, and competition being thus prevented,
the land was bought by the brother for onetenth of its actual value.
The whole transaction was alleged to be "a fraudulent contrivance on the part of the defendant to
obtain his brother's land for one-tenth of its
value." The court enjoined the defendant
from proceeding at law under the title thus
fraudulently obtained, saying: "This court
has often repeated that the statute of frauds
should never be perverted to an instrument
of fraud. Thus, in a case of an agreement
such as the statute plainly declares void, if
not reduced to writing, yet if this was omitted by fraud, the defendant would not be
permitted to avail himself of the statute.
In Whitchurch v. Bevis, 2 Brown Ch. 565,
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Thurlo-w says, If you Interpose the
medium of fraud, by which the agreement
is prevented from being put in writing, 1
agree the statute is inapplicable.
See Keith
V. Purvis, 4 Desaus. Eq. 114."
In the case cited of Keith v. Purvis, a
creditor induced his debtor's agent not to
bid at a sale of his debtor's land by promising to give the debtor time to pay the debt,
This agreeand then to reconvey the land.
ment was disclosed
at the sale, and prevented
other bids, whereby the creditor
bought the land at one-third of its value, but
afterward refusing to reconvey, the debtor
Lord

brought his bill for relief. To this it was
that the agreement was void by the
statute of frauds; but the court held, '-'that
if the agreement was void, the creditor must
surrender up his advantage under it and be
liable to make good the loss sustained by the
"Can it
adverse party from his conduct."
be tolerated," says the court at page 121,
"that a creditor shall, at a sale of his debtor's property, lull him to sleep and keep off
other purchasers by an agreement under
which he buys in the land for a small sum
much below the value, and then that he
should declare that the agreement was void
under the statute of frauds, and that the
other party should have no benefit from the
agreement, whilst he reaped all the fruits?
Surely not.
Courts of justice would be blind
indeed if they could permit such a state of
things."
In Peebles v. Reading, 8 Serg. & R. 492,
"If
the supreme court of Pennsylvania said:
by the artifice of the purchaser declaring he
was to buy for the owner, others were prevented from bidding, and the land was sold
at a great undervalue, this would make him
a trustee."^
And in Trapnall v. Brown, 19
Ark. 49, propeity of the value of $5,000 was,
by agreement similar to the one in the present case, bought in for $176, other persons
declining to bid on being informed of the object of the agreement.
"Under these circumstances,"
the court said, "we think it
would be a fraud in the purchaser to keep
the property in violation of the agreement.

objected

TRISTS,

That the statute which was designed to prevent fraud would be used as a shield and in
the commission
of fraud, which the coui'ts
of equity will not tolerate.
We think therefore that the court below did not err in
treating the purchaser as a trustee."
These
observations,
made in these cases, are as pertinent to that now under consideration, as
they were in them.
Many of these cases
are identical in all important particulars
with this, and there is no good reason why
the same rules of law and morals enunciated
in them should not govern and control the
decision
in this case. The fact that an
agreement
is void, under the statute of
frauds, does not entitle either party to relief in equity, but other facts may; and
when they do, it is no answer to the claim
for relief, that the void agreement was one
of the instrumentalities through which the
fraud was effected.
Ormond v. Anderson, 2
Ball & B. 369. Where one of the parties to
a contract,
void by the statute of frauds,
avails himself of its invalidity but unconscientiously appropriates what he has acquired under it, equity will compel restitution; and it constitutes no objection to the
claim, that the opposite party may happen
to secure the same practical benefit, through
the process of restitution, which would have
resulted from the observance
of the void
agreement
Floyd v. Buckland, 2 Freem.
Ch. 268; Oldham v. Lltchford, Id. 284; Devenish V. Baines, Finch, Prec. 3; Thynn v.
Thynn, 1 Vern. 296; Reech v. Kennegal, 1
Ves. Sr. 125; Davis v. Walsh, 2 Har. & J.
329; Wilcox v. Morris, 1 Murph. 116; Stoddard V. Hart, 23 N. Y. 500.
It is very clear to my mind, both upon
principle and authority, that the referee
erred in excluding the evidence offered, and
that the judgment must be reversed and a
new trial ordered, with costs to abide the
event

PORTER,
MORGAN,

WRIGHT,

JJ.,

concurred.

sented.

Judgment reversed,

LEONARD,
HUNT, J.,

and
dis-

and new trial ordered^
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Appeal from superior court, Chatham county; Whl taker, Judge.
Action by Samson Edwards against Jennie Culbertson for money paid and for a
lien on land purchased therewith. Judgment
for plaintiff for amount paid without a lien.
Plaintiff appeals.
Modified.
T. B. Womacli, for appellant.
ning, for appellee.

John Man-

SHEPHERD, C. J. According to the finding of the jury the defendant fraudulently
obtained of the plaintiff the sum of $275.25,
for the purpose of purchasing the land de"
scribed in the complaint, and that the fraud
consisted in "falsely and fraudulently promising and pretending that, if the plaintiff
would let her have the said sum of money
tor said purpose, she would marry him in a
very short time, and that the land to be purchased with the said money should be in
lieu of her right of dower which she would
acquire" by the said marriage.
Upon this
verdict, his honor rendered a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff for the recovery of the
amount so fraudulently obtained, but refused to declare it a charge upon the land
by the defendant with the said
purchased
money, the land still remaining in her hands.
Were there nothing more than a mere promise to marry, it is plain that a violation of
it would not entitle the plaintiff to any equitable relief, but we must infer from the verdict that the defendant did not intend to perform the promise at the time it was made,
it, as well as the
and that she intended
additional agreement to hold the land in lieu
of dower, simply as a trick or contrivance
by which to cheat and defraud the plaintiff
of his money. By submitting to the verdict
and judgment, the defendant
(even if she
could successfully do so) is precluded from
denying that she obtained the money under
which the law denounces as
circumstances
fraudulent, and, this being so, it cannot be
doubted that if the specific money had been
retained by her and could have been identified, the plaintiff, in a proper action, could
If this be true, why may
have recovered it.
not the money be traced into the land and deThis is a
clared to be a charge thereixpon?
somewhat novel question in this state, but
in view of well-settleu equitable principles,
as well as authorities in other jurisdictions,
it is believed to be unattended with any very
serious ditfieulty.
The only decision of this court to which
we have been referred as bearing upon the
question Is that of Campbell v. Drake, 4
The plaintiff filed a bill in
Ired. Bq. 94.
equity against the heirs at law of one Farrow, praying that they be declared trustees
of certain land purchased by their ancestor
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with money stolen by him of the plaintiff
while in the employment of the latter as his
clerk.
The court said that it was "not at all
like the eases of dealings vnth trust funds
executors,
guardians, factors,
by trustees,
and the like, in which the owner of the fund
may elect to take either the money or that
in which It was invested;" and It was accordingly held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the particular relief asked for. It
was strongly intimated, however, by Ruffln,
that the
C. J., in delivering the opinion,
plaintiff might "have the land declared liable
as a security for the money laid out for it."
It was not stated upon what principle this
could be done, but we apprehend that it was
proposition that,
based upon the general
whenever a person has obtained the property
of another by fraud, he is a trustee ex maleficio for the person so defrauded, for the purpose of recompense or indemnity.
"One of
the most common cases," remarks Judge Story, "in which a court of equity acts upon the
ground of implied trusts in invitum, is when
a party receives money which he cannot conscientiously
withhold from another party."
Story, Eq. Jur. § 1255.
And he states it to
be a general principle that "whenever the
property of a party has been wrongfully misapplied, or a trust fund has been wrongfully converted into another species of property, if its identity can be traced, it will be
held in its new form liable to the rights of
the original owner, or cestui que trust."
Id.
222;
Whitley v. Foy,
§ 1258; Hill, Trustees,
6 Jones, Eq. 34; Taylor v. Plumer, 3 Maule
& S. 562; KnatchbuU v. Hallett, 13 Ch. Div.
696;
People v. City Bank, 96 N. Y. 32; National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54.
Jlr. Pomeroy says: "In general, whenever
the legal title to property, real or personal,
has been obtained through actual fraud, or
through auy other circumstances
which render it unconscientious
for the holder of the
legal title to retain and enjoy the beneficial
interest, equity imposes a constructive trust
on the property thus acquired in favor of the
one who is truly and equitably entitled to the
same, although he may never, perhaps, have
had any legal estate therein, and a court of
equity has jurisdiction to reach the property
either in the hands of the original wrongdoer or in the hands of any subsequent holder, until a purchaser in good faith and without notice acquires a higher right, and takes
the property relieved from the trust. The
forms and varieties of these trusts, which are
termed 'ex maleficio' or 'ex delicto,' are practically vpithout limit. The principle is applied whenever it is necessary for the obtaining
of complete justice, although the law may also give the remedy of damages against the
wrongdoer." Pom. Eq. Jur. 1053. A confidential relation is not necessary to establish such trust, and there is no good reason
why the owner of property taken and converted by one who has no right to its possession should be less favorably situated in
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court of equity, in respect to his remedy, (at least for the purpose of "recompense or indemnity,") than one who by an
abuse of trust has been injured by the wrongful act of a trustee to whom the possession
of trust property has been confided.
"The
beautiful character— pervading excellence, if
one may say so — of equity jurisprudence,"
sa.ys Judge Story,
"is that it varies its adjustments and proportions so as to meet the
very form and pressure of each particular
case in all its complex
habitudes." The
trusts of which we are speaking are not what
is known as "technical trusts," and the
ground of relief in such cases is, strictly
Equity despeaking, fraud, and not trust.
clares the trust in order that it may lay its
hand upon the thing and wrest it from the
This principle
possession of the wrongdoer.
is distinctly recognized by our leading text
writers, and it is said by ilr. Bispham (Bisp.
Eq. 92) that "equity makes use of the machinery of a trust for the puiTDOse of affording redress in cases of fraud." The principles above stated are illustrated by many decisions to be found in the reports of other
states, and as our case may easily be assimilated to those in which money or other property has been stolen and converted, such
cases must be recognized as pertinent authority in the present investigation. In Newton
V. Porter, 69 X. Y. 133, it was held that the
owner of negotiable securities, stolen and afterwards sold by the thief, may follow and
claim the proceeds In the hands of the felonious taker or of his assignee with notice;
and that this right continues and attaches to
any securities or property in which the proceeds are Invested, so long as they can be
traced and identified.
The law, it was said,
a

"will raise a trust in invitum out of the
transaction, in order that the substituted
property may be subjected to the purposes
Andrews, J.,
of indemnity and recompense."
said that "equity only stops the pursuit when
the means of ascertainment falls, or the
rights of bona fide purchasers
for value,
without notice of the trust, have Intervened.
The relief will be molded and adapted to the
circumstances
of the cases, so as to protect
the rights of the true owner." Lane v. Dighton, Amb. 409; Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P.
Wms. 679; Lench v. Lench, 10 Ves. 511;
Perry, Trusts, § 829; Story, Kq. Jur. § 1258.
In Bank v. Barry, 125 Mass. 20, it was held
that equity will charge land, paid for in part
with the proceeds of stolen property, with a
trust in favor of the owner of the property
for the amount so used. In Humphreys v.
Butler, 51 Ark. 351, 11 S. W. Rep. 479, the
In paying for a house and lot
defendant.
purchased by him for $400, wrongfully used
belonging to the plaintiff, and of
$149.52
which he had obtained possession without
her authority, knowledge,
or consent. The
court declared the defendant a trustee to
the extent of the money of the plaintiff used
by him, and charged the same upon the property, and in default of its payment by a certain time decreed that the same be sold to
satisfy the said lien. These and other authorities that could be cited abundantly sustain the intimation of Chief Justice Ruffln, to
which we have referred, and we are therefore of the opinion that the money fraudulently obtained of the plaintiff may be followed into the land described in the complaint, and that the judgment of his honor
should be so modified as to declare It to be
a charge

upon the same.

Modified.
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therefore, and for that reason, and to effect that ulterior purpose, she gave her es(95 N. Y. 403.)
tate in form to the professional friends, not
Court of Appeals of New York. 1884.
meaning
any beneficial legacy to them or
Appeal from surrogate court, Kings coun- for their use. With this development of the
defense the attack took on a new phase.
ty.
The facts of the case are stated in the The heirs at law and next of kin began an
action in equity to set aside and annul the
opinion of the court.
residuary devise and bequest, or to estabGeo. H. Starr and Samuel D. Morris, for lish a trust, which, failing as to the intendappellants. William N. Dykman, for re- ed beneficiaries, should result to those who
spondents.
would otherwise have taken by descent or
distribution. Both cases are now before us,
FINCH, J. The testatrix gave to three and it is convenient to consider them topersons, who were her lawyer, her doctor gether, since our conclusion in one may
and her priest, absolutely, but as joint ten- tend seriously to affect the result in the
ants, the bulk of her estate.
Practically other.
she disinherited her relatives in favor of
The proof is uncontradicted that the testastrangers, who had no claim upon her trix made the residuary devise and bequest
bounty, except such as originated in their in its absolute and unconditional form in
professional characters, and the confidence
reliance upon a promise of the legatees to
and friendship thus engendered.
For this apply the fund faithfully and honorably to
the charitable uses dictated in the letter of
reason probate of the will was resisted.
While the testatrix was shown to have been instructions. It does not disprove this
superstitious, whimsical, blindly devoted to statement to assert that no express promise
her church and its ecclesiastics, habitually to that effect was made, or that it was the
under the influence of stimulants, and seri- pledge of Judge McCue alone. One of the
ously dependent upon the advice of those legatees, Father McGuire, is dead, and the
who became her residuary legatees, it is title is in the two survivors, and it is with
yet certain that there was no want of tes- them only that we need to deal. The trial
tamentary capacity. But although the at- judge did, indeed, find as a fact that Dr.
tack failed upon that ground, the charge of Dudlej' did not know until after testatrix's
undue influence was somewhat supported death that the unattested letter of instrucby the evidence relating to her character tions existed, but he certainly did know beand surroundings, which made possible fore the will was made the character of
and tended to render probable the exist- the intended disposition; that he was seence of an outside power capable of mould- lected as one of the exeeutor.s;
that the
ing her wishes to its own. The exigency relatives by blood were to take but a trifle,
demanded
of the proponents some ade- and that the bulk of the estate was to be
quate and reasonable explanation of a applied to charitable purposes by the exand with this knowledge he acdiversion of the estate to strangers hold- ecutors;
ing the power and influence derived from cepted the proposed trust. The trial judge
confidential relations, consistent with the further finds that Judge McCue "made no
free action and untrammeled exercise of promise to obtain the bequest or devise and
the testamentary intention. The explana- practiced no fraud." This finding is assailed, but unsuccessfully so far as it frees
tion came. A letter of instruction, addressthe legatees from a charge of actual fraud.
ed to the residuary legatees, contemporaneous with the will, and dictating the pur- In that respect we agree that there was no
pose as well as explaining the reason of the evil or selfish intention on their part. But
absolute legacy, was produced upon the the finding that Judge McCue "made no
hearing. These written instructions demon- promise to obtain the bequest or devise"
strated that the residuary clause was not cannot be sustained.
If anything is renderintended by the testatrix to pass to the ed certain by the evidence it is that the
legatees any beneficial interest. The abso- testatrix made the absolute devise and belute devise, on its face diflicult of explana- quest upon the suggestion of a necessity
tion except upon a theoi-y of undue in- therefor by Judge JlcCue, and upon the unfluence, thereby lost its suspicious character derstanding that he
and his associates
and put the legatees in more of a disinter- would faithfully and honorably carry out
It apijeared that the testa- her expressed intentions. If we say that
ested attitude.
trix did not at all desire or intend to be- ilcCue made no such promise, that he came
stow her estate upon those to whom she under no such honorable obligation, then we
gave it; that her real intention was to de- must say that the testatrix was misled into
that a false belief, upon which, as true, she unvote it to certain charitable purposes;
these, she was advised, could not effectively mistakably acted.
For it is not possible to
had said—we
be accomplished by her will, except through doubt that if the legatees
we will do as we please;
an absolute devise to individuals, in whose will not promise;
honorable action she could confide;
and. we will not be even honorably bound not to
re
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take tliis money for oi'.selvo:— the absolute
bequest would never have been made. It
matters little that McOue did not make in
promise.
words a formal and
express
Everything that he said and everything
that he did was full of that interpretation.
When the testatrix was told that the legal
effect of the will was such that the legatees could divert the fund to their own use,
which was a statement of their power, she
was told also that she would only have
tlieir honor and conscience on which to rely,
and answered that she could trust them;

which

AVhere

was an assertion of their duty.
in such case the legatee, even by

encourages
silent acquiescence,
the testatrix to make a bequest to him to be by him
applied for the benefit of others, it has all
the force and effect of an express promise.
Wallgrave v. Tebbs, 2 Kay & J. 321;
If he
Schultz's Appeal, SO Pa. St. 405.
does not mean to act in accord with the declared expectation
which underlies and induces the devise, he is bound to say so,
for his silent acquiescence is otherwise a
fraud. Russell v. .Jacksou, 10 Hare, 204.
So far then as McCue is concerned
he
stands in the attitude of having procured
and induced the testatrix to make a devise
or bequest to himself and his associates, by
asserting its necessity and promising faithfully to carry out the charitable purposes
for which it wi»s made, and whether his asnot,
or did
knew or promised,
sociates
makes no difference where the devise is to
them as joint tenants, and all must get their
by
rights through the result accomplished
one.
Itowliotham v. Dunnett, 8 Ch. Div.
430;
Hooker v. Oxford, 33 Mich. 453; Russell V. Jackson, 10 Hare, 206. If, therefore,
in her letter of instructions, the testatrix
had named some certain and definite beneticiary. capable of taking the provision intended, the law would fasten upon the legatee a trust for such beneficiary and enforce
it, if needed, on the ground of fraud. Equity acts in such case not because of a
trust declared by the testator, but because
of the fraud of the legatee. For him not
to carry out the promise by which alone he
procured the devise and bequest, is to pera fraud upon the devisor which
petrate
equity will not endure. The authorities on
Thynn v. Thynn,
this point are numerous.
1 Vern. 296; Oldham v. Litchford, 2 Freem.
284; Reech v. Kennegal, 1 Ves. Sr. 124;
I'odmore v. OJunning, 3 Sim. 485; Muckleston V. Brown, 6 Ves. 52; Hoge v. Hoge, 1
Watts, 163; McKee v. Jones, 6 Pa. St. 42.j;
Dowd V. Tucker, 41 Conn. 197; Hooker v.
Oxford, 33 Mich. 454; Williams v. Vreeland,
The circumstances in
32 N. J. Eq. 135.
these cases were varied and sometimes peculiar, but all of them either recognize or
It has been
enforce the general doctrine.
twice applied in our own state. Brown v.
Lynch, 1 Paige, 147; Williams v. Fitch, 18

N. Y. 546. In the last of these cases the
making of a bequest to the plaintiff was prevented by an agieement of the father, who
was next of kin, to hold in trust for the
plaintiff; and the English casein were cited
with approval and the trust enforced.
All
along the line of discussion it was steadily
claimed that a plain and unambiguous devise in a will could not be modified or cut
down by extrinsic matter lying in parol, or
unattested papers, and that the statute of
frauds and that of wills excluded the evidence; and all along the line it was steadily
answered that the devise was untouched,
that it was not at all modified, that the
property passed under it, but the law dealt
j with tlie holder for liis fraud, and out of
inthe facts raised a trust, ex maleflcio,
stead of resting upon one as created by the
testator.
The character of the fraud which
.justifies
the equitable
interference is well
in Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass.
described
40.
It was said to consist "in the attempt to
take advantage of that which has been done
in performance or upon the faith of the
agreement
while repudiating its obligation
under cover of the statute."
Yet that is not the position of the defendants here. By their answer they deny any
promise,
any
whatever, made by them;
trust accompanying the request; any agreement to hold for the benefit of others; and
insist that the property is theirs "for their
own use and disposal."
Yet this is evidently intended merely aa
an assertion of what they insist Is their
legal position, and is not meant as a repudiation of their promise or its honorable
oliligation, and no beneficiary claiming any
such violation of duty, or even as threatened or intended, is lief ore us.
But it may happen, as It does happen
here, that all of the charitable uses enjoined are for the benefit of those incapable of taking, or of a character in direct
violation of the law of the state. What
then becomes the duty of a court of equity?
A fraud remains, except that It takes on
graver proportions, and becomes more certain and inevitable.
The agreement which
induced the absolute device, and the fraud
of a beneficial holding secured by a contrary promise, still confront us. And what
is worse, it does not need that the absolute legatees repudiate their promise, for if
ever so honorably willing to perform it, they
cannot do so without setting at defiance and
secretly evading the law and general policy
of the state.
The alternative is plain, and
offers no chance of escape.
If the legatees
repudiate their obligations, that is a fraud
upon the dead woman, who acted upon the
faith of their promise.
If they are willing
to perform they cannot perform, except by
a fraud upon the law to which they and the
testatrix are equally parties.
In such a case the fraud remains and ex-
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Ists, Identical In its character as to the testatrix, but an injury to the heir at law and
next of kin instead of an identified and capable beneficiary. And it becomes not only
a fraud against them, but a fraud upon the
law, since it is a declared and admitted effort to accomplish by a secret trust what
could not on the face of the will be done at
all. If, on the ground of fraud, equity, as
it has often done, and wUl always do, fastens a trust ex maleficio upon the fraudulent legatee or devisee for the protection of
a named and definite beneficiary, no reason
can be given why It should 'not do the same
thing when the fraud attempted assumes a
more serious character, because aimed at an
evasion of the law, and seeking the shelter
of unauthorized purposes.
In such event. If
equity withholds its power, one of two things
is accomplished; either the legatee holds the
estate beneficially, which is a fraud upon
the testatrix and the intended objects of her
bounty, or the fund Is devoted to unauthorized purposes. In fraud of the law, and of
the heirs and next of kin. If a trust ex
Bialeficio may be fastened upon the property In the hands of the fraudulent legatee
in the one case, why not also in the other?
If in the one the fraud grows out of a refusal to perform, which would be the voluntary act of the legatee repudiating his promise, and so an actual fraud; in the other it
grows out of the impossibility of performance, except in defiance of the public law,
which is legally a fraud. In neither event
can the legatee honestly hold.
In both, either fraud triumphs, or equity defeats it
through the operation of a trust, and proAnd so are the
tects those justly entitled.
In Jones v. Badley, L. R. 3 Eq. Cas.
cases.
635, the suit was by the co-heiresses
and
next of kin to make the defendants trustees
for them, on the ground that a devise made
to them of a residue absolute on Its face
was, In fact, for charitable purposes in violation of the mortmain act, and made on the
faith of an agreement by the legatees that
they would make such application.
One of
them was the confidential medical adviser
of the testatrix; the devise to the two was
in joint tenancy; no purposed or Intentional
dishonesty was charged against them; Instead of wholly repudiating their duty, they
alleged in their aaswer a design to carry out
the charitable purposes; and yet the court
did not hesitate on the ground of fraud to
fasten a trust upon the property in their
hands for the benefit of the heir and next of
kin. Wallgrave v. Tebbs, 2 Kay & J. 313.
321, and Russell v. Jackson, 10 Hare, 207,
were cited with approval. The latter case
was a bill filed by the next of kin, alleging
that the absolute devise of a residue was
upon a secret trust either for charitable or
The court so held as to
illegal purposes.
the proceeds of the freehold, and leasehold
estates, and because the dispositions "could
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not by law take efiCect," declared the devisees trustees for the heir and next of kin.
In Muckleston v. Brown, 6 Ves. 63, 65, Lord
Bldon intimated that where the devisees
took under an agreement to hold upon such
trusts as the testator should declare, but he
omitted to declare any, there would be a
trust to the heir which equity would decree;
and added, as to a case of evasion of the
"Is the court
statute, the pointed inquiry:
to feel for individuals, and not to . feel for
the whole of its own system, and compel a
discovery 'of frauds that go to the root of
its whole system?" In Schultz's Appeal, 80
Pa. St. 405, the plaintiff failed solely for
want of proof of an agreement by the legatee
inducing the devise; and the same difficulty
existed In Rowbotham v. Dunnett, 8 Ch. Div.
430; and as to three of the four tenants In
common in Tee v. Ferris, 2 Kay & J. 367;
but all confirm the general doctrine asserted.
It is needed now that we consider the character of the charitable uses upon which these
legatees agreed to hold the residuary estate.
The testatrix began her letter of Instructions
by saying: "I am desirous of accomplishing
certain purposes, some of which at least cannot be legally carried out by express provisions of my will; and, therefore, in order
more certainly to effect my purposes I have
constituted you such residuary devisees and
legatees."
The first purpose indicated is to
"set apart" the income of $20,000 to the
ecclesiastical education of poor young men
for the Roman Catholic priesthood.
She directed that this provision be made "a permanent one" and that the legatees make
such arrangements that after their death
the income should continue so to be appropriated.
This purpose contemplated and required that the principal of the fund should
be held inalienable and without an absolute
power of disposition during the three lives
of the legatees and for an indefinite period
beyond.
During this period the legal' title
to both the real and personal property would
remain In the trustees and they pay over
the income, and after the death of two the
survivor was directed
in some undefined
manner to provide for the continuance of
such Income in the future.
The plan violated the statute against perpetuities both
as to real and personal estate, and the active
trust was unlimited in Its duration.
Schettler V. Smith, 41 N. Y. 334; Adams v. Perry,
43 N. Y. 497; Garvey v. McDevitt, 72 N. Y.
561.
What the respondent replies is that
"the legatees may hand over the designated
sum to an Incorporated college" engaged in
educating that class of young men.
But the
testatrix neither authorized nor contemplated any such thing.
She chose her trustees
for three lives, and no other was to be substituted till the death of the third, and then
there might be another will, with an absolute bequest of the $20,000 to three other
trustees, all honorable men, acting under a
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letter of Instructions, and so tlie process go
If,
on in evasion and defiance of the law.
indeed, the testatrix intended a gift to a
college coiTporation,
that could have been
done by her will.
She could have made the
devise or bequest without the risk of depending on some one's honor that the fund
would not be diverted to private use, so
that, in so far as this devise or bequest was
represented to require an absolute devise or
bequest to individuals, she was either misled or deceived, or else did not intend a gift
to a college
corporation. The legatees,
therefore, cannot perform their promise as
they made it and as the testatrix understood
it without violating the law of the state
against perpetuities.
The letter of instruction then proceeds:
"I desire $3,000 set apart, the income whereof shall be applied to the purchase of shoes
for poor children attending the parochial
schools "of St. Paul's R. C. Church, Brooklyn."
This provision offends in the same
way with the first as to the duration of the
trust with also the difficulty that the beneficiaries are indeterminate. Levy v. Levy,
33 N. Y. 99.
Again the respondent answers,
both as to this clause and the one following
which requires -'$3,000 set apart for the St.
Vincent de Paul Society connected with St.
Paul's Church," that the church is incorporated, "and will receive $6,000 with a request from the i-esiduary
legatees to use
one-half the income to purchase shoes for
poor children attending the parochial school."
The request would bind nobody.
What the
testatrix directed was not a gift to the
church, but an application by her own chosen trustees of income to the two specified
purposes.
And if she intended the disposition now suggested, once more it is true that
she could have given $0,000 to the church
corporation with a request as to the supply
of shoes quite as well as her legatees can
do it, and there was no need of the absolute
devise

and bequest

represented

to exist.

Then follow these provisions, viz.: "The
sum of $3,000 for the benefit of the Home of
the Good Shepherd, and the sum of $5,000
for the Little Sisters of the Poor, both in
Brooklyn."
It is said that these two societies are incoi-porated,
but they may not
be entitled to the principal, if the trustees
refuse it, for the latter are authorized to
"limit the use of said bequests to the income
thereof." And again the obsei"vation recurs
that a bequest to these corporations could
easily have been made in the wiU if that had
been understood to be the real intention.
Finally the letter prescribes that any residue of the fund remaining should be applied
"in aid" of the charities and purposes named
in the will or in the letter, "or in any other
charity which you or a majority of you may
prefer." The respondent says that just such
a provision as this in the body of a will has
been upheld. Power v. Cassidy, 79 N. X.

That is not true. On the conti-ary this
court has very recently declined to carry the
doctrine of that case beyond its own essential limits, and is not likely to agree that a
devise may become the mere equivalent of
a general power of attorney.
Prichard v.
Thompson, 95 N. Y. 76.
All through this letter the duty of the
legatees is denominated
a "trust," the gifts
provided are sometimes called "bequests,"
and at its close, after charging the legatees
to impose upon her beneficiaries "as far as
you can" the "obligation" of "'the offering
of the holy sacrifice of the mass" in her own
behalf and that of certain named relatives,
she expresses her own sense of the force
and chai-acter of her letter in the concluding
sentence, "I desire to give to these instructions all the force and solemnity of a last
will and testament."
This letter of instructions clearly and unmistakably shows the real nature of the
transaction. The writer leaves almost nothing to the discretion of the trustees.
She selects out her own objects of charity in the
main, describes them in detail, fixes the
amounts to be given and impresses upon her
directions the "solemnity of a last will and
testament." It is not at all the case of a
devise to one absolutely to be expended at
his discretion, but a definite and distinct
trust having in view specific purposes and
contemplating their precise performance.
If we construed this document to mean
such disp<isitions as are now asserted, we
should be driven to the inevitable inference
that every one of them could have been
easily, and safely, and perfectly made in the
will itself, and that when told to the contrai-y by .Judge McCue the testatrix was told
what was utterly untinie, and what a jury
might easily believe was known to be tmtrue, and so that the testatrix was led, by
deception and fraud, to incur the danger and
peril of an absolute devise and bequest— a
conclusion which would destroy the will as
the product of fraud.
We do not believe
that. Justice to two honorable men, of character and standing, forbids any such theory.
Nothing about the case calls upon us for a
conclusion so harsh and needless.
On the
contrary, we think Judge McCue told the
truth to the testatrix, and that truth was
that she could not tie up her estate in the
hands of individuals perpetually, they distributing only the income, without violating
the law of the state, and that she must
either give up the purpose or depend for its
accomplishment upon an absolute devise accompanied by a secret trust.
We have thus an important question
squarely presented.
If equity will not touch
this devise by putting a trust for the heirs
at law and next of kin upon the fund in the
hands of these legatees, the road to an
evasion of oui- statutes, and to the temptations of necessity or greed, will be left wide
602.
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While In such cases it has been well
said that the court should act with caution
and only upon the clearest proof of the
fraud (Collins v. Hope, 20 Ohio, 501), yet
when, as here, the facts are proved beyond
reasonable question, we ought not to hesitate.
The testatrix did intend an absolute
devise to these legatees on the face of the
will; but she did not Intend that they should
have the resultant beneficial interest, and relied upon their promise to carry its fruits
elsewhere. They do not refuse to perform.
Although they deny the promise, it is quite
possible that they mean to keep it. We are
not authorized to say or suspect that they
will not, but if they do, they must inevitably
carry out a planned and purposed evasion
of our statutes against perpetuities.
It is said, however, and that brings us to
the decisive point in the case; that the English authorities turned upon the fact that because of the statutes of mortmain the lands
devised upon an honorable promise by the
absolute devisee to dispense them in charity,
could not by any process or in any mode be
carried to that destination without violating
the law, while In this case the charity Is
not prohibited, but only certain modes of Its
operation. Let us test this suggestion.
The statutes of mortmain were numerous,
and followed each other in a succession as
rapid as the devices and evasions of the ecclesiastics which they were framed to overthrow, until by the Act 9 Geo. II. c. 36, it
was ordained that no lands or tenements, or
money to be laid out thereon, should be given for or charged with any charitable uses
whatsoever, unless by deed intended, executed In the presence of two witnesses and
maue at least one year before the death of
the party and registered In a prescribed manner.
While under this statute a devise of
land was forbidden to charitable uses, It
could be so devoted by a deed inter vivos,
and in each of the cases we have cited, the
absolute devisee, acting as owner, could by
Indenture have transferred to . charity the
land he had taken as devisee.
But that did
not serve to ward off a trust ex maleficio In
any single instance.
The result was plainly
apparent that the property of the testator,
by the artifice of an absolute devise coupled
with a secret agreement, had been carried
to a charity in defiance of the public law and
in fraud of the mortmain acts.
These acts
did not, therefore, absolutely and totally forbid gifts of land to charitable uses. They
put their prohibition not on the gift, but on
the manner of It. They forbade It by will
It Is a similar prohibition upon
or devise.
the manner of gifts or transfers which our
While It Is true, as was said
law Imposes.
at special term in the very able opinion contained In the record, that our statute does
not forbid charitable devises and bequests,
it does forbid expressly and Imperatively a
Gifts or
certain manner of making them.
open.
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transfers made In that manner are prohibited
and made void. The principal legatee in
this case knew It, and It was distinctly planned between him and the testatrix that her
which
purpose,
understood and declared
could not be lawfully carried out by a devise
on the face of the will, should be effected
by an absolute devise coupled with his honorable obligation to hold and appropriate the
property to forbidden uses. An evasion of
the law was the very occasion and object
of the absolute devise.
Without that it
could not have been suggested without a
fraud upon the testatrix, for If there was no
need of it. If no statute was to be avoided or
flanked, the very suggestion of an absolute
devise was fraudulent
The question here is the character of the
legatees' agreement and precisely that and
They
nothing else must serve as a test.
agreed for three lives, under the pretense of
ownership, to dole out the income of this
fund to Indeterminate persons of their selection; at the end of three lives in some manner to continue that process, making It permanent;
and to dispense a possible surplus
That
to any charities they might choose.
precise agreement, the one which they made,
on the faith of which the testatrix acted,
they must honorably and explicitly carry out
or else they have defrauded her; and if
they do carry It out as they agreed and as
she understood it, they tie the property up
for three lives and an uncertain period beyond, and so violate and defy the law.
We are not ready to concede that our statute against perpetuities is any the less
sacred than the English acts of mortmain,
or may be evaded with Impunity.
It may
possibly be that the evils of such evasion
are greater in the one case than in the other,
but that will not justify us m shutting our
eyes to the process, or holding that equity
stands helpless In presence of the fraud.
The learned presiding judge at the general
term, while affirming this judgment formally that it might more swiftly come to our
bar, sent with it a very wise and prudent
caution. He said: "It seems clear to us
that the law ought not to encourage arrangements for the disposition of property by testators, such as this case discloses." In Wallgrave V. Tebbs, supra, the vice-chancellor
said that "the duty of a devisee under the
circumstances stated was to throw up the
property." Any devise or bequest of this
character Is dangerous and Indefensible. It
exposes testators to the suggestion of unnecessary difficulties as inducements to the artifice of an absolute devise concealing an illegal trust. It exposes the devisee to temptation and even when he acts honestly, to
It subsevere and unrelenting criticism.
If we
serves no good or useful purpose.
sustain it we admit that any statute may
be thus evaded, and that equity cannot redress the wrong.

492

CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS.

We are not satisfied that the will was
made through undue influence and therefore
affirm the judgment of the general term
which affirmed the decree of the surrogate,
with costs.
But in the equity action we reverse the
judgment of the general term and of the

special tei-n\. wUli '-outs of both parties on
the appeal to this court, payable out of the
fund, and ord»r a new trial.
All concur as to the first appeal.
All concur as to the second, except RAPAl.LO, J.,
not voting.
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CURDY

V.

BERTON.

(21 Pac.

858,

(No. 11,949.)

79 Cal.

Svipreme Court of California.

420.)

June

4,

i880.

Department 2.
Appeal from superior
court, city and county of San Francisco;
John Hunt, Judge.
Action by Frank Curdy against G. A. Berton, executor of Francis Berton, deceased, to
declare a trust, and for an accounting.
Judgment for defeniiant, and plaintiff appeals.
D. M. Delmas, for appellant. D. W.
jDouthitt and Smith, Wright & Pomeroy, for
respondent.

McFarland, J. Madeline Curdy died
February 9, 1877, in Alameda county, Cal.
She left a will duly executed, in which, after
bequests to several persons, including the
plaintiff herein, there occurs tlie following:
"I give in trust to Francis Berton, now Swiss
consul in San Francisco, all the moneys
possess in France, and principally my share
of the Italian rentes deposited in the bankinghouse of Messrs. Hentsch, Lutscher & Co.,
of Paris, to be distributed according to the
Berton
private instructions I give him."

I

was present

when

the

will

was

made, and

wrote it for the testatrix at her request; and
at the time of the making of the will she verbally instructed him to distribute said property or its proceeds to certain relations and
others in France, other than the plaintiff
herein, and gave him an order for said property. The facts in proof show that he at
least impliedly agreed to accept the trust.

After

her death, and before

the commence-

of this action, said Berton faithfully
distributed said property in accordance with
This
the said instructions of said testatrix.
action is brought by plaintiff, a brother of
the deceased, and one of her heirs-at-law, to
have it decreed that Berton held the legal
title to said property in trust for the heirs of
said deceased, for an accounting, and for the
payment to him of his proportionate share of
said property, with interest, profits, etc.
Francis Berton died during the pendency of
the action, and his executor, George A. Berton,
The court
was substituted as defendant.
gave Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff
appeals from the judgment, and from an order denying a new trial.
Upon yie main point in the case the position of appellant is, in brief, that, as the statute law of this state requires a will to be in
writing, therefore, "where a testator devises
property in trust to bo applied to such uses
as the testator has verbally specified to the
devisee, the trust attempted to be created by
parol fails, and the devisee takes the property
The
in trust for the heirs of the testator."
contention of respondent is, in brief, that,
independent of the statute of wills, where
a testator bequeaths property in trust to a
legatee without specifying in the will the
purposes of the trust, and at the same time
communicates those purposes to the legament
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writings, and
tee orally, or by unattested
the legatee, either expressly or by silent acquiescence, promises to perform the trust,
and the trust itself is not unlawful, there a
court of equity will raise a constructive trust
in favor of the beneficiaries intended by the
testator, and will charge the legatee as a constructive trustee for them, upon the ground
that the legatee will not be countenanced in
perpetrating a fraud by encouraging the testator to make a bequest which would not
otherwise have been made, and then refusing to execute his promise. We think that
respondent's view of the law, as above stated,
There are some eases which supis correct.
port the proposition of appellant, notably,
the case of Olliffe v. Wells, 130 Mass. 221;
but the weight of authority and the better
reason are the other way.
Obviously, the clear intention of the testatrix, as expressed in the written will, was
that the property in question should not go
He, however, says, in effect:
to plaintiff.
"True, the property was not to come to me.
It was given to Berton upoffthe understanding, between him and the testatrix, that it
was to go to the benefit of certain other pertheir
sons; but, as they cannot' establish
rights as beneficiaries, according to the statute of wills, Berton must be held to be my
trustee, against the intention of the testatrix.
"
stand upon what clai m to be the dry law.
case,
no just imEvidently, in a doubtful
pulse would move a court to lean towards a
proposition involving such consequences;
and, as the question is an open one in this
stale, we are at liberty to follow those au-

I

I

thorities, and that line of reasoning which
appear to us to be most in consonance with
the true principles of equity and justice.
We find in the Case of O'Hara, 95 N. T.
403, a very full statement of the considerations which, in our opinion ought to govern
In that case
the decision of the case at bar.
the testatrix, by her will, practically disinherited her relations in favor of strangers,
giving the bulk of her estate to three legatees, who were her lawyer, her doctor, and
hei priest. The will was attacked by the
heirs, on the ground of want of testamentary
As there
and undue influence.
capacity
was considerable
evidence to support these
charges, the legatees finally, to establish some
reasonable explanation of a diversion of the
estate to strangers having influence from
confidential relations, showed that they were
not to have any beneficial interest in the
estate, but were to devote it entirely to certain charitable uses, according to instructions
given them by the testatrix at the time the
will was made. It appeared, however, that
these charitable uses were in direct violation
The heirs at
of the statute law of the state.
law then began an action in equity to establish a trust, which, failing as to the intended
beneficiaries on account of illegality, should
result to them. The legatees then, although
intending to carry out the wishes of the testatrix, stood upon their rights under the
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terms of the will, which upon its face gave
tliem the property absolutely; denied that
they had accepted any trust, or that any
could be proven by extrinsic matter lying
outside the will; and insisted that the property was theirs absoluteiy. The question
thus presented was, In substance, the one
The only difference is that
presented here.
in the O'Hara Case the instructions were in
writing, while in the case at bar they were
oral. But neither in the argument of counsel, nor in the opinion of the court, was there
any distinction made between written and
oralinstructions or promises.
The principles
announced applied equally to both.
There
was no claim that the letter of instructions
came within the rule that an extraneous paper may be incorporated into a validly executed will by a direct reference to it in the
will itself. There was no reference whatever in the will to the letter.
The court in
the O'Hara Case, after stating that "the
proof is uncontradicted that the testatrix
made the residuary devise and bequest in its
absolute and unconditional form in reliance
upon a promise of the legatees to apply the
fund faithfully and honorably to the charitable uses dictated in the letter of instructions," proceeds to discuss the question
whether or not one of the legatees, McCue,
expressly promised to accept the trust. After
reviewing the evidence (which was somewhat contradictory) on that point, tlie court
says; "Where, in such case, the legatee, even
the tesby silent acquiescence, encourages
tatrix to make a bequest to him, to be applied
by him to the benelit of others, it has all the
force and effect of an express promise. Wallgrave V. Tebbs, 2 Kay & J. 321; Scliultz'
Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 405. If he does not mean
to act in accord with the declared expectation which underlies and induces the devise,
he is bound to say so, for his silent acquiesEussell v. Jackcence is otherwise a fraud.
son, 10 Hare, 204." The court then proceeds
to state the principles which should determine the main question under discussion, as
follows: "If, therefore, in her letter of instruction the testatrix had named some certain and definite beneficiary, capable of taking the provision intended, the law would
fasten upon the legatee a trust for such
beneficiary, and enforce it, if needed, on the
ground of fraud.
Equity acts, in such case,
not because of a trust declared by the testator, but because of the fraud of the legatee.
For him not to carry out the promise by
which alone he procured the devise and bea fraud upon the dequest is to perpetrate
visdr, which equity will not endure.
The
authorities on this point are numerous."
"The
(Here follows a long list of cases.)
circumstances in these cases were varied and
sometimes peculiar, but all of them either
recognize or enforce the general doctrine. It
has been twice applied in our own state.
Brown v. Lynch, 1 Paige, 147; Williams v.
Fitch, 18 N. Y. 546. In the last of these
cases the making of a bequest to the plaintiff
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was prevented by an agreement of the father, who was next of kin, to hold in trust
for the plaintiff; and the English cases were
cited with approval, and the trust enforced.
All along the line of discussion it was steadily claimed that a plain and unambiguous
devise in a will could not be modified or cut
down by extrinsic matter lying in parol, or
unattested
papers, and that the statute of
frauds and that of wills excluded the evidence; and all along the line it was steadily
answered
that the devise was untouched;
that it was not at all modified; that the property passed under it, but the law dealt with
the holder for his fraud, and out of the facts
raised a trust ex maleflcio, instead of resting
The
upon one as created by the testator.
character of the fraud which justifies the
interference is well described in
equitable
It was said
Glass V. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 40.
to consist ' in the attempt to take advantage
of that which has been done in performance
or upon the faith of the agreement, while repudiating its obligation under cover of the
statute.' " The other parts of the opinion
discuss the question wliether, as the charitable uses could not be enforced, because forbidden by the statute, the legatees could be
held as trustees for the heirs, but that question does not arise in the case at bar.
We have thus referred at length to the
O'Hara Case because it contains a lucid
statement of the principles which apply to
the case at bar, and for the additional reason
that in the opinion of the court and the briefs
of counsel nearly all the authorities bearing
We also refer
npon the question are cited.
especially to the case of Williams v. Vreeland, 32 N.
Eq. 135, which declares the
doctrine above stated; and in the notes to
which are collated extracts from about 40
different cases, all of which are confirmatory
of said doctrine. See, also. Hooker v. Axford, 33 Mich. 453; In re Fleetwood, L. R.
15 Ch. Div. 594; In re Boyes, L. R. 26 Ch.
Div. 531; and Riordan v. Banon, 10 Ir. Eq.
The cases cited will show that it is im469.
material whether the instructions given by a
testator are oral or in writing. Indeed, in
the opinion of the court in the O'Hara Case,
(above quoted,) where the phrase "lying in
parol, or unattested papers" is employed, the
word "parol" is evidently used in its usual
meaning, as synonymous with "verbal" or
"oral," and not in its broader meaning of
"not under seal."
The California cases of
De Laurencel v. De Boom, 48 Cal. 581; Estate of Shillaber, 74 Cal. 144. 15 Pac. Rep. 453 ;
and Estate of Brooks, 54 Cal. 475, — while in
harmony with the principles above stated, —
are not directly to the point involved in the
case at bar. Our conclusion is that the court
below correctly decided that Francis Berton,
deceased, properly distributed the property In
France, in accordance with the instructions
given him by the testatrix when the will was
made, and which instructions he, at that time,
agreed to carry out. Of course, the case must
be distinguished from one where a testator.

J.
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intending to give certain property directly to
a certain person, for that person's sole benefit, fails to designate in the will either the
property or the person. In such a case no
These views
question of trust could arise.
make it unnecessary to determine the other
two points made by respondent: (1) That
the order for the property in France, given
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by the testatrix to Barton at the time the
will was made, constituted a transfer of the
property in prcesenti; and (2) that the action was barred by the statute of limitations.
The judgment and order are afhrmed.
"VVe

STBIN,

concur

J.

:

Thornton,

J.;

Sharp-
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are payable out of income as distinguished
from corpus, and that, almost precisely to the
extent contended for by the plaintiff, they are

WEALL.

ANDREWS

T.

WEALIi.

(42 Ch. Div. (174.)

S\iprerae Court of Judicature.

July

12, 13, 20,

1889.

Benjamin

Weall, who died in 1868, bequeathed his residuary personal estate. Including leaseholds, to John Weall the elder,
^Yilliam Weall the elder, and William Lightfoot, upon trust
thereout
to raise certain
sums, and as to the ultimate residue upon
trust to pay the income thereof to Margaret
Andrews (therein called JIargaret Weall) during her life and after her death upon the
And the testator
trusts therein mentioned.
devised the residue of his real estate to the
same trustees upon trust (subject to certain
payments) to pay the residue of the rents and
profits to Margaret Andrews during her life,
and after her decease upon the trusts thereWilliam Weall the elder died
in mentioned.
in 1874, and .John Weall the elder died in
1879; and the defendants William Weall and
John Weall were appointed trustees in their
The defendants William Weall and
places.
John \^'eall and William Lightfoot for several
years prior to 18.S4 employed Sydney P. Weall
as solicitor to the estate and to collect the
rents, allowing him a commission
of '< per
cent, on the rents.
They also paid, or allowout of the rents, certain
ed him to retain
sums of money for costs, part of which, as
Margaret Andrews alleged, and as the court
held on the evidence were unnecessary, and
part ought to have been charged to corpus
William Lightfoot died
and not to Income.

in

1886.

Margaret

this
action
Andrews brought
William Weall and
defendants
John Weall and against the executore of W.
Lightfoot claiming that the defendants William Weall and John Weall and the estate of
William Lightfoot were jointly and severally
liable to make good to her the losses she had
incurred as aforesaid; and claiming all necessary accounts as to the estate of the testator and the costs of the fiction.
The principal defense was that the plaintiff
was aware of and assented to what was
done, and that some of the costs were incuragainst
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red by her desire.
This was the trial of the action.

Warmington. Q. C, and JIacSwinney, for
plaintiff. Barber, Q. C, and Bardswell, for
defendants.
Soames, Edwards & Jones, for plaintiff.
B. W. Reeves, for defendant Sedguirck & Co.

KEPrmCH, J. The only point argued on
the further consideration of the case and now
requiring decision is by whom the costs of
The short result
the action are to be borne.
of the proceedings Is that none of the costs
which are mentioned in the statement of
claim and which gave rise to the litigation

not chargeable against the trust estate at all.
Therefore,
generally,
the plaintiff
speaking
has succeeded, and the defendants, the presof a deceasent trustees and representatives
ed trustee, have failed in the action, and the
questions occur, why is not the plaintiff entitled to her costs, and why should the defendants not be held liable to pay them?
On behalf of the defendants it was argued
by Mr. Barber with his accustomed force that
they had been proved to be in the 'UTong
only as regards matters of account, and that
trustees do not pay costs occasioned by errors In accounts, and, indeed, are allowed
them out of the trust estate unless misconduct has been proved: and he relied on tlie
cases of 'l\u'ner v. Hancock, 20 Ch. Div. 30.'!.
Those
and Stott v. Milne, 2.") Ch. Div. 710.
cases, of course, are binding on me and must
be followed; but I venture to add that in my
judgment they express in apt language what
They
has ever been the rule of the court.
express what is termed the contract between
trustee and cestui que trust, and also that
tenderness which the court is anxious to exhibit towards trustees honestly exercising discretion in discharge of their duties, often difficult and still more often thankless.
This, however, does not dispose of the case
There is another and somewhat
before me.
different question which must all the more
be considered because, as pointed out by Mr.
■V^'armington in reply, this is not really an action for administration of a trust, but it was
commenced and brought to trial for the purpose of cliallenging the claim of the trustees
to chart^c particular items of expenditure
against tlie trust estate.
Consider for a moment the position of that
special ay-enl: called a trustee as regards the
He certainly has
employment of subagents.
the right to appoint them, if and so far as
the work of the trust rea.sonably requires;
for instance, he may appoint a broker to
or a solicitor
make or realize investments,
to do legal business, and the power of emat
ployment involves
that of remuneration
the cost of the trust estate. The limit of the
power of employment is, as pointed out in
the well-known case of Speight v. Gaunt, 22
Ch. Div. 727, 9 App. Cas. 1, reasonableness,
and whether there happens to be a standard
to which appeal can be made by taxation or
or not, reasonableness
must also,
otherwise
I think, be the limit of the power of reA trustee is bound to exercise
muneration.
discretion in the choice of his agents, 'but so
long as he selects persons properly qualified
he cannot be made responsible for their intelligence or their honesty.
He does not in
any sense guaranty the performance of their
duties.
It does not, however, follow that he
can intrust his agents with any duties which
they are willing to undertake, or pay them
or agree to pay them any remuneration which
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they see fit to demand.
The trustee must
consider these matters for himself, and the
court would be disposed to support any conclusion at which he arrives, however erroneous, provided it really is his conclusion,— that
is, the outcome
of such consideration
as
might reasonably be expected to be given to
a like matter by a man of ordinary prudence
guided by such rules and arguments as generally guide such a man in his own affairs.
If trustees fail to exercise their discretion, or
purporting to exercise it do so in such a manner that the court is bound to infer that they
have not done so honestly, their costs of any
proceedings
challenging
their accounts are
taken out of the rules laid down in Turner v.
Hancock, 20 Ch. Div. 303, and Stott v. Milne,
25 Ch. Div. 710; and the court is at liberty,
and under
certain
may be
circumstances
bound, for the protection of cestuis que trustent, to disallow the trustees' costs, or even
make them pay those of others.
One other general remark before applying
principles to the particular case.
these
Trustees deserve and receive the upmost conThey
sideration at the hands of the court.
gratuitously undertake duties for the benefit
of others, and as regards costs and otherwise
they are entitled to generous treatment.
But
cestuis que trustent also have their rights,—
their claim to consideration.
The trust property is theirs, managed for their benefit, and
on the trial of a question between them and
their trustees, by whom costs are to be borne,
they may fairly require something more to
They
be proved than absence of dishonesty.
must not complain of mistakes or errors in
judgment, but reasonable prudence is not too
much for them to require, and by reasonable
prudence I mean that which is defined in the
judgment in the case of Speight v. Gaunt, 22
Ch. Div. 727, 9 App. Cas. 1, already mentioned.
I have intended throughout the above remarks to follow the principles of that case
and of subsequent cases commenting
on it.
A decision of the house of lords requires no
sanction,
but the language used by other
judges in adopting and expounding that particular decision has assisted to make it a
most instructive and useful statement of the
extent and limit of trustees' authority and
Now, to apply these
liability.
consequent
principles to the case in hand. Of the three
trustees of Benjamin Weall's will in office
during the period of the transactions to
which this litigation relates John Weall was
undoubtedly the foremost.
He was the acting trustee, and by him William Weall, who,
as far as I can see, did nothing, was content
to be guided.
William Lightfoot, the third
trustee (now dead), also did little, but he
to
had views of his own, which, according
he asserted with some
the correspondence,
They were peculiar views and open
vigor.
to criticism, but he has not had an opportunity of explaining himself, and
therefore
refrain from further comment Suffice it to
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that, as regards the particular matter
which gave rise to this action, he certainly
did not differ from his colleague John Weall,
of a
in the sense of urging the adoption
say

course more agreeable to the plaintiffs rehad employed
quirements.
These trustees
as their solicitor for trust purposes Mr. Sydney F. Weall, and, besides giving him ordinary legal business, they had allowed him
to receive the rents of the trust estate and
to retain a commission of 5 per cent, for his
trouble.
This does not commend itself to
me, but the plaintiff's claim to be reimbursed
this commission was abandoned at the trial,
and although it was stipulated that the proper influence, whatever that might be, on the
subject of costs should not thereby be lost,
yet, not having had an opportunity of fully
prefer to lay it aside.
discussing the matter,
Observe, however, that this receipt of rents
has really been the moving cause of the litigation, for it is clear that, if Sydney F. Weall
had not had the means of paying himself the
charges objected to, he would never have
been paid at all, and this action would not
Mr. Sydney F. Weall,
have been necessary.
without instructions or any sufficient reason,
prepared an abstract of the title to the testator's lesiduary estate, and charged for it
nearly £100. To this charge the plaintiff objected.
Having read through the correspondence, the position taken by her is plain,
as is also the manner in which she was treated by the trustees.
She from first to last objected to the charge on principle, and asserted
that it must be wholly disallowed. They, on
the other hand, never went further than a
suggestion that the bill should be taxed, and
though perhaps taxation might have solved
the difficulty, it would have been one under
special order and not such as was suggested
or was likely to be assented to by the solicitor. It is due to the defendant John Weall
to say that he knew and admitted that the
charge was altogether wrong, and my conclusion from the correspondence, without further explanation,
is that with but little encouragement he would have taken a bolder
course than, unfortunately for himself and
again call
his colleagues, he in fact did.
attention to the fact that Sydney F. Weall's
receipt of rents had enabled him to pay himself, and this placed the trustees in a position
of great difficulty.
Failing to obtain redress, the plaintiff commenced this action, and, passing over the
statement of claim (in which the facts are
stated plainly and with due moderation),
I
must say a word on the defense.
The trustees had claimed to charge the particular
costs already mentioned against the plaintiff's
income to the exoneration of the corpus of the
trust estate. For this there was no justification, but they pleaded the plaintiff's wish to
that effect, and that she had acquiesced in
their dealings with the Income. At the trial
they were forced to admit this view to be erroneous, and to account to the plaintiff for
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They further pleaded
income accordingly.
that the particular costs had been incurred in
compliance
with the plaintiff's express desire, of which they were unable to tender any
And, the plaintiff alleging that
evidence.
noue of tUe costs were cliargeable against income, but that some were chargeable against
corpus, and the rest not chargeable against
the trust estate at all, the trustees justified
all the costs, including those admitted by
John Weall to have been improperly incurred,
as properly chargeable against corpus.
This
question has been investigated in a most complete and satisfactory manner, with the result
already noticed.
It has been determined that
out of £175. 4s. 8d., the total amount of costs,
£84. 7s. 8d., or less than 50 per cent., is properly chargeable against corpus, and that, as
regards the sum of £90. 17s., there is no
charge whatever, or, in other words, that sum
has been improperly paid to or allowed to be
retained by the solicitor. I am not sure how
far the conclusion from this ought to be affected by any offer made on behalf of the
plaintiff, but it is worthy of notice that an
offer was made which would have given almost exactly this result without the pain and
expense of litigation. Why it was declined
thinls, be an
It would.
do not understand.

I

I

unwarranted departure from the principles
which I have endeavored to expound not to
make the trustees pay the costs which have
been occasioned by their disregard of those
principles and tlieir unjustifiable defense.
To accede to the argument of counsel for the
trustees that I ought not in any event to do
more than deprive them of their costs would
be to cast on the trust estate an undue burden
by reason of litigation which is the direct
It is
consequence of the trustees' default.
right to add that, having gone carefully
through the pleadings and the other papers to
see whether I could relieve them of any part
of the costs as being in respect of matters
capable of being brought under the general
rules In favor of trustees, I regret to say that
The
I can find no reason for distinction.
trustees seem to me to have been wholly
■wTong from first to last.
The form of order may require consideration, but, as regards the only point argued,
my judgment is that the defendants, the trusof the deceased
tees, and the representatives
trustee must pay the costs of the action, inwho
cluding the costs of the remaindermen
were added as defendants in order to try the
liability of the corpus on which the trustees
insisted.
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EARL, J. This action was brought by the
receiver of the Central Savings Bank of the
city of New York against the defendants,
who were trustees of the bank, to recover
damages which, it is alleged, they caused the
bank by their misconduct as such trustees.
The first question to be considered is the
measure of fidelity, care and diligence which
such trustees owe to such a bank and its depositors. The relation existing between the
corporation and its trustees is mainly that of
principal and agent, and the relation between
the trustees and the depositors is similar to
that of trustee and cestui que trust The
trustees are bound to observe the limits placed
upon their powers in the charter, and if they
transcend such limits and cause damage, they
If they act fraudulently or
incur liability.
do a willful wrong, it is not doubted that
they may be held for all the damage they
But if
cause to the bank or its depositors.
they act in good faith within the limits of
powers conferred, using proper prudence and
for mere
diligence, they are not responsible
That the
mistakes or errors of judgment
trustees of such corporations are bound to
use some diligence in the discharge of their
All the authoriduties cannot be disputed.
ties hold so. What degree of care and diliNot the
gence are they bound to exercise?
highest degree, not such as a very vigilant
or extremely careful person would exercise.
If such were required, it would be difficult
to find trustees who would incur the responIt would not
sibility of such trust positions.
be proper to answer the question by saying
Few persons would be
the lowest degree.
willing to deposit money in savings banks,
or to take stock in corporations, with the imderstanding that the trustees or directors
were bound only to exercise slight care, such
as inattentive persons would give to their
own business, in the management of the large
and important interests committed to their
hands.
When one deposits money in a savings bank, or takes stock in a corporation,
thus divesting himself of the Immediate control of his property, he expects and has the
right to expect that the trustees or directors
who are chosen to take his place in the management and control of his property, will exercise ordinary care and prudence in the trusts
committed to them— the same degree of care
and prudence that men prompted, by self-interest generally exercise in their own affairs.
When one voluntarily takes the position of
trustee or director of a corporation, good faith,
exact justice, and public policy unite In requiring of him such a degree of care and prudence, and it is a gross breach of duty — crassa
negligentia—not to bestow them.
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It Is Impossible to give the measure of culpable negligence for all cases, as the degree
of care required depends upon the subjects to
which It is to be applied.
First Nat. Bank v.
Ocean Nat. Bank, 60 N. Y. 278.
What would be
slight neglect in the care of a quantity of iron
might be gross neglect in the care of a jewel.
What would be slight neglect in the care exercised In the affairs of a turnpike corporation or even of a manufacturing corporation,
might be gross neglect in the care exercised
in the management of a savings bank intrusted with the savings of a multitude of poor
people, depending for its life upon credit and
liable to be wrecked by the breath of suspicion.
There is a classification of negligence
to be found in the books, not always of practical value and yet sometimes serviceable, into slight negligence,
gross negligence,
and
that degree of negligence intermediate the
two, attributed to the absence of ordinary
care; and the claim on behalf of these trustees is that they can only be held responsible
in this action in consequence of gross negligence, according to this classification.
If
gross negligence be taken according to its ordinary meaning— as something
nearly approaching fraud or bad faith — I cannot yield
to this claim; and if there are any authorities upholding the claim, I emphatically dissent from them.
It seems to me that It would be a monstrous proposition to hold that trustees, intrusted with the management of the property.
Interests and business of other people who divest themselves of the management and confide in them, are bound to give only slight
care to the duties of their trust, and are liable only in case of gross inattention and negligence; and I have found no authority fully
upholding such a proposition.
It is true that
authorities are found which hold that trustees are liable only for crassa negligentia,
which literally means gross negligence;
but
that phrase has been defined to mean the absence of ordinary care and diligence adequate
to the particular case.
In Scott v. De Peyster, 1 Edw. 513, 543—a case much cited—
the learned vice-chancellor said: "I think the
question in all such cases should and must
necessarily be, whether they (directors) have
omitted that care which men of common prudence take of their own concerns.
To require more, would be adopting too rigid a
rule and rendering them liable for slight neglect; while to require less, would be relaxing
too much the obligation which binds them to
vigilance and attention in regard to the interests of those confided to their care, and expose them to liability for gross neglect only —
which is very little short of fraud itself." In
Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 11, Judge Sharswood said: "They [directors] can only be regarded
as mandataries— persons
who have
gratuitously undertaken to perform certain
duties, and who are therefore bound to apply
ordinary skill and diligence, but no more."
In Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 R,
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312, Jenckes, J., said: "The sole question
is, whether the directors have or have not beThey are liable onstowed proper diligence.
ly for ordinary care; such care as prudent
And in the
men take in their own affairs."
same case, Ames, J., said: "They should not
therefore be liable for innocent mistakes, unintentional negligence, honest errors of judgment, but only for willful fraud or neglect,
and want of ordinary knowledge and care."
The same case came again under consideration in 3 R. I. 9, and Green, C. J., said: "We
think a board of directors, acting in good
faith and with reasonable care and diligence,
who nevertheless fall into a mistake, either
as to law or fact, are not liable for the consequences of such mistake."
In the case of
Liquidators of Western Bank v. Douglas, 11
Sess. Cas. (Scot.) 112, It is said: "Whatever
the duties (of directors) are, they must be discharged
with fidelity and conscience, and
with ordinary and reasonable care.
It is not
necessary
that I should attempt to define
where excusable remissness ends and gross
That must depend to a
negligence begins.
large extent on the circumstances.
It is
enough to say that gross negligence in the
performance of such a duty, the want of reasonable and ordinary fidelity and care, will
impose liability for loss thereby occasioned."
In Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 405,
Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said, that a person who accepted the office of director of a
corporation "is obliged to execute it with
although
fidelity and reasonable diligence,"
In Litchfield
he acts without compensation.
v. White, 3 Sandf. 545, Sandford, J., said:
"In general a trustee is bound to manage
and employ the trust property for the benefit
of the cestui que trust with the care and diligence of a provident owner.
Consequently
he is liable for every loss sustained by reason
of his negligence, want of caution or mistake,
as well as positive misconduct."
In Spering's Appeal, Judge Sharswood said
that directors "are not liable for mistakes of
judgment, even though they may be so gross
as to appear to us absurd and ridiculous, provided they were honest, and provided they are
fairly within the scope of the powers and discretion confided to the managing body." As
I understand this language, I cannot assent
to It as properly defining to any extent the
Like a
natm-e of a director's responsibility.
mandatary, to whom he has been likened, he
Is bound not only to exercise proper care and
diligence, but ordinary skill and judgment.
As he is bound to exercise ordinary skill and
judgment, he cannot set up that he did not
When damage is caused by
possess them.
his want of judgment, he cannot excuse himOne
self by alleging his gross Ignorance.
who voluntarily takes the position of director,
and invites confidence in that relation, undertakes, like a mandatary, with those whom he
represents or for whom he acts, that he possesses at least ordinary knowledge and skill,
and that he will bring them to bear In the
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discharge of his duties.
Story, Ballm. § 1S2.
Such is the rule applicable to public officers,
to professional men and to mechanics, and
such is the rule which must be applicable to
every person who undertakes to act for another in a situation or employment requiring
skill and knowledge; and it matters not that
the service is to be rendered gratuitously.
These defendants voluntarily took the position of trustees of the bank.
They Invited
depositors to confide to them their savings,
and to intrust the safe-keeping
and management of them to their skill and prudence.
They undertook not only that they would discharge their duties with proper care, but that
they would exercise the ordinary skill and
judgment requisite for the discharge of their
delicate trust.
Enough has now been said to show what
measure of diligence, skill, and prudence the
law exacts from managers and directors of
corporations; and we are now prepared to
examine the facts of this case, for the purpose of seeing if these trustees fell short of
this measure in the matters alleged In the
complaint.
This bank was Incorporated
by the act
chapter 467 of the Laws of 1867, and it commenced business In the spring of that year,
in a hired building on the east side of Third
avenue, in the city of New York.
It remained there for several
years, and then removed to the west side of the avenue, between Forty-Fifth and Forty-Sixth
streets,
where it occupied hired rooms until near the
time of its failure In the fall of 1875.
During the whole time the deposits averaged only about $70,000.
In 1867, the income of the
bank was $942.12, and the expenses, Including amounts paid for safe, fixtures, charter,
current expenses and interest to depositors,
In 1868, the income was
were $5,571.34.
$5,471.43, and the expenses Including interest
to depositors, $5,719.43.
In 1869, the income
was $3,918.27, and the expenses and interest
paid, $5,346.05.
In 1870 the income was $5,784.09, and expenses and Interest,
$7,040.22.
In 1871 the Income was $13,551.14; which Included a bonus of $4,000, or $6,000 obtained
upon the purchase of a mortgage of $40,000,
which mortgage was again sold In 1874 at a
discount of $2,000, and the expenses, including interest paid, were $9,124.05. In 1872
the Income was $5,100.51, and the expenses,
including Interest paid, were $7,212.49. Down
to the 1st day of January, 1873, therefore, the
total expenses, including interest paid, were
$5,046 more than the income.
To this sum
should be added $2,000, deducted on the sale
of the large mortgage in 1874, which was
purchased at the large discount in 1871, as
above mentioned, and yet entered in the assets at its face. From this apparent deficiency should be deducted the value of the safe
and furniture of the bank, from which the reAt the
ceiver subsequently realized $500.
same date the amount due to over one thousand depositors was about $70,000, and the
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assets of the bank consisted of about $13,000
in cash and the balance mostly of mortgages
upon real estate.
While the bank was In this condition, with
a lease of the rooms then occupied by it expiring May 1, 1874, the project of purchasing
a lot and erecting
a banking-house thereon
began to be talked of among the trustees.
The only reason put on record in the minutes
of the meetings held by the trustees for procuring a new banking-house was to better

the financial condition of the bank. In February, 1873, at a meeting of the trustees a
committee
was appointed "on site for new
building;" and In March the committee entered into contract for the purchase
of a
plot of land, consisting of four lots, on the
comer of Forty-Eighth street and Third avenue, for the sum of $74,500; of which $1,000
was to be paid down, $9,000 on the 1st day
of May then next, and $64,000 to be secured
by a mortgage, payable on or before May 1,
1875, with interest from May 1, 1873, at seven per cent.; and there was an agreement
that payment of the principal sum secured
by the mortgage might be extended to May
1. 1877, provided a building should, without
unavoidable delay, be erected upon the corner lot, worth not less than $25,000.
This
contract was reported by the committee to
the tnistees, at a meeting held April 7. On
the 1st day of May, 1873, the real estate was
conveyed and the cash payment
was made,
and four separate mortgages were executed
to

secure

the

balance,

one

upon

each

lot.

The mortgage upon the lot upon which the
bank building was afterward erected was
for $30,500. At the same time the bank became obligated to build upon that lot a building covering its whole front, twenty-five feet,
and sixty feet deep, and not less than five
stories high, and have the same inclosed by
the 1st day of November then next. Upon
that lot the bank proceeded, in the spring of
1875, to erect a building covering the whole
front, and seventy-six
feet deep, and five
stories high, at an expense of about $27,000.
And the buiding was nearly completed when
in
the receiver of tlie bank was appointed
November of that year.
The three lots not
of,
needed for the building were disposed
as we may assume, without any loss, leaving the corner lot used for the building to cost
the bank $29,250; and we may assume that
that was then the fair value of the lot. This
case may then be treated as if the trustees
had purchased the comer lot at $29,250, and
bound themselves to erect thereon a building
costing $27,000. When the receiver was appointed that lot and building, and other assets which produced less than $1,000, constituted the whole property of the bank; and
subsequently the lot and building were swept
away by a mortgage foreclosure, and this action was brought to recover the damages
caused to the bank by the alleged improper
investment of its funds, as above stated, in
the lot upon which the building was erected.
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At the time of the purchase of the lot tha
bank was substantially insolvent. If it had
gone into liquidation, its assets would have
fallen several thousand dollars short of discharging its liabilities, and this state of
It had
things was known to the trustees.
been in existence about six years, doing a
losing business. The amount of its deposits,
which its managers had not been able to
increase, shows that the enterprise was an
abortion from the beginning, either because
it lacked public confidence, or was not needIt
ed in the place where it was located.
had changed its location once without any
benefit.
It had on hand but about $13,000
in cash, of which $10,000 were taken to make
the first payments.
The balance of its assets
was mostly in mortgages not readily convertfor $40,000,
ible.
One was a mortgage
which had been purchased at a large discount, and we may infer that it was not very
salable, as the trustees resolved to sell it as
early as May, 1873, and in August, 1873, authorized it to be sold at a discount of not
more than $2,500, and yet it was not sold
Lintil 1874.
In this condition of things the
complained
of,
trustees made the purchase
under an obligation to place on the lot an
expensive
banking-house.
Whether under
the circumstances
the purchase was such as
the trustees, in the exercise of ordinary prudence, skill and care, could make; or whether the act of purchase was reckless, rash,
extravagant, showing a want of ordinary prudence, skill and care, were questions for the
jury.
It is not disputed that, under the
charter of this bank, as amended in 1868
(chapter 294), it had the power to purchase a
lot for a banking-house "requisite for the
transaction of its business." That was a
power, like every other possessed by the
bank, to be exercised with prudence and
care.
Situated as this moribund institution
was, was it a prudent and reasonable thing
to do, to invest nearly half of all the trust
funds in this expensive lot, with an obligation to take most of the balance to erect
thereon an extravagant building? The trustees
were urged on by no real necessity.
They had hired rooms where they could have
remained; or if those rooms were not adequate for their small business, we may assume that others could
have been hired.
They put forward the claim upon the trial
that the rooms they then occupied were not
That may have been a good reason
safe.
for making them more secure, or for getting other rooms, but not for the extravagance in which they indulged.
It is inferable however that the principal motive which
influenced

the trustees

to make

the

change

of location was to improve the financial condition of the bank by increasing its deposits. Their project was to buy this corner
lot and erect thereon an imposing edifice, to
inspire confidence, attract attention, and thus
draw deposits.
It was intended as a sort of
advertisement of the bank, a very expensive

r,02

DUTIES AND LIABILITIES

Savings banks are not organone Indeed.
ized as business enterprises.
They have no
stockholders,
and are not to engage in speculations or money-making in a business sense.
They are simply to take the deposits, usually small, which are offered, aggregate them,
and keep and invest them safely, paying
such Interest to the depositors
as is thus
made, after deducting expenses, and paying
It is not legitithe principal upon demand.
mate for the trustees of such a bank to seek
deposits at the expense of present depositors.
It Is their business to take deposits
when offered.
It was not proper for these
trustees— or at least the jury may have
found that it was not— to take the money
then on deposit and invest In a bankinghouse, merely for the purpose of drawing
In making this investment
other deposits.
the interests of the depositors whose money
was taken, can scarcely be said to have been
consulted.
It matters not that the trustees purchased
this lot for no more than a fair value, and
that the loss was occasioned by the subsequent general decline in the value of real
They had no right to expose their
estate.
bank to the hazard of such a decline. If the
purchase was an improper one when made,
it matters not that the loss came from the
unavoidable fall In the value of the real esThe jury may have found
tate purchased.
that it was grossly careless for the trustees
to lock up the funds in their charge in such
where they could not be
an investment,
reached in any emergency which was likely
to arise in the affairs of the crippled bank.
We conclude therefore that the evidence
justified a finding by the Jury that this was
not a case of mere error or mistake of judgment on the part of the trustees, but that it
was a case of improvidence, of reckless, unIn which the trusreasonable extravagance.
tees failed In that measure of reasonable prudence, care and skill which the law requires.
This case was moved for trial at a circuit
court, and before the jury was impaneled the
defendants claimed that the case was improperly in the circuit, and that It should be
tried at special term; and the court ordered
that the trial proceed, and at the close of
the evidence the defendants moved that the
complaint be dismissed, on the ground that
the action was not a proper one to be tried
before a jury, and should be tried before the
The motion was
equity branch of the court.
denied, and these rulings are now alleged for
The receiver in this case represents
error.
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the bank, and may maintain any action the
bank could have maintained.
The trustees
may be treated as agents of the bank.
In
re German Min. Co., 27 Eng. Law & Eq. 158;
Belknap v. Davis, 19 Me. 455; Bedford R.
Co. V. Bowser, 48 Pa. St 29; Butts v.
Wood, 38 Barb. 181; Austen v. Daniels, 4
Denio, 299; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. McPherson,
35 Mo. 13.
And for any misfeasance or nonfeasance, causing damage to the bank, they
were responsible to It, upon the same principle that any agent Is for like cause responsible to his principal. It has never been
doubted that a principal may sue his agent
in an action at law for any damages caused
by culpable misfeasance or non-feasance in
The only relief
the business of the agency.
claimed In this complaint was a money judgment, and we think it was properly tried as
an action at law.
No equitable rights were
to be adjusted, and there was no occasion to
appeal to an equitable forum.
Treating this therefore as an action at
law, it follows also that the objection taken
that other trustees should have been joined
In actions ex
as defendants cannot prevail.
delicto the plaintiff may sue one, some or all
liquidators of Western
of the wrong-doers.
Bank v. Douglas, 22 Sess. Cas. (Scot.) 475;

Barb. Parties, 203.
The defendants Hoffman and Gearty filed
petitions for their discharge in bankruptcy
after the commencement of this action, and
before judgment, and they
were discharged
alleged
action.

such

discharge

as a defense

to the

The trial judge and the general term
held that the discharge furnished no defense,
This claim
and we are of the same opinion.
was purely for unliquidated damages occasioned by a tort Such a claun was not provable In bankruptcy, and therefore was not
discharged.
Rev. St. U. S. (2d Ed.) §§ 5115,
Zinn v. Rltterman, 2 Abb.
5119, 5067-5071;
Prax:. (N. S.) 261; Kellogg v. Schuyler, 2 Denio, 73; Crouch v. Gridley, 6 Hill, 250; In
re Wlggers, 2 BIss. 71, Fed. Cas. No. 17,623;
In re Clough, 2 Ben. 508, Fed. Cas. No. 2,905; In re Sidle, 2 N. B. R. 77, Fed. Cas. No.
12,844.

I conclude therefore that the judgment appealed from should be aflBrmed.
The appeal by the plaintiff from the order
of the general term, granting a new trial as
to defendant Smith, must, for reasons stated
on the argument, be dismissed, with costs.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed, and appeal from order
dismissed.
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(40
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TALBOT.

N. Y. 76.)
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Court of Appeals of New York.

1869.

This was an action for an accounting

against the defendants, as the surviving executors of the will of the father of the plainBy the will the executors were ditifEs.
rected to invest $15,000 for each of the plaintiffs, and the executors made these investments in certain railroad bonds and stock,
and in some bank stock. The value of these
the investsecurities having depreciated,
ment was repudiated by the plaintifEs, and
this action brought. The further facts appear in the opinion of the court.
Stephen P. Nash, for appellants.
M. Titus, for respondents.

George

WOODRUFF, J. It is conceded that in
England the rule Is, and has long been settled, that a trustee, holding funds to invest
for the benefit of his cestui que trust, is
bound to mate such investment in the public debt, for the safety whereof the faith of
their government is pledged; or in loans, for
which real estate is pledged as security.
And that although the terms of the trust
commit the investment, in general terms, to
the discretion of the trustee, that discretion
'
Is controlled by the above rule, and is to be
exercised within the very narrow limits,
which it prescribes.
As a purely arbitrary rule, resting upon
any special policy of that country, or on any
peculiarity in its condition, it has no application to this country. It is not of the common law. It had no applicability to the condition of this country, while a colony of
Great Britain, and cannot be said to have
been incorporated In our law.
So far, and so far only, as it can be said to
rest upon fundamental principles of equity,
commending themselves to the conscience,
and suited to the condition of our affairs,
so far it is true, that it has appropriate application and force, as a guide to the administration of a trust here, as well as in England.
do not therefore deem it material to inquire through the multitude of English
cases, and the abundant texts of the lawwriters, into the origin of the rule in England, or the date of its early promulgation.
deem it necNor In this particular case do
essary to determine whether it should, by
precise analogy, be deemed to prohibit here
investments in any other public debt than
that of the state of New York.
Neither, in my judgment, are we at liberty, in the decision of this case, to propound any new rule of conduct, by which
to Judge of the liability of trustees, now subUnder trusts herejected to examination.
tofore created, the managers thereof per-

I
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formed their duty with the aid of rules for
the exercise of their discretion, which were
the utterance of equity and good conscience,
and
intelligible
their understanding,
to
available for their information; otherwise,
trusts heretofore existing have been traps
and pitfalls to catch the faithful, prudent
and diligent trustee, without the power to
avoid them.
But it is not true that there is no underlying principle or rule of conduct in the administration of a trust, which calls for obedience.
Whether it has been declared by
the courts or not, whether it has been enacted in statutes or not, whether it is in
familiar recognition in the affairs of life,
there appertains to the relation of trustee
and cestui que trust, a duty to be faithful,
to be diligent, to be prudent in an administration intrusted to the former, in confidence in his fidelity, diligence and prudence.
To this general statement of the duty of
trustees, there is no want of promulgation
or sanction, nor want of sources of informaIn the whole histion for their guidance.
tory of trusts, in decisions of courts for a
century in England, in all the utterances of
tTie courts of this and the other states of
this country, and not less In the conscious
good sense of all intelligent minds, its recognition is uniform.
The real inquiry therefore is. In my judgment, in the case before us, and in all like
Has the administration of the trust,
cases:
created by the will of Charles W. King, for
the benefit of the plaintiff, been governed
by fidelity, diligence and prudence? If it
has, the defendants are not liable for losses
which nevertheless have happened.
This however aids but little in the examination of the defendants' conduct, unless
the terms of definition are made more preWhat are fidelity, diligence and discise.
cretion? and what is the measure thereof,
which trustees are bound to possess and exercise ?

It is hardly necessary to say that fidelity
imports sincere and single intention to administer the trust for the best Interest of the
parties beneficially Interested, and according
to the duty which the trust Imposes.
And
this is but a paraphrase of "good faith.''
The meaning and measure of the required
prudence and diligence has been repeatedly
discussed, and with a difference of opinion.
In extreme rigor, it has sometimes been
said that they must be such and as great as
that possessed and exercised by the court
of chancery itself. And again, it has been
said that they are to be such as the trustee
exercises in the conduct of his own affairs,
of like nature, and between these is the declaration that they are to be the highest prudence and vigilance, or they will not exonerate.

My own Judgment, after an examination
of the subject, and bearing in mind the nature of the office, its importance and the
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considerations which alone induce men of
suitable experience, capacity and responsibility to accept its usually thankless burden,
is that the just and true rule is that the
trustee is bound to employ such diligence
and such prudence in the care and management as in general prudent men of discretion and intelligence in such matters employ
in their own like affairs.
This necessarily excludes all speculation,
all investments for an uncertain and doubtful rise in the market, and of course every
thing that does not take into view the nature and object of the trust, and the consequences of a mistake in the selection of the
investment to be made.
It therefore does not follow that because
prudent men may, and often do, conduci
their own affairs with the hope of growing
rich, and therein take the hazard of adventures which they deem hopeful, trustees
may do the same; the preservation of the
fund and the procurement of a just income
therefrom are primary objects of the creation of the trust itself, and are to be primarily regarded.
If it be said that trustees are selected by
the testator or donor of the trust, from his
own knowledge of their capacity, and without any expectation that they will do more
than, in good faith, exercise the discretion
and judgment they possess, the answer is:
First, the rule properly assumes the capax:ity of trustees to exercise the prudence and
diligence of prudent men in general; and
second, it imposes the duty to obsex've and
know or learn what such prudence dictates
in the matter in hand.
And once more the terms of the trust, and
its particular object and purpose, are in no
case to be lost sight of in its administration.
Lewin, in his treatise on the law of Trasts,
etc., (page 332), states, as the result of the
several cases, and as the true rule, that "a
trustee is bound to exert precisely the same
care and solicitude in behalf of his cestui
que trust as he would do for himself; but
greater measure than this a court of equity
In general this is true; but
will not exact."
if it imports that if he do what men of ordinary prudence would not do, in their own
affairs, of a like nature, he will be excused,
on showing that he dealt with his own property with like want of discretion, it cannot be
sustained as a safe or just rule toward cestuis que trust; nor is it required by reasonable Indulgence to the trustee; it would be
laying the duty to be prudent out of view
entirely, and
cannot think the writer intended it should be so understood.
The Massachusetts cases (Harvard College
V. Amory, 9 Pick. 446; Lovell v. Mlnot, 20
Pick. 116) cited by the counsel for the defpndants, are In better conformity with the
have stated it
rule as
To apply these general views to the case
before us, and with the deductions which
necessarily flow from their recognition: The

I
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testator gave to each of his children $15,000,
the interest on the same, so far as required,
to be applied to their maintenance and education, and the principal, with any accumulations thereon, to be paid to them severally
on their majority; appointed the defendant,
Talbot, and his partner, Mr. Olyphant, executors, "intrusting to their discretion the
settlement of my affairs and the investment
of my estate for the benefit of my heirs."
If am correct in my views of the duty
of trustees, this last clause neither added to,
nor in any wise affected the duty or responsibility of these executors; without it they
were clothed with discretion; with it their
discretion was to be exercised with all the
care and prudence belonging to their trust
relation to the beneficiaries.
Such is the
distinct doctrine of the cases very largely
cited by the counsel for the parties, and is,
I think, the necessary conclusion from the
just rule of duty have stated.
What then was the ofllce of the trustees,
as indicated by the terms and nature of the
trust? If its literal reading be followed, it
directed that "$15,000" in money be placed
at "interest."
The nature of the trust, according to the manifest intent of the testator, required that in order to the maintenance and support of infant children, whose
need, in that regard, would be constant and
unremitting, that interest should flow in
with regularity and without exposure to the
uncertainties or fluctuations of adventures
of any kind. And then the fund should continue, with any excess of such interest accumulated for their benefit, so as to be delivered at the expiration of their minority.
Palpably then the first and obvious duty
was to place that $15,000 in a state of security; second, to see to it that it was productive of interest; and third, so to keep the
fund that it should always be subject to
future recall for the benefit of the cestui que
trust.
do not attach controlling importance to
the word "interest" used by the testator, but
do regard it as some guide to the trustees,
of the testator, that he
as an expression
did not contemplate any adventure with the
fund, with a view to profits as such.
But apart from the inference from the use
of that word,
think it should be said, that
whenever money is held upon a trust of this
description, it is not according to its nature,
nor within any just idea of prudence to place
the principal of the fund in a condition in
which it is necessarily exposed to the hazard
of loss or gain, according to the success or
failure of the enterprise in which it is embarked, and In which by the very terms of
the investment, the principal Is not to be
returned at all.
It is not denied that the employment of
the fund, as capital In trade, would be a
clear departure from the duty of trustees.
If It cannot be so employed under the management of a copartnership, I see no reason

I
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for S9.ylng that the Incorporation of the partners tends, in any degree, to justify it.
The moment the fund is invested in bank,
or insurance, or railroad stock, it has left
the control of the trustees; its safety and
the hazard, or risk of loss, is no longer dependent upon their skill, care or discretion
in its custody or management, and the terms
of the investment do not contemplate that
it ever will be returned to the trustees.
If it be said that at any time the trustees
may sell the stock (which Is but another
name for their interest in the property and
business of the corporation), and so re-possess themselves of the original capital,
reply that is necessarily contingent and uncertain; and so the fund has been voluntarily placed in a condition of uncertainty, dependent upon two contingencies: First, the
practicability of making the business profitable; and, second, the judgment, skill and
fidelity of those who have the management
of it for that purpose.
If it be said that men of the highest prudence do in fact invest their funds in such
stocks, becoming subscribers and contributors thereto in the very formation thereof,
and before the business is developed, and
in the exercise of their judgment on the
probability of its safety and productiveness,
the answer is, so do just such men, looking
to the hope of profitable returns, invest
money in trade and adventures of various
kinds. In their private affairs they do, and
they lawfully may put their principal funds
at hazard; in the affairs of a trust they may
not.
The very nature of their relation to it
forbids it.
If it be said that this reasoning assumes
that it is certainly practicable so to keep the
fund that It shall be productive, and yet safe
against any contingency of loss; whereas
in fact If loaned upon bond and mortgage, or
upon securities of any description, losses
from insolvency and depreciation may and
often do happen, nothwithstanding due and
proper care and caution is observed in their
selection.
Not at all. It assumes and insists that the trustees shall not place the
fund where its safety and due return to their
hands will depend upon the success of the
business in which it is adventured, or the
skill and honesty of other parties intrusted
with its conduct; and it is in the selection
of the securities for its safety and actual return that there is scope for discretion and
which if exercised in good faith,
prudence,
constitute due performance of the duty of

I
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was not bound to accept these stocks as and
for his legacy, or the investment thereof.
In regard to the bonds of the Hudson
River Railroad Company and of the Delaware and Hudson Canal Company, it appears by schedule B, given in evidence, that
the former were mortgage bonds; but what
was the extent or sufficiency of the security
afforded by such mortgage, or what property was embraced in it does not appear,
nor does it appear whether there was any
security whatever for the payment of the
canal company's bond.
It is not necessary for the decision of this
case; and
am not prepared to say that an
investment in the bonds of a railroad or
other corporation, the payment whereof is
secured by a mortgage upon real estate, is
not suitable and proper under any circum-

I

stances.
If the

real estate Is ample to insure the
payment of the bonds,
do not at present
perceive that it is necessarily to be regarded
as Inferior to the bond of an individual secured by mortgage; it would of course be
open to all the inquiries which prudence
would suggest if the bond and mortgage
were that of an individual.
The nature,
the location and the sufficiency of the security and the terms of the mortgage, and
its availability for the protection and ultimate realization of the fund, must of course
enter into the consideration.
But it is not necessary to pursue that subject The plaintiff in his complaint rejects
the entire investment. The court below
held that It was equitable that the plaintiff
should be held to receive the whole or none
of the stocks and bonds, and to that ruling
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant have
excepted; and therefore the question whether the judgment below was correct in thai
respect is not before us.
It is proper however to say that do not
clearly apprehend the propriety of that ruling, unless it be on the ground that the
plaintiff in his complaint did so elect.
The rule is perfectly well settled that a
cestui que trust is at liberty to elect to approve an unauthorized investment and enjoy its profits, or to reject it at his option;
perceive no reason for saying that
and
where the trustee has divided the fund into
parts and made separate investments, the
cestui que trust is not at liberty, on equitable as well as legal grounds, to approve and
adopt such as he thinks It for his interest
to approve.
The money invested Is his
money; and In respect to each and every
the trustees.
My conclusion is therefore that the defend- dollar. It seems to me he has an unqualified
ants were not at liberty to invest the fund right to follow it, and claim the fruits of its
bequeathed
to the plaintiff In stock of the investment, and that the trustee cannot deny
Delaware and Hudson Canal Company; of it. The fact that the trustee has made
the New York and Harlem Railroad Com- other investments of other parts of the fund,
pany; of the New York and New Haven which the cestui que trust is not bound to
Railroad Company; of the Bank of Com- approve, and disaffirms, cannot,
think,
merce;
or of the Saratoga and Washington affect the power. For example, suppose in
Railroad Company; and that the plaintiff the present case the cestui que trust, on de-
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livery to him of all the securities and bonds
In wbiph his legacy had appeared invested,
Although these investments
had declared:
are Improperly made, not in accordance with
the Intent of the testator, nor in the due performance of your duty, I waive all objection
on that account, except as to the stock of the
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Saratoga and Washington Railroad C!om.
reject and return to you.
pany. That
la
it doubtful that his position must be sustained?
The result is, that the main features of tb«
Judgment herein must be affirmed.

I

DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF TRUSTEES.
LAMAR
(5 Sup. Ct. 221,
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112 U. S. 452.)

Supreme Court of the United

States.

Dec. 1,

1884.

xVppeal from the circuit court of the United States for the Southern district of New

Yorlt.
E. N. Dicljerson, for appellant.

and Geo. C. Holt, for appellee.

S.

P. Nash

GRAY, J. This is an appeal by the executor of a guardian from a decree against
him upon a bill in equity filed by the administratrix of his ward. The original bUl, filed
on July 1, 1875, by Ann C. Sims, a citizen
of Alabama, as administratrix of Martha M.
Sims, in the supreme court of the state of
New York, alleged that on December 11,
1855, the defendant's testator, Gazaway B.
Lamar, was duly appointed, by the surroof Richmond, in that
gate of the county
state, guardian of the person and estate of
Martha M. Sims, an infant of six years of
age, then a resident of that county, and gave
bond as such, and took into his possession
and control all her property, being more
than $5,000; that on October 5, 1874, he
died iu New York, and on NoTember 10,
1874, his will was there admitted to probate,
and the defendant, a citizen of New York,
was appointed his executor; and that he and
his executor had neglected to render any
account of his guardianship to the surrogate
of Richmond county, or to any court having
thereof, or to the ward or her
cognizance
administratrix; and prayed for an account,
and for judgment for the amount found to
be due.
The defendant removed the case into the
circuit court of the United States for the
Southern district of New York, and there
filed an answer, averring that in 1855, when
Lamar was appointed guardian of Martha
M. Sims, he was a citizen of Georgia, and
she was a citizen of Alabama, having a tem^porary residence in the city of New York;
that in the spring of 1861 the states of
Georgia and Alabama declared themselves
to have seceded from the United States, and
to constitute members of the so-called Confederate states of America, whereupon a
state of war arose between the United States
and the Confederate states, which continued to be flagrant for more than four years
after; that Lamar and Martha M. Sims
were in the spring of 1861 citizens and residents of the states of Georgia and Alabama, respectively, and citizens of the Confederate states, and were engaged in aiding
and abetting the state of Georgia and the
so-called Confederate states in their rebellion against the United States, and she continued to aid and abet until the time of
her death, and he continued to aid and abet
tiU January, 1865; that the United States,
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by various public acts, declared all his and
her property, of any kind, to be liable to
seizure and confiscation by the United States,
and they both were, by the various acts of
congress of the United States, outlawed and
debarred of any access to any court of the
United States, whereby it was impossible
for Lamar to appear in the surrogate's court
of Richmond county to settle and close his
accounts there, and to be discharged from
his liability as guardian, in consequence
whereof the relation of guardian and ward,
so far as it depended upon the orders of that
court, ceased and determined; that, for the
purpose of saving the ward's property from
seizure
and confiscation by the United
States, Lamar, at the request of the ward
and of her natural guardians, all citizens of
the state of Alabama, withdrew the funds
belonging to her from the city of New York,
and invested them for her benefit and account in such securities as by the laws of
the states of Alabama and Georgia and of
the Confederate states he might lawfully
do; that in 1864, upon the death of Martha
M. Sims, all her property vested in her sister, Ann C. Sims, as her next of kin, and
any accounting of Lamar for that property
was to be made to her; that on March 15,
1867, at the written request of Ann C. Sims
and of her natural guardians, Benjamin H.
Micou was appointed her legal guardian by
the probate court of Montgomery county, in
the state of Alabama, which was at that time
her residence, and Lamar thereupon accounted for and paid over all property with which
he was chargeable
as guardian of Martha
M. Sims, to Micou as her guardian, and received from him a full release therefor; and
that Ann C. Sims, when she became of age,
ratified and confirmed the same. To that
answer the plaiutifC filed a general replication.
The case was set down for hearing in the
circuit court upon the bill, answer and replication, and a statement of facts agreed
by the parties, in substance as follows: On
November 23, 1850, William W. Sims, a citizen of Georgia, died at Savannah, in that
state, leaving a widow, who was appointed
his administratrix, and two infant daughters, Martha M. Sims, born at Savannah on
September 8, 1849, and Ann C. Sims, born
In 1853 the
in Florida on June 1, 1851.
widow married the Rev. Richard M. Abercrombie, of Clifton, in the county of Richmond and state of New York. On December
11, 1855, on the petition of Mrs. Abercrombie, Gazaway B. Lamar, an uncle of Mr.
Sims, and then residing at Brooklyn, in the
state of New York, was appointed by the
surrogate of Richmond county guardian of
the person and estate of each child "until
she shall arrive at the age of fourteen years,
and imtil another guardian shall be appointed;" and gave bond to her, with sureties,
"to faithfully in all things discharge the
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duty of a guardian to the said minor according to law, and render a true and just
account of all moneys and other property
received by him, and of the application thereof, and of his guardianship in all respects,
to any court having cognizance thereof;" and
he immediately received
from Mrs. Aberin money $5,106.89 belonging
cromble
to
each ward, and invested part of it. In January and April, 1856, in stock of the Bank
of the Republic, at New York, and part of
it, in March and July, 1857, In stock of the
Banli of Commerce, at Savannah, each of
which was then paying, and continued to
pay until April, 1861, good dividends annually, the one of 10 and the other of 8 per
cent.

In 1856, several months after Lamar's appointment as guardian, Mr. and Mrs. Abercrombie removed from Clifton, in the state
of New York, to Hartford, in the state of
Connecticut,

and there resided

till

her death.

In the spring of 1859.
The children lived
with Mr. and Mrs. Abercrombie, Lamar as
guardian paying Mr. Abercrombie for their
board, at Clifton and at Hartford, from the
marriage until her death;
and were then
removed to Augusta, In the state of Georgia,
and there lived with their paternal grandmother and her unmarried daughter and only
living eliild, their aunt; Lamar as guardian
continuing to pay their board.
After 18.50
neither of the children ever resided In the
state of New York. On January 18, 1860, their
aunt was married to Benjamin H. Micou,
of Montgomery, In the state of Alabama, and
the children and their grandmother thereafter lived with Mr. and Jlrs. Micou at
Montgomery,
and the children were educated and supported at Mr. Micou's expense.
I'l-om ]s.')5 to 1859 Lamar resided partly in
In the
Geoi'gia and partly in New Y'ork.
spring of ISiJl he had a temporary residence
in the city of New York, and upon the breaking out of the war of the rebellion, and after
removing all his own property, left New
Y'ork, and passed through the lines to Savannah, and there resided, sympathizing with
the rebellion, and doing what he could to
its success, until January, 1865,
accomplish
and continued to have his residence in Savannah until 1872 or 1873, when he went to
New Y'ork again, and afterwards lived there.
Mr. and Mrs. Micou also sympathized with
the rebellion and desired its success, and
each of them, as well as Lamar, failed during the rebellion to bear true allegiance to
the United States.
At the time of Lamar's appointment as
guardian, 10 shares in the stock of the
Mechanics' Bank of Augusta, in the state of
(reorgia, which had belonged to William W.
Sims in his life-time, stood on the books of
the bank in the name of Mrs. Abercrombie
as his administratrix, of which one-third belonged to her as his widow, and one-third
In January, 1856,
to each of the infants.

bank refused a request of Lamar to
transfer one-third of that stock to him as
guardian of each infant, but afterwards paid
to him as guardian, from time to time, twothirds of the dividends during the life of
Mrs. Abercrombie, and all the dividends after her death until 1865.
During the period
last named, he also received as guardian the
dividends on some other bank stock in Savannah, which Mrs. Abercrombie owned, and
to which, on her death, her husband became
entitled.
Certain facts, rehed on as showing
that he, immediately after his wife's death,
made a surrender of her interest in the bank
shares to Lamar, as guardian of her children,
are not material to the understanding of the
decision of this court, but are recapitulated
in the opinion of the circuit court. 7 Fed.
180-185. In the winter of 1861-62, Lamar,
fearing that the stock in the Bank of tlie
Republic at New Yorlt, held by him as guai'dby the United
ian, would be confiscated
States, had it sold by a friend in New York;
the proceeds of the sale, which were about
20 per cent, less than the par value of the
stock, invested at New Yorlc in guarantied
bonds of the cities of New Orleans, Memphis,
and Mobile, and of the East Tennessee &
Georgia Railroad Company; and those bonds
Lamar from
deposited in a bank in Canada.
time to time invested the property of his
wards, that was within the so-called Confederate states, in whatever seemed to him
to be the most secure and safe — some in Confederate state bonds, some in the bonds of
the individual states which composed the
confederacy, and some in bonds of cities, and
of railroad coiTporations, and stock of banks
within those states. On the money of his
wards, accruing from dividends on bank
stock, and remaining in his hands, he charged himself with interest until the summer
of 1862, wlien, with the advice and aid of
Mr. Micou, he invested $7,000 of such money
in bonds of the Confederate states and of the
state of Alabama; and in 186.3, with the
like advice and aid, sold the Alabama bonds
for more than he had paid for them, and
invested
the proceeds also in Confederate
charged his wards with the
states bonds;
money paid, and credited them with the
bonds;
and placed the bonds in the hands
of their grandmotlier,
who gave him a receipt for tliem and held them till the end
of the rebellion, when they, as well as the
stock in the banks at Savannah,
became
wortliless.
Martha M. Sims died on November 2, 1864,
at the age of 15 years, unmarried and intestate, leaving her sister Ann C. Sims her next
of kin. On January 12, 1867, Lamar, in answer to letters of inquiry from Mr. and Mrs.
Jlicou, wrote to Mrs. Micou that he had
saved from the wreck of the property of his
niece, Ann C. Sims, surviving her sister,
three bonds of the city of Memphis, indorsed
by the state of Tennessee, one bond of the
the
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city of Mobile, and one bond of the Bast
Tennessee
& Georgia Railroad Company,
each for $1,000, and with some coupons past
due and uncollected; and suggested that by
reason of his age and falling health, and of
the embarrassed state of his own affairs, Mr.
Mleou should be appointed In Alabama guardIan in his stead.
Upon the receipt of this
letter, Mrs. Micou wrote to Lamar, thanking
him for the explicit statement of the niece's
affairs, and for the care and trouble he had
had with her property; and Ann C. Sims,
then nearly 16 years old, signed a request,
attested by her grandmother and by Mrs.
Micou, that her guardianship might be transferred to Mr. Micou, and that he might be appointed
her guardian. And on March 15,
1867, he was appointed guardian of her property by the probate court of the county of
Montgomery and state of Alabama, according to the laws of that state, and gave bond
as such.
On May 14, 1867, Lamar sent to
Micou complete and correct statements of
his guardianship account with each of his
wards, as well as all the securities remaining in his hands as guardian of either, and
a check payable to Micou as guardian of Ann
in money due her;
O. Sims for a balance
and Micou, as such guardian, signed and sent
to Lamar a schedule of and receipt for the
property, describing it specifically, by which
It appeared that the bonds of the cities of
New Orleans and Memphis, and of the Bast
Tennessee
& Georgia Railroad Company,
were Issued, and the Memphis bonds, as well
as the railroad bonds, were Indorsed by the
state of Tennessee,
some years before the
breaking out of the rebellion.
Micou thenceforth continued to act In all respects as the
only guardian of Ann C. Sims until she became of age on June 1, 1872.
No objection or complaint was ever made
by either of the wards or their relatives
against Lamar's transactions or Investments
as guardian until July 28, 1874, when Micou
wrote to Lamar informing him that Ann C.
Sims desired a settlement of his accounts,
and that he had been advised that no credits
could be allowed for the Investments in Confederate states bonds, and that Lamar was
responsible for the security of the investments in other bonds and bank stock.
Lamar was then sick in New York, and died
there on October 5, 1874, without having answered the letter.
Before the case was heard
in the circuit court, Ann C. Sims died, on
May 7, 1878, and on June 20, 1878, Mrs.
Micou was appointed, in New Yorli, administratrix de bonis non of Martha M. Sims, and
as such filed a bill of revivor in this suit.
On October 3, 1878, the defendant filed a
cross-bill, repeating the allegations of his answer to the original bill, and further averring that Ann C. Sims left a will which had
been admitted to probate in Montgomery
county, in the state of Alabama, and afterwards in the county and state of New York,
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by which she gave all her property to Mrs.
Micou, who was her next of kin, and that
Mrs. Micou was entitled to receive for her
own benefit whatever might be recovered in
the principal suit, and was estopped to deny
the lawfulness or propriety of Lamar's acts,
because whatever was done by him as guardIan of Martha M. Sims in her life-time, or as
guardian of the Interests of Ann C. Sims as
her next of kin, was authorized and approved
by Mrs. Micou and her mother and husband
as the natural guardians of both children.
Mrs. Micou, as plalntlfC In the bill of revivor,
alleging that Ann
answered
the cross-bill,
succeeded to Martha's property as her administratrix, and not as her next of kin, admitting Ann's will and the probate thereof,
denying that Mrs. Micou was a natural
guardian of the children, and denying that
she approved
or ratified Lamar's acts as
guardian. A general replication was filed to
that answer.
Upon a hearing on the pleadings and the
agreed statement of facts, the circuit court
dismissed the cross-bill, held all Lamar's investments
to have been breaches of trust,
and entered a decree refening the case to
a master to state an account.
The case was
afterwards heard on exceptions to the master's report, and a final decree entered for
the plaintiff for $18,705.19, Including the value before 1861 of those bank stocks in Georgia of which Lamar had never had possession.
The opinion delivered upon the first
hearing is reported in 17 Blatchf . 378, and in
1 Fed. 14, and the opinion upon the second
hearing in 7 Fed. 180. The defendant appealed to this court.
The authority of the surrogate's court of
the county of Richmond and state of New
York to appoint Lamar guardian of the persons and property of infants at the time
within that county, and the authority of the
supreme court of the state of New York, in
which this suit -was originally brought, being
a court of general equity jurisdiction, to take
cognizance thereof, are not disputed; and, upon the facts agreed, it is quite clear that
none of the defenses set up in the answer
afford any ground for dismissing the bill.
The war of the rebellion, and the residence
of both ward and guardian within the territory controlled by tlie insurgents, did not
discharge the guardian from his responsibility to account, after the war, for property
of the wards which had at any time come
Into his hands, or which he might, by the
exercise of due care, have obtained possession of.
A state of war does not put an end
to pre-existing obligations, or transfer the
property of wards to their guardians, or release the latter from the duty to keep it safely, but suspends until the return of peace
the right of any one residing in the enemy's
country to sue in our courts. Ward v. Smith,
7 Wall. 447; Montgomery v. U. S., 15 Wall.
395, 400; Insurance Co. v. Davis, 95 U. S.
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Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100 Mass. 561,
3 Phillim. Int. Law (2d Ed.)
The appointment of Micou in 1867
§ 589.
by a court of Alabama to be guardian of the
surviving ward, then residing in that state,
did not terminate Lamar's liability for property of Ms wards ■which he previously had or
ought to have taken possession of. The receipt given by Micou was only for the securities and money actually handed over to him
by Lamar; and if Micou had any authority
to discharge Lamar from liability for past
mismanagement of either ward's property,
he never assumed to do so. The suggestion
in the answer, that the surviving ward, upon
the
coming of age, ratified and approved
acts of Lamar as guardian, finds no support
in the facts of the case. The further grounds
of defense, set up in the cross-bill, that Micou participated in Lamar's investments,
and
that Mrs. Micou approved them, are equally
unavailing. The acts of Micou, before his
own appointment as guardian, could not bind
the ward. And admissions In private letters
from Mrs. Micou to Lamar could not affect
the rights of the ward, or Mrs. Micou's authority, upon being afterwards appointed administratrix of the ward, to maintain this
bill as such against Lamar's representative,
even if the amount recovered will inure to
her own benefit as the ward's next of kin.
1 Greenl. Ev. § 179.
The extent of Lamar's
liability presents more difficult questions of
law, now for the first time brought before
this court. The general rule is everywhere
recognized, tliat a guardian or trustee, when
Investing property in his hands, is bound to
act honestly and faithfully, and to exercise a
such as men of ordinary
sound discretion,
prudence and intelligence use in their own
affairs. In some jurisdictions no attempt has
been made to establish a more definite rule;
In others, the discretion has been confined,
by the legislature or the courts, within strict
limits.
The court of chancery, before the Declaration of Independence, appears to have allowed
some latitude to trustees in making investments.
The best evidence of this is to be
found in the judgments of Lord Hardwicke.
He held, indeed, in accordance with the clear
weight of authority before and since, that
money lent on a mere personal obligation,
like a promissory note, vnthout secm'ity, was
Ryder v. Bickerat the risk of the trustee.

42o,

430;

503,

5G4,

570;

ton, 3 Swanst.

80,

note, 1 Eden,

149,

note;

Barney v. Saunders, 16 How. 535, 545; Perry,
Trusts, § 453. But, in so holding, he said:
"For it should have been on some such security as binds land, or something to be anAl81, note.
swerable for it." 3 Swanst.
though in one case he held that a trustee,
directed by the terms of his trust to invest
the trust money in government funds or other
was responsible for a loss
good securities,
caused by his investing it in South Sea stock,
and observed that neither South Sea stock nor
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bank stock was considered a good security,
because it depended upon the management of
the governor and directors, and the capital
might be wholly lost (Trafford v. Boehm, 3
Atk. 440, 444); yet, in another case, he declined to charge a trustee for a loss on South
Sea stock, which had fallen in value since
the trustee received It, and said that "to compel trustees to make up a deficiency, not owing to their willful default. Is the harshest
demand that can be made in a court of
equity."
Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Atk. 513, 514,
West, Ch. 31, 34. In a later case he said:
"Suppose a trustee, having in his hands a
considerable sum of money, places it out in
the funds, which afterwards sink in their
value, or on a security at the time apparently
good, which afterwards turns out not to be
so, for the benefit of the cestui que trust;
was there ever an instance of the trustee's
being made to answer the actual sum so
answer, 'No.' If there is no
placed out?
mala fides, nothing willful In the conduct
of the trustee, the court will always favor
him; for, as a trust is an office necessary in
the concerns between man and man, and
which, If faithfully discharged, is attended
with no small degree of trouble and anxiety.
It is an act of great kindness in any one
To add hazard or risk to that
to accept it.
trouble, and subject a trustee to losses which
he could not foresee, and, consequently, not
prevent, would be a manifest hardship, and
would be deterring every one from accepting
an office."
That this opinion
so necessary
was not based upon the fact that in England
is
trustees usually receive no compensation
clearly shown by the chancellor's adding that
the same doctrine held good in the case of
a receiver, an officer of the court, and paid
for his trouble; and the point decided was
that a receiver, who paid the amount of rents
of estates in his charge to a Bristol tradesman of good credit, taking his bills therefor
on London, was not responsible for the loss
of the money by his becoming bankrupt.
Knight V. Plymouth, 1 Dick. 120, 126, 127, 3
Atk. 480. And the decision was afterwards
cited by Lord Hardwicke himself as showing
that when trustees act by other hands, according to the usage of business, they are not
Ex parte Belchier, 1
answerable for losses.

I

Amb.

218,

In later

219,

1

Kenyon,

38,

47.

times, as the amount and variety
of English government securities increased,
the court of chancery limited trust investments to the public funds, disapproved investments either in bank stock or in mortgages
of real estate, and prescribed so strict a rule
that parliament interposed; and by the statutes of 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, and 23 & 24 Vict,
c. 38, and by general
orders in chancery,
pursuant to those statutes, trustees have been
authorized to invest in stock of the bank
of England or of Ireland, or upon mortgage
of freehold or copyhold estates, as well as in
Lewln, Trusts (7th Ed.)
the public funds.
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In a very recent case the court
of appeal and the house of lords, following
the decisions of Lord Hardwicke in Knight
V. Plymouth and Ex parte Belchier,
a'bove
cited, held that a trustee Investing trust
funds, who employed a broker to procure securities authorized by the trust, and paid the
purchase money to the broker, if such was
the usual and regular course of business of
persons acting with reasonable care and prudence on their own account, was not liable
for the loss of the money by fraud of the
broker.
Sir George Jessel, M. E., Lord Justice Bowen, and Lord Blackburn affirmed
the general rule that a trustee is only bound
to conduct the business of his trust in the
same manner that an ordinarily prudent man
of business would conduct his own; Lord
Blackburn adding the qualification
that "a

282, 283, 287.

trustee must not choose investments
other
than those which the terms of his trust permit." Speight V. Gaunt, 22 Oh. Div. 727,
739, 762, 9 App. Cas. 1, 19.
In this country there has been a diversity
in the laws and usages of the several states
upon the subject of trust investments.
In New York, under Chancellor Kent, the
rule seems to have been quite undefined.
See
Smith V. Smith, 4 Johns. Oh. 281, 285; Thompson y. Brown, Id. 619, 628, 629, where the
chancellor
quoted the passage above cited
from Lord Hardwicke's opinion in Knight v.
Plymouth. And in Brown v. Oampbell. Hopk.
Ch. 233, where an executor in good faith made
an investment,
considered at the time to be
advantageous, of the amount of two promissory notes, due to his testator from one manufacturing corporation, in the stock of another
manufacturing corporation, which afterwards
became insolvent,
Chancellor
Sanford held
that there was no reason to charge him with
the loss.
But by the later decisions in that
state investments In bank or railroad stock
have been held to be at the risk of the trustee, and It has been intimated that the only
investments
that a trustee can safely make
without an express order of court are In govKing v.
ernment or real estate securities.
Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76, affirming 50 Barb. 453;
Ackerman v. Emott, 4 Barb. 626; Mills v.
HofCman, 26 Hun, 594; 2 Kent, Comm. 416,
note b. So the decisions in New Jersey and
Pennsylvania tend to disallow investments in
the stock of banks or other business corporations, or otherwise than in the public funds or
in mortgages of real estate. Gray v. Fox, 1
N. J. Eq. 259, 268; Halsted v. Meeker's Ex'rs,
18 N. J. Eq. 136; Lathrop v. Smalley's Ex'rs,
23 N. J. Eq. 192; Worrell's Appeal,
9 Pa.
508, and 23 Pa. 44; Hemphill's Appeal, 18 Pa.
303; Ihmsen's Appeal, 43 Pa. 431.
And the
New York and Pennsylvania courts have
shown a strong disinclination to permit investments in real estate or securities out of
Ormiston v. Olcott, 84 N.
their jurisdiction.
Y. 339; Rush's Estate, 12 Pa. 375, 378.
In New England, and in the southern states,
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the rule has been less strict In Massachusetts, by a usage of more than half a century,
approved by a uniform course of judicial decision, it has come to be regarded as too firmly settled to be changed, except by the legislature, that all that can be required of a
trustee to invest is that he shall conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion,
such as men of prudence and intelligence exercise in the permanent disposition
of their
own funds, having regard, not only to the
probable income, but also to the probable
safety, of the capital; and that a guardian or
trustee is not precluded from investing in the
stock of banking, insurance, manufacturing,
or railroad corporations within or without the
state. Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick.
446, 461; Lovell v. Minot, 20 Pick. 116, 119;
Kinmonth v. Brigham, 5 Allen, 270, 277; Clark
V. Garfield,
8 Allen, 427; Brown v. French,
125 Mass. 410; Bowker v. Pierce, 130 Mass.
In New Hampshire and in "Vermont, in262.
vestments, honestly and prudently made, in
securities of any kind that produce income,
appear to be allowed.
Knowlton v. Bradley,
17 N. H. 458; Kimball v. Reding, 11 Fost. 352,
874; French v. Cun-ier, 47 N. H. 88, 99; Barney V. Parsons, 54 Vt. 623.
In Maryland, good bank stock, as well as
government securities and mortgages on real
estate, has always been considered a proper
investment.
Hammond v. Hammond, 2
Bland, 306, 413; Gray v. Lynch, 8 Gill, 403;
Murray v. Feinour, 2 Md. Ch. 418. So, in
Mississippi, investment in bank stock is alSmyth V. Biuns, 25 Miss. 422.
lowed.
In South Carolina, before the war, no more
definite rule appears to have been laid down
than that guardians and trustees must manage the funds in their hands as prudent
men manage their own affairs.
Boggs v.
Adger. 4 Rich. Eq. 408, 411; Spear v. Spear,
9 Rich. Eq. 184, 201; Snelling v. McCreary,
14

Rich. Eq.

In

291,

300.

Georgia
the English rule was never
adopted ; a statute of 1845, which authorized
executors,
administrators,
and
guardians,
trustees, holding any trust funds, to invest
them in securities of the state, was not considered compulsory;
and before January 1,
1863
(when that statute was amended by
adding a provision that any other investment
of trust funds must be made under a judicial order, or else be at the risk of the trustee,) those who lent the fund at interest, on
what was at the time considered by prudent
men to be good security, were not held liable for a loss without their fault. Cobb,
Dig. 333; Code 1861, § 2308; Brown v.
Wright, 39 Ga. 96; Moses v. Moses, 50 Ga.
9, 33.

In Alabama

the supreme court in Bryant
Craig, 12 Ala. 354, 359, having intimated
that a guardian could not safely invest upon
either real or personal security without an
order of court, the legislature,
from 1852,
authorized guardians and trustees to invest
V.
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tors V. James, 2 Watts & S. 568; Johnson v.
Copeland, 35 Ala. 521; Brown v. Lynch, 2
Bradf. 214; Mears v. Sinclair, 1 W. Va. 185;
Pot. Introduction Generale aux Ooutumes,
No. 19; 1 Burge, Col. Law, 39; 4 Phillim.

by changing her domicile, change the domicile of the infants; the domicile of the children, in either case, following the IndependKennedy v.
of their parent.
ent domicile
Ryall, 67 N. Y. 379; Potinger v. Wightman,
Dedham v. Natick, 16 Mass. 135;
3 Mer. 67;
But when the widow,
Dicey, Dom. 97-99.
by marrying again, acquires the domicile of
a second husband, she does not, by taking
her children by the first husband to live
with her there, make the domicile which she
derives from the second husband their domicile; and they retain the domicile which
acthey had, before her second marriage,
Cumquired from her or from their father.
ner v. Milton, 3 Salk. 259, Holt, 578; Freetown V. Taunton, 16 Mass. 52; School Direc-

require that, as a general rule, the management and Investment of his property should
be governed by the law of the state of his
domicile, especially when he actually resides
there, rather than by the law of any state
in which a guardian may have been appointed or may have received some property
of
the ward. If the duties of the guardian
were to be exclusively regulated by the law
of the state of his appointment,
it would
follow that in any case in which the temporary residence of the ward was changed
from state to state, from considerations of
health, education, pleasure, or convenience,
and guardians were appointed In each state,
in the different
appointed
the guardians
states, even if the same persons, might be
held to diverse rules of accounting for different pares of tne ward's property.
The
form of accounting, so far as concerns the
remedy only, must, indeed, be according to
the law of the court in which relief is sought;
but the general rule by which the guardian
is to be held responsible for the Investment
of the ward's property is the law of the
place of the domicile of the ward. Bar, Int.
Law, § 106 (Gillespie's translation) p. 438;
Whart. Confl. Laws, § 259. It may be suggested that this would enable the guardian,
the domicile
by changing
of his ward, to
choose for himself the law by which he
should account.
Not so. The father, and
after his death the widowed mother, being
and the person from
the natural guardian,
whom the ward derives his domicile, may
change that domicile.
But the ward does
not derive a domicile from any other than a
A testamentary guardian
natural guardian.
nominated by the father may have the same
control of the ward's domicile that the father
596,
had.
5 Paige,
AVood v. Wood,
605.
And any guardian, appointed in the state of
the domicile of the ward, has been generally
held to have the power of changing
the
ward's domicile from one county to another
within the same state and under the same
law. Cutts V. Haskins, 9 Mass. 543; Holyoke V. Haskins, 5 Pick. 20; Kirkland v.
Whately, 4 Allen, 462; Anderson v. Anderson, 42 Vt. 350; Ex parte Bartlett, 4 Bradf.
221; Reg. v. Whitby, L. R. 5 Q. B. 325, 331.
But it is very doubtful, to say the least,
whether even a guardian appointed in the
state of the domicile of the ward (not being the natural guardian or a testamentary
guardian)
can remove the ward's domicile
beyond the limits of the state in which the
guardian Is appointed, and to which his legal

liii bond and mortgage, or on good personal
security,
with no other limit than fidelity
Code 1852, §
and prudence might require.
2024; Code 1867, § 2426; Foscue v. Lyon,

Ala. 440, 452.
The rules of Investment varying so much in
the different states, it becomes necessary to
and
consider by what law the management
investment of the ward's property should be
governed.
As a general rule (with some exceptions not material to the consideration
of
this case) the law of the domicile governs the
status of a person, and the disposition and
management
The
of his movable property.
domicile of an infant is universally held to
he the fittest place for the appointment of a
guardian of his person and estate; although,
for the protection of either, a guardian may
in any state where the person
be appointed
or any property of an infant may be found.
On the continent
of Europe, the guardian
appointed in the state of the domicile of the
ward is generally recognized as entitled to
the control and dominion of the ward and
his movable property everywhere, and guardians specially appointed in other states are
By
responsible
to the principal guardian.
the law of England and of this country, a
guardian appointed by the courts of one state
has no authority over the ward's person or
property in another state, except so far as
allowed by the comity of that state, as expressed through its legislature or its courts;
but the tendency of modern statutes and decisions is to defer to the law of the domicile,
and to support the authority of the guardian
Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U.
appointed there.
cited; Morrell
S. 613, 631, and authorities
Woodworth v.
V. Dicliey, 1 Johns. Ch. 153;
Spring. 4 Allen, .321; Milliken v. Pratt, 125
Mass. 374, 377, 378; Leonard v. Putnam, 51
N. H. 247; Com. v. Bhoads, 37 Pa. 60;
Sims V. Ilenwicli, 25 Ga. 58; Dicey, Dom.
172-176;
Westl. Int. Law (2d. Ed.) 48-50;
Whart. Coufl. Laws (2d Ed.) §§ 259-268. An
As
infant cannot change his own domicile.
infants have the domicile of their father,
he may change their domicile by changing
his own; and after his death the mother,
while she remains a widow, may likewise,

Int. Law (2d Ed.) § 97.
The preference due to the law of the
ward's domicile, and the Importance of a
uniform administration of his whole estate,
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authority

Is confined.
Douglas v. Douglas,
12 Eq. 617, 625; Daniel v. Hill, 52
430; Story, Confl. Laws, § 506, note;

L. E.

Ala.
Dicey, Dom. 100, 132. And it is quite clear
that a guardian appointed in a state in which
the ward is temporai-ily
residing,
cannot
change tlie ward's permanent domicile from
one state to another.
The case of such a
guardian differs from that of an executor of,
or a trustee under, a will. In the one case,
the title in the property is in the executor or
the trustee;
in the other, the title in the
property is in the ward, and the guardian
has only the custody and management of it,
with power to change its investment.
The
executor or trustee is appointed at the domicile of the testator; the guardian is most fitly
appointed at the domicile of the ward, and
may be appointed in any state in which the
person or any property of the ward is found.
The general rule which governs the administration of the property in the one case may
be the law of the domicile of the testator;
in the other case. It is the law of the domicile of the ward.
As the law of the domicile of the ward has
no extraterritorial effect, except by the comity
of the state where the property is situated, or
where the guardian is appointed,
it cannot,
of course, prgviill against a statute of the
state in which the question is presented for
adjudication, expressly applicable to the esHoyt
tate of a ward domiciled elsewhere.
Cases may also
V. Spragae, 103 U. S. 613.
arise with facts so peculiar or so complicated
as to modify the degree of influence that the
court in which the guardian is called to account may allow to the law of the domicile
of the ward, consistently with doing justice
to the parties before it. And a guardian,
who had in good faith conformed to the law
of the state in which he was appointed, might,
perhaps, be excused for not having complied
with stricter rules prevailing at the domicile
of the ward. Bat in a case in which the
domicile of the ward has always been in a
state whose law leaves much to the discretion of the guardian in the matter of investments, and he has faithfully and prudently
exercised that discretion with a view to the
pecuniary interests of the ward, it would be
inconsistent with the principles of equity to
charge him with the amount of the moneys
invested, merely because he has not complied
with the more rigid rules adopted by the
courts of the state in which he was appointed.
The domicile of William W. Sims, during his
life and at the time of his death in 1850, was
in Georgia.
This domicile continued to be
the domicile of his widow and of their infant
children until they acquired new ones. In
1853 the widow, by marrying the Rev. Mr.
Ambercrombie, acquired his domicile.
But
she did not, by taking the infants to the
home, at first in New York and afterwards
in Connecticut, of her new husband, who was
of no kin to the children, was under no legal
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obligation to support them, and was, in fact,
paid for their board out of their property,
make his domicile, or the domicile derived by
her from him, the domicile of the children of
Immediately upon her
the first husband.
death in Connecticut, in 1859, these children,
both under 10 years of age, were taken back
to Georgia to the house of their father's
mother and unmarried sister, their own nearest surviving relatives; and they continued
and aunt in
to live with their grandmother
Georgia until the marriage of the aunt in
January, 1860, to Mr. ilicou, a citizen of Alabama, after which the grandmother and the
children resided with Mr. and Mrs. Micou at
their domicile in that state.
Upon these facts, the domicile of the children was always in Georgia from their birth
until January, 1860, and thenceforth was either in Georgia or in Alabama. As the rules
of investment prevailing before 1863 in Georgia and in Alabama did not substantially differ, the question in which of those two states
their domicile was is immaterial to the decision of this case; and it is therefore unnecessary to consider whether their grandmother was their natural guardian,
and as
such had the power to change their domicile
from one state to another.
See Hargrave's
note 60 to Co. Litt. 88b; Reeve, Dom. Rel.
315; 2 Kent, Comm. 219; Code Ga. 1861, §§
1754, 2452; Darden v. Wyatt, 15 Ga. 414.
Whether the domicile of Lamar in December,
1855, when he was appointed
in New York
guardian of the infants, was in New York or
in Georgia, does not distinctly appear, and is
not material; because, for the reasons already stated, wherever his domicile was, his
duties as guardian in the management
and
investment of the property of his wards were
to be regulated by the law of their domicile.
It remains to apply the test of that law to
Lamar's acts or omissions with regard to the
various kinds of securities in which the property of the wards vi^as invested.
1. The sum which Lamar received in New
York in money from Mrs. Abercrombie he invested in 1856 and 1857 in stock of the Bank
of the Republic at New York, and of the
Bank of Commerce at Savannah,
both of
which were then, and continued till the breaking out of the war, in sound condition, paying
good dividends.
There is nothing to raise a
suspicion that Lamar, in making these investments, did not use the highest degree of
prudence;
and they were such as by the law
of Georgia or of Alabama he might properly
make.
Nor is there any evidence that he
was guilty of neglect in not withdrawing the
investment in the stock of the Bank of Commerce at Savannah before it became worthless.
He should not, therefore, be charged
with the loss of that stock.
The investment
in the stock of the Bank of the Republic of
New York being a proper investment by the
law of the domicile of the wards, and there
being no evidence that the sale of that stock
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by Lamar's order la New York, in 1SB2, was
not judicious, or was for less tban its fair
inarliet price, he was not responsible for the
decrease in its value between the times of its
He had the aupurchase and of its sale.
thority, as guardian, without any order of
court, to sell personal property of his ward
in his own possession, and to reinvest the
proceeds.
Field v. Schieffelin, 7 Johns. Ch.
150; Ellis V. Essex Merrimack Bridge, 2 Pick.
243.
That his motive in selling it was to
avoid its being confiscated by the United
States, does not appear to us to have any
And
bearing on the rights of these parties.
no statute under which it could have been
confiscated has been brought to our notice.
The act of July 17, 1862, c. 195, § 6, cited by
the appellant, is limited to property of persons engaged in or abetting armed rebellion,
which could hardly be predicated of two girls
12 St 591.
Whatunder 13 years of age.
ever liability, criminal or civil, Lamar may
have incurred or avoided as towards the United States, there was nothing in his selling
this stock, and turning It into money, of
which his wards had any right to complain.
As to the sum received from the sale of the
stock In the Bank of the Republic, we find
nothing in the facts agreed by the parties,
upon which the case was heard, to support
the argument that Lamar, under color of proallowed the
tecting his wards' interests,
funds to be lent to cities and other corporaOn
tions which were aiding in the rebellion.
the contrary, it is agreed that that sum was
applied to the purchase in New York of guarantied bonds of the cities of New Orleans,
Memphis, and Mobile, and of the Bast Tennessee & Georgia Railroad Company; and the
description of those bonds, in the receipt afterwards given by Micou to Lamar, shows
that the bonds of that railroad company, and
of the cities of New Orleans and Memphis, at
least, were Issued some years before the
breaking out of the rebellion, and that the
bonds of the city of Memphis and of the railroad company were, at the time of their isThe
sue, indorsed by the state of Tennessee.
company had Its charter from that state, and
its road was partly in Tennessee and partly
Tenn. St 1848, c. 169. Under
in Georgia.
the discretion allowed to a guardian or trustee by the law of Georgia and of Alabama, he
was not precluded from investing the funds
in his hands in bonds of a railroad corporation, indorsed by the state by which it was
As Lamar,
chartered, or in bonds of a city.
in making these investments, appears to have
used due care and prudence, having regard to
the best pecuniary Interests of his wards, the
sum so invested should be credited to him
in this case, unless, as suggested at the argument, the requisite allowance has already
been made in the final decree of the circuit
court in the suit brought by the representative of the other ward, an appeal from which
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was dismissed by this court for want of jurisdiction in lOi U. S. 405.
2. Other moneys of the wards in Lamar's
hands, arising either from dividends
which
he had received on their behalf, or from interest with which he charged himself upon
sums not invested, were used in the purchase
of bonds of the Confederate states, and of the
state of Alabama. The investment in bonds
of the Confederate states was clearly unlawful, and no legislative act or judicial decree
or decision of any state could justify It. The
so-called Confederate government was in no
sense a lawful government, but was a mere
government of force, having its origin and
foundation in rebellion against the United
States.
The notes and bonds issued in its
name and for its support had no legal value
as money or property, except by agreement
or acceptance of parties capable of contracting with each other, and can never be regarded by a court sitting under the authority
of the United States as securities in which
trust funds might be lawfully
invested.
Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1; Head v.
Starke, Chase, 312, Fed. Cas. No. 6,293; Horn
v. Lockhart, 17 Wall. 570; Confederate Note
Case, 19 Wall. 548; Sprott v. U. S., 20 Wall.
459; Fretz v. Stover, 22 Wall. 198; Alexander V. Bryan, 110 U. S. 414, 4 Sup. Ct. 107.
An infant has no capacity, by contract with
his guardian, or by assent to his unlawful
acts, to affect his own rights. The case is
governed in this particular by the decision in
Horn V. Lockhart in which it was held that
an executor was not discharged from his liability to legatees by having invested funds,
pursuant to a statute of the state, and with
the approval of the probate court by which
he had been appointed, in bonds of the Confederate states, which became worthless in
his hands. Neither the date nor the purpose
of the issue of the bonds of the state of Alabama is shown, and it is unnecessary to consider the lawfulness of the investment in
those bonds, because Lamar appears to have
sold them for as much as he had paid for
them, and to have invested the proceeds in
additional Confederate states bonds, and for
the amount thereby lost to the estate he was
accountable.
Bank of
3. The stock in the Mechanics'
Georgia, which had belonged to William W.
Sims in his life-time, and stood on the books
of the bank in the name of his administratrix,
and of which one-third belonged to her, as
his widow, and one-third to each of the infants, never came into Lamar's possession;
and upon a request made by him, uie very
next month after his appointment, the bank
refused to transfer to him any part of it He
did receive and account for the dividends;
and he could not, under the law of Georgia
concerning foreign guardians, have obtained
possession of property of his wards within
that state without the consent of the ordiThe atnary. Code 1861, §§ 1834r-1839.
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to charge hiin for the value of the
principal of the stock must fail for two reasons:
First. This very stock had not only belonged to the father of the -wards in his lifetime, but it was such stock as a guardian or
trustee might properly invest In by the law of
Georgia.
Second. No reason is shown why
this stock, being in Georgia, the domicile of
the wards, should have been transferred to a
guardian who had been appointed in New
York during their temporary residence there.
against
The same reasons are conclusive
tempt
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charging him with the value of the bank
stock In Georgia, which was owned by Mrs.
Abercrombie in her own right, and to which
Mj. Abercrombie became entitled upon her
death.
It is therefore unnecessary to consider whether there is sufficient evidence of
surrender by him of her inan Immediate
terest to her children.
The result is that both the decrees of the
circuit court in this case must be reversed,
and the case remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
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SIMMONS
(43

N. W.

V.
561,

OLIVER
74

Wis.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

et al.
633.)

Nov. 5, 1889.

Appeal from circuit court, Fond du Lac
county; N. S. Gilson, Judge.
Accounting and petition to be discharged
by M. W. Simmons, trustee of the estate of
William Oliver, deceased. Elizabeth Oliver
and others, beneficiaries, objected to the account, and opposed the petition. From a
judgment holding the trustee liable for certain losses, he appeals.
Knowles & Phelps, for appellant. N. C.
Giffin, for respondents.

J.

Cole, 0.
M. W. Simmons, as trustee,
received the funds mentioned in his account
from the former trustee, Smith, to invest
and to keep invested for the benefit of the
The income was to be
beneficiaries named.
paid to the widow during her life, and $1,000
was to be paid the children in equal portions
when the youngest should arrive at age. No
directions were given in the order appointing
Simmons as to how the trust funds should be
invested. It appears that in 1883 the trustee
loaned to the McDonald Manufacturing Company a portion of the fund, taking its indorsed note, which note was taken up in
February, 1884, by a new note for the amount
of the loan unpaid, such note running one
year, which was indorsed by the president
The company
and secretary of the company.
at this time was in good financial standing,
and the indorsers were reputed to be perfectIn
ly responsible, and men of ample means.
a few months, however, the company failed,
and turned over its property to a trustee, and
the piesident, who was supposed to have the
most property of either of the indorsers, beThe claims
came unable to pay his debts.
against the manufacturing company were
finally compromised at 50 cents on the dollar,
in cash and notes, and 50 cents in mining
Simmons at first destock at $5 a share.
clined to take the mining stock, not considering it of any value, but after a few
months, thinking it might turn out to be
worth something, decided to take it and pay
an assessment of $50 upon it, for which it
was advertised for sale. The testimony clearly shows that the compromise made by the
creditors of the manufacturing company was
the best that could be realized at the time;
and that the mining stock, which proved to
be worthless, was considered of some value.
The trustee, in his account filed, wishes to
be credited and allowed for the mining stock
at its face value and interest thereon since
June 22, 1888, and the amount paid upon it
with another
together
as an assessment,
small item of $11. The beneficiaries object
to the allowance of these items, and thecourt
below decided that the estate of the trustee
must make good the loss resulting to the
trust-estate by reason of the loan to the manufacturing company.
We think the circuit

court was

clearly
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right in holding the trustee liable for the loss
of the trust funds under the circumstances.
He made a loan to a manufacturing company
upon its note and the personal security of
two indorsers. It is true, when the note for
the amount of the loan unpaid was given in
February, 1884, in addition to the security
of the indorsers, the company had assigned
to the trustee as collateral for the payment
of the note a bond, which was supposed to
be a lien upon real estate, but which was afterwards held by this court to be invalid, and
not a lien upon its property. So it eventually turned out that the loan was made to a private business corporation upon personal seWhile there is no evidence
curity alone.
that the trustee did not act in good faith in
making the loan, doubtless deeming it entirely safe, and amply secured, yet he cannot
be protected against the loss.
We are disposed, on this subject, to follow the English
rule which has been adopted in some of our
sister states, and hold that the trustee cannot invest trust funds in personal securities,
and that it is not an exercise of sound discretion to so invest them.
Says Parkek, V. C,
in Ackerman v. Emott, 4 Biirb. 626-636:
"It is a well-settled rule of the English court
of chancery that the trustee can only proteL-t
himself against risk by investing the trust
fund in real estate, or governmental securities. He must either take security on veal
estate, or invest in a fund approved by the
court; and no other fund is there approved
The
by the courts except the public funds. "
learned counsel on behalf of the trustee candidly admits that it is the rule of the earlier
decisions, and the one which is laid down in
some of our elementary works on this subject, which say that the trustee is personally
liable in case of any loss from investments in
personal securities, no matter how safe they
may, at the time, seem to be.
The concession is according to the fact, as an examination of the authorities will show. But he
insists that this well-established rule shall be
changed to meet the conditions and needs of
present business and methods of investment.
Investments, he says, in personal securities,
are deemed quite as safe and reliable, by
good business men, as loans upon real estate,
which is subject to great changes in value
from one cause or another.
This remark
may be true when applied to new towns or
cities where there is more or less speculation
in real estate; but as a general rule the commercial world regards loans made upon adequate real estate security as more safe and
Of
desirable than upon personal security.
course it is not practicable for a trustee always to find government securities in which
to invest, but he can usually find opportunities to make loans upon safe and adequate real estate securities, and, in view of
the hazards of other investments, of which
this case furnishes a good illustration, we
are disposed to hold that the trustee should
not be protected against loss in investing
trust funds unless he loans on real estate
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security, or invests in some other security Hpproved by the court to which he is accountable for the manner he executes his
trust.
If this rule shall be found inconvenient, or on the whole not best adapted to the
new condition of things, or to the necessities
of present business arrangements, the legislature can change it by authorizing the investment of trust funds in shares or stocks, or
on the credit of business corporations, or on
the personal security of individuals.
We
prefer to adhere to the well-established rule
in relation to the investment of trust funds,
and if a change is to be made let the legisla-
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ture make it. We do not enter upon a discussion of the doctrine which makes an investment on private or personal security at
the risk of the trustee, because the law is elementary. The prevailing rule in the United
States and in England is to prefer either public securities or real estate securities to personal security, and this, we think, is a wise
Hill, Trustees,
and salutary rule to follow.
368 et seq., and cases referred to in the notes;
1 Perry, Trusts, § 453 etseq.; 2 Pom. Eq.
Jur. § 1074; Clark v. Garfield, 8 Allen, 427.
It, follows from these views that the judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed.
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Sullivan

&

PUTXAil, J.

a He confidence which the
In his executors, -whom he
his trustees, was unboundalso constituted
that they, as trustees,
ed.
He directed
should not be required to give any other
security than their own bond, without sureties, and that each of them should be ac"simply for his own acts, doings
countable
and defaults as such trustee."
The general question is, whether the trustees have abused the trust.
The testator made provision for the support of his wife mainly from the proceeds of
the trust fund. He speaks of the profits,
income, dividends, which were to come from
it through their hands. '±ney were to loan
the 50,000 dollars upon ample and suflBcient
security, or invest the same in safe and productive stock, either in the public funds,
bajQk shares or other stock, according to their
best judgment and discretion.
It is very clear that the testator did not
intend to limit the income to the simple interest of the fund; for if he had so intended,
he would not have spoken of dividends and
profits, but would have given an annuity of
three thousand dollars a year.
It has been argued that the testator gave
the sum of fifty thousand dollars as the trust
fund, and that the trustees could only have
demanded that sum of the executors.
But
we tlilnk that no important Inference can be
drawn from that fact It would not follow
from thence, that there should have been a
sale of the personal property or stocks of the
The trustees
testator and a reinvestment.

testator reposed

"and the executors

were the same persons, and

of going through the useless formality of a sale and Investment, it was clearly competent for them to select from the ample funds of the estate, those stocks which
should form the capital of the trust fund.
And in making that selection, it Is very clear
to us, that they should have preferred that
stock which would probably give her the
most profit, and at the same time preserve
It would not
the value of the capital sum.
for example have been the exercise of a
to have appropriated the
sound discretion,
trust fund in the stock of an incorporated
company which gave great dividends for the
time being, but which would, according to
the terms of its charter, expire as soon as
the death of the wife could be calculated to
In such a case nothing would be
happen.
left of the capital for those in remainder.
On the other hand, if the Investment of the
trust fund were in stock which made large
dividends, and which had acquired its value
instead

It

was said by ijord Hardwlcke

In Jack-

son V. Jackson, 1 Aik. 514, that "to compel
trustees to make up a deficiency not owing
to their wilful default, is the harshest demand that can be made in a court of equity." The statute of Geo. I, for the indemnity
of guardians and trustees, provides that
there be
diminution of the principal, without the default of the trustees, they shall not
If that were otherwise, who would
be liable.
imdertake such hazardous responsibility?
It is argued for the appellants, that the
trustees have not loaned the money on good
security.
The answer is found in the authority which the testator gave to them.
They were to loan, or to invest the fund in
They preferred the latter.
stocks.
But
is argued, that they did not invest
in the public funds, bank shares or other
stock, within the true intent and meaning of
the authority, uut in trading companies, and
so exposed the capital to great loss.
And we
are referred to Trafford v. Boehm,
Atk.
444, to prove the position, that such an investment will not have the support of
court
of chancery.
The chancellor seems to suppose that funds or other good securities,
must be such as have the engagement of the
government
to pay off their capital. Bank
stock, as well as South-Sea stock, which were
in the management of directors, &c. were
not considered by that court as good security. But no such rule has ever been recognized here.
In point of fact, there has
been as great fluctuation in the value of the
stock which was secured by the promise and
faith of the government, as of the stock of
banks. And besides, the testator himself
considers that bank shares might be
safe
object of investment— "safe and productive
stock." And yet bank shares may be subject to losses which may sweep away their
whole value.
Lord Hardwicke
considers
that South-Sea annuities and bank annuities
stand upon different footing, because the directors have nothing to do with the principal, and are only to pay the interest, until
the government pay off the capital, and thereii'

for appellants.
S. Hubbard,
Shaw, for appellee.

3

446.)

Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Jan. 10, 1831.

by the prudent management of Its proprietors, and might be reasonably calculated upon as a safe and permanent capital, such an
Investment
would seem to be according to
the manifest intent of the testator.
It is somewhat remarkable that the testator did not himself appropriate the stock of
which the trust fund should consist, but that
he should have left the selection to his trustees.
But as it would have been necessary
to empower them to change, sell out and
reinvest, perhaps it was wise in the testator
to leave the whole matter, the selection as
well as the management, to them. Be that
as it may, he has given them that authority.
But it has happened that the value of the
capital stock in which the trust fund was
invested, has fallen, and those in remainder
call upon the trustees to make up the deficiency.

a

Supreme

Pick.

AMORY.

a

(9

et al. v.

a

HARVARD COLLEGE
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fore that they only are properly good securities.
This reasoning has very little or no application here; for, in the first place, the stocks
depending upon the promise of the government, or, as they are called, the public funds,
are exceedingly limited in amount, compared
with the amount of trust funds to be invested; and, in the second place, it may well be
doubted, if more confidence should be reposed
in the engagements
of the public, than in
the promises and conduct of private corporations which are managed by substantial and
prudent directors. There is one consideration much in favour of investing in the stock
of private corporations. They are amenable
to the law.
The holder may pursue his legal
remedy and compel them or their ofhcers to
do justice. But the government can only be
supplicated.

It

that manufacturing
and insurance stocks are not safe, because
the principal is at hazard.
But this objection applies to bank shares, as well as to
shares in incorporated manufacturing and incompanies.
surance
To a certain extent,
each may be considered as concerned or interested in trade.
The bank deals in bills of
exchange and notes, and the value of its capital depends upon the solvency of its debtors.
It may, for example, very properly discount upon the responsibility of merchants
of good credit at the time, but who, before
the maturity of their notes, become bankrupts from unavoidable and unforeseen merIn this way a bank becantile hazards.
in navigation,
comes indirectly interested
to an extent very
trade and merchandise,
little, if any, short of the trade in which
manufacturing companies engage. The capital in both cases may be lost by the conduct
of those who direct their affairs, notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable prudence
and discretion.
has

been

argued,

In regard to insurance companies or incorporations, the capital seems, at first view, to
be exposed to greater risk, but it is believed
that there has not been much if any more
fluctuation of the capital in those investments,
than in incorporated companies for banking or
If the insurance be
manufacturing purposes.
so general as to embrace a fair proportion of
all the property at risk, it will generally yield
profit, and preserve the capital
a reasonable
entire.
It will not do to reject those stocks as unsafe, which are in the management of directors, whose well or ill directed measures may
involve a total loss. Do what you will, the
If the public funds are
capital is at hazard.
resorted to, what becomes of the capital when
the credit of the government shall be so nluch
impaired as it was at the close of the last
war?
Investments on mortgage of real estate are
Its value fluctuates more,
not always safe.
perhaps, than the capital of insurance stock.
Again, the title to real estate, after the most
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may be Involved, and
careful investigation,
ultimately fail, and so the capital, which was
originally supposed to be as firm as the earth
itself, wiU be dissolved.
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall conduct himself faithHe is
fully and exercise a sound discretion.
to observe how men of prudence, discretion
and intelligence manage their own affairs, not
in regard to speculation, but in regard to the
of their funds, considpermanent disposition
ering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested.
But in the case at bar, the testator referred
of this trust especially to
the management
the judgment and discretion of the trustees
one of whom is the
whom he appointed;
brother, and the other was the cousin of his
wife, for whose support this provision was
These trustees are not to be made
made.
chargeable but for gross neglect and wilful
mismanagement.
The testator expressly authorized the trusin "other stock" than bank
tees to invest
shares or the public funds; so they might as
well select other stocli as that which the testator named.
There can be no doubt but that shares in
manufacturing and insuring incorporations!
are and were commonly called and known by
The investment would
the name of stock.
therefore be clearly within the letter of the
authority.
It has been argued, "that the trustees
should have invested in safe and productive
stock, at their own and a sound discretion,
without being governed by the known opinions of the testator;" "that he was at liberty
to speculate, but the trustees were not."
If
these positions should be granted, the desired
If the testator,
inference would not follow.
for example, had been in the habit of dealing
largely in lotteries and games of hazard, it
would undoubtedly not have justified the trussuch investments,
tees in making
notwithstanding the testator had been the favourite
of fortune.
But if the testator had invested
his funds to remain permanently in any stock,
that circumstance might well be taken into
by the trustees when called to
consideration
exercise their own best skill and discretion.
They might reasonably and properly inquire
and consider what their testator would do in
the circumstances in which they were placed.
Would he recommend an investment
that
should give simple Interest on a loan, or in
stock that would probably give much more,
and yet have the principal sum reasonably
safe?
The circumstance of the trustees' reposing
confidence
had, is one
where the testator
which is always to be considered as tending
properly
to their discharge.
Thompson
v.
Brown, 4 Johns. Ch. 62S. The case of Rowth
V. Howell, 3 Ves. 565, has a strong bearing
upon this part of the case. There the testator,
having great confidence in his banker, recommended it to his executors not to be in a hur-

mo
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ry to withdraw the funds from him.
But
after the death of the testator, the banker
misapplied them, and probably stung by remorse on account of his fraud, he committed
It was urged against the executors,
suicide.
that they might have withdrawn the securities
from the banker; and they had time enough
to do so; but it was considered that the loss
arose from the confidenee originally reposed
in the banker by the testator, and the executors were not subjected to the loss.
In the case at bar, the testator was a man
of extraordinary forecast and discretion, in
regard to the management of his property.
His vast accumulation could not be ascribed
causes, but to calculation
and
to accidental
reflection.
The fact that he had within three
or four years Invested nearly half his property
in manufacturing stock, was entitled to great
and respect, and would, withconsideration
have a
out any change of circumstances,
strong tendency to justify the selection of the
manufacturing stock as part of the trust fund.
■yVe cannot think with the counsel for the
appellants, that the dividend of fourteen per
cent arising from the recovery of the claim
against the Spanish government, can be conIt was residered as part of the capital.
ceived in the nature of salvage; which is always divided as profits, and not treated as
part of the capital stock.
And we do not think that the negotiations
between the Boston Manufacturing Company
and the Men'lmack Manufacturing Company,
In relation to making a large quantity of machinery, and the sale of patents and of patterns for castings, by the Boston Manufacturing Company to the Merrimack Manufacturing
Company, should be considered as part of the
capital stock. We have seen no evidence that
they were ever treated as such by the proWe think the sums arising from
prietors.
those causes were properly considered as the
fruits of their industry, and placed to the account of profit and loss of the Boston Manufacturing Company.
It is proved or admitted, that the stock
which the trustees selected to constitute the
trust fund of 50,000 dollars, was of that value
when it was taken by them.
We are of opinion that they had a right to
select the stock which they did for that purpose, and that they acted In the premises acAnd
cording to their best skill and discretion.
we have not seen any evidence which would
satisfy us, that under all the circumstances
of the case, they did not act with a sound discretion In making the selection and investment.

But if we were less clear than we are upon
that point, we are of opinion that this whole
matter has been settled in the court of probate, where the appellants had notice to attend, and where all objections were raised and
The judge thereupon made a
considered.
decree, from which there has not been any
appeal.
We say the whole matter, because the ex-
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ecutors and the trustees are the same persons.
On February 9, 1824, the executors, after due
notice to all persons interested, presented their
account with the estate, and appropriated the
stock which should constitute
the fund of
50,000
dollars selected by them as ti'usteea
for Mrs. McLean.
The Massachusetts
General Hospital was heard In fact, and (as has
been said and not denied) the objections were
made by the same able and learned counsel
who now appears in their behalf. And upon
the hearing, the judge of probate allowed the
account There was no appeal from that setBy the legal operation of that settlement.
tlement, the trustees became chargeable with
that selected trust fund, and it Is not now
competent for the appellants to contend that
those stocks were not legally appropriated by
the executors and received by the trustees, as
the fund of 50,000 dollars given by the testator.
If the college had any objections, they
Probably every obshould have made them.
jection to the account which could have been
made by the college was in fact made by the
hospital.
It has been argued that the account which
was settled and acquiesced in, was rendered
by the executors and not by the trustees, and
ought not to bar this process, which Is against
the surviving trustee. But it was a settlement
of the very root and substance of this controThe executors announced their selecversy.
tion and appropriation of the stock for the
The trustees (being the same persons)
fund.
became Instantly chargeable with the manIt Is the original mis-approagement of it.
priation and selection, which is the subject
Suppose the trustees had not
of complaint.
been the executors, and that the college and
the hospital had requested the executors to
deliver to the other persons as trustees the
particular stock to constitute the trust fund;
could those institutions object against the trusa
tees, that those stocks did not constitute
proper fund? It would seem clear that the
They would say to the
trustees might justify.
"You acquiesced In the aptwo institutions,
by the executors, and we also
propriation
thought It advisable, safe and expedient."
We think that that matter having been settled by a court of competent jurisdiction,
without appeal, the decree is final and conclusive.
The college and the hospital were especially
put upon their guard; for the executors, in
their letter of December 27, 1823, informed
their committee, that they should be duly notified when these accounts should be presented for allowance
at the probate office, that
they might object to any arrangements which
the executors might have made for the capital
of the 50,000 dollars. As no appeal was made
from the decree of the probate court, all parties in interest must be presumed to have acwhich were
quiesced in the arrangements
then made for the capital of the trust fund of
If there had been an appeal.
50,000 dollars.
It would probably have been heard and de-
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termtned before there was any depreciation
upon the whole Investment.
Indeed It appears
from the evidence, that the stock of the Merrimack Manufacturing
Company
advanced
twenty per cent from the time when the stock
was selected in February, 1824, to December
1, 1825.

The claim now made upon the trustees, to
make up the subsequent depreciation,
would
seem to be justified only on the ground of
gross abuse of their trust, even if it were not
barred by the decree In the probate court
from which no appeal was made. But upon
examining all the documents and evidence, it
seems to us that there is no reason whereon
to ground that imputation.
Trustees are justly and uniformly considered favourably, and it is of great importance
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to bereaved families and orphans, that they
should not be held to make good, losses in
the depreciation of stocks or the failure of the
capital itself, which they held in trust, provided they conduct themselves honestly and
discreetly and carefully, according to the existing circumstances, in the discharge of their
If this were held otherwise, no prutrusts.
of losses
dent man would run the hazard
which might happen without any neglect or

of good faith.
The judgment of this court is, that the decree of the probate court, from which the
appellants appealed, be, and it is hereby affirmed; and that the record be remitted to
that court for further proceedings according
to law to be there had; and that the appel-

breach

lee recover

his costs.
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BENTLEY

v.

CRAVEN.
Nov. 15, 16, 1853.

■

The plaintiff Bentley carried on business in
partnership with the defendants Craven, Prest
and Younge, as sugar refiners, at Southampton.
Craven vras the managing partner, and
generally resided in London, where he did the
agency business of the firm, made aU the
of sugar and kept the London
purchases
books, visiting Southampton once a week for
the affairs
of superintending
the purpose
there.
He was, however, at liberty to carry
busion, and did carry on, an independent
ness as a sugar dealer, in which he had great
skill and knowledge, and was able to buy to
Accordingly, in 1851, he
great advantage.
bought a quantity of sugar, and afterwards
sold it to the firm at a profit, but at the fair
market price of the day. Bentley having
complained of this, on the ground that they
in
were sugar refiners and not speculators
sugar. Craven took offense and canceled the
transaction, but he, nevertheless, continued to
speculate in sugars, and, vrithout acquainting
his partners with the fact, sold various quantities of his own sugars at various times to
the firm, at the market prices of the day,
but at a considerable profit in each case, the
in the
sums so gained by him amounting
whole

to about

£853

ITs.

3d.

R. Palmer and W. D. Lewis, for plaintiff.
Mr. Amphlett, for Prest. Mr. Cole, for
Younge.
Mr. RoupeU and Mr. Selwyn, for
Craven.

THE MASTER

OF

THE ROLLS.

This

on the first
me to be founded
principles of equity, and that it would be a
violation of them to allow this gentleman to
retain the profit which he has made upon
these sugars.
Two principles with relation to the doctrine
of principal and agent have been recognized
from the earliest times. One is, that an
agent employed to purchase cannot legally
buy his own goods for his principal; neither
can an agent employed to sell, himself purchase the goods of his principal. If he should
do so, and thereby make a profit, his principal
altothe transaction
may either repudiate
gether or, adopting it, may claim for himself
The same
the benefit made by his agent.
principle is applicable to a great many other
relations, as to that of trustee and cestui que
trust and others. The court has repeatedly
applied this rule where the transaction was
perfectly bona fide; it Is founded on this principle, that an agent will not be allowed to
place himself in a situation which, under ordinary circumstances, would tempt a man to
do that which Is not the best for his prinappears

to

cipal, and it Is the plain duty of every agent
to do the best he can for his principal.
have no doubt that many persons act in Ignorance of this rule of equity; for otherwise
these cases would not come so frequently into
I have never seen a case which ilcourt.
lustrated the principle more clearly than this.
The case is this: Four partners establish
a partnership for refining sugar; one of them
is a wholesale grocer, and, from his business,
is peculiarly cognizant with the variations in
the sugar market,
and has great skill In
buying sugar at a right and proper time for
Accordingly, the business of
the business.
selecting and purchasing
the sugar for the
He being
sugar refinery is intrusted to him.
the person to buy, it is his duty and business
to employ his skill In buying for the sugar
refinery at thje time he thinks most beneficial.
Having, according to his skill and knowledge, bought sugar at a time when he thought
it likely to rise, and it having risen, and
the firm being in want of some, he sells his
own sugars to the firm, without letting the
partners know that it was his sugar that was
sold, for that is expressly and clearly stated
in his own affidavit.
In fact, he himself says, not only that he
did not tell his copartners, but that he avoided
it. The only way in which a sale of that sort
could be made valid and effectual would be
by communication
of the fact The agent
should say to his principal "I have certain
sugars of my own which I do not choose to
sell to you, unless you give a particular price
for them; you have the option to do it or not,
as you think fit." If he had said that, the
relation of principal and agent between them
was conwould, so far as this transaction
If, after recerned, have been determined.
ceiving this statement, his partners had consented to his terms, the transaction might
have stood good; but. In the absence of such
a statement, the purchase by an agent of his
own goods for his principal cannot be sustained in this court, even though the sale
may have been made at the fair market price,
and at such a price as that at which he might
have sold to any other person; and If, by
he makes a profit, the
such a transaction,
principal is entitled to take that profit to
himself. This accordingly puts an end to the
as to whether the partners
are
questions
bound to adopt or to repudiate the transaction; or if they adopt it, as to the price at
which the sugar should be charged and the
This gentleman has made a profit of
like.
£853 in the course of one year, by sales to
himself as agent of the firm, and in my opinion the firm is entitled to that benefit and
He Is agent for the firm for buying
profit.
sugars; he has sold his own sugars to the
firm and made that profit, and the firm are
entitied to it accordingly.

I

(18 Beav. 75.)

Court of Chancery.
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MUNSON

et al. v. SYRACUSE,
OO. et al.

(8 N. E. 355, 103 N.

Y.

Court of Appeals of New York.

G. & C.

RT.

58.)

Oct. 5, 1886.

Appeal by plaintiffs from a judgment upon
of the general term of the Fifth
department of the supreme court, aflBrmlng
a judgment entered upon the report of a referee in favor of defendant.
The action was
to enforce specific performance of a contract
to deliver certain bonds of the Syracuse, Geneva & Coming Railway Company.
The issues were referred to J. L. Angle, of Rochester, who reported in favor of plaintiff, August 20, 1880, and judgment was entered directing specific performance of the contract,
from which judgment defendants appealed to
on
the general term. Fourth department,
which appeal said judgment was reversed,
on the ground that the contract sought to be
The
enforced
was against public policy.
case was again tried before A. J. Northrup,
as referee, who reported in favor of defendants, upon which report judgment was enfrom which
tered dismissing the complaint,
judgment plaintifCs appealed to the general
judgment was
term, when the last-named
Plaintiff thereupon appealed to
affirmed.
the court of appeals.
a decision

Samuel Hand and B. W. Huntington, for
appellants, Edgar Munson and others. Geo.
F. Comstock, for respondents, Syracuse, G. &
C. Ry. Co. and another.

ANDREWS, J. We think it would be difficult to affirm the judgment of the court below dismissing the complaint. If, in order to
do so, it was necessary to uphold the proposition that the original contract of August
the plaintiffs and Magee,
13, 1875, between
was Invalid either because Munson, one of
the plaintiffs, was, at the time of entering
into the contract, a director of the Sodus
Bay & Corning Railroad Company, or for the
reason that the contract violated the rule
which prohibits combinations to prevent competition at a judicial or other public sale.
The situation was briefly this:
The Sodus Bay & Corning Railroad Company was organized in 1871 to construct and
operate a railroad from Corning, in the county of Steuben, to Sodus Bay, In the county
of Wayne, a distance of about 86 miles, passing through the counties of Schuyler, Yates,
and Ontario, by way of Savona, Penn Yann,
Of this road the plaintiff Munand Geneva.
In 1872
son 'was president and a director.
on its
the corporation created a mortgage
projected road, its franchises and property,
for $1,500,000, to secure a contemplated issue
of bonds to that amount, to be used in the
construction of the road. It proceeded to
secure rights of way over a portion of its
line, graded about 30 miles of its track, b^
tween Savona and Geneva, and expended in
the aggregate, in securing titles and in the
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prosecution of the work, the sum of $250,000.
It issued bonds under the mortgage to the
amount of $257,000, from the proceeds of
which the expenditures were made. At the
date of the contract between the plaintiffs
and Magee, August 13, 1875, the plaintiffs
of the bonds, $241,000
held and controlled,
In amount; the remaining $16,000 being in
the hands of a former treasurer of the company, whose title thereto seems to have been
disputed,
but who subsequently received a
dividend thereon from the proceeds of the
mortgage sale. The title of the plaintiffs to
the $241,000 of bonds was not questioned,
and there is no suggestion that they were
not bona fide holders for value, or that the
bonds did not represent a valid debt against
the company for their full amount.
In January, 1874, the company became inIt defaulted in the payment of the
solvent.
interest on its bonds at that date, and in the
spring of 1875 all operations on the road were
suspended, and the further prosecution of the
In
enterprise
was practically abandoned.
short, when the contract of August 13, 1875,
was made, the company was hopelessly bankrupt, the work had stopped, the interest on
its bonds had been unpaid for 18 months,
and practically its whole property consisted
of disconnected rights of way over a portion
of its route, and a road-bed partially graded
and whatever
between Savona and Geneva;
property it had of any value was acquired
through the means furnished by the holders
of the bonds.
Under these circumstances the parties entered into the contract of August 13, 1875.
It recites that the plaintiffs own and represent $241,000 of the bonds of the Sodus Bay
& Corning Railroad Company, and that Marepregee, the other party to the contract,
sents the persons and interests proposing to
organize another railroad company for the
construction of a railroad from the vicinity
of Corning to Geneva.
The parties of the
first part (the plaintiffs) agree to proceed at
once to secure the foreclosure of the mortgage, and purchase, on the foreclosure
sale,
the property, rights of way, franchises, and
interests
covered thereby,
and convey the
same to Magee, or to the railroad company
proposed to be organized.
Magee, the other
party to the contract, agrees to deliver, or
cause to be delivered, to Munson and his
associates, in payment for the said property,
rights of way, and franchises—First, mortgage bonds of the proposed railway company
to the amount of 50 per cent, of the principal
and interest of the bonds of the Sodus Bay
& Corning Railroad Company held by them.
The contract contains other stipulations not
now necessary to mention.
In the view we take of another question in
the case, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the contract of August 13,
1875, was valid as between the original parties thereto;
that is, whether the plaintiff
Munson, ia entering into the contract, vio-
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lated any duty owing by him to the corporation of which he was a director, or whether
the contract as a whole was, on the part of
Muuson and his associates, anything more
than a legitimate arrangement to protect
their interests as bondholders, and to malie
the mortgage security available for the payThe
ment of a part of the mortgage debt.
contract was not by or with the Sodus Bay
and, assum& Corning Railroad Company;
ing that the question as to the validity of
the original contract can be raised in this
action, we are not prepared, without further
consideration,
to condemn the transaction on
Duncomb
either of the grounds suggested.
Marie v. GarV. Railroad Co., &i N. Y. 190;
rison, 83 N. y. 14; Harpending v. Munson, 91
N. Y. 650.
But this action is not brought
to enforce the contract of August 13, 1875,
against the defendant Magee. It Is an aotion to compel the specific performance, by
of the undertalithe defendant corporation,
ing of Magee In that contract to deliver the
bonds of the new company as therein provided, -founded upon the assumption by the
by resolunew company of that obligation,
tion of its board of directors passed August
con13, 1875, and also upon the subsequent
tract of September 14, 1875, made between
the company and the plaintiffs, which In Its
primary provision substituted the company
to the place of Magee as the party of the
second part in the contract of August 13,
1875.

The action in its entire scope is framed
the obligation of the defendant
under its contract of assumption.
It was tried upon this theory. The exceptions point to this as the ground of the action, and Magee is joined as defendant, and
in the demand of relief, as the custodian of
bonds of the company which the plaintifCs
claimed he should be adjudged to deliver
to them by the judgment in the action.
Throughout the trial the action was treated
as an action against the defendant corporation upon its contract, and in no respect as
an action against Magee to enforce a liability against him under the contract of August 13, 1875.
The plaintiffs, therefore, are
to enforce
corporation

compelled to meet the question whether, upon principles of equity, they are entitled to
the aid of the court to enforce an executory
contract between themselves on the one side,
on the other,
and the defendant corporation
for the sale of the property of the former,
in a case where one of the plaintiffs, at the
time the contract was made, was a director
of the purchasing corporation, and took part
in making the contract upon which the action is brought
For a proper understanding of the situation a few additional facts need to be stated.
On the twenty-sixth of August, 1875, Magee
and his associates organized a railroad company to construct a railroad from Coming to
by the contract of
Geneva, as contemplated

August

13,

1875.

The plaintiff Munson was
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one of the promoters, and became a director
and stockholder,
and was the first president
of the corporation.
On the thirty-first of
August, 1875, Magee executed a written assignment to the new corporation,
the Syracuse, Geneva & Corning Railway Company,
of his rights under the contract with the
plaintiffs of August 13, 1875; and the board of
directors, at a meeting on the same day, in
which the plaintiff Munson participated,
passed a resolution assuming the contract
on the part of Magee, and agreeing to perform it, except in one particular not now
material to be mentioned.
On the fourteenth
of September, 1875, the contract before referred to of that date was entered into between the plaintiffs and the new corporation, and was executed individually by each
of the plaintiffs, and on the part of the corporation by the plaintiff Munson as president.
The proceedings of the board of directors inof August
dicate that when the resolution
13, 1875, was passed, and for two or three
months thereafter, the company contemplated building its road to Geneva on the same
line substantiallv as that of the Sodus Bay &
Corning Railroad Company, but in December,
1875, it located an entirely new line, not coincident in any part with the line originally
contemplated,
upon which new line its road
was subsequently built It is found, and the
evidence supports the finding, that the best
Interests of the company were promoted by
The plaintiffs
adopting
its present route.
procured a foreclosure of the mortgage, and
purchased the property, as they had agreed,
in 1877, tendered a deed
and subsequently,
corporation,
and
to the defendant
thereof
demanded the delivery of the bonds, which
was refused.
In determining the legal question presented, it Is proper to say that there Is no evidence of any actual fraud or collusion on the
part of any of the parties to the original contract of August 13, 1875, or that the contract
of assumption was induced by any improper
appliances or motives whatever.
It is plain
that Magee and his associates, when they
entered into the original contract contemplated building the proposed road on the line of
the Sodus Bay & Corning Railroad Company, and that the contract was made with
a view of acquiring for the new road the
rights of way and other property of that
corporation.
It is equally plain that the contract of assumption was entered into by the
new corporation
with the same expectation,
and for the same purpose.
If the contract was otherwise unobjectionable, it could not, we think, be assailed on
the ground that it was a contract outside
of the power of the defendant corporation.
The statute authorizes a railroad corporation to acquire land for Its track and other
necessary purposes, by voluntary purchase or
by condemnation (Laws 1850, c. 140, §§ 14,
15); and an agreement, made on the purchase
of rights of way, to pay therefor in bonds
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of the purchasing corporation, secured by a
mortgage on its property, Is clearly, we think,
witliin the implied, if not within the express,
powers of a railroad corporation. Section 28,
subd. 10.
The contract made between the
defendant corporation and the plaintiffs was
in substance a contract to purchase rights
of way; and although the defendant's
line
was not formally located on the line proposed to be purchased, and was ui fact subsequently located on a different line, this
change of purpose does not, we think, affect
the question of corporate
power.
But we are of opinion that the contract of
September

14,

1875,

is repugnant

to the great

rule of law which invalidates all contracts
made by a trustee or fiduciary, in which he
is personally interested,
at the election of
the party he represents.
There is no controversy as to the facts bringing the case as
to Munson within the operation of the rule.
He and his associates were dealing with
a corporation in which Munson was a director, in a matter where the interests
of
the contracting parties were or might be in
conflict
The contract bound the corporation to purchase, and Munson, as one of the
directors,
participated in the action of the
corporation in assuming the obligation, and in
binding itself to pay the price primarily
agreed upon between the plaintiffs and MaHe stood in the attitude of selling as
gee.
owner, and purchasing as trustee.
The law
permits no one to act in such inconsistent
relations. It does not stop to Inquire whether the contract or transaction was fair or
unfair. It stops the Inquiry when the relation is disclosed, and sets aside the transaction, or refuses to enforce it, at the instance
of the party whom the fiduciary undertook
to represent,
without undertaking to deal
with the question of abstract justice in the
particular case. It prevents frauds by making them, as far as may be, impossible, knowing that real motives often elude the most
searching inquiry; and it leaves neither to
judge nor jury the right to determine, upon
or disada consideration of its advantages
whether a contract made under
vantages,
such circumstances shall stand or fall.
It can make no difference in the application of the rule in this case that Munson's
associates were not themselves disabled from
contracting with the corporation,
or that
Munson was only one of ten directors who
voted in favor of the contract. The contract
on its face notified Munson's associates of
his relation to the corporation, and that the
contract was subject to be defeated on that
ground; and, on the other hand, a corporation, in order to defeat a contract entered
into by directors, in which one or more of
them had a private interest, is not bound to
show that the Influence of the director or directors having the private interest determinThe law cannot
ed the action of the board.
accurately measure the influence of a trustee
with his associates, nor will it enter into the
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inquiry, in an action by the trustee in his
private capacity to enforce the contract, in the
making of which he participated. The value
of the rule of equity to which we have adverted, lies, to a great extent, in its stubIts rigidity gives
bornness and inflexibility.
it one of its chief uses as a preventive or
discouraging influence, because it weakens
the temptation to dishonesty or unfair dealing on the part of the trustees, vitiating,
without attempt at discrimination, all transactions in which they assume the dual characters of principal and representative.
The rule has been declared and enforced in
a great variety of cases; but in none, perhaps, with more vigor and completeness, both
upon principle and authority, than in the
leading case of Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns.
Ch. 252.
But the case of Railway Co. v.
Blakie, 1 Macq. 461, decided by the house of
lords, is in many of its features similar to the
present one.
In that case it appeared that
the plaintiffs were a manufacturing firm, and
that one of them was also a manager of the
Aberdeen Railway Company, the defendant,
and the chairman of the board.
At a meeting of the managers, they by resolution authorized their engineer to contract for iron chairs
needed by the company.
The agent contracted with the plaintiffs' firm. It did not appear
that the member of the firm, who was also a
manager and the chairman of the company, Intermeddled with the dealing on either side,
further than that it may be assumed he was
at the meeting which authorized the engineer
to procure a supply of chairs.
The plaintiffs
brought their suit to enforce specifically the
performance of the contract, or, in the alternative, to recover damages for its non-performance.
After a decision in their favor in
the lower court, the company appealed to the
house of lords, where the ruling was imanimously reversed, on the ground that the contract was condemned by the rules of equity
as having been made between the company of
which one of the . plaintiff s was a manager,
and a private firm of which he was a member.
The opinions of Lord Chancellor Cranworth,
and of Lord Brougham,
vindicate,
upon impregnable grounds, the general rule, and its
application to the particular case.
We have designedly omitted, up to this
time, special
reference
to a circumstance
which it is claimed takes the case out of the
operation of the general equitable rule; that
is, that the contract with the defendant corporation was not, on the part of the plaintiffs,
a fresh dealing in respect to the sale of their
interest in the property of the Sodus Bay &
Corning Railroad Company, but was simply
a substitution,
in the place of Magee, of the
corporation
organized by him and his associates for the purpose of carrying out the
original arrangement.
But the promoters of
the corporation are not the corporation.
The
legal body is distinct from the individuals who
compose it. The statute confers no authority
upon the promoters of a corporation to enter
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into preliminary contracts binding the corporation when it shall come into existence. Such
contracts may bind the individuals who make

If adopted by the corporation, and
them.
they are within the corporate powers, and
are not otherwise subject to objection, they
may become the contract of the corporation,
and enforceable as such.
In respect to contracts of promoters. Judge
Redfield says:
"The promoters are In no
sense identical with the corporation, nor do
they represent It in any relation of agency;
and their contracts could, of course, only bind
the company so far as they should be subsequently adopted by It as their successors."
1
Redf. Rys. 9.
But the corporation is at liberty to refuse
to sanction them; and, if its sanction is obtained by the act or co-operation of directors
who have a private interest, we perceive no
reason why, under the general rule, the corporation may not resist an action for specific
performance;
at least, In a case where it has
not accepted the consideration and taken the
benefit.
It is claimed that the general policy of the
law In this state sanctions the contract in
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question,

and we are referred to chapter 710,
which authorizes the purchaser, or
the grantee of the purchaser, of the real estate, tracks, and fixtures of a railroad corporation sold under a mortgage or decree, to associate with him other persons, and form a
new corporation to maintain and operate the
But the transaction in question was
road.
not in any proper sense an arrangement for
of an existing railroad.
It
the reorganization
was contemplated that the new corporation
should operate or maintain the road of the old
corporation.
The line of the new corporation, by its articles, extended only from Coming to Geneva; whereas the route of the old
corporation was from Corning to Sodus Bay.
When the contract was made, the enterprise
of building the Sodus Bay & Corning road had
been commenced, but the road had not been
built. 11^ route had only in part been located,
and the great burden and expense of the undertaking was yet to be incurred.
The case
is not in terms within the act of 1873; nor, as
we think, within its spirit and intent.
These views lead to an affirmance of the
All concur, except RAPALLO and
judgment.
FINCH, JJ., not voting.

Laws

1873,
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RICH
(33

T.

BLACK

Atl. 880,

173

et al.

Pa.

Supreme Court of PennsylTania.

92.)

Jan.

6, 1896.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Allegheny county; Thomas Ewing, Judge.
BUI by Martha K. Rich against Black &
Baird, Daniel H. Barr, and others, to have
said Barr declared trustee for plaintiff as to
certain land, and to obtain an accounting by
defendants.
From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal.
AflBrmed.

J. S. & E. G. Ferguson, for appellants.
A. Woodward, for appellee.

M.

STERRBTT, C. J. The rule of public policy which avoids, at the instance of the cestui que trust, purchases made by agents for
sale, is practically absolute in its character.
Courts of equity view such transactions with
jealous eye; and it is only under special circumstances, amounting to a dissolution of the
trust relation, when the parties have dealt at
arm's length, that their validity is recognized.
And
Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 254.
the reasons are obvious.
On the one hand,
the relation which such agents bear is confidential, and disarms the vigilance of their
principals. It affords peculiar facilities for
obtaining exclusive information in respect of
the property intrusted to them for sale. Their
implies that they have superior
employment
advantages
for making sales, and that they
will use every effort and means to obtain the
highest price for the benefit of their principals.
On the other hand, their individual interest
is to purchase at the lowest price, and places
them In a position which is inconsistent with
the faithful and proper discharge of the duties of the trust. The opportunity will naturally lead to temptation, to abuse, and, as
was aptly said by Mr. Chancellor Kent in Davoue V. Fanning, supra, be poisonous in its
consequences.
The cestui que trust is not
bound to prove, nor is the court bound to
judge, that the trustee has made a bargain
advantageous
to himself.
The fact may be
so, and yet the party not have it in his power
distinctly and clearly to show it. "There may
be fraud," as Lord Hardwicke observed, "and
the party not able to prove it."
Thus an
agent, by virtue of his trust relation, may
discover valuable minerals in the land, and,
locking the knowledge in his breast, take advantage of it in making a contract with his
If he deny it, how can the
cestui que trust.
court find the fact? "The probability is that
a trustee who has once conceived such a purpose will never disclose it, and the cestui que
trust will be effectually defrauded." Ex parte Lacey, 6 Ves. 627. So he may take advantage of his superior knowledge of the market
and skill in manipulation to obtain results
"It is to guard against
beneficial to himself.
this uncertainty and hazard of abuse, and to
remove the trustee from temptation, that the
rule does and will permit the cestui que trust
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to come, at his own option, and without showing actual injury, and insist upon having the
experiment of another sale" (Davoue v. Fanning, supra) ; or, as was held in our own case
of Swisshelm's Appeal, 56 Pa. St. 475, treat
the purchase as Inoperative in respect of the
land unsold by the trustee, and compel an account of the proceeds of sale made by him
"This is a
to innocent purchasers for value.
remedy that goes deep, and touches the very
root of the matter." Davoue v. Fanning, supra; Leisenring v. Black, 5 Watts, 303; Parshall's Appeal, 65 Pa. St. 224; Bice v. Davis,
Murphy v.
136 Pa. St. 439, 20 Atl. 513;
The cestui
O'Shea, 2 Jones & Lp T. 422.
que trust must. It is true, move within a reabut what shall amount to a
sonable time;
reasonable time will depend on circumstances,
In the
and lies in the discretion of the court.
which may
absence of special circumstances
lengthen or shorten the time, the analogy of
Marshall's Estate, 138
the law is followed.
Pa. St 285, 22 Atl. 90. These appellants misapprehend the rationale of this rule. They Insist that because, as they claim, the sale was
satisfactory to Mrs. Rich, the rule has no application. Conceding that in the first instance
it was satisfactory, that fact would not take
away her option to rescind; for these appellants then and for a long time afterwards ostensibly maintained towards her the character of agents for sale, and wiUfuUy concealed
the fact of their own interest. They maintain
their characters of inconsistency even now by
claiming not only title as purchasers, but comRoll, whom they
missions as agents for sale.
first reported as the purchaser, confessedly
knew nothing of it. The alleged interest of
Gillespie and Neeb Is more than doubtful,
and, if it ever existed, was soon parted with.
To all practical intents and purposes, these
agents were the real purchasers, without the
knowledge of their cestui que trust. Rosenberger's Appeal, 26 Pa. St. 67.
However
Mrs. Rich may have felt in the first instance
in regard to the sale, it Is not likely that it
would have been satisfactory had she been
fully informed of the facts.
When she gave
her agents a minimum price, It was manifestly intended as a guide to them in negotiating
sale, and Implied a just expectation
on her
part and an engagement on theirs that they
would make an honest endeavor to obtain a
higher price.
If Roll, GiUespie, and Neeb
were really intending purchasers, the obvious
course was that these agents for sale should
They did not occupy
take competitive bids.
the position of middlemen with equal duty to
Their primary duty was to Mrs. Rich.
both.
But, so far as appears, no bona fide effort
Inwas made by them to perform this duty.
stead, Mrs. Rich was asked to take less, and,
when this was refused, they hastened to avail
themselves
of the minimum price in their
own interest, and had already made large
profits before Mrs. Rich's discovery of the
facts. If they could realize profits for themselves, they could and should have done so
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que trust.
That was their
employment, and that their undertaklnir; and
eqvdty will treat that as done which ought to
To sustain the purchase
have been done.
made in these circumstances would work "actual injury" to Mrs. Rich, tend to encourage
breaches of trust, and violate a wise rule of

for their cestui
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public policy.
Having taken action In time,
the plaintiff was entitled to the relief which
the decree of the court below is Intended to
secure.

Decree afiSrmed, and appeal dismissand it
to the

with costs to be paid by appellants;
Is ordered that the record be remitted
court below for further proceedings.
ed,
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BENT

V.

PRIEST.

(86 Mo. 475.)

Supreme Court of Missouri.

Oct. Term,

1885.

A. J. P. Garescbe and J. M. Holmes, for
appellant. T. L. Gant and J. M. Gloyer,
for respondent.

BLACK, J. In 1873, the superintendent
of insurance began proceedings to wind up
the St. Louis Mutual Insurance Company,
which was not then in a satisfactory condition.
Most of the directors regarded a reinsurance as the best way out of the difH.culty. Efforts were made to that end, including negotiations with the Mound City
Life Insurance Company.
Charles H. Peck,
who was a large stockholder in the St. Louis
Mutual, but not a director or officer, made
proposals to some of the officers of the
Mound City to bring about such an arrangement, the result of which was a contract
between Peck and the president of that com1873, by
pany, dated the 27th of November,
which, after reciting the desire of that company to efCect the reinsurance, and the deemto accomed necessity of Peck's services
plish that object, the company agreed to pay
him $155,000 within sixty days, for which
sum Peck was to "devote his services for the
procurement of such reinsurance and effecting a contract between said companies."
Peck thereupon approached the defendant,
a director of the St. Louis Mutual, who at
first did not take much interest in the matPeck, then, in substance, stated that
ter.
he was largely interested in having the reinsurance effected; that it was worth ten or
fifteen thousand dollars to the stockholders
of the St. Louis Mutual, and that he meant
business.

Priest and Wyman were partners in the
real estate business, and upon Peck's suggestion that his business was legitimately
within the partnership business. Priest referred Peck to Wyman, who was at a desk
in the same room or office. The result of
the negotiation between Peck and Wyman
was that the former placed bonds of the

Leavenworth, Atchison & Northwestern Railroad Company of the par value of fifteen
thousand dollars in the hands of Mullikin
to be handed to Wyman, if the reinsurance
was effected, otherwise they were to be
returned to Peck. This agreement was in
writing, but was subsequently destroyed.
The evidence, including a letter from Peck,
shows that he agreed within thirty days to
substitute money, or bonds of the Vulcan
Iron Company, or St. Louis Gaslight Comipany, for these railroad bonds, the latter, it
is said, then being worth but sixty cents
on the dollar.
As the Mound City Insurance Company
then stood, the superintendent of insurance
did not regard it strong enough to make the
•reinsurance, and it was required to add a
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In
half million dollars to its capital stock.
December,
a contract of reinsurance
1873,
was made by the St. Louis Mutual with the
Mound City, the latter also stipulating that
for a transfer of all of the assets of the St.
Louis Mutual it would assume all the liabilities of that company, increase its own
stock a half a million dollars, and out of
this increased stock exchange its own stock
for that of the St. Louis Mutual. Of the
twenty directors of the St. Louis Mutual,
voted
Including the defendant,
seventeen.
The Mound City increased
for the measure.
its stock as agreed, the reinsurance was approved by the superintendent of insurance
and by the court in which the proceedings
against the St. Louis Mutual were pending,
By
were dismissed.
and those proceedings
the 17th of January, 1874, the whole conPeck
tract was substantially completed.
from the
received his agreed compensation
Mound City Insurance Company in secured
notes which that company acquired by the
assignment from the St. Louis Mutual. Peck
would not, at least did not, substitute money
or bonds of the iron company, or gas company, as he had agreed, for the railroad
bonds in the hands of Mullikin, and Wyman,
In
unable to do better, took those bonds.
August, 1874, Priest and Wyman dissolved
their partnership, at which time Wyman
handed over to Priest the one-half of the
railroad bonds.
The conclusion from all the evidence is
irresistible that defendant agreed to and did
advocate and vote for the assignment and
reinsurance, in consideration of the arrangement between Peck and Wyman. At all
events the bonds were given to secure defendant's active influence in favor of the
meastu'e, though without this he might not
have been hostile to the transaction.
In 1877 the superintendent of insurance
commenced new proceedings against the St.
Louis Mutual Life Insurance Company, and
plaintiff was appointed
receiver. By thin
suit he seeks to charge the defendant as a
trustee of all the railroad bonds.
The circuit court so held and decreed as to the onehalf received by the defendant, and on his
refusal to produce the same, entered a money judgment for the estimated value. From
this judgment the
defendant appealed.
Plaintiff took a writ of error. In like manner both parties come to this court from'
the court of appeals, where the judgment
of the circuit court was affirmed.
1. An
agent or trustee cannot unite in
himself the opposite character of buyer and
seller, and if he does the profits may be
charged with a trust for the benefit of the
principal, unless the latter confirm the transaction with full knowledge of all the facts.
So, too, if the agent make gains from the
use of the trust funds or property he must
account therefor. We need not cite authorities from this and other courts to support
these plain propositions. Again, if the agent
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accept any benefits In conducting the business of bis principal he will hold them in
trust for the principal. Story, Agency (8th
Ed.) § 211; Perry, Trusts, § 206; Jacobus v.
Munn, 37 N. J. Eq. 48.
The directors of a corporation
occupy a
fiduciary
position.
They are trustees and
agents of the corporation
and stockholders.
In general they are governed by the same
rules as are applied to trustees and agents.
Parker v. Nickerson, 112 Mass. 195; Railway
Co. V. Poor, 59 Me. 277; Railway Co. v. Hudson, 19 Eng. Law & Eq. 365.
In Perry on
Trusts, at section 207, it is said:
"And so
all advantages, all purchases, all sales, and
all sums of money received by directors in
dealing with the property of the corporation
are made and received by them as trustees
of the corporation, and they must account for
all such moneys or advantages, received by
them by reason of their position as trustees."
Defendant does not seriously controvert these
general principles of equity jurisprudence, but
he insists they have no rightful application to
this ease, because the bonds were never made
a part of the assets of the St. Louis Mutual,
did not constitute a part of the consideration,
avowed or concealed, paid by the Mound
City, and were not made by him in the legitimate business of the corporation.
He relies
with full confidence upon Tyi-rell v. Bank, 10
H. L. Cas. 26. The substantial facts of that
case were these:
The bank had been recently
organized, and Tyrrell was its solicitor. . Mrs.
Campbell owned certain property, upon a part
of which was situated a building known as
the Hall of Commerce.
Read had a contract
with her for the purchase of the whole property at £49,200.
Tyrrell and Read formed a
combination
to sell the property to the bank
at an advanced price, and Tyrrell, for his influence, was to have a one-half interest in
which Read had with Mrs.
the contract,
Tyrrell kept the agreement secret
Campbell.
from the bank, at the same time urged the
bank to purchase, professing to act for it as
Eventually the bank purchased the
solicitor.
Hall of Commerce part of the property at
Out of this Mrs. Campbell was paid,
£65,000.
some litigated claims were settled, and the
balance was paid to Read, who divided the
profits with Tyrrell, each making some £6,000,
and had left also the unsold portion of the
property, alleged to be of the value of £8,000.
The suit was brought by the bank against
Tj-rrell and Read. The master of the rolls
dismissed the bill as to Read, and decreed
Tyrrell a trustee for the bank of all interest
acquired in the property, accounts were directed to be taken, and Tyrrell was ordered
to convey to the bank his share In the propOn appeal, proseerty not sold to the bank.
cuted by Tyrrell, the decree was modified in
that Tyrrell
The Lords considered
form.
could not be decreed a trustee of the unsold
portion of the property, and should not have
been directed to convey that to the bank, because, as was said, the limit of the agency of
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Tyrrell, the extent of his obligation, and the
relation of solicitor and client, were to be ascertained by the extent of the property sold
by Tyrrell to the bank.
The lord chancellor
very clearly states that Tyi-rell could only be
a trustee as to that portion of the property
sold to the bank, and as to that he should

make no gain.
He proceeds to say the object
which the master of the rolls has in view
is to be accomplished in another way: "Tyrrell must receive from his clients, in his character of vendor to his clients, only that sum
of money which, as between him and Read,
Tyrrell must be taken to have paid for the
property conveyed to his clients, but that sum
of money must be ascertained in the following way.; by deducting from it the value of
the unsold property included in the contract
between Read and Tywell, but not Included
in the contract of sale to the clients."
The bank among other things contended
that, assuming Tyrrell's agency as to the
bank was confined to the Hall of Commerce
part of the property, still the circumstances
showed that he received the share in the rest
as a bribe, and for that reason the bank was
entitled to a conveyance of it. As to this
"No aucontention. Lord Chelmsford said:
thority has been adduced in support of such
a proposition,
and I do not think it can be
maintained. In order to simplify the question, let it be supposed that Tyrrell had acquired no interest in the property, but that
Read had offered him £5,000 to induce the
respondent
to purchase, and that they had
been persuaded by Tyrrell to buy at an exOf course, they might have
cessive price.
rescinded
the contract,
but could they in
any manner have obtained the £5,000 on the
ground that It belonged to them?
If, by
reason of the agreement between Read and
Tyrrell, the respondent had been prevailed
upon to give too large a sum for the property, they might have maintained an action
on the case against both the parties to the
imposition upon them, and have recovered
damages;
or they might have sued their
agent, Tyrrell, for damages arising from the
breach of duty, and they would probably
have received an amount equal to the sum
which he had improperly received as a fair
measure of the injury which they had susBut the £5,000 itself, as a specific
tained.
demand, they could In no manner have recovered.
The unsold part of the property
in the same manner cannot be directly reached by any proceeding
of the respondent."
These remarks of Lord Chelmsford, If detached from the facts of that case and the
decree actually made, appear to give some
support to the defendant's position here.
The solicitor could be regarded as the
agent of the bank only so far as the bank
became the purchaser; beyond that he had
a right to deal for himself; yet the decree
as modified did not allow him to make any
gain out of the transaction taken as a
whole. He was allowed to keep the unsold
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portion, but Its value -was deducted from the
amount which he was allowed to receive
from the clients in the statement of the account.
Practically, there was little, if any,
difCerence between the decree as made by
the master of the rolls and as modified, in
its effect upon the parties, and this seems
to have been conceded in terms by Lord
Cranworth.
The facts there in judgment
and the decree even as modified do not fur, nish a precedent in defendant's favor.
"Where a trustee retired from his office in
consideration that his successor paid him a
sum of money, it was held that the money
so paid should be treated as a part of the
trust estate, and be accounted for as such
by the retiring trustee, on the ground that
he could make no profit directly or indirectly
from the trust property, or from his office of
trustee.
Sugden v. Crossland, 3 Smale &
G. 192. In Gaskell v. Chambers, 26 Beav.
360, it appears
the Eagle Insurance Company desired to buy out the business of
the London Mutual Insurance Company, and
agreed to and did pay a specific consideration therefor, and, by a secret agreement
with the directors, agreed to and did pay
to them the further sum of four thousand
pounds as a compensation for the loss of
their officers.
These directors were held to
be trustees for the corporation, and it was
also ruled that they received that sum by
reason of their position as trustees, and must
account therefor.
These cases are all quite clear to the effect
that the trustee will not be allowed to make
gain to himself, beyond his allowed compensation, by reason of his office and infiuence as
By accepting the office the disuch trustee.
rector undertakes to give his judgment and
influence to the interests of the corporation in
all matters in which he represents or professes to represent it. That judgment and influence, if right, belongs to the corporation,
and so does that which it produces, and the
bonds received by the director are its property, as between it and the defendant.
The circumstance that they came from Peck, and not
directly from the Mound City Insurance Company, is wholly immaterial. They came from
the agent of that company, and the extravagant amount paid Peck impresses one with
the notion that more than fair commissions
was included in the $155,000.
However that
may be, what the director makes in his office
as such

belongs

to the

corporation.

It will

not do to clog these principles of law applied
to principal and agent, trustee and cestui que
trust, with exceptions and modifications. They
must not be whittled away.
Whatever may
be the practice in such cases, the agreement
by which the bonds were acquired was an illegal contract, as well as a plain breach of
duty. No court, it is true, would aid the defendant or the receiver, or the corporation of
which he Is the receiver, in recovering the
bonds from Peck, for that would be to execute
Neither would a court
the illegal contract.
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assist Peck in recovering them back after the
So, too, an agent
transaction was completed.
may resist an accounting on the ground that
or
the subject of the agency was illegal,
against public policy.
Story, Agency, § 235.
But when the subject of the agency is entirely legal, and that was the case here, and profits are made by a violation of duty, it would
be obviously unjust to allow the agent to reap
the fruits of his own misconduct.
Id. § 207.
An agent is accountable to his principal for
moneys that come into his hands as such,
even if such amount be composed of usurious
Interest, and not collectible by the principal
himself.
Chinn v. Chinn, 22 La. Ann. 599.
One party cannot hold back proceeds from
another, of whom he was representative,
on
the ground that there was illegality in the way
of getting the money.
Whart. Cont. § 354.
The defendant acquired the bonds while acting and prefessing to act in his capacity of
director, and must be held to have received
them in that capacity.
The plaintlfif's case is
made out by the proof of these facts, and we
are not concerned in the execution of the illegal agreement.
2. As to the writ of error prosecuted by the
receiver we do not see that he has any right
to the bonds which never came to the defendant. Wyman, who acquired them, is no party
to this suit, and held no fiduciary relation to
the plaintiffs corporation.
The receiver has
elected to take the course here pursued and
must be content with such property 'as it wiU
reach.
3. This suit was begun February 19, 1879,
five years and ten to fifteen days after Wyman received the bonds for himself and defendant.
The agreement by which the bonds
were acquired and the receipt of the same are
facts which were kept secret from all persons
save those directly connected therewith, until 1878, when rumors were afloat pointing to
They were then brought to the
these facts.
attention of the court, and soon thereafter this
suit was begun. Defendant pleaded the fiver
year statute of limitations, and plaintiff replied that the fraud was not discovered until
within five years next before the commencement of the suit.
Section 3230, Rev. St., specifies five different classes of civil actions (other than those for the recovery of real estate)
which can only be commenced within five
years after the cause of action shall have accrued. The fifth is: "An action for relief on
the ground of fraud, the cause of action in
such case to be deemed not to have accrued
until the discovery by the aggrieved party, at
any time within ten years, of the facts constituting the fraud."
Our statute of limitations applies to equitable, as well as legal, causes of action, and
we agree with counsel for the defendant that
this clause under consideration should be considered in the light of the former equity rules,
the place of which, In many respects, at least.
It was designed to take. Beyond doubt the
statute does not now and never did run
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against an express continuing trust in favor of
tlie trustee, certainly not until lie openly repudiates the trust. Johnson v. Smith, 27 Mo.
591; Smith v. Ricords, 52 Mo. 581, 56 Mo.
Conceded it must be that by the equity
553.
rules, the statute was not applied by way of
analogy, in cases of actual fraud, until the
discovery of the fraud. But is it true, as is
contended here, that by those rules the statute
was applied without regard to the time of discovery in case of constructive
frauds and
trusts? It was said by Scott, J., in Keeton's
Heirs v. Keeton's Adm'r, 20 Mo. 541: "In
implied and constructive
cases of resulting,
trusts, where a party is to be constituted a
trustee by a decree of a court of equity founded on fraud, it is well settled as a rule of equity, that the statute of limitations, and presumptions from lapse of time, will operate.
With regard to the statute of limitations, it will
run from the time that the facts are brought
home to the knowledge of the party."
See,
also. Perry, Trusts, §§ 228, 230; 1 Daniell, Ch.
PI. 669; Hunter v. Hunter, 50 Mo. 445; Ang.
Lim. § 470. In the case last cited the defendants were the uncles and agents of the plaintiffs for the management and sale of the
lands; they purchased the lands, with the value of which plaintifCs were not familiar, at an
under value; they then sold the same at an
advanced price.
It was a suit to establish a
constructive trust for the profits arising from
It was there said: "If a party
the re-sale.
is in possession of, or has notice of, the main
facts constituting the fraud, the statute will
The difcommence running from that time."
ference of opinion expressed in that case and
the subsequent one of Rogers v. Brown, 61
Mo. 187, is not pertinent to any inquiry here,
for this case in no way concerns real estate.
Many authorities do hold that, in cases of
constructive trusts and frauds, the statute
will begin to run without regard to the time
of the discovery.
This appears to be due to
the fact that often in such cases the facts
are open and the law frequently draws its
conclusion without regard to the motives,
relation of the
because of the confidential
Much, we think, depends upon the
parties.
fact whether the fraud is a secret or open
one. If the substantial facts constituting
the fraud, in cases like the one under consideration,
were open, it is believed, under
the equity rules, the statute of limitations
would have been applied at once, but if these
facts were in their nature secret and were
unknown, it Is believed the statute would
not begin to run until they were discovered,
there being no want of diligence on the part
Here the fraud consists
of the complainant.
in professing to act for and in the interest
of the corporation, as was defendant's duty,
when, in. reality, he was acting for himself
The agreement unand for his private gain.
der which this was done was in its very
nature a secret one, one which the corporation would not naturally suspect, and one
which would not be revealed by any act
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openly done. Of course, here, simple knowledge of the existence of the agreement and
acquisition of the bonds thereunder, brought
home to the plaintiff, or the corporation
of
which he is receiver, would start the statute
and from that time it would continue to run
notwithstanding the subsequent appointment
of the receiver.
This knowledge was not acquired until much more than fifteen days after the receipt of the bonds, by Wyman.
The
by which the transaction was
circumstances

|
|
j
!
|
j
|

discovered show there were no laches on the
part of the plaintiff or his corporation.
We
conclude the clause of the statute before noted applies to this case, and under it the cause
of action is not barred.
4. A contract
founded on a champertous
consideration
is illegal, against public policy
and void.
Duke v. Harper, 66 Mo. 55. In
that case the contract there in question was
held not to be champertous because the attorneys did not bind themselves to pay any
portion of the expenses of the litigation.
Where the right of the plaintiff, which he
seeks to enforce, Is derived under a title
founded
on his champerty,
the suit must
fail. Courts are not organized for the purpose of enforcing such contracts.
Many of
the authorities cited by defendant go to this
extent and no farther. Some of them do appear to hold that where there is a champertous
contract, by which the suit is prosecuted, and
that fact comes to the knowledge of the
court, it should dismiss the suit.
Barker v.
Barker, 14 Wis. 143; Webb v. Armstrong, 5
Humph. 379. Others appear to give a qualified approval to the doctrine.
On the other
hand a number of cases hold that the fact
that the suit is being prosecuted under a
champertous contract is no defense, and that
the illegality of such a contract can only be
set up when it is sought to enforce the contract.
Hilton V. Woods, L. R. 4 Eq. 432;
Whitney v. Kirtland, 27 N. J. Eq. 333; Allison V. Railway Co., 42 Iowa, 274; Court-

right V. Burnes, 3 McCrary, 60, 13 Fed. 317.
Unless the plaintiff's title, by which he seeks
to enforce a right, is infected by a champertous contract, we see no reason why the suit
may not proceed, though such a contract exists as between the plaintiff and his attorney.
It is time enough to turn a party out
of court when he asks the aid of a court to
enforce such a contract.
This is, in substance, the rule as to most illegal contracts,
and there is no good reason at this day for
making an exception in this class of contracts.
Certain policy holders brought to light the
facts upon which this suit is founded, and
were permitted by the court to prosecute the
same in the name of the receiver upon indemnifying him, and, as a consequence, the
funds in his hands, against the payment of
costs. These policy holders were but protecting their own rights.
They could not
well sue in their own names. In such cases
it is not an uncommon thing for cautious
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courts to require that the officer be made
safe against costs of long and tedious suits.
Thus far there Is no element of champerty
In the defense.
It would seem the defendant
ofCered to prove that the attorney by whom
the suit was Instituted and who represented
these policy holders gave the bond, and, further, that he had an agreement with the receiver by which he was to have a certain
portion of the avails of the suit for his services.
In view of this offer let it be conceded, for the purpose of this case, without
deciding the question that the agreement between the attorney and the receiver w»s
still, applying the principle bechampertous,
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fore announced, that constituted no defense
to this a.ction. The receiver's accounts will
come before the court for its approval and it
will be time enough then to examine into the
questions of the validity of the agreement.
The plaintifE is in no wise affected by the
illegal agreement, even if any there was.
We do not think public policy requires the
courts to turn aside and investigate such
side issues.

The judgment in this case, from which
both parties come to this court, is affirmed.

HENRY,
concur.

O.

J.,

dissents.

The other judges
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The question presented by
a trustee, who accepts and performs the trust, without any
contract or stipulation of the parties, or
any provision In the order of court appointing him, for compensation for his
services, is entitled to compensation for
care bestowed, and for time expended in
executing the trust. The rule laid down
in the text-book is "that a trustee is not
for personal
entitled to compensation
trouble and loss of time. " Perry, Trusts,
§§ 904-906; Hill, Trustees, 889; 2 Lewin,
Trusts, 627. And such seems to be the rule
established by the English court of equity,
although in the later cases exceptions to
that general rule have been more frequent,
in cases where the court can find from the
attending circumstances that both parties
would be
expected that compeusation
made. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1268, and cases
cited; authorities supra. The rule applied,
not only to trustees so cited, but also to all
who hL'id a fiduciary relation, as executors
and administrators, mortgagees in possession, receivers and guardians, and to oflicers, directors, and trustees of corporaThe rule is based upon the well rections.
ognized principle, upon which courts of
equity invariably act, that the trustee
should execute the trust for the benefit of
the cestui que trust alone, and that he
shall desire no profit by reason of the
And the rule was adopted and entrust.
forced for the reason that, while in a particular case the allowance of compensation might be justly allowed, and the estate not be charged with more than it
might otherwise have to bear, yet the
adoption of the contrary rule would have
the tendency to tempt the trustee to disregard the interest of the beneficiaries, and
lead, in general, to the consequence of loading the estatefor the benefit of the trustee,
by pretenses of care, trouble, and loss of
time; thus placing the trustee In a position, which equity forbids, where his personal interests would conflict with the performance of his duty. And it is held that
in this there was no hardship upon the
trustee, for he might choose whether he
will accept the trust or not. So a trustee
might refuse to accept appointment by a
court unless pro vision was made for proper
compensation; and, if he undertook the
trust with the understanding that upon
application compensation
subsequent
would be allowed, the court may at the
proper time ascertain and allow the same.
Brocksopp V. Barnes, 5 Madd. 90; Morison V. Morison. 4 Mylne & C. 215; English
note to Robinson t. Pett. 2 Lead. Gas. Eq.

this record is whether

By this well-settled rule the services
of a trustee, in the absence of a provision
for compensation in advance, are to be
performed as a gratuity, without regard
to the advantage that may result from
his superior care, skill, and diligence in the
We are
management of the trust-estate.
aware that in many of the states of the
Union, and in the federal courts, a different rule prevails ; but the law, as established by the courts of equity in England,
in respect of compensation of conventional
trustees, has been so long and firmly established in the jurisprudence of this state
that it ought not to be changed by judicial
As said by the appellate
determination.
court, the rule has been applied in all its
strictness in this state whenever the question has arisen. See Constant v. Matteson, 22 111.546; Hough v. Harvey, 71 111. 72;
Huggins V. Rider, 77 111. 360. In some of
the states, the right of mere conventional
trustees to compensation has been fixed
by statute; while perhaps in all, as in this
state, la ws ha ve been passed alio wing compensation of trustees required by law to
be appointed, such as executors and administrators, guardians, conservators, and
assignees of insolvent estates. And it is
now universally held in this country that
a receiver, being the arm of the court to
execute its orders in respect of the property of which the court has taken control,
may be allowed compensation out of the
funds in his hands. In some, and perhaps
a majority, of the states, where remuneration has been provided by statute to those
to whom the law intrusts the care and
management of the estates of lunatics, infants, deceased persons, insolvents, and
the like, the courts by an equitable construction have extended the right to voluntary or conventional trustees, when the
agreement, deed, will, or order of appointment is silent. See American note to Robinson V. Pett, supra. And this vie w is pressed
upon usln this case with great force. But
it must be answered, regardless of what
our views might be if the question was an
open one in this state, that the same statutes now in force, or others in every respect identical in effect, were in force when
each of the decisions of this court referred
to upon this question was rendered, and
manifestly were not regarded by the court
as controlling. Notwithstanding
these
statutes, this court adopted and has since
adhered to the common-law rule. Appellant's trusteeship falls clearly within the
rule, and, while he would be entitled to
have allowed him all money actually expended in good faith for the preservation
of the trust fund, if any, he can recover
nothing for his personal or professional
services in respect of his trusteeship.
His
claim for compensation as trustee, as well
as for attorney's fees for professional services rendered duringthecontinuance of the
trust, were properly disallowed by the
court. Hill, Trustees, 890; Perry, Trusts,
The judgment of the
§ 904, and cases supra.
appellate court must be affirmed.
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111. 139.)
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Court of Appeals of New York.
Appeal
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Sept. 23, 1873.

from

order on settlement of accomits of Edward Schi^l, trustee, etc., of the
estate of Jacob Appley, which disallowed an
Item of $2,500 charged for his services as
such trustee.
Jacob Appley died seized of a large real
and personal estate.
By his last will and
testament he deVised and bequeathed all his
property, with certain exceptions, to his executors and the survivor of them, upon certain trusts therein named.
The will, after
reciting the trusts, contained this clause:
"And also that my said executors retain and

pay unto themselves out of said rents and
incomes all costs, charges and expenses that
they shall have to pay or be put unto in the
fulfillment of this my will, and a reasonable
compensation for their services."
By an order of the supreme court, Schell
was appointed trustee in place of those named in the will.
In his accounts he made a
charge in gross of $2,500 for his services.
The referee reported in favor of its allowance.

Amasa J. Parker, for appellant.
Hand, for respondent.

Samuel

RAPALLO, J. The order appealed from
shows upon its face that it was made upon
the ground that the compensation of the
trustee for his services should be limited to
commissions,
at the rate allowed by statute
to executors and administrators, for receiving and paying out moneys.
This is the settled rule in cases where the
creator of the trust has made no provision
for compensation to the trustee. Under such
circumstances the courts have by analogy
allowed the same commissions which are by
statute allowable to executors and administrators, and have restricted the allowances
to those

rates.

But where the Instrument creating the
trust provides that the trustee shall have a
compensation for his services in executing
the trust, such provision will be enforced.
If the instrument declares the rate of compensation, it must be followed. If it establishes no rate, the value of the services
should be ascertained by judicial investigation. Meacham v. Stemes, 9 Paige, 398.
The provision of the wiU in question is
that the trustees (of whom the applicant is
the successor) shall retain and pay unto
themselves, out of the rents and income of
the testator's estate, aU costs, charges and
expenses that they shall have to pay or be
put unto In the fulfillment of his will, and
a reasonable compensation for their services.
It would seem a sufficiently simple proposition that the question, what is a reasonable sum to be allowed to the trustee over
and above his proper disbursements for his
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services. Is a question of fact determinable
upon the same principles which would regulate such an inquiry were the controversy
one arising upon an employment inter vivos.
But It is claimed on the part of the respondent that the statute which regulates
the commissions of executors, administrators
and guardians determines that the rate thereby allowed is a reasonable compensation,
and that the subject of the amount of compensation is closed to further inquiry.
The
learned court at special term seems to have
adopted this view, and its decision has been
affirmed at general term.
We cannot concur
in the soundness of these conclusions. In
the first place, the provisions of the statute
do not in terms apply to trustees.
The original trustees in this case were the same persons who were named In the wiU as executors, but their offices as trustees were additional to and distinct from their legal duties
as executors.
The applicant succeeds to the
office of trustee and not of executor.
The decisions which apply to trustees the same
rules as to compensation which the statute
applies to executors, etc., rest upon the principle of analogy and not upon the command
of the statute.
They are confined to cases
where no provision is made by the creator of
the trust for the compensation of the trustees.
In such cases, there being no express
declaration of the creator of the trust that
his appointees should be compensated, yet it
being unreasonable under ordinary circumstances to require them to perform their responsible duties gratuitously, it is a fair presumption that the testator assumed that they
would be entitled to the commissions established by law for similar services when rendered by executors, etc.
Where however he
expressly provides that they shall have a reasonable compensation for then* services, he
must be supposed to have intended that the
compensation should be reasonable with reference to the special circumstances of his estate and the services which he has required
them to perform.
The object of the statute is to furnish a
general and arbitrary rule for cases not otherwise provided for; but it should not govern where the testator has, by reason of peculiar circumstances existing in reference to
his estate, required extraordinary services
on the part of those to whose care he has
confided it, and has specially provided that
their compensation shall be reasonable, which
is equivalent to declaring that it shall be proportioned to the value of the services they
may render.
By such a direction the testator necessarily confides to the tribunals under whose jurisdiction the administration of
his estate may come, the adjustment of the
compensation of his trustees, and this is a
duty which those tribunals must perform
conscientiously upon the evidence
before
them.
It was therefore the duty of the court
below In the case to determine whether the
sum claimed by the trustee was or was not

536

DUTIES AND LIABILITIES

reasonable under the circumstances, and to
allow or reduce it according to their judgment, without being controlled by the statute.
The case shows that the duties of the
trustee were onerous, and Involved more
than the mere receipt and disbursement
of
money.
He was intrusted with the management of forty houses and lots, the buildings
being old and requiring frequent repairs,
and the trustee swears that he has given
them his personal care and attention, besides
attending to the receipt and application of
the funds.
Whether the sum of $2,500 allowed by the
referee Is a reasonable amount Is a question
for the court below. The report of the referee is not conclusive, but merely for the in-
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formation of the court.
The court, at special
should exercise Its discretion whether
to confirm or modify It, and if the amount is
in its Judgment excessive, It should be reduced, but the amoimt should be determined
with reference to the facts of the case and
not by the statute.
The orders of the special and general
terms should be reversed, and the proceedings remitted to the court below to rehear
at special term the motion to confirm the report of the referee.
The costs of the appellant should be allowed to him out of the fund.
term,

All

concur, except

GROYDB, J^

Ordered accordingly.

Qot voting.
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7.

AMERICAN
(52

NAT. BANK.

N. Y. 1.)

Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 21, 1873.
Action to recover $1,625.13, deposited by
plaintiff with defendant in the name of Van
Alen & Rice.
Van Alen & Rice were merchants in the
city of New York.
Before Feb., 1867, the
plaintiff, a resident of Danville, Penn., had
indorsed a note for Van Alen & Rice, due
iMarch 8, 1867.
On Feb. 4, 1867, plaintiff sent to Van Alen
& Rice bonds, with a letter to the effect that
they could be used "to protect the note on
If you can
(plaintiff) am indorser.
which
get along without using them you can let me
know, and I will give instructions as to fu-

I

ture disposal of them."
On Feb. 15, 1867, plaintiff wrote another letter, giving Instructions to "collect the coupon
of the 7-30 bond, and retain all until you can
determine as to your ability to meet the note
maturing March 8. If you are able to meet
it advise me so soon as you can determine,
and I will then give further advice in regard
♦ •
* If you want to sell
to the bonds.
them and let the proceeds lay to your credit
In bank, so that It will be available 8th
March, do so. It would make your bank account look better, and perhaps do you good
In that way."
The bonds were sold Feb. 20, 1867, for
51,628.12.
A check was received therefor
which was used by Van Alen & Rice. On the
same day they deposited
with defendant
$1,711.66 "to cover the sale of the bonds."
It
was deposited for plaintiff. On the following
day Van Alen & Rice wrote plaintiff, notifying him of the sale and deposit.
Van Alen & Rice made no subsequent deposit In the defendant's bank, and never
drew any check against this deposit, or any
check upon the bank, except a check in plaintiff's favor for the amount due him, March 6.
Van Alen & Rice had made an accommodation note for McCombie & Child, which became due March 4, at defendant's bank, for
$15,000.
On the day it became due McCombie & Child sent their certified check to Van
Alen & Rice, and that check was deposited
with defendant to pay the note. On March
6 plaintiff served upon defendant a notice of
his right to the money, and presented the
Payment was refused.
check for payment.
Judgment for plaintiff.

J.

Charles H. Woodbury, for appellant.
Vanderpoel, for respondent.

Aaron

The learned counsel for
C. J.
Is undoubtedly right in the position that if, as between the plaintiff and Van
Alen & Rice, there was no trust impressed upon the deposit in the bank defendant, to an
amount equal to the proceeds of the bonds
sold by Van Alen & Rice for the plaintiff, this
It is settled that
action cannot be maintained.
the holder of a check cannot maintain an ac-

CHURCH,

the appellant
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tion against the drawee, after a refusal to
pay, for want of privity, and that a check
against a general bank account does not operate as an assignment.
JEtna Nat. Bank v.
Fourth Nat. Bank, 46 N. Y. 82, 7 Am. Rep.
314; Bank v. Millard, 10 Wall. 152, and cases
there cited.
This action is based upon another principle equally well settled, viz., that
so long as money or property belonging to the
principal or the proceeds thereof may be
in the hands of the
traced and distinguished
agent or his representatives
or assignees, the
principal is entitled to recover it unless it has
2
been transferred for value without notice.
Grat. 544; Pennell v. Deffell, 4 De Ges, M. &
G. 372; 6 Jones, Eq. 34; 2 Hem. & M. 417; 2
Kent, Comm. 796, 801. It appears to me clear
that Van Alen & Rice were the agents of the
plaintiff to sell the bonds, and were bound to
He
keep the proceeds of the same for him.
owned the bonds, directed their sale, and also
directed that the proceeds should be kept for
him in a particular manner, and he was notified by Van Alen & Rice that they had been
sold and the avails placed and would be kept
as directed.
These undisputed facts establish
the relation of trustee and cestui que trust between the plaintiff and Van Alen & Rice as to
the proceeds of these bonds.
It is .claimed however that this principle is
not applicable because the identical money for
which the bonds were sold was not deposited.
This objection would be fatal if there had in
fact been no substitution of other money for
the proceeds of the bonds.
It seems to have
been assumed on the trial that the check given upon the sale of the bonds was used by
Van Alen & Rice for their own benefit, and if
the evidence had stopped there the trust fund
would have been gone and dissipated, and of
course beyond the reach of being traced.
But
the uncontradicted
evidence is that on the
same day Van Alen & Rice substituted other
money for that obtained for the bonds, and
placed it in the bank defendant to their credit,
to be retained for the plaintiff as arranged between them, and notified the plaintiff thereof. The letter of the 21st of February to the
plaintiff in connection with the evidence of
G. R. Van Alen is conclusive that the money
referred to in the letter was that deposited in
the bank defendant.
The point made is this:
A. having $100, the proceeds of a sale of property of B., Intends to place it in a repository
and keep it for B., and instead of putting the
identical bank bills in the designated place
substitutes
others of the same amotmt and
keeps them for B. as such proceeds, can there
be a doubt that the $100 thus substituted
would occupy the same position as the particular bills obtained for the property, and that
they would be impressed with the same trust?
Suppose Van Alen & Rice had got the check
cashed by a third person and deposited the
money, it would of course be regarded as the
proceeds of the check, and belong to the plaintiff as effectually as the check itself. Does It
make any difference whether the money was
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from a third person upon ttie check
or from the safe of Van Alen & Rice? In either case the money is the proceeds of the
check and stands in lieu of it. It is said that
the secret intention of Van Alen & Rice canobtained

not effect such a result.
Between them and
the defendant as to the substitution it was not
They in substance notified the plainsecret.
tiff that they had placed on deposit the proceeds of his bonds and would keep It for him.
They did deposit the amount which they treated as the proceeds, and declared it to be such.
If
Can they deny it? Can any one for them?
I send a note to an attorney to collect, and deposit the money in a bank in his own name
and keep it for me, is my title to the money
impaired because he fails to deposit the identiMy agent collects $100 rent for
cal bills?
me and puts the bills in one pocket and takes
the same amount from another pocket and deposits it and notifies me. Are my rights gone
by the change of money?
think not. Stripped of unsubstantial forms, the case presented
is that of a person delivering stock or bonds
to an agent for sale with directions to deposit
the proceeds in a bank to the credit of the
agent, but to keep it in that way for him, and
the agent follows the directions.
Can there be
a doubt as to the ownership of the money as
between the agent and the principal? Clearly
Suppose the principal had directed the
not.
agent to loan the money on a note or mortguj4e, would not the security belong to the principal? The bank defendant upon receiving
the deposit became the debtor ostensiblir to
the depositor, but equitably to the real owner.
The obligation incurred by the bank was to
pay the money on demand in the usual course
of business, and had a right to require a check
from the depositor. When this formality was
complied with and the bank was notified that
the money actually belonged to the plaintiff,
it did not lie in its mouth to set up a want of
privity. Privity has nothing to do with the
question.
The bank had the plaintiff's money
and gave its obligation in form to another person, but the obligation was in fact owned by
the plaintiff and he can enforce it. There is
no mystery or sanctity respecting the obligations of a bank in such a case, different from
those of a private person, and if this money
had been loaned to the latter under an agreement to repay it upon the presentation of the
agent's check, he would not have been heard
to say when the plaintiff presented the check,
"I made no contract with you, and although
have no claim to the money you cannot maintain an action because there is no privity between us and the check does not operate as an
The answer would be that the
assignment."
plaintiff owned the obligation, and had the
same right to recover it as he would if the
person had possession of his horse, and refused to deliver it on demand. The only effect of
the direction to deposit in a particular manner
was to relieve the agent upon complying with
the direction from liability for loss without his
fault. In the absence of such a direction the

I
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principal, while he might pursue and claim the
money, would not have been obliged to do so,
and could have also held the agent personally.
It is objected also that the money was so
mingled with the agent's own money as not
to be traceable in the hands of the defendant.
When Van Alen & Rice deposited this money
for the plaintiff they included with it a few
dollars of their own. But this does not affect
the plaintiff's right to it. When a trustee deposits trust moneys in his own name in a
bank with his individual money, the character
of the trust money is not lost but it remains
the property of the cestui que trust.
If such
money can be traced into the bank, and it remains there, the owner can reclaim it. When
deposited, the bank incurred an obligation to
repay it, which is not lessened or impaired because it incurred, at the same time, an obligation to pay other money belonging to the agent
individually. If A. sells B.'s horse for $100,
and puts it in a box with $100 of his own, the
$100 of B. may be claimed by him although
the particular bills constituting
it could not
be identified.
So if the same $200 were deposited in a bank to the credit of A., the title
of B. to $100 would not be affected by the association, and the bank would owe that money
to B. in equity, although it owed A. also for
his individual money.
These views are not
only consonant with integrity and justice, but
are fully sustained by authority.
The case of Pennell v. Deffell, 4 De Gex, K.
& G. 372, is a leading and very instructive case
upon this whole subject.
It was a contest
between the successor of one Green, an official
assignee in bankruptcy, and the personal representatives of Green for moneys standing to
his individual credit In the Bank of England
and another bank.
These moneys had been
deposited from time to time by Green, and
consisted of funds received by him in his official capacity as trustee and his own Individual
funds.
The account was kept in his individual name, without any discrimination between
the trust and private funds, and the question
was, whether the various persons interested
in the trust funds could claim the respective
amounts due them, or whether the defendants
were entitled to receive and administer upon
the money as a part of the estate of Green.
The master of the rolls held that the cestuls
que trustent could not hold the money because
it had no "earmark," and could not be traced
and distinguished
within the principle before
adverted to. This decision was reversed upon
appeal to the Court of Appeal in Chancery.
The Lord Justice Knight Bruce, after a clear
statement illustrating the doctrine upon which
the principle rests, proceeds to say: "When a
trustee pays trust money into a bank to his
credit, the account being a simple account
with himself, not marked or distinguished in
any other manner, the debt thus constituted
from the bank to him is one which, as long
as it remains due, belongs specifically to the
trust as much and as effectually as the money
so paid would have done had it specifically
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been placed by the trustee In a particular repository and so remained; that Is to say, if
the speclflc debt shall be claimed on behalf of
the cestuis que trustent it must be deemed
specifically theirs. * * * This state of things
would not,
apprehend, be yaried by the circumstance of the banli holding also for the
trustee, or owing also to him money in every
sense his own."
The Lord Justice Turner
also delivered an elaborate opinion sustaining
the same doctrine, in the course of which he
says:
"Suppose a trustee pays into a bank
moneys belonging to his trust to an account not
marljed or distinguished as a trust account,
and pays in no other moneys, could it for one
moment be denied that the moneys standing
to the account of the debt due from the bankers, arising from the moneys so paid in, would
belong to the trust and not to the private estate of the trustee?
Then suppose the trustee
subsequently pays in moneys of his own, not
belonging to the trust, to the same account.
Would the character of the moneys which he
had before paid in, of the debt which had before accrued, be altered?
Again, suppose the
trustee, instead of subsequently paying moneys into the bank, draws out a part of the
trust moneys which he has before paid in,
would the remainder of those moneys and of
the debt contracted in respect of them lose
their trust character? Then can the circumstance of the account consisting of a continued series of moneys paid in and drawn out
alter the principle? It may indeed increase the
difficulty of ascertaining what belongs to the
trust, but
can see no possible ground on
which it can affect the principle."
In the case of Overseers of the Poor v. Bank
of Virginia, 2 Grat. 544, 44 Am. Dec. 399, an
attorney deposited a check for the amount of
a judgment in favor of his clients to his own
credit, having a small amount of other money to his credit, and died. On the day of his
death a note fell due belonging to the bank
which it claimed to set off, but the court held
that the clients were entitled to the money.
Stanard, J., says:
"The credits to Langhorne
with the bank are several, and the sources of
*
* * They are
each distinctly identified.
as distinct and distinguishable as they would
be were they in separate parcels in the hands
of Langhorne, with labels on each designating
the sources from whence they were derived."
The same principle was decided in 6 Jones,
Eq. 34.
So also in Frith v. Cartland, 2 Hem.
& M. 417, where a person received from the
plaintiff certain acceptances to take up paper
owing to the plaintiff, and got them cashed
After mingling the money
and ran away.
with his own, and making various changes
and transformations, he was arrested, and the
plaintiff was decided to be entitled to the
money in preference to creditors;
Vice-Chancellor Wood saying that "the court attributes
the ownership of the trust property to the cestui que trust so long as it can be traced."
The same principle was decided in Veil v.
Mitchell, 4 Washb. 105, in respect to the avails

I

I

OF TRUSTEES.

539

of certain foreign bills collected by an agent.
In MerrUl v. Bank of Norfolk, 19 Pick. 32,
involving the same principle, Morton, J., said:
"The defendants having the plaintiff's money
in their hands, for which a demand was made
before the action was commenced, are liable
for the amount with interest from the time
when it was demanded."
These rules and adjudications, which are decisive of this case,
The bank defendant
accord with the equities.
has no lien upon this money, and does not
claim to have, and no claim is set up in the
answer. Nor does it appear that any one else
has. If Van Alen & Rice had given a lien for
value upon this money, or had obtained a loan
upon the apparent ownership of it in any way,
the rights of the party holding the claim may
have been superior to those of the plaintiff.
No such claim is set up or shown.
The note
falling due the 20th of February was not set
up in the answer, and if it had been, would
not have operated as a defense. This deposit
was demanded the 6th of February and could
have been assigned by Van Alen & Rice, and
the holder, if for value, could have enforced it.
The note due the 20th was not an off-set, and
could not be as against any but Van Alen &
Rice.
The question is therefore entirely between the plaintiff and Van Alen & Rice; the
former claims the money and the latter admits
the claim, and the facts sustain the justice
of it. The defendant occupies the position of
objecting to the title of the plaintiff without
having or claiming any title itself.
If Van
Alen & Rice had refused to give a check, the
plaintiff might have been obliged to resort to
an equitable action; but if a title is established by the plaintiff, and he presented the eviagreed to
dence upon which the defendant
pay the money, I see no reason why an action
at law may not be maintained, but it is imnecessary to pass upon this point as it was not
made. Neither was the point made that a part
of the deposit could not be recovered.
It was -suggested on the argument that notice to the bank by the depositor was necessary to protect the rights of the plaintiff, but
this is not so. The title of the plaintiff does
not depend upon whether the bank knew he
had a title or not.
That rested upon other
facts. A notice to the bank might have prevented any transfer or the creation of a lien
by the depositor, or prevented the bank from
taking or acquiring such lien in good faith, but
could not otherwise be necessary or important.
The appellant also claims that the plaintiff's
money was in fact drawn out by the check for
$15,000 on the 4th of February.
The authorities before cited adopt the rule
that moneys first deposited apply upon checks
first drawn, and the accounts in the case of
Pennell v. Deffell were adjusted upon that
principle.
Without undertaking to determine when
this rule should, and when it should not, be
adopted, it is sufficient to say that the $15,000 credit and debit was a special transaction.
The check of a third person was put in to
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an accommodation
note of Van Alen &
Rice and used for tliat purpose, so tliat the
general rule would not apply to that item.
With that exception no money was drawn
after the deposit of $1,711, which included
The decision in
the proceeds of the bonds.
Mtaa. Nat. Banli v. Fourth Nat. Bank, supra,
has no bearing on this case. There was no
question of title in the plaintiff in that case.

pay
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and this court held that the obligation of the
bank defendant to the depositor was discharged by the payment of another note against
the depositor before the plaintiff's note became due, and that the plaintiff had no right
of action.
The judgment must be affirmed. All concur
exept

ALLEN

and

GROVER,

Judgment affirmed.

JJ.,

dissenting.
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WATERMAN
(32

Supreme

Appeal
trict.
Bill by
James D.
Moulton,

N. E.

ALDEN

et al. v.
972,

144 111. 90.)

Court of Illinois.
from appellate

et al.

Jan.

court,

19,

1893.

second

dis-

Robert W., Charles, Albert H., and
Waterman, Sarah J. and Kate D.
Ellen L. Thomas, Caroline W.
Syme, and J. Frank Wells, legatees under the
will of James S. Waterman, deceased, for
themselves, and all others similarly situated
who may join therein, against Philander M.
Alden, George S. Robinson, Sarah E., Mary
J. Clayton, Charlotte and Caroline M. Waterman, Lizzie Chase, and Jennie Kinney, to obtain an accounting from said Alden and Robinson, to have them removed as trustees under said will, and for other relief. A decree
was rendered, from which the complainants
appealed to the appellate court.
That court
affirmed the decree, and complainants again
appeal.

Reversed.

W. R. Plum,

for appellants.
Dunton, for appellees.

WILKIN, J.

Carnes

&

On the 28th day of NovemJames S. Waterman executed his
last will and testament, by which he gave
his wife one third of all his estate, and a
specific legacy of $5,000 in trust for the use
of one Nellie Farnhdon. The rest of his estate was disposed of by the following residuary clause:
"I give, devise, and bequeath all the rest, residue, and remainder
of my estate, both real and personal, to the
said Philander M. Alden and George S. Rob*
* * the executors
of this, my
inson,
last will and testament, hereinafter nominated and appointed,
in trust for the use
and benefit of my brothers and sisters, to
wit, [naming them] to have and hold, manage and control, the same for such purpose,
for and during the term of twenty one years
from and after the date of my decease, and
during the continuance of said trust estate,
as aforesaid, to receive, collect, and pay over
to my said brothers and sisters above named
the net income and profits thereof, in equal
portions to each, annually, the child or children of a deceased brother or sister to take
the same portion the father or mother would
have taken if living; and, at the expiration
of said twenty one years after my decease,
I give, devise, and bequeath to my said
brothers and sisters, their heirs and assigns,
forever, the said rest, residue, and remainder
of my estate, both real and personal, to be
equally divided between them, share and
share alike, the child or children of any deceased brother or sister to take the same
share the father or mother would have taken
if living, and, in case of the death of any of
my said brothers or sisters leaving no issue,
the share of such brother or sister would
have taken if living to be equally divided
among my surviving brothers and sisters."
ber, 1870,
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The testator died July 19, 1883, and on the
24th of the same month said will was duly
admitted to probate in the county court of
De Kalb county, whereupon said Alden and
and took upon
Robinson were qualified,
themselves the duties of executors and trustees, as in and by the will provided. The
estate was very large, being inventoried at
about $531,000, consisting of farm lands and
other real estate to the value of $127,512.70,

and the balance in cash, notes and accounts,
stocks, etc. The widow declined to take under the will, and, her husband having left no
of such,
child or children, or descendants
one half of the entire estate, real and personal, was partitioned and set off to her, as
provided by the statute in such case. The
administration was still pending and undetermined in said county court at the filing of
this bill. Said Alden and Robinson had reduced a part of the trust property to possession, and made a partial distribution of
the proceeds
thereof
to the beneficiaries,
when on the 9th of June, 1887, Robert W.
and Charles Waterman, surviving brothers
of the testator, and certain children of deceased brothers and sisters, claiming under
said residuary clause, began this action in
the circuit court of said De Kalb county
against Alden and Robinson, to compel them
to render an account of their trusteeship,
to
charge them with certain losses to the trust
estate by reason
of their negligent and
wrongful conduct in and about the management of the same, and to have them removed as such trustees, and others appointed in
their stead. After protracted litigation a final decree was rendered in the cause by the
circuit court of Lee county, to which it had
been removed.
The complainants carried the
record to the appellate court of the second
district by appeal.
There both parties assigned errors, and an extended statement of
the case, with a very carefully prepared opinion by Cartwright, J., was filed (42 111. App.
294), affirming the decree of the circuit court
in all respects.
This appeal is from that
judgment of affirmance.
The record is unusually voluminous, and the argument of
counsel on behalf of appellants has taken an
almost unlimited range.
It would be impossible to even casually notice all the points
made, without extending this opinion to an
length.
unreasonable
For a full statement
of the facts of the case we refer to the opinion of the appellate coiu:t. We also concur
In the conclusions reached by that court, as
set forth in said opinion, except as herein-

after indicated.
The points more particularly pressed upon
our attention are— First, the circuit court
erred in refusing to remove appellees as trustees; second, the circuit court erred in refusing to hold said trustees personally liable
for the loss of the "Marsh indebtedness;"
third, the circuit court erred in its division
of the costs and expenses of the litigation.
The parts of the final decree relating to these
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of error are as follows: "It la
assignments
further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that
the motion of complainants,
filed herein on
the 17th of July, 1890, for the removal of
Alden and Robinson as trustees, be overrul"And it is further ordered, adjudged,
ed."
and decreed that this court has no jurisdiction to investigate the charge against said
Alden and Robinson or either, on account of
any alleged loss growing out of the failure
of the Sycamore Marsh Harvester Man'fg
Co., the Marsh Binder Man'fg Co., C. W.
Marsh, and W. "W. Marsh, or either, or two
or more, of them, or the alleged neglect of
the said Alden and Robinson to collect or
secure the payment of obligations owing by
them, or some of them, to the estate of James
S. Waterman, dec'd."
"It is further ordered,
adjudged, and decreed that the expenses of
this litigation be paid up to October 15, 1889,
as found by said master's report, to wit:
$3,869.71, and the attorneys' fees and attorneys' expenses in this cause paid or incurred since October 15, 1889, as enumerated,
and shown by the testimony of D. J. Carnes
and William Lathrup, heard in open court,
up to July 19, 1890, to wit: $1,348.27 to be
allowed said trustees in their accounts when
they shall have actually paid the same, and
shall be charged to the principal fund, less
one-fourth part of the gross attorneys' fees
therein included, which one-fourth part is
found by the court to be $988.62, and which
one-fourth part said trustees are ordered to
bear personally, leaving $4,229.36 to be charged to the principal fund. - This decree shall
not be construed as allowing or disallowing
any other expense of this litigation paid or
incurred by said trustees since October 15,
1889.
And it is further ordered and decreed
that the costs of this proceeding be taxed as
follows,— that is to say, that two thirds thereof be paid by the trustees, as such, out of
the principal fund in their hands, and one
third of said costs out of the distributable
income going to the complainants,
and that
in taxing the costs the clerk allow $500 paid
by stipulation on file herein to Mason B.
Loomis, and $360 paid by said trustees to
Dixon, as special masters;
Sherwood
also
payment by them of $15.40 for witness fees,
which sums, so
and $312.80 for depositions;
far as paid by them, except that paid Master
Dixon, are shown by his report to have been
paid, and are embraced in the items of $3,869.71 costs of this litigation. The clerk vrill
also tax, as part of the complainant's
costs
herein, the sum of $392.86, paid by complainalso $47.40 for
ant for taking depositions;
certified copies of record, $2.50 for service of
subpcEuas, $8 witness fees paid by complainThe clerk will also tax the
ants' solicitor.
usual taxable costs Incurred by either party." We will consider the foregoing questions in the order named, referring to the
facts appearing in the record especially applicable thereto.
There is no difficulty In finding the legal
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measure of care and diligence required at
the hands of trustees in the management of
a trust estate.
Cases may be found holding
as no compensation
can be
that. Inasmuch
allowed them when not expressly provided
for, they can only be held liable for losses
which result from their gross negligence or
willful misconduct;
but the rule undoubtedly is that they must discharge the duties
of their trust to the best of their skill and
ability, "with such care and diligence as
men fit to be intrusted with such matters
may fairly be expected to put forth in their
own business of equal importance."
2 Story,
Eq. Jur. § 1268b; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1070. The
evidence in this case clearly shows, and in
fact it is admitted, that appellees were, prior
to the filing of this bill, guilty of some negligence in and about the management of the
First, they wholly failed to
trust property.
keep proper accounts of the trust funds, and
of their dealings with the same, as will more
fully appear hereafter. In the second place,
Robinson gave little or no attention to the
business,
being much of the time absent
from the state. It will not do to say, as is
attempted,
that his personal attention was
not necessary to the proper management of
the business, in view of the fact that numerous letters were written him by Alden, complaining of his continued absence, and demanding his presence and attention to the
Finally,
estate.
general
negligence
was
shown in failing to promptly collect or secure claims due the estate, especially owing
by the Marsh Manufacturing Companies.
It
does not follow necessarily that, because of
these acts of negligence, a court of chancery
should remove them.
Courts of equity have
a very broad jurisdiction over trust estates
and trustees, and will remove the latter for
a failure, through neglect or from willfulness, 10 perform their duties, or will compel
them to carr.v out the trust which they have
been appointed to and have accepted, as shall
appear, under all the circumstances
of a given case, for the best interest of the estate
and all parties interested in the same.
In 2
Story, Eq. Jur. § 1289, it is said:
"It is not,
indeed, every mistake or neglect of duty or
inaccuracy of conduct of trustees which will
induce courts of equity to adopt such a
course, [remove the trustees,] but the act or
omission must be such as to endanger the
trust property, or to show a want of honesty, or a want of proper capacity to execute
the duties, or want of reasonable
fidelity."
The dereliction of duty on the part of these
trustees seems to have resulted from mere
negligence rather than willfulness, and we
are of the opinion that the chancellor
was
justified, on the whole record, in refusing to
remove them.
Whether or not the trustees should be
held personally liable for losses sustained
by the complainants on the Marsh indebtedness is attended with much more difficulty. It is alleged in the bill that among
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the assets which came into their hands were
three judgment notes payable to said James
W. Waterman,— one for $5,000, dated April
27, 1883, due in 90 days, signed by the Sycamore Marsh Harvester Company and C. W.
and W. W. Marsh;
one for the sum of
$3,000, dated June 13, 1883, due in 90 days,
by the same parties; and one for $5,350.40,
dated January 1, 1878, by C. W. and W. W.
Marsh alone. It is there alleged that after
said notes came into their hands, and were
due and payable to them, they knew the makers were embarrassed
financially, and likely
to fall, but took no steps to collect or secure
the same until June 30, 1884; that said AIden, being cashier, one of the directors, and
a large stockholder in the Sycamore National
Bank, on October, 1883, the said Alden knowing the financial embarrassment of the said
makers of said notes, said bank loaned them
about $25,000; that thereafter said Alden
pressed said parties for security for said bank
indebtedness,
which was given, but that he
made no effort whatever to obtain security
for said indebtedness
due the estate, although security therefor could have been obtained; that on said June 30, 1884, Alden
caused the notes due the estate to be put in
judgments in the circuit court of Lee county, although the circuit court of De Kalb
county was at the time in session, the makers of said notes having property in the lastnamed county subject to lien and levy of
judgments on said notes; that he employed
the same attorney who represented
said
bank, and he at the same time took judgment in its favor for said $25,000 indebtedness; that, through the wrongful and negligent conduct of said trustee, said property
in De Kalb county was allowed to be levied
upon and taken on executions in favor of said
bank and others, to the exclusion of those
in favor of the estate; that, through the
negligence of the trustees, property attempted
to be levied upon in said county on executions in favor of the estate was wrongly described, and thereby priority of lien in favor
of said estate lost; that by reason of such
neglebt and mismanagement
on the part of
appellees the greater part of the said indebtedness was wholly lost to said estate.
The first special master to whom the case
was referred found against the complainants

on these allegations as to negligence
and
omissions of duty on the part of the trustees,
and reported that they should not be held
liable for the loss; but the chancellor before whom the case was pending took a different view of the evidence, and on exceptions to the master's report found "that said
trustees,
Alden and Robinson, should have

known that said Marsh Harvester Manufacturing Company and the Marshes were insolvent, and In falling condition,
from the
time of the death of the said James S. "Waterman until their actual failure, about July,
1884, and that said trustees did not exercise
due and proper diligence to collect or have
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said undisputed indebtedness to said
and It appearing, had said trustees
diligently pressed said undisputed indebtedness to said estate for payment or security,
that security might have been obtained therefor, so it Is ordered that trustees, Alden and
Robinson, be charged with the payment of
said undisputed indebtedness to said estate."
This order only includes the two notes signed
by the manufacturing companies
and the
secured
estate;

as
note being disputed,
On a re-reference
of the
case the master was directed to report the
amount of loss on said two notes, which
he did, finding the amount to be $1,365.51;
but the circuit court of Lee county, as appears from the foregoing extract from its
decree, refused to allow the claim for want
of jurisdiction.
That a loss to the complainants has l)een sustained by reason of
the failure of appellees to collect the whole
amount of those notes is not denied.
That
they might have been collected by the use
of ordinary business management and diliby
gence, or secured, is clearly established
the evidence.
We think it is equally clear
that the trustees knew that said parties
were heavily indebted,
and liable to fail,
long before any effort was made by them
to secure or collect said indebtedness.
The
only finding of the court below on the facts
is to that effect.
While Special
Master
Loomis by his report excuses the conduct of
the trustees, he does not do so on the ground
that they were not negligent, but rather upon the theory that, from the relations existing between the testator and the Marshes,
it Is fair to presume that he, if living, would
have used no more care and diligence in enforcing those claims than did appellees.
It
need scarcely be suggested that no such test
can properly be applied to the conduct of
trustees.
There may be abundant reason for
believing that Mr. Waterman, though a careful business man, would much rather have
lose the indebtedness
than to have pressed
the collection of It, but that furnishes no
excuse for these trustees to neglect or fail
to use all reasonable diligence in the matter.
Mr. Waterman might do with his own as
he pleased, but the duties of these appellees
are fixed by law, and if they have violated
those duties they are personally liable.
The question, then, as to whether or not
the circuit court erred in refusing to hold
appellees liable to make good said loss, must
that, upon
be decided upon the admission
the facts proved and found by that court in
a proper tribunal, they can be so held; the
only question now being, did said court properly hold that it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter? That eotu'ts of
chancery have jurisdiction generally, on the
application of beneficiaries of a trust fund,
to charge
trustees with losses occurring
through their negligence or mismanagement.
Is too clear to call for the citation of authorities.
The decree of the circuit court
Marshes,

the

other

hereafter shown.
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proceeded upon the theory
as the trustees were also
of the will of James S. Waterexecutors
man, a court of chancery could not compel
them to make good the loss sustained by
complainants without interfering with the
jurisdiction of the county court before which
the administration of tlie estate was pendThis, we thiak, is a misapprehension.
ing.
The negligence in failing to secure or collect
these claims, it is said, was the negligence
of the executors, over whom, in the administration of the estate, the county court has
exclusive jurisdiction.
The relief sought by
this bill is against the trustees, and not the
executors;
and, if the relief prayed cannot
be granted by a court of chancery,
it must
be because complainants have failed to prove
such dereliction of duty on the part of appellees, in their capacity as trustees,
as
should make them liable, and not because
their bill seeks to remove any part of the
administration of the estate from the county court. It does not follow, because Alden and Robinson were guilty of negligence
in not collecting said indebtedness as executors, they are not also guilty of neglect of
duty in that regard as trustees. Suppose
other persons had been executors, and they
had been guilty of the conduct charged in
this bill, causing the loss here complained of,
and these trustees, with full knowledge
of
that misconduct, had not only consented, but
thereto, would there
themselves contributed,
have been any doubt as to the power of a
court of chancery to charge the trustees, regardless of the liability of the executors in
their settlement of the estate in the county
court? The executors and trustees being the
same persons, it is impossible
that there
should be an act ot fraud or breach of duty
by the executors which is not consented to
in by the trustees.
and acquiesced
The
question is not in which capacity appellees
are liable, and hence cases cited by counsel
on either side, discussing the question as to
whether funds were held in the one capacity
or another, have no application.
On the allegations of the bill, and the finding of the
facts by the circuit court, the debts in question have been absolutely lost to the estate,
and to that extent the complainants
have
been injured; and the only question which
can now or hereafter arise between these
parties is, have these trustees, by their negligent conduct, become liable for that loss?
Nothing which may be hereafter done in the
settlement of the estate in the county court
can affect this question, and we are unable
to see why these complainants should be
sent to that court for the settlement of their
rights. We are therefore of the opinion that
the circuit coru:t eired in refusing to take
jurisdiction of the question of the liability
of appellees for said loss, and that it should
have decreed that they make good the same
to the trust fimd in their hands.
As to the note signed by the Marshes
seems

to

have

that inasmuch
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alone, the first master
reported
that the
makers claimed to have a defense against
it, and, when the case was again referred,
the master was directed to ascertain whether
or not a valid defense did exist to said note,
and report the same.
He reported that a defense was insisted upon, and that on the
testimony of said C. W. and W. W. Marsh
it was established, the only question being
as to the competency
of those parties as
witnesses to prove the defense; and on that
question he foimd that in their favor. We
think his conclusion as to their competency
was correct.
Moreover,
it does not appear
that appellees could have secured or collected
that note, however prompt and diligent they
might have been. The Marshes denied that
they owed it, and do not aay they would
have paid or secured it if applied to for that
purpose; whereas they admit that the other
two notes were imdisputed, and could have
been secured if security had been asked for.
Appellees should not, therefore, be held liable on said personal note.
Both parties object to the apportionment
of the costs and expenses of the suit made
by the circuit court.
We think the order in
that regard is quite as favorable to appellees
as the facts of the case would justify.
They
are responsible for the most expensive portion of this litigation, in failing to keep proper accounts of their trusteeship.
In the first
special master's report is the significant finding that they "made out and exhibited
an
entirely new book of accounts as executors,
also one as trustees, since the filing of the
bill;" and that fact the master well says
"amounts to an admission that prior books
were not what tliey ought to be."
There
is no claim on their part that they attempted to keep accurate separate accounts of the
trust estate. The only apology for failing
to do so is that they did not know how to
classify the two kinds of property.
But they
were entitled to counsel, at the expense of
the trust estate, to assist them, and, if necessary, to the directions of a court of equity
in that regard.
They certainly had no right
to omit a plain legal duty because they may
have been in doubt as to how it should be
performed.
On that theory they might have
neglected that duty during the entire period
of their trusteeship.
At all events, on the
report of the first master the court found
it necessary to again refer the case to a second master to make a complete statement of
the account, and this of necessity greatly
increased the costs and expenses of the suit.
Appellees
cannot therefore justly complain
that they were required to pay a considerable part of the whole expense.
On the other hand, owing to the large amount and
variety of assets belonging to the estate, it
wag a matter of some difliculty at least, as
the result of this litigation shows, to determine just what property belonged to principal and what to income. As before said,
appellees were entitled to the advice of coun-
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sel, and, if necessary, the aid of the court,
to properly settle that question.
The statement of the account approved by the court
below is therefore for the benefit of all parties interested in the trust estate,— those who
take the income, and those who shall finally
take the principal; and it cannot be said
that either should be entirely exempt fronj
liability for costs and expenses in making it.
It is conceded that taxing costs in a chancery proceeding Is always within the sound
legal discretion of the chancellor,
and that
his decree in that regard will only be reviewed where it is shown that there has been
an abuse of that discretion. We see no reason for Interfering in the present case on
that ground.
It is insisted with great earnestness that the account stated by the last
special master, and approved by the court,
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is erroneous, in that it falls to charge the
trustees with interest on the small amounts
which had been charged wrongfully by Alden
for railroad fare and commissions on insurance.
It is perhaps true that the account is
inaccurate in that respect, but the matter is
of so little importance that no court ought
to entertain the objection as reversible error.
We have examined the account, and compared it with the proofs in the case, and are
satisfied that it is substantially correct, and
does justice between the parties, except in
as
the matter of the Marsh indebtedness,
above stated.
For that error the decree of
the circuit court will be reversed, and the
cause will be remanded to the circuit court,
with directions to enter a decree in conformity with the views herein expressed.
Reversed

and remanded.
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BARKER'S TRUSTS.
(1 Ch.

Chancery

Div.

Division.

43.)

Nov. 6, 1875.

This was a petition under the trustee act,
and the bankruptcy act, 1869, asking
for the removal of the sole trustee of a will
(who had also a beneficial interest under it),
on the ground that he had been adjudicated
bankrupt, and for the appointment of a
new trustee in his place, and for a vesting or1850,

der.

Part of the property subject to the trusts
of the will consisted of bonds transferable by
delivery with coupons. The trusts were to
receive the income, and pay it to one of the
petitioners during life.
Mr. Chitty, Q. C, and Mr. Bush, in support
Barber, for trustee.
Chapman
of petition.
Solicitors: Tatham, Procter & Co.; Walter,
Moojen & Co. Mr. Chester, for other parties.
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JESSEL, M. R. In my view, it is the duty
of the court to remove a bankrupt trustee
who has trust money to receive or deal with,
so that he can misappropriate it. There may,
be exceptions, under special circumstances,
to
that general rule; and it may also be that,
where a trustee has no money to receive, he
ought not to be removed merely because he
has become bankrupt; but I consider the general rule to be as I have stated. The reason
is obvious. A necessitous man is more likely
to be tempted to misappropriate trust funds
than one who is wealthy; and besides, a man
who has not shewn prudence in managing his
own affairs is not likely to be successful in
managing those of other people.
However, if special circumstances
are required for the removal of a bankrupt trustee,
should in the present case find them in the
nature of the trust property. Part of the
property consists of bonds with coupons, which
could very easily be made away with. The
trustee must be removed, and I make an order accordingly.

I
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CHICK

et

al. v.

(2

Kan.

WILLETTS.
384.)

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Jan. Term,

1864.

.Error from district court, Shawnee county.
Nathan P. Case, for plaintiffs in error.
& D. Brockway, for defendant in error.

J.

C. J. Two questions are preby the record: First, which law, the
twentieth section of the Code, or the second section of the "amendatory act," prescribes the limitation; and, second, when an
action upon a promissory note, secured by a
mortgage on real estate, is barred by the
statute of limitations, has the mortgagee any
remedy upon the mortgage? These are the
facts: On the sixth day of April, 1858, at
Kansas City, in the state of Missouri, the
defendant executed to the plaintifCs his
promissory note, payable one day after
date. Afterwards, and on the 12th day of
August of that year, the defendant, to secure the payment of the note, executed, in
this state, a mortgage upon some lots in Tocontained a stipulapeka, which mortgage
tion that If default was made in the payment of the note for two years from the date
of the mortgage, that Instrument might be
foreclosed,
etc. On August 13, 1863, a suit
was instituted upon the note and mortgage,
and the facts, as above stated, being admitted, judgment was rendered for the defendant. To reverse that judgment this proceeding is instituted.
The note having been made in Missouri,
would, under the act of February 10, 1859,
have been barred in two years from the
passage of that act, if there were nothing
By a stipulation in
else to be considered.
the mortgage, the time of payment was deferred two years from August 12, 1858.
The mortgage having been made in this
state, was the arrangement, with reference
to our statute of limitations, a Kansas or
Missouri contract? Although no change was
made upon the face of the note, yet the
clause of the mortgage referred to was effective to change its terms as if written
across its face. The time of Its payment,
with reference to the land, was extended
two years. Its payment, as against the land,
could not be enforced before that time; nor
would the limitation laws begin to run
against it until the expiration of that time.
These changes in the original contract were
effected by the paper which was executed
by
in this state. The contract evidenced
the mortgage is essentially different from
that set out In the note, and must control it.
Therefore, the contract, as it stood, after
the making of the mortgage, was a Kansas
contract, and would not be barred in two
years.
The statutes of limitation of this state are
wholly unlike the English statute, and differ materially from the limitation laws of
those states which have adhered to the com-
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mon law forms of action and modes of
Those statutes apply, In terms,
procedure.
to the forms of the action at law and contain
no provisions concerning an equitable proceeding.
If a party had concurrent remedies, one at law, the other in equity, courts

of equity applied the limitation prescribed
for the action at law. But In all other cases
they were said to act merely in analogy to
the statutes, and not In obedience to them.
In this state, the case Is entirely different.
The distinction between actions at law and
suits in equity is abolished; and the statutes of limitation apply equally to both classes of cases. They were made to apply to the
subject matter, and not to the form of the action. In England and the states referred to,
a limitation different from that prescribed
for simple contracts in writing, was prescribed for specialties. Here, "an action upcontract
on a specialty, or any agreement,
or promise in writing," must be brought
within three years; and it matters not what
the relief demanded may be, whether such
as could formerly be obtained only in a
court of law, or such as might have been
afforded by a court of equity exclusively.
Mortgages here differ essentially from
law, and in the
.mortgages
at common
states referred to. At common law, a mortgage was a conveyance
with a defeasance,
and gave the mortgagee a present right of
Upon It, even before the condipossession.
tions were broken, he might enter peaceably
If the condition was
or bring ejectment.
broken, the conveyance became absolute.
If
the money was paid when due, the estate
reverted to the mortgagor; If not so paid,
the estate was gone from him forever. After
a time, the law of mortgage was so modified
that the legal title was not considered as
having passed until the condition was broken. At a later day, another still more important Innovation was made. While it was
considered that, upon the condition broken,
the mortgagee became invested with the legal title, and was entitled to possession, yet,
in that condition of things, his title was
subject to a defeasance.
The rents and profits operated as cancellation, pro tanto, of
his conveyance; and when they reached a
sum sufficient to reimburse his original Investment, with such use as the law allowed,
the legal title reverted to the mortgagor, and
he would be entitled to the possession; and
he had a right to facilitate this operatlou
by payment of the money, and upon application to a court of equity, his title would
be disencumbered of the cloud the mortgage
cast upon it. This right of the mortgagor
was called "the equity of redemption," and,
considering the then prevalent theory of
mortgages, the phrase was peculiarly appropriate and expressive.
The title had passed,
but he had a right to redeem; and it Is
among the highest glories of equitable jurisprudence, that at so early a day the means
of enforcing this right were supplied. Some
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of the states still adhere to the common law
view, more or less modified by the real nature of the transaction; but in most of them,
practically, all that remains of the old theory
is their nomenclature. In this state, a clean
The comsweep has been made by statute.
mon law attributes of mortgages have been
wholly set aside; the ancient theories have
been demolished; and if we could consign
to oblivion the terms and phrases— without
meaning except in reference to those theories
— with which our refl^ections are still embarrassed, the legal profession on the bench and
at the bar would more readily understand
and fully realize the new condition of things.
The statute gives the mortgagor the right to
the possession, even after the money is due,
and confines the remedy of the mortgagee to
an ordinary action and sale of the mortgaged
premises; thus negativing any idea of title
It is a mere security, alin the mortgagee.
though in the form of a conditional conveyance; creating a lien upon the property, but
vesting no estate whatever, either before or
after condition broken. It gives no right of
possession, and does not limit the mortg.agor's right to control It— except that the security shall not be impaired. He may i?ell
It, and the title would pass by his convey-

ance—subject,
of course, to the lien of the
mortgagee.
If we are right in these views as to our
statute of limitations, and the operation of a
mortgage under our law, the English cases
and cases in New York and Ohio, cited by
counsel for plaintiffs, have no application to
the case at bar. The statutes of limitation
under which they were majJe, make distinctions between notes and mortgages whi(;h
do not exist here; and the operations of
notes and mortgages there and here are totally different. The decisions are not au!:horities in this case, for the reason that thpy
are not applicable, and cannot be made st,.
If our limitation law omitted mortgages, and
our law of conveyances gave the right of possession to the mortgagee,
some of them
would be in point; but as neither of these
conditions exist here, they thrOw no light
upon the questions
under consideration in
the case at bar.
Our conclusions are, that the twentieth
section of the Code prescribes the limitation
to an action on the note or mortgage, and as
the three years expired on the 12th day of
August, 186S, a suit commenced on the 13th
was too late. Judgment affirmed.
All the justices concurring.
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BA-RRETT

et al. v.

HINCKLEY.

(14 N. E. 863, 124 111. 32.)
Supreme Court of Illinois.
Jan. 19, 1888.
Appeal from superior court. Cook county;
J. E. Gary, Judge.
Watson S. Hinckley, plaintifE, sued George
D. Earrgtt, Adalina S. Barrett, and William H. Whitehead, impleaded witli others,
Judgment
for
defendants,
in ejectment.
plaiijtiff, and the above-mentioned
defendants appealed.
for appellants.
Whitehead & Packard,
Wilson & Moore, for appellee.

MULKEY, J. Watson S. Hinckley, claiming to be the owner in fee of the land in controversy, on the twenty-sixth day of February, 1885, brought an action of ejectment in
the superior court of Copk county against the
appellants, George D. Barrett, Adalina S.
Barrett, Williajn H. Whitehead, and others,
There
thereof.
to recover the possession
was a trial of the cause before the court
without a jury, resulting in a finding and
judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendThe evidence tends to show
ants appealed.
the following state of facts: In 1870, Thomas Kearns was in possession of the land,
claiming to own it in fee-simple.
On Augjjst 3d of that year he sold and conveyed it
to William H. W. Cushman for the sum of
Cushman gave his four jiotes to
$80,000.
Kearns for tjie balance of the purchase monmaturing in 30 days;
ey,— ojie for $12,500,
three for $16,875 each, maturing, respectively, in two, three, and four years after date, —
and all secured by a mortga,ge on the premises.
The notes seem to have all been paid
but the last one. In 1878, Kearns died, land
his widow, Alice Kearns, administered on
Previous to his death, however,
his estate.
he had hypothecated
the mortgage and last
note to secure a loan from Greenebaum.
Subseqijently, and before the commencement
of the present suit, Greenebaum, in his own
right, and Mrs. Kearns, as administratrix
of her husband, for value, sold and assigned
by a separate instrument in writing the
mortgage and note to the appellee, Watson
This is in substance the case
S. Hinckley.
The defendants showed
made by plaintiff.
no title in themselves or any one else. The
conclusion to Jbe reached, therefore, depends
upon whether the case made by the plaintiff
warranted the court below in rendering the
judgment it did.
It is claimed by appellants, in the first
place, that much of the evidence relied on
by appellee to sustain the judgment below
was improperly admitted by the court, and
various errors have been assigned upon the
of the
record questioning the correctness
They,
rulings of the court in this respect.
however,
go further, and insist that, even
conceding the facts to be as claimed by appellee himself, they are not sufficient in law
As the judgment beto sustain the action.
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low will have to be reversed on the ground
last suggested, it will not be necessary to
We proconsider the pther errors assigned.
pose to state as briefly as may be some of
the reasons which have led us to the conclusion reached.
In doing so, it is perhaps
proper to call attention at the outset to some
considerations that should be steadily kept
in mind as we proceed, and to which we attach not a little importance.
It is first to be specially noted that this is
a suit at law, as contradistinguished from a
It is brought to enforce a
suit in equity.
naked legal right, as distinguished from an
right. The plaintiff seeks to reequitable
cover certain lands,
the title whereof he
To do this he is bound
claims in fee-simple.
to show in himself a fee-simple title at law,
as contradistinguished from an equitable fee.
Fischer v. Eslaman, 68 111. 78; Wales v.
B.ogije, 31 111. 464; Fleming v. Carter, 70
Has
111. 286; Dawson v. Hayden, 67 111. 52.
he done this?
He attempts to derive title
remotely through the mortgage from Cushman to Kearns, but upon what legal theory
His immeis not very readily perceived.
diate source of title, however, seems to be
Mrs. Kearns, as administratrix of her husas pledgee of the
band, and Greenebaum,
The instrument through
note and mortgage.
which he claims is lost or destroyed, and all
we know concerning its character is what
the plaintifE himself says about it. As to its
contents,
he does not pretend to state a
single sentence or word in it, but characterizes it as an assignment, and gives the conclusions which he draws from it in general
terms only. After stating his purchase of
the note and mortgage in January, 1880, he
says: "The assignment was from Mrs.
Kearns,
of Thomas
the administratrix
Kearns' estate, and Elias Greenebaum, the
banker. At the time of the purchase, a separate writing was given to ine,— a full as* • * It was a very explicit assignment.
signment, or full assignment,
of the note
and mortgage, and the land, the property,
and all the right and title to the land." It
will be observed, the instrument is throughout characterized as an assignment only,
which does not, like the term "deed" or
signify an Instrument under seal.
specialty,
A mere written assignment, founded upon a
valuable consideration, is just as available
for the purpose of passing to the assignee the
equitable title to land as an instrument under seal.
Such being the case, we would
clearly not be warranted in inferring that
the assignment was under seal, from the
simple fact that the witness gives it as his
opinion that the instrument was "a full assignment" of the land, which is nothing
more than the witness' opinion upon a question of law. There not being sufficient evidence in the record to show that the assignment was under seal, it follows that, even
conceding the legal title to the property to
have been in Mrs. Kearns and Greenebaum,
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or either of them. It could not have passed to
the appellee by that Instrument, and, If not
by it, not at all, because that is the only
muniment of title relied on for that purpose.
This conclusion is of course based upon the
fundamental principle that an instrument
inter partes, in order to pass the legal title to
real property, must be under seal. But this
is not all.
Even conceding the sufficiency of
the assignment to pass the legal title, the
record, in our opinion, fails to show that the
assignors, or either of them, had such title;
hence there was nothing for the assignment
to operate upon, so far as the legal estate in
Having no such title,
the land is concerned.
they could not convey it. "Nemo plus juris
ad alienum transfeiTe potest, quam ipse habet." That the legal estate in this property
or
Mrs.
was not either in Greenebaum
Kearns at the time of the assignment to
plaintiff is demonstrable by the plainest prinThomas Kearns
ciple of law.
Let us see.
was the owner of this property in fee. He
conveyed it in fee to Cushman.
The latter,
as a part of the same transaction, recouto Kearns.
veyed it by way of mortgage
By reason of this last conveyance, Kearns
of the property, and
mortgagee
became
According to the EngCushman mortgagor.
lish doctrine, and that of some of the states
of the Union, including our own, Kearns, at
least as between the parties, took the legal
estate, and Cushman the equitable.
According to other authorities, Kearns, by virtue of
Cushman's mortgage to him, took merely a
lien upon the property to secure the mortgage
Indebtedness,
and the legal title remained
in Cushman.
For the purposes of the present inquiry, it is not important to consider
just now, if at all, which is the better or
It is manifest, and must be
true theory.
conceded, that the legal estate in the land,
after the execution of the mortgage, was
either in the mortgagee or mortgagor, or in
Such being the case, it is
both combined.
equally clear appellee, to succeed, must have
deduced title through one or both of these
parties. This could only have been done by
showing that the legal title had, by means
of some of the legally recognized modes of
conveying real property, passed from one or
This he did not
both of them to himself.
do, or attempt to do; indeed, he does not
claim through them, nor either of them. Not
only so; neither Mrs. Kearns nor Greenebaum, through whom appellee does claim,
derives title through any deed or conveyance executed by either the mortgagor or
nor does either of them claim
mortgagee;
as heir or devisee of the mortgagor or mortgagee.
As the assignment of the note and mortgage to appellee did not, as we hold, transfer or otherwise affect the legal title to the
land, it may be asked, what effect, then, did
it have? This question, like most others
pertaining to the law of mortgages, admits
of two answers, depending upon whether the

mles and principles which prevail in courts
of equity or of law are to be applied. If the
latter, we would say none; because, as to
the note, that could not be assigned by a
separate instrument, as was done in this
Ryan v.
case, so as to pass the legal title.
May, 14 lU. 49; Fortier v. Darst, 31 111. 213;
Chickering v. Raymond, 15 111. 362. As to
the mortgage, it is well settled that could
not be assigned like negotiable paper, so as
to pass the legal title in the instrument, or
clothe the assignee with the immunity of an
innocent holder, except under certain circumRailway
stances which do not apply here.
Co. V. Loewenthal, 93 lU. 433; Hamilton v.
Lubukee,
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111. 415;

Olds

v. Cummings,

31

Mclntire v. Yates, 104 111. 491; Fortier V. Darst, 31 111. 212.
But that the mortgagee, or any one succeeding to his title,
might, by deed in the form of an assignment, pass to the assignee the legal as well
as the equitable interest of the mortgagee,
we have no doubt, though there is some conflict on this subject.
2 Washb. Real Prop.
115, and authorities there cited.
Yet the assignors, in the case in hand, not having the
legal title, as we have just seen, could not,
by any form of instrument, transmit it to
If, however, the rules and princianother.
ples which obtain in courts of equity are to
bo applied, we would say that, by virtue of
111. 188;

the
the appellee became the
assignment,
equitable owner of the note and mortgage,
and that it gave him such an interest or
equity respecting the land as entitled him to
have it sold in satisfaction of the debt.
There is perhaps no species of ownership
known to the law which is more complex, or
which has given rise to more diversity of
opinion, and even conflict in decisions, than
that which has sprung from the mortgage of
By the common law, if the
real property.
mortgagor paid the money at the time specified in the mortgage, the estate of the mortgaof the congee, by reason of the performance
dition therein, at once determined, and was
forever gone, and the mortgagor, by mere operation of law, was remitted to his former estate. On the other hand, if the mortgagor
failed to pay on the day named, the title of
became absolute,
the mortgagee
and the
mortgagor ceased to have any interest whatBy the exever in the mortgaged premises.
ecution of the mortgage, the entire legal estate passed to the mortgagee, and, unless it
was expressly provided that the mortgagor
should retain possession till default in payment, the mortgagee might maintain ejectment as well before as after default. This is
the view taken by the common-law courts of
England, and which has obtained, with certain limitations, in most of the states of the
Union, including our own, in which the common-law system prevails. In Carroll v. Ballance, 26 111. 9, which was ejectment by the
mortgagee against the assignee of the mortgagor, to recover the mortgaged premises, this
court thus states the English rule on the
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subject: "In England, and In many of the
American states, it is understood that the ordinary mortgage deed conveys the fee in the
land to the mortgagee, and under it he may
oust the mortgagor immediately on the execution and delivery of the mortgage, without
waiting for the period fixed for the performiince of the condition, [citing Ooote Mortg.
339; Blaney v. Bearce, 2 Greenl. 132; Brown
V. Cram, 1 N. H. 169; Hobart v. Sanborn, 18
N. H. 226; Paper-Mills v. Ames, 8 Mete.
(Mass.) 1]. And this right is fully recognized
by courts of equity, although liable to be defeated at any moment in those courts by the
payment of the debt." Again, in Nelson v.
Pinegar, 30 111. 481, which was a bill by
mortgagee to restrain waste, it is said:
"The
complainant, as mortgagee of the land, was
the owner in fee, as against the mortgagor
and all claiming under him. He had the jus
in re, as well as ad rem, and being so is entitled to all the rights and remedies which the
law gives to such an owner." So, in Oldham
v. Pflegar, 84 111. 102, which was ejectment
by the heirs of the mortgagor against th'e
grantee of the mortgagor, this court, in holding the action could not be maintained, said:
"Under the rulings of this court, the mortgagee is held, as in England, in law the owner
of the fee, having the jus in re, as well as
the jus ad rem." In Finlon v. Clark, 118 111.
32, 7 N. B. 475, the same doctrine
is announced, and the cases above cited are referred to with approval. Taylor v. Adams,
115 111. 570, 4 N. E. 837.
Courts of equity,
however, from a very early period, took a
widely different view of the matter. They
looked upon the forfeiture of the estate at
law, because of non-payment on the very day
fixed by the mortgage, as in the nature of a
penalty, and, as in other cases of penalties,
gave relief accordingly. This was done by
allowing the mortgagor to redeem the land
on equitable terms at any time before the
right to do so was barred by foreclosure.
The right to thus redeem after the estate had
become absolute at law in the mortgagee was
called the "equity of redemption," and has
continued to be so called to the present time.
These courts, looking at the substance of the
transaction, rather than its form, and with a
view of giving effect to the real intentions of
the parties, held that the mortgage was a
mere security for the payment of the debt;
that the mortgagor was the real beneficial
owner of the land, subject to the incumbrance

of the mortgage; that the interest of the mortgagee was simply a lien and incumbrance upon the land, rather than an estate in it. In
short, the positions of mortgagor and mortgagee were substantially reversed in the view
taken by courts of equity.
These two systems grew up side by side,
and were maintained for centuries without
conflict or even friction between the law and
equity tribunals by which they were respectively administered. The equity courts did
not attempt to control the law courts, or even
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question the legal doctrines which they anOn the contrary, their force and
nounced.
validity were often recognized in the relief
Thus, equity courts, in allowing a
granted.
redemption after a forfeiture of the legal estate, uniformly required the mortgagee to reconvey to the mortgagor, which was of course
necessary
to make his title available in a
court of law. In maintaining these two systems and theories in England, there was none
of that confusion and conflict which we en-

counter in the decisions of the courts of this
country; resulting, chiefly, from a failure to
keep in mind the distinction between courts
of law and of equity, and the rules and prinThe
ciples applicable to them respectively.
courts there, by observing these things, kept
the two systems intact, and in this condition
they were transplanted to this country, and
became a part of our own system of law.
But other causes have contributed to destroy
that certainty and uniformity which formerly
Chiefly among these
prevailed with us.
causes may be mentioned the statutory changes in the law in many of the states, and the
failure of the courts and authors to note those
changes in their expositions of the law of
such states. Perhaps another fruitful source
of confusion on this subject is the fact that
in many of the states the common-law forms
of action have been abolished by statute, and
instead of them a single statutory form of action has been adopted, in which legal and
equitable rights are administered at the same
time, and by the same tribunal. Yet the distinction between legal and equitable rights is
still preserved, so that, although the action in
theory is one at law, it is nevertheless subject
to be defeated by a purely equitable defense.
Under the influence of these statutory enactments and radical changes in legal procedure,
by which legal and equitable rights are given
effect and enforced In the same suit, the
equitable theory of a mortgage has in many
of these states entirely superseded the legal
one. Thus, in New York it is said, in the case
of Trustees, etc., v. Wheeler, 61 N. Y. 88,
"that a mortgage is a mere chose in action.
It gives no legal estate in the land, but is
simply a lien thereon; the mortgagor remaining both the legal and equitable owner of the
fee." following this doeti'ine to its logical
results, it is held by the courts of that state
that ejectment under the Code will not lie at
the suit of the mortgagee against the owner
of the equity of redemption.
Murray v. Walker, 31 N. Y. 399. In strict conformity with
the theory that the mortgagee has no estate
in the land, but a mere lien as security for his
debt, the courts of New York, and others taking the same view, hold that a conveyance
by the mortgagee before foreclosure, without
an assignment of the debt, is in law a nullity.
Jackson v. Cmtis, 19 Johns. 325; Wilson v.
Troup, 2 Cow. 231; Jackson v. Willard, 4
Johns. 41. And this court seems to have recognized the same rule as obtaining in this
state, in Delano v. Bennett, 90 IlL 533.

552

MORTGAGES.

Tlie New York cases just cited, and all otliers taking the same view, are clearly inconsistent with the whole current of our decisions
on the subject, as is abundantly shown by
the authorities already cited.
The doctrine
would seem to be fundamental that if one sui
juris, having the legal title to land, intentionally delivers to another a deed therefor, containing apt words of conveyance, the title at
law, at least, will pass to the grantee; but
for what purposes or uses the grantee will
hold it, or to what extent he will be able to
enforce it, will depend upon circumstances.
If the mortgagee conveys the land without
assigning the debt to the grantee, the latter
would hold the legal title as trustee for the
holder of the mortgage debt.
Sanger v. Bancroft, 12 Gray, 367; Barnard v. Baton, 2
Gush. 304; Jackson v. Willard, 4 Johns. 40.
It is true, the interest which passes is of no
appreciable value to the grantee.
Thus, in
the case last cited, Chancellor Kent, in speaking of it, says: "The mortgage interest, as
distinct from the debt, is not a fit subject of
assignment.
It has no determinate value. If
it should be assigned, the assignee must hold
the interest at the will and disposal of the
creditor who holds the bond."
In AVait's Actions and Defenses (volume 4, p. .HJ.'ij the rule
is thus stated: "By the common law, a mortgagee in fee of land is considered as absolutely entitled to the estate, which he may devise
or transmit by descent to his heirs."
In conformity with this view, Pomeroy, in his work
on Equity Jurisprudence, (volume 3, p. 150,)
in treating of this subject, says: "In law, the
mortgagee
may convey the land itself by
deed, or devise it by will, and on his death Intestate it will descend to his heirs.
In equity,
his interest is a mere thing in action, assignable as such, and a deed by him would operate
merely as an assignment
of the rnortgage;
and in administering the estate of a deceased
mortgagee a court of equity treats the mortgage as personal assets, to be dealt with by
the executor or administrator."
We have already seen that under the decisions of this
court, and by the general cin:rent of authority, a mortgage is not assignable at law by
mere indorsement, as in the case of commerBut, on the other hand, the estate
cial paper.
and interest of the mortgagee may be conveyed to the holder of the indebtediess, or
even of a third party, by deed with apt words
of conveyance; and the fact that it is in form
will make no difference.
an assignment
2
Washb. Real Prop. 115, 116.
Such an assignee, if owner of the mortgage indebtedness, might, no doubt,, maintain ejectment In
his own name for his own use.
Or the action
might be brought in his name for the use of a
Kilthird party owning the indebtedness.
So, in this case,
gour V. Gockley, 83 111. 109.
if the action had been brought in the name of
Keams' heirs for the use of Hinckley, no reason is perceived why the action might not be
maintained.
It must not be concluded, from what we

have said, that the dual system respecting
mortgages, as above explained, exists in this
state precisely as it did in England prior to
its adoption in this country, for such is not
the case.
It is a conceded fact that the equitable theory of a mortgage has, in process of
time, made in this state, as in others, material
upon the legal theory which
encroachments
is now fully recognized
in courts of law.
Thus, it is now the settled law that the mortgagor or his assignee is the legal owner of
the mortgaged estate, as against all persons
except the mortgagee or his assigns.
Hall v.
Lance, 25 111. 250, 277; Emory v. Keighan,
88 111. 482.
As a result of this doctrine. It
follows that, in ejectment by the mortgagor
against a third party, the defendant cannot
defeat the action by showing an outstanding
Hall v. Lance, supra.
title in the mortgagee.
So, too, courts of law now regard the title of
a mortgagee in fee in the nature of a base
or determinable
fee.
The term of its existence is measured by that of the mortgage
debt.
When the latter is paid off, or becomes
barred by the statute of limitations, the mortgagee's title is ea;tinguished by operation of
law. Pollock V. Maison, 41 111. 516; Harris
V. ilills, 28 111. 44; Gibson v. Rees, 50 111.
383.
Hence the rule is as well established
at law, as it is in equity, that the debt is the
principal thing, and the mortgage an incident.
So, also, while it is indispensable
in all cases
to a recovery in ejectment that the plaintiff
show In himself the legal title to the property
as set forth in the declaration,
except where
the defendant is estopped from denying it,
yet it does not follow that because one has
such title he may under all circumstances
maintain the action; and this is particularly
so in respect to a mortgage title.
Such title
exists for the benefit of the holder of the mortgage indebtedness,
and it can only be enforced by an action in furtherance of his interests; that is, as a means of coercing payment.
If the mortgagee, therefore, should,
for a valuable consideration, assign the mortgage indebtedness to a third party, and the
latter, after default in payment, should take
possession of the mortgaged premises, ejectment would not lie against him at the suit
of the mortgagee, although the legal title
would be in the latter, for the reason it would
not be in the interest of the owner of the
In short, it is a well-settled
indebtedness.
principle that one having a mere naked legal
title to land in which he has no beneficial interest, and in respect to which he has no
duty to perform, cannot maintain ejectment
against the equitable owner, or any one having an equitable interest therein, with a present right of possession.
This case, with a
slight change of the circumstances, would afford an excellent illustration of the principle.
Suppose the present plaintiff had obtained
possession under his equitable title to the note
and mortgage, and the heirs of Keams, who
hold the legal title, had brought ejectment
against him, the action clearly could not have
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been maintained, for the reasons we have just
stated.
But It does not follo-yv, because sucji
an action would not lie against him, that he
could, upon a mere equitable title, maintain
the action against others.
Cottrell v. Adams,
2 Biss. 351-3bo, Fed. Gas. No. 3,272; 9 Myers,
iTed. Dec. 240.
The question in that case
was almost identical with the question in this,
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and the court reached the same conclusion
See, also, Speer v. Hadduck, 31 111.
we have.
439.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the
court below is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed.
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isting
sisting
curred
The

indorsement,
or any subininchoate or otherwise,
380.)
by the mortgagees for the mortgagor.
July
Term,
1865.
Michigan.
Supreme Court of
mortgagees, at the time of the indorseAppeal in chancery from Wayne circuit.
ments in question, had no notice of the deed
The facts, so far as they are necessary to
to Howard, unless the record of that deed is
an understanding of the legal questions into be considered such notice, the deed having been some months previously recorded.
volved in the case, will be found stated in
the opinion.
The validity of the mortgage, as between the
parties, for any amount of advances which
G. V. X. I^throp, for complainant. H. H.
might be made, or liabilities incurred under
Emmons and A. Pond, for defendants.
it, after they should have been thus made or
CHRISTIANOY, J. The mortgage, which incurred, is not questioned by the defendants; nor is it denied that the record of it
the bOl in this case seeks to foreclose, was
would be sufficient notice to subsequent purexecuted by John Ladue to the complainant
chasers and incumbrancers,
and Francis E. Eldred, composing the firm
of the amount
which the mortgagees might actually have
of Ladue & Eldred, on the 4th day of Aur
advanced or indorsed for the mortgagor;
or,
gust, 1852, to secure and indemnify the firm
which might be
in other words, the amount for which it had
against any indorsements
become an actual and subsisting security, at
made, or liabilities to be incurred, by them
the time when the question of notice of the
as sureties for John Ladue, as well as for
mortgage
became material, which, for the
any moneys they might advance for him, acpurposes of this case, is admitted to cover
cording to the condition of a bond to which
the period from the purchase
by Howard
the mortgage was collateral, and which was
down to the time of the recording of his
of like efifect There was nothing in the padeed, the record of which is claimed to be
pers or in the arrangement between the parnotice to the mortgagees as regards any adties which bound Ladue & Bldred to make
vances made to, or liabilities incurred by,
any advances
or to indorse any paper for
them for the mortgagor after the recording
John Ladue, or to incur any liability for him,
nor was the latter bound to accept any such of the deed. Nor is it denied, that if the
by the contracts
mortgagees,
The effec*t of the arrangeor arrangeaccommodation.
ments between them and the mortgagor (to
ment was that such advances and liabilities,
if made or incurred, would be purely optional secure which, on the part of the latter, was
the object of the mortgage), had been bound
This morton the part of the mortgagees.
to make advances or to indorse for the mortgage was duly recorded on the day of its
gagor, the record of the mortgage
date.
On the 9th day of May, 1853, John
would
have been full notice to Howard, and the
Ladue, the mortgagor, sold and conveyed the
mortgage would have been good against him,
to Charles Howard
premises
mortgaged
though the advances were not in fact made
(through whom the railroad company derive
their title), by warranty deed, which was i or the paper indorsed until after the deed to
him and actual notice of that deed to the
duly recorded on the 9th day of July, 1853.
mortgagees.
The defendants also admit that
John Ladue, however, remained in possesthe result would be the same under this
sion, using the premises as before, until his
mortgage, as to any advances made or paper
death, December 4, 1854.
indorsed by the mortgagees for the mortgaNo claim is made for any advances made
gor, before they had actual or constructive
by Ladue & Eldred to John Ladue, but the
notice of the sale and deed to Howard.
whole claim under the mortgage is based
But
they insist that, as there was not at the time
made for him by the
upon indorsements
of Howard's purchase or the recording of his
which have been paid by Anmortgagees,
deed any debt of the mortgagor,
and
drew Ladue, one of the complainants,
or any liability incurred for him by the mortgagees,
by the
as shown
all these indorsements,
absolute or inchoate, nor any obligation on
proofs, were made some time after the sale
their part to incur such liability, the mortto Howard and the recording of his deed.
gage was not then an incumbrance
Whatever indorsements were made prior to
in fact
or in legal effect; that It could only become
that time seem to have been taken up by
such from the time when the advances or inJohn Ladue; and it does not satisfactorily
dorsements were actually made; and it beappear by the evidence that any of these ining optional with the mortgagees whether
dorsements,
made since the recording of
they would make any such advances or inHoward's deed, were made in renewal of
dorsements,
and the indorsements
to that
being
paper indorsed by them previous
made subsequent
to the recording of HowNo indorsements made prior to the retime.
ard's deed, the mortgage is, in legal effect,
cording of Howard's deed are in any way insubsequent to the deed, and the record of
volved, and the case may therefore be conthe deed was notice to the mortgagees
of
sidered in all respects in the same light as
if no such previous indorsements had ever Howard's rights.
The first question, therefore, for our debeen made, especially as it does not appear
that at the time of the sale to Howard, or termination is, what was the legal effect of
the mortgage
the recording of his deed, there was any ex(if any) upon the land, at
V.

(13 Mich.

unsatisfied

liability,
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the time of the recording of the mortgagor's
deed to Howard?
That a mortgage in this state, both at law
and In equity, even when given to secure
a debt actually subsisting at its date, conveys no title of the land to the mortgagee
(especially since the statute of 1843, taking
away ejectment by the mortgagee); that the
title remains in the mortgagor until foreclosure and sale, and that the mortgage is
but a security, in the nature of a specific
lien, for the debt, has been already settled
by the decisions
Dougherty
of this court.
V. Randall, 3 Mich. 581; Oaruthers v. Humphrey, 12 Mich. 270; and Crippen r. Morrison, to be reported in 13 Mich.
-Jiis is in
accordance with the well-settled law of the
state of New York, from which our system
of law in regard to mortgages has been, in
a great measure, derived.
Jackson v. Willard, 4 Johns. 41; Collins v. Torrey, 7 Johns.
277; Runyan v. Messerean,
11 Johns. 534;
Gardner v. Heartt, 3 Denio, 232; Edwards v.
Insurance Co., 21 Wend. 467; Waring v.
Smyth, 2 Barb. Oh. 119; Bryan v. Butts, 27
Barb. 504; Bank v. Tallman, 31 Barb. 201;
Cortright v. Cady, 21 N. Y. 342.
This view of a mortgage is also sustained
by several of the English decisions, and substantially this is the more generally received
American doctrine, as will sufficiently appear
by reference to the decisions, most of which
have been carefully collected in the elaborate
brief of the defendant's counsel, but which
are too numierous to be cited here. There
are exceptions and peculiarities in particular
states, in some of which, as in some of the
New England states and Kentucky, the old
idea of an estate upon a condition continues
to rankle in the law of mortgages, like a
foreign substance in the living organism,
but is rapidly being eliminated and thrown
off by the healthy action of the courts imder
a more vigorous application of plain common
sense.
But few of the incidents of this antiquated doctrine are now recognized in most
of the states of this Union; the title, for
nearly all practical purposes, being now recognized, both at law and in equity, as continuing in the mortgagor, and the mortgage
as a mere lien for the security of the debt.
But wherever any vestige of this now nearly exploded idea continues to prevail, in connection with the more liberal doctrines of
modern times which the courts have been
from time to time, to adopt, it
compelled,
seems only to confuse and deform the law
of mortgages by various anomalies and inmaking it a chaos of arbitrary
consistencies,
and discordant rules, resting upon no broad
or just principle; while, by recognizing the
mortgage as a mere lien for the security of
the debt, at law as well as in equity, and
thus giving it effect according to the real
understanding and intention of the parties,
the law of mortgages becomes at once a
principles, easily
of homogeneous
system
understood and applied, and just in their
operation.
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A mortgage, then, being a mere security
for the debt or liability secured by it, it
necessarily results:
secured is
(1) That the debt or liability
the principal, and the mortgage but an inSee cases above cited;
cident or accessory.
also, Richards v. Synes, Barnad. Oh. 90;
Roath V. Smith, 5 Conn. 133; Lucas v. Harris, 20 111. 165; Vansant v. Allman, 23 111.
31; Ord v. McKee, 5 Oal. 615; Ellison v.
Daniels, 11 N. H. 274; Hughes v. Edwards,
9 Wheat. 489; Green v. Hart, 1 Johns. 580;
McGan v. Marshall, 7 Humph. 121; 4 Kent,
Comm. 193; McMillan y. Richards, 9 Oal.
365.
(2) That anything which transfers the debt
(though by parol or mere delivery), transSee cases above
fers the mortgage with it.
cited, especially Vansant v. Allman, 23 111.
31; Ord v. McKee, 5 Oal. 615; Ellison v.
See, also, Martin v.
Daniels, 11 N. H. 274.
Mowlin, 2 Burr. 978; Clark v. Beach, 6 Conn.
164;
Southern v. Mendane, 5 N. H. 420;
Wilson V. Kimball, 27 N. H. 300, 36 N. H.
39; Orowl v. Vance, 4 Iowa, 434; 1 Blackf.
137; 5 Cow. 202; 9 Wend. 410; 1 Johns. 580.
(3) That an assignment of the mortgage
without the debt is a mere nullity. Ellison
V. Daniels, 11 N. H. 274; Jackson v. Bronson, 19 Johns. 325;
Wilson v. Throop, 2
Cow. 195; Weeks v. Eaton, 15 N. H. 145;
Peters v. Jamestown Bridge Co., 5 Oal. 324;
Webb V. Flanders, 82 Me. 175; 4 Kent,
Comm., ubi supra; Thayer v. Campbell, 9

Mo.

277.

release,
That payment,
or anything
which extinguishes the debt, ipso facto extinguishes the mortgage.
Lane v. Shears,
1 Wend. 433; Sherman v. Sherman,
3 Ind.
337; Ryan v. Dunlap, 17 111. 40; Armitage
12 B. Mon. 496;
V. Wicklifee,
Paxon v.
Paul, 3 Har. & McH. 399; Perkins v. Dibble, 10 Ohio, 433; Buckenridge v. Ormsby,
1 Marsh. 257; Cameron v. Irwin, 5 Hill, 272.
It will be seen from these authorities that
some, if not all, of these incidents or characteristics of a mortgage are recognized by
some of the courts which still hold the
mortgage to be a conveyance of the estate,—
an idea, however, with which they are utterly inconsistent, as such incidents can
only logically flow from the doctrine that
the estate still remains in the mortgagor,
and that the mortgage is but a Uen for security of a debt.
These propositions being established, the
necessary
result is that the mortgage instrument, without any debt, liability, or obligation secured by it can have no present
legal effect as a mortgage or an incumbrance
upon the land. It Is but a shadow without
a substance, — an incident without a principal, — and it can make no difference In the
result whether there has once been a debt
or liability which has been satisfied,
or
whether the debt or liability to be secured
has not yet been created, and it requires,
as in this case, some future agreement
of
the parties to give it existence.
At most.
(4)
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is only between the nonentity
which follows annihilation and that which
the difference
precedes

existence.

The instrument can only take effect as a
mortgage
or incumbrance from the time
when some debt or liability shall be created, or some binding contract is made,
which is to be secured by it. Until this
takes place, neither the land nor the parties,
nor third persons, are bound by it. It constitutes, of itself, no binding contract.
Either party may disregard or repudiate it at
his pleasure.
It is but a part of an arrangement, merely contemplated as probable,
and whifh can only be rendered effectual by
the futm'e consent and further acts of the
parties. It is but a kind of conditional
proposition, neither binding nor intended to
bind either of the parties, till subsequently
assented to or adopted by both.
Though the question does not properly
arise here, we take it for granted, for the
pm-poses of this case, that the mortgage instrument may, if properly executed, go upon
the record,

and become effectual

between

the

parties when the debt or liability contemplated shall have been created, unless the
mortgagor has, in the meantime, — as he had
a clear right to do, — ^parted with the title
and deprived himself of the power of creating an incumbrance upon it. But the mere
recording of the instrument would not make
it a mortgage or incumbrance in legal effect, if it were not so before, nor give it a
greater effect as to third persons than it had
The record of such an
between the parties.
instrument might be an intimation that adwere contemplated
vances and indorsements
as probable, and that they might, therefore,
have been already made; and for this reason
might, to this extent, properly put a purBut
chaser or incumbrancer upon inquiry.
imless it is to have a greater effect than
the record of other mortgages, it could be
notice only of such facts as might have
been ascertained by inspection of the instrument and papers referred to, and by
inquiry; in other words, by a knowledge
of the rights of the parties in respect to
the land at the time notice became material, which, for the pm-poses of this case,
as already explained, we shall assume to be
from the time of Howard's purchase down to
the time when he recorded his deed. The result must, therefore, be the same here as
if there had been no record. Had Howard
made the most diligent inquiry in connection
with the inspection of the papers, what facts
could he have ascertained? Nothing material to the rights of the parties or to his
own rights beyond the facts already stated,
—nothing which, in any manner, interfered
with the mortgagor's absolute right of sale.
He would have leai-ned, in fact, that the
instrument recorded as a mortgage was not,
in legal effect, a mortgage, nor upon any
principle of justice or equity an incumbrance
upon the land; that either party had a per-

fect right to refuse to give that futiu-e assent, or to enter into that future contract
or arrangement,
by which alone it Could
acquire vitality or force.
He had, therefore, a just right to conclude that the record
of his deed would be fair notice to the persons mentioned as mortgagees, as the instrument could only become a mortgage subsequent to that time, and then only by reason
of some future debt or liability which it
required the further assent and agreement
of the parties to create. He had a right to
conclude that, upon every sound principle,
Ladue & Eldred would, as prudent men, be
as likely, and ought to be as much bound,
to look to the record before making any such
advances, or indorsing paper for the mortgagor, as if a new mortgage for the pm-pose were to be taken at the time, since they
had the same option to make the advances
or not, as any new mortgagee would have
had,

and

ought,

therefore,

to be governed

by the same prudential considerations.
And
they must be presmned to have known that
John Ladue, until such advances or indorsements were made by them, had full power
to sell the land free from any incumbrance
of the mortgage instrument, which had not
as yet become a mortgage.
But it is urged, on the part of the complainant, that it was the duty of Howard, on
making the purchase, to give actual notice
of the fact to the mortgagees, so that they
might not afterwards be led to incur further liabilities on the faith of the mortgage.
In England, where there is no general registry law by which the record of deeds and
mortgages is made notice to all the world,
and the state of the title cannot therefore
be always ascertained in this way as with
us, and where parties, therefore,
can only
rely upon actual notice, there may be good
reason for requiring actual notice in such
a case.
But upon no principle which
have
been able to comprehend,
do I think such
actual notice should be required in a case
like the present.
Nor have I been able to
see any just or substantial reason why the
record of Howard's deed (which was long
before this mortgage instrument took effect
as an incumbrance, and therefore prior in
fact and law) should not be deemed notice
to the mortgagees in the same manner, and
to the same extent, as if their mortgage had
not been executed or recorded until the time
when it became effectual as a mortgage by
their indorsements.
Within the very spirit
and purpose of the registry law, it seems
to me, the record of the deed must be held
notice in the one case as well as in the othview, it seems to me,
er. The opposite
rests upon the erroneous idea that the recording of a mortgage adds something to
its validity as between the parties, and that,
even as between them, an Instrument may
be made a mortgage by recording it, which
would not have that operation without the
This, certainly, is not the effect of
record.
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our registry laws.
If Howard could not rely upon the record of his deed for giving
notice to these mortgagees,
as to future

advances or Indorsements, without which
their mortgage instrument could never become effectual, even as between the parties,
then it is difficult to see why he should be
allowed to rely upon it as against any person who he might know had contemplated
purchasing or taking a mortgage upon the
property, and whose efforts or conversations
had gone so far as to render it probable to
the mind of such person that his preliminary negotiations or conversations might,
at some future period, have resulted in a
though at the time
purchase or a mortgage;
of the record of Howard's deed they had not
resulted in any binding contract whatever,
and both parties were at liberty to disregard them, without any breach of faith.
As to all such persons, it has, I think, been
generally conceded that the record of a deed
is sufficient notice. In Craig v. Tappin, 1
Sandf. Ch. 78, a ease cited by complainant's
counsel, it was held that notice that a mortgage was about to be made, is not enough
to bind a party with notice of the mortgage.
And see Gushing v. Hurd, 4 Pick. 252; Warden v. Adams, 15 Mass. 232.
I have thus fat endeavored to show that
upon principles resulting from the nature of
here, this morta mortgage,
as recognized
gage should be considered, in fact and in
legal effect, subsequent to the deed, and that
the registry of the deed should, therefore,
The
be considered notice to the mortgagees.
authorities upon this question are not so
numerous
as one would be led to expect;
but the few which are to be found are conflicting. I shall first notice those which are
at
clalriied to be opposed to the conclusion
which I have arrived. The English authorities upon this question I consider of very little, if any, weight, for the reason already
stated, and for the further reason that, for
is there still
several purposes, a mortgage
held to be a conveyance of the estate upon
condition, and the mortgag:ee as having the
legal title— a doctrine upon which the right
of tacking (never recognized in this state)
to some extent depends, the legal title coupled
with an equity being held to prevail over
Kent, Gomm. 117; Ooote,
4
an equity.
Mottg. 410 et seq.; opinion of Lord Granworth in Hopkinson v. Rait, 7 Jur. (N. S.)
1209.
The latter remark applies also with
equal force to the decisions cited from Kentucky. Nelson's Heirs t. Boyte, 7 J. J.
Marsh. 401, goes upon the express ground
conveys the legal title,
that the mortgage
therefore,
is not
and that the mortgagee,
bound to notice the recdrd of a mortgage subwho has
seqifently made by the mortgagor,
It cites Batik
only the equity of redemption.
v. Vance, 4 Lift. 173, as supporting the docNelSon
trine of tacking upon this ground.
as another reason,
T. Boyce also assigns,
why thfe record should not be notice, a pro-
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vision of their statute allowing sixty days
in which to record a mortgage, and says an
examination of the record by the first mortgagee might therefore be of no use. Now it
is clear that neither of these reasons for refusing to the record the effect of notice exists here.
Of the case of Burdett v. Glay, 8
B. Mon. 287 (besides the fact that the mortgagee there holds the legal estate), it may
further be noticed that, though the previously
mortgage
recorded
was in part to secure
future liabilities, yet all the liabilities were
incurred before the subsequent
mortgage.
There are some few cases in this country,
decided mainly, if not solely, upon the authority of Gordon v. Graham, 7 Vin. Abr. p.
52, 2 Bq. Gas. Abr. 598, which can have little
influence here, not only for the reason above
stated, but because the ease itself is no
longer law, even in England.
This case decided that a mortgagee holding a mortgage
to secure money lent, and future advances
(which he was not bound to make), was entitled to preference over a subsequent mortgagee, even for advances
made after notice of the second mortgage.
But so far as
relates to advances rdade after such notice,
this ease was expressly overruled by the
house of lords in Hopkinson v. Rait, 7 Jur.
(N. S.) 1209, 5 Law Times (N. S.) 90.
Most of the eases cited by complainant's
counsel against the proposition I have endeavored to establish have no bearing upon
the particular question we are now discussing.
Bank V. Finch, 3 Barb. Ch. 293, only
decides that when a mortgage is given to secure an existing debt, the mortgagee does not
lose his security by extending the time and
taking a renewal note for the same debt.
In Craig v. Tappin, 2 Sandf. Gh. 78, the
question of notice did not arise, and so far
as the reasoning of the court has auy bearing upon the present question, it is in favor
of the position
have endeavored to establish. In King V. McVickar, 3 Sandf. Gh.
208, Stuyvesant v. Hone,
1 Sandf.
Gh. 419,
and Stuyvesant v. Hall, 2 Barb. Ch. 151, no
of future advances or liabilities
question
was involved; but the question relating to
the effect of the record was similar to that
decided in this court in James v. Brown, 11
Mich. 25, and decided the same way, — a question so entirely foreign to that we are now
discussing as to require no comment
Eyer v. Bank, 11 111. 381, only decides that
a mortgage subsequently
executed is entitled
over one previously executed
to preference
for future advances, after notice of the second mortgage to the first mortgagee.
The
notice in this case happened to be an actilal
notice, but the question of the effect of the
record, as notice, was not involved nor decided.
Rowan v. Rifle Co., 29 Gonn. 282, has
The title
no bearing upon this question.
had never been in the debtor, but was conveyed by a third person to, and held by,
the creditors, in security for future advances
for the debtor, which the creditors had agreed
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to make.
The decision stands well upon two
grounds:
First. The title being in the creditors and not in the debtor, the creditors w^ere
not bound to notice the record of a mortgage
made by the debtor, who had no title. Second.
That the advances were not voluntary, the
creditors
$40,000,
being bound to advance
and the balance being advanced to save their
interest and to carry the contract into effect.
Hence the creditors were allowed priority for
all their advances, though part were made
after notice of the mortgage.
In Wilson v. Kussell, 13 Md. 495, the deed
of trust, which was in the nature of a mortgage, recited that the mortgagees had agreed
to loan the mortgagors their notes, from time
to time, as might be desired, etc. The case
seems to have been decided mainly on the
authority of Gordon v. Graham,— the authority of which is recognized, though it was
not needed in that case. It does not appear
whether there was actual notice of the second mortgage, and no difference is intimated
between actual notice, and the record.
In
Taylor v. Man's Ex'rs, 5 Kawle, 51, the question, so far as regarded the 'effect of the
record,
was similar to that in James v.
Brown. The judgment was, in legal effect as
well as in date, a prior incumbrance,
and
the mortgage, in legal effect as well as in
date, subsequent to it.
There were no future
advances in question.
There are, however, two cases (and they
are the only ones cited, or which I have met
with) which are directly opposed to the conclusion at which I have arrived, and which
go to the point that the record of Howard's
deed would not be notice to Ladue & Bldred.
McDaniels v. Colvin, 16 Vt. 300, and Truscott V. King, 6 Barb. 346; s. c. on appeal,
6 N. Y. 166.
McDaniels v. Colvin rests upon
the authority of English cases, among which
is that of Gordon
v. Graham,
which are
adopted by the court as authority. The case
expressly holds that the record of the second
mortgage could not be held notice, even as
to subsequent advances, under the first mortJudge Redfleld (afterwards chief jusgage.
See his remarks upon this
tice) dissented.
question (sustaining the views I have adoptAnd in the
ed). 12 Am. Law Reg. p. 191.
extent and character of the actual notice to
be given by the subsequent to the prior mortgagee, this case would not probably now be
recognized as law in any court in this country. Truscott v. King was the case of a
judgment to secure a sum due, as well as
future advances which might be made, and
a mortgage was subsequently made by the
Advances were made by the judgdebtor.
ment debtor after the mortgage was recorded. As decided in 6 Barb, it was held that
the judgment took precedence for all advances until actual notice of the mortgage,
on the ground that the record is only notice
to subsequent, and not to prior, incumbranIn the court of appeals (6 N. Y.),
cers.
where the judgment was reversed on other

grounds. Judge Jewett, who gives the leading opinion of the court, does not allude to
this point.
It is only alluded to by Edmonds, J., who says:
"It is well settled that
a judgment for future advances is good, not
only against the debtor, but also against subsequent incumbrancers,
at least up to the
time when a subsequent judgment or mortgage should intervene.
But when such subsequent incumbrance
may be said to intervene is not so well settled, whether at the
time it is put upon the record, or at the time
the prior incumbrancer has actual notice of
it The supreme court, in deciding the case,
held that it ought to be only from the time
of actual notice, because the docketing of a
judgment or recording of a mortgage was,
under the statute, notice only to subsequent,
In this, I
and not to prior, incumbrancers.
am inclined to think, the court was right."
Now, it seems; to me, the real question
which lay at the basis of the inquiry in the
above case, and to which that decided by the
court was only incidental and secondary,
was, which in legal effect was the prior,
and
and which the subsequent, incumbrance,
this depended solely upon the fact when, as
regarded the advances in question, they reDid the judgment, in
spectively took effect.
legal effect, become an Incumbrance for such
advances before they were made and before
there was any agreement that they should
What were the relative rights of
be made?
the parties to the judgment at the time the
Could the judgment
mortgage was recorded?
be enforced as an incumbrance for these advances, by reason of any rights or obligations existing between the parties at that
time?
If not, then, as to these advances,
there was no incumbrance
at the time the
mortgage was recorded and the incumbrance
of the judgment was, in legal effect, subseThis, which seems
quent to the mortgage.
to me to be the main question, is neither discussed nor alluded to either by the supreme
The court,
court or the court of appeals.
therefore, in simply saying that the record
of the mortgage is notice only to subsequent
incumbrancers,
assume, as it seems to me,
without an attempt to establish, the main
point in controversy.
There may, perhaps,
be some difference, in principle, between a
judgment given as security for future advances, and a mortgage given for a like purpose. But if there is not, and if the decision in Truscott v. King is to be considered
as equally applicable to a mortgage, then I
cannot resist the conviction that it is in direct conflict with the principles which necessarily result from the uniform course of decision in that state,— holding a mortgage to
be a mere security for, and incident of, the
debt, incapable of a separate and independent existence.
Having examined the cases relied upon by
counsel, as tending to conthe complainant's
trovert the conclusions at which
have arrived,
will now refer to those of an op-
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posite tendency,
some of which expressly
hold the record to be notice of the intervening conveyance or incumbrance.
In Collins v. Carlisle, 13 111. 254, there
was a mortgage to secure future advances,
and a contract subsequent in date and time
of record for the sale of the land by the
mortgagor,
both recorded.
It was held, the
mortgage was valid for those advances only
which M'ere made prior to the recording of
the contract. The principle is not discussed,
but it seems to be talien for granted that
the record of the contract was notice as to
advances afterwards made.
In Kramer v. Bank, 15 Ohio, 253, it was held
that a mortgage to indemnify against indorsements to be made for the mortgagor is valid
and constitutes a lien, which taiies precedence
of the hen of a judgment rendered after such
indorsements have been made. But it is said
the lien of a judgment would probably be preferred to the lien of the mortgage for advances made subsequent to the recovery of the
judgment.
The liability of the mortgagee had
attached before the subsequent judgment, and,
therefore, the point was not Involved.
But
in the subsequent case of Spader v. Lawler,
17 Ohio, 371, which was also the case of a
mortgage to secure future advances, it was
held that the mortgage must be postponed to
a mortgage subsequently recorded, but before
the future advances were made, thus directly
holding the record notice as to advances thereafter made under the first recorded mortgage;
in other words, treating the first as a subsequent mortgage in reference to advances made
after the record of the second. It is true that
one of the grounds upon which the decision
seems to be placed is that the record of the
mortgage (for the advances) ought to give notice of the amount of the incumbrance.
The first case, so far as have been able to
discover, which fully meets and discusses the
question upon principle, is that of Terhoven v.
Kerns, 2 Barb. 96." It was the case of a judgment to secure future advances, which were
optional; and it was held that such judgment, as to advances made after the rendition
of a subsequent judgment, was not a lien as
against the latter.
The judgments are treated by the court as standing upon the same
grounds as mortgages,
and the question is
discussed generally.
It is held, that a mortgage to secure future advances, which are optional, does not talie efiEect between the parties
as a mortgage or incumbrance
until some advance has been made,— that, if not made until after another mortgage or incumbrance has
been recorded, it is, in fact, as to such after
advances, a subsequent and not a prior incumbrance;
and that the record of the subsequently recorded mortgage is notice, as to such
after advances, as much as if the mortgage
first recorded had not been executed until aftThe doctrines
er such advances were made.
of this case were fully as strongly reaffirmed
Appeal, 36 Pa. 170.
in Bank of Montgomery's
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See, also, Parmenter v. GiUespie, 9 Barr. 86,
and note "a," as to distinction between cases
when the mortgagee is bound to make the adThe docvances, and when they are optional.
trine of these cases is pronounced reasonable
by Sanford, J., delivering the opinion of the
court in Boswell v. Goodwin, 31 Conn. 7i, and
he pointedly asks why such mortgage should
not be treated "in all respects as if executed
at the time when the advances are made."
But one of the judges dissented as to this
point, and the case was decided upon other
grounds.
Judge Eedfleld, late chief justice of Vermont, ably discusses this question in a note to
the case of Boswell v. Goodwin, 12 Am. Law
Reg. p. 92, arriving substantially at the same
conclusion as that at which
have arrived.

I

And Mr. Washburn in 1 Washb. Real Prop,
p. 542, says it seems now to be the general
rule.

The counsel for the complainant
have
strongly urged the inconverftence which must
result, especially to banks and bankers (who
are accustomed to take such mortgages), by
requiring an examination of the record every
time they are called upon to make such advances under such a mortgage.
Like Judge
Redfield (in the note above cited),
have not
"been able to comprehend'' this hardship.
It
is, at most, but the same inconvenience
to
which all other parties are compelled to submit when they lend money on the security of
real estate,— the trouble of looking to the
value of the security.
But, in truth, the inconvenience is very slight.
Under any rule of
decision they would be compelled to look to
the record title when the mortgage is originally taken. At the next advance they have only
to look back to this period, and for any future advance only back to the last, which
would generally be but the work of a few
minutes, and much less inconvenience
than
they have to submit to in their ordinary daily
business in making inquiries as to the responsibility, the signatures and identity of the parties to commercial paper.
But if there be any
hardship, it is one which they can readily
overcome, by agreeing to make the advances;
in other words, by entering into some contract,
for the performance of which, by the other
party, the mortgage may operate as a security. They can hardly be heard to complain
of it as a hardship that the courts refuse to
give them the benefits of a contract which,
from prudential or other considerations, they
were unwilling to make, and did not make until after the rights of other parties have intervened.
Courts can give effect only to the
contracts
the parties have made, and from
the time they took effect.
The decree must be reversed, and the biU
dismissed,
and the appellants
must recover
their costs in both courts.

I

MARTIN, C. J., and COOLBY, J., concurCAMPBELL, J., did not sit in this case.
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AETNA LIFE INS.

collect a tax of $15,000 upon the taxable propCO. OF HARTFORD
SAME t. erty of the inhabitants of the town to aid in
TOWN OP MIDDLEPORT.
TOWN OF BELMONT. SAME v. TOWN the construction of said railroad, provided
Watseka, a city in the county of Iroquois, sitOF MILFORD.
T.

(8 Sup. Ct. 625,

124

U. S.

Supreme Court of the United

534.)

States.

Feb.

6, 1888.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Northern District of Illinois.
This was an appeal from a decree of the
circuit court of the United States for the
Northern district of Illinois, dismissing on de-

murrer the bill of the Aetna Life Insurance
The subCompany,
the present appellant.
stance of the bill is that the complainant is
the owner of 15 bonds, of $1,000 each, issued
by the township of Middleport, in the state
of Illinois, dated February 20, 1871, and delivered to the Chicago, Danville & Vincennes
These bonds were payRailroad Company.
able to bearer, and were bought of the railwho paid
road company by the complainant,
value for them. The bill recited that this
railroad company was incorporated in 1865
under the laws of the state of Illinois, with
power to construct a railroad from a point In
Lawrence county, by way of Danville, to
the city of Chicago; that an act of the legislature of that state, passed March 7, 1867, aulying
cities, towns, or townships,
thorized
within certain limits, to appropriate moneys
and levy a tax to aid the construction of said
road; and "that said act authorized all incorporated towns and cities, and towns acting
lying wholly or
under township organization,
in part within 20 miles of the east line of the'
state of Illinois, and also between the city of
Chicago and the southern boundary of Lawrence county, In said state, to appropriate
such sums of money as they should deem
proper to the said Chicago, Danville & Vinto aid it in the
cennes Railroad Company,
of Its road, to be paid as soon
construction
as the track of said road should be laid and
through such cities, towns, or
constructed
townships: provided, however, that a proposishould first
tion to make such appropriation
be submitted to a vote of the legal voters of
such cities, towns, or townships at a regular,
annual, or special meeting, of which at least
ten days' previous notice should be givfen; and
also provided that a vote should be taken on
such proposition, by ballot, at the usual place
of election, and that a majority of the votes
cast should be in favor of the proposition.
And your orator further avers that said act
authorized and required the authorities of such
cities, towns, and townships to levy and collect such taxes, and to make such other provisions as might be necessary anti proper for
the prompt payment of such appropriations
It is then alleged that on the
60 made."
eighth day of .Tune, 1867, after due publication
of notice according to law, a meeting of
the legal voters of said town of Middleport was held, at which they cast their votes
by ballot upon the proposition to levy and

uated in or near the south line of said town,
should be made a point in said road; that it
appeared, on counting the votes, that 323 were
in favor of and 68 were against such tax, and
was duly dethat thereupon the proposition
clared carried, the proceedings relating to the
meeting and vote duly attested by the town
clerk and the moderator of the meeting, and
by said clerk duly recorded in the town records. The bill further aveiTed that the railroad company accepted this vote and appropriation of the township, and, relying upon
such vote and the good faith of said town, accepted the condition of the appropriation, and
constructed and completed its track through
said town; that on the tenth day of February, 1871, the board of town auditors adopted
a resolution of which the following is a copy:
"Whereas the township of Middleport did, on
the eighth day of June, 1867, vote aid to the
Chicago, Danville & Vincennes Raihroad Company to the amount of fifteen thousand dollars, and it appearing that said township is
unable to pay such amount in money, therefore
resolved by the board of auditors of said
township that bonds issue to said Chicago,
Danville & Vincennes Railroad Company to
the amount of fifteen thousand dollars, together with a sufficient amount to cover the
discount necessary on said bonds in negotiating the same, to-wlt, one thousand five hundred dollars; said bonds to be dated February 20, A. D. 1871, and to bear interest at the
rate of ten per cent, from date per annum,"
In pursuance of this resolution, it was alleged that on the twenty-fourth day of March,
and town clerk of Mid1871, the supervisor
dleport executed the 15 bonds which are the
subject of this suit; that "the said bonds were
numbered one to fifteen, inclusive, and were
delivered to the said railroad company, upon
the fulfillment of the conditions of said vote,
in payment of ninety cents on the' dollar of
the appropriation made to said company by
said vote; both partjes believing that said
bonds were fully authorized by law, and were
legal, valid, and binding on said town, and
|
. also believing them to be legal evidences of
the debt in favor of said company incurred
by said town in voting said appropriation."
It was then alleged that on or about the
twenty-sixth day of June, 1876, the town of
Middleport, which up to that time had paid
the interest upon the bonds, filed a bill in
equity in the circuit court for the county of
Iroquois against the complaihant corporation
as the holder of said bonds, and certain other
persons, "alleging, in substance, the making
and issuing of said bonds, as herein stated,
that the same were delivered to your orator,
and that your orator was the holder thereof,
and that the same were made and issued without authority of law, and were invalid, and
praying the court so to decree, and to enjoin
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your orator from collecting the same, and for
other relief, as by the record in the cause,
upon reference
thereto, will fully appear."
It was averred that the circuit court dismissed
the bill, but that upon appeal to the supreme
court of Illinois the decree dismissing it was
reversed,— that court holding that these bonds
were void, as issued without authority of law ;
and the case was remanded to said circuit
court for further proceedings, whereupon it
passed a decree, in conformity withtheopinion
of said supreme court, adjudging the bonds
void, and enjoined their collection.
The bill
then charged that said supreme court, while
holding the bonds to be void, did not deny,
but impliedly admitted, the validity of the
appropriation by the town, and insisted that
by the issue and delivery of said bonds to the
railroad company, and their sale by that company to the present complainant. It was thereby subrogated to the rights of action which
that company would have on the contract evidenced by the vote of the town, and the acceptance and fulfillment of the contract by
the railroad company.
It was also alleged
that no part of the principal sum named in
the bonds, or any part of said appropriation,
had ever been paid, but that, on the contrary, the town of Middleport denied all liability therefor; that ever since the purchase
of said bonds the complainant had continued
to hold, and then held, the same, and had been
and then was the holder of all rights which
the railroad company or its assigns had
against said town by reason of the premises.
A decree was then prayed for that the town
of Middleport should pay to complainant the
amount found due, and should without delay
levy and collect all taxes necessary for such
payment;
also, that the court would enforce
the rights of complainant by writs of mandamus, and such other and further orders and
decrees according to the course of equity as
should be necessary
and proper;
and also
prayed that W. H. Leyford, in whose hands
as receiver
Danville & Vinthe Chicago,
had been placed
cennes Railroad Company
might be
by the court, it being insolvent,
To this bill
made a party defendant thereto.
the defendant demurred,
and assigned the
following as causes for demurrer:
First. That said bill does not contain any
matter of equity whereon this court can
ground any decree or give complainant any
relief as against this respondent.
Second. Bill shows it is exhibited against
respondent
and the Chidago,
Danville &
Railroad Company and William
V'incennes
Leyford, its receiver, as respondents thereto,
and the facts set forth therein show the same
relief cannot be granted against all of said
respondents, and fails to state facts showing
jointly liable, but stated facts
respondents
which show this respondent, if liable at all,
is not jointly liable or in any manner connected with the others, and the bill is multifarious.
Third. Fails to show any written agreement
on which suit is brought that would bind re-
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spondent, and fails to state facts showing a
cause of action exists against respondent that
arose within five years last past before bringing suit.
Fourth. Fails to show any written agreement on which suit is brought binding on respondent on which has arisen a cause of action within the last ten years prior to bringing this suit.
Fifth. Fails to set forth facts showing an
excuse for the great delay in bringing suit
which is shown on face of bill, and equity
will not relieve against laches.
Sixth. Bill contains many blanks of dates
and names and nothing on face of bill from
which facts can be obtained to fill same.
The court below sustained the demurrer,
and dismissed the bill, from which judgment
complainant appealed.
O. J. Bailey, Jas. H. Sedgwick, and Francis
Fellowes, for appellant.
Robert Doyle, for
appellee.

Jlr. Justice MILLER, after stating the case
as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
In the argument of the demurrer before
the circuit court, several objections to the
bill

were taken.

The defendant in error,

however,
relies here upon three principal
gi'ounds of defense: First, it denies the right
of subrogation, upon which rests the whole
case of the complainant; second, it relies
upon the statute of limitations of five years;
and, third, it asserts that the former decree
in the state court is a bar to the action here.
The circuit court held that the statute of
limitations was a bar to the present suit,
and dismissed the bill on that ground.
But we regard the primary question,
whether the complainant is entitled to be
substituted to the rights of the railroad company after buying the bonds of the township, a much more important question, and

are unanimously of opinion that the transaction does not authorize such subrogation.
The bonds in question in this suit were delivered by the agents of the town of Middleport to the railroad company, and by that
company sold in open market as negotiable
instruments to the complainant in this action. There was no indorsement, nor is there
any allegation in the bill that there was any
express agreement
that the sale of these
any obligation
bonds
carried with them
which the company might have had to enforce the appropriation voted by the towil.
Notwithstanding the averment in the bill
that the intent of complainant in purchasing
said bonds, and paying its money therefor,
was to acquire such rights of subrogation,
it cannot be received as any sutflcient allegation that there was a valid contract to
that effect. On the contrary, the bill fairly
presents the Idea that by reason of the facts
of the sale the complainant was in equity
subrogated to said rights, and entitled to enforce the same against the town of Middle-
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port. The argument of the learned counsel
in the case is based entirely upon the right
of the complainant to be subrogated to the
rights of the railroad company by virtue of
the principles of equity and justice. He
does not set up any claim of an express con-

tract for such subrogation. He says: "The
t'quity alleged in the plaintiff's bill is, as
1 liave said, the equity of subrogation. Before proceeding to call the attention of the
court to the facts from which this equity
arises, it may be useful to advert to the instances in which the right of subrogation exists, and to the principles on which it rests."
He founds his argument entirely upon the
proposition that when the complainant purchased these bonds he thereby paid the debt
of the town of Middleport to the railroad
company, as voted by it, and that, because it
paid this money to that company on bonds
which are void, it should be subrogated to
the right of the company against the town.
The authorities on which he relies are all
cases in which the party subrogated has
actually paid a debt of one party due to
another, and claims the right to any security which the payee in that transaction had
against the original debtor. But there is no
payment in the case before us of any debt
of the town. The purpose of the purchase as
well as the sale of these bonds, and what
the parties supposed they had effected by it,
was not the payment of that debt, but the
sale and transfer of a debt of the town from
one party to anothei', which debt was evidenced by the bonds that were thus transferred. Neither party had any idea of extinguishing by this transaction the debt
of the town. It was very clear that It was
a debt yet to be paid, and the discount and
interest on the bonds was the consideration
which induced the complainant to buy them.
The language of this court In Otis v. Cullum, 92 tl. S. 447, is very apt, and expresses
precisely what was done in this case. In
that case Otis & Co. were the purchasers of
bonds of the city of Topeka from the First
National Bank of that iplace. These bonds
were afterwards held by this court to be
void for want of authority, just as in the
case before us. A suit was brought against
the bank, which had failed and was in the
hands of a receiver, to recover back the
After refermoney paid to it for the bonds.
ring to the decision of Lambert v. Heath, 15
Jlees. & W. 486, this court said: "Here, also,
the plaintiffs in error got exactly what they
intended to buy, and did buy. They took no
guaranty. They are seeking to recover, as
it were, upon one, while none exists. They
are not clothed with the rights which such
Not
a stipulation would have given them.
having taken It, they cannot have the benefit of it. The bank cannot be charged with a
liability which it did not assume. Such securities throng the channels of commerce,
which they are made to seek, and where
they find their market. They pass from

hand to hand like bank-notes.
The seller is
liable ex delicto for bad faith; and ex contractu there Is an Implied warranty on his
part that they belong to him, and that they
are not forgeries. While there is no express
stipulation, there is no liability beyond this.
If the buyer desires special protection, he
must take a guaranty. He can dictate its
terms, and refuse to buy unless it be given.
If not taken, he cannot occupy the vantage
ground upon which it would have placed
him." Page 449.
Nor can this case be sustained upon the
principle laid down in this court in Louisiana V. Wood, 102 TJ. S. 294. That was a case
in which the city of Louisiana, having a
right by its charter to borrow money, had
issued bonds and placed them on the market
for that purpose.
These bonds were negotiated by the agents of the city, and the
money received for their sale went directly
into its treasury. It was afterwards held
that they were invalid for want of being
registered.
Afterwards the parties who had
bought these bonds brought suit against the
city for the sum they had paid, on the
ground that the city had received their money without any consideration, and was bound
The court
ex aequo et bono to pay it back.
said: "The only contract actually entered
into Is the one the law implies from what
was done, to wit, that the city would, on demand, return the money paid to it by mistake, and, as the money was got under a
form of obligation which was apparently
good, that interest should be paid at the legal rate from the time the obligation was
denied."
In the present case there was no borrowing of money. There was nothing which
pretended to take that form. No money of
the complainants ever went into the treasury
of the town of Middleport; that municipality never received any, money in that transIt did not sell the bonds, either to
action.
complainant or anybody else. It simply delivered bonds, which it had no authority
to issue, to the railroad company, and that
corporation accepted them in satisfaction of
the donation by way of taxation which had
been voted in aid of the construction of its
road. The whole transaction of the execution and delivery of these bonds was utterly
void, because there was no authority in the
town to borrow money or to execute bonds
for the payment of the sum voted to the
They conferred no right
railroad company.
upon anybody, and of course the transaction
by which they were passed by that company
to complainant could create no obligation, legal or implied, on the part of the town to
pay that sum to any holder of these bonds.
City of Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 U. S. 190,
5 Sup. Ct. 820, sustains this view of the subject. That town had issued bonds for the
purpose of aiding in the construction of a
system of water-works. In that case, as in
Louisiana v. Wood, the bonds were so far
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excess of the authority of the town to
create a debt that they were held by this
court to be void, in the case of Buchanan v.
Litchfield, 102 U. S. 278. After this decision,
Ballon, another holder of the bonds, brought
a suit in equity upon the ground that, though
the bonds were void, the town was liable to
him for the money which he had paid in

their purchase. This court held that there
was no equity in the bill, on the ground that,
if the plaintiff had any right of action
against the city for money had and received,
it was an action at law, and equity had no
jurisdiction.
In
It was also attempted.
that case, to establish the proposition that,
the money of the plaintiffs having been used
in the construction of the water-works, there
was an equitable lien in favor of the plaintiffs on those works for the sum advanced.
This was also denied by the court.
One of the principles lying at the foundation of subrogation in equity, in addition to
the one already stated, that the person seeking this subrogation must have paid the
debt, is that he must have done this under
to save himself from losa
some necessity,
which might arise or accrue to him by the
enforcement of the debt in the hands of the
original creditor; that, being forced under
such circumstances to pay off the debt of a
creditor who had some superior lien or right
to his own, he could, for that reason, be subrogated to such rights as the creditor, whose
debt he had paid, had against the original
debtor.
As we have already said, the plaintiff in this case paid no debt. It bought certain bonds of the railroad company at such
discount as was agreed upon between the
parties, and took them for the money agreed
But, even if the case
to be paid therefor.
here could be supposed to come within the
rule which requires the payment of a debt in
order that a party may be subrogated to the
rights of a person to whom the debt was
paid, the payment in this case was a voluntary interference of the Aetna Company in
It had no claim against
the transaction.
It had no interest
the town of Middleport.
at hazard which required It to pay this debt.
If it had stood off, and let the railroad company and the town work out their own relations to each other, it could have suffered
There was no obligano harm and no loss.
tion on account of which, or reason why, the
complainant should have connected itself in
any way with this transaction, or have paid
this money, except the ordinary desire to
The
make a profit in the purchase of bonds.
fact that the bonds were void, whatever
right it may have given against the railroad company, gave it no right to proceed
upon another contract and another obligation of the town to the railroad company.
These propositions are very clearly stated in
a useful monograph on the Law of Subrogation, by Henry N. Sheldon, and are well established by the authorities which he cites.
is derived from
Tl)eili)CtrinAO(,Sii'"-"srf'<^ion
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the civil law, and "it is said to be a legal Action, by force of which an obligation extinguished by a payment made by a third person is treated as still subsisting for the benefit of this third person, so that by means of
it one creditor is substituted to the rights,
* * *
remedies, and securities of another.
It takes place for the benefit of a person
who, being himself a creditor, pays another
creditor whose debt is preferred to his by
being
reason of privileges or mortgages,
obliged to make the payment,
either as
standing in the situation of a surety, or that
he may remove a prior incumbrance from
the property on which he relies to secure his
Subrogation, as a matter of right,
payment.
independently of agreement, takes place only
for the benefit of insurers; or of one who,
being himself a creditor, has satisfied the
lien of a prior creditor; or for the benefit of
a purchaser who has extinguished an incumbrance upon the estate which he has purchased; or of a co-obligor or surety who has
paid the debt which ought, in whole or in
part, to have been met by another." Sheld.
Subr. §§ 2, 3.
In section 240 it is said: "The
doctrine of subrogation is not applied for the
mere stranger or volunteer who has paid the
debt of another without any assignment or
agreement
for subrogation, without being
under any legal obligation to make the payment, and without being compelled to do so
for the preservation of any rights or property of his own." This is sustained by a
reference to the cases of Shinn v. Budd, 14
N. J. Bq. 234; Sandford v. McLean, 3 Paige,
117; Hoover v. Epler, 52 Pa. St. 522.
In Gadsden v. Brown, Speer, Eq. 87, 41,

Chancellor Johnson says: "The doctrine of
subrogation is a pure, unmixed equity, having its foundation in the principles of natural justice, and from its very nature never
could have been intended for the relief of
tliose who were in any condition in which
they were at liberty to elect whether they
would or would not be bound; and, so far
as
have been able to learn Its history, it
has never been so applied. If one with a
perfect knowledge of the facts will part
with his money, or bind himself by his contract in a sufliclent consideration, any rule
of law which would restore him his money
or absolve him from his contract would subvert the rules of social order.
It has been
directed In its application exclusively to the
relief of those that were already bound,-who
could not but choose to abide the penalty."
This Is perhaps as clear a statement of the
doctrine on this subject as is to be found
anywhere.
Chancellor Walworth, In the case of Sandford V. McLean, 3 Paige, 122, said: "It Is
only in cases where the person advancing
money to pay the debt of a third party
stands in the situation of a surety, or is
compelled to pay it to protect his own rights,
that a court of equity substitutes him in
the place of the creditor, as a matter of
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course, ■without any agreement to that effect.
cases the demand of a creditor,
which Is paid with the money of a third person, and without any agreement that the security shall be assigned or kept on foot
for the benefit of such third person, is abso-

In other

lutely extinguished."
In Railroad Co. v. Dow, 120 U. S. 287, 7
Sup. Ct. 482, this court said: "The right of
subrogation is not founded on contract. It
is a creation of equity; is enforced solely
for the purpose of accomplishing the ends
of substantial justice, and is independent of
any contractual relations between the parties."
In the case of Shinn v. Budd, 14 N. J.
Eq. 234, the New Jersey chancellor said
(pages 236, 237): "Subrogation as a matter
of right, as it exists in the civil law, from
which the term has been borrowed and
in our own, is never applied in
adopted
aid of a mere volunteer. Legal substitution into the rights of a creditor, for the
benefit of a third person, takes place only
for his benefit who, being himself a creditor, satisfies the lien of a prior creditor, or
for the benefit of a purchaser who extinguishes the incumbrances upon his estate,
or of a co-obligor or surety who discharges
the debt, or of an heir who pays the debts
of the succession.
Code Nap. bk. 3, tit. 3,
art. 1251; Civil Code La. art. 2157; 1 Poth.
Obi. pt. 3, c. 1, art. 6, § 2. 'We are ignorant,'
say the supreme court of Louisiana, 'of any
law which gives to the party who furnishes
money for the payment of a debt the rights
of the creditor who is thus paid. The legal
claim alone belongs, not to all who pay a
debt, but only to him who, being bound for
it, discharges it.'
Nolte & Co. v. Their Creditors, 9 Mart. (La.) 602; Curtis v. Kitchen,
8 Mart. (La.) 706; Cox v. Baldwin, 1 Miller,
(La.) 147. The principle of legal substitution.

adopted and applied In our system of
equity, has, it Is believed, been rigidly restrained within these limits." The cases here
referred to as having been decided in the
supreme court of Louisiana are especially
applicable, as the Code of that state is in the
main founded on the civil law from which
this right of subrogation has been adopted
by the chancery courts of this country. The
latest case upon this subject Is one from
the appellate court of the state of Illinois,—
Suppiger v. Garrels, 20 Bradw. 625,—the substance of which Is thus stated in the sylla"Subrogation in equity Is confined to
bus:
the relation of principal and surety and
guarantors; to cases where a person, to protect his own junior lien, is compelled to remove one which is superior; and to cases of
insurance. ♦ ♦ * Any one who Is under
no legal obligation or liability to pay the
debt is a stranger, and, if he pays the debt,
a mere volunteer."
No case to the contrary
has been shown by the researches of plaintiff in error, nor have we been able to find
anything contravening these principles in
our own investigation of the subject. They
are conclusive against the claim of the complainant here, who in this instance Is a
mere volunteer, who paid nobody's debt,
who bought negotiable bonds in open market without anybody's indorsement,
and as
a matter of business.
The complainant
company has therefore no right to the subrogation which it sets up in the present action.
Without considering the other questions,
which Is unnecessary, the decree of the circuit court Is affirmed.
These principles require, also, the aflirmance of the decrees in the cases of the same
appellant against the town of Belmont, (No.
1,135,) and the town of Milford, (No. 1,136;)
and so it is ordered.
as
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PUSEY

V.

(1 Vern.

Michaelmas

Term.

PUSEY.
273.)

Nov. 20, 1684.

Bill was that a horn, which, time out of
mind, had gone along with the plaintiff's
estate, and was delivered to his ancestors
in ancient time to hold their land by, might
he delivered to him; upon which horn was
this inscription, viz. "Pecote this horn to
hold huy thy land."
The defendant answered as to part, and
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demurred as to the other part, and the demurrer was that the plaintifE did not by
his bill pretend to be entitled to this horn,
either as executor or devisee; nor had he in
his bill charged it to be an heir-loome.
The demurrer was overruled, because the
defendant had not fully answered all the
particular charges in the bill, and was orAnd the lord keeper
dered to pay costs.
was of opinion that if the land was held by
the tenure of a horn or cornage, the heir
would be well entitled to the horn at law.
Vide 1 Inst. 107a.
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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
HALI,

V.

WARREN.

(9 Ves.

Chancery.

605.)

July

4, 1804.

The bill was filed to obtain a specific performance of an agreement, executed by the
defendant, for the sale of an advowson
and estate to the plaintiff. Hall, in trust,
for the other plaintiff, Hanson, at such price
as the advowson should be valued at by
Mr. Morgan, and the other premises by persons to be nominated.
The agreement was
dated the 9th of March, 1802.
On the 8th
of May following, under a commission of
lunacy, the defendant was found a lunatic
from the 1st of May, 1792, with lucid intervals.
Two grounds of defence were taken by
the answer of the lunatic, by his committee:
1st, that he was Insane at the time of the
execution
of the contract: 2dly, that the
plaintiffs knew his situation, and took advantage of It, to induce him to sell to Hall;
concealing the circumstance, that Hanson
was the real purchaser; being aware, that
from a former quarrel the defendant would
not sell to him. A great deal of evidence
was gone into, on both sides, as to his state
of mind.
Mr. Eomilly, Mr. Stanley, and Sir Thomas
Turton, for plaintiffs, pressed for an issue;
insisting upon their right to a decree, upon
the ground, either that the defendant was
not a lunatic, when he entered into the contract; or, that it was executed in a lucid
interval. They had not traversed the inquisition.
Mr. Piggott, Mr. Fonblanque, and Mr.
Cooke,
for defendant.— The rule, as laid
down by Lord Thurlow, in Attorney General
V. Parnther, 3 Brown, Ch. 441, 443, is, that
where a person seeks to avoid his own act,
by alleging incompetence
at the time, the
proof is incumbent upon him. But where it
has been previously found, that the party to
be affected by the transaction, was not competent at a previous date, those who seek
to bind him, must show his competence at
the time.
It is difficult to determine the
degree of capacity necessary to characterLord Thurlow seems to
ize a lucid interval.
think it sufliclent, that any man would suppose him capable of transacting for himself.
This plaintiff has had the opportunity of
In Owen v. Datraversing the inquisition.
vies, 1 Ves. Sr. 82, Lord Hardwicke takes
the distinction between the case of an estate
vested in trustees, and in the lunatic himself; observing, that in the latter case that
circumstance may prevent the remedy in
equity, and leave it at law.
But, independent of the question of sanity,
at the date of this transaction, to obtain a
performance under such circumstances, the
terms of the contract ought to be clearly
fair, reasonable, and certain. In
proved,
this instance, the value of the advowson was
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to be ascertained by the actuary of an insm-ance ofiice, who was nam'ed; and the value
of the other premises by other persons, to be
It does not appear, that these
nominated.
valuers ever were named; and that cannot
be supplied by the court; who cannot give
the arbitrator the information, which the
How can this court
party could have given.
supply the want of judgment as to the value
In Emery v. Wase, 5 Ves.
of. the timber?
an
846, 8 Ves. 505, Lord Alvanley considered
agreement to sell according to the valuation
of another person, not such as the court
Praying an
would be desirous to enforce.
issue, and undertaking to show a lucid interval at the date of the agreement, they
must also show, that the plaintiff was bound
at that time. An issue is granted only in
aid of a legal right, as that of an heir at
law: not where the object is the specific perIn that case the
formance of an agreement.
course required, that the plaintiff should
have previously ascertained his right at law;
that he should show, he had sustained damage, which was not repaired by the verdict;
and that the very essence of the relief was,
that he sliuuld have the thing in specie.
Mr. Eomilly, in reply. — An agreement to
sell at the valuation of another person is not
unusual. The chance is perfectly equal.
In
Emery v. Wase the decision was not upon
If the party refuses to name
that ground.
a valuer, the court refers it to the master.
A plaintilf clearly has a right to a specific
performance;
even though a jury would
give twice the amount in damages.
Upon
the question of lunacy, it is clear, a lunatic
is bound by an act done in a lucid interval;
and till the act of Geo.
(St. 15 Geo. II, p.
607, c. 80), even marriage, contracted in a
lucid interval, was good. The person who has
a contract with the lunatic, is permitted to
traverse; as he may show, that the party
with whom he contracted never was a lunaBut the question, whether the defendtic.
ant was a lunatic at the date of the agreement, could not have been tried in a travIn Ex parte Feme, 5 Ves. 450, 832.
erse.
Lord Rosslyn's opinion was, that the jury
could not find as to any intervening period.
But certainly the question, whether he was
in a lucid interval, could not have been tried;
the inquiry in such a proceeding as to that,
being, whether the party is liable to lucid
intervals;
not as to the particular time.
It
seems to be supposed, that, if the defendant
is now a lunatic, the contract cannot be
executed;
by analogy to criminal cases, in
which a man who becomes a lunatic, at any
time before execution, is not punished.
But
if that objection holds in civil cases, It will
apply equally to prevent a decree for a spe-

II

cific performance against the representatives;
for they cannot tell what the lunatic might
have said.
In Owen v. Da vies there happened to be trustees: but this party does not
object;
but chooses to take the title with
the defect
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THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS. The object of tbis bill is to obtain the specific perSupposing
the
fonuance of an agreement.
contract to have been entered into by a competent party, and to be in the natm'e and
circmnstances of It unobjectionable, it i.s as
much of course in this court to decree a
specific performiince, as it is to give damages
7 A'es. 30.
See White v. Damon,
at law.
Upon
The contract is produced and proved.
to prevent
the face of it nothing appears
There is nothing unreasonable,
execution.
as between the parties, upon the face of it.
It fixes no value upon the estate: but it
provides a mode, in which the value is to
be ascertained,
that is perfectly fair and
equal between them.
It must be supposed,
that if competent, they had taken the proper
means of getting at the real value, by employing persons of skill to value the advowson and the farms.
The first objection
against carrying this agreement into execution is, that in consequence of some dispute
with Hanson, the defendant had an objection to dealing with him. But the evidence
does not bring it up to that; showing, not
that he made any declaration to that effect,
but only, that some quarrel had taken place,
totally unconnected with the subject of the
therefore, that
contract.
The circumstance,
Hall is a nominal contractor, is immaterial;
for it happens in a vast proportion of cases,
that the contract is entered into in the name
of a trustee.
But the principal objection to the performance is, that the defendant was not competent, having been insane at the time the contract bears date. That is matter of fact.
In support of that fact alleged, the inquisition is produced: by which the defendant is
found a lunatic from a period long antecedent, but with lucid intervals. That inquisition, having been taken in the absence of
upon him.
the plaintiff, is not conclusive
Biit it is evidence prima facie of the lunacy.
It is however competent to third parties to
dispute the fact; and to maintain, that, notwithstanding the inquisition, the object of it
was of sound mind at any period of the time
which it covers. An opportunity, it is said,
has been already afforded of traversing the
and undoubtedly,
if it would
inquisition:
have answered the plaintiff's purpose merely to have traversed and contradicted
the
finding, by showing that the defendant was
not a lunatic, he ought to have embraced
that opportunity: and it was unnecessary
But if,
to come here in the first instance.
as it is said, he may have been a lunatic,
with reference to the general state and habit
of his mind, during a considerable space of
time, but with lucid intervals, and the contract was executed during one of those lucid
intervals, I doubt very much whether that
whethcould have been got at by a traverse;
er, upon that proceeding, it could have been
ascertained, that upon a given day he had a
lucid interval; which might cume to be a

material inquiry with reference to the execution of this contract; for though the plaintiff wishes for an issue upon both points, he
seems from the general tenour qf his statemem to confide more in establishing a lucid
interval than in negativing the fact, that the
defendant
ever was deranged.
It was not
therefore improper for the plaintiff, under
these circumstances, to waive the opportunity
of traversing, and to come here for an issue;
upon the supposition, that the contract was
entered into, either by a person who was not
a lunatic;
In the
or in a lucid interval.
latter case it would be equally binding; for
the law upon this subject is, that all acts
done dui'ing a lucid interval are to be considered done by a person perfectly capable
managing,
of contracting,
and disposing of,
his affairs, at that period.
This has more
frequently occurred upon wills. A multitude of questions has been raised upon the
execution of a will during a lucid interval;
and, that being proved, the will has been held
valid and effectual, to all intents and purposes,
for the conveyance of real and personal es-

tate, as if the testator had never been deranged.
It must be the same as to contract, or any disposition of property..
If he
had made an absolute conveyance it would
have been good, if made in a lucid interval.
The question, therefore, being reduced to
to prevent
the fact, there is no circumstance
supposing the
the execution of the contract;
party to have been competent; and the fact
of his competence ought to be put in a course
I should certainly refuse, upon
of inquii-y.
the evidence before me, to determine that
he was not a lunatic; and as to a lucid interval, upon this evidence, I should hesitate
considerably; not being sufficiently apprized
of his life at that
of all the circumstances
particular period. The history of the contract itself is not brought forward. The circumstances of the negotiation do not appear.
Something material to the competence might
arise or result from the very mode in which
In one case,
the negotiation was conducted.
I remember, the manner, in which the will
was written and executed, went a great way
towards showing, it was in a lucid interval:
the mode of the act being part of the evidence of the testator's sanity.
See Temple v.
Temple, 1 Hen. & M. 47<i. There is some
general evidence with reference to his situation for some considerable time previous to
the contract; and very little negative evidence: none applying exactly, or approaching
nearly, to the period, except the servant's;
and that not of a nature to be conclusive;
supposing the evidence strong about the period.
But it is for a jury to determine, what
was the degree of efficiency and competence
of his mind at the time. All the difficulties
suggested by the defendant,
the plaintiffs
will have to struggle with; for, if general
lunacy is established, they will be under the
necessity of showing, according to Attorney
General v. Parnther, that there was, not
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merely a cessation of the violent symptoms
of the disorder, but a restoration of the
faculties of the mind, sulHcient to enable the
party soundly to judge of the act. That is
an inquiry much more fit for examination
viva voce before a jury, than upon written
depositions.
There is nothing, therefore, to prevent my
sending it to that inquiry. Difficulties indeed are suggested, supposing even that it
should be found that the contract was made
in a lucid interval, as to the mode in which
it is t© be carried into execution; for it is
said, as to that, there are provisions in it,
which cannot now be executed.
I do not
see those difficulties so strong as to be convinced, that it is Impossible
to execute It;
that the previous Inquiry is not to be made,
and would b« nugatory; for If there was
a valid and binding contract, the supervening
incapacity of one party cannot deprive the
other of the benefit.
Nothing appears in the
acts to be done, so purely personal, that they
cannot be supplied without the intervention
of the mind and the act of the party; for
they are to be done with reference to a given
mode; and with regard to ascertaining the
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value, a mode equivalent,
and as effectual
and fair, may be found. So, as to the objection from the difficulty of making the
conveyance,
the difficulty that struck Lord
Hardwicke, in Owen v. Davies, was avoided
there;
But it does
as there were trustees.
not appear to me, that, if the plaintiff is satisfied with that which is in truth no title,
but only an enjoyment under this court, he
ought not to have all the court can give
him.
It Is disadvantage to him, of which
the other cannot complain,
that he cannot
get a good title; but must rest an Indefinite
period, without a title, having only the enjoyment. These difficulties are not so strong
Inquiry, before
as to preclude the previous
we can ascertain the precise mode, in which
the subsequent parts are to be carried Into
execution.
Therefore take an issue.

The Issue directed was the same as in a
former case of Clerk v. Clerk, 2 Vern. 412,
whether the defendant was a lunatic at the
time of the execution of the contract; and
if so, whether he had lucid Intervals; and
whether the contract was executed during a
lucid InteiTal. Niell v. Morley, 9 Ves. 478.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
BINDGB
(57

Commission

V.

N. Y.

BAKER.
209.)

of Appeals

Cases.

1874.

Action to recover one-half the expense of
party-wall in Norwich, Chenango county.
The parties agreed by parol, in April, 1869,
or cellar-wall of
to construct a basement
stone eight feet high, one-half of the width
of 'Vvhich should stand upon the plaintiff's
land and the other half upon the defendant's
land, and to build upon the stone wall a partition of wood between their respective adThis agreement as the
joining buildings.
plaintifC testified, was before the commencement of the construction of the stone wall so
far modified that the partition above the
of brick
stone wall was to be constructed
instead of wood. In pursuance of this agreement each party at his own expense built
one-half of the basement wall, and laid upon
sleepers upon
this wall, thus constructed,
which to rest the first floor of their respective buildings. The plaintiff so constructed
the cellar or basement wall of his building
as to correspond to the basement stone wall
his
and procured
erected by the parties,
building timber to be cut the proper length
for use in the brick wall, in the construction
of which the defendant had agi'eed to join
him.
The defendant then refused to join the
plaintifC in the construction of the brick \yall,
whereupon the plaintifC gave him notice to
join In its consti-uction, and that in case of
his failure to do so, he should proceed and
construct it and compel him to pay one-half
The deof the expense of its construction.
fendant again refused to join the plaintiff
in its constmction, and forbade him from
constructing it on the defendant's premises.
The plaintiff then proceeded and constructed
the wall and brought this action to recover
one-half of the necessary expenses of its
Judgment for plaintiff.
construction.
a

Charles JIason, for appellant

E. H. Prin-

dle, for respondent.

GRAY, C. The contract, under which the
parties commenced and proceeded in the construction of the party-wall, was for an interest in land, an easement which could not
have been acquired by parol; and the defendant's failure to perform it, however injurious that failure may have been to the
plaintiff, would not, had the contract remainhave afforded him a
ed wholly unexecuted,
But the defendant having
cause of action.
proceeded with the plaintiff in its execution,
so far as to lead the plaintiff to believe that
the contract was made not only in good faith
but that it would be fully executed on the
part of the defendant, insomuch, that the
plaiiitiff had contributed his share to the construction of that part of the wall which by
the contract was to be made of stone; had,
at the same time, constructed the cellar or
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basement walls in his own apartment to conform to the party-wall thus constructed by
the equal contribution of the parties; and
had also procured his timber for use In the
construction of the residue of his building, to
be cut of the length requisite for use in the
brick wall, which by their agreement, the
defendant was, after the completion of the
stone wall, to join in constructing upon It.
His failure, at this stage of the performance
of the contract, by refusing to join in that
part of the party-wall which was to consist
of a brick wall above and to rest upon the
stone wall, operated under the circumstances, as a fraud upon the plaintiff; and hence
in an action for specific performance an equiestoppel upon the defendant
table
would
have been established, and with the right of
the plaintiff to a decree against the defendant for a specific performance of the contract; or, in other words, that he join the
plaintiff in constructing the brick wall, as
the jury in answer not only to the Interrogatory submitted to them, but in substance, by
their general verdict, found he had agreed to
do. 2 Story, Eq. Jur., § 750; Will. Eq. Jur.
283; Malins v. Brown, 4 N. Y. 403, 407, 411.
But, because the plaintiff had, and might
have pursued this remedy, it by no means
proves that he had no other remedy equitable in its character, which would produce
the same result in less time and at less exbetter
pense, and under the circumstances,
adapted to the ends of justice in a case like
The time
consideration.
the one under
which would necessarily have been consumed in the prosecution of an action for specific
delay in
and the consequent
performance,
the erection of the wall would, under the
exigency of the case in hand, and with all
by the plaintiff for
needful arrangements
completing his half of the wall, and using it
in the construction of other parts of his
building, result in damages to him nearly as
great, if not greater, than the expenses in-

curred in constructing the defendant's half.
Such a remedy was therefore so inexpedient
as to amount to a denial of justice, and if
the plaintiff has no other equitable remedy,
or is not permitted to avail himself of one,
he must bear with conceded injustice and
blame the law. Such a state of things ought
not to be tolerated, and need not be, where
principles prevail. If
equitable
established
at the joint
the wall had been constructed
as In good conexpense of both parties,
science it should have been, and repairs upeach party
on it had become necessary,
would have been obliged to conti'ibute to
them, and if either party, after notice by the
other to do so, had declined, the party giving
the notice (as the plaintiff did in this case),
might have proceeded, made the repairs, and
maintained his action for the amount of onehalf of the expense incurred in making them,
upon the ground that the benefit was equal,
and that even-handed justice would compel
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each party to bear his share of the burden.
Campbell v. Mesier, 4 Johns. Ch. 334, 338,
339, 8 Am. Dec. 570.
A decree for specific performance is nothing more or less than a means of compelling
a party to do precisely what he ought to
have done without being coerced by a court.
Such a decree might well go further, and provide that in case of delay by the defendant
beyond some reasonable time, to be fixed by
the court after notice of the decree, the
plaintiff might proceed and erect the wall,
one-Ualf of the necessary expense of which
should be paid by the defendant And now
that the plaintiff has, after due notice, borne
the defendant's share of the burden, and
done exactly what would necessarily by a
decree for specific performance have been
adjudged that the defendant ought to have
done without suit, no good reason can be
assigned why, when the exigency of the case
has rendered the remedy by action for specific performance wholly inadequate to accomplish the ends of justice, the defendant
should not be held responsible for his share
of the burden when it is shown that in equity he ought to do so, upon the same principle
that a party who ought in equity to contribute one-half of the necessary expense of repairing a wall is bound, after notice and refusal, to pay the adjoining owner who has
exrepaired it one-half of the necessary
penses of the repairs; and notwithstanding
the facts which establish the equitable obligation to build may be widely different from
such as would establish an equitable obligation to repair, yet the principle upon which
contribution is enforced is the same in each
case. Contribution was at one time enforced
only in a court of equity, and it was said by
Baron Parlie (6 Mees. & W. 168) that Lord
Eldon regretted, not without reason, that
courts of law had ever assumed jm-isdietion
of the subject; they have nevertheless done
so, and as Justice Bronson said in Norton v.
Coons, 3 Denio, 130, 132, "borrowed their jurisdiction on this subject from courts of equity, and along irith it, taken the maxim that

equality is equity." And Story, in his work
upon Contracts (second volume, § 885), referring to contribution by co-sureties or coguarantors, says, it was formerly questioned
whether at law contribution could be enforced without some positive agreement to
that effect; but it is now well established
that it may be enforced both in law and equity.
The right to maintain such an action
at law has not, in this state, been questioned
in modern times, and especially where the
remedy can be as conveniently administered
in an action at law as in equity, since both
are administered by the same judge.
The judgment should be afllrmed.

DWIGHT, O. This is an action brought to
recover the one-half of the amount of the
expense incurred by the plaintiff in building
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of the
a party-wall between the premises
plaintiff and the defendant.
The plaintiff
bases his right of action on a parol agreeIt
ment between him and the defendant.
appeared at the trial, according to the testimony of both parties, that there had been
such an agreement
to build a stone wall,
which was suitable as a foundation for a
partition-wall to rest upon, and that was actually carried out by their mutual consent
and acts.
Whether there was an agreement
to go further, and to build a party-wall was
The plaintiff's claim was, that
contested.
there was an agreement to build at joint expense, a wooden partition between buildings
lots of the
to be erected on the respective
parties, and that this was afterward so modi-

fied as to substitute a brick partition-wall in
The question was submitted to
its place.
"Did the
the jury in the following form:
defendant,
E. D. Baker, agree with the
plaintiff, H. A. Rindge, that he would join
with said Rindge in the building of the brick
wall in question?" The jury found in the

afiirmatlve.
The form in which the case is presented
for the consideration of this court is, assuming the existence of the parol agreement, and
that the foundation-wall was actually built
by both parties, and that the defendant now
refuses to go on and complete the brick portion of the wall, can the plaintiff, upon due
notice, complete that portion of the wall at
his own expense, and recover from the defendant his proportion of the outlay? It is
to be observed that this is not the ordinary
case of an easement created by parol, but
that it is a more special inquiry, whether a
parol agreement to build a wall is enforceable in a court of justice, and if so, whether
it can be substantially enforced under the
facts of the present case by an action to recover the amount necessarily expended in

consti'uctlon.
It will be proper to consider
at the outset whether a written agreement
to build a wall is capable of enforcement in
equity. If not, it would of course follow
that a parol agreement partly executed cannot be. On the general question of enforcing
a covenant to build or to repair, there has
been great diversity of opinion, and the decisions are conflicting. The leading authorities in England are Mosely v. Virgin, 3 Ves.
Jr. 185; Wilkinson v. Clements, L. R. 8 Ch.
App. 96. Other cases are collated in Story,
Eq. Jur. §§ 725, 729 (11th Ed.). In Wilkinson V. Clements, supra, one of the latest decisions by the appellate court, it is said to
be the settled rule in England that the court
will not in general enforce a covenant to
build houses. The principal reason seems to
be that damages supply an adequate comWhere, on the other hand, dampensation.
ages will not answer, the usual rule prevails,
and a remedy will be gi-anted in equity, on
account of the inadequacy of the relief at
law. This was the result in that case; and a
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com-t would have had jurisdiction In respect
It has
to it in case it had been in writing.
already been shown that the court would
have enforced
the
the contract between
plaintiff and defendant had it been written.
The next inquiry is, whether the plaintiff
was bound to resort to the remedy of specific
performance?
It would seem not. Specific
performance
is merely a remedy for an existing right; each of the parties, by force of
the contract, became a trustee for the other;
there was an equality of burdens as well as
of rights growing out of the contract relaSpecific performance
tions of the parties.
is
but a single mode of enforcing the equitable duties growing out of these relations.
The parties have voluntarily subjected themselves to the rule that "equality is equity;"
each of them having thus become equitably
bound to pay his share of the amount necessary to construct the wall, is liable in equity to an action for contribution. This has
been applied to cases of contribution between
Story, Eq. Jur. § 64, f; 1
co-contractors.
Pars. Gout. 31. The whole doctrine rests
upon principles of natural justice and equity.
Tlie plaintiff had his choice of remedies.
in
He might demand specific performance;
which case he would pay only one-half of
the expense, and insist upon the defendant's
rendering the other half; or, after demand
and refusal, he might build the entire wall
and bring his action for contribution. He
has elected to take the latter course.
It is claimed that the present action is
not an equitable one. The fact that it is
brought for money is not decisive upon that
The real test in such an action is
point.
this: if it be brought, far damages or breach
case at law; if it_^be
of contract it Is
brought for money, by way of performance
Thus
is a case in equity.
of the contract,
where a vendor, in a contract for the sale of
land, sues for the price, his action Is equitaThe mutuality of the contract gives
ble.
and
each of the parties the same remedy;
yet the recovery by the vendor is simply in
money.
If this theory did not prevail- in
the
respect to contracts partly performed,
vendor would be utterly without remedy,
since
is well settled that there is no action at law on a parol contract in part perThat the vendor can have an equiformed.
in
table
action
for money is established
Crary v. Smith,
N. Y. 60; Brown v. Haff,
Paige, 240; "Will. Eq. Jur. 290. The action in the present case was brought for relief, and the facts disclose an equitable
The fact that
cause of action.
was tried
by jury, with consent of parties, is immaterial, as the court might, of its own motion, have submitted the questions to
jury;
and any informality in the mode of procedure was waived by mutual consent.
No
preliminary settlement of the issues is requiColnjan v. Dixon, .50 X. Y. 572.
site.
This view of the case is strengthened by
2

it

a

it

party having iioiformed his part of the contract had his remedy in equity, against the
The point in Mosely v. Virgin
othea- party.
was, that an agreement to build may be enforced if sufficiently certain and specific.
The
This is the view of Mr. Justice Story.
cases earlier than Willdnson v. Clements are
collected in Beck v. Allison, 4 Daly, 421, in
which case the conclusion is maintained, in
an elaborate opinion, that in a proper ease,
the jm-isdiction to decree specific performance of a covenant to repair exists, the case
being placed on the same general ground as
The present
that of a covenant to build.
by
case falls within the rule established
tliese authorities. It was not a general and
indefinite covenant.
The place on which the
wall was to be erected was fixed by the contract; its length, height and thickness were
prescribed, as well as the materials of which
This is the test
it was to be constructed.
given in Mosely v. Virgin, supra, and in StoThe plaintiff could have had
ry, Eq. § 727.
no adequate remedy in damages, as he needed to have the wall stand on the defendant's
land, in order to carry out his building as it
The result is that if the agieewas planned.
ment had been in writing it would have been
enforced by a court of equity.
The next inquiry is, whether the act of
building the stone foundation-wall was such
a part performance as to take the case out
of the statute of frauds. This is not an instance of a mere parol license, executed in
part; it is rather that of an agreement, from
which the defendant was to receive the same
The inducement on
benefit as the plaintiff.
the defendant's part to allow the plaintiff's
wall to stand on his land, and to aid in constructing it, was the fact that he was to receive a benefit from having the same support to his own part of the wall, from the
service
plaintiff's land and a corresponding
If, then, the court will not
and expenditure.
entertain an action for specific performance
in the present case, it will be because there
are some parol agreements which have been
partly carried out that do not fall within the
general rule that part performance takes the
Xo reason
case out of the statute of frauds.
can be given why an ordinary contract to
land in fee shall be withdrawn
purchase
from the statute by part performance, which
will not apply to the present case. Mr. Frye
states the rules as follows:
(1) The act of
must be referable to the
parol performance
(2) They
alleged agreement and no other.
must be such as render it a fraud on the defendant, to take advantage of the contract
not being in writing.
(3) The agreement to
which they refer must be such as in its own
nature is enforceable by the court. (4) There
must be proper evidence of the parol agreeFry, Spec. Perf. (Am. Ed.) 251. All
ment.
of these exist in the present case. In commenting upon the third, he remarks that the
agreement must be of such a nature that the
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tli« fact that the common-law courts hold
that if a tenant In common, or joint tenant, or other person who Is under a duty to
repair,
fails to contribute after a demand
by a co-tenant or co-obligor, the latter, on
incurring the necessaiy expense, may bring
an action on the case to recover the proportionate share of the defaulting party. Loring V. Bacon, 4 Mass. 575; Mumford v.
Brown, 6 Cow. 475, Iti Am. Dec. 440; Doane
V. Badger, 12 Mass. 65.
This action is based
on a failure to discharge the equitable duty
Imposed on the defendant which is derived
from the principle of natural justice lying at
the root of the doctrine of contribution.
It is
however urged that the defendant does not,
by this action, obtain an easement of permanent value to himself. The answer is that if
he does not he suffers only by his own neglect.
The correct view however is that the
judgment will establish his right and act as
an estoppel against the plaintiff and all claiming under him, as the existence of the easement is the very proposition which it is necessary to establish in order to recover.
A
final suggestion is that the parol contract
having been partly executed, the parties to
it are estopped from denying the existence
of the easement. The authorities are quite
distinct to this effect, and the proposition is
fully justified by the rules of estoppel as applied to the case of expenditures made upon
of
land on the faith of the representations
an owner.
Brown v. Bowen, 30 N. Y. 541,
86 Am. Dee. 406; 3 Washb. Real Prop. 68,
In, Campbell v. McCoy, 31
and cases cited.
Pa. 263, a parol executed agreement to erect
a dam was held to be irrevocable in equity,
and that it created a permanent right which
would survive the erection itself. Rerick v.
Kern, 14 Serg. & R. 267, 16 Am. Dec. 497.
The same rule was applied to tiie laying
down of water-pipes in Le Pevre v. Le
Pevre, 4 Serg. & R. 241, 8 Am. Dec. 696.
In
McKellip V. Mcllhenny, 4 Watts, 317, 28 Am.
Dec. 711, the doctrine was applied to a license to flood land, on which money and labor had been expended, on the faith of the
Beatty v. Gregory, 17 Iowa, 114, 85
license.
Am. Dec. 546, is a case of a wall partly built
on a licensee's land.
There is, in some of the authorities, a confusion growing out of a want of accurate
discrimination between cases arising in law
and equity. At law a parol license, owing
to the statute of frauds, is revocable at the
pleasure of the licenser, notwithstanding the
of money on his land by the liexpenditure
The cases on this subject are so nucensee.
merous and so uniform that it would be a
waste of time to refer to them. In equity
As a court of
the rule is quite different.
equity will take a parol contract for the sale
of lands out of the statute of frauds, when
it is partly performed, it will, on the same
principle, treat an executed parol contract
for an easement as equivalent to a grant
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under seal, where the parties cannot be reUnder this
stored to their original position.
doctrine the acts of the parties in the present case have created a permanent easement
upon the land, of which all who may purThe
chase of them are bound to take notice.
judgment for the plaintiff, in the present case,
simply recognizes the existence of that easement, and the added duty or obligation of
mutual contribution for its erection and
maintenance.
The judgment of the court below should
be affirmed.

REYNOLDS, C. It appears to be conceded that the agreement to erect the partywall created, or was intended to create an
easement in land, and that to make it valid,
it should have been in writing. It was by
parol, and was doubtless void under the statute of frauds. The parties however proceeded under it, so far, as that it is also agreed,
that in consequence of part performance
the
plaintiff might, after the repudiation by the
defendant, have appealed to a court of equity to compel him to specifically perform; and
yet it is conceded that a resort to this remedy would have been, if successful,
inadequate to redress the injury to the plaintiff.
In the earlier days of the law, a party having some claim to equitable relief was obliged to resort to a tribunal exercising
that
sort of jurisdiction, invented,
it is said, in
some of the old books, to do justice in cases
wherein the courts of common law were deficient, and of the common law it has been
said that by reason of its flexibility it was
capable of affording an adequate remedy in
most cases of wrong. It however did happen that separate courts of common law and
equity jurisdiction did exist for a long time,
and until within a comparatively recent period, existed in this state;
and it may not
be denied that under this system, by reason
of the ignorance of counsel or the learning of
judges and chancellors, it occasionally happened that suitors were found in the wrong
forum and turned away without relief on
payment of costs.
Of whatever magnitude
such an evil may have been it seems very
clear to, me, that it was attempted
to be
remedied by our constitution of 1846 and the
Code of 1848, with its multitude of modifications.
It is suggested that the present action is
one at common law and carmot be maintained upon a void contract.
This general
It is
rule no judge or lawyer will dispute.
further said, the plaintiff's remedy was in
equity, where he should have succeeded, but
success would have been of no practical
value; in other words, the remedy would
have been worse than the disease.
He came
into a court having general jurisdiction both
in law and equity, and stated the facts of
his case in his complaint, as he was authorized by law to do, and in the most essential
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particular proved their truth, as is found by
the verdict of the jury, and had judgment.
If he may not have properly had judgment,
it being agreed that he was entitled to relief, where else should he go to obtain it?
The court to which he applied had the authority to do him justice in some form, and
it could turn him over to none other; for no
other court existed to which he could apply
for the remedy he was in some form entitled
to. Since the radical changes to which reference has been made, it has sometimes been
very dithcult to distinguish by any thing
that appears in a pleading, between an action
at law or a suit in equity.
Before the
change in practice, the distinction between a
common-law declaration and a bill in chancery was very well understood.
Now both
jurisdictions are blended, and a party is permitted to state his case upon its facts, in his
own form, and to take such relief as he ought
to have, If he be entitled to any, and if he
makes any mistake in his allegations
the
court may. In its discretion, conform the allegations to the facts proved, and give the
appropriate judgment which either law or
equity demands.
General jurisdiction, both
in law and equity, having been united in
the same court, with a form of procedure
common to all cases, it is difficult by the
mere inspection of a pleading, to determine
whether a given case is to be governed by
rules;
and I am of the
legal or equitable
opinion, that the inevitable result of such a
system will be the abolition of all substsintial distinctions between law and equity. If
different and distinct forms of pleading and
proceeding were preserved, the two separate
jurisdictions might be longer continued, even
of
when the same court took cognizance
both.

It Is said that this is a pure and simple action at law, to recover damages for the
It must be conbreach of a void contract.
fessed that the complaint bears some of the
common-law
decmarks of an old-fashioned
laration, omitting its prolixity. But, as
understand,
it also states in a concise form
all the facts upon which the plaintiff relies
for relief, and these facts have, .at least substantially, been found by the jury to be true.
Why may_not this, under the present, sysa bill in equity?
It is quite
/ fem,~15ecalled
rfrue that there is no prayer for specific perperformed
con) formance of the partially
tract, but that is not of the slightest conseJIarquat v.
quence, as has been often held.
ilarquat, 12 N. Y. 336; Emery v. Pease, 20
In the latter case, what was from
N. Y. 62.
the prayer of the complaint, regarded by the
whole supreme court as an action at law,
to recover money due upon an account stated, and the plaintiff nonsuited because he
had not appealed to the equity ear of that
court was, in the court of appeals, disapproved, because the facts stated entitled the
plaintiff to an accounting as in the case of a
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partnership, and the case thereafter proceeded upon that theory.
That case, In principle, does not appear to me to be unlike this,
so far as the form of proceeding and forum
is concerned.
It seems to be clear that the
defendant ought to have done as he verbally
agreed to do. He had got the plaintiff into
more or less difficulty, for the reason that
his promises had been not only relied upon,
but his fidelity evinced by acts tending to
the consummation
of the common purpose.
He then repudiates, and the plaintiff must
suffer great injury if he stops the improvement contemplated, and incur extra cost and
expense if he perform the work and furnish
the material which the defendant agreed to
do and ought to have done.
It is quite true that the defendant forbade
the plaintiff from proceeding to complete the
party-wall according
to the mutual parol
agreement, but if the matter had gone so far
as that equity would compel him to complete
it, his order to stop could be of no more force
or effect than that of an ancient monarch
who ordered the waves of the ocean to be
stayed.
It is further urged that even if tibe defendant pay the judgment against him, he has no
grant of an easement to continue the partywall on the land of the plaintiff. This in
one sense may be entirely true, but the same
law that, in effect, compels him to perform
his agreement with the plaintiff by paying
damages, will protect him in the enjoyment
of every right of property which he could
have had if he had not made it necessary to
appeal to the courts.
It does not appear
that he ever requested the plaintiff to grant
him any easement whatever; and we are
not to assume that if he had, and offered to
fulfill the conditions of his part of the agreeIndeed,
ment, it would have been refused.

if it appeared in his answer in this case
that he had offered to pay (which was at
least equal to performance) upon the condition that the plaintiff' granted an easement
equal to what the contract demanded, I think
the court ought to and would have so ordered, but the defendant put his right upon
an entirely different contingency and must
abide

the result.

Another objection is made against the propriety of the judgment of the supreme court
in this case that there is no precedent for it,
and that it is the very first of the kind
known to the law. While I do not quite
agree to the fact as alleged, I am yet willing to assume that there is no case reported
in the boolis which affords an exact precedent for the judgment I am prepared to give.
Where precedents are reasonable they furnish a safe guide to follow; and where they
are unreasonable,
as is not uncommon,
a
delicate and difficult question is often presented.
But where there are no precedents
that appear to be binding upon the conscience of a court, the demands of justice re-
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quire that, In a proper

case, one should be
made.
In the present case we all agree that
the plaintiff has sustained an injury for
which he should have redress, and there is
no complaint that the judgment below has
awarded him more damages than he was
fairly entitled to recover.
It is possible that

OF CONTRACTS.

575

a case precisely like this has never before
arisen, but if any shall hereafter arise, it
may as well be understood that a party thus
injured is not without an adequate remedy

in the courts.
The judgment of the supreme court should
be affirmed, with costs.
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ADDERI^EY

v.

DIXON.

(1 Sim. & S. 607.)

Chancery.

The plaintiffs having purcliased and talxen
assignments of certain debts wliicli had beL'U
proved under two commissions of bankrupt,
agreed to sell them to the defendant for 2s.
6d. in the pound.
The defendant's solicitor, accordingly, gave
notice of the sale to the assignees, and prepared an assignment of the debts, and the
plaintiffs, notv^^ithstanding
the purchase money had not been paid, executed it, and signed
money, and
the receipt for the consideration
The bill vras
left It in the solicitor's hands.
to
filed to compel the defendant specifically
perform the agreement, and to pay the purchase money to the plaintiffs.
The defendant, by his answer, submitted
that the matter of the agreement was not the
proper subject of a bill in equity for a specific
and claimed the same benefit
performance;
as if he had demurred to the bill.
Mr. Sugden and Jlr. Garratt, for plaintiffs.
Mr. Hart and Mr. Treslove, for defendant.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR.

Courts of eqperformance
of contracts, not upon any distinction between realty and personalty, but because damages at law
may not, in the particular case, afford a comThus a court of equity decrees
plete remedy.
of a contract for land, not beperformance
cause of the real nature of the land, but because damages at law. whicli must be calculated upon the general money-value of the
land, may not be a complete remedy to the
purchaser, to whom the land may have a peSo a court of eqculiar and special value.
uity will not, generally, decree performance of
a contract for the sale of stock or goods, not
because of their personal nature, but because
damages at law, calculated upon the marketprice of the stock or goods, are as complete a
remedy to the purchaser as the delivery of
the stock or goods contracted for; inasmuch
as, with the damages, he may purchase the
same quantity of the like stock or goods.
In Taylor v. Neville, cited in Buxton v.
Lister, .3 Atk. 383. specific performance was
decreed of a contract for the sale of 800 tons
of iron, to be delivered and paid for in a certain number of years and by instalments; and
the reason given by Lord Hardwicke, is that

uity decree the specific
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such sort of contracts differ from those that
are immediately to be executed. And they do
differ in this respect, that the profit upon the
contract being to depend upon future events,
cannot
be correctly
estimated in damages
where the calculation must proceed upon conjecture.
In such a case to compel a party to
accept damages for the non-performance
of
his contract, is to compel him to sell the actual
profit which may arise from it, at a conjectural price. In Ball v. Ooggs, 1 Brown, Pare
Cas. 140, specific performance was decreed in
the house of lords of a contract to pay the
, plaintiff a certain annual sum for his life, and
I also a certain other sum for every hundred
; weight of brass wire manufactured
by the defendant during the life of the plaintiff.
The
I
same principle is to be applied to this case.
Damages might be no complete remedy, being
to be calculated merely by conjecture;
and to
compel the plaintiff in such a case to take
damages would be to compel him to sell the
annual provision during his life for which he
had contracted,
at a conjectural
price.
In
Buxton V. Lister, Lord Hardwicke puts the
1 case of a ship carpenter
purchasing
timber
was peculiarly convenient to him by
j which
reason of its vicinity; and also the case of an
owner of land covered with timber contracting to sell his timber in order to clear his
land; and assumes that as, in both those cases, damages would not, by reason of the special circumstances be a complete remedy, equity would decree a specific performance.
The present case being a contract for the
s.ile of the uncertain dividends which may become payable from the estates of the two
bankrupts, it appears to me that, upon the
principle established by the cases of Ball v.
Coggs, and Taylor v. Neville, a court of equity
will decree specific performance, because damrepresent the
j ages at law cannot accurately
j value of the future dividends;
and to compel
this purchaser to take such damages would be
to compel him to sell these dividends at a conj
; jectural price.
It is true that the present bill is not filed by
[
the purchaser, but by the vendor, who seeks,
not the uncertain dividends, but the certain
sum to be paid for them.
It has, however,
been settled, by repeated decisions that the
remedy, in equity must be mutual;
and that,
when a bill will lie for the purchaser, it will
also lie for the vendor.
Vide Withy v. Cottle, 1 Sim. & S. 174.
Hamblin t. Dinneford
2

Bdw.

531.
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HODGES

V.

KOWING

et ux.

Atl. 979, 58 Conn. 12.)
Court of Errors of Connecticut.

(18

iupreme

April

15,

1889.

Fairfield county; Fenn, Judge. ,
Suit by P. H. Hodges against E. W. Sowing and wife for specific performance of a
contract for sale of land. Judgment for
plaintiff, and defendants appeal.
D. B. Lockwood and E. W. Seymour, for
T. "W. Wheeler and H. J. Curtis,
appellants.
for appellee.
Appeal from superior court,

BEARD SLEY, J. On tHe 17th day of August, 1887, the defendants entered mto the
Stratfollowing contract -with the plaintiff:
ford, Ausust 17th, 1887. We agree to purStratford,
chase of P. H. Hodges his place in
Conn., containing fifteen acres, more or less,
for the sum of nine thousand five hundred
dollars; to pay six thousand cash, and three
thousand five hundred on bond and mortgage
for one year; to take title immediately, and
possession on the lirst of January, 1888, and
have paid him one hundred dollars on acEliza Kowcount. Edwin W. Rowing.
ING." Ko writing relating to the contract
The court bewas signed by the plaintiff.
low, upon the petition of the plaintiff, decreed that the defendants should specifleally
perform the contract, from which decree they
They claim that under
appeal to this court.
the statute of frauds the plaintiff was not
bound by the contract, not having signed any
memorandum of it, and hence that it should
not, in equity at least, be enforced against
them, and make this claim the ground of one
The statute, reof their reasons of appeal.
quires only that the written agreement shall
"
be signed by the party to be charged therewith." The defendants rely upon certain
cases as authority for their claim, and among
others upon the cases of Benedict v. Lynch,
1 Johns. Ch. 370, and Lawrenson v. Butler,
Both of these cases are
1 Schoales & L. 13.
in accord with the claim of the defendants;
but the former case is opposed to the numerous decisions in the state of New York on the
same subject, and the latter case to nearly all
the English decisions. In the case of Clason
V. Bailey, 14 Johns. 484, Chancellor Kent,
after reviewing the New York decisions,
says that "it is sufficient if the agreement be
" In the
signed by the party to be charged.
the
English decissame opinion he reviews
"There is
ions up to that time, and adds:
and united
nothing
to disturb this strong
of
current of authority but the observation
Lord Redesdale in Lawrenson v. Butler, 1
Schoales & L. 13, who thought that the contract ought to be mutual, and that if one
party could not enforce it the other ought
not. " The authority of Lawrenson v. Butler
seems not to have been recognized in EngThe more recent decisions in that
land.
country are referred to in 1 Benj. Sales, §§ 254,
There is still some conflict in the de255.
cisions in this country, but the weight of auHUa'CH.& BUNK.EQ.-37
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thority is that the statute of frauds is satisfied by the signature to the contract of the
party sought to be charged only, whether the
suit to enforce it be at law or in equity, and
whether it relates to the sale of real or personal estate.
CJa-son v. Bailey, 14 Johns.
484; McCrea ^ Purmort, 16 Wend. 460;
Richards v. Grsen, 23 N. J. Eq. 536; Railroad
Corp. V. Evans, 6 Gray, 33; Sutherland v,.
Briggs, 1 Hare, 34. We think that there is
not sulHcient ground for this reason of appeal.
Another reason of appeal is "that the specific execution of the contract should not have
been decreed, because it is too uncertain to
be enforced, inasmuch as it could not be understood from the writing itself without the
"
No
necessity of resorting to parol proof.
objection seems to have been made to the contract when it was offered in evidence, and
therefore the objection now made, that it is
void upon its facCj comes too late to be entitled to consideration. But the claim, if
seasonably made, would have been unfounded.
The defendants do not specify in their reasons
of appeal, or in their brief, the particulars
in which they claim that the contract is deficient in certainty.
We suppose their claim
to be that the statement of the location of the
land is too indefinite to satisfy the requirement of the statute of frauds. If the only
description of the land had been "fifteen
acres, more or less, in the town of Stratford, "
there would have been force in this claim,
though according to the decisions of courts of
high authority such a description might have
been applied to the land intended by it by extrinsic evidence. In the case of Hurley v.
Brown, 98 Mass. 545, the only description in
the contract of the property agreed to be conveyed was "a house and lot on Amity street."
The court admitted evidence that there was
only one house and lot on Amity street which
the defendant had a right to convey, and that
the parties had been in treaty for the purchase and sale of it, and that the subjectmatter of the contract might be thus identiSee, also, Mead v. Parker, 115 Mass.
fied.
413; Robeson v. Hornbaker, 3 N.
Eq. 60.
In the present case the court finds that the
plaintiff owned no other real estate in Stratford, and that the same was occupied by hitn
as a homestead and residence.
But we think
that the description of the land in this contract is so definite as not to require a resort
to extrinsic evidence to identify it, other
than such as is always necessary to apply a
description of real estate to the premises described.
The language of the contract is:
"
We agree to purchase of P. H. Hodges his
place at Stratford, containing fifteen acres,
more or less."
The import of the word
"place" in this connection is reasonably certain. Its popular and correct meaning, as
thus used, is the place where one resides; his
The
homestead.
Webst. Diet., in tierbum.
court finds that the plaintiff told the defendants, before they signed the contract, that
the place contained about 15 acres, and that
The
this statement was made in good faith.

J.
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defendants assign as a reason of appeal that
"there was not about fifteen acres of land."
It is enough to say that the court does not
find that there were not 15 acres in the place,
but evidently declined to make such a finding.
The defendants introduced the recitals in two
deeds as evidence of the quantity of land in
One was the deed to the plaintiff
tlie place.
of the land, in which was added to the description of the quantity of land the words
"more or less," and the other was a conveyance of a small strip of the land to a railroad
company, specifying the quantity conveyed.
Except for the words "more or less" in the
deed to the plaintiff, it would have appeared
that there was a fraction of an acre less than
The court, referring
15 acres in the piece.
to this evidence, says: "There was no evidence as to the exact quantity of land except
"
It properly rethe recital in said deeds.
garded those recitals as inconclusive eviThe remaining reason of appeal is
dence.
that the plaintiff had adequate remedy at law.
The defendants claim that the equitable jurisdiction of the courts in this state was restricted by the provision in the old statute
last found in Revision 1875, p. 413, § 5, that
courts of equity shall "take cognizance only
of matters in which adequate relief cannot be
had in the ordinary course of law," and that
that provision is still in force. It is unnecessary to inquire whether that provision has not,
as the plaintiff claims, been since repealed by
the practice act passed in 1879, because, in
our view, it did not have the restrictive effect claimed for it. A similar claim was
made by the defendant in the case of Munson
v. Munson, 30 Conn. 425, and the court say
the provision referred to "is simply an afiirmThe
ance of a well-settled rule of equity."
rule of equity is thus stated by Judge Swift:
"It is a leading principle that equity will not
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interpose where there is an adequate remedy
at law.
It is not sufSvjient that there is a
remedy, but it must be as complete and beneficial as the relief in equity. " 2 Swift, Dig.
c. 1, § 1. In the action at law for the breach
of the contract the plaintiff could only recover the excess, if any, of the sum agreed to
be paid for the land above its market value
when the contract was to be performed . Such
a remedyis manifestly inadequate, and courts
of equity, therefore, hold, as a general rule,
that when a contract for the sale of real estate has been fairly entered into, the party
contracting to sell, as well as the party contracting to buy, is entitled to have it specifically performed. The cases on this question are all one way. It is true courts of
equity have, in the exercise of their discretion, refused to apply the rule in certain
cases where it would be productive of hardship or inconvenience. The court did so in
the case of Whitney v. City of New Haven,
23 Conn. 624. In that case the city had contracted to purchase from the plaintiff land
and water-rights for the purpose of providing
a watei' supply, and afterwards voted to abandon the project contemplated by the purchase.
The court dismissed the bill for a
specific performance, but remark as follows
in their opinion: "As a general rule, where
the purchaser of real estate can come into a
court of equity, to obtain a deed of it, the
vendor can come there to get his money,
which was agreed to be paid; but the rule is
not universally true, and it should not be applied, we think, where it wiU do unnecessary
mischief to one of the parties." In the present case the contract appears to have been
fairly made, and is subject to the general rule
of equity. There is no error in the judgment complained of. The other judges concurred.
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PORTER

V.

D.

(24

Supreme

FRENCHMAN'S

LAND
Atl.

Judicial

&

814,

WATER

BAT
CO.

& MT.

Court

of

Maine.

Jan.

15,

1892.

Report from supreme judicial court, Hancock county.
Bill in equity by Margaretta ,B. Porter
against Frenchman's Bay & Mt. Desert Land
& Water Company, to wMcli respondent demurred.
On report.
Demurrer sustained,
and bill dismissed.
Deasy & Higgins, for plaintifE.
Hamlin, for defendant.

LIBBEY, J.

Hale

&

Bill in equity, praying for
for a specific performance of a contract in writing, made by tbe defendant
with the plaintiff, for the purchase of a lot
of land in the village of Sorrento.
It comes before this court on a demurrer
and the questo the bill by the defendant,
tion to be determined is whether, upon the
allegations in the bill, this court has jurisdiction in equity to decree a specific performance.
We thinii it clear that In a proper case
the court has jurisdiction to decree specific
performance or a contract in writing for the
conveyance of land, in a bill brought by the
Rev. St. § 6, c. 77,
vendor or by the vendee.
«1. 3.
But the court in this state does not
take jurisdiction in equity when the plaintiff
has a plain, adequate, and complete remedy
in an action at law. Milliken v. Dockray,
■decree

80 Me. 82, 13 Atl. 127; Bachelder T. Bean,
76 Me. 370; Alley v. Chase, 83 Me. 537, 22

Atl.

84 Me. 195.)
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393.

And we think it must appear by the allegations in the bill, where an action at law
may be mamtained,
that the remedy by
it is not plain, adequate, and complete; for
It is a well-established rule of equity pleading that the bill must contain allegations
showing that the court has equity jurisdicStory, Eq. j^l. §§ 10, 34; Jones v.
tion.
Newhall, 115 Mass. 244, 252, 253.
In this case, we think it perfectly clear
that the plaintifE has a right to maintain an
action at law for a breach of the contract.
That being so, to show jurisdiction in equity,
there should be some allegations In the bill
showing that the remedy at law would not
There is nothing
be adequate and complete.
of the kind in this bill. After setting out
the contract, it alleges that the plaintiff was
in possession of the land, and has continued
to be in possession of the land, to the time
of the filing of the bill; no allegation that
her action in regard to the land was in any
way changed by the making of the contract;
no allegation that anything had been done by
either party, in consequence of the making
of the contract, which could not be taken
into consideration in the assessment of the
plaintiff's damages.
Demurrer sustained.
Bill dismissed, with
costs.

PETERS, C. J., and WALTON, VIRGIN,
EMERY, and WHITEHOUSE, JJ., concurred.
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BUMGARDNER
(13

Supreme

et al. v.

LEAVITT

et al.

S. E. 67. 35 W. Va, 194.)

Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
March 31, 1891.

Appeal and supersedeas from circuit court.
Wood county.
Barna
Loomis & Tavener, for appellants.
Powell and Okey Johnson, for appellees.

LUCAS, P. This suit originated by the
tiling of a bill in chancery by H. B. Bumgardner, a married woman, and H. F. Bumgardner, her husband, against C. P. Leavitt
and others, in the circuit court of Wood county.
The female plaintiff alleges that the defendant Lieavitt induced her to invest $1,000
in the steam-boat General Dawes, the proposed cost of which was $7,500.
It was understood that the boat was to be put in a jointstock company, in which the plaintiff H. E.
Bumgardner was to have shares in proportion to the money she had advanced, as aforesaid.
The plaintiff exhibits with her bill an
agreement as follows: "This article of agreement, made and entered into this the l-lth day
of July, 1884, between C. P. Leavitt, county
of Wood, and state of West Virginia, and H.
E. Bumgardner of Hockingport, Athens Co.,
Ohio, witnesseth, that the said C. P. Leavitt,
in case of misunderstanding,
or not being able
to agree, or in case of death of Herman Bumgardner, agent, said Leavitt agrees to take
the said stock of Mrs. Bumgardner at not exceeding cost, or, if boat depreciates in value,
at fair cash valuation.
The said Mrs. H. B.
Bumgardner agrees to give said C. P. Leavitt
the refusal over any other purchaser.
The
said stock referred to above is stock in the
[Signed] C. P. Leavsteamer General Dawes.
itt." And there is further exhibited the following notice:
"To Chas. P. Leavitt— Sir:
propose to sell you my stock in the Farmer's
Trans. Co. in accordance with your contract
of July 14, 1884, at cost, or, if the boat has
depreciated in value, at its fair cash valuation.
Your early attention is called to this matter,
having arisen under which
the contingency
you bound yourself to take said stock.
fSignby H. F. Bumgarded] H. E. Bumgardner,
ner, Ag't. Jlarch 31, 1887." The bUl suppleagreement, signed
ments the above-written
by C. P. Leavitt, by stating that it was a part
of the consideration that the husband, H. F.
was to have regular employBumgardner,
ment on said steam-boat, of which said C. P.
Leavitt was to be master. It is further alleged that all of the interests, including the stock
owned by Leavitt, (which was a large majority of it,) as well as that owned by H. B.
was capitalized into a corporaBumgardner,
tion known as the Farmer's Transportation
The
Company, or conveyed to said company.
steamer was valued at $7,G00 at that time,
and 760 shares of capital stock of the par value of $10 per share were issued, of which 100
shares were given to said H. E. Bumgardner,

I
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and 1% shares to her husband, in order that;
he might be represented in the company.
It
is further alleged that C. P. Leavitt took
charge as master, and pursuant to the agreement gave H. F. Bumgardner employment,
but that they soon disagreed, and said H. F.
Bumgardner
was discharged.
Plaintiffs proceed to aver that since such disagreement they
have at all times been ready to give said Leavitt the preference of purchasing said stock,
and have urged him to buy said stock according to his agreement, but he has steadily and
persistently
refused to do so, until the 31st
day of March, 1887, when the above notice
was written and served.
They charge that
there has been no depreciation in the value of
the boat, but that it has been increased in
size and capacity at a large expense, and its
value enhanced in consequence.
It is further
alleged that one B. W. Petty, who is made a
defendant, had attached the 101% shares of
stock in the circuit court of Wood county in
an action at law against H. F. Bumgardner.
It is further alleged that the plaintiffs were
largely indebted to J. W. Arnold and L. H. Arnold, both of whom were made defendants,
and that the female plaintiff executed a hen
upon the said 100 shares of stock to secure
By an agreement and comsaid indebtedness.
promise between the plaintiffs and said E. W.
Petty his debt is reduced to $422, which It is
agreed shall be paid him out of the proceeds
arising from the sale of said 101% shares of
stock; and by like agreement with J. W. and
L. H. Arnold, they are to receive the residue
of the proceeds of said sale as a compromise,
and in full settlement of the Indebtedness due
them from the plaintiffs.
Plaintiff H. B.
Bumgardner,
it is alleged, has always been
ready, and has offered, and now offers, to specifically perform the said agreement on her
part, by assigning and transferring said 101%
shares of the stock free and unincumbered, as
of the 31st day of March, 1887.
The prayer
of the bill is that the court wiU declare the
plaintiff to be entitled to a specific performance and execution of the said agreement,
with interest on the said amount from March
second, that the court will decree
31, 1887;
that the amount ascertained to be due said H.
B. Bumgardner
from said C. P. Leavitt may
be paid over to said B. W. Petty and said J.
W. and L. H. Arnold, as above set out; and,
thirdly, for all proper accounts and general
The bill was demurred to by Leavitt,
relief.
but the demurrer was overruled, whereupon C.
P. Leavitt filed his answer, in which he admits the agreement as set out in the bill, so
far as it goes, but he denies it was ever understood or contemplated that the said H. F.
Bumgardner should have the right, at any
time he might thereafter
see fit, to require
respondent to buy the stock of said H. B.
Bumgardner, and to require respondent to pay
therefor the original cost, but in truth it was
intended to give respondent refusal and right
to buy said stock at any time, provided he
paid therefor as much as any other bidder.
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and provided, furtherinore, that respondent so
desired.
He alleges that the boat is not worth
more than $2,500, about one-third of what she
cost at the time said stock was issued;
and
that the present value of said 101% shares in
the bill mentioned is not worth more than
He denies that the
$333.33% at the outside.
stock has ever been tendered him, or that either of the plaintiffs have ever proffered the
same at anything like a fair cash valuation.
He admits that on or about the
day of
July, 1887, he offered them $850 for the stock,
although he knew that they had immeJiately
before that offered it to another party at $800.
He alleges that it had been assigned by H. B.
Bumgardner to Mrs. J. W. Arnold, to secure
of a debt, and the certificate was
payment
then held by one L. N. Tavener, as attorney
for said Arnold, who had notified the secretary of the corporation, and requested a transRespondent sets out also
fer on the books.
that the certificate was incumbered by a lien
of said E. W. Petty, and he pleads that the
plaintiffs had not title to said stock, and so
Respondcould not carry out the agreement.
ent further alleges that his said offer of $850
was made in good faith, and he was ever
ready from the time he offered in 1887 to buy
said stock to take the same, but his offer was
not accepted, nor was there ever tendered to
respondent the said stock at any time, nor
could it be, since they had parted with the
title. He denies that he ought in equity to be
compelled to pay for the stock, which cannot
to the full
be dehvered, and is incumbered
J. W. Arnold and L.. H.
amount of its value.
Arnold filed their joint arid separate answer,
in which they admit all that is said in the bill
about the mortgage or pledge of the stock to
them, and admit that they have agreed that
out of the proceeds arising from the sale E.
W. Petty should be first paid, and that they
would accept the residue of the proceeds in
full satisfaction of their lien, and that they
L. N. Tavener,
have accordingly authorized
Esq., their attorney, to execute their release,
in order that said H. B. Bumgardner may execute to said defendant C. P. Leavitt an unincumbered transfer of said 100 shares of stock
in fulfillment of said H. E. Bumgardner's contract on her part, as set out in Exhibit No. 1
of the bill. E. W. Petty likewise answers, and
his
admits all the averments of the bill as to
and also
lien upon the stock by attachment,
the agreement with reference to his payment
out of the proceeds of sale.

A vast amount of testimony was taken,
very little of which had anything to do
with the case, the bulk of it seeming to be
predicated upon some extraneous controversies as to the earnings of the boat, and
Leavitt's settlement with the corporation
and stockholders. On the 10th of December, 1888, the case came on to be finally
heard, and the court decreed that H. E.
Bumgardner was entitled to specific execution of the contract; that demand was made
by her on the 31st day of March, 1887; and
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tliat the 101% shares of stock were then
worth $866.60; and the said 0. P. Leavitt is
decreed to pay that amount, with interest
from 31st day of March, 1887, aggregating the sum of $954.76, which he is to pay,
with interest thereon from the date of decree.
The money is to be distributed to the
Arnolds and Petty in accordance with their
respective liens, and agreement.? with reference to the same.
The decree then proceeds
to direct "that L. N. Tavener, who is authorized in a writing filed in the papers in
this cause to release the lien of said J. W.
Arnold and L. H. Arnold upon 100 shares
of the stock aforesaid, to execute said release of said lien, and, in case said L. N.
Tavener shall fail or refuse to execute said
release within ten days from this date, then
Barna Powell, who is hereby appointed a
special commissioner for the purpose, is authorized and directed to execute a release
of the lien of said J. W. Arnold and L. H.
Arnold, as aforesaid, upon the 100 shares
of stock held in the name of H. E. Bumgardner and filed with the papers in this
cause, which certificate of 100 shares, as
well as the certificate of 101% shares now
also in the file in this cause, are to be delivered to said C. P. Leavitt upon payment
by him, or some one for him, to the defendants Petty and Arnolds and plaintiffs, the
sum hereinbefore decreed by him to be paid."
Leave was given the plaintiffs to sue out
execution.
Prom this decree the defendant
Leavitt has appealed to this court.
The first and pivotal question to be decided in this case is whether the court of
chancery had jurisdiction to decree specific
performance. If not, the bill should have
In the first
been dismissed on demurrer.
place, regarding the defendant Leavitt, as
having for a consideration obtained the refusal of, or, as we may call it, the option
on, this stock, could he have maintained a
bill for specific performance against Mrs. H.
E. Bumgardner in case she had refused to
let him have the stock, and had insisted on
selling it to some one else? This is an important question,
if such relief
because,
could be granted to the purchaser were
he to apply, the seller, who has given the
purchaser such preference or option, is entitled to like relief by reason of the operation
of the principle of mutuality of right and
remedy.
The general doctrine upon this subject is thus stated by Mr. Pomeroy: "It is
not then sufiicient in general that a valid and
binding agreement exists, and that an action
at law for damages will lie in favor of either party for a breach by the other; the
peculiarly distinctive feature of the equitable doctrine is that the remedial right to a
specific performance must be mutual."
See
Moore v. Fitz Randolph, 6 Leigh, 175. This
is a general rule, namely, that the right to a
specific execution of a contract, So far as the
question of mutuality is concerned, depends
itself is obliupon whether the agreement
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gatory on both parties, so that upon the application of either against the other the
court would grant a specific performance.
Says Mr.
Duvall V. ilyeis, 2 Md. Ch. 401.
Pomeroy: "It is a familiar doctrine that if
tlie right to the specific performance of a
contraL-t exists at all, It must be mutual.
The remedy must be alike attainable by both
parties to the agreement."
Pom. Spec. Perf.
In the present case it appears that
§ 165.
the defendant Leavitt, being the owner of
about three-fourths of the stock in a steamboat, entered into an agreement with a married woman with reference to $1,000 of the
same stock.
It is true that the contract was
signed by him alone.
The circumstance that
It was signed by him alone is not material,
since it is admitted by both parties that she
entered into the contract, and was to be
bound by it. Wat. Spec. Perf. §§ 268, 270.
Neither is the fact that she was a married
woman material in this state, since, by our
married woman's act, which went into operation in 1809, (see Code, c. 66,) a married
woman may not only take and hold personal property, such as stocks, but, being
she may vote the same
such a stockbolder,
consequently she
in any organized company;
had the right of disposition and the power
It is also true
to sell or contract to sell.
that, according to her statement,
personal
services entered into a part of the consideration of the contx-act, and it is a rule almost
universal that a contract for personal servagainst the party
ices cannot be enforced
promising such services, and hence for the
want of the requisite mutuality specific execution will not be enforced against the opposite party, unless the services have been
actually performed, and the contract to that
extent been executed, as was the case here.
Pom). Spec. Perf. § 310.
These obstacles being disposed of, we may
inquire, had Mrs. Bumgardner persisted in
selling this stock to a third party, contrary
to her agreement, could Leavitt have asked
the court of chancery to interfere by injunction, and to compel her to transfer the stock
to him upon payment of the price stipulated
in the agreement?
The question of specific
performance of contracts for the delivery of
stock is frequently treated by the text-writers in an empirical and unsatisfactory manner, as if there were something peculiar in
this character of personal property, which
it impossible to classify it under
rendered
any general rule. Mr. Fry, for example,
does not hesitate to say positively that a
conti'act for the sale of stock will not be
specifically enforced, although he afterwards
admits that railway shares form an excepFry, Spec. Perf. §§ 24, 27. Mr. Pomtion.
eroy's treatment of the subject is equally
unsatisfactory.
See Pom. Spec. Perf. §§ 17The true principle would seem to be
19.
that, as a general rule, courts of equity will
not enforce specific performance of contracts
for the delivery of shares of stock, but when
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a purchaser has bargained for such shares,
or taken an option upon them, because they
have for him a unique and special value, the
loss of which could not be adequately compensated by damages at law, the chancellor,
in the exercise of a sound discretion, may
This principle we
decree specific execution.
find laid down and insisted upon in the more
"The
recent work of Mr. Waterman, (1881.)
same principles," he says, "govern in conti'acts for the sale of stock as in the sale
of other property,— that is, if a breach can
In damages, equity
be fully compensated
will not interfere; while it will do so when,
notwithstanding the payment of the money
value of the stock, the plaintiff will still lose
a substantial benefit, and thereby remain
If a contract to convey
uncompensated.
stock is clear and definite, and the uncertain
value of the stock renders It difficult to do
justice by an award of damages, specific
performance will be decreed."
Wat. Spec.
Perf. § 19. Among the many other cases
cited in support of this proposition is the
leading case of Doloret v. Rothschild, decided by Sir John Leach, vice-chancellor. In
1824, 1 Sim. & S. 590, In which it is said that
a bill will lie for the specific performance
of a contract for the purchase of government stock, where it prays for the delivery
of certificates which give the legal title to
There are many other cases,
the stock.
however,
both In England and America,
which sustain the correct principle as laid
down above, but which It is unnecessary to
In the present case the purchaser of
cite.
the refusal of or option upon the stock In
was dealing for an article
the steamboat
which he could not go upon the market and
buy, and which no one could deliver to him
but the holder, with whom he bargained.
The shares of stock evidently had for him'
a peculiar value, which could not be compensated by mere damages, such as would be
recovered
at law. Their possession would
enable him to control the company, and to
retain his position as master of the vessel.
For the same reason, therefore, that a contract for railway shares will fre(Juently be
specifically performed,
viz., whenever such
shares are being purchased for the purposes
of organization and control,
think a court
of equity would have interfered in this case
In favor of C. P. Leavitt, had he filed a bill

I

praying for Its intervention. It follows,
therefore, upon the ground of mutuality of
remedy and reciprocity of obligation, that
such a bill could be maintained by Mrs.
Bmngardner. There is another ground quite
as apparent as that stated above, and that is
that the legal title to this stock had passed
into the hands of a third party, who is properly made a co-defendant.
In the case cited
above of Doloret v. Rothschild, 1 Sim. & S.
590,
the vice-chancellor remarks: "I consider also that the plaintiff, not being the
original holder of the scrip, but merely the
bearer, may not be able to maintain any

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
action at law upon the contract, and that,
if he has any title, it must be in equity."
So in the present case the plaintiffs are in a
situation in which a court of equity sees its
way clearly to administer complete and adequate remedial justice to all parties interested, whereas, if they were remitted to a
court of law, if relief could be afforded at
all, it could only be done by resorting to
several actions, perhaps no less than three.
Upon the general
principle, therefore, of
avoiding circuity of action, and affording
relief where the remedy at law is inadequate,
it was proper for the court of equity to exercise its jurisdiction.
Whenever the remedy at law would be incomplete and inadequate because the court of law cannot give
a conditional or modified
judgment, and
would be unable to preserve the benefit of
the agreement to all the parties interested,
equity has jurisdiction to enforce the agreement.
In the case of Summers v. Bean, the
general principle is thus declared by Judge
Moneure, (13 Grat. 412:) "Generally an adequate remedy may be had at law for the
breach of a contract concerning any other
personalty than slaves, and therefore, as a
general rule, a court of equity will not enforce the execution of such a contract. But
sometimes an adequate remedy at law cannot be had for the breach of such a contract,
and then its specific execution will be enforced in equity." As it was said in May v.
Le Claire, 11 Wall. 218, in order to oust
the equity jurisdiction, the remedy at law
must be "as effectual and complete as the
chancellor can make it." The same princiby all the text-writers.
ple is recognized
See Fry, Spec. Perf. § 18; Pom. Spec. Perf.
Mr. Waterman says tersely: "If,
29.
§
however, the remedy at law would be wholly

OF CONTRACTS.

583

inadequate or impracticable, specific perWat. Spec. Perf.
formance will be decreed."
For these reasons, therefore, we think
§ 17.
there was no error in overruling the demurUpon the merits, alrer to the plaintiffs' bill.
though there was, as we have said, a great
the
deal of unnecessary testimony taken,
plaintiffs' case might have rested, and no
Qoubt did rest, upon the testimony of the
defendant C. P. Leavitt himself. Out of the
to him, of which
propoiinded
108 questions
some were frivolous, and nearly all impertinent, he is asked on the 103d question
whether he did not offer Mrs. Bumgardner
$850 for her stock, in order to get rid of
Bumgardner, to which he replies: "Yes; I
wanted to get rid of him. Here is one of
the clerks right here who asked him what
he would take for it at different times."
"Did you not make a prop104th question:
osition to buy the stock on account of your
obligation under that contract? Answer.
I guess the clerk
Oh, yes; several times.
here knows that I made offers at different
times through Mr. Ritchie, and Mr. BarinThe deger can testify to the same thing."
fendant further testifies that these offers
were made in March, 1887, or a little after
that time, and that the negotiations would
have been concluded, except for some trivial
and inconsequential dispute about matters
foreign to the subject-matter. To take the
defendant, therefore, at his own word, and
fix the value of the stock at a price only differing by a few dollars from what he himself offered, with interest from the time of
his offer, was a judgment of the circuit
court of which he has no right to complain,
and we think, therefore, that the decree
complained of should be in all respects affirmed.
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JACOBS

723,

171

Supreme Court of Illinois.

et al.

111. 624.)

Feb. 14, 1898.

Appeal from appellate court. First district.
Bill in equity by George M. Welty to restrain H. R. Jacobs from refusing to perform a, contract for the use of a theater ,
and to enjoin Ulysses D. Newell from the
use and occupation of the same.
From the
decree of the appellate court (64 lU. App.
affirming the decree of the superior
285),
court of Cook county, in favor of defendants, plalntifC appeals.
Affirmed.
Bulkley, Gray & More, for appellant.
James E. Purnell, for appellee H. R. Jacobs.
Partridge & Partridge, for appellee U. D.
Newell.

CARTER, J. This was a bill for an injunction filed December 28, 1895, In the superior court of Cook county, by the appellant, in which he alleged that he was a theatrical manager and proprietor; that on
April 9, 1895, he entered into a written contract with H. R. Jacobs, manager, and repre^
sentlng M. J. Jacobs, proprietor, of the Alhambra Theater, in Chicago, to play his company in the "Black Crook" at such theater
nights, commencing
for seven consecutive
December 29, 1895; that Jacobs was to furnish the house, well cleaned, lighted, and
heated, together with the stock, scenery, and
equipments contained therein, stage hands,
stage carpenter, fly men, regular ushers, gas
man, property man, janitor, ticket seller,
orchestra,
doorkeepers,
house programmes,
licenses, billboards, bill posting, distribution
of printed matter, usual newspaper advertisements, and the resources of the theater
in stage furniture and properties not perishable; that Welty was to furnish a company
of first-class artists, to the satisfaction of
Jacobs, together with special scenery, calcium lights, etc., and also, 10 days in advance,
certain printing, prepaid and free from all
charges, consisting of a variety of bills, etc.;
that appellant was to receive 60 per cent,
of the gross receipts up to $5,000, and 70
that if the
per cent, on all over $5,000;
company should not prove satisfactory to
Jacobs, whose judgment was to be conclusive, or If the company should prove not to
be as represented, then Jacobs should have
the right to cancel the contract by giving appellant at least one week's notice, by mail
or otherwise; that appellant's company was
not to appear at any other house In the city
prior to the date of the performance speciaccident,
fied; that if, by any unforeseen
whatever, Jacobs
fire, or for any reason
could not furnish the house for said performance the contract was to become null and
The bill further alleged that appelvoid.
lant had kept and performed all his covenants; that he had tendered the printing as
required, and that he was ready to furnish
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a satisfactory company; that he had received
no notice from Jacobs that his company was
not satisfactory nor as represented, and had
been given no notice of the termination of
his contract as therein provided; that within the then last 30 days Jacobs had entered
into a contract with U. D. Newell for the
Alhambra Theater for the same week that

appellant's contract provided for; that Newell claims to be the manager of another company, also engaged in producing the "Black
Crook"; that Jacobs and Newell were combining and confederating to injure and defraud appellant, as Newell had agreed to
produce the play for a less percentage than
appellant; that appellant had 40 performers under contract, and would be obliged to
pay them their salaries whether they performed or not, and that he could procure no
other place for his performance during said
time, and would be compelled
to remain
idle, at great expense; that the money value
of his contract could not be determined, either actually or approximately, in any other
manner than by carrying out and fully performing it according to Its conditions; that
Jacobs and Newell had announced their intention of keeping appellant out of the possession and use of said theater; that appellees were financially irresponsible. The bill
prays for an order enjoining appellees from
hindering appellant and his company from
taking possession of the Alhambra Theater,
its appurtenances
and stage property, and
from hindering, delaying, Interfering with,
or preventing appellant from producing said
play in accordance with said contract, and
also restraining appellees from using or occupying said theater, its stock, scenery, and
equipments,
during said period of seven
days, and from allowing any other person
or company to use or occupy the same; and
also restraining and enjoining appellees from
refusing to furnish to appellant, during such
period, the usual and necessary light, heat,
music, regular stage hands, stage carpenter,
etc., and for general relief.
The injunction
was granted, and served on appellees December 28, 1895.
On December 30, 1895, a
rule was entered on appellees to show cause
why they should not be punished for contempt of court in violating this injunction.
The next day an order was entered modifying the Injunction so as to permit Newell to
produce the play at the Alhambra, and Jacobs
was ordered to pay into court 60 per cent,
of the entire receipts received by him at the
Alhambra for the week, and to pay to Newell 30 per cent, of such receipts, and the
cause was continued to January 3, 1896.
On
that day both appellees answered, replication was filed, and Newell moved for a dissolution of the injunction. Appellee Jacobs
in his answer admitted the making of the
contract with appellant, but denied that appellant's company was satisfactory or as
represented, and alleged that he had notified
appellant thereof, and had canceled the con-
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tract; denied all combination to injure appellant; admitted that he had made a contract
with Newell for the same week he had formerly contracted to appellant; denied that
appellant had furnished the printing as required; and that he was without remedy exAppellee Newell
cept in a court of equity.
in his answer alleged that he had been informed that appellant's contract had been
canceled; that on November 29, 1895, he
had made a contract with Jacobs to play
the Tompkins Black Crook Company in the
Alhambra for seven successive nights, beginning December 29, 1895, the contract behke appellant's, except
ing in all particulars
of receipts; that as
as to the percentage
early as December 27th he had removed to
the Alhambra a number of articles belonging
to his company and had taken possession of
the same; alleged various communications
and negotiations between all the parties to
this suit from December 16th until the bill
was filed; that, becoming alarmed that Jacobs would close up the Alhambra entirely
during that week, he (Newell) had procured
an injunction from the circuit court on December 27, 1895, and had it served on Jacobs the same day, restraining Jacobs from
closing up the theater during ssaid week and
excluding his company from presenting their
play; charges appellant with laches and bad
faith in suppressing all information in regard to such first injunction, and alleged
that appellant's contract was in violation of
the statute!s, which forbid any amusement
or diversion on Sunday, so that specific performance could not be enforced.
The cause was heard by the court, and a
decree entered finding that the injunction
had been violated by appellees, and that
under the order modifying the injunction
there had been paid into court $1,134.75;
that the equities were with the appellees;
and that the appellant had a complete and
adequate remedy at law, and that the injunction was improvidently issued; and the
bill was therefore dismissed, and the money
ordered returned to Jacobs. Appellant appealed, and asked that the money be re■
tained in the clerk's hands pending the appeal, which was allowed, and the money
ordered left with the clerk until the final deThe appellate court
termination on appeal.
affirmed the decree, and appellant has further appealed to this court.
There was no sufficient proof that Jacobs
canceled his contract with Welty on any of
the grounds stipulated in it, and the question is not whether Jacobs was justified in
violating the contract, but whether his bill
of complaint for equitable relief can be sustained or he should be remitted to his action
at law. Strictly speaking, the bill was not
one for specific performance, but for injunction only. It is clear from its allegations
and the authorities bearing upon the question that specific performance of the conIt Is not, and
tract could not be decreed.
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cannot be, contended that appellant could
have been compelled, by any writ the court
could have issued, to occupy the theater
with his company of actors and give the performances contracted for, any more than a
public singer or speaker can be compelled
specifically to perform his contract to sing
Negative covenants not to sing
or speak.
or perform elsewhere at a certain time than
place have been enforced by
a designated
the injunctive process, but further than this
such contracts have not been specifically enforced by the courts, by injunction or othLumley v. Wagner, 1 De Gex, M. &
erwise.
G. 604; Daly v. Smith, 38 N. T. Super. Ct.
In Lumley v. Wagner there was an ex158.
press covenant not to sing elsewhere than
at the complainant's theater, and the injunction was placed on that ground.
But it is urged that negative covenants
may be implied as well as expressed, and,
when necessarily implied from the terms of
the contract, they will be enforced In like
Monciting the following cases:
manner;
tague V. Flockton, L. R. 16 Eq. 189; Great
Northern Ry. Co. v. Manchester, S. & L. Ry.
Co., 5 De Gex & S. 138; Chicago & A. Ry. Co.
V. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 24 Fed. 516;
Singer Sewing-Mach. Co. v. Union B. & E. Co.,
Holmes, 253, Fed. Cas. No. 12,904; 2 High,
Inj. (2d Ed.) § 1150; Fredrlcks v. Mayer, 13
How. Prac. 566.
While there was a negative covenant in the contract under consideration against Welty, it is not important to
consider whether or not appellant might
have been enjoined from performing elsewhere than at Jacobs' theater at the time in
question,
for it is manifest he could not
have been compelled to perform at said theater.
Before a contract will be specifically
enforced there must be mutuality in the contract, so that it may be enforced by either;
and, as this contract was of such a nature
that it could not have been specifically enforced by appellee Jacobs, it should not be
so enforced by appellant.
Lancaster v. Roberts, 144 111. 223, 33 N. E. 27; Fry, Spec.
Perf. §§ 440, 441; Wat. Spec. Perf. § 196;
Cooper V. Pena, 21 Cal. 411.
But it is urged that courts of equity will
by injunction restrain the violation of contracts of this character in many cases where
they cannot decree specific performance,
and the following among other cases are referred to: Western Union Tel. Co. v. Union
Pac. Ry. Co., 3 Fed. 423-429; Wells, Fargo
& Co. V. Oregon R. & Nav. Co., 15 Fed. 561,
and 18 Fed. 517; Wells, Fargo & Co. v.
Northern Pac. R. Co., 23 Fed. 469.
Without determining whether there may not be
exceptional cases not falling within the general rule, we think the rule is as stated in
Chicago M. G. L. & F. Co. v. Town of Lake,
130 m. 42, 22 N. E. 616, and the authorities
there quoted.
It was there said (page 60,
130 ni., and page 619, 212 N. E.): "The bill
of complaint in this case, though not strictly
a bill for the specific performance of a con-
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tract, Is Jn substance a bill of that kind.
In 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1341, it Is said: 'An
injunction restraining the breach of a contract is a negative specific enforcement of
that contract.
The jurisdiction of equity
to grant such Injunction is substantially coincident with its jurisdiction to compel a
specific performance.
Both are governed by
the same doctrine and rules.
It may be
stated, as a general proposition, that whenever the contract is one of a class which
wiU be aflirmatively specifically enforced, a
court of equity will restrain its breach by
injunction, if this is the only practical mode
of enforcement which its terms permit.' "

It

is plain that, as a general rule, to enjoin
one from doing something in violation of his
contract Is an indirect mode of enforcing
the affirmative provisions of such contract,
although such an injunction may often fall
short of accomplishing its object.
It is obvious from what has been said and from
the authorities that to enjoin appellee Jacobs, as prayed in the bill, from refusing to
furnish the usual and necessary light, heat,
music, regular stage hands, stage carpenter, ushers, equipments,
etc., provided for
in the contract, would be the same, in substance, as to command him to furnish th'^m,
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and without them the use of the theater
building would iieem to be of little use. It
is practically conceded by counsel for appellant that this part of the contract could not
be specifically enforced as prayed, or otherwise, in equity; but it is cod iided that
this part of the contract is merely incidental
to the more important part of it, which was
the right to occupy and use the theater and
its furnishings, and give therein the performances provided for, and to exclude from
a like occupation and use the other appellee,
Newell, and that the injunction was proper
for that purpose.
This would have been an
indirect method of enforcing a part performance of the contract, and courts will not enforce specific performance of particular stipulations separated from the rest of the contract, where they do not clearly stand by
themselves, unaffected by other provisions.
Baldwin v. Fletcher, 48 Mio^-. 604, 12 N. "W.
Even if such a decree might have been
873.
■'-itained, we are satisfied
the sound legal
discretion of the court was not violated in
refusing it, or in dissolving the injunction
Appellant's remedy,
after it was granted.
if any he had, was at law. The judgment
of the appellate court is affirmed. Judgment
affirmed.
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JONES
(115

Supreme

V.

NEWHALL.

Mass. 244.)

Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Suffolk.
June 20, 1874.

Bill by Leonard S. Jones against Benjamin
B. Newhall to enforce specific performance
of a contract for the purchase of all the interest of complainant In the Worthington
Land Associates, and all the right and interest of Jones in any property belonging to
the Dorchester Land Association, the share
of said Jones consisting of 14 shares of stock
of said land association, together with two
Decree for plaintiff.
certain mortgages.
Bill disCase reported to the full court
missed.

R. D. Smith & A. B. Jones, for plaintiff.
A. C. Clark, for defendant

WELLS, J. Jurisdiction in equity Is conferred upon this court by Gen. St. c. 113, §
2, to hear and determine "suits for the specific performance of written contracts by
and against either party to the contract,
and his heirs, devisees, executors, administrators and assigns." The power extends alike
to written contracts of all descriptions, but
Its exercise is restricted by the proviso,
"when the parties have not a plain, adequate and complete remedy at the common
law."
This proviso has always been so construed and applied as to make it a test. In
each particular case, by which to determine
whether jurisdiction in equity shall be entertained. If the only relief to which the
plaintiff would be entitled In equity is the
same in measure and kind as that which he
might obtain in a suit at law, he can have
no standing upon the equity side of the
court, unless his remedy at law is doubtful,
circuitous, or complicated by multiplicity of
parties having different Interests. Charles
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 6 Pick. 376,
396; Sears v. Boston, 16 Pick. 357; Wilson
V. Leishman, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 316, 321; HIlliard v. Allen, 4 Cush. 532, 535; Pratt v.
Pond, 5 Allen, 59; Glass v. Hulbert 102
Mass. 24, 27; Ward v. Peck, 114 Mass. 121.
In contracts for the sale of personal property jurisdiction in equity Is rarely entertained, although the only remedy at law
may be the recovery of damages, the measure of which Is the difference between the
market value of the property at the time of
the breach and the price as fixed by the
contract. The reason is that in regard to
most articles of personal property, the commodity and its market value are supposed
to be substantially equivalent, each to the
other, so that they may be readily Interchanged. The seller may convert his rejected goods Into money; the purchaser,
with his money, may obtain similar goods;
each presumably at the market price; and
the difference between that and the contract
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price, recoverable at law, will be full indemnity. Jones V. Boston Mill Corp., 4 Pick.
507, 511; Adderley v. Dixon, 1 Sim. & S. 607;
Harnett v. Yielding, 2 Schoales & L. 549,
553; Adams, Eq. 83; Fry, Spec. Perf. §§ 12,
29.

It is otherwise with fixed property like
Compensation in damages,
real estate.
measured by the difference In price as ascertained by the market value and by the contract, has never been regarded In equity as
such adequate Indemnity for nonfulfillment
of a contract for the sale or purchase of
land as to justify the refusal of relief In
equity. When that Is the extent of the
right to recover at law, a bill In equity is
maintainable, even In favor of the vendor,
to enforce fulfillment of the contract, and
payment of the full amount of the price
agreed on.
Old Colony Railroad v. Evans, 6
Gray, 25.
Although the general subject is within the
chancery jurisdiction of the court, yet inadequacy of the damages recoverable at law
is essential to the right to Invoke its action
as a court of chancery In any particular case.
The rule is the same whether applied to the
contracts for the sale of real or of personal
estate.
The difference In the application
arises from the difference in the character
of the subject-matter of the contracts In respect to the question whether damages at
law will afford fuU and adequate Indemnity
to the party seeking relief.
If the character
of the property be such that the loss of the
contract will not be fairly compensated
In
damages based upon an estimate of Its market value, relief may be had In equity,
whether it relates to real or to personal estate.
Adderley v. Dixon, 1 Sim. & S. 607;
Duncuft V. Albrecht 12 Sim. 189, 199; Clark
V. Flint, 22 Pick. 231; Story, Eq. Jur. § 717;
Adams, Eq. 83; Fry, Spec. Perf. §§ 11, 23,
30, 37.

The property In question In this case ap
pears to be of such a character. It is not
material, therefore, whether the Interest of
the plaintiff is in the nature of realty or of
personalty. But the relief he seeks Is not
such as to require the aid of a court of
equity. At the time this bill was filed the
only obligation on the part of the defendant
to be enforced either at law or In equity
was his express promise to pay a definite
sum of money as an installment towards the
purchase of certain property from the plaintiff. That promise Is supported by the executory agreement of the plaintiff to convey
the property, contained In the same instrument, as Its consideration; but in respect of
performance the several promises of the defendant are separable from the entirety of
the contract and each one may be enforced
by itself as an assumpsit
The plaintiff Is
not obliged to sue In damages upon his contract as for a general breach.
He may recover at law the full amount of the install-
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ment due.
In equity he can have no decree
beyond that
He cannot come into equity
to obtain precisely what he can have at law.
Howe V. Nickerson, 14 Allen, 400, 406;
Jacobs V. Peterborough & S. R. Co., 8 Gush.
223; Gill V. Bicknell, 2 Cush. 355; Russell

Clark, 7 Cranch, 69.
The plaintiff has no occasion for any order
of the court in regard to performance by himself. At most, aU that is necessary for him
to do in order to recover his judgment at
law, is to offer a conveyance of a portion of
his interest corresponding to the amount of
the installment due.
We do not regard the fact, stated In the
report, that the defendant "also refused to
pay an assessment then due, or about to become due," for which he was bound by the
contract to provide, and hold the plaintiff
harmless; because that is immaterial upon
demurrer, there being no allegation in the
bill in reference to it. And besides, there
would be sufficient remedy at law for such a
breach, if It were sufficiently alleged and
V.

proved.
If the plaintiff will be compelled to bring
several actions for his full remedy at law,
it is because he has a contract payable in
installments; that is, he may have several
causes of action.
But he may sue them severally, or he may join them all in one suit,
when all shall have fallen due, at his own
He is not driven into equity to
election.
escape the necessity of many suits at law.
It is true, as the plaintiff insists, that
a different rule exists in the English courts
of chancery, and that in numerous cases, not
unlike the present, relief in equity has there
been granted by decree for payment of a
sum of money due by contract, although

equally recoverable at law. The maxim,
which, as we apply it, makes the want of
adequate remedy at law essential to the
right to have relief in equity in each case,
has always been attached to chancery jurisdiction. But in the English courts it has
been rather by way of indicating the nature
and origin of the jurisdiction, and defining
the class of rights or subjects to which it
attaches, than as a constant limit upon its
exercise.
Courts of chancery were created
to supply defects in proceedings at common
law. Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 49, 54. Their jurisdiction grew out of the exigencies of the
earlier periods in the judicial history of the
country, and was from time to time enlarged
Its limits, having
to meet those exigencies.
become defined and fixed by usage, have not
contracted as the jurisdiction of the common-law courts was extended. It has always been held that jurisdiction once acquired in chancery, over any subject or class
of rights, is not taken away by any subsequent enlargement of the powers of the
courts of common law, nor by reason of any
new modes of remedy that may be afforded
by those.courts. Story, Eq. Jur. S 64i; Snell,
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J.
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De Gex, F. &
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Hence arose a wide range of concurrent
Jurisdiction, within which chancery proceeded to administer appropriate remedies, without regard to the question whether a like
remedy could be had in the courts of law.
Colt V. Woollaston, 2 P. Wms. 154; Green v.
Barrett, 1 Sim. 45; Blain v. Agar, 2 Sim.
289; Cridland v. De Mauley, 1 De Gex & S.
459; Evans v. Bicknell, 6 Ves. 174; Burrowes V. Lock, 10 Ves. 470. One of its maxims was that there must be mutuality of
right to avail of that jurisdiction. Accordingly, if the contract or cause of complaint
was such that one of the parties might require the peculiar relief which chancery
alone could afford, it was frequently held
that the principle of mutuality required that
jurisdiction should be equally maintained in
favor of the other party, who sought and
could have no other relief than recovery of
the same amount of money due or measure
of damages as would have been awarded by
judgment in the court of law. Hall v. Warren, 9 Ves. 605; Walker v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co., 6 Hare, 594; Kenney v. Wexham, 6 Madd. 355.
In contracts respecting land there Is an
additional consideration for maintaining jurisdiction in equity in favor of the vendor
as well as the vendee, which is doubtless
much more influential with the English
courts than it can be here; and that is the
doctrine of equitable conversion. It is referred to as a reason for the exercise of jurisdiction at the suit of the vendor, in Cave
V. Cave, 2 Eden, 130;
Eastern Counties Ry,
Co. V. Hawkes, 5 H. L. Gas. 331; Fry, Spec.
Perf. § 23.
In Massachusetts, instead of a distinct and
independent court of chancery, with a jurisdiction derived from and defined and fixed
by long usage, we have certain chancery
powers conferred upon the court of common
law, whose jurisdiction and modes of remedy as a court of law had already become extended much beyond those of English courts
of common law, partly by statutes and partly by its own adaptation of its remedies to
the necessities which arose from the absence
of the court of chancery. This difference in
the relations of the two jurisdictions would
alone give occasion for different rules governing their exercise. Black v. Black, 4 Pick.
234, 238; Tirrell v. Merrill, 17 Mass. 117, 121;
Baker v. Biddle, Baldw. 394, Fed. Cas. No.
764.

The successive statutes by which the equity powers of this court have been conferred or enlarged have always affixed to their
exercise the condition that "the parties have
not a plain, adequate, and complete remedy
at the common law." This has been construed as referring "to remedies at law as
they exist under our statutes and according to our course of practice." Pratt v. Pond^
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Allen, 59. It has also been repeatedly held
that, in reference to the range of jurisdiction conferred, the several statutes were to
be construed strictly.
Black v. Black, and
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, ubi
supra. No reason or necessity remains for
the maintenance of concurrent jurisdiction,
except for the sake of a more perfect remedy in equity when the plaintiff shall establish his right to it. And such we understand
to be the purport and intent of our statutes upon the subject.
Milkman v. Ordway, 106 Mass. 232; Angell v. Stone, 110
Mass. 54.
A similar restriction upon the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is so construed
with great strictness. Oelricks v. Spain, 15
Wall. 211, 228; Grand Chute v. Winegar,
Id. 373; Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bailey,
13 Wall. 616; Parker v. Winnlplseogee Lake
Cotton & Woollen Co., 2 Black, 545; Baker
V. Biddle, Baldw. 394, Fed. Cas. No. 764.
See, also, Woodman v. Freeman, 25 Me. 531;
I'iscataquis F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 60 Me.

5

178.

Even in courts of general chancery powers
and of independent organization, while the
power to entertain bills relating to all matters which in their nature are within their
concurrent jurisdiction is maintained, yet
the usual course of practice is to remit parties to their remedy at law, provided that
be plain and adequate, unless for some reason of peculiar advantage which equity is
supposed to possess, or some other cause
influencing the discretion of the court. Kerr,
Fraud & M. 45; Blsp. Bq. § 200; also, Id.
§ 37; Snell, Eq. 334; Clifford v. Brooke, 13
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Ves. 131; Whitmore v. Mackeson, 16 Beav.
126; Hammond v. Messenger, 9 Sim. 327;
Hoare v. Bremridge, L. B. 14 Eq. 522, 8 Ch.

App. 22.
The doctrine of Colt v. Woollaston, 2 P.
Wms, 154, and Gr'^en v. Barrett, 1 Sim. 45,
thougn not expressly overruled, has been
questioned (Thompson v. Barclay, 9 Law J.
Ch. 215, 219), and does not seem to govern
the usual practice of the courts. See cases
above cited, and Newham v. May, 13 Price,
749.

But, independently of statute restrictions,
the objection that the plaintiff may have a
sufficient remedy or defense at law in the
particular case is a matter of equitable disright;
cretion, rather than of jurisdictional
and is therefore not always available on
demurrer. Colt v. Nettervill, 2 P. Wms. 304;
Ramshire v. Bolton, L. B. 8 Eq. 294; Hill v.
Lane, L. R. 11 Eq. 215; Barry v. Croskey, 2
Johns. & H. 1.
According to the practice in this commonwealth, on the other hand, under the statutes relating to the exercise of jurisdiction
In equity, a bill is demurrable, not only if
it show that the plaintiff has a remedy at
law, equally sufficient and available, but also
If it fail to show that he is without such
Pool v. Lloyd, 5 Mete. (Mass.) 525,
remedy.
529; Woodman v. Saltonstall, 7 Cush. 181,
Pratt V. Pond, 5 Allen, 59; Clark v. Jones,
Id. 379; Metcalf v. Cady, 8 Allen, 587; Mill
River Loan Fund Ass'n v. Olaflin, 9 Allen,
101; Com. V. Smith, 10 Allen, 448; Bassett
V. Brown, 100 Mass. 355, 105 Mass. 551, 560.
The demurrer, therefore, must be sustained, and the bill dismissed.

17 Eq. 132.)
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1873.
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a
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a
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"To which
desire now to add that we
arranged, when so required, that you would
deliver the said coal into our wagons on
siding of the Taff Vale Railway at such a
reduction in price as you could obtain off the
cost in comparison with the delivery into the
Taff Vale works, provided that the Taff Vale
Railway Company would provide such siding (which you had not been able to obtain),
and to which you would forthwith make
road;
in reference to which
am glad to
have seen Mr. Fisher, and
inform you that
obtained his consent to his company providing the needful siding, a most valuable conof the possibly very
cession in prospect
large quantities of coal you talked of flooding
me with.
also promised to lend you £1,(X)0,
to aid you in opening and developing
the
said colliery at the rate of £5 per cent, per
annum interest, to be taken in such proportions monthly as you require in exchange for
your acceptances at six months' date, all
remain,
which please confirm, and
"Yours faithfully,
"Rich.

a

3

a

That negotiations for an arrangement upin an agreement,
on this footing resulted
meeting, between the plaintiffs
come to at
and Rowland on the 6th of December, 1871,
by which they agreed that Rowland should
sell to the plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs
should buy the whole of the get of the coal
seam of the said colliery for
of the No.
five years, the quantity not to be less than
that then delivered to the Taff Vale Ironworks, unless the coal should fail, at 6s. per
that the Taff Vale Railway
ton, provided
siding to which
Company would provide
Rowland should forthwith make a road, and
that the plaintiffs should lend to Rowland
£1,000 to aid him in openmg the colliery and
that this agreement was reduced to writing

" 'Sold R. F., Esq., M. P., the whole of the
get of the No.
coal out of the Newbridge
Colliery property for five years, the quantity
not to be less than at present delivered to
his Taff Vale works; unless the coal should
fall, at 6s. per ton payment as usual.'

I

a

a

a

mum.

"Dear Sir:
have been excessively occupied since our mterview last month, and have
not found time to sit down and write in detail
that which we mutually agreed upon beyond
the simple sale of coal described in the pencil
memorandum
we drew up together in the
following terms:
" '6 Dec. 1871.

I

coals

3

to purchase

some time been accustomed

of the defendant Rowland, and that at the
hereinafter
time of making the agreement
subsisting contract,
mentioned
there was
under which Rowland was supplying the
plaintiffs from 1871 to the 4th of January,
quantity of coal from the said
1872, with
colliery.
That at the time of the making of the
agreement
of the 6th of December, 1871,
the Newbridge Colliery was only opened upseam,"
on one seam of coal, called "the No.
and was only partially opened on that seam;
that Rowland was anxious to extend the
openings in the seam, and had made representations
to that effect to the plaintiffs,
and that he (Rowland) was short of capital
for extending his works, and that, with a
comparatively small outlay, the colliery would
day, and
produce nearly 300 tons of coal
siding could be had on the Taff
that if
Vale Railway, near the Taff Vale Ironworks,
he (Rowland) would be able to deliver the
considerable
coal with greater facility and
reduction of cost.
posiThat the plaintiffs were then in
much
tion to consume at the ironworks
larger quantity of coal than they had previously taken, and were disposed to make an
arrangement with Rowland to supply him
with capital to enable him to extend his colliery, and also to make an arrangement with
the Taff Vale Railway Company for the considing, provided that Rowland
struction of
contract of sale to the
would enter into
plaintiffs of all the coal which the said collease of five
liery would produce, for
years, provided that the quantity then supstated miniplied should not be less than

be included.
That the said agreements were reduced
in the form of
to writing by
memorandum
letter of the 4th of January, 1872, addressed to Rowland and confirmed by him in writing, and another
memorandum
subscribed
thereto of the 5th of January, 1872, which
were as follows:

I

Nov.

Demurrer.
The plaintiffs in this case, Richard Fothergill and Ernest Thomas Hankey, were ironmasters, carrying on the Aherdare Ironworks.
The defendant Richard Rowland was lessee
of the Newbridge Colliery.
The bill alleged that the plaintiffs had for

I

Master of the Rolls.

signed
In the form of
pencil memorandum
by liowland, and about the same time the
plaintiffs agreed with Rowland that, besides
seam, another vein
the coal of the said No.
should be included in the contract, and, at
the option of the plaintiff Fothergill, any
other vein of coal within the collieiy should
a

ROWLAND.

I

(Ij. R.

v.

4,

"It

Fothergill."

"5th Jan.

1872.

is understood

between us that besides
the No.
coal named herein that the Forest
Vach vein is included in the foregoing contract, and. further, that any other vein of coal
worked shall be included at the option of Mr.
Fothergill or representatives.
3

^*

FOTHBRGILL
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"Rich. Fothergill.
"Richd. Rowland."
That in part performance of the said agreement Rowland had commenced to deliver coal
from the said colliery to the ironworks; that
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the plaintiffs had advanced to him the sum of
£1,000, which he had employed in extending
the colliery; and that the siding was constructed by the Taff Vale Railway Company
under the arrangement
made with them toy
one of the plaintiffs.
That after January, 1872, coal of the description yielded by the colliery increased very
much in value, and that Rowland had appealed to the plaintiffs to make some modification in the contract, which they had refused,
though they had made an allowance by way
■of gift to the amount of one-third of the contract price; but that no variations in the contract had been assented to by the plaintiffs.
That coal of the description yielded by the
colliery had advanced from Cs. to 13s. per ton.
That the plaintiffs had discovered that Rowland, in violation of the terms of his agreement, was selling coal from the said No. 3
seam to other persons than the plaintiffs; and
that the deliveries were greatly below the
minimum quantities specified In the contract.
That in August, 1873, the plaintiffs discovered that Rowland had entered into an agreement with the defendants Spickett, Price, Bassett, and Meyer, for the sale to them of the
colliery; and that such agreement was entered into for the purpose of evading the peron the part of Rowland of the
formance
agreement between the plaintiffs and himself,
and of depriving the plaintiffs of their rights
in the premises.
The plaintiffs prayed, firstj^or anj^junction to r estrain the defendants firgmZseUing,
assigning, or dispjjsj ng of or interfering_w ith
the"colliery, except subiect t n thp figrppmpnt
; and from
be^eS3bailataBffls^aad_^W]and
intprfpri ng with
.gftTrin^^^^dlspnalng of or
an:^^
coal gotte n or to be gotten out of the said
colliery, except for the_jmrpose of the performance

of

the .agreement;

and,

that it might be declared

secondly,

that the Jrtfflinffs
were entitled to the whole of the get of the
seam of coal No. 3, and of the Forest Vach
vein of the colliery, and also, at the option of
the plaintiffs, to the whole of the get of any
other seam of coal worked at the colliery during the period of five years, upon the terms of
the said agreement

embodied in the memoran1871, and the 4th

da of the 6th of December,
and 5th of January, 1872.
The defendants demurred

to the bill.

Sharp & TJUithorne, agents for Simons &
Plews, Merthyr Tydvil, for plaintiffs. I. H.
Wrentmore, W. Kelly, and Mr. Gosling, for
defendants.

I

feel no doubt
SIR G. JESSEL, M. R.
whatever on the question, therefore I think it
I never did
is my duty to give a decision.
approve, when at the bar, and I do not approve now, when on the bench, of the practice of not deciding a substantial question
when it is fairly raised between the parties
and argued, simply because it is raised by
It is a great benefit to all parties
demurrer.
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to have the question in the case speedily and
and the practice of decheaply determined,
murring ought, if possible, to be encouraged.
am sorry to
The question is one which
have to decide against the plaintiffs. No honest man, whether on the bench or off it, can
approve of the conduct of the defendants.
The first defendant, Rowland, has entered into a contract bona fide for valuable considerations to sell a quantity of coal to be raised
from his mine to the plaintiffs. He has received the advantages of the contract, and because coal has risen in value and he can get a
better price elsewhere, he does not choose to
Such conduct ought not
perform his contract.
Then
to meet with the approval of anybody.
have to determine is, whether
the question
the plaintiffs have come to the right court to
obtain that which the law will undoubtedly
in some
give them, namely, compensation
shape or other for the loss they have sustainIt appears to
ed by this breach of contract.
me, as the law now stands, a court of equity cannot give them any relief.
The first question is, what is the contract
for? In my view of the contract it is one for
the sale of coals, that is, coals gotten, the get
of coal, the severed chattel, and it has no relation whatever to a contract for real estate.
That point really was not argued by Mr. Fry,
although Mr. Marten did touch upon it.
think it must be assumed, therefore, to be a
simple contract for the sale of a chattel of a
very ordinary description not alleged to be a
peculiar coal, or coal that cannot be got elseread the bill,
On the contrary, as
where.
there is coal that can be got elsewhere of the
The
same description, only at a higher price.
result is that the plaintiffs wiU incur an
amount of damage to be measured by the
market price which they may have to pay for
as the coal
the coal of the same description
agreed to be supplied by the defendant Rowland.
It is said, however, that, although you can
ascertain the market price as regards all the
past nondelivery, you cannot ascertain exactly
the market price as to future deliveries.
To
say that you cannot ascertain the damage in
a case of breach of contract for the sale of
goods, say in monthly deliveries extending
over three years (which is the case here,
for there are three years unexpired of the
contract), is to limit the power of ascertaining damages in a way which would rather
astonish gentlemen who practice on what is
called the other side of Westminster HalL
There is never considered to be any diflSculty in ascertaining such a thing, therefore
do not think it is a case in which damages could not be ascertained at law.
That being so, what is there to distin-

I

I

I

I

I

guish this from any ordinary contract for
the sale of goods? We have been told it has
some connection with the colliery.
I suppose
coals must necessarily have connection with
a colliery, and it >happens that the person
who sold the coal to be produced from a gir-
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en colliery was also at that time the owner
of the colliery.
I apprehend there Is no difficulty about entering into a contract for
the sale of coal coming from a particular
colliery by persons not owners of that colliery; that is the common practice.
The
and there being
coals not being delivered,
no means of obtaining their delivery without compelling
Rowland to
the defendant
raise them, it has been admitted before me
that this Is a contract of which you cannot obtain a si)ecific performance in a court
of equity.
Therefore any relief to be obtained by the
plaintiffs in the shape of compensation must
be obtained at law, and
do not understand
that the plaintiffs, coming here for an injunction which they ask, are willing to abandon
their claim to compensation at law in the
shape of damages.
Then it is said, assuming this contract to
be one which the court cannot specifically
perform, it is yet a case in which the court
will restrain the defendants from breaking
the contract.
But
have always felt, when
at the bar, a very considerable diflScuIty in
understanding the court on the one hand
professing to refuse specific performance
because it is difficult to enforce it, and yet
on the other hand attempting to do the same
thing by a roundabout method.
If it is right
to prevent the defendant Rowland from selling coal at all, he not having stipulated not
to sell coal, but having stipulated to sell all
the coal he can raise to somebody who has
promised valuable consideration, — why is it
not right to compel him to raise it and deliver it? It is difficult to follow the distinction, but
cannot find any distinct line laid
down, or any distinct limit which
could
seize upon and define as being the line dividing the two classes of cases — that is, the
class of cases in which the court, feeling
that it has not the power to compel specific
performance, grants an Injunction to restrain
the breach by the contracting party of one
or more of the stipulations of the contract,
and the class of cases in which it refuses to
have asked (and I am sure
interfere.
should have obtained from one or more of
the learned counsel engaged in the case every
have not only
assistance) for a definition.
not been able to obtain the answer, but

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I
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have obtained
that which altogether commands my assent, namely, that there is no
such distinct line to be found in tht authorities.
am referred to vague and general
propositions,— that the rule is that the court
is to find out what it considers convenient,
or what will be a case of sufficient Importance to authorize
the interference of the
court at all, or something of that kind.
That being so, and not being able to discover any definite principle on which the
court can act,
must follow what Lord St.
Leonards says, in Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De
Gex, M. & G. 604, is the proper conduct for
a judge, in not extending this jurisdiction.
am not, however, entirely without assistance from authority, because it appears to
me that this very case has been put, though
only by way of illustration, by a very great
judge, Lord Cottenham, in Heathcote v. Railway Co., 2 Macn. & G. 112, where he aays:
"If A. contract with B. to deliver goods at a
certain time and place, will equity interfere
which
to prevent A. from doing anything
may or can prevent him from so delivering
the goods?"
That is the exact case I have
to deal with, because I have decided that
the contract is a contract for the delivery of
Finding the dictum of Lord Cottengoods.
ham express on the subject, and the plaintiffs' counsel not having been able to produce to me any authority in which there has
been such an Injunction granted on the sale
of goods or any chattel, in a case in which
specific performance
could not be granted,
think I shall do right in following that authority; and I say, although I say it with
much regret, that it is a case in which equity
can afford no relief.
With regard to the question of costs,
think it is undesirable to take the technical
admission
of the facts of the bill, when a
person files a demurrer, to be an admission
of the truth of the facts against him for the
If there is no remedy at
purpose of costs.
all at la,w, I think the rule that the costs
should follow the result too valuable a one
to be tampered with. On these grounds I
allow the demurrer, with the usual consequences.
A petition of appeal was presented against
this decision, but the case was compromised
before it came to a hearing.

I

I

I

I

I
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PHILADELPHIA

et al. v.

CAPE MAY
(30

N,

S.

J.

L. RY.

Eq.

&

CO.

12.)

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Oct. Term,

1878.

Bill for specific performance.
and answer.

J. W.
House,

Heard on biU

Griggs, for complainants.
for defendants.

W. A.

RUNYON, Ch. The bill is filed to obtain
by the dea decree for specific performance,
fendants, of a contract entered into between
the complainants, partners in business, and
by
them, on the 19th of December,
1877,
which the former agreed to construct, equip
and finish, for the latter, a single-track, narrow-gauge railroad, and telegraph line In connection therewith, from the terminus of the
Camden, Gloucester & Mount Ephraim Railway to high-water mark in the city of Cape
May, with stations, engine and freight houses,
machine and repair-shops, turn-tables,
waterstations, &c., &c., and all necessary terminal
facilities, for $2,000,000, payable in the capital
stock and first mortgage bonds of the company.
By the contract, the complainants were to
complete the work within five months after
the bonds were negotiated and sold at a price
not less than ninety cents on a dollar of the
par value thereof; and it was stipulated that
they should not be sold at less than that price
without the consent of both parties.
The bill states that the complainants entered
on the work, and proceeded with it from the
date of the contract to the 20th of February
following; that there was, at the latter date,
due to them, under the contract, the sum o'f
that they were then
or thereabouts;
$40,000,
entitled to have an estimate made, but the
defendants refused to make it, or to pay them,
or to carry out the contract, which the complainants allege would be of great value to
them if performed; and, further, that the defendants cannot respond in damages for their
refusal to carry out the agreement; and that
the complainants could profitably dispose of
the bonds and stock stipulated for as payment.
The bill prays that the defendants may be decreed to specifically perform the contract generally, and, also, that they may be required to
make the estimate before mentioned, and deliver bonds and stock to the complainants for
the amount which may be found due them
thereon.
The defendants' answer admits the contract and declares their willingness to perform
it, but alleges their inability to do so by reason of the provisions of an act of the legislature of this state (a supplement to the general
railroad law), approved on the 19th of February, 1878. By pne of those provisions the
provision of the original act requiring that the
articles of association should not be filed until
at least $2,000 of stock for every mile of the
HUTCH.& BUNK.EQ.— 38
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proposed railroad should have been subscribed
and ten per cent, paid thereon, was altered
so as to require that the entire amount of
$2,000 per mile shall be paid to the treasurer
of this state, to be repaid by him to the directors or treasurer of the company in the
manner specified in the supplement, as the
work of constructing the railroad shall progress. By the other, the provision of the original act which authorized the mortgaging of
the road, &c., of the company, to secure the
payment of their bonds to an amount not exceeding the amount of the paid-up capital
stock, was altered by adding a provision that
if any person or persons shall issue such bonds
to any greater amount than the amount which
at the time of such issue shall have been
actually paid up on the capital stock of the
company, he, she or they shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and, on conviction, be punished
by fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment at hard labor for not more than three
years, or both, at the discretion of the court.
These provisions of the supplement were therein expressly made applicable to corporations
already organized under the original act. The
defendants state that they have expended all
the money received by them on account of
their capital stock in the work on the road,
and that they are not able to comply with the
provisions of the supplement, and that, by the
terms of the supplement, their charter is forfeited, by reason of their failure to comply
with the provisions of that act.
There are several considerations which forbid the granting of the relief prayed for in
this suit. If this court would undertake the
performance of such a contract as that stated
in the bill, a contract for building and equipping a long line of railroad, building station,
freight and engine houses, &c., &c. (and the
current and great weight of authority is decidedly against it,—Story, Eq. Jur. § 726; Ross
V. Union Pac. R. Co., 1 Woolw. 26, Fed. Cas.
No. 12,080;
Fallon v. Railroad Co., 1 Dill.
121, Fed. Cas. No. 4,629; South Wales R. Co.
V. Wythes, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 880), Ji£_ais;i
ability^ifttie defendants would be a sufiicient
reason for fef using.
Courts of equity will
never undertake to enforce specific performance of an agreement where the decree would
be a vain or imperfect act. Tobey v. County
of Bristol, 2 Story, 800, Fed. Cas. No. 14,065.
And the incapacity of the defendant to carry
the contract into execution affords a ground
of defence in a suit for specific performance.
Fry, Spec. Perf. § 658.
In this case the defendants are willing to
perform their part of the contract if they can
lawfully do so. They have never refused to
issue their bonds and stock to the complainants in accordance with the terms of the contract, except because of the provisions of the
supplement
above referred to, under which
they apprehend they may have lost their corporate existence, and by which, if their corr
porate existence be not lost, their directors
and officers who should act in the matter
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would be liable to severe and ignominious
punishment for so doing. P. L. 1878, p. 23.
They have not complied with the provisions
of the supplement in reference to the amount
to be paid in on their capital stock, and have
not been able and are not able to do so. Only
ten per cent of the amount of their capital
stock has been paid in. Their corporate powers are, according to the supplement, extinct,
and the corporation is dissolved.
P. L. 1878,
p. 22. The complainants, however. Insist that
the supplement is an unconstitutional law; that
it destroys their contract, which existed when
it was passed, and which was founded on the
faith of the original act; that it deprives
them of their vested rights thereunder,
and
that it should be declared to be unconstitutional, and Its provisions, so far as they are
subject to that objection, disregarded.
But it
is in nowise necessary to consider that question; for, If there were no other valid objection, this court would not, under the circum-
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stances of the case, declare that the apprehensions, or doubts at least, of the defendants,
as to the validity of the supplement, are wholly groundless, and direct them to proceed, notwithstanding the penalties above mentioned,
to issue bonds according to the contract and in
violation of the prohibition of the supplement;
to subject themselves to indictment for misdemeanor and the consequences of conviction.
It is enough that the legislature has forbidden
them to issue the bonds to induce this court
to refuse to order them to issue them. But,
further, there is at least doubt whether the
company still has a corporate existence.
Though the court might, If the case were
free from these difficulties, direct the defendants to make the estimate of work already
done prayed for In the bill (Waring v. Railway Co., 7 Hare, 482), yet, for the considerations already presented, that relief must also
be denied.
The bill wUU be dismissed.
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and
the second part the necessary privileges
of all
requisite facilities for the transaction
the express business over the entire length of
(99 U. S. 191.)
their road, extending from Salisbury to MorOct.
States.
Supreme Court of the United
ganton, in North Carolina,
and furnish such
1878.
facilities by all its passenger trains running
each way over its road as may be necessary
Appeal from the circuit court of the Unitto forward without delay all the express mated States for the Western district of North
ter that may be offered by said party of the
Carolina.
second part, and to do all in its power to
This is
bill In equity, filed June 18, 1875,
promote the convenience of said party of the
corby the Southern Express Company,
of its express
second part in the transaction
poration of Georgia, against the Western
business, both at way and terminal stations.
corpoNorth Carolina Railroad Company,
"Said party of the second part agrees to
ration of North Carolina, W. A. Smith, and
Henry Clews, for the specific performance of load and unload said express matter by its
own agents, at its own proper costs and char1865,
contract entered into December
ges, and save harmless said party of the first
between the railroad company and the compart against all claims for loss and damage
plainant.
to the express matter of the party of the secThe bill alleges that the railroad company
was organized for the purpose of construct- ond part, except that which occurs from the
ing
railroad from Salisbury, North Car- negligence and carelessness of said party of
point on the Tennessee line; that the first part or its agents.
olina, to
"The said party of the first part agrees to
it completed that portion of its line between
in run- carry free of charge the messengers in charge
Salisbury and Morganton, and put
of express matter and the officers and agents
ning order; that the road-bed, roUing-stock,
of the said party of the second part passing
&c., became dilapidated during the war, and
The
over the road upon express business.
that the company in 1865 was without the
said party of the second part agrees to pay to
safe
means to repair the road and make
the said party of the first part fifty cents
for the transportation of passengers and
per hundred pounds for all express matter carfreight; that the company, having been unAn account of the
ried over the road.
successful elsewhere, applied to the comweights of all express matter shall be taken
plainant for
loan or advance of $20,000;
by said party of the first part whenever they
that the complainant having agreed to loan
or advance that sum in consideration
of se- shall see fit to do so, and delivered to the
agent of the party of the first part, weekly or
curing the exclusive privilege of transporting
monthly, as may be desired.
freights over said road as far as Morganton,
"The accounts for transportation to be
entered,
and of certain other advantages,
made up monthly, and the sum found to be
with the advice and consent of the stockdue to said railroad company for transportaholders of the railroad company, into the foltion, at the rate hereinafter specified, shall be
lowing contract with that company:
applied monthly toward the payment of sai(^
"This Indenture of agreement, made and
twenty thousand ($20,000) dollars, until the
entered Into this second day of December,
A. D. eighteen hundred and sixty-five, be- whole sum, with interest, is paid, after which
payments for transportation shall be made by
tween the Western North Carolina Railroad
said party of the second part monthly In cash.
Company, as party of the first part, and the
"This contract shall remain in force for the
Southern Express Company, as party of the
full term of one year, from the first day of
second part, witnesseth as follows:
January, eighteen hundred and sixty-six. If
"Whereas the party of the second part has
the said sum of twenty thousand
agreed to loan and advance to the party of
($20,000)
dollars, with interest thereon, shall not have
the first part the sum of twenty thousand
been repaid to the said second party at the
($20,000) dollars upon the notes of said railexpiration of said one year, this contract shall
road company, bearing Interest at the rate
continue in force for
of six per cent per annum, which sum is to
further period, and
until the whole of said twenty thousand ($20,for
be expended in repairs and equipments
said road.
And whereas the party of the first 000) dollars, with interest thereon, shall have
part is desirous of securing the services of an been repaid.
And the said party of the first
part hereby covenants and agrees that
will
efficient and responsible agent for the transnot furnish express privileges over said road
action of all of the express business over its
to any other parties during the existence of
road, and is willing to provide the requisite
this contract on any more favorable terms
facilities for the proper transaction of said
than those herein made with the said party
express business in the manner and upon the
of the second part, both as to rate of transterms hereinafter specified:
portation paid, advance payments, and total
of said
"Now, therefore, in consideration
amount paid per annum.
It is mutually coveloan and advance, and the rents, covenants,
nanted and agreed by the parties hereto that
and agreements hereinafter made and providany other contracts
that may now exist,
ed, said party of the first part hereby agrees
whether verbal or written, for express service
and binds itself to grant to the said party of
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between the parties hereto, shall terminate
and cease on the thirty-first day of December,
eighteen hundred
and sixty-flve,
at which
time this contract shall take effect.
"In witness whereof, the parties to these
presents have hereunto set their hands and
seals the day and year first above written.

"Tod R. Caldwell,
"Pres't W. N. C. R. R. Co.
"H. B. Plant,
"Pres't Southern Express Company."
The bill then alleges that the $20,000 was
paid in compliance with the contract, and
that shortly thereafter the complainant
entered upon the road, transported
freight according to the terms of the contract, kept
regular accounts and exhibited them to the
company, which were always approved, and
it continued to act under said contract until
July, 1873; that in 1870 the railroad company conveyed to Tod R. Caldwell and Henry
Clews, as joint tenants, and to the survivor
of each,— the former of whom has since deceased,— all its real and personal property, including its franchises,
in trust, to secure a
large number of its bonds then about to be
issued; that $1,400,000
of said bonds were
sold or hypothecated, and came into the hands
of persons unknown to the complainant, but
for much less than their value and not by a
bona fide sale; that, notwithstanding, the alleged creditors of the company instituted foreclosure proceedings in the circuit court of the
United States for the Western district of
North Carolina, and in 1873 obtained a decree ordering the sale of all the property of
Smith,
that the defendant,
said company;
having in that suit been appointed receiver of
forbade the complainant,
in
the company,
July, 1873, from further using the cars of
the company, unless upon conditions whereby said contract was virtually surrendered or
the complainant
that thereupon
ignored;
was compelled to abandon said railroad, although the money so loaned, with a portion
of the Interest thereon, is still due and unIt then alleges that the suit is brought
paid.
with the consent of said court, and with the
of making such parties defendant
privilege
as might be deemed necessary for that purpose; that the trustees in the mortgage to
secure the bonds of the railroad company had
express notice of the contract when they accepted the trust, and that it was claimed by
the complainant as an existing lien; that the
substance of said contract had been published
separately at the instance of the stockholders
of the railroad company, and was well known
to its creditors and to the purchasers of its
bonds at the time, and especially to the defendant Smith; and that the railroad company having conveyed away Its property, and
being in part insolvent, the violation of the
contract cannot he compensated by any damages which would be recovered at law. The
bill therefore prays for a decree compelling
the railroad company to specifically perform
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its contract, and for such other and furtherelief as the nature and circumstances of the
case may require, and for process against the
defendants.
The charter of the railroad company granted in February, 1855, is annexed to the bill
and made a part thereof.
Its twenty-fifth
and twenty-sixth sections are as follows:
"Sect. 25. Be it fm-ther enacted, that the
said company shall have the exclusive right
of conveyance,
transportation of persons,
goods, merchandise,
and produce over the
said railroad, to be by them constructed, at
such charges as may be fixed on by the
board of directors.
"Sect. 26. Be it further enacted, that said
company may, when they see fit, farm out
their right of transportation over said railroad, subject to the rules above mentioned;
and the said company and every one who
may have received from it the right of transportation of goods, wares, and merchandise
over the said railroad, shall be deemed and
taken to be a common carrier, as respects all
goods, wares, produce, and merchandise
inti'usted to them for transportation."
At rule-day in July, 1875, the writ of subpoena was returned
executed, and the cause
continued
until the October term, when it
was ordered that the commissioners
in possession of the road in the Western district of
North Carolina, and Howerton, president of
the company, be notified to appear and answer or demur to the bill of complaint at
rule-day in January, 1876. The commissioners appeared and demurred.
The demurrer
was sustained and the bill dismissed.
The
express company then brought the case here.
Clarence A. Seward, for appellant.
Merrimon, for appellee.

A.

S.

SWAYNE, Justice. The bill avers that it
was filed against the receiver appointed by
the court below, that he was in possession
of the railroad, and that the institution of the
suit was by the consent of the court.
Without this latter fact the bill could not have
been filed or maintained.
The suit would
have been a contempt of the court which
had appointed the receiver, and punishable
as such. Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203.
The citizenship of the complainant corporation is sufficiently averred.
Express Co. v.
Kountz, 8 Wall. 342. Such a complainant
need not prove its existence, unless the fact
is directly put in issue by the defendant.
Society for Propagation of Gospel v. Town
of Pawlet, 4 Pet. 480.
To the objection that the requisite corporate power of the complainant
is not shown,
there are two answers.
The contract of a
corporation is presumed to be infra vires, until the contrary is made to appear. 2 Waite,
Act. & Def. 334.
The charter is set out in the record, and
forms a part of it. That leaves no room for
doubt

upon

the subject.
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Adequate capacity on the part of the railroad company to make the contract is to be
presumed in like manner.
No party defendant was necessary but the
receiver.
He was In the possession of the
property and effects of the railroad company, subject to the order of the court, and
could have specifically performed
the contract, or paid back the money loaned if the
court had so directed.
The presence of the
other parties was immaterial, and the bill
might well have been dismissed as to them.
Davis V. Gray, supra; Doggett v. Railroad
Co., 99 U. S. 72.
The contract between the express company
and the railroad company was that the latter should give to the former the necessary
facilities for the transaction of all Its business upon the road, forward without delay
by the passenger trains both ways all the
express matter that should be offered, do all
in its power to promote the convenience of
the express company, both at the way and
terminal stations, and carry free of charge
the messengers in charge of the express matter, and the officers .and agents of the express company passing over the road on express business.
for these
The consideration
stipulations was a loan by the express company to the railroad company of $20,000, to
be expended in repairs and equipments for
the road, the loan to bear interest at the rate
of six per cent per annum, and the payment
of fifty cents per hundred pounds for all express matter carried over the road, to be applied in discharge of the loan and interest.
The contract was to continue for one year
from the first day of January, 1866, and until the principal and interest of the debt
should be fully paid. The bill avers that
the receiver had refused to carry out the
contract, and that the principal of $20,000
and a part of the interest were unpaid.
The enforcement of contracts not relating
to realty by a decree for specific performance is not an unusual exercise of equity
jurisdiction. Such cases are numerous
in
both English and American jurisprudence.
They proceed upon the ground that under
a judgment at law would
the circumstances
not meet the demands of justice, that it
would be less beneficial than relief in equity,
that the damages would not be an accurate
satisfaction, that their extent could not be
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exactly shown,

or that
remedy would be
with doubt and difficulty.
Judge Story, after an
tion of the subject, thus
legal

597
the pursuit of the
attended otherwise
elaborate

examina-

lays down the general rule: "The just conclusion in all such
cases would seem to be that courts of equity
ought not to decline the jurisdiction for a
of contracts whenever
specific performance
the remedy at law is doubtful in its nature,
extent,
or adequacy." 2 Story,
operation,
Eq. Jur. § 728. See, also, Stuyvesant v.
Mayor, etc., 11 Paige, 414; Barr v. Lapsley,
Co., 2
1 Wheat. 151;
Storer v. Railway
Younge & C. 48; Wilson v. Railroad Co., L.
R. 9 Eq. 28.
But we need not pursue the subject further,
because there is one provision of the contract in this case which is fatal to the relief
sought.
A court of equity never interferes
Frye,
where the power of revocation exists.
Spec. Perf. 64.
The contract stipulates that after the first
year it shall cease upon the payment of the
and interest.
This might be made
$20,000
immediately upon the rendition of the decree.
The action of the court would thus become
a nullity.
There is another objection to the appellant's case which is no less conclusive.
The road is in the hands of the receiver
appointed in a suit brought by the bondholders to foreclose their mortgage.
The appellant has no lien.
The contract
neither
expressly nor by implication touches that subject.
It is not a license as insisted by counsel. It is simply a contract for the transportation of persons and property over the
A specific performance by the receivroad.
er would be a form of satisfaction or payment which he cannot be required to make.
As well might he be decreed to satisfy the
appellant's demand by money, as by the service sought to be enforced.
Both belong to
the lien-holders, and neither can thus be diverted.

The appellant can, therefore, have no locus
standi in a court of equity.
Both these objections appear by its own
showing. It was, therefore, competent and
proper for the court below, sua sponte, to
dismiss the bill for the want of equity upon
its face. Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 37.
Decree

affirmed.
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BROWN, J.

This action was brought in
court to restrain the defendant,
Helen Braham, otherwise known as Lilian
Russell, from violating her agreement with
the plaintiff by singing during the current
than at
season in any other employment
the plaintiff's theater, which the complaint
alleges she is about to do. A preliminary
injunction having been obtained at the time
of the commencement of the action, the cause
was removed by the plaintiff to this court
before answer; and the defendant now
moves upon affidavits to dissolve the injuncBy the agreement in writing between
tion.
the parties, the defendant agreed to sing in
comic opera in the employment of the plaintiff whenever required during the season of
on or about Sep1882 to 1883, commencing
tember ] , 1882, at a stipulated weekly salary.
By article 1 the agreement provides that "the
artist is engaged exclusively for Mr. John McCaull, and during the continuance of this engagement will not perform, sing, dance, or
otherwise exercise her talent in theater, coneither
or elsewhere,
cert halls, churches,
gratuitously or for her remuneration or advantage, or for that of any other person or
the

state

(although not
other theater or establishment
thereby prevented from fulfilling her engagement with Mr. McCaull) without having first
in writing of Mr. Mcobtained permission
Caull; and for each and every breach of this
rule the artist shall forfeit one week's salary,
or her engagement, at the option of Mr. McCaull; but such forfeiture of one week's salary shall not be held to debar Mr. McCaull
from enforcing the fulfillment of this contract in such a manner as he may think fit."
By article 3 it is provided that "no salaries
will be paid for any night or days on which
the artist may not be able to perform through
Illness or other unavoidable cause; and the
artist absenting herself, except from illness
or other unavoidable cause, will forfeit one
week's salaiy, or her engagement, at the option of Jlr. McCaull, and will also be held
liable for any loss that may be sustained by
Mr. McCaull owing to such absence. Illness,
to be accepted as an excuse, must be attested
by a medical certificate, which must be delivered to Mr. McCaull or his representative
as early as possible, and before the comShould such
mencement of the performance.
absence exceed two weeks, the engagement
may be canceled at the option of Mr. Mc-

Caull."
The defendant entered upon the performance of her engagement at the Bijou Opera
House in this city in September, 1882, with
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great success, which was continued until prevented from further performance by proHaving partially recovei'ed,
tracted illness.
she attempted to renew her appearances, but
in Decemafter three nights' performances,
ber, she suffered a relapse from which she
did not recover until about the middle of
February, 1888.
By the written contract the plaintiff was to
furnish all costumes.
This was modified,
prior to September, by an oral agreement by
which the plaintiff was to pay a larger salary and the defendant to furnish her own
costumes.
Both parties agree as to the modification of the contract to this
The
extent.
'
defendant
contends that in addition to the
above the oral contract was further modified
by the plaintiff agreeing to pay her weekly
salary as at first fixed during the continuance
of any illness; that the sum of about $350,
paid to her by the plaintiff during her illness,
was paid in pursuance of this modification of
and that since the middle of
the contract;
December the plaintiff has refused to continue such payment during that part of her
illness, in violation of the agreement as modified.

The plaintiff denies that the modification
of the contract included any agreement to
pay her during illness, and asserts that the
moneys actually paid her while ill were merely advances on account of future salary to be
earned, and so expressly stated at the time.
Each party sustains its respective claims in
They
this respect by several witnesses.
leave this branch of the subject in so much
doubt that I feel obliged to reject it from
consideration,
without prejudice to either in
regard to their mutual claims in respect to it,
since neither party made it a ground of terminating the contract.
Up to the time this action was commenced
had given no notice to the
the defendant
plaintiff terminating the agreement; nor had
the plaintiff, as he might have done according
to the express provision of the agreement,
notified the defendant that it was canceled,
I
owing to her absence beyond two weeks.
must, therefore, hold the agreement as still
in force.
Contracts for the services of artists or authors of special merit are personal
and peculiar; and when they contain negative covenants which are essential parts of
the agreement, as in this case, that the artists
will not perform elsewhere, and the damages, in case of violation, are incapable of
definite measurement, they are such as ought
to be observed in good faith and specifically
That violation of such
enforced in equity.
covenants will be restrained by injunction, is
Lumley v.
now the settled law of England.
Wagner, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 60i; Montague

Flockton, L. R. 16 Eq. 189, 199.
The subject was exhaustively considered by
Freedman, J., in the case of Daly v. Smith,
49 How. Prac. 150, in whose conclusions, in
accordance
with the English eases above
cited, I fully concur.
In the present case it
V.
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is,

however,
urged jthat the rerqedy by . Injunction should not be alToWeclT on the groimd
ffiat the "pTaintiff's damages have been llquiffated by the first article of the contract
above qiioted;
na:mely, that "for each and
every breach of this rule the artist shaU'f orfeit onie week's salary;" and the cases of
Bameg V. McAllister, 18 How. Prac. 534;
Nessle v. Reese, 29 How. Prac. 382; Mott v.
Mott, 11 Barb. 127, 134; and Trenor v. Jackson, 46 How. Prac. 389, are cited in support
of this view.
There is no doubt of the general principle
that where the damages for the violation of
a covenant
are either liquidated by the

agreement, or may be easily and definitely ascertained,
the parties will be left to their
remedy at law. But it is clear that in cases
of contract like the present, the damages are
not capable of being definitely ascertained
or measured;
and in the cases first above
cited, injunctions were for that reason allowed.
The only question in this case, therefore, which distinguishes the present agreement from those, is whether the provision
for the forfeiture of a week's wages for
every violation of article 1 is such a liquidation of the damages as bars the remedy by
injunction.
In Barnes v. McAlister and in
Nessle v. Reese and Mott v. Mott, supra,
there was a covenant to pay a specific sum
for failure to observe the covenant in these
cases;
and these sums were held by the
court to be strictly liquidated damages.
Where the provision of the contract is in
the nature of a penalty, and not liquidated
damages, it is well settled that such a provision will not prevent the remedy by injunction to enforce the covenant specifically;
and the provision will be construed as a
penalty, and not as liquidated damages,
where its plain object is to secure a performance of the covenant, and not intended
as the price or equivalent to be paid for a
nonobservance
of it.
Howard v. Hopkyns,
2 Atk. 371; Bird v. Lake, 1 Hem. & M.
Fox V. Scard, 33 Beav. 327; Sloman v. Walter, 1 Brown, C. C. 418; Jones v. Heavens, 4
Ch. Div. 636.
Whether the language of the contract Is
to be construed as a penalty or as liquidated
damages is to be determined
from^ its language and its presumed intent to be gathered from the circumstances of the parties
and the nature of the agreement.
"A penalty," says Lord Loughborough, in Hardy v.
Martin, 1 Cox, Ch. 26, "is never considered
in this court as the price of doing a thing
which a man has expressly agreed not to do;
but if the real meaning and intent of the
contract is that a man should have the power, if he chooses, to do a particular act upon
the payment of a certain specified sum, the
power to do the act upon the payment of
the sum agreed on is part of the express
contract between the parties."
Vincent v.
King, 13 How. Prac. 234-238; Kerr, Inj. 409.
In Coles V. Sims, 5 De Gex, M. & G., Lord

Ill;

OF CONTRACTS.

599

Justice Turner says, upon this point, (p. 1:)
"The question in such cases, as I conceive,
is, whether the clause is inserted by way of
penalty or whether it amounts to a stipulation for liberty to do a certain act on the
payment of a certain sum."
That the clause providing for the forfeiture of one week's salary for each violation
of this contract was in the natm-e of a penalty, and designed solely to secure the observance of article 1, is manifest both from
the general nature of the employment and
the requirements of a manager of opera, as
well as the express language of this article;
because (1) the stipulation is not for the
payment of a certain sum as liquidated damages, but only for the forfeiture of a week's
salary; (2) it gives an option to the plaintiff,
instead of such forfeiture, to annul the engagement; (3) it declares that such forfeiture
shall not disbar the plaintiff! from' enforcing
the fulfillment of this contract in such a
manner as he shall think fit, i. e., by any
available legal or equitable remedy.
As the
remedy by injunction is one of the remedies
available, this language is equivalent to an
express declaration that the provision for the
forfeiture of a week's salary for each violation shall not affect his right to a remedy
by injunction. This last stipulation would
not, indeed, influence the court, provided it
was clear that the damages were intended
to be liquidated at a specific sum, for which
the defendant was to have the option of singing at any other theater.
But these several
clauses taken together show conclusively that
no such thing was Intended,
and that the
sole object was to secure the specific observance of the contract that the defendant
should not sing elsewhere;
and the plaintiff
is therefore entitled to restrain the violation
of it. As the season will close on May 15th
and the contract then terminate, there are
certain equitable conditions which should be
observed, and which it is competent for the
court, in continuing the injunction, to impose.
Russell V. Farley, 105 U. S. 433, 438.
The injunction of this court must not be
used directly or indirectly to enforce the collection by the plaintiff of his alleged but
disputed claim' for previous advances, through
the nonpayment
of salary hereafter earned,
at least until his right is legally adjudicated.
(2) Considering the short period remaining,
the defendant must not be sent to California,
where by the contract she might have been
taken without salary en route going and returning; nor, having respect to her precarious health, should she be sent to any very
distant point; (3) the plaintiff should furnish satisfactory seciu-ity for the prompt
payment weekly for the defendant's services
at the rate of $150 per week, the contract price,
from the time the defendant gives notice in
writing of her readiness to sing under the
contract,
so long as she shall continue in
readiness to perform her duties.
In case of failure to pay any future salary
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earned, the defendant may apply, on tv/o
days' notice, to the plaintiff's attorneys for
the dissolution of this injunction.
An order may be entered continuing the
injunction subject to the above provisions
and conditions.

NOTE.
Employe from Serving Rival of
Bmploj-ei-.— The decisions upon the judicial enforcement of the stipulations common between
actoi-s. artists, authors, lecturers, or other professional workers and their employers, that the
employs shall not exercise his skill and talent
for any other person, are not very numerous,
but they estaband are somewhat conflicting;
lish the modern general doctrine to be that the
employer is not obliged to submit to a breach of
the covenant, and content himself with an action for damages, but, .in a proper case, may
restraining
the employe
have an injunction
from engaging in any rival service; and this,
whether compelling the latter to perform his
affirmative engagement to labor for his employer is practicable or not. To reconcile the
decisions would be difficult, except upon the
explanation that, when suits of this nature
were first brought, the inadequacy of the action for damages, as a remedy, was not fully
perceived; but that, gradually, as one case after another was presented, it became better understood, and equity judges grew more prompt
and willing to exercise their jurisdiction on the
ground that employers of public performers cannot well be compensated in damages for departures of artists from their establishments.
If an actor, continuing to perform for his general employer, according to his engagement,
plays on "off nights" for a rival theater, the
question how much the receipts of his employer
have been diminished by the opportunity given
the public of hearing the favoritfe elsewhere, is
too vague and uncertain to be shown by legal
proof.
And if, as is frequently the case, he
from his first engagement wholly,
withdraws
and devotes himself to the service of a competitor, the question of damages is rendered
still more perplexing by the difficulty of showr
ing wliat profits the deserted manager would
have realized had the performances been continued as agreed; and the latter needs, also, to
have some indemnity, difficult to be estimated
in money, for his liability to refund for tickets
or boxes sold in advance, and for his loss of
prestige through failure of his announced enObviously courts of justice cantertainments.
not compel public performers or members of the
professions to perform specific services they
have promised; there are no means at the command of a tribunal for compelling a person to
or write, nor is there any
act, sing, speak,
standard for determining whether one has done
so in good faith and with his best skill.
The
result, therefore, is that a properly-framed stipulation, in a contract for services of this description, forbidding the employe to serve elsewhere, may be enforced by injunction.
Such
are equally obtainable under the
injunctions
codes of procedure, upon complaint in a civil
action; or, in states adhering to the old practice, upon bill in equity; or, in the United
States circuit court, sitting in equity, if the
parties are citizens of different states.
In what eases the fact that the contract of
the parties, by liquidating the damages or otherwise, gives the employer a better remedy by
action than usual, precludes his resort to injunction, is the question particularly
discussed
in the text, and nothing need be added to Judge
Brown's able and lucid exposition of the principles governing that branch of the subject.
This note will indicate the development of the
general power of equity to enjoin in these cases.
Early English decisions went upon the theory
that although an independent, simple covenant
not to undertake specified services may be en-

Enjoining
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forced, when reasonable and consistent with
public policy, yet in a contract between A. and
B. that B. shall act or sing, etc., for A., and
shall not perform for any one else, the negativi'
clause is merely incidental to the affirmative;
and unless the case is one in which the court
can enforce the affirmative stipulation it ought
not to enjoin a proposed breach of the negative.
These decisions, therefore, generally denied A.'s
prayer for an injunction
to restrain B. from
performing
in the employment of C, unless
special ground of equitable jurisdiction
some
over the case existed. The following are illustrative cases : Price agreed to prepare exchequer
reports for Clarke to publish, without, however,
engaging not to write for any one else. The
saying
lord chancellor refused an injunction,
that as he had no jurisdiction to compel Price,
directly, to write reports for Clarke, he ought
not to do so indirectly, by forbidding him to
write for any one else. Clarke v. Price (1819)
2 Wils. Ch. 157.
A similar application was denied for the same reason, where the engagement of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful
Knowledge with Baldwin's publishing firm was
simply to furnish them with certain maps and
charts for publication, a thing which the court
had no means of compeUing directly. Baldwin
V. Society (1838) 9 Sim. 393.
The actor Kean
was advertised to play at DruiT Lane theater,
while there was yet 10 days unexpired of a
prior engagement at Covent Garden. The vicechancellor denied the application of the Covent
Garden proprietors to enjoin him, for the same
reason, viz., that there was no jurisdiction to
compel him to perform his 10 days' service.
Kemble v. Kean (1829) 6 Sim. 333. Upon examination of a special agreement for mercantile services of defendant, containing a stipulation forbidding his working for any other house,
the affirmative stipulations of the contract were
pronounced too vague and too onerous towards
the employs to allow of decreeing a specific
performance, and the court would not enjoin the
breach of the negative covenant alone.
Kimberley V. Jennings (1836) 6 Sim. 340.
Upon the other hand, the case of Morris v. Colman (1812) IS Ves. 437, illustrates the principle
that a covenant not to serve may be enforced
by injunction where other facts give equitable
jurisdiction
of the controversy.
Colman, noted
as a dramatist, became manager of the Haymarket theater, under an agreement in the nature of a copartnership,
which contained a
clause restraining him from writing dramatic
pieces for any other theater.
In a suit which
arose between the parties interested in the management, the validity of this clause was questioned before Lord Chancellor Eldon.
He pronounced it valid and enforceable, it being bepartners,
tween
and being neither contrary to
public policy nor unreasonable as between the
parties. The decision has generally been explained in later cases on the ground that the
stipulation was one of several in an agreement
of copartnership, and that equity has jurisdiction of disputes among partners, though this explanation has been questioned. 2 Philli. 597.
Early American decisions ran in the wake of
the English; our courts did not deny the jurisdiction, but were loth to exercise it. De Bivafinoli, while manager of the Italian theater in
New York, engaged Corsetti as fipst bass in
operas, the latter agreeing not to make use of
his talents in any other theater. But before the
opening of the season Corsetti was announced
to sail for Cuba, to perform there under another
manager. De Rivafinoli then sought an injunction, (and ne exeat,) which Chancellor Walworth refused, on the ground that under the
circumstances the application was premature,
for before commencement of the actor's engagement the manager could not have a right of
action. On the general question he said, in effect, that while it is theoretically proper that
"a bird that can sing and will not sing must
be made to sing," yet there is an obstacle to
making a vocalist sing by order of the court of
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On appeal the familiar objection
was urged that equity will not enjoin the
cannot
negative covenant where
breach of
performance of the afBrmative one to
decree
which
Sim. 333; Id. 340;
incident.
St.
Macn. & G. 393. But Lord Chancellor
Leonards said that when the reason why tho
court could not decree specific performance is
not that the plaintiff is not entitled to it, but
merely the want of means to compel the defendant to perform, he thought the court need
not on that account refrain from doing what
perwas within its power, viz., forbidding
formance which will violate the contract. To
remedy at law
the objection that there was
by action for damages, the lord chancellor replied that such remedy was no better than exists upon covenants not to practice as attorney,
surgeon, etc., within certain limits, which are
often enforced by injunction.
Another objection was that the promise not to sing elsewhere was not in the original agreement; but
the chancellor said that the two papers were
not independent, but were in effect one contract;
and that even
the stipulation not to
sing elsewhere had never been made in writing, he thought
was implied in the original
contract; in other words, singing for Mr. Gye
was
breach of the spirit and meaning of the
contract to sing for Mr. Lumley.
Another objection was that the injunction would be mischievous, because
would prevent a popular
artist from singing at one theater, while the
court could not promote her performing at another; hence the tendency would be to prevent
the public from hearing her anywhere; but the
chancellor said that the artist had no right to
complain on this ground; the injunction would
merely forbid her doing what she had engaged
not to do. The temporary injunction was, therefore, continued.
Lumley v. Wagner (1852)
De Gex. M. & G. 604; 13 Eng. Law & Eq.
252.
The opinion embodies an elaborate review
of the previous English cases on the extent to
which equity may go in enjoining breach of
and the
negative covenants of various kinds;
decision has been generally followed in both
countries as establishing the jurisdiction to enforce contracts not to serve in public performances or intellectual work.
A firm of Frer.ch photographists, Fredricks
& Co., employed Constant Mayer as "artist
painter" for three years, at an annual salary,
to retouch proofs in oil at their New York
house,
and he engaged not to work for any
one else; yet he left them and engaged with
Gurney.
The question whether the court could
grant an injunction was decided in their favor,
the judge saying that this remedy is not applicable to all restrictive covenants, for many
may be protected by action for damages; but
great actor, or
contracts for employment of
for services which involve exercise of high
powers of mind peculiar to the one person,
cannot be treated by ordinary rules, but reFredquire the special remedy of injunction.
ricks V. Mayer (1857) 13 How. Prac. 566. But,
on the merits of the application under the particular circumstances, the judge denied it; and
this was affirmed in Fredricks v. Mayer,
Bosw. 227.
Annetti Galletti agreed to dance at the
Broadway Music Hall, New York, for six
weekly salary, and to "exercise
months at
her utmost abilities for the promotion of the exhibition."
But the agreement did not contain
her to perform
an express clause forbidding
elsewhere
and on account of this omission the
employer's motion for an injunction was denied.

Butler

V.

Galletti

manager

(1861)

21

How. Prac.

465.

of the Olympic theater in
New York, engaged Willio to play at the Olympic for three months, and "not to perform at
any other establishment,"
After playing
etc.
hightwo months, ^Villio accepted an offer of
An injuncer salary from
Boston theater.
tion was granted, the court mentioning, with
a
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chancery, in the fact that no officer of the court
has that perfect knowledge of the Italian language, or possesses that exquisite sensibility in
the auricular nerve, which is necessary to the
understanding and enjoyment of Italian opera;
and it would be dilflcult for a master to determine whether a defendant sang in faithful performance of his engagement, or ascertain what
effect the coercion might produce upon his singing, especially in the livelier airs. De Rivafinoli V. Corsetti (1833) 4 Paige, 264. Similar
considerations led Edwards, J., to refuse a similar application in Sanquirico
v. Benedetti, 1
Barb.' 314,
The comedian Ingersoll agreed with Hamblin,
the manager of the Bowery theater in New
York, to play for him for three years, also, not
to act except for Hamblin during the term; but
an injunction was refused because there was
no ground of jurisdiction
over the affirmative
part of the agreement, while the negative was
a mere matter between employer and employe.
Hamblin v. Dinneford (1835) 2 Edw. Ch. 529.
When Burton, the famous comedian of a generation ago, was manager of Front Street theater,
Baltimore, he bargained with Bm-ke to withdraw Mrs. Burke's services from the employment of Manager Marshall and bring her to
join Burton's company. Marshall then sued for
an injunction, which was issued below. On appeal the court held that either of three facts
shown, viz., there was no express restrictive
clause in the contract between the Burkes and
complainant;
complainant was prosecuting an
action at law; and Mrs. Burke's engagement, if
any, would be void as that of a feme covert, —
was enough to defeat the suit. Burton v. Marshall (1846) 4 Gill, 487. De Pol v. Sohlke
(18C9) 7 Rob. Ecc. 280, was decided after Lumley V. Wagner (1 De Gex, M. & G. 604), yet
does not mention
but takes the older doctrine
for granted. The opinion assumes, however,
that irreparable damage to follow from
breach
negative covenant may be ground of equiof
table jurisdiction, and the judge refused to enjoin the danseuse Sohlke from performing for
other employers, not for want of power, but because, as the plaintiffs had not
theater in operation in which they could use her services,
therefore they could not be irreparably damaged
by her dancing elsewhere for the time being.
Thus American as well as English courts, down
to the middle of our century, were unwilling to
enjoin an employe's breach of
collateral promise not to serve elsewhere, unless the affirmative
engagement were
proper subject-matter
of
equitable relief.
Development of the Modern Doctrine.— Since
about 1850
broader and more liberal position
has been taken. An advance was distinctly
made in Dietrichsftn v. Cabburn,
Philli. 52, and
Rolfe V. Rolfe, 15 Sim. 88, (both 1846,) in
which the rule adverse to enforcing
negative
stipulation
was distinctly questioned and limited; though these were not cases of professional services, but of contracts for exclusive
employment in mercantile duties. The circumstances of
controlling decision, Lumley y.
Wagner, which soon followed them, were that
Manager Lumley engaged Mile. .Johanna Wagner to sing at Her Majesty's Theater, London,
for three months, in certain specified operas, at
weekly salary of £100.
The agreement, as
originally signed, did not in so many words forbid her from singing for any other employer;
but
few days afterwards
the manager objected to the omission, and Mile. Wagner's
agent then added an article, saying:
"Mile.
Wagner engages herself not to use her talents
at any other theater, nor in any concert or
reunion, public or private, without the written
authorization of Mr. Lumley." Notwithstandhigher salary,
ing this, she did accept (for
was said) an engagement from Manager Gye
to sing at the Italian opera, Covent Garden,
and Lumley sued for an injunction.
It was
granted below. Lumley v. Wagner,
De Gex
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Hare, 241;
reveal secrets of business
Eng. Law
Eq. 182), of
contract not to write
particular d(:>cription
of book (2 Sim.
S.
1; 18 Ves. 437), of
contract not to practice
particular trade or calling (125 Mass. 258; 16
Vt. 176 22 Law Rep. 693
Jur. [N. S.] 976
15 Sim. 88), although in either case the injured
party could maintain an action for damages,
there is no good reason for refusing an injunction to forbid breaking
contract for exclusive
professional
services,
forcible and sound.
A curious German case
recounted in 26 Alb.
Law J. 3. Cases involving
claim of the artist
that the manager first broke the contract by
assigning the artist to
part or position less
desirable than that which the contract assured,
or by failing to give due opportunity for appearances, are: Daly v. Smith, 49 How. Prac.
150, Roserie v. Kiraify, 12 Phila. 209, and De
Pol V. Sohlke,
Rob. Ecc. 280.
Must there be an Express Negative Contract?
— Several English cases support the view that
an engagement not to serve elsewhere
faircontract, in general
to be implied from
terms, to perform under one manager or at one
judges have
establishment.
But American
generally
refused to interfere
unless there
were an express stipulation forbidding the service sought to be enjoined.
In other words, in
this country a simple engagement to serve
leaves the employ^ at liberty to talie other service, provided he faithfully performs the first
engagement.
Gill, 48't;
Burton v. Marshall,
Butler V. Galletti, 21 How. Prac. 465; Wallace V. De Young, 98 111. 638.
But compare
Manufacturing Co. v. Cook, Bost. Law Rep.
a

4

547,

549.

Covenant. — The restrictive clause may well be drawn in the following
appropriate
form — maliing
variations
to the circumstances of the particular case:
And
is further agreed, in consideration of
the premises, that the party of the second part
(the actor, artist, or other employe) will not,
during the term of this agreement, exercise his
professional skill and talents as an actor (or
artist, etc.) in public, (within the city of New
York, or otherwise state the limits to which the
restriction
intended to be confined; and the
courts are more willing to enforce these restriclimited), either for
tions when the locality
compensation or gratuitously, and either upon
his own account or for another employer or
establishment, without the consent in writing
of the party of the first part first obtained, under pain of injunction, action for damages, or
any other available judicial remedy: provided,
however, that the party of the second part may
at any time and as often as he thinks fit perform gratuitously
at any entertainment charitably given for the burial expenses and relief
of the family of a deceased actor, (or otherwise sta'te explicitly any right which the actor
desires to reserve.)
Procedure. — Several
of the cases indicate
is proper to join the second employer
that
as co-defendant, and to draw the injunction
so
as in terms to forbid him to employ the chief
defendant, as well as prohibit the latter from
performing.
Clarke v. Price,
Wils. Ch. 157;
Lumley v. Wagner,
De Gex, M. & G. 604;
Gill, 487; Hamblin v.
Burton v. Marshall,
Dinneford,
Edw. Oh. 528.
Whether
the
practitioner may have
ne exeat as well as
injunction,
see De Rivafinoli v. Corsetti,
Paige, 264; Sanquirico v. Benedetti,
Barb.
315; Hayes v. Willio, 11 Abb. Prac. (N. S.)
167.
What action lies in behalf of an injured
manager or other employer against
rival or
cempetitor for inducing artists of his company
or employes in his establishment to leave his
service, see Bowen v. Hall, 20 Am. L. Reg.
(N. S.) 578. and note, Id. 587.
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approval, the modern doctrine that a definite
contract by an actor not to perform at any other theater than his employer's may be enforced:
and saying that this remedy is not impaired
Hayes v. Willio
by the Code of Procedure.
(1871) 11 Abh. Prac. (N. S.) 167.
Montague, manager of the Globe theater,
London, engaged Flockton to act at the Globe,
without exacting an express stipulation
that
he should not act elsewhere.
But the vicewas
chancellor said that such a stipulation
implied. An engagement to perform for a definite term at one theater involves an engagement not to perform during the term at any other theater.
When a person agrees to act at a
particular theater, he agrees not to act anywhere else as plainly as if a negative clause
Montague v. Flockton
were inserted.
(1873)
L. R. 16 Eq. Cas. 189; 28 Law J. (N. S.) 581.
obiter,
And the same opinion was expressed,
in Fechter v. Montgomery, 33 Beav. 22, where
the suit was by Fechter as manager: and, ex
parte, in Webster v. Dillon, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 432.
Manager Daly engaged Fanny Morant Smith
to play at his theater in New York city during the seasons of 1874. 1875, and 1876. the
contract containing a stipulation that she should
not act during the term of the contract at
any other New York city theater without his
written consent; and that if she should attempt
to do so, the plamtiff might, "by legal process,
or otherwise, restrain her from so performing on
payment to her, during such restraint," of onefourth her salary under the contract.
She,
however, allowed herself to be advertised to
play at a rival establishment, the Union-square
theater, and he brought suit for an injunction.
The New York superior court pronounced the
stipulation not to perform, valid, and proper
saying that, alto be enforced by injunction;
though the clause as to plaintiffs restraining a
breach on paying a quarter salary could not give
jurisdiction, yet, as the court had jurisdiction
without it, the clause might be regarded as a
guide in fixing the terms of the injunction.
Therefore, the actress was enjoined from playing within
the city, provided
the manager
should punctually pay to her one-quarter of
agreed
salary.
Daly
v.
Smith
her
(1874) 49
How. Prac. 150. The opinion has been commended for its review of the authorities.
For other cases in which the modern doctrine
(of Lumley v. Wagner) has been incidentally
recognized of discussed, and applied in a way
not aiding materially to support
see Maple20 Wkly. Rep. 176, where
son V. Bentham,
the vice-chancellor
denied an application
by
Mapleson, lessee of the Royal Italian Opera,
to enjoin his first tenor from singing elsewhere;
Wolverhampton,
etc.. Ry. Co. v. London, etc.,
Ry. Co., L. R. 16 Eq. Cas. 433, involving an
agreement relative to use of
railroad;
and
Manufacturing
Co. v. Cook, Bost. Law Rep.
547, in which an employe
of
manufacturing
company was enjoined from breaking his covenant with his employers that he would not for
five years disclose their secrets or engage with
any other employer; with which latter case
compare Estcourt v. Estcourt Hop Essence Co.,
32 Law T. (N. S.) 80; reversing same case
31 Law T. (N. S.) 567; Gower v. Andrew, 14
Cent. Law J. 50; and Deming v. Chapman, 11
Judge Lowell's opinion in
How. Prac. 382.
Singer Sewing-machine Co. v. Union Buttonhole, etc., Co.,
Holmes, 253,
an instructive
discussion of the application of the doctrine to
ordinary mercantile contracts, in which a promisor agrees not to deal with any other than
the promisee; with which case compare Bickford V. Davis, 11 Fed. 549, and Fothergill y.
See, also,
Rowland, L. R. 17 Eq. 132.
note
by E. H. Bennett, to Bowen v. Hall, 20 Am.
Law Reg. (N. S.) 578, 587.
The suggestion
made at the close of this note, that, since modbreach of
ern equity enjoins
contract not to
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The bill, filed the 15th of June, 1819, stated
that in 1814 the defendant George Price,
Esq., proposed to compose and write reports
of cases argued and determined in the court
of exchequer; and the plaintiffs entered into
a treaty with him as to the terms upon which
the same should be printed and published;
and that on the 27th of April, 1814, the following agreement was signed by him: "Memorandum: It is agreed between George Price,
Esq., and William Clarke and Sons, as follows: Mr. Price undertakes to compose and
write the cases In the court of exchequer,
with Easter term, 1814, and to
commencing
periodically; the said William
be published
Clarke and Sons to be at the charge of all expenses of paper, printing and advertising,
which expenses, when discharged, to divide
the profits of the said work equally (that is
to say), one moiety to the said George Price,
the other to the said William Clarke and
Sons; all accounts to be adjusted at Christmas in every year, at the customary trade
And it Is further
price and commission:
agreed that Messrs. Clarke shall be at liberty
to relinquish the undertaking should they think
it advisable."
The bill further stated that, in pursuance
of the agreement, Mr. Price composed and
wrote divers reports of cases argued and determined in the court of exchequer, and that
the plaintiffs printed and published them at
their owm costs and charges, periodically and
in parts; that the first volume consisted of
three parts, the first being published in August, 1814, the second in May, 1815, and the
that on the 2d of
third in March, 1816;
March, 1816, a variation in the agreement
was made between the plaintiffs and Mr.
Price, and that a memorandum thereof was
made in writing and signed by Mr. Price, in
"March 2d, 1816.
the words following:
of agreement between George
Memorandimn
Price and William Clarke & Sons: Whereas,
by an agreement bearing date the 27th of April, 1814, between the above parties, it was
there stipulated that Mr. Price should take
and Messrs.
the reports in the exchequer,
Clarke should print the same, and divide the
profits between the respective parties:
And
whereas the first volume of the Reports in the
Court of Exchequer has been printed and
published by the said George Price and William Clarke & Sons: And whereas the said
of selling all his
George Price is desirous
copyright and interest in the first volume:
In consideration of which, the said William
Clarke & Sons agree to give, and the said
George Price agrees to accept, of the sum of
And the said George Price further
£166.
agrees to give any further assignment of the
copyright, if required from him by the said
William Clarke & Sons." That, in pursuance
of the second agreement, the plaintiff duly
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That in further
paid to Mr. Price the £166.
pursuance of the agreement of the 27th of
April, 1814, Mr. Price continued to write and
compose reports of cases argued and deterand that
mined in the court of exchequer;
before the publication of the first part of the
second volume, and on or about the 11th of
was
1816,
November,
a further agreement
made between the plaintiffs and Mr. Price,
thereof made as follows:
and a memorandum
Memorandum of agree"November 11th, 1816.
ment between George Price, Esq., and William Clarke & Sons: Mr. Price agrees to the
following terms for writing and composing
the second volume of his Reports in the Exchequer, sale of his copyright, and interest in
the said volume; Messrs. Clarke, for the considerations above, to pay to Mr. Price, within
one month after the publication of each part,
the sum of £6 10s. for each sheet of sixteen
pages royal octavo, and in the same proportion for any less quantity than a sheet; Mr.
Price to be allowed the sum of £2 on each
part for corrections; all above that sum to be
paid by Mr. Price, and deducted out of the
payment for each part; Mr. Price to give a
if required, at Messrs.
further assignment,
Clarke's expense."
The bill further stated that, in pursuance
of the agreements, Mr. Price composed and
wrote a second volume of reports of cases
argued and determined in the court of exchequer, and which the plaintiffs, at their expense, printed and publishe<i in four parts,
the first part on the 20th of January, 1817,
the second on the 23rd of April, 1817, the
third on the 1st of June, and the fourth on
the IStti of September, 1817; and that the
plaintiffs duly paid the sums of money due
to Mr. Price for the copyright of the second
volume, according to the three memorandums
of agreement.
That In June, 1817, the plaintiffs and Mr. Price agreed to make a further
variation in the terms of the agreement of
the 27th of April, 1814, and on the 19th of
June, 1817, the following memorandum was
"London, June 19th, 1817. Memosigned:
randum:
Mr. Price agrees with Messrs.
Clarke to receive for his Interest in the agreement for the exchequer reports, dated 27th
of April, 1814, commencing at the third volume, the sum of £7 per sheet, and £3 per part
for con-ectious;
all above that sum to be
paid by Mr. Price, and if under £3 the difference to be paid to Mr. Price until the sale
shall exceed a thousand, but not to apply to
any reprints above that number of the parts
already published or to be. Mr. Price agrees
to give any further assignment of the copyright and future Interest to Messrs. Clarke,
at their expense."
The bill further stated that in pursuance
of the agreements of the 27th of April, 1814,
and the 19th of June, 1817, Mr. Price wrote
and composed, and the plaintiffs printed and
published, at their expense, the third volume,
consisting of four parts, and also two parts
of the fourth volume, at the times specified
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in the bill, and that they had paid to ilr.
were not entitled to the assistance
of the
Price the sums which by the agreements were
court.
due to him in respect of the third volume,
An Injunction having been obtained
ex
parte, on the filing of the bill and on afiiduand also <!ivers sums on account of the fourth
vit, a motion was now made to dissolve it.
volume.
The bill further stated that Mr. Price had
Mr. Wetherell, J. Wilson, and Mr. Price,
made some contract with the other defendfor defendants Price and Sweet. Mr. Heald
ants, Brooke and Sweet, by which he had
and Mr. Ching, for defendant Brooke.
Mr.
bound himself to write and compose new volShadwell, for plaintiffs.
umes of reports of cases argued and determined in the court of exchequer, and in the
exchequer chamber, in order and to the inTHE LORD CHANCELLOR. The case of
tent that the same might be printed and pubMorris v. Oolman is essentially different from
the present.
lished by Brooke and Sweet; and the plainIn that case, Morris, OoLman,
and other persons were engaged In a partnertiffs insisted that they were entitled to have
ship in the Haymarket Theater, which was
an assignmeut duly made to them of all the
copyright in such of the reports as he had
to have continuance for a very long period, as
written and composed, and to be the printers i -long Indeed as the theater should exist. Coland publishers,
and to have an assignment ; man had entered into an agreement which I
made to them, of the copyright of all such of I was very unwilling to enforce,— not that he
would write for the Haymarket Theater, but
the said reports as he shall hereafter write
and compose, upon making to him such paythat he would not write for any other theater.
ments as he is entitled to by virtue of the
It appeared to me that the court could enforce that agreement by restraining him from
agreements of the 27th of April, 1814, and
writing for any other theater.
the 19th of June, 1817.
The court
The bill prayed that the defendant, Mr. could not compel him to write for the HayPrice, might be decreed specifically to per- market Theater, but it did the only thing in
its power,— it induced him indirectly to do the
form the said agreements expressed in the
by permitting
the plainone thing by prohibiting him from doing ansaid memoraudum
tiffs to print and publish the reports of cases other. There was an express covenant on his
part contained in the articles of partnership.
in the court of exchequer, so long as he
But the terms of the prayer of this bill do
should continue to compose and write the
not solve the difficulty; for, if this contract
same, upon the terms agreed upon in the
is one which the court will not carry into
respectively, and deliversaid memorandums,
execution, the court cannot indirectly enforce
of said
ing to the plaintiffs the manuscripts
it by resU'aining Mr. Price from doing some
reports for that purpose, and by duly makother act.
This is an agreement which exing and executing to the plaintiffs an assignpressly provides that Mr. Price shall write
ment of the copyright of such parts of the
and compose reports of cases to be publisTisaid work as had been published, and should
ed by the plaintiffs.
be
written and composed, the
In Morris v. Colman,
thereafter
plaintiffs being ready to pay to him such
there was a decree directing the partnership
to be carried on. It could not be put an end
sums of money as should be justly due to
to, and it was the duty of the parties to interhim; also praying an injunction to restrain
Mr. Price from printing or publishing, or em- fere; but I have no jurisdiction to compel
ploying the other defendants, or any other
Mr. Price to write reports for the plaintiffs.
I cannot, as in the other case, say that 1 will
person or persons than the plaintiffs, to print
induce him to write for the plaintiffs by preand publish the fifth or any subsequent volventing him from writing for any other perume or part of the same work which Mr.
son, for that is not the nature of the agreePrice should thereafter compose and write,
ment. The only means of enforcing the exeand to restrain the other defendants, Brooke
cution of this agreement would be to make
and Sweet, from printing and publishing the
an order compelling Mr. Price to write resaid work so written and composed, or to
ports for the plaintiffs, which I have not the
be written and composed, or any part theremeans of doing.
If there be any remedy in
of.
The answers submitted that, on the true
this case it is at law. If I cannot compel Mr.
of the agreements, Mr. Price Price to remain in the court of exchequer for
construction
the purpose of taking notes, I can do nothing.
was not bound to employ the plaintiffs as the
I cannot indirectly, and for the purpose of
publishers of all future reports to be written
him to perform the agreement,
compelling
by him; that the plaintiffs were informed in
October, 1818, of the contract between Mr.
compel him to do something which Is merely
Price and the other defendants; that on the incidental to the agreement.
It is also quite
clear that there is no mutuality in this agree1st of April, 1819, the work was advertised,
I am of opinion that have no jurisment.
as being about to be published, and that the
had now printed a cuusiderable
diction in this case.
defendants
Injunction dissolved.
part of the fifth volume, and had thereby inThe bill was afterwards dismissed, with
curred great expense; and that the plaintiffs,
costs, for want of prosecution.
tiaving suffered such expense to be incurred.
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The bill in this suit was filed on the 22d
April, 1852, by Benjamin Lumley, the lessee
of her Majesty's Theatre,
against Johanna
Wagner, Albert Wagner, her father, and
Frederick Gye, the lessee of Covent Garden
Theatre;
it stated that In November, 1861,
Joseph Bacher, as the agent of the defendants
Albert Wagner and Johanna Wagner, came
to and concluded at Berlin an agreement In
writing in the French language, bearing date
1851, and which agreethe 9th November,
ment being translated into English was as
follows:
"The undersigned Mr. Benjamin Lumley,
possessor of her Majesty's Theatre at London,
and of the Italian Opera at Paris, .of the one
part, and Mademoiselle Johanna Wagner cantatrice of the Court of his Majesty the King
of Prussia, with the consent of her father,
Mr. A. Wagner, residing at Berlin of the
other part, have concerted and concluded the
following contract: First, Mademoiselle Johanna Wagner binds herself to sing three
months at the theatre of Mr. Lumley, her
Majesty's, at London, to date from the 1st
of April, 1852 (the time necessary for the
journey comprised therein), and to give the
parts following: 1st. Romeo, Montecchi; 2nd.
Fides, Prophete; 3rd. Valentine, Huguenots;
4th. Anna, Don Juan; 5th. Alice, Robert le
Diable; 6th. An opera chosen by common
accord.
Second. The three first parts must
necessarily be, 1st, Romeo, 2nd, Fides, 3rd,
Valentine; these parts once sung, and then
only she will appear, if Mr. Lumley desires
it, in the three other operas mentioned aforeThird, These six parts belong exclusaid.
sively to Mademoiselle Wagner, and any other cantatrice shall not presume to sing them
during the three months of her engagement.
If Mr. Lumley happens to be prevented, by
any cause soever, from giving these operas,
he is nevertheless held to pay Mademoiselle
.Johanna Wagner the salary stipulated lower
down for the number of her parts as if she
B'ourth, In the case where
had sung them.
Wagner should be prevented
Mademoiselle
by reason, of illness from singing in the
course of a month as often as it has been
stipulated,
Mr. Lumley is bound to pay the
salary only for the parts sung. Fifth, Mademoiselle Johanna Wagner binds herself to
sing twice a week during the run of the
however if she herself was
three months;
hindered from singing twice in any week
whatever, she will have the right to give at
representation.
a later period the omitted
Wagner fulfilling the
Sixth, If Mademoiselle
wishes of the direction, consent to sing more
than twice a week in the course of three
months, this last will give to Mademoiselle
Wagner 50£ sterling for each representation
Seventh, Mr. Lumley engages to pay
extra.
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Wagner a salary of 400£ sterMademoiselle
ling per month, and payment will take place
in such manner that she will receive 10O£
Eighth, Mr. Lumley will
sterling each week.
pay by letters of exchange to Mademoiselle
Wagner at Berlin, the 15th of March, 1852,
the sum of 300£ sterling, a sum which will
be deducted from her engagement in his reNinth, In all cases
taining 100£ each month.

except that where a verified illness would
if Mademoiselle
place upon her a hindrance,
Wagner shall not arrive in London eight days
after that from whence dates her engagement, Mr. Lumley will have the right to regard the nonappearance as a rupture of the
contract, and will be able to demand an inTenth, In the case where Mr.
demnification.
Lumley should cede his enterprise to another, he has the right to transfer this contract
to his successor, and in that case Mademoiselle Wagner has the same obligations and
the same rights towards the last as towards

Mr. Lumley.

Johanna Wagner,
"Albert Wagner."

"Berlin, the 9th November, 1851."
The bill then stated, that in November,
Joseph Bacher met the plaintifC in Paris,
when the plaintifC objected to the agreement
as not containing a usual and necessary
clause, preventing the defendant Johanna
Wag-ner from exercising her professional abilities in England without the consent of the
whereupon
Joseph Bacher, as the
plaintifC,
agent of the defendants Johanna Wagner
and Albert Wagner, and being fully authorized by them for the purpose, added an article in writing in the French language to the
agreement, and which, being translated into
English, was as follows:
1851,

"Mademoiselle Wagner engages herself not
to use her talents at any other theatre, nor
in any concert, or reunion, public or private,
without the written authorization of Mr.
Lumley.
Dr. Joseph Bacher,
"For Mademoiselle Johanna Wagner, and
authorized by her."

The bill then stated that the defendants J.
and A. Wagner subsequently made another
engagement with the defendant F. Gye, by
which it was agreed that the defendant J.
Wagner should, for a larger sum than that
stipulated by the agreement with the plaintiff, sing at the Royal Italian Opera, Covent
Garden, and abandon the agreement with the
plaintiff. The bill then stated that the defendant F. Gye had full knowledge of the
previous
agreement with the plaintiff, and
that the plaintiff had received a protest from
the defendants J. and A. Wagner, repudiating
the agreement
on the allegation that the
plaintiff had failed to fulfill the pecuniary
portion of the agreement.
The bill prayed tliat the defendants Johanna Wagner and Albert Wagner might be
restrained from violating or committing any
breach of the last article of the agreement;
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that the defendant Johanna Wagner might
be restrained from singing and performing
or singing at the Royal Italian Opera, Govent Garden, or at any other theatre or place
without the sanction or permission in writing of the plaintiff during the existence of
the agreement with the plaintiff; and that
the defendant Albert Wagner might be restrained from permitting or sanctioning the
defendant Johanna Wagner singing and performing or singing as aforesaid; that the
defendant Frederick Gye might be restrained from accepting
the professional services
of the defendant Johanna Wagner as a singer and performer or singer at the said Royal
Italian Opera, Covent Garden, or at any
other theatre or place, and from permitting
her to sing and perform or to sing at the
Royal Italian Opera, Covent Garden, during
the existence
of the agreement with the
plaintiff, without the permission or sanction
of the plaintiff.
The answer of the defendants A. and J.
Wagner attempted to show that Joseph Bacher was not their authorized agent, at least
for the purpose of adding the restrictive
clause, and that the plaintiff had failed to
make the stipulated payment by the time
in the agreement.
The plaintiff
mentioned
having obtained an injunction from the vice
chancellor Sir James Parker on the 9th May,
1852, the defendants now moved by way of
appeal before the lord chancellor i to discharge his honor's order.
Mr. Bethell, Mr. Malins, and Mr. Martindale, in support of the appeal motion.
Mr.
Bacon and H. Clarke, contra, in support of

the injunction.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR. The question which I have to decide in the present
case arises out of a very simple contract,
the effect of which is, that the defendant
Johanna Wagner should sing at her Majesty's Theatre for a certain number of nights,
and that she should not sing elsewhere (for
that is the true construction) during that
As I understand the points taken
period.
by the defendants'
counsel In support
of
this appeal they in effect come to this, namely, that a court of equity ought not to grant
an injunction except in cases connected with
specific performance, or where the Injunction being to compel a party to forbear from
committing an act (and not to perform an
act), that injunction will complete the whole
of the agreement remaining unexecuted.
I have then to consider how the question
stands on principle and on authority, and in
so doing I shall observe upon some of the
cases which have been referred to and com1 The case was heard by the lord chancellor
on a representation that it was intended to confine the argument to the legal question alone,
which it was said involved an important point
of equity jurisdiction, on which the authorities
were conflicting.

OF CONTRACTS.

upon by the defendants In support
of their contention.
The first was that of
Martin v. Nutkln, 2 P. Wms. 266, In which
the court issued an injunction restraining an
act from being done where it clearly could
not have granted any specific performance;
but then it was said that that case fell within one of the exceptions which the defendants admit are proper cases for the interference of the court, because there the ringing of the bells, sought to be restrained, had
been agreed to be suspended by the defendant in consideration of the erection by the
plaintiffs of a cupola and clock, the agreement being in effect the price stipulated for
relinquishing bell-ringing at
the defendant's
stated periods; the defendant having accepted the benefit, but rejected the corresponding obligation.
Lord Macclesfield first granted the injunction which the lords commissioners, at the hearing of the cause, continued for the lives of the plaintiffs. That
case therefore, however it may be explained,
as one of the exceptional cases, is nevertheless a clear authority showing that this court
has granted
an injunction prohibiting the
commission
of an act in respect of which
the court could never have interfered by
way of specific performance.
The next case referred to was that of
Barret v. Blagrave, 5 A''es. 555, which came
first before Lord Loughborough, and afterwards before Lord Eldon, 6 Ves. 104. There
a lease had originally been granted by the
plaintiffs, the proprietors of Vauxhall Gardens, of an adjoining house, under an express covenant
that the lessee would not
carry on the trade of a victualler or retailer
of wines, or generally, any employment that
would be to the damage of the proprietors
of Vauxhall Gardens.
An under-lease having been made to the defendants,
who were
violating the covenant by the sale of liquors, the proprietors of Vauxhall Gardens
filed a bill for an injunction, which was
granted by Lord Loughborough.
It has been
observed In the argument here, that in granting the injunction, Lord Loughborough said:
"It is in the nature of specific performance,"
and that therefore that case also falls under one of the exceptional cases. When that
case came before Lord Eldon he dissolved
the injunction, but upon a different ground,
namely, on that of acquiescence
for many
years, and in a sense he treated it as a
case of specific performance.
As far as the
words go, the observation of those two eminent judges would seem' to justify the argument which has been addressed to me; in
effect, however, it was only specific performance, because a prohibition preventing the
commission of an act may as effectually perform an agreement as an order for the performance of the act agreed to be done. The
agreement in that case being that the house
should not be opened for the purposes of
entertainment to the detriment of Vauxhall
Gardens,
the court granted the Injunction;
mented
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that was a performance of the agreement in
substance,
and the term' "specific performance" is aptly applied in such a case, but
not in the sense in which it has been used
before

It

me.

was also contended that the plaintiff's
remedy, if any, was at law; but it is no
objection to the exercise of the jurisdiction
by injunction that the plaintiff may have a
legal remedy.
The case of Robinson v. Lord
Byron, 1 Brown, Ch. 588, before Lord Thurlow, so very often commented upon by succeeding judges, is a clear illustration of that
proposition, because in that case the defendant, Lord BjTon, who had large pieces of
water in his park, which supplied the plaintiffs mills, was abusing his right by preventing a regular supply to the plaintiff's
mill, and although the plaintiff had a remedy at law, yet this court felt no difficulty
in restraining Lord Byron by injunction from
preventing the regular flow of the water.
Undoubtedly there are cases such as that
cited for the defendants of Collins v. Plumb,
16 Ves. 454, before
Lord Eldon, in which
this court has declined to exercise the powei(which in that instance it was assumed to
have had) of preventing the commission of
an

act, because

such

power

could

not

be

properly and beneficially exercised.
In that
case the negative covenant, not to sell water to the prejudice
of the plaintiffs, was
not enforced by Lord Eldon, not because he
had any doubt about the jurisdiction of the
court (for upon that point he had no doubt),
but because it was impossible to ascertain
every time the water was supplied by the
defendants,
whether it was or not to the
damage of the plaintiffs; but whether right
or wrong, that learned judge. In refusing to
exercise the jurisdiction on very sufficient
grounds, meant in no respect to break in on
the general rules deducible
from the previous authorities.
At an early stage of the argument I adverted to the familiar cases of attorneys'
clerks, and surgeons' and apothecaries'
apprentices, and the like, in which this court
has constantly interfered, simply to prevent
the violation of negative covenants;
but it
was said that in such cases the court only
acted on the principle that the clerk or apprentice
had received all the benefit, and
that the prohibition operated upon a concluded contract, and that therefore the injunction fell within one of the exceptional cases.
do not, however, apprehend that the jurisdiction of the court depends upon any such
principle. It is obvious that in those cases
the negative
covenant
does not come into
operation until the servitude is ended, and
therefore that the injunction cannot be required or appUed for before that period.
The familiar case of a tenant covenanting
not to do a particular act was also put during
the argument; but it was said that in such
a case the jurisdiction springs out of the relation of landlord and tenant, and that the

I
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tenant having received the benefit of an executed lease, the injunction operates only
so as to give effect to the whole contract.
That, however, cannot be the principle on
which this court interferes, for, beyond all
doubt, where a lease is executed containing
aflirmative and negative covenants, this court
will not attempt to enforce the execution of
the affirmative covenants, either on the part
of the landlord or the tenant, but will leave
it entirely to a court of law to measure the
damages;
though with respect to the negative covenants, if the tenant for example
has stipulated not to cut or lop timber, or
any other given act of forbearance, the court
does not ask how many of the affirmative
covenants on either side remain to be performed under the lease, but acts at once by
giving effect to the negative covenant, specifically executing it by prohibiting the commission of acts which have been stipulated
not to be done. So far then each of the cases
to which I have referred appears to me to
be in direct contravention of the rules which
have been so elaborately pressed upon me
by the defendants' counsel.
The present is a mixed case, consisting not
of two correlative acts to be done, one by
the plaintiff and the other by the defendants,
which state of facts may have and in some
cases has introduced a very important difference,— but of an act to be done by J.
Wagner alone, to which Is superadded a neg^
atlve stipulation on her part to abstain from
the commission of any act vrhich will break
covenant, — the one
in upon her affirmative
being ancillary to, concurrent and operating
The agreement to
together with the other.
sing for the plaintiff during three months
at his theatre, and during that time not to
sing for anybody else, is not a correlative
contract, it is in effect one contract; and
though beyond all doubt this court could not
interfere to enforce the specific performance
of the whole of this contract, yet in all sound
construction and according to the true spirit
of the agreement, the engagement to perform
for three months at one theatre must necessarily exclude the right to perform ^t the
same time at another

theatre.

It

was

clear-

ly intended that J. Wagner was to exert her
vocal abilities to the utmost to aid the theatre
I am
to which she agreed to attach herself.
of opinion, that if she had attempted, even
in the absence of any negative stipulation,
to perform at another theatre, she would have
broken the spirit and true meaning of the contract as much as she would now do with reference to the contract into which she has actually entered.
Wherever this court has not proper jurisit
diction to enforce specific performance,
operates to bind men's consciences, as far as
they can be bound, to a true and literal perand it will
formance of their agreements;
not suffer them to depart from their contracts at their pleasure, leaving the party
to the
with whom they have contracted
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mere chance of any damages which a jury
may give.
The exercise of this jurisdiction
has,
believe, had a wholesome tendency towards the maintenance of that good faith
which exists in this country to a much greater degree perhaps than in any other; and although the jurisdiction is not to be extended, yet a judge would desert his duty who
did not act up to what his predecessors have
handed down as the rule for his guidance in
the administration of such an equity.
It was objected that the operation of the
injunction in the present case was mischievous, excluding the defendant J. Wagner from
performing at any other theatre while this
court had no power to compel her to perform
It is true, that I
at her Majesty's Theatre.
have not the means of compelling her to sing,
but she has no cause of complaint, if I comof
pel her to abstain from the commission
an act which she has bound herself not to
do, and thus possibly cause her to fulfill
The jurisdiction which I
her engagement.
now exercise is wholly within the power of
the court, and being of opinion that it is a
proper case for interfering, I shall leave nothing unsatisfied by the judgment I pronounce.
The effect too of the injunction, in restraining J. Wagner from singing elsewhere may,
in the event of an action being brought
against her by the plaintiff, prevent any such
amount of vindictive damages being given
against her as a jury might probably be inclined to give if she had carried her talents
and exercised them at the rival theatre; the
injunction may also, as I have said, tend to
the fulfillment of her engagement, though, in
continuing the injunction, I disclaim doing
indirectly what I cannot do directly.
I am
Referring again to the authorities,
well aware that they have not been uniform,
and that there undoubtedly has been a difference of decision on the question now revived
before me. But, after the best consideration
which have been enabled to give to the subhave arrived
ject, the conclusion at which
by the greatest
supported
is, I conceive,
weight of authority. The earliest case most
directly bearing on the point is that of Morris
There Mr. Colman
18 Ves. 437.
V. Colman,
was a part proprietor with Mr. Morris of the
Haymarket Theatre, and they were partners
in that concern, and by the deed of partnership Mr. Colman agreed that he would not
exercise his dramatic abilities for any other
theatre than the Haymarket. He did not,
however, covenant that he would write for
the Haymarket, but it was merely a negative
covenant that he would not write for any
Lord Blother theatre than the Haymarket.
don granted an injunction against Mr. Colman writing for any other theatre than the
Haymarket; and the ground on which Lord
Eldon assumed that jurisdiction was the subject of some discussion at the bar. It was
truly said for the defendants that that was
a case of partnership; and it was said, moreover, that Lord Cotteuham was mistaken in

I

I

I
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the case of Dietrichsen v. Cabburn, 2 Phil.
Ch. 52, when he said that Lord Eldon had not
decided Morris v. Colman on the ground of
agree that the
there being a partnership.
observations,
which fell from Lord Eldon in
the subsequent
case of Clai'ke v. Price, 2
Wils. 1-57, show that he did mainly decide it
on the ground of partnership; but he did not
In the
decide it exclusively on that ground.
argument of Morris v. Colman, 18 Ves. 437,
Sir Samuel Romilly suggested a case almost
identical with the present.
He contended
that the clause restraining Mr. Colman from
writing for any other theatre was no more
against public policy than a stipulation that
Mr. Garrick should not perform at any other
theatre than that at which he was engaged
would have been. Lord Eldon, adverting in
his judgment to the case put at ftie bar, said:
"If Mr. Garrick was now living, would it be
that he should contract with
unreasonable
Mr. Colman to perform only at the Haymarket Theatre, and Mr. Colman with him to
write for the theatre alone? Why should
they not thus engage for the talents of each
other?" He gives the clearest enunciation of
his opinion, that that would be an agreement
which this court would enforce by way of in-

I

junction.
The late Vice Chancellor Shadwell, of
whom I always wish to be understood to
speak with the greatest respect, decided in a
different way, in the cases of Kemble v.
Kean, 6 Sim. 333, and Kimberley v. Jennings,
Id. 340, on which I shall presently make a
In the former case, he
few observations.
observed that Lord Eldon must be understood
in the case of Morris v. Colman, 18 Ves. 437,
to have spoken according to the subject-mat-

ter before him, and must there be considered
to be addressing himself to a case in which
Colman and Garrick would both have had a
must,
partnership interest in the tlieatre.
entirely dissent from that interhowever,
Lord Eldon's words are perfectly
pretation.
plain, they want no comment upon them,
they speak for themselves.
He was alluding
to a case in which Garrick, as a performer,
would have had nothing to do with the
theatre beyond the implied engagement that
he would not perform anywhere else; and
that
have come to a very clear conclusion
Lord Eldon would have granted the injunction in that case, although there had been no
partnership.
The authority of Clarke v. Price, 2 Wils.
157, was much pressed upon me by the learnbut that is a
ed counsel for the defendants;
case which does not properly belong to their
argument, because there there was no negaquite admit that this
tive stipulation, and
court cannot enforce the performance of such
an affirmative stipulation as is to be found in
having
There the defendant
that case.
agreed to take notes of cases in the court of
exchequer, and compose reports, for the plaintiff, and having failed to do so, the plaintiff,
Mr. Clarke, filed a bill for an injunctioB, and

I

I

I

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Lord Eldon, whea refusing the injunction, in
effect said, I cannot compel Mr. Price to sit
in the court of exchequer and take notes and
compose reports; and the whole of his judgment shows that he proceeded (and so it has
been considered in later cases) on. the gi-ound
that there was no covenant, on the part of
the defendant, that he would not compose reThe expressions
l^orts for any other person.
in the judgment are: "I cannot, as in the
other case" (referring to Morris v. Colman,
18 Ves. 437), "say that
will induce him to
write for the plaintiff by preventing him from
wi'itlng for any other person;" and then
come these Important words, "for that is not
ins nature of the agreement" Lord Eldon
therefore was of opinion, upon the construction of that agreement, that it would be
against its meaning to affix to it a negative
quality and import a covenant into it by implication, and he, therefore, very properly as
I conceive, refused that injunction. That
therefore,
in no respect touches the
case,

I

question now before me, and 1 may at once
had only to deal with the
declare, that if
affirmative
covenant
of the defendant J.
Wagner that she would perform at her Majesty's Theatre,
should not have granted any

I

I

injunction.
Thus far, I think, the authorities are very
strong against the defendants'
contention;
but the case of Kemble v. Kean, 6 Sim. 333,
to which
have already alluded, is the first
case which has in point of fact introduced all
the difficulties on this part of the law. There
Mr. Kean entered into an agreement precisely
similar to the present.
He agreed that he
would perform for Mr. Kemble at Drury
Lane, and that he would not perform anywhere else during the time that he liad stipulated to perform for Mr. Kemble.
Mr.
Kean broke his engagement, a bill was filed,
and Vice Chancellor Shadwell was of opinion that he could not grant an injunction to
restrain Mr. Kean from performing elsewhere, which he was either about to do or
actually doing, because the court could not
enforce the performance of the affirmative
covenant that he would perform at Drury
Lane for Mr. Kemble. Being pressed by that
passage which I have read from in the lord
judgment in Morris v. Colman,
chancellor's
18 Ves. 437, he put that paraphrase or commentary upon it which
have referred to;
that is, he says:
"Lord Eldon is speaking of
a case where the parties are in partnership
together."
I have come to a different conclusion, and
am bound to say that, in my
apprehension,
the case of Kemble v. Kean
was wrongly decided and cannot be maintain-

I

I

I

ed.

The same learned judge followed up his decision in that case in the subsequent one of
Kimberley v. Jennings, 6 Sim. 340. That
was a case of hiring and service, and the
v»ce chancellor
there virtually admitted that
a negative covenant might be enforced in this
court, and quoted an instance to that effect
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He said: "I rewithin his own knowledge.
member a case in which a nephew wished to
go on the stage, and his uncle gave him a
of his
large sum of money in consideration
covenanting
not to perform within a particular district; the court would execute such
a covenant, on the ground that a valuable
He adconsideration had been given for It."
mits therefore the jurisdiction of the court,
if nothing but that covenant remained to be
The learned judge however adds,
executed.
"but here the negative covenant does not
It is coupled with the agreestand by itself.
ment for service for a certain number
of
years, and then, for taking the defendant into
* * * this agreement cannot
partnership,
be performed in the whole, and therefore this
court cannot perform any part of it." Whatever

may

have

been the

mutual

obligations

in that case, which prevented the court from
giving effect to the negative covenant,
am
not embarrassed
with any such difficulties
here, because, as I have already shown, both
the covenants are on the part of the defend-

I

ants.

The case of Hooper v. Brodrick, 11 Sim. 47,
was cited, as an instance in which the court
had refused an injunction under circumstanbut, in that case, the
ces like the present;
lessee of an inn had covenanted to use and
keep it open as an inn during a certain time,
and not to do any act whereby the license
might become forfeited. In point of fact the
was that he might be compelled
application
to keep it open, and the vice chancellor makes
this observation:
"The court ought not to
the defendant from disconhave restrained
tinuing to use and keep open the dernised
premises as an inn, which is the same in effect as ordering him to carry on the business
of an innkeeper; but it might have restrained him from doing, or causing or permitting
to be done, any act which would have put it
out of his power, or the power of any other
person, to carry on that business on the premises. It is not, however, shown that the defendant has threatened, or intends to do, or
to cause or permit to be done, any act whereby the hcenses may become forfeited or be
refused;
and therefore the injunction must
be dissolved."
That therefore is an authority directly against the defendants, because
it shows that if there had been an intention
to break the negative
covenant this court
would have granted the injunction.
The case of Smith v. Fremont, 2 Swanst.
330, was also relied upon by the defendants,
as an instance where the injunction had been
refused,
nant.

but there there was no negative covewas an attempt to restrain, by injunction, a man from supplying horses to a
coach for a part of a road, when the party
who was applying for the injunction was
himself incapable of performing his obligation
to horse his part of the road.
Lord Eldon,
in refusing the Injunction and deprecating the
interference of the court in such cases, there
said:
"The only instance
recollect of an

It
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application to this court to restrain the driving of coaches occurred in the case of a perEon who, having sold the business of a coach
proprietor from Reading to London, and undertaljing to drive no coach on that road,
afterwards established one. With some doubt,
whether I was not degrading the dignity of
saw my way In
this court by interfering,
that case; because one party had there covenanted absolutely against interfering with the
business which he had sold to the other."
That again is a direct authority, therefore,
as Lord Eldon exagainst the defendants,
pressly says he had Interfered in the case of
a negative covenant, although he could not
interfere on that occasion because there was
no such covenant.
Some observations have been made upon a
decision of my own in Ireland, In the case of
Gervais v. Edwards, 2 Dru. & W. 80; that debelieve to. be right, but it is quoted
cision
was of opinion that this court
to show that
cannot Interfere to enforce specific performance, unless it can execute the whole of an
I abide by the opinion
there
agreement.
expressed, and 1 mean to do nothing in this
case which shall in any manner interfere
That was properly a case
with that opinion.
for specific performance, but from the nature
of the contract itself there was a portion of
I said. In
it which could not be executed.
I cannot execute this contract which
effect:
is intended to be binding on both parties;
cannot execute a portion of this contract for
one, and leave the other portion of the contract unexecuted for the other; and, therefore, as I cannot execute the whole of the
contract, I am bound to execute no part of it.
That, however, has no bearing on the present
case, for here I leave nothing unperformed
which the court can ever be called upon to

I

I

I

I

I

perform.

In Hills V. Croll, 2 Phil. Ch. 60, Lord Lyndhurst refused to enforce an injunction to restrain the violation of a negative covenant.
It was a case in which A. had given to B.
a sum of money, and B. covenanted that he
would buy all the acids he wanted from the
manufactory of A., who covenanted that he
would supply the acids, and B. also covenanted that he would buy his acids from no
Lord Lyndhurst refused to
other person.
prohibit B. from obtaining acids from any
other quarter, both because the covenants
and because he could not
were correlative,
compel A. to supply B. with acids; and if,
therefore, he had restrained B. from taking
acids from any other quarter, he might have
ruiued him In the event of A. breaking his
affirmative covenant to supply the acids.
That case has never been rightly understood.
It Is supposed that Lord Lyndhurst's decision was based upon a wrong principle; that
he followed the authority of Gervais v. Edwards and such cases, and that he improperly applied the rule which was In that class
of cases properly applied, but under the cirof the case before him I think
cumstances
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the rule was not Improperly applied.^
The
next case which has been so much observed
upon was that, before Lord Cottenham,
of
Uieti-ichsen v. Cabbum, 2 Phil. Ch. 52.
That
was a very simple case, and the question
upon what principle It was decided formed
the subject of discussion before me. A man,
in order to obtain a great circulation of his
patent medicine, entered Into a contract with
a vendor of such articles, giving him a general agency for the sale of the medicine, with
40 per cent, discount,
and stipulating that
he would not supply anybody else at a larger
discount than 25 per cent. He violated his
contract and was proceeding to employ other
agents with a larger discount than 25 per
2 The following,
containing all the material
portions of Lord Lyndhurst's judgment in Hills
V. Croll, is taken from the shorthand writer's
notes, and has been kindly furnished to the reporters by one of the counsel who was engaged
in that cause, and by whom a very full report
of the case will be found published, in "Reports of Cases in the Law of Real Property and
Conveyancing," volume 1, p. 541:

"THE LORD CHANCELLOR.

"In this case of Hills v. Croll, Croll had obtained two patents for the purpose of purifying
gas, and the result of the purification of gas
was the manufacture of muriate of ammonia
and sulphate of ammonia.
He entered into a
contract with Hills, who is the plaintiff in this
suit, and the contract was to this effect:
Mr.
Croll was to purchase all the acids that he was
to use in iiis process under his patent from Mr.
Hills. Mr. Hills, on his side, was to have the
right of purchasing all the ammonia that should
be produced as the result of those processes,
at
certain prices as to the one and as to tlie other.
In addition to this, there was a stipulation
that, in all the licenses that were granted for
using those patents, the parties to whom those
licenses were to be granted should he bound to
purchase all the acids which were used in the
processes
from Mr. Hills, and that Mr. Hills
should have the same option that he had in the
case of Croll, of purchasing from them all the
ammonia that should be produced in the course
of the processes.
It was also stipulated that
Mr. Hills should have the option to supply
either muriatic acid or sulphuric acid, as he
should think proper, regulating his option by
the market prices of the muriate of ammonia
and the sulphate of ammonia.
I thinlr this is
the substance of the original agreement between these parties.
The agreement was entered into in the month of March, 1841.
It
was found, on the part of Mr. Croll, that the
mode of payment and other arrangements with
respect to this agreement were inconvenient,
in consequence
of which a coiTespondence takes
place between him and Mr. Hills, in the month
of September, 1842, and the agreement was
modified according to the terms of a letter,
dated,
think, in September, written by him.
One of the stipulations in the original agi'eement was that Mr. Hills should be a signing
party in all the licenses that were granted by
Mr. Croll for the use of the patent. The first
stipulation, in the letter of September, was that
he should not be required to be a signing party; but it provided that there should be a covenant in all those agreements, a covenant to the
effect stilted in the original agreement, namely,
that the parties to whom the licenses were
granted should purchase their acids from Hills,
and give Hills the right to purchase the amRegulations
monia.
were also made altering
the terms on which the acids were to be purchased and the ammonia to be sold.
There
were some other subordinate stipulations
to
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An Injunction was applied for and
cent.
was gi'anted.
It was said tliat it was properly granted, because it was a case of part-

nersliip. Tliis, however, was not tlie fact;
it was not a case of partnership, but was
strictly one of principal and agent; and it
was only because there was the negative
covenant that the court gave efCect to it. It
is impossible to read Lord Oottenham's judgment without being satisfied that he did not
though he
consider it to be a partniership,
said it was in the nature of a partnership;
and in a popular sense it might be so called,
because the parties were there both dealing
with respect to the same subject, from which
which it is not necessary at present to advert.
The letter, however, concluded with a stipulation to this effect, that if Mr. Oroll was in
any particular to depart from the agreement
agreement was to be
so modified the original
enforced.
I think those two documents, the
original agreement and the letter, formed the
substance of the contract between the parties
as it existed after September, 1842.
"Some doubt was expressed as to whether or
not the contract so modified has been acted upon in that shape.
It appears beyond all doubt
that it was so acted upon, because the accounts
were, from time to time, rendered on the footing of the modified agreement, and it is also
clear from the letter of Mr. Hills of the 8th
of December, in which he refers expressly to
the prices that were regulated by the letter of
September, 1842."
His lordship here referred to another question raised in the com'se of the discussion,
namely, whether the second or modified agreement had been put an end to by the operation
of the clause providing for the enforcement of
the first or original agreement; and, after remarking that it was unnecessary for him for
the purpose of the present question to come to
any conclusive decision on that point, proceeded
as follows:
"Those are the facts of the case for the purpose of raising the narrow question, as it appears to me, which the court has to decide.
The bill was filed for the purpose of calling on
the court to declare that that agreement should
be specifically performed.
"Now there is no principle of the court which
I understand to be more clearly established
than this, that the court will not decree an
agreement to be specifically performed, unless
it can execute the whole of the agreement."
The question, therefore, in this case will be
whether the court has power, from the nature
of this agreement, to execute the whole of it, —
every part of it. Part of the prayer which is
consequent upon a specific performance is that
the defendant should be restrained from purchasing acids from anybody but Mr. Hills, and
also that he should be restrained from granting licenses, except according to the agreement
that was in force between the parties.
Now, then, with respect to the first of these
points, there is a stipulation on the part of
Hills that he will supply the acids; there is a
stipulation on the part of Mr. CroU that he
will purchase acids from Hills, and from no
other person. Has the court any power whatever to compel Mr. Hills to comply with that?
Can the court order Mr. Hills to continue the
manufacture of acids for the purpose of supplying Mr. CroU?
Can the court call upon
him, if he should not manufacture acids, and
require him to purchase acids for the purpose
appreof supplying Mr. CroU?
It is clear,
There
hend, that the court has no such power.
are cases in which the court will do indirectly
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each was to have a benefit, but In no legal
sense was it a partnership.
Up to the period when Dietrichsen t. Cabappreburn, 2 Phil. Ch. 52, was decided,
hend that there could have been no doubt
on the law as applicable to this case, ex-

I

for the authority of Vice Chancellor
Shadwell; but with great submission it appears to me that the whole of that learned
judge's authority is removed by himself by
his decision in the later case of Rolfe v.
Rolfe, 15 Sim. 88. In that case A. B. and C.
were partners as tailors. A. and B. went
out of the trade on consideration of receiving
£1,000 each, and C. was to continue the busicept

A ease commonly
what it cannot do directly.
cited for that purpose is the case of a nuisance.
The court would not compel a party who had
erected a wall to the nuisance of another, —
would not compel the party by any direct order
to pull down that wall;
but the court can "
make an order requiring him not to continue
nuisance,
the
which would have the effect of
compelling him to pull down the wall. In the
case of Morris v. Colman, the court restrained
Mr. Colman from writing for any other theatre,
inferring from that that the order would compel Mr. Colman, or have the tendency to compel Mr. Colman, to write for the Haymarket
Theatre.
But in this case the court has no
power to compel Jlr. Hills to supply acids by
ordering him not to supply acids to any other
person; that is not the agreement, nor was it
ever intended that it should be the agreement.
Therefore, unless the court can compel him by
a direct order to supply Mr. CroU from time to
time with the acids that Mr. Oroll requires, it is
quite clear that this court cannot execute all
the parts of this contract.
The court cannot,
therefore, compel the party specifically to perform the contract.
It was thrown out in the course of the argument, that this court might compel one party
to perform his part of the contract, and leave
the other party to his remedy at law.
No such
principle has ever been acted on in this court;
it has been so laid down over and over again,
and, in a recent case that was cited at the bar
(Gervais v. Edwards, 2 Dru. & War. 80), Sir
Edward Suyden held that, unless this court
can execute every part of the contract, this
court will not compel a specific performance of
a part. When this cause therefore comes to a
hearing,
am of opinion that, according to the
facts as they at present stand, and according
to the statement of the principle
have mentioned, this court cannot restrain Mr. Croll
from purchasing
acids elsewhere, because it
cannot compel Mr. Hills on his side to furnish all the acids that may be necessary for
the manufacture carried on by Mr. Croll.
If
the court cannot do this, it cannot restrain the
parties at the hearing.
It is quite clear that
upon this interlocutory
application the court
cannot restrain Mr. Croll from purchasing acids
apprehend therefore that the deelsewhere.
cision of the vice chancellor, which proceeded
on the principle
have stated, and rightly on
the grounds I have stated, and which I believe
is the principle of this court, and the principle
on which the vice chancellor acted as to that
part of the case is correct;
and equally applies, as it appears to me it does, to that part
of the notice of motion with respect to the licenses,
because that forms a part of the contract, — the general contract.
If the court cannot execute the whole of the contract, it cannot execute the contract in part; therefore
am of opinion that in this case the motion must
be refused, and refused with costs.

I

I

I

I
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A. entered Into a
ness on his own account
covenant that he would not carry on the
trade of a tailor, which he had Just sold,
within certain limits, and C. entered into a
covenant that he would employ A. as cutter at a certain allowance.
The bill was filed
simply for an injunction to prevent A. from
setting up as a tailor within the prescribed
limits, and the vice chancellor gra ted that
injunction. It was objected that this court
could not grant the injunction when there
was something remaining to be performed,
for that A. had a right to be employed as
a cutter, which right this court would not
even attempt to deal with or enforce as
against C. That case therefore was open
to a diflBculty which does not occur here;
in fact the same difficulty which might have
arisen in Hills v. CroU, 2 Phil. Ch. 60, before Lord Lyndhurst.
But the vice chancellor held that to be no difficulty at all, observing that the bill simply asked for an injunction which he would grant, although he
could not give effect to the affirmative covenant to do the act In respect of which no
specific performance was aslied.
His own
decisions in Kemble v. Kean, 6 Sim. 333, and
in Klmberly
v. Jennings, Id. 340,
were
pressed upon him; but he observed, "that
the bills in the cases cited asked for specific performance of the agreement, and that
the injunctions were sought as only ancillary to that relief, but the bill in the present
case asked merely for an injunction."
He
no longer put it on the inability of the court
to enforce a negative covenant, but he put it
on the form of the pleadings.
Whether that
form was sufficient to justify his opinion is
a question with which I need not deal; but
1 am very clearly of opinion that the case of
Kolfe V. Rolfe, 15 Sim. 88, does remove the
whole weight of that learned judge's authority on this subject.
It was said In argument that the injunction prayed in Rolfe v. Rolfe, 15 Sim. 88,
was merely ancillary to the relief; but it will
be seen that that was not so, and that the
prayer extended only to the injunction, and
had nothing to do with relief in the shape of
specific performance; and the learned judge
himself stated that, if it had gone to that extent, he, following his former decisions, would
not have granted the injunction.
From a careful examination of all these
authorities I am of opinion that the principles and rules deducible from them are in
direct contravention of those principles and
rules which were so elaborately pressed upon
me during the argument; and I wish it to be
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distinctly understood
that I entertain no
doubt whatever that the point of law has
been properly decided In the court below.
It
was nevertheless, and with some reason, said
that, although the point of law should be decided in the plaintiff's favor, still he might
be excluded from having the benefit of it on
the merits of the case.
His lordship here entered into a minute
examination of the statements in the answers and affidavits as to the unauthorized
addition of the restrictive clause, and as to
the nonfulfillment by the plaintilf of his portion of the agreement.
In reference to those
points

he observed

that,

w^hether

the clause

was originally added with or without authority, the evidence showed a clear acquiescence on the part of the defendants
to its
remaining in the agreement;
that the operation of the agreement
had been In the
first instance postponed to suit the convenience of the defendants; and that as to the
payment of the £300 although the plaintiff
could not have come into a court of equity
to enforce the contract without having tendered the amount stipulated to be paid, yet
it was distinctly proved that it had in fact
been paid to the common agent of both parties for the purpose of being handed to the
defendants.
His lordship concluded by saying that, looking at the merits and circumstances of the case, as well as at the point
of law raised, he must refuse this motion
with costs.
In the course of the argument, and in order to prove the plaintiff's readiness to perform his part of the contract, an affidavit
made by Dr. Bacher was read, which was to
the effect that he had written and sent a letter to the defendant J. Wagner, informing
her of his having received from the plaintiff
the £300,

and offering

to pay

that

sum

ac-

cording to her instructions. A letter of the
same date as that referred to in the affidavit
was admitted to have been received by the
defendant J. Wagner, but it was positively
denied that it contained any such offer.
The
letter itself was not forthcoming, and Its
nonproduction
was not accounted for. No
copy was kept by Dr. Bacher.
The lord chancellor observed that, when
the affidavit, as to the contents of the letter
was made. Dr. Bacher could not have known
that the letter would not be produced; that
the affidavit, therefore, if untrue, was at the
imminent peril of exposure by the production
of the letter; and that under such circumstances the representation
In the affidavit
must be taken to be true.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
MONTAGUE

v.

PLOCKTON.

(L. R. 16 Eq. 180.)
May 26, 1873.
This was a motion on behalf of the plaintiff, Henry James Montague, the lessee and
manager of the Globe Theater in London,
for an injunction to restrain the defendant,
Charles Poston Iflocliton, from acting, or
causing his name to be advertised as about
to act, at any place other than the plaintiff's
theater, or otherwise than for the plaintiff's
benefit, for a period of nine months, from
the 2d of October, 1872, and in particular
from acting at an intended dramatic performance at the Crystal Palace.
In August, 1871, an engagement was proposed to the defendant on behalf of the
plaintiff, that the defendant should perform,
upon certain terms specified, at the Globe
Theater. To this proposal the following answer was returned by the defendant, dated
the 16th of August, 1871, and addressed to
Mr. Edward English, the plaintiff's agent:
"Dear Sir: I accept the engagement for
the Globe Theater, imder the management
of H. J. Montague, Esq., at a weekly salary
of five pounds, and, if required to go into
the provinces, traveling expenses paid and
20 per cent, on my London salary.
Line of
business, old men and character business; to
commence
on or about 2d October,
1871.
For the season of not less than nine months'
duration. A fortnight's rehearsal to be given prior to opening, subject to the rules and
regulations of the theater.
"[Signed]
O. P. Flockton."
During the pendency of the last-mentioned
on the 2d of March,
agreement,
namely,
1872, the plaintiff and the defendant entered
into another agreement, which was accepted
by the defendant, in these terms:
"I hereby accept the renewal of my enwith H. J. Montague, Esq., for
gagement
his next season on the same terms as at
present existing between us.
"[Signed]
C. P. Flockton."
It appeared that in May, 1872, a notice
was posted in the greenroom of the Globe
Theater to the effect that the season would
close on the 4th of June, on which day all
pending engagements would terminate, and
the house was accordingly closed upon that
day.

A company was then formed by the plaintiff for certain theatrical performances in
the provinces, in which the defendant took
part, and these performances commenced on
the 4th of June, and terminated on the 28th
of September, 1872.
The next London season at the Globe
Theater commenced in October, 1872, and
the defendant, Mr. Flockton, played at the
theater as he had previously done till the
10th of March, 1873, when he requested the
plaintiff to allow him to perform at the
Regent's Park Theater, which was to be
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Upon this occasion, accordopened in May.
ing to the plaintiff's statement, the defendant said: "I only ask you to lend me, and
shall finish my engagement with you afterwards." The plaintiff declined to accede to
the defendant's request, on the ground that
he should require his services for the next
On the
piece that was to be brought out.
2d of April the defendant wrote the following letter to the plaintiff:
"Dear Sir: As you are aware my engagement with you terminated on the 2d of December last, pm-suant to our agreement bearing date the 2d of March, 1872, I am desirous to close my connection
with your
theater, and therefore now give you four
weeks' notice in pursuance of such my de-

I

sire."
The matter was then placed by the plaintiff in the hands of his solicitors, Messrs.
Lumley, who wrote to the defendant stating
that he had taken a wrong view of the
terms of the contract, which did not in fact
terminate until nine months after the commencement of the season, in October, 1872;
that the defendant was causing Mr. Montague

considerable

inconvenience

and

loss,

by not attending the rehearsal of a new
play soon to be produced, although every
reasonable notice had been given him; and
they called upon him to be in attendance the
following morning at 11 o'clock to rehearse
the part assigned to him.
This summons not being attended to by
the defendant, the plaintiff was obliged to
engage another actor, Mr. Palmer, to perform the part assigned to the defendant.
The plaintiff then discovered that the defendant was negotiating for an agreement to
act at a new theater in course of erection
in London, before the expiration of the term
alleged to be comprised
in the agreement
of the 2d of March, 1872, and on the 28th
of April, 1873, the plaintiff also discovered
that the defendant was advertised as intending to act on the 3d of May at the Crystal
Palace in the part of Polonius in Hamlet,
and consequently this bill was filed for an
injunction in the terms already stated.
It was alleged by the defendant that, according to the prevailing custom, the manager had the right of closing the season by
notice, and that he had done so.
The plaintiff alleged that the notice did not close the
season.
TLere was conflicting evidence on
this point.
Lumley & Lumley, solicitors for plaintiff.
Mr. Oakes, solicitor for defendant.
Mr. Glasse, Q. C, and Mr. B. Cutler, for
plaintiff. Mr. Hemming, for defendant

SIR R. MALINS, V. C, after reading the
letter of the defendant, dated the 16th of
August, 1871, accepting the engagement to
perform' for the plaintiff during the season
of at least nine months, continued:
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The first question is, what is the meaning
of that contract? It has been argued that it
was an engagement for the season, and that
it left the performer at the mercy of the
proprietor to terminate the season whenever
he thought fit. It is said that Mr. Montague
ha\ing put up a notice in the greenroom of
the theater in the month of May, 1872, notifying that the season's engagements would
terminate on the 4th of June then next, that
My
that has put an end to the contract.
opinion is that if an actor engages himself
for the season he leaves himself at the
mercy (within reasonable limits of construction) of the proprietor of the theater to fix
what the season is.
But that is not the
meaning
of this contract; because, while
engages Jlr.
the proprietor, Mr. Montague,
Flockton for the season, there is a stipulation, which is for the protection of the performer, that that season is not to be one
month, two months, or three months, as the
proprietor may think proper, but that, whenever he may choose to terminate his season,
that season, for the purpose of paying the
actor, is not to be less than nine months.
In my opinion, it was absolutely impossible,
provided Mr. Flockton performed his part
of the contract, for Mr. Montague to evade
performing his part of it by paying the stipulated salary for a period of not less than
nine months.
This contract, then, being, as I am bound
in the only way it
to assume, understood,
could be understood, by each of the parties,
was commenced in or about the month of
■
October, and matters went on satisfactorily
on both sides, as I must assume, because in
the month of March, five months after the
contract had been commenced, and while Mr.
Flockton was still performing for Mr. Montague, a proposal was made by Mr. Montague,
and was accepted by Mr. Flockton, in theSe
"I hereby accept the renewal of my
terms:
engagement with H. J. Montague, Esq., for
his next season, on the same terms as at
Now, what is
present existing between us."
the meaning of "the next season"?
am
perfectly clear that It was a repetition of the
old contract; it was to be the next season
commencing in October, 1872, lasting for not
It follows that, for
less than nine months.
the season beginning in 1872 and ending in
accepting these terms, is
1873, Mr. Montague,
bound to pay Mr. Flockton for nine months,
and Mr. Flockton is equally bound to perform for Mr. Montague, if Mr. Montague requires him to do so. I am surprised that by
any ingenuity Mr. Flockton should have persuaded himself that the meaning of that contract was, as he stated in his letter, that the
next season was not the London season, but
The thing is, in my
the country season.
It has nothing to
opinion, perfectly absurd.
because the
do with the country season;
original contract was this: He is to have
£5 a week If required to go into the prov-

I

OF CONTRACTS.

inces;
assuming,
therefore, that he may be
required to go, he will agree to do so, and
in that case he is to have his traveling expenses paid, and 20 per cent, additional upon his London salary. The original contract
is for a London engagement, with the privilege on Mr. Montague's part of requiring him
to go into the provinces, where he would be
entitled to 20 per cent, additional and all
traveling expenses paid. Therefore, when he
says the next season, it is subject to the same
stipulation; it is for the London theater,
with the right on the part of Mr. Montague to
require him to go into the provinces
upon
those terms.
The contention of Mr. Flockton that the next season commenced in the
month of June and ended in the month of
September is, in my opinion, simply ridiculous.
I totally differ from it, and I am clear
that it meant the next season, commencing
in October and terminating at the earliest
at the end of nine months.
Then let us see what was the view of the
parties themselves, and how this was acted
upon.
If it were according to Mr. Flockton's
view, how did it happen that he commenced
acting for Mr. Montague again in the month
of October last, and continued uninterruptedly and amicably, as I understand, to act
for him down to the month of April? The
object of it is evidently that which is stated
by the plaintiff in his affidavit filed the Gth
of March; and, as it is not contradicted by
Mr. Flockton, I must take It to be perfectly
Mr. Montague says: "On or about
accurate.
the 20th day of JIarch, 1873,
was in my
dressing room at the Globe Theater with a
friend, and the defendant came in and asked
me if I would allow him to go and play a
very fine part at the Regent's Park Theater,
which it was proposed to open in the month
of May, and, he added [now, here is an admission of the whole case], 'Of course, you
will lend me for a time only; then I will
come back and finish my engagement.'
said, in reply, 'I am sorry, my dear Flockton,
cannot, as I hope to have you in my
next piece.'
On my saying that, he walked
away rather annoyed."
That was on the
20th of March. Then what is the next thing
he does?
I am satisfied from the evidence
that, there being a piece then in preparation,
it was the intention of Mr. Montague that
Mr. Flockton should take a part in it; but,
unfortunately, before it came out Mr. Flockton, on the 2d of April, adhering to this most
unjustifiable view of the contract, writes to
Mr. Montague this letter: "As you are aware
my engagement with you terminated on the
2d of December last, pursuant to our agreement bearing date the 2d of March, 1872,
am desirous to cease my connection
with
your theater, and therefore now give you
four weeks' notice in pursuance of such my
Now, he knew perfectly well that
desire."
Mr. Montague was not aware of any such
thing as the termination of the agreement in

I
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pecpmber, for he knew tliat the conversation
of the 20th of March which occurred between
them took an entirely different view of the
case, and after making that admission himself to Mr. Montague I cannot conceive that
anything could be more unjustifiable than
that Mr. Flockton should say, "As you are
aware, my engagement with you terminated
on the 22d of December last."
That was objected to by Mr. Montague, who,
think,
acted in perfect good faith. He remonstrated, and, finding his remonstrances
were not

I

attended

to, he applied

to his

solicitors.

So

far from Mr. Montague not performing his
part of the contract or being desirous to
avoid employing Mr. Flockton in his new
piece, as was suggested,
Lumley
Messrs.
wrote a letter to this efCect: "Mr. Montague
states, further, that you are even now causing him considerable inconvenience and loss
by your not attending to the rehearsal of a
new play soon to be produced, although every
reasonable

notice

has

been

given

you,

and

we now call upon you to be in attendance
to-morrow on the stage to rehearse the part
assigned to you at 11 o'clock, at which hour
the company
assemble for the purpose of
rehearsal." Therefore it is Mr. Flockton who
is now repudiating his contract.
He is called upon to perform it, but he adheres to his
refusal, and seeks an engagement, first at
the Regent's Park Theater, and secondly at
the Crystal Palace. Now, unless theatrical
managers are to be completely at the mercy
of their performers, the performers are not
to be suffered to break their engagements
whenever they think fit.
I can readily believe, if Mr. Flockton had requested Mr. Montague to allow him to perform the part of
Polonius in Hamlet at the Crystal Palace,
that his request would have been acceded
to, and this suit would not have been instituted; but that was not all that Mr. Flockton wanted. In setting his contract at defiance, it is perfectly clear his object was not
simply to perform at the Crystal Palace, but
also to perform at the Regent's Park Theater, either because he could get a better salary or be enabled to play a higher class of
characters,
which perhaps to an actor Is as
strong an inducement as any money that can
be given to him.
But he is, in my opinion,
entirely wrong.
If he is put upon his contract, he is uound
to perform for Mr. Montague for the season;
and I am glad to hear from his counsel, Mr.
Hemming, that Mr. Flockton expresses his
willingness, if the court puts a different construction upon it to his own, to submit to the
opinion of the court, and perform his part of
the contract.

Now, that being

the effect of the agreebetween the parties, that is, that Mr.
Flockton has bound himself for the whole of
the season which commenced in October last
for nine months, which, on the one hand,
obliges Mr. Montague to pay him his salary
ment
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months, and obliges Mr. Flockton,
on the other hand, to perform for Mr. Montague for the same period, Jt^said, jQ__order_to,jjEaIdJhis, thatjie S"nor"b53n4, because there is no negative stipulation in 4be
certainly am under the impres"opntraet.
sion that in the case of Lumley v. Wagner, 1
De Gex, M. & G. 604, if there had been no
negative stipulation the court would have interfered;
and I gather this particularly from
the passage in Lord St. Leonard's judgment,
Id. 618, where he says: "The agreement to
sing for the plaintiff during three months at
his theater, and during that time not to sing
for anybody else, is not a correlative contract;
it is, in effect, one contract, and though, beydnd all doubt, this court could not interfere
of the
to enforce the specific performance
whole of this contract, yet, in all sound construction, and according to the true spirit of
the agreement, the engagement to perform
for three months at one theater must necessarily exclude the right to perform at the
It happened
same time at another theater."
that that contract did contain a negative
and, finding it there. Lord St.
stipulation,
Leonards relied upon it; but I am satisfied
that if it had not been there he would have
come to the same conclusion, and granted the
injunction, on the ground that Mdlle. Wagner, having agreed to perform at Mr. Lumley's theater, could not at the same time be
But,
permitted
to perform at Mr. Gye's.
however that may be, it is comparatively
unimportant,
because the subsequent
authorities have completely
settled this point.
It
appears to me, on the plainest ground, that
an engagement to perform for nine months
at Theater A. is a contract not to perform at
Theater B., or at any other theater whatever. How is a man to perform his duty to
the proprietor
of a theater if, when he has
engaged himself to perform for him, he is to
go away any night that he may be wanted
must treat Mr. Flockto another theater?
ton as if he were the greatest actor in the
world, and as if wherever he went the public would run after him; and according to
this, if a proprietor engages an actor to perform for him, he is not, because he is only
wanted for three nights in the week, to be
at liberty to go and perform at any other
theater during the other three nights, and
thereby take away the advantage of the contract which he has entered into with his emThat, in my opinion, is utterly inconployer.
of the
sistent with the proper construction
There is no doubt whatever that
contract.
of these contracts is,
the proper construction
that where a man or woman engages to perform or sing at a particular theater for a particular period, that involves the necessity of
his or her not performing or singing at any
other during that time.
That does not rest upon my opinion only,
because it was acted upon in Webster v. DilIn that case there
lon, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 432.

for nine

I

I
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was, it seems, no argument on the part of
the defendant.
I suppose they did not argue
it because they found they could mal£e nothThe defendant Dillon, an actor,
ing of it.
having agreed to perform at Sadler's Wells
Theater in certain characters for twelve successive nights, proposed to perform during
the same period at another
theater.
Mr.
Swanston applied for the injunction, and Vice
Chancellor
Sir W. Page Wood "thought the
words of Lord St. Leonards were sufficiently
strong to justify his making the order, and
he granted an Injunction restraining the defendant from acting at any other place than
the plaintiff's theater dm'ing the ordinary
hours of performance there of twelve consecutive nights, commencing on the 20th of April,
the plaintiff imdertaking to abide by such order as to damages as the court might direct."
He fully adopts there the principle that it is
not necessary to have a negative covenant in
order to prevent the performance
at another
In Fechter v. Montgomery, 33 Beav.
theater.
22,
think all men must concur in the reasonableness of the views of the master of the
Mr. Fechter had engaged Mr. Montrolls.
gomery, who had been a provincial actor, and
desired to appear on the London boards to
characters,
perform Shakespeare's
and Mr.
for ffve
Fechter had kept Mr. Montgomery
months idle, but he paid him his salaiy. Mr.
object was to be occupied;
Montgomery's
he
did not want to be kept idle, he wanted to
show his talents to London audiences, and it
being clear that Fechter had kept him five
idle, and, for all that apmonths perfectly
peared, was likely to keep him idle for another Ave months, Mr. Montgomery would not
Mr.
submit to it, and broke his engagement.
Fechter then filed a bill for an injunction, and
in my opinion the master of the roUs could
not have come to any other conclusion than
that Mr. Fechter had broken his part of the
conti-act, and therefore he would not enforce
The contract
it as against Montgomery.
there did not contain any negative stipulation
that he would not perform except for Mr.
The master of the roUs in that case
Fechter.
says (33 Beav. 26): "But having regard to
the situation of the parties, having regard to
the nature of a contract of this description,
and having regard also to the previous letter
of the 21st of June, 1862, written to Mr.
Bamett, and the conversation
which took
place prior to this agreement being entered
into, with respect to which conversation there
does not appear to me to be much difference
am of opinion that it was an
on either side,
agreement entered into by Mr. Fechter to emduring a reasonable
ploy Mr. Montgomery,
time, to act at this theater, and that it was
an agreement on the other side that he (Mr.
elsewhere
should not perform
Montgomery)
without the consent of Mr. Fechter; there
was a mutuaUty in the agreement entered
Into on both sides; on the one side, that he
should have an opportunity of displaying

I
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what his abilities and talents were before a
London audience, and on the other side, that
he should not act elsewhere unless with the
There are, therepermission of the plaintiff."
fore. Sir W. Page Wood, when vice chancellor, and the master
of the rolls. Lord
Romilly, taking precisely the same view, that
an engagement to act at one theater is a proThere
hibition against acting at any other.
in the
involved
Is also the whole principle
case of De Mattos v. Gibson, 4 De Gex & J.
276, which was with regard to a totally different subject undoubtedly, namely, the chartering of a ship.
The ship was chartered for
a particular voyage, and the charterer proposed to sell her, and employ her in a totally
There the court decided
difCerent manner.
that there was a contract that she should not
be employed for any other purpose, and granted an injunction against her being so employthink, therefore, that it is
ed accordingly.
should desire, as
decidedly established, and
far as my opinion is of value on the subject,
that it should be considered my opinion, that
to act in one particular
a man agreeing
theater during the season is party to a contract that he will act there and not anyA negative contract is as neceswhere else.
sarily implied as if it had been plainly exThen the result is: here is a conpressed.
It is said by
tract entered into for value.
Mr. Flockton that the plaintiff has refused
to perform his part of the contract, and has
also refused to allow him to perform.
That
is explained in the affidavits.
It is not attempted to be answered.
It is perfectly clear
that, in consequence of Flockton having absented himself, and given the notice of the
2d of October, when this new piece was about
to be brought out, Mr. Montague was obliged
to apply to another actor, a Mr. Palmer, to
act in the place of Mr. Flockton, and that, in
consequence of the default of Mr. Flockton
to perform his contract, he has brought this
trouble upon himself.
Mr. Montague very
properly said: "I have engaged Mr. Palmer.
cannot turn him out.
You have brought
this upon yourself, and while this piece lasts
I cannot employ you to perform in it." But
if he had not done that,
am perfectly clear
that he would have continued to employ him
there, and that the circumstance
of his not
being employed is entirely in consequence of
his attempting to repudiate his own contract.
Under these circumstances^ I am clearly of
opinion that Mr. Montague
has established
that Mr. Flockton is under an engagement to
perform for him, and, being under that engagement, is not at liberty to perform at any
other theater whatever without his permisthink it is a matter of very great imsion.
portance for actors to understand, that entering into a contract to perform at Theater A.
obliges them to perform there alone, and that
they cannot be permitted
to perform anywhere else so long as the other party performs
his part of the agreement

I

I
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am, therefore, of opinion that Mr. Montague is entitled to the injunction.
Mr. Hemming asked that the Injunction
might not be extended to prevent Mr. Plockton from fulfilling the engagement he had already entered into to perform once more at
the Crystal Palace.
Mr.
The Vice Chancellor recommended
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Montague to concede this request as a favor.
Mr. Glasse said that Mr. Montague would
not object to the defendant's performing once
more at the Crystal Palace.
The Vice Chancellor thereupon granted the
Injunction in the terms of the prayer, hut so
as not to interfere with Mr. Flockton's playing one more day at the Crystal Palace.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

^d
DONTSTBLL

v.

BEXNETT.

(22 Ch. Dlv. 835.)

>

Chancery.

Feb. 8, 1883.

By

an agreement dated the 15th of December, 18S2, and made between the plaintiff, J. Donnell, a manure manufacturer, of
the one part, and Cormack, a fish curer and
fish smoker, of the other part, it was agreed
that Cormack should sell and that the plaintiff should buy all parts of fish not used by
Cormack in his business of a fish curer and
fish smoker at the price of 23s. per ton for
the space of two years from the 81st of Dethereof
cember, 1882, and in consideration
Cormack further agreed that he would not
sell during the said space of two years any
fish or parts of fish to any other manufacturer whatever; and the plaintiff further
agreed that he would take and t)ay for all
fish or parts of fish which Cormack should
deliver to bim at the said price of 23s. per
ton delivered at the plaintiff's works.
It was admitted that the defendant never
delivered any fish or parts ot fish under the
contract to the plaintiff', but that he entered
into a contract with the defendant Bennett
to deliver all the parts of fish which he did
not require in his business to Bennett; it
was also admitted that the plaintiff had suffered damage by this breach of contract, and
that the defendant Bennett had paid Cormack considerable sums of money to induce
him to break his contract with the plaintiff,
in order that Bennett might obtain the substantial monopoly of all the refuse of fish
In Grimsby or the neighborhood.
This was an action by the plaintiff against
Bennett and Cormack as co-defendants asking for an injunction to restrain Cormack
from selling any fish to Bennett or any other
manufacturers except the plaintiff, and to resti-ain Bennett from buying any such fish

from Cormack.
H. A. Giffard, Q. C, and Mr. Hall, for
plaintiff. Cozens-Hardy, Q. C, and Mr. Williamson, for defendants.
Bower, Cotton & Bower, for plaintiff.
Williamson, Hill & Co., for defendants.

FRY, J. The question which arises is by
no means an easy one. It is difficult because
of the state of the authorities upon the point.
It appears to me that the tendency of recent
decisions, and especially the cases of Fothergill V. Rowland, L. R. 17 Eq. 132, and of
Wolverhampton and W. Ry. Co. v. London
and N. W. Ry. Co., L. R. 16 Eq. 433, is
towards this view — that the court ought to
look at what is the nature of the contract
that if the contract as
between the parties;
a whole is the subject of equitable jurisdiction, then an injunction may be granted in
support of the contract whether it contain or
does not contain a negative stipulation; but
that if, on the other hand, the breach of the
contract is properly satisfied by damages,
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then that the court ought not to interfere
whether there tie or be npt the negative stipulation. That, I say, appears to me to be
the point towards which the authorities are
tending, and I cannot help saying that in my
judgment that would fijrnlsli a proper line
by which to divide the cases. But the question which I have to determine is not whether that ought to be the way in which the line
should be laid down, but whether it has been
so laid down by the authorities which are
binding on me.
Now several cases have been cited by the
plaintiff as authorities in favor of his contention,
in the first place there Is the case
of Dietrlchsen v. Cabburn, 2 Phil. Ch. 52, in
which undoubtedly the court enforced by
way of Injunction a stipulation not to sell
except in a particular manner, and there the
whole contract was one which could not
have been performed specifically by the court.
Still more, in Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De Gex,
M. & G. 604, the court enforced by way of
injunction a portion of a contract the whole
of which could not have been enforced by
way of specific performance; and Lord SL
Leonards in considering that case discussed
the question whether an injunction ought to
be granted in some cases in which specific
performance
cannot be granted, and he determined that question plainly in the aflirmative.
He made these observations (Id. 619):
"Wherever this court has not proper jm'Isdictlon to enforce specific performance it
as far
operates to bind men's consciences,
as they can be bound, to a true and literal
performance of their agreements;
and it will
not suffer them to depart from their contracts at their pleasure, leaving the party
with whom they have contracted to the mere
chance of any damages which a jury may
The exercise of this jurisdiction has,
gis^e.
I believe, had a wholesome tendency towards
the maintenance
of that good faith which
exists in this country to a much greater
degree perhaps than in any other;
and although the jurisdiction is not to be extend
ed, yet a judge would desert his duty who
did not act up to what his predecessors have
handed down as the rule for his guidance
in the administration ot such an equity."
It is plain, therefore, that Lord St. Leonards did not adopt the view which has occm'red to me as that towards which the more
recent cases have been tending.
That is the way in which the direct authorities stand in cases in which there is a
negative clause, and they appear to me to
show that in cases of this description where
a negative clause is found, the court has enforced it without regard to the question
whether specific performance could be granted of the entire contract.
Then it is said by Mr. Cozens-Hardy that
In all those cases the negative contract enforced was but a part of a larger contract,
and that it was a separable part of that
larger contract, and that those cases do not
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apply to a case like the present, In wMcJi,
as lie suggestB, the negatiye contract Ip coextensive witli the positive contract.
Upon that argument two inquiries arise.
In the first place, is it true to say that the
negative contract is in the present instance
coextensive vfith the positive? In my judgment it is not.
The affirmative contract is
that tlie vendor will sell all his fish refuse
for' two years to the purchaser. The negative contract is that during two years he will
not sell any refuse fish to any other manufactiurer whomsoever; leaving it open to him
so far as regards the negative contract, either
not to sell at all, or to sell to some person
other than a manufacturer.
But in the next
place one must inquire whether the authorities support any such distinction as that
which has been urged by Mr. Cozens-Hardy.
It appears to me that they do not.
In Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De Gex, M. & G.
604, the contract was that Mdlle. Wagner
would sing three months at Her Majesty's
Theater in London. The negative contract
was that she would not "use her talents at
any other theater, nor in any concert or reunion, public or private, without the written
authorization of Mr. Lumley."
It Is quite
true that the contract contains certain stipulations as to how many nights she should be
required to sing, but it appears to me to be
evident that the substantial conti-act— the affirmative contract—was that she would sing
Of course she could
there for three months.
not be always singing, and therefore the contract must state necessarily some limits as
to how often she was to sing, but when she
did sing during the three months she was to
sing at Her Majesty's Theater;
the negative
terms were that during tli? tJbree months she
would not sing anywhere else than at Her
Majesty's Theater. It appears to me that
those two contracts are substantially coexBut further than thAt it is to be
tensive.
borne in mind that Lord St. Leonards does
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not dwell on the distinction which is now
sought to be drawn, and so far as I am
aware no trace of it is to be found in the
earlier authorities.
But then comes the case of Catt v. Tourle,
L. R. 4 Ch. 654, before the Lords Justices,
in which Hills v. Croll, 2 Phil. Oh, 60, was referred to. Now HiUs V. Croll was a case which
contained
an affirmative and negative contract, and Lord Justice Giffard expressly said
that if that case is to be taken as laying
down that the court is to refuse to act on a
negative covenant wherever there is a correlative obligation which it cannot enforce,
If it is taken as going
it does not apply.
that length, it is contrary to the case of Lumley V. Wagner, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 604, and
must be considered as overruled.
It appears to me, therefore, that that point
which has been urged upon me does not receive any sanction from the earlier authorities.
I have come to the conclusion, therefore,
upon the authorities, which are binding upon
me, that I ought to grant this injunction.
I
do so with considerable
difficulty because I
find it hard to draw any substantial or tangible distinction between a contract containing
an express negative stipulation and a contract containing an affirmative stipulation
which implies a negative.
I find it exceedingly difficult to draw any rational distinction between the case of Fothergill v. Rowland, L. R. 17 Eq. 132, and the case now before me. But at the same time the courts
have laid down that, so far as the decisions
have already gone in favor of granting injunctions, the injunction is to go.
It appears to me that this case is within
the earlier decisions, and although
should
be far from sorry if the court of appeal were
to take a different view, I think
am bound
here by the authorities, and therefore
grant the injunction till the hearing of the
cause.

I
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WM. ROGERS MANUF'G CO.
(20

Atl.

467,

v.

ROGERS.

58 Conn. 356.)

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
17.

Feb.

1890.

Appeal from superior court, Hartford
county; Fbnn, Judge.
This was a suit to enjoin the violation
of a contract between F'rank W. Rogers
and the Wm. Rogers Manufacturing Company and the Rogers Cutlery Company as

follows: "(1) That said companies

will

employ said Rogers in the business to be
done by said companies, according to the
stipulations of said agreement, for the period ot twenty-five years therein named, if
said Rogers shall so long live and discharge the duties devolved upon him by
said Watrous as general agent and manager of the business to be done incommon
by said companies, under the directions
and to the satisfaction
of said general
agent and manager; It being understood
that such duties may include traveling for
said companies, whenever, in the judgment of said general agent, the interest of
the business will be thereby promoter^
(2) The said companies agree to pay said
Rogers for such services so to be rendered,
at the rate of $1,000 per year for the first
five years of such services, and thereafter
the same or such larger salary as may be
agreed upon by said Rogers and the directors of said companies, said salary to
be in full during said term of all services to
be rendered by said Rogers, whether as an
employe or an ofiicer of said companies,
unless otherwise agreed.
(3) The said
Rogers, in consideration of the foregoing,
agrees that he will remain with and serve
said companies under the direction of said
Watrous, as general agent and manager,
including such duties as traveling for said
companies, as said general agent may devolve upon him, including also any duties
as secretary or other officer of either or
both of said companies, as said companies
may desire to have him perform at the
salary hereinbefore named for the first five
years and at such other or further or different compensation thereafter during the
remainder of the twenty-five years as he,
the said Rogers, and the said companies
may agree upon. (4) The said Rogers
during said term stipulates and agrees
that he will not be engaged or allow his
name to be employed in any manner in
any other hardware, cutlery, flatware, or
hollow-ware business either as manufacturer or seller, but will give, while he shall
be so employed by said companies, his entire time and services to the interests of
said common business, diminished only by
sickness, and such reasonable absence for
vacations or otherwise as may be agreed
upon between him and said general agent. "
The complaint was held insufficient, and
the plaintiffs appealed.
F. Cbamberlin and E. S. White, for apC. iJ. IngersoII and F. L. Hudpellants.
gerford, for appellee.

ANDREWS, C.J. Contracts for personal
service are matters for courts of law, and
equity will not undertake a specific performance. 2 Kent, Comm. 258, note b;
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Hambllnv.Dinneford,2Edw.Ch.529;
Sanquirico v.Benedetti,] Barb. 315; Haight v.
Badgeley, 15 Barb. 499; De Rivafinoli v.
Corsettl, 4 Paige, 264. A specific performance in such cases is said to be impossible
because obedience to the decree cannot be
compelled by the ordinary processes of the
court. Contracts for personal acts have
been regarded as the most familiar Illustrations of this doctrine, since the court
cannot in any direct manner compel the
party to render the service. The courts in
this country and in England formerly held
that they could not negatively enforce the
specific performance of such contracts by
means of an injunction restraining their
violation. 3 Wait, Act. & Def. 754; Marble
Co. V. Ripley, 10 Wall. 340; Burton v. Marshall, 4 Gill, 487"; De Pol v. Sohlke, 7 Rob.
(N. Y.)280; Kemble v. Kean, 6 Sim. 333;
Baldwin v. Society, 9 Sim. 393; Fothergill
V. Rowland, L. R.17Eq.l32. The courts in
both countries have, however, receded
somewhat from the latter conclusiim, and
it is now held that where a contract stipulates tor special, unique, or extraordinary
personal services oracts, or where the services to be rendered are purely intellectual,
or are peculiar and individual In their
character, the court will grant an injunction In aid of a specific performance. But
where the services are material or mechanical, or are not peculiar or individual, the
party will be left to his action for damages.
The reason seems to be that services of the former class are of such a nature as to preclude the possibility of giving the injured party adequate compensation in damages, while the loss of services of the latter class can be adequately
compensated by an action for damages.
2 Story, Fq. Jur. § 958a ; 3 Wait, Act. & Def.
754; SPom.Eq. Jur.§ 1343: California Bank
V. Fresno Canal, etc., Co., 53 Cal.201 ; Singer
Sewing-Machine Co. v. Union Button- Hole
Co., 1 Holmes, 253, Lumley v. Wagner, 1
De Gex, M. & G. 604; Railroad Co. v. W'ythes, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 880; Montague v.
Flockton, L. R. 16 Eq. 189. The contract
between the defendant and the plaintiffo is
made a part of the complaint. The services which the defendant was to perform
for the plaintiffs are not specified therein,
otherwise than that they were to be such
asshould be devolved upon him bythegeneral manager; "it being understood that
such duties may include traveling for said
companies whenever, in the judgment ol
said general agent, the interests of the
business will be thereby promoted ; " and
also "including such duties as traveling
for said companies as said general agent
may devolve upon him, including also any
duties as secretary or otherofficerofeither
or both of said companies as said companies may desire to have him perform."
These services, while they may not be m«iterial and mechanical, are certainly not
purely intellectual, nor are they special, or
unique, or extraordinary; nor are they so
peculiar or individual that they could not
be performed by any person of ordinary
intelligence and fair learning.
If this was
all there was in the contract it would be
almost too plain for argument that the
plaintiffs should not have an injunction.
The plaintiffs, however, insist that the
negative part of the contract, by which
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the defendant stipulated and agreed that
would not be engaged in or allow his
name to be employed In any manner in
any other hardware, cutlery, flatware or
hollow-ware business, either as a manufacturer or seller, fully entitles them to an
injunction against its violation. They
aver in the complaint, on information and
belief, that the defendant is planning with
certain of their competitors to engage
with them in business, with the intent and
purpose of allowing his name to be used or
employed in connection with such business
as a stamp on the ware manufactured;
-nd they say such use would do them
great and irreparable injury. If the plaintiffs owned the name of the defendant as
a trade-mark, they could have no difficulty
in protecting their ownership ; but they
make no such claim, and all arguments or
analogies drawn from the law of trademarks may be laid wholl.y out of the case.
There is no averment in the complaint
that the plaintiffs are entitled to use, or
that in fact they do use, the name of the
defendant as a stamp on the goods of their
own manufacture, nor any averment that
such use, if it exists, Is of any value to
them. So far as the court is informed, the
defendant's name on such goods as the
plaintiffs manufacture is of no more value
he
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than the names of Smith or Stiles or John
Doe. There is nothing from which the
court can see that the use of the defendant's name by the plaintiffs is of any value
to them, or that its use as a stamp by
their competitors would do them any injury other than such as might grow out
of a lawful business rivalry. If by reason
of extraneous facts the name of the defendant does have some special and peculiar
value as a stamp on their goods, or its use
as a stamp on goods manufactured by their
rivals would do them some special injury,
such facts ought to have been set out so
that the court might pass upon them. In
the absence of any allegation of such facts
we must assume that none exist. The
plaintiffs also aver that the defendant intends to make known to their rivals the
knowledge of their business, of their customers, etc., which he has obtained while
in their employ. But here they have not
shown facts which bring the case within
any rule that would require an employe
to be enjoined from disclosing business
secrets which he has learned in the course
of his employment, and which he has contracted not to divulge. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass 452. There is no error in the
judgment of the superiorcourt. Theother
Indges concurred.
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METROPOLITAN EXHIBITION
EWING.
(42

CO.

v.

March

25,

Fed. 19a)

Circuit Court, S. D. New York.
1890.

In Equity.

On bill for injunction.

Joseph F. Choate and George F. Duysters,
for plaintiff.
Henry Bacon, for defendant

WALLACE, J. This action is brought to
restrain a threatened breach of contract for
the performance
of personal services which
require special aptitude, skill, and experience.
It is a case in -which an action at law would
not afford the plaintiff an adequate remedy
for the breach, and in which the power of the
court should be exercised by preventive interposition, if it is found that the contract is
such as the plaintiff claims it to be.
The
circumstances

are

such

that,

unless

a

pre-

liminary injunction is granted, the plaintiff
will obtain no effectual remedy, because, before the cause can be brought to final hearing, the time will have passed within which
the relief sought would be practically useful,
and, if it be then adjudged that the plaintiff
injunction, the
is entitled to a permanent
judgment will be declaratory merely.
Although preliminary relief is not to be granted
in a case in which it is doubtful whether the
plaintiff will be finally successful, yet, where
the questions are such that they can be fully
considered and as safely decided upon a motion for a preliminary injunction as at iinal
hearing, it Is the duty of the court to consider
and determine them, and not defer the party
invoking its assistance to a time when a decree, if awarded, would be too late.
upon
The contract
which the plaintiff
founds its claim for relief is in form between
the New York Base-Ball Club as party of the
first part, and the defendant as party of the
second part; but there is no reason to doubt
that the New York Base-Ball Club was the
agent of the plaintiff in entering into the
contract, that the plaintiff is the real principal, that the contract was intended to inure
for the benefit of the plaintiff, and that the
plaintiff is entitled to enforce it against the
defendant to the extent that the New York
Base-Ball Club could do so. The doctrine is
now generally recognized that, while a court
of equity will not ordinarily attempt to enforce contracts which cannot be carried out
by the machinery of a court, like that involved in the present case, it may nevertheless practically accomplish the same end by
enjoining the breach of a negative promise,
and this power will be exercised whenever
the contract is one of which the court would
direct specific performance, if it could practically compel its observance by the party refusing to perform through a decree for spe-

It is indispensable, where
cific performance.
the contract does not relate to realty, that it
be one for the breach of which damages
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would not afford an adequate compensation
to the plaintiff.
It must be one in which the
plaintiff comes into court with clean hands,
and which is not so oppressive as to render
it unjust to the defendant to enforce it. It
must be one in which there are mutual promises, or which is founded on a sufficient consideration.
It must be one the terms of
which are certain, and in respect to which the
minds of the parties have distinctly met, so
that there can be no misunderstanding of
their rights and obligations.
The contract Is executed as of the date of
April 29, 1889. It is a formal document, consisting of 20 articles, by which the New York
Base-Ball Club employs the defendant, and
the defendant undertakes to perform professional services as a base-ball player for the
club for the season (specified in ai-tiele 2) beginning April 1, 1889, and ending October 31,
1889.
Article 20 provides that the salary to
be paid the defendant shall be $2,000, payAmong other things, the
able semi-monthly.
contract provides by different articles that
the club may at any time terminate the conti'act on 10 days' notice to the defendant,
whereupon the obligations of both parties are
to cease; that the club shall provide the defendant while "abroad" with proper board
and lodging, and pay all necessary traveling
expenses; that if the defendant, during the
term of his employment, be guilty of any excessive indulgence In liquor, or of gambling,
or of insubordination, he shall be liable to
certain specified penalties;
and that, if the
club ceases to be a member of the National

League of Professional Base-Ball Clubs,
either compulsorily or voluntarily, the "defendant shall. If the right of reservation be
transferred" by the club to any other club,
receive from that club at least the same
amount in salary that he receives by the
present contract.
It contains, also, the following provision: "Article 18. It is further
understood and agreed that the party of the
first part shall have the right to 'reserve" the
said party of the second part for the season
next ensuing the term mentioned In paragraph 2, herein provided, and that said right
and privilege is hereby accorded to said party
of the first part upon the following conditions, which are to be taken and construed
precedent to the exercise of
as conditions
such extraordinary rights or privileges, viz.:
(1) That the said party of the second part
shall not be reserved at a salary less than
that mentioned in the 20th paragraph herein,
except by the consent of the party of the second part; (2) that the said party of the second part, if he be reserved by the said party
of the first part for the next ensuing season,
shall not be one of more than 14 players then
under contract,— that is, that the right of reservation shall be limited to that number of
players,

and no more."

The plaintiff alleges that the defendant
was one of 14 players, and no more, so reserved under said contract; that on the 22d
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day of
option
son of
timely

October, 1889, plaintiff exercised its
to reserve the defendant for the sea1890 by giving the defendant due and
notice, in writing, of its intention to
do so; and that, noth withstanding the exercise of this option, the defendant has engaged his services for the season of 1890 to
another organization, to act for it as a baseball player during that season.
The plaintiff
insists that, by the terms of the contract, it
is entitled to the services of the defendant
as a base-ball player for the season of 1890
upon the terms and conditions of the contract for the season of 1889, except the condition giving a right to reserve him for a
subsequent season.
The case turns upon the meaning and effect of the clause and contract which gives
the club the right to reserve the defendant
for the season next ensuing.
It is plain
enough that the option is a right of reservation for the next ensuing season only,— the
season ensuing the term mentioned in article 2, — and does not extend beyond the term
It
from April 1, 1890, to October 31, 1890.
is equally plain that the salary for the ensuing season is to be the same as that for the
season of 1889, unless the parties mutually
But what is the charconsent to a change.
acter of the option which the plaintiff is permitted to exercise?
What is the right to "reserve" the defendant? If it is the right to
retain and have his services as a base-ball
player for the season of 1890, when is the
right of election to be manifested, and upon
what terms are these services to be rendered?
Can the club wait until April 1, 1890,
before it manifests its intention to exercise
the option? Is the club to pay the defendant's board and lodging while he is "abroad,"
serving the club, during the season of 1890?
Can the club discharge him at any time durAre the
ing that season on 10 days' notice?
penalties
for intoxication, gambling, or insubordination enforceable during the season
of 1890? In short, does the contract embody the definite understanding of the parties to it in respect to their reciprocal rights
and obligations after the season of 1889 shall
have ended? If the term, "the right to reserve," has no defined meaning,
and there
were no extrinsic sources by which to ascertain the sense in which it is used by the parties, it would be an ambiguous phrase.
As
applied to a contract for personal services,
the right to reserve would convey a very unintelligible conception of the conditions and
incidents of the service to be rendered or
enjoyed.
A contract by which one party
agrees, for an equivalent, to reserve himself
for another for a stated period, or to reserve
himself as a lawyer or doctor or artist or
laborer for a specified term, would very inadequately express a promise to devote his professional or manual services exclusively to
the other during that period; and the promise of a base-ball player to reserve himself
for a particular club for a given season
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would hardly, without more, convey any definite meahing of the tmderstanding of the
parties.
It certainly would not bind him to
submit to any special rules or regulations respecting the performance of his services not
expressly consented to, or not to be necessarily implied from the nature of the employment and the situation of the contracting
parties.
If it had been the meaning of the
contract to allow the club to renew the engagement of the defendant for a second sea.son upon the same conditions
as those for
the first season, that intention could have
been easily and unequivocally expressed.
As
it is, it is left wholly to implication, unless
the "right to reserve" is a term having a defined and specific signification.
This ambiguity suggests such grave doubt as to the
meaning of the clause that in two adjudged
cases, in which it has been considered by the
courts, the judges have thought it too indefinite to be enforceable.
In Exhibition Co. v.
Ward, 9 N. Y. Supp. 779, (in the supreme
court of this state,) Mr. Justice O'Brien was
of the opinion that the failure to provide for
the terms and conditions of the contract for
the second season rendered the clause so indefinite and uncertain that it could not be
the basis of equitable relief, or that it meant
that every player is bound for the ensuing
season upon the s&me terms and conditions
as those of the first season, including the
signing of a new contract containing the option to reserve.
In Philadelphia Ball Club
against Hallman, in the court of common
pleas of Philadelphia, Judge Thayer was of
the opinion that the failure to designate the
terms and conditions of the new engagement
under which the player is to be reserved
rendered the contract of reservation wholly
uncertain, and therefore incapable of enforcement.

Where the terms employed to express some
particular condition of a contract are ambiguous,
and cannot
be satisfactorily
explained by reference to other parts of the
contract,
and the parties have made other
contracts in respect to the same subject-matter, and apparently in pursuance of the same
general purpose, it is always permissible to
examine all of them together in aid of the interpretation of the particular condition; and,
if it is found that the ambiguous term has
a plain meaning by a comparison of the several contracts and an examination of their
provisions, that meaning should be attributed to it in the particular condition. So,
also, if it appears that the term used has an
established meaning among those engaged in
the business to which the contract has reference, and, unless it is given that meaning,
is indefinite and equivocal,
it should be
treated, in interpreting the contract, as used
according to that understanding; and in construing a contract the court is always at lil>erty to look at the surrounding and antecedent circumstances,
and avail itself of the
light of any extrinsic facts which will enable

624

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

it to view the contract from the standpoint
of the parties at the time when it was made.
In the present case, it will satisfactorily appear, by resort to these sources of interpretation, that the term "right to reserve" is
used in the contract in the sense that oband that it
tains in base-ball nomenclature,
is intended to signify an option, the character of which was well understood by baseball clubs and professional players when the
Obviously, the
present contract was made.
right to reserve given by the eighteenth
clause of the contract is the same thing as
in that
the right of reservation mentioned
part of the contract which provides that the
present club may disband, and transfer its
right of reservation to some other club. The
agreement is in a form common to all contracts between base-ball clubs organized under what is known as the "national agreea form
ment" and professional players,
which is prescribed by the national agreement.
The national agreement is a compact
between
the various base-ball
associations
constituting the National League Base-Ball
Clubs and the American Association of BaseBall Clubs, made with a view to regulate the
rights and obligations of the members as respects one another.
One of its paramount
features consists of provisions regulating the
privilege of clubs to reserve a stated number
of players.
The provisions are framed to
prevent any club of the National League or
the American Association from engaging a
player already reserved by another, and to
render the player so reserved ineligible for
by any other club. They reemployment
quire each club, on the 10th day of October
in each year, to transmit to all the other
clubs a reserved list of players, not exceeding 14 in number, then under contract, and
of such players reserved in any prior list
who have refused to contract for another
year, and declare such players ineligible to
contract with any other club.
Inasmuch as
the parties to the national agreement comprise all, or substantially all, the clubs in the
country which employ professional players,
this national agreement, by indirection, but
practically, affects every professional player,
his privilege
of engaging
and subordinates
as he chooses to the option of the club by
As Is stated
which he is under reservation.
in a recent publication edited by a prominent
professional player: "The most important
feature of the national agreement, unquestionably, is the provision according to the
club members the privilege of reserving a
stated number of players. Xo other club of
any association under the agreement dare enTo this rule,
gage any player so reserved.
more than any other thing, does base-ball,
as a business, owe its present substantial
By preserving intact the strength
standing.
of the team from year to year, it places the
business of base-ball on a permanent basis,
and thus offers security to the investment
The reserve rule itself is a usurof capital.

|
\

pation of the player's rights; but it is, perhaps, made necessary by the peculiar nature
of the ball business, and the player is indirectly compensated by the improved standing of the game.
The reserve rule takes a
manager by the throat, and compels him to
keep his hands off his neighbor's enterprise."
In the contracts between clubs and players as framed prior to November, 1887, there
was no provision by which the player consented to the option for reserve on the part
of the club. But the contracts did contain
a condition that the player should conform
to, and be governed by, the constitution and
provisions of the national agreement;
and
the player thereby assented to become ineligible for engagement by any other club
of the league during the season of his engagement by a particular club, or while the
option of re-engaging
him for an ensuing
year on the part of that club remained in
Changes were made from time to
force.
time in various features of the national
agreement.
The players were obliged to inform themselves of the latest changes, in
order to understand the precise terms of
They became
their contract with the clubs.
unwilling to consent to a form of contract
by which they were to be subjected to conditions not mentioned in the contract itself.

In

I
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November,

1887,

a committee

represent-

ing the professional players met a committee representing
the parties to the national
agreement for the purpose of agreeing upon
certain changes to be made in the form
of the contract.
The committees
finally
agreed that the obnoxious clause in the contract should be omitted, and the clause now
found in the eighteenth article should be inserted.
This was the origin of the clause
giving to the club, by the contract itself, the
option of reserve.
The clause was manifestly inserted in order to give, by an express
condition,
the right of reservation to the
clubs which theretofore the players had only
given by agreeing to be bound by the terms
of the national agreement.
By ascertaining
what that right of reservation was, it can
be plainly seen what the parties had in mind
in using the term in the present contract.
If, when the contract was made, the term
had a well-understood definition, there was
no necessity to particularize in the contract
the conditions or characteristics of the option.

Reference has already been made to the
provision of the nat'onal agreement requiring each club, on the 10th day of October
in each year, to transmit to all the other
clubs a reserved list of players, and declaring such players ineligible to contract with
any other club. This provision is to be read
in connection with another provision of the
national agreement, which prescribes that no
contract shall be made "for the services of
any player by any club for a longer per.od
than seven months, beginning April 1st and
terminating October 31st, and no such con-
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tract for services to be rendered after the
expiration of the current year shall be made
prior to the 20th day of October of such
year." The two provisions, read together,
allow a period of 10 days to intervene between the time when a club can exercise the
privilege of placing a player upon its reserved list and the time when it can make a
contract with him for services to be rendered in an ensuing year, thus emphasizing a
distinction between the right to treat the
player as reserved and the contract which
is to fix the terms upon which the reservation is to be complete.
The effect of these
provisions is that, when the club has exercised its privilege of reservation, no other
club is permitted to negotiate with the player; but the club which has placed him upon
the reserved list, and no other, is then at
liberty to enter into a contract with him to
obtain his services for an ensuing year. Consequently the right of reservation is nothing
more or less than a prior and exclusive right,
as against the other clubs, to enter into a
contract securing the player's services for
another season. Until the contract is made
which fixes the compensation of the player
and the other conditions of his service, there
is no definite or complete obligation upon
his part to engage with the club. He agrees
that he will not negotiate with any other
club, but enjoys the privilege of engaging
with the reserving club or not, as he sees
fit. Head with this understanding, the clause
in question by which the privilege of reserving the defendant is given to the club
expresses definitely the terms of the option.
If the club exercises the right of reservation, it agrees in advance that the player
shall receive at least as large a salary as
he has received during the current year, and
leaves it open to him to contract on that
basis for the next season, or to insist on a
larger salary. All the other terms of the
are matters of negotiation beengagement
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tween the club and the player. The law
implies that the option of reservation is to
be exercised within a reasonable time; but
when this has been done the right to reserve
the player becomes the privilege, and the
exclusive privilege, as between the reserving
club and the other clubs, to obtain his services for another year if the parties can agree
As a coercive condition
upon the terms.
which places the player practically, or at
least measurably, in a situation where he
must contract with the club that has reserved him, or face the probability of losing
any engagement for the ensuing season, it
is operative and valuable to the club. But,
as the basis for an action for damages if
the player fails to contract, or for an action
to enforce specific performance, it is wholly
nugatory. In a legal sense, it is merely a
contract to make a contract if the parties
It may be that heretofore the
can agree.
clubs have generally insisted upon treating
the option to reserve as a contract by which
they were entitled to have the services of
the player for the next season upon the
terms and conditions of the first season, and
even requiring him to enter into a new contract containing the option for reservation;
and it may be that the players have generally acquiesced in the claims of the clubs.
However this may be, the players were not
in a position to act independently; and, if
they had refused to consent to the terms
proposed by the clubs, they would have done
so at the peril of losing any engagement.
The facts, therefore, are not such as to permit any weight to be given to the acts of
the parties as evincing their own construction of the contract.
It follows that the act of the defendant
in refusing to negotiate with the club for an
engagement for the season of 1890, while a
breach of contract, is not the breach of one
which the plaintiff can enforce.
The motion
for an iniunctlon Is denied.

ALLEGHENY BASE-BALL CLUB
BENNETT.

(14

Circuit Court,

v.

Fed. 257.)

W. W. Pennsylvania.

Novem-

ber 18, 1882.

In Equity.
BiU to enforce compliance
with agreement to enter into contract to give
personal

Bill in
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services.
equity by the Allegheny

Base-hall
Cluh, a corporation of Pennsylvania, against
Charles W. Bennett, a citizen of Michigan,
to compel the respondent to execute a formal
cpntract to give his exclusive services as a
base-hall player to the complainant during
the base-ball season of 1883, and also for an
injunction to restrain him from executing a
lilie agreement with the Detroit Base-ball
Club, and from performing such services for
than the
any other person or corporation
complainant during the season named.
The bill was filed on the fifth day of October, 1882, and was based upon the following written instrument, to-wit:
"It Is hereby agreed, this third day of
August, 1882, between the Allegheny Baseball Club and Charles W. Bennett, that said
Charles W. Bennett hereby promises and
binds himself that between the fifteenth and
thirty-first days of October, 1882, he will sign
a regular contract of the Allegheny Baseball Club, a chartered company belonging to
the American Association of Base-ball Clubs,
which contract shall bind him to give his
services as a base-ball player to said club
for the season of 1883, and shall bind said
Allegheny Club to pay him the sum of $1,700 for and during such season of 1883; and
of his agreement to sign
in consideration
such a contract in October, the sum of $100
is now paid to said C. W. Bennett, the reWitceipt of which is hereby acknowledged.
ness our hands and seals this third day of
August, 1882.
"The Allegheny Base-baU Club, by
"H. D. McKnight, President. [Seal.]
[Seal.]
"C. W. Bennett.
"A. G. Pratt, Witness."
The bill averred substantially that the
complainant was engaged in the business of
playing base-ball for profit, and that by the
of much time and large sums
expenditure
of money it made preparations for the exhibition of such games, and expected to receive large returns from the same; that the
respondent was a skillful player of base-ball,
and. In consequence of his agreement with
B. N. Williamson and James
complainant,
F. Galvin, two other skillful players, had entered into a similar agreement with complainant; that respondent had refused to
sign the "regular contract" referred to, and
had entered into a like contract with the
Detroit Base-ball Club; that, accordingly,
Williamson and Galvin refused to keep their
and that
said engagement with complainant,
the base-ball season had now so far advan-

ced that complainant could not secm-e other
players of equal skill with said Bennett, Williamson,
and Galvin, whereby complainant
"would be seriously damaged, to an amount
of not less than $1,000."
The bill prayed that Bennett be required to
sign the "regular contract," and perform his
coveuants,
and also that he be restrained
from entering into a similar contract with
the Detroit Base-ball Club, or any other association or person, and from playing base
ball "for hire, ' during the base-ball season
of 1883, for any other than complainant.
The complainant moved for a preliminary
injunction.
The motion was argued by
James Bakewell, and was opposed by A.
Tausig, and was denied.
The respondent
demurrer,
on the
filed
then
a general
grounds:
(1) That the bill was prematurely
brought; (2) that the agreement was a mere
anticipating the
preliminary arrangement,
making of a final contract, and that, therefore, there was no contract before the court
capable of specific enforcement;
(3) that the
agreement was unlimited as to place, and
and void as
unreasonable
was, therefore,
against public policy, as covenants in restraint of trade;
(4) that the complainant
had an adequate remedy at law.

A. Tausig, A. W.
Brown, for demurrer.

Duff,

and

Marshall

a suit there must be a cause
action Avhen
such suit is commenced.
One
55 Ga. 329; 29 111. 497; 4 Sneed, 583.
who has anything to do on a particular day
has the whole of that day to perform such
act, so that suit for a breach of performance
102
cannot be instituted until the next day.
Mass. 65; 6 Watts & S. 179; 18 Cal. 378.
And, in general, the time within which a
contract is to be executed is as much the
essence of it as any other part. 6 Wis. 120;
43 Me. 158; 18 Ind. 365; 17 Me. 316; 22

To maintain

of

Me.

133.

The present bill for an injunction to
restrain the defendant from playing with the
Detroit Club, as in violation of the alleged
agreement, will not lie for the reason the contract is a mere preliminary arrangement, and
What are the terms
not a final agreement.
of the alleged contract? They provide and
contemplate the execution of a regular agreement, in order to bind the parties and render
the contract mutual, final, and conclusive.
The preliminary contract shows that it was
executed with reference to a future and final
(1)

agreement between the parties.
A contract
requires
mutuality as to all its essential
terms, stipulations, and conditions.
Is there
any allegation upon the face of the bill that
a final, regular contract was ever agreed upon between the parties? There Is no contract, therefore, capable of being enforced in
a court of equity, and the present bill must
Railway Co. v. Wythes, 5 De
be dismissed.
Gex, M. & G. 888.
Specific performance will
not be decreed if it is not clear that the
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of the parties have come together.
Wistar's Appeal, 80 Pa. 484.
(2) Specific performance will not be enforced, directly or indirectly, unless the agreement Is mutual, its terms certain, its enforcement practicable, and the complainant is
without adequate redress In an action at law,
(Blsp. Eq. § 377, and cases cited; 10 Wall.
339; 5 De Gex, M. & G. 888;) and it will
not be enforced when it Is doubtful whether
an agreement has been concluded,
(14 Pet.
77; 81 Pa. 484;) nor where the duties are
continuous and require siiill and judgment,
A court of chancery will not
(10 Wall. 339.)
of a contract,
decree the specific performance
where it would be impossible for the court to
enforce the execution of its decree, or where
the literal performance, if enforced, would be
Bisp. Bq. 436.
a vain and idle act.
contract is legal
(3) Even if the alleged
and binding on the defendant, the demurrer
should be sustained, because the plaintiff has
It may have to
an adequate remedy at law.
pay a higher salary to secure a player of
Bennett's skill, and the difference would be
the measure of damages for breach of contract.
(4) Even if the court should be of the opinion that a contract was executed, full, final,
and mutual as to all its terms, conditions,
and stipulations, and also of opinion that
negative covenants not to exercise a trade,
or calling within reasonable limprofession,
its may be enforced by injunction, such conelusion would have no application to enjoin
and restrain the defendant.
The contract is
and void on grounds of public
unreasonable
policy, as in cases of covenants in restraint
McClurg's
•of trade, because It Is unlimited.
Appeal, 58 Pa. 51; Gillis v. Hall, 2 Brewst.
342; Catt v. Tourle, L. R. 4 Ch. App. 654.
should be sustained be(5) The demurrer
cause equity will not indirectly enforce specific performance of a contract for personal
■services where the services require a succession of acts whose performance
cannot be
by one transaction, but will be
accumulated
continuous and require the exercise of special
knowledge,
skill or judgment. Pom. Spec.
Per. § 312; Ford v. Jermon, 6 Phlla. 6; De
Pol V. Sohlke, 7 Rob. (N. Y.) 280; Sanqulricio
1 Barb. 315; Kemble v. Kean,
V. Benedetti,
■6Sim. 333; Hills v. Croll, 2 Phila. 60; Rolfe
v. Rolfe, 15 Sim. 88; Fothergill v. Rowland,
L. R. 17 Eq. 132; Kimberley v. Jennings, 6
The personal acts with respect to
Sim. 340.
which courts of equity entertain jurisdiction

minds
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to decree specific performance have reference to property of some kind. There is none
where a contract for personal services alone
There are sevhas been actively enforced.
eral, however, In which the court has interfered negatively. Thus, in the case of a theater, considered as a partnership, a contract
with the proprietors not to vprite dramatic
pieces for any other theater Is valid, and a

violation of it will be restrained by injunction.
Clark V. Price, 2 Wils. 157; Willard,
Eq. 278. But where there is no partnership
between the parties, and the defendant has
violated his engagement to one theater and
formed a conflicting engagement with another, a court of equity will not interfere either
actively to compel performance of one contract, or negatively to prevent the performWillard, Eq. 278; Kemance of the other.
ble V. Kean, 6 Sim. 333.
The cases where
injunctions have issued relate (1) to partnership agreements;
(2) to property of some
kind; (3) to express negative covenants.
Willard, Eq. 277, 278.
(6) If the court should be of opinion that
the alleged contract is complete, mutual, certain, and final, and that under it the plaintiff
has no full, complete, and adequate remedy
at law, the present biU will not lie for the
prematurely
following reasons:
(1) It is
No injury to plaintiff (if any) can
brought.
arise until the ball season of 1883 commences. As the plaintiff will not be actively engaged under the alleged contract until the
regular season of 1883 opens, no damage can
result until that time from the act which it
is sought to enjoin. (2) There is no right to,
or necessity for, an Injunction, for it cannot
appear, at the present time, that defendant
will play ball during the season of 1883,
De Rivin violation of said alleged contract.
afinoli V. Corsettl, 4 Paige, 264; De Pol v.
If the injury be
Sohlke, 7 Rob. (N. Y.) 283.
doubtful, eventual, or contingent, equity will
Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Pa. 274;
not enjoin.
Huckenstein's Appeal, 70 Pa. 108. If the
alleged Injury is only problematical, accordmay or may not
ing as other circumstances
arise, or if there is no pressing need for an
injunction, the court will not grant it until
Kerr,
a tort has actually been committed.
Injunc. 339.
James Bakewell and

J.

S. Ferguson,

AOHESON, D. J. (orally).
tained and bill dismissed.

contra.

Demurrer sus-
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McGOWIN

V.

REMINGTON.

(12 Pa. 56.)

Supreme

Court

of Pennsylvania.

Sept.

20,

1849.

Appeal from district court, Allegheny comity, in equity.
Ou the 6th September, 1847, Z. W. Remington filed a bill in equity, setting forth that,
prior to the grievances complained of, he had
been for many years a surveyor and regulator
of the streets, lanes, and alleys of the city of
Pittsburgh, and other places around said city,
and as such had made many plans and plots
of ground in said city and throughout said
county, and maps of lands and grades of
streets and roads, and drafts of surveys of
plantations in other counties adjoining, and
possessed certain furniture and instruments
of surveying, v^hich vrere of great value to
him, a list of which is appended to this bill,
and prayed to be made and taken as part
thereof,— marked as "Exhibit A."
That on or about 1st April, 1843, intending
to engage in other occupations and to remove
from Pittsburgh, vphere he had before re.sided
and had his oflBce for several years, and rethe
posing all confidence in the defendant,
defendant having been for several years under the complainant's tuition and under his
deservice as a surveyor, the complainant,
sirous and Intending to benefit defendant,
who purposed to succeed and follow in the
left in
business pursued by the complainant,
the care and custody of defendant, and for
the mere purpose of promoting the interest
all his plots of
and business of defendant,
survey and plans, drafts and property, as set
forth in Exhibit A, besides other plots and
drafts, which he cannot recollect, that defendant might refer to and use in his said business until they would be required by comexpecting
some
plainant, he, complainant,
day to resume his old business of surveyor at
Pittsburgh, in case he should not succeed in
his new occupation.
That complainant,
after he had left the
said plots, plans, drafts, and property with
defendant,
went to dwell in Beaver county,
and left them in the office which complainant
had occupied before and at his said departure
from Pittsburgh, and the possession of which
said oflSce he gave up to defendant along with
the said plots, plans, drafts, and furniture
and instruments aforesaid, all which things
and very
are of real value to complainant,
diflScuIt and impossible to replace or procure,
and no damages for which in a court of law
could compensate.
That complainant had used efforts since to
procure his papers, furniture, and instruments, to no purpose, defendant refusing to
deliver them up, and uow threatening that he
will destroy them rather than give them up to
complainant.
And complainant believes and is informed
that the defendant is now engaged in copying
many of said plots, plans, and drafts for his
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own use, and to be used by him as a surveyor
in and about said city of Pittsburgh and adjoining counties, to the great Injury of complainant; and complainant believes that defendant is disposed and is likely to injure,
and fraudulently intends to destroy or secrete
said plots, plans, drafts, and instruments, so
that complainant may not recommence his
business.
That complainant returned to Pittsburgh in
the spring of this year, and some time in July
last went to defendant's office and demanded
of defendant the return of his said plots,
plans, drafts, and instruments, informing him
that he had returned to Pittsburgh and opened an office, and resumed his business as a
surveyor; defendant refused to deliver them
to complainant,
and said there were some of
them he, defendant, could not get along without.
The bill then went on to propound Interrogatories to the defendant touching the several allegations
of fact before made, and
prayed that JIcGowin be decreed to deliver
up to the plaintiff the said plots, etc., and any
copies thereof made since demand.
The bill
further prayed an injunction to resti'ain McGowln from copying, and from destroying, or
injuring, or secreting said plots, etc., and -a
subpoena to answer.
The exhibit, marked A,
contained a detailed list of plots, drafts, furnitui-e, instruments, etc., demanded.
The subpoena issued forthwith, and September 9, a bond having been filed, application was taade for an injunction, which was
awarded and issued. 4th October rule to
plead, answer or demur by first Monday in
November.
2&th October
demurrer filed,
which was overruled 22d December, and a
second special injunction awarded.
3d January, 1848, answer filed, and motion to dissolve injunction.
The answer was to the following effect: It
admitted that Remington was a surveyor, and
as such had in his possession plans, plots,
maps, etc., such as were specified in the bill,
with certain exceptions, particularized in a
schedtile of explanations;
that he removed to
Beaver,
and that respondent
occupied his
office after he left The answer affirmed that
the plans, etc., were greatly overrated
in
value, and have no such peculiar characteristics as to make them subjects of equity jurisdiction, by reason of their unique and original description;
that most, if not all of them,
could be supplied or substituted from other
offices, and from private individuals, and
from the public records of the county and
state, being generally copied, and mostly from
papers unofficial and unauthenticated.
It affirmed that the plans, etc., belonged, some of
them to the respondent, some to other persons,
and denied the demand for them, etc.
The complainant filed a replication, and
took evidence of his having made the demand mentioned
in his bill. On 13th January, 1849, the cause having been heard on
the bill, answer, exhibits, and proofs, and on
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argument of counsel, tbe court ordered and
decreed that the clerk of the court do deliver to the complainant the papers, maps,
and plans, which have been placed by order
of the court in his custody, and it is ordered
and decreed further that the defendant deliver unto Read Washington, Esq., one of the
in chancery,
masters
all the plots, plans,
drafts, furniture, and instruments, left in defendant's possession as set forth in the hill
of complainant, and vehich are not now in the
possession of the clerli of this court, and also
of any copies thereof which may have been
made by respondent since the day of the demand thereof stated in the bill, and that the
master have power, and is hereby required to
ascertain by interrogatories to be exhibited in
writing to defendant, whether there are any
of the said plans, maps, plots, drafts, furniture, or instruments disclosed in said bill in
his possession undelivered,
and that the master require defendant to answer thereto upon
oath, and to Inquire upon interrogatories of
defendant,
to be administered to him under
oath, what copies of or copying from said papers he may have made, and whether the
same have been delivered up; and that said
master mali;e report (if required by further

order) to this court thereof.
And further ordered that the injunction
heretofore issued be continued and made perpetual, and that the said master deliver to
the complainant the said plans, plots, drafts,
furniture, and instruments which may be
placed in his hands by virtue of this decree.
And further ordered that the costs and fees
in this suit be taxed by the clerk, and that
the bill thereof be immediately paid by the
defendant into court.
On 20th January, 3849, defendant appealed
from this decree, and 20th June following decree was made for a specific delivery, for refusing obedience to which a rule for attachment was taken, and on 4th September respondent appealed.
In this court these exceptions were taken:
(1) Want of jurisdiction over subject-matter of the bill.
no sufficient groimd
(2) The bill presents
for the interference of a court of equity in

Pennsylvania.
(3) The courts of law have adequate

rem-

edies.
(4) The decree covers some descriptions of
property which are not the subject of equity
jurisdiction under any state of facts.

Craft & McCandless,
Dunlop, for appellee.

BELL, J.

for appellant.

Mr.

The defendant having failed to
by proof, his allegation of sale or
gift of the articles sought to be recovered
by this bill, the contest in this court is reduced to two questions: First, whether the
bill presents sufficient grounds to warrant
the interference of a court of equity, in this
state, under the statute conferring equitable
sustain,
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Secondly, whether that portion
jurisdiction?
of the decree which covers the surveying
instruments and furniture described in the
exhibits annexed to the bill can be sustained?
As to the first point, the defendant insists
that the only remedy is at law. Though the
action of replevin is, with us, a broader
remedy than in England, lying in all cases
where one man Improperly detains the goods
of another, it is in no instance efCective to
enforce a specific return of chattels, since a
claim of property and bond given is always
sufficient
to defeat reclamation, no matter
what may be the eventual issue of the conAs, therefore, our common-law tritest.
bunals are as powerless for such a purpose,
as the similar English courts, the propriety
of exerting the equitable jurisdiction now
Invoked must depend with us on the same
reasons that are deemed sufficient to call it
Here, as there, the Ininto action there.
quiry must be whether the law alfords adequate redress by a compensation in damages,
where the complaint is of the detention of
personal chattels. If not, the aid of a court
of chancery will always be extended to remedy the Injury, by decreeing a return of the
thing Itself.
The precise ground of this jurisdiction is
said to be the same as that upon which the
specific performance of an agreement Is enforced, namely, that fruition of the thing,
the subject of the agreement, is the object,
the failure of which would be but illy supplied by an award of damages.
Lowther v.
Lowther, 13 Ves. 389. In the application of
this rule some difficulty has been experienced.
The examples afforded by the English books are usually those cases, where,
from the nature of the thing sought after,
its antiquity, or because of some peculiarity
connected with it. It cannot easily, or at all,
be replaced.
Of these may be instanced the
title deeds of an estate and other muniments
of property, — valuable paintings (Lowther v.
Lowther, supra); an antique silver altar
piece (Duke of Somerset v. Cookson,
3 P.
Wms. 389); an ancient horn, the symbol of
tenure, by which an estate Is held (Pusey
V. Pusey, 1 Ves. 273); heirlooms (8 Ves. &
B. 18); and even a finely carved cherrystone (Amb. 77).
Such articles as these are
commonly esteemed not altogether, or perhaps at all, for their Intrinsic value, but as
being objects of attachment or curiosity, and,
therefore, not to be measured In damages
by a jury, who cannot emter Into the feelings of the owner. So too the impossibility,
or even great difficulty, of supplying their
loss, may put damages out of the question
as a medium' of redress. But these are not
the exclusive reasons why chancery interferes, for there may be cases in which the
thing sought to be recovered Is susceptible of
reproduction or substitution, and yet where
damages
could not be so estimated as to
cover present loss or compensate its future
consequent
And I take It
inconvenience.
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wood, to be severed by the defendants, who
were to have eight years to dispose of
and to pay for it in six yearly Installments.
Lord Hardwicke was, at first, exti-emely reluctant to entertain the bill, but after discussion came to the conclusion that, though
relating to a personal chattel, it was such
an agreement that the plaintiff might come
into chancery for a specific performance.
He instanced the case of Taylor v. Neville,
which was a bill for the performance of articles for the sale of eight hundred tons of
iron, to be paid for in
certain number of
years, by installments, where the decree
prayed for was made; and proceeded to
observe:
"Such sort of contracts as these differ from those that are immediately to be
executed.
There are several circumstances
wliich may concur.
A man may contract
for the purchase of a great quantity of timber, as
ship carpenter,
by reason of the
vicinity of the timber; and this is on the
part of the buyer.
On tlie part of the seller,
suppose
man wants to clear his land iu
particular sort of husorder to turn it to
bandry; there nothing can answer the justice of the case but the performance of the
Similar in principle is
contract in specie."
the case of Falls v. Reid, 13 Ves. 70, where
the plaintiffs prayed the restoration of an
silver snuffbox,
used for many
engraved
j-ears by a society, as the symbol of their
association; and Nutbrown v. Thomson,
where
tenant brought a bill against his
lessor, who, under the pretense of the tenant's covenant, had repossessed himself of
the land, and seized upon the stock of cattle,
wliich by the lease the tenant was to enjoy
for seven years. The objection was that the
tenant's remedy, if he was entitled to one
But how,
at all, was at law. In damages.
asked Lord Eldon, are damages to be estiThe direction to a
mated in such a case?
jury must be to give, not the value of the
chattels, but their value to the tenant!
A
similar question may well be propounded in
By what standard would you
our case.
measure the Injury the plaintiff may sustain
in future from being deprived, even for a
brief period, of the use of papers essential
Their
to the prosecution of his business?
intrinsic value might, perhaps, be ascertained
by an estimate of the labor necessary to
admitting the means to
their reproduction,
be at hand, and within the power of the

no
upon data possibly
as being predicated
accessible,
a wrong is perpetrated
longer
which a chancellor ought not to hesitate iu
relieving. It is enough for this purpose that
perfect relief at law Is not apparent The
thing to be guarded against is, not the invasion
of the defendant's rights, for he
stands here absolutely without any, except
the common interest every citizen has in
preserving the proper line of distinction that
divides the jurisdiction and limits the powWhat Is to be
ers of the several courts.
avoided is an unnecessary trespass upon the
province of the common-law tribunals, and
this is to be tested by the simple query
whether they offer a full remedy for the
wrong complained of?
But there is another ground upon which
In Falls
this proceeding may be sustained.
V. Reid, the snuffbox was deposited with the
member of the society, upon
defendant, as
certain terms, to be redelivered upon the
Lord Rosslyn
happening
of certain events.
held that under these facts, the defendant
was a depositary on an express trust which,
upon a common ground of equity, gave the
plaintiff title to sue in that court; and In
this he was supported by Lord Eldon, In the
subsequent
case of Nutbrown v. Thornton.
According to the proof in our case, the papers and documents claimed were left with
the defendant under the express understanding that they were to be redelivered whenever the plaintiff should see fit to resume
the business of his then profession in this
city. It is then the case of direct confidence
violated,— spell sufficiently potent to call
Into vigorous activity the authority invoked.
As to the second question. It Is perhaps
enough to say that, when once
court of
equity takes cognizance of a litigation, it
will dispose of every subject embraced within the circle of contest, whether the question
be of remedy or of distinct yet connected
topics of dispute.
If the jurisdiction once
attaches from the nature of one of the subjects of contest. It may embrace all of them,
for equity abhors multiplicity of suits. Thus,
in the case last cited, the chancellor ruled
a

V.

example

a

Lister, 3 Atk. 384, furnishes an
in the analogous instance of a contract for the sale of personalty, — contracts,
which are most commonly left to be dealt
with at law. It was a bill to enforce the
performance of an agreement for the purchase of several large parcels of growing
Buxton

plaintiff.
But how could a tribunal ascertain the probable loss which, in the meantime, might be sustained? The present pecuniary Injury might be little or nothing,
might
and so possibly of the future; or
be very great, depending upon the unascertainable events of coming time, as these may
be influenced by the misconduct of the dethink,
fendant. These considerations show,
Besides,
the case is not one for damages.
as many of the maps, plans, surveys, aud
calculations are said to be copies of private
papers, we are by no means satisfied they
could be replaced at all. Certainly not withrisk to
out permission of the owners;
which the plaintiff ought not unnecessarily
If to these reflections we add
to be exposed.
the fact that some of these documents are
the original work of the plaintiff, of value

a

this is always so, 'where, from the nature
of the subject or the immediate object of the
parties, no convenient measure of damages
or, where nothing could
can be ascertained;
answer the justice of the case but the perOf this
formance of a contract in specie.

a
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that where a nerson is found wrongfully
in possession oT a farm, over which the
comt had undoubted power, and also in possession of the stock upon it, at the same
time and under the effect of the same wrong,
the court will undoubtedly make him account
for and deliver back the whole. In the case
at bar the surveying instruments and office
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furniture stand in the same category with
the maps, drafts, etc., were delivered to the
defendant at the same time, and are withIn
held by an exertion of the same wrong.
short, tliey enter into and make part of the
same transaction, and may, therefore, be the
objects of the same measure of redress.
Decree

affirmed.
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PROSPECT PARK & C. I. R.
ISLAND & B. R.
(39

CO. v.
CO.

CONEY

N. E. 17, 144 N. Y. 152.)

Court of Appeals

of New York.

Dec. 11, 1894.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,
department
Action by the Prospect Park & Coney Island Railroad Company against the Coney
Ifland & Brooklyn Railroad Company for
specific performance. From a judgment of
the general term (21 N. Y. Supp. 1046) reversing a judgment for plaintiff, It appeals.
Second

Reversed.
George W. Wingate, for appellant
liam N. Dykman, for respondent

BARTLBTT, J.

Wil-

The parties to this action
into a contract June 1, 1882, and the
plaintiff seeks to compel Its specific performance.
The special term rendered judgment
fi>r plaintiff;
the general term reversed the
judgment;
and the plaintiff comes here under the usual stipulation in case of affirmance.
The reversal was for error both of
law and fact, and, the failure to insert a
certificate that the case contains all the evidence having been cured by the amendment
of the return by the supreme court, we are
called upon to review the facts as well as the
law.
At the time of making the contract, the
plaintiff owned a steam surface railroad,
usually known as "Culver's Coney Island
Railroad," which extended from Coney Island to a depot at the comer of Ninth avenue and Twentieth street, in the city of
Brooklyn, and adjoining Greenwood
Cemetery; the plaintiff also owned certain horsecar railroads, which were entirely distinct
from the steam railroad, extending from the
depot to Fulton ferry; the plaintiff also
owned a charter entitling it to construct a
horse-car line from the depot to Hamilton
Ferry and other points.
The defendant, at
the time of executing the contract, was operating certain horse-car lines which ran
from Hamilton, Fulton, and other ferries,
and from the East River bridge, to Ninth
street and Ninth avenue, and through Ninth
to Fifteenth street,
on Fifteenth
avenue
street to Coney Island avenue, and thence
to Coney Island. These lines were operated
By the contract the plainwholly by horses.
tiff granted the defendant the right to use
its tracks on Ninth avenue from Fifteenth
street to the depot at Ninth avenue and
Twentieth street, free of charge, for 21 years
The defendant covenantfrom June 1, 1882.
ed to run during the spring, summer, and
fall months, to plaintiff's depot, cars to connect with the ferries and all plaintiff's trains
The plaintiff
to and from Coney Island.
teragreed to furnish defendant necessary
minal facilities at the depot. This contract
was obviously advantageous to both parties.
entered
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The plaintiff secured passmgers to Coney
Island from defendant's lines, and the defendant greatly increased its travel by having a direct connection with steam transit
to Coney Island.
The defendant's horse-car
line to Coney Island could not successfully
compete with plaintiff's steam route.
The
plaintiff provided defendant with the necessary terminal facilities as required, and the
contract was acted upon by both parties until the month of October, 1889. At that time
there was a change in defendant's management, and the compa,ny contracted
for an
electrical equipment from the Parade Ground
to Coney Island, commonly known as the
"Trolley System." The plaintiff, in May,
1800, finding that defendant was not running
cars to the depot as required by the contract,
performance, and was advised
requested
that the defendant was under no obligations
to run the cars, and did not Intend to do it
This action was commenced the following
October.

It is Insisted by the defendant that the
adoption of the trolley system is. In contemplation of law, a use of steam, under the
clause in the contract which provides that
if the defendant shall use steam as a motive
power between Ninth avenue and Fifteenth
street, in the city of Brooklyn and Coney
Island, either pai'ty can terminate the contract on six months' notice, and that the correspondence
and answer in this • case are
equivalent to notice, and the contract no
longer exists.
We agree with the special
term that the electrical system adopted by
the defendant cannot be regarded as the use
of steam as a motive power.
Hudson River
Tel. Co. v. Watervliet Turnpike & Ry. Co.,
135 N. Y. 393, 402, 32 N. E. 148.
It would be
In disregard of the natural and obvious meaning of language to hold otherwise. We cannot agree with the general term that the use
of the words "steam as a motive power" was
only another form of referring to rapid transit, by whatever means accomplished.
To
so hold would be to make a new contract
for the parties.
The defendant Insists, further, that by reason of certain acts of plaintiff,
and by
changes in the surrounding circumstances,
ic
would be Inequitable and unjust to enforce a
specific performance of the contract
This
leads us to consider some additional facts
disclosed by the record.
On the 9th of December, 1885, plaintiff
leased to the Atlantic Avenue Railroad Company aU Its franchises to construct and operate horse-car railroads in the city of Brooklyn, and on May 27, 1887, in pursuance of
chapter 282 of the Laws of 1886, conveyed
said rights and Interests
absolutely.
"The
lease and conveyance were made expressly
subject to the contract In question, and reserved all the defendant's rights thereunder.
They also required the Atlantic Avenue Railroad Company to operate the VanderbUt Avenue Railroad Company
as had been prevl-
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ously done by the plaintiff. The defendant
made no objection to this transfer until after
its refusal to perform the contract Defendant lu-ges that It was greatly damaged by
the fact that the Atlantic Avenue Railroad
Company had completed, under the franchise
obtained from plaintiff, a horse-car line to
We are imable to perthe Hamilton ferry.
ceive how defendant has suffered any damage, in view of the fact that it purchased
with full knowledge of plaintiff's franchise,
It
and its desire to dispose of the same.
by the uncontradicted evidence
appears
that defendant sought to purchase of plaintiff
this franchise to complete a route to the
Hamilton ferry either just before or about
the time the contract was executed.
The defendant further contends that the
plaintiff, under a proper construction of the
contract, was not at liberty to sell out its
street-car interests, although not restrained
This contention
by any positive provision.
is based mainly on the alleged fact that the
AUantio Avenue Railroad Company is an
and did not have
active rival of defendant,
the same motive to deal fairly with defendant that plaintiff had while seeking to build
The principal
up its Coney Island business.
complaint against the Atlantic Avenue Railroad Company is based upon the manner in
which it performed the contract in regard to
defendant's terminal facilities at the depot,
corner Ninth avenue and Twentieth street.
The evidence does not satisfy us that there
was any persistent effort to delay the cars of
defendant at that point, or to prevent passengers from the steam road selecting from
the cars in waiting the one in which to ride,
without undue interference.
We think the
by
contract
was substantially performed
plaintiff and its grantee in regard to terminal
facilities of defendant, and, even if this were
not the case, the defendant could have compelled the observance of its contract rights
in every particular by resort to the court
The fact already referred to, that defendant
continued to act under the contract for more
than four years after this lease to the Atwithout
lantic Avenue lUiilroad Company,
very strongly
objection,
must
be taken
It seems to
against it in a court of equity.
us very clear that when the management of
defendant was changed in October, 1889, and
the road from the Parade Ground to Coney
Island was operated by electricity, it at once
became an active and successful rival of the
plaintiff in securing passengers to and from
Coney Island, and had every motive to rid
itself of the contract, if it could be legally
done. We agree with the learned trial judge
that while it is impossible, under the state of
the proofs,
to determine to what extent
plaintiff has been damaged by defendant's
adoption of the trolley system, yet it is dear
that it has suffered considerable loss. It is,
of com^e, entirely legitimate for defendant
to secure to itself whatever share of the
Coney Island travel it can by ttue exercise of
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proper business methods, but we are unable
to perceive any reason, unuer the proofs as
presented, why defendant should be released
from the obligations of a contract entered
into in good faith by both parties, and that
by years of
has been practically construed
performance.
It may very well be that, under a contract having 21 years to run, chere
may be such a change of conditions as will
affect unfavorably
the one party or the
other;
but this offers no reason for refusing specific performance, unless subsequent
events have made performance by the defendant so onerous that the enforcement
would impose great hardship and cause little
v.
or no benefit to the plaintiff. Trustees
317; Murdfeldt v.
Thacher,
87 N. Y. 316,
Railroad Co., 102 N. Y. 703, 7 N. E. 404. In
the case at bar the plaintiff, we think, would
be benefited by defendant running the transfer car in Ninth avenue from Fifteenth street
On the
to
its depot at Twentieth street.
other hand, it may be assumed that the defendant, by cheaper fare, and its ability to
carryi passengers to Coney Island without
transfer, wiU be able to secure its fuU share
of the passengers to and from the seashore.
The result of compelling the specific performance of this contract wiU be to afford
public an opportunity, when
the general
traveling over the line of defendant from
the ferries, to make choice of the route they
will take to Coney Island when arriving at
Ninth avenue and Fifteenth street While it
of
may be somewhat
to the disadvantage
defendant to perform its contract, under the
present circumstances,
when active competition exists between plaintiff and defendant,
yet that fact presents no legal reason for discharging it from the obligations of its contract.
As a final point, the learned counsel for
the defendant insists that equity will not
enforce the specific performance of a contract having some years to run, which requires the exercise of skill and judgment,
and a continuous series of acts. While there
is some conflict in the cases, and all are not
to be reconciled, yet the great weight of authority permits specific performance in the
case at bar.
The special term enjoined the
defendant from operating any of its cars unless it performs its contract with the plaintiff. The provisions of this contract are
neither complicated nor diflicult, and are
such as a court of equity can enforce, in its
discretion. A few of the cases may be referred to, as illustrating the power vested
In a court of equity to compel the specific
performance of contracts similar to the one
at bar. In Storer v. Railroad Co., 2 Younge
& C. N. R. 48, the court compelled the defendant to construct and forever maintain
The court
an archway and its approaches.
said there was no difficulty in enforcing such
a decree.
In Wilson v. Railway Co., L. R.
to
9 Eq. 28, the defendant was compelled
See, also,
erect and maintain a wharf.
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Co., L. R. 13 Bq. 44.
In
Wolverhampton & W. R. R. v. London & N.
W. R. R., L. R. 16 Eq. 433, the agreement
was that the
between
the two companies
defendant should work the plaintiff's line,
and, during the continuance of the agreement, develop and accommodate
the local
and through trade thereof, and carry over it
certain specific traffic. The bill was filed to
restrain the defendant from carrying a portion of the traffic which ought to have passed over the plaintiff's line by other lines of
The point was made that the
the defendant
court could not undertake to enforce specific
performance, because It would require a
series of orders and a general superintendence to enforce the performance, which could
not conveniently be administered by a court
of justice. The Injunction issued, and Lord
Selborne said (page 438): "With regard to
the argument that, upon the principles applicable to specific performance, no relief
can be granted, I cannot help observing that
there is some fallacy and ambiguity in the
way in which, in cases of this character,
those words 'specific performance' are used.
* * * The common expression,
as applied
to suits known by that name, presupposes an
executoi7, as distinct from an executed,
agreement • • • Confusion has sometimes arisen from transferring
considerations applicable to suits for specific performance, propei'ly so called, to questions as to
the propriety of the court requiring something or other to be done in specie. • • •
Ordinary agreements for work and labor to
be performed, hiring and service, and things
of that sort, out of which most of the cases
have arisen, are not, In the proper sense of
the word, cases for 'specific performance';
In other words, the nature of the contract Is
not one which requires the performance of
some definite act such as the court Is in the
habit of requiring to be performed by way
of administering superior justice, rather than
to leave the parties to their remedies at law.
• • • Tiie question is whether, the defendants being in possession, they are not at liberty to depart from the terms on which it
was stipulated that they should have that
The American cases are equally
possession."
In Lawrence v. Railway Co., 36
clear.
Hun, 467, the defendant was, among other
things, to erect a depot at which all trains
Specific performance was dewere to stop.
creed; the court heading that although, imder
Greene v. Railroad
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the agreement the defendant could not be
compelled to run trains upon Its road, yet It
might properly be enjoined fi-om running any
regular trains which did not stop at the station.
The objection that the judgment In
this case Involves continuous acts, and the
constant supervision of the court Is well met
by the reasoning In Central Trust Co. v.
Wabash, St Louis & P. Ry. Co., 29 Fed.
646, being affirmed
as Joy v. St. Louis, 138
U. S. 1, 47, 50, 11 Sup. Ct 243, where Judge
Blatchfbrd wrote the opinion. As to Inconvenience,
or circumstances which affect
the Interest of one party alone, constituting
a reason why performance should not be decreed, the case of Marble Co. v. Ripley, 10
Wall. 339, 358, furnishes a clear discussion
of the general principles Involved. The rule
established by the above and kindred cases
Is that a contract Is to be judged as of the
time at which it was entered into,, and, if
fair when made, the fact that It has become
a hard one by the force of subsequent circumstances or changing events will not necessarily prevent its specific performance.
See,
also, Stuart v. Railway Co., 15 Beav. 513;
Mortimer v. Capper, 1 Brown, Ch. 156; Jackson v. Lever, 3 Brown, Oh. 605; Paine v.
Meller, 6 Vea 349; Paine t. Hutchinson, L.
R. 3 Eq. 257; Telegraph Co. v. Harrison, 145
U. S. 459, 472, 473, 12 Sup. Ct 900.
A large
nimaber of other cases might be cited, sustaining the power of the court to decree the
specific performance of this contract, b\it we
do not deem It necessary.
There can be no
well-founded doubt as to the power of the
coiu't in the premises, and the Important
question is whether, in the exercise of a wise
discretion,
and in view of all the circumstances, specific performance should be decreed.
After a most careful consideration of
this case, we have reached the conclusion
that the plaintiff Is entitled to have the contract specifically performed.
The order of
the general term is reversed, and the judgment of the special term is affirmed, with
costs In all the courts.
All conciu*, except
ANDREWS, C. J., who dissents on the ground

that plaintiff, having established a rapidtransit road, although the propulsion is by
electricity, has met the condition of the contract which entitled it to terminate such contract, or at least has placed itself In such a
position that a court of equity will not enforce specific performance.
Ordered accordingly.
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(8

Supreme Court

V.

Wall.

TAYLOE.
557.)

of the United

States.

Dec,

1869.

Appeal from the supreme court of the District of Columbia.
This was a suit in equity for the specific
performance of a contract for the sale of
certain real property situated in the city of
Washington, in the District of Columhia, and
adjoining the hotel owned by the complainant, Willard, and known as Willard's Hotel.
The facts out of which the case arose were
as follows:
In April, 1854, the defendant leased to the
complainant the property in question, which
was generally known in Washington as "The
Mansion House," for the period of ten years
from the 1st of May following, at the yearly
rent of twelve hundred dollars. The lease
contained a covenant that the lessee should
have the right or option of purchasing the
premises, with the buildings and improvements thereon, at any time before the expiration of the lease, for the sum of twentytwo thousand and five hundred dollars, payable as follows:
two thousand dollars in
cash, and two thousand dollars, together
with the interest on all the deferred instalments, each year thereafter until the whole
was paid; the deferred payments to be secured by a deed of trust on the property,
and the vendor to execute to the purchaser
a warranty deed of the premises, subject to a
yearly ground-rent of three hundred and
ninety dollars.
At the time of this lease gold and silver, or
bank hills convertible on demand into it,
were the ordinary money of the country, and
the standard of values.
In 1861 the rebellion broke out, lasting till 1865.
In the interval, owing to the influx of people, property
In the metropolis used for hotels greatly Increased in value, and as was alleged by Tayloe, who produced what he deemed a record
to show the fact, the complainant, Willard,
assigned an undivided half of the property
which had been leased to him as above-mentioned to a brother of his.
In December,
1861, the banks throughout the country suspended payments in specie, and in 1862 and
1863, the federal government issued some
hundred millions of notes, to be used as
money, and which congress declared should
be a tender in the payment of debts.
Coin
soon ceased to circulate generally, and people used, in a great degree, the notes of the
government to pay what they owed.
On the 15th of April, 1864, two weeks before the expiration- of the period allowed the
complainant for his election to purchase —
the property having greatly increased in
value since 1854, the year in which the lease
was made — the complainant addressed a letter to the defendant, inclosing a check, payable to his order, on the Bank of America^
in New ¥ork, for two thousand dollars, as
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the amount due on the 1st of May following
on the purchase of the property, with a
blank receipt for the money, and requesting
the defendant to sign and return the receipt,
and stating that if it were agreeable to the
defendant he would have the deed of the
property, and the trust deed to be executed
by himself, prepared between that date and
the 1st of May.
To this letter the defendant,
on the same day, replied that he had no time
then to look into the business, and returned
the check, expressing a wish to see the complainant for explanations before closing the
matter.

On the following morning the complainant
called on the defendant and informed him
that he had two thousand dollars to make
the first payment for the property, and offered the money to him.
The money thus offered consisted of notes of the United States,
made by act of congress a legal tender for
debts.
These the defendant refused to accept, stating that he understood the purchase-money
was to be paid in gold, and
that gold he would accept, but not the notes,
and give the receipt desired.
It was admitted that these notes were a,t the time greatly
depreciated in the market below their nominal
value.i
On repeated occasions subsequently
the complainant sent the same amount — two
thousand dollars— in these United States
notes to the defendant in payment of the
cash instalment on the purchase, and as often were they refused by him.
On one of
these occasions a draft of the deed of conveyance to be executed by the defendant,
and a draft of the trust deed to be executed
by the complainant, were sent for examination, with the money.
This last was prepared for execution by
the complainant alone, and contained a provision that he might, if he should elect to do
so, pay off the deferred payments at earlier
dates than those mentioned in the lease.
These deeds were returned by the defendant, accompanied witli a letter expressing
dissatisfaction at the manner in which he
was induced to sign the lease with the clause
for the sale of the premises, but stating that
as he had signed it he "should have carried
the matter out" if the complainant had proffered the amount which he knew he had offered for the property, meaning by this statement, as the court understood it, if he had
proffered the amount stipulated in gold.
No
objection was made to the form of either of
the deeds.
Soon afterwards the defendant left the city
of Washington, with the intention of being
absent until after the 1st of May.
On the 29th of April the complainant, finding that the defendant had left the city, and
perceiving that the purchase was not about
to be completed within the period prescribed
15th of April and May 1st,
one dollar in gold was worth from one
dollar and seventy-three cents to one dollar
and eighty cents in United States notes.
1 Between" the
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by the covenant in the lease, and apprehensive that unless legal proceedings were taken
by him to enforce its execution his rights
thereunder might be lost, instituted the present suit.
In the bill he set forth the covenant giving
him the right or option to purchase the premises; his election to purchase;
the notice to
the defendant; the repeated efforts made by
him to obtain a deed of the property; his offer to pay the amount required as the first
in United
instalment of the purchase-money
States notes, and to execute the trust deed
stipulated
to secure the deferred payments,
and the refusal of the defendant to receive
the United States notes and to execute to
him a deed of the premises.
It also set forth
the departure of the defendant from the city
of Washington, and his intended absence
beyond the 1st of May following, and alleged that the appeal was made to the equitable interposition of the court, lest on the
return of the defendant he might refuse to
allow the complainant to complete the purchase, and urge as a reason that the time
within which it was to be made had passed.
The bill concluded with a prayer that the
court decree a specific performance of the
agreement by the defendant, and the execution of a deed of the premises to the complainant; the latter offering to perform the
agreement on his part according to its true
intent and meaning.
The bill also stated some facts, which it is
unneeessarj^ to detail, tending to show thai
the acquisition of the property in question
was of especial importance to the complainant.
The answer set up that the complainant,
even on his own showing, had no case; that
there was no proper tender; that even if the
complainant once had a right to file a bill
in his sole right— the way in which the present bill was filed— he had lost this right by
the transfer of the half to his brother; that
the complainant had not demanded an execution even of the contract which he himself
set forth, but by the drafts of the tnist deed
sent to Tayloe, and which was the trust deed
of which he con+emplated the execution, he
proposed to pay, at his own option, the whole
before the expiration of the
purchase-money
ten yeare, and thus would interfere with
the duration of that security and investment
in the identical property leased, which had
and provided
been originally contemplated
for; thus subjecting the defendant to risk
and expense in making a new investment.
The answer concluded with an allegation,
that "by the great national acts and events
which had occurred when the complainant
filed his bill, and which were still Influencing
all values and interests in the country, such
a state of things had arisen and now existed,
as according to equity and good conscience
ought to prevent a decree for specific performance in this case, upon a demand made
on the last day of a term of ten years, even

if

in strict law (which was denied) the complainant was entitled to make such demand."
Both Tayloe and Willa:rd were examined
as witnesses.
that
The former testified,
when the lease was executed he objected to
a stipulation for a sale of the premises, and
that Willard said it should go for nothing.
Willard swore that he had said no such
thing.
The court below' dismissed the bill, and
Willard took the present appeal.
Curtis, Poland & Howe, for appellant.
& McPherson, contra.
Mr. Justice
of the case,

FIELD,
delivered

Cox

after stating the facts
the opinion of the

court.

The covenant in the lease giving the right
or option to purchase the premises was in
the nature of a continuing olfer to sell. It
was a proposition extending through the
period of ten years, and being under seal
mtist

be regarded

as made upon

a sufficient

consideration, and, therefoi-e, one from which
the defendant was not at liberty to recede.
When accepted by the complainant by his
notice to the defendant,
a contract of sale
between the parties was completed.
Railroad Co. V. Bartlett, 3 Cush. 224; Welchman
V. Spinks, 5 Law T. (N. S.) 385; Warner v.
Willington, 3 Drew. 523; Railroad v. Evans,
6 Gray, 25.
This contract is plain and certain in its terms, and in its nature and in the
attending its execution
circumstances
appears to be free from objection.
The price
stipulated for the property was a fair one.
At the time its market value was under fifteen thousand dollars, and a greater increase
than one-half in value during the period of
ten years could not then have been reasonably anticipated.
When a contract is of this character It is
the usual practice of courts of equity to enforce its specific execution upon the application of the party who has complied with its
stipulations on his part, or has seasonably
and in good faith offered, and continues
ready to comply with them.
But it is not
the invariable practice.
This form of relief is not a matter of absolute right to
either party; it is a matter resting in the
discretion of the court, to be exercised upon
a consideration of all the circumstances of
each particular case.
The jurisdiction, said
Lord Erskine (12 Ves. 332), "is not compulsory upon the court, but the subject of discretion.
The question is not what the court
must do, but what it may do under [the]
circumstances,
either exercising the jurisdiction by granting the specific performance or
abstaining from it."
And long previous to him Lord Hardwicke
and other eminent equity judges of England
had, in a great variety of cases, asserted
the same discretionary power of the court.
In Joynes v. Statham, 3 Atk. 388, Lord Hardwicke said: "The constant doctrine of this
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court is, that it is in their discretion, whether in such a bill they will decree a specific
performance or leave the plaintiff to his remedy at law." And in Underwood v. Hitct»cox, 1 Vas, Sr. 270, the same great judge said,
in refusing to enforce a contract: "The rule
of equity in cari-ying agreements into specific performance is well known, and the
court is not obliged to decree every agreejnent entered into, though for valuable consideration, in strictness of law, it depending
on the circumstances."
Later jurists, both in England and in the
United States, have reiterated the same doctrine.
Chancellor Kent, in Seymour v. Delancy, 6 Johns. Ch. 222, upon an extended
review of the authorities on the subject, declares it to be a settled principle that a specific performance of a contract of sale is not
a matter of course, but rests entirely in the
discretion of the court upon a view of all
the circumstances; and Chancellor Bates, of
Delawai'e, in Godwin v. Collins, recently decided, upon a very full consideration of the
adjudged eases, says, that a patient examination of the whole course of decisions on this
subject has left with him "no doubt that, as
a matter of judicial history, such a discretion
has always been exercised in administering
this branch of equity jurisprudence."
It is true the cases cited, in which the discretion of the court is asserted, arose upon contracts in which there existed some inequality
or unfairness in the terms, by reason of which
injustice would have followed a specific performance.
But the same discretion is exercised where the contract is fair in its terms,
if its enforcement, from subsequent events,
or even from collateral circumstances, would
work hardship or injustice to either of the
parties.
In the case of City of London v. Nash,
a lessee, had
1 Ves. Sr. 12, the defendant,
covenanted to rebuild some houses, but, instead of doing this, he rebuilt only two of
On a bill by
them, and repaired the others.
performance Lord
the city for a specific
Hardwicke held that the covenant was one
which the court could specifically enforce;
for
but said, "The most material objection
and which has weight with
the defendant,
me, is that the court is not obliged to decree
a specific performance, and will not when it
would be a hardship, as it would be here
upon the defendant to oblige him, after having very largely repaired the houses, to pull
them down and rebuild them." In Faine v.
Brown (cited in Ramsden v. Hylton, 2 Ves.
Sr. 306) similar hardship, flowing from the
specific execution of a contract, was made
the ground for refusing the decree prayed.
In that case the defendant was the owner
of a small estate, devised to him on condition

that if he sold it within twenty-five years
should go to
one-half of the purchase-money
Having contracted to sell the
his brother.
property, and refusing to carry out the contract under the pretence that he was intoxi-
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cated at the time, a bill was filed to enforce
its specific execution, but Lord Hardwicke
is reported to have said that, without regard
to the other circumstance, the hardship
if
alone of losing half the purchase-money,
the contract was carried into execution, was
sufficient to determine the discretion of the
court not to interfere, but to leave the parties to the law.
The discretion which may be exercised in
this class of cases is not an arbitrary or
capricious one, depending
upon the mere
pleasure of the court, but one which is controlled by the established doctrines and settled principles of equity.
No positive rule
can be laid down by which the action of
the court can be determined in all eases. In
general it may be said that the specific relief
will be granted when it is apparent, from a
view of all the circumstances of the particular case, that it will subserve the ends of
justice; and that it will be withheld when,
from a like view, it appears that it will produce hardship or injustice to either of the
parties.
It is not sufficient, as shown by the
cases cited, to call forth the equitable interposition of the court, that tlie legal obligation under the contract to do the specific
thing desired may be perfect.
It must also
that the specific enforcement
will
appear
work no hardship or injustice, for if that
result would follow, the court will leave the
parties to their remedies at law, unless the
granting of the specific relief can be accompanied with conditions which will obviate
that result. If that result can be thus obviated, a specific performance will generally
It is
in such cases be decreed conditionally.
the advantage of a court of equity, as observed by Lord Redesdale in Davis v. Hone,
2 Schoales & L. 348, that it can modify the
demands of parties according to justice, and
where, as in that case, it would be inequitable, from a change of circumstances,
to enforce a contract specifically, it may refuse its
decree unless the party will consent to a
conscientious modification of the contract, or,
what would generally amount to the same
thing, take a decree upon condition of doing
or relinquishing certain things to the other
party.
In the present case objection is taken to
the action of the complainant in offering, in
payment of the first instalment stipulated,
notes of the United States.
It was insisted
by the defendant at the time, and it is contended by his counsel now, that the covenant
in the lease required payment for the property to be made in gold.
The covenant does
not in terms specify gold as the currency in
which payment is to be made; but gold, it is
said, must have been in the contemplation
of the parties, as no other currency, except
for small amounts, which could be discharged
in silver, was at the time recognized by law
as a legal tender for private debts.
Although the contract in this case was not
until the proposition of the deI completed
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fondant was accepted In April, 1864, after
the passage of the act of congress making
notes of the United States a legal tender for
private debts, yet as the proposition containing the terms of the contract was previously
made, the contract itself must be construed
as if it had been then concluded to take effect
subsequently.
It is not our intention to express any opinion upon the constitutionality of the provision of the act of congress, which makes the
notes of the United States a legal tender
for private debts, nor whether, if constitutional, the provision is to be limited in its application to contracts, made subsequent to
the passage of the act.
See Hepburn v.
Griswold, 8 Wall. 603.
These questions are
the subject of special consideration in other
cases, and their solution is not required for
the determination of the case before us.
In
the view we take of the case, it is immaterial
whether the constitutionality of the proviThe relief which
sion be affirmed or denied.
the complainant seeks rests, as already stated, in the sound discretion of the court;
and, if granted, it may be accompanied with
such conditions as will prevent hardship and
The suit itinsure justice to the defendant.
self is an appeal to the equitable jurisdiction
of the court, and, in asking what is equitable
to himself, the complainant necessarily submits himself to the judgment of the court, to
do what it shall adjudge to be equitable to
the defendant.
The kind of- currency which the complainant offered, is only important in considering
A party does
the good faith of his conduct.
not forfeit his rights to the interposition of
a court of equity to enforce a specific performance of a contract, if he seasonably and
in good faith offers to comply, and continues
ready to comply, with its stipulations on his
part, although he may err in estimating the
It is only in courts
extent of his obligation.
of law that literal and exact, performance is
The condition of the currency at
required.
the time repels any imputation of bad faith
in the action of the complainant. The act of
congress had declared the notes of the United
States to be a legal tender for all debts,
without, in terms, making any distinction bebefore, and those
tween debts contracted
after its passage.
Gold had alcontracted
from circulation.
most entirely disappeared
The community at large used the notes of
of all
the United States in the discharge
They constituted, in fact, almost the
debts.
entire currency of the country in 1864. They
were received and paid out by the government; and the validity of the act declaring
them a legal tender had been sustained by
nearly every state court before which the
The defendant, It
question had been raised.
is true, insisted upon his right to payment
in gold, but before the expiration of the period prescribed for the completion of the purchase, he left the city of Washington, and thus
cut off the possibility of any other tender than

In the
the one made within that period.
the
presence of this difficulty, respecting
which could not be obmode of payment,
viated, by reason of the absence of the defendant,
the complainant filed his bill, in
which he states the question which had
arisen between them, and invokes the aid of
the court in the matter, offering specifically
to perform the contract on his part according
He thus plato its true intent and meaning.
ced himself promptly and fairly before the
court, expressing a willingness to do whatever it should adjudge he ought in equity
and conscience to do in the execution of tlie
contract.
Nothing further could have been reasonably required of him under the circumstances,
even if we should assume that the act of congress, making the notes of the United States
a legal tender, does not apply to debts created before its passage, or, if applicable to
such debts, is, to that extent, unconstitutional
and void.
In the case of Chesterman v. Mann, 9 Hare,
212, it was held by the court of chancery of
England, that where an underlessee had a
covenant for the renewal of his lease, upon
paying to his lessor a fair proportion of the
fines and expenses to which the lessor might
in obtaining a renewal of his
be subjected
own term from the superior landlord, and o
any increased rent upon such renewal, and
there was a difference between the parties
as to the amount to be paid by the underlessee, he might apply for a specific performance of the covenant, and submit to the court
So here in this case,
the amount to be paid.
the complainant applies for a specific performance, and submits the amount to be paid
by him to the judgment of the court.
We proceed to consider whether any other
circumstances have arisen since the covenant
in the lease was made, which render the enforcement of the contract of sale, subsequently completed between the parties, inequitable.
Such circumstances are asserted to have arisen in two particulars; first, in the greatly increased value of the property; and second,
in the transfer of a moiety of the complainant's original interest to his brother.
It is true, the property has greatly increased in value since April, 1854.
Some increase was anticipated by the parties, for the
covenant exacts, in case of the lessee's election to purchase, the payment of one-half
more than its then estimated value. If the
actual increase has exceeded the estimate
then made, that circumstance furnishes no
ground for interference with the arrangement
of the parties.
The question, in such cases,
always is, was the contract, at the time it
was made, a reasonable
If
and fair one?
such were the fact, the parties are considered as having taken upon themselves the
risk of subsequent fluctuations in the value
of the property, and such fluctuations are not
allowed to prevent its specific enforcement.
Hare, 129; Iiow.v.
Wells V. Railway Co.,
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Treadwell, 12 Me. 441; Fry, Spec. Pert. §§
235, 252.
Here the contract, as already stated, was, whien made, a fair one, and in all
its attendant circumstances, free from objection. The rent reserved largely exceeded the
rent then paid, and the sum stipulated for
the property largely exceeded its then market
value.

The transfer, by the complainant to his
brother, of one-half Interest in the lease, assuming now, for the purpose of the argument, that there is, in the record, evidence,
which we can notice, of such transfer, in no
respect affects the obligation of the defendant, or impairs the right of the complainant
of the contract.
The
to the enforcement
brother is no party to the contract, and any
partial interest he may have acquired therein,
The
the defendant was not bound to notice.
for
owners of partial interests in contracts
land, acquired subsequent to their execution,
are not necessary parties to bills for their
The original parties on one
enforcement.
side are not to be mixed up in controversies
between the parties on the other side, in
which they have no concern.
If the entire contract had been assigned
to the brother, so that he had become substituted in the place of'the complainant, the
In that
case would have been different.
event, the brother might have filed the bill,
and insisted upon being treated as representing the vendee. The general rule is, that the
parties to the contract are the only proper
parties to the suit for its performance, and,
except in the case of an assignment of the
entire contract, there must be some special
circumstances to authorize a departure from
the rule.
in
The court, says Chancellor Cottenham,
Tasher v. Small, 3 Mylne & C. 69, "assumes
jurisdiction in cases of specific performance
of contracts, because a court of law, giving
damages only for the non-performance of the
contract, in many cases, does not afford an
adequate remedy.
But in equity, as well as
at law, the contract constitutes the right,
and regulates the liabilities of the parties;
and the object of both proceedings is to
place the party complaining, as nearly as
possible, in the same situation as the defendant had agreed that he should be placed in.
It is obvious, that persons, strangers to the
contract, and, therefore, neither entitled to
the rights nor subject to the liabilities which
arise out of it, are as much strangers to a
proceeding to enforce the execution of it as
they are to a proceeding to recover damages
for the breach of it."
When the complainant has received his
deed from the defendant, the brother may
claim from him a conveyance of an interest
in the premises, if he have a valid contract
for such interest, and enforce such conveyance by suit; but that is a matter with
which the defendant has no concern.
It seems that the draft of the trust deed,
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to secure the deferred payments, sent to the
defendant for examination, was prepared for
execution by the complainant alone, and contained a stipulation that he might, if he
should so elect, pay off the deferred payments at earlier dates than those mentioned
in the covenant in the lease; and it is objected to the complainant's right to a specific
performance, that the trust deed was not
drawn to be executed jointly by him and his
brother, and that it contained this stipulation. A short answer to this objection is
found in tht, fact, that the parties had disagreed in relation to the payment to be
made, and until the disagreement ceased no
deeds were required. It is admitted that the
form of the trust deed was not such a one
as the defendant was bound to receive, but
as it was sent to him for examination, good
faith and fair dealing required him to indicate in what particulars it was defective, or
with which clauses he was dissatisfied.
Whether it was the duty of the complainant
or defendant to prepare the trust deed, according to the usage prevailing in Washington, is not entirely clear from the evidence.
There is testimony both ways. The true
rule, independent of any usage on the subject, would seem to be that the party who
is to execute and deliver a deed should prepare it. It is, however, immaterial for this
case, what rule obtains in Washington. Until the purchase-motiey was accepted, there
was no occasion to prepare any instrument
for execution.
So long as that was refused
the preparation of a trust deed was a work
of supererogation. Besides, the execution of
the trust deed by the complainant was to be
simultaneous with the execution of a conThe two were to
veyance by the defendant.
be concurrent acts; and if the complainant
was to prepare one of them, the defendant
was to prepare the other, and it is not pretended that the defendant acted in the matter at all.
The objection to the trust deed, founded
upon the omission of the name of the complainant's brother as a co-grantor, does not
merit consideration. All that the defendant
had to do was to see that he got a trust deed,
as security for the deferred payments, from
the party to whom he transferred the title.
The defendant states in his testimony that
when the lease was executed he objected to
the stipulation for a sale of the premises,
and that the defendant told him that it
should go for nothing. And it has been
argued by counsel that this evidence should
The ancontrol the terms of the covenant.
swer to the position taken is brief and decisive. First, nothing of the kind is averred in
the answer; second, the testimony of the
defendant in this particular is distinctly
contradicted by that of the complainant, and
is inconsistent with the attendant circumstances;
and third, the evidence is inadmissible. When parties have reduced their con-
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tracts to writing, conversations controlling
or changing tlieir stipulations are, in the absence of fraud, no more received in a court
of equity than in a court of law.
Upon a full consideration of the positions
of the defendant we perceive none which
should preclude the complainant from claiming a specific performance of the contract.
The only question remaining is, upon what
terms shall the decree be made? and upon
this we have no doubt.
The parties, at the time the proposition to
sell, embodied in the covenant of the lease,
was made, had reference to the currency
then recognized by law as a legal tender,
which consisted only of gold and silver coin.
It was for a specific number of dollars of
that character that the offer to sell was
made, and it strikes one at once as inequitable to compel a transfer of the property for
notes, worth when tendered in the market
only a little more than one-half of the stipulated price. Such a substitution of notes for
coin could not have been in the possible expectation of the parties. Nor is it reasonable to suppose, if it had been, that the covenant would ever have been inserted in the
lease without some provision against the
substitution. The complainant must, therefore, take his decree upon payment of the
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stipulated price in gold and silver coin.
he seeks equity he must do equity.
The decree of the court below will, therefore, be reversed, and the cause remanded
with directions to enter a decree for the execution, by the defendant to the complainant,
of a conveyance of the premises with warranty, subject to the yearly ground-rent specified in the covenant in the lease, upon
the payment by the latter of the instalments
past due, with legal interest thereon, in gold
and silver coin of the United States, and
upon the execution of a trust deed of the
premises to the defendant as security for
the payment of the remaining instalments
as they respectively become due, with legal
interest thereon, in like coin; the amounts
to be paid and secured to be stated, and the
form of the deeds to be settled, by a master; the costs to be paid by the complainant.

Whilst

The CHIEF JUSTICE, with NELSON, J.,
concurred in the conclusion as above announced, — that the complainant was entitled
to specific performance on payment of the
price of the land in gold and silver coin,—
but expressed their inability to yield their
assent to the argument by which, in this
case, it was supported.
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FISH

V.

LESER

et

al.

(69 111. 394.)

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. Term.

1873.

Appeal from superior court, Cook county;
Joseph B. Gary, Judge.
This was a bill for specific performance,
filed by John Fish against John Leser and
Johanna Leser, his wife. The substance of
the material facts is given In the opinion of
the court.
Nissen & Barnum, for appellant.
son, Sackett & Bean, for appellees.

Wilkin-

CRAIG, J. This was a bill, filed in the superior court of Cook county, by John Fish, appellant, against John Leser and Johanna Leser, appellees, to enforce the specific performance of a contract for the sale of a certain lot
Upon the hearing of the case, the
In Chicago.
court entered a decree dismissing the bill and
prosecuted this appeal.
the complainant
Courts of equity will not always enforce
the specific performance
of a contract.
Such
applications are addressed to the sound legal
discretion of the court, and the court must
be governed, to a great extent, by the facts
of each case, as it is presented.
A specific performance will not be decreed
unless the agreement has been entered into
with perfect fairness, and without misapprehension,
misrepresentation
oppression.
or
Frisby v. Ballance, 4 Scam. 287; Underwood
V. Hitchcock, 2 Ves. Sr. 279.
The contract
must be fair, equitable and just, and the complainant should be prepared to show that it
will not be unjust or oppressive on the defendant to have the contract enforced.
Stone

Pratt, 25 111. 25.
We will, then, examine some of the leading facts in this case, and see if the complainant has brought himself within the principles announced, which are necessary in order to enable him to obtain the relief he asks,
in a court of equity.
It appears that the defendants, or one of
them, in the fall of 1871, were the owners of
the property in question, and had owned and
resided upon It for many years.
The appelby birth with but little
lees are foreigners
education, and are not well acquainted with
they transacted but little busiour language;
ness, — indeed, the evidence shows that John
Leser has, for several years, been scarcely
competent to transact any business; they can
write, but are unable to read our writing.
The house In which they resided, on the
property In question, together with other
property on the same street, was destroyed
by the fire of October 9, 1871.
Previous to
the fire their property was not desirable, and
could not readily be sold in the market, on
account of the bad repute of other houses on
The fire, however, removed
the same street.
this objection to the street, and property
immediately began to advance.
Farwell &
Co. commenced to build on the same street,
V.
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on the next block west, which also caused
property to advEince. These facts were unknown to the Lesers, but were well known
to enterprising business men.
Under these
circumstances,
the Lesers, soon after the fire,
were sought out by one John P. White, a
real estate agent in the city, who desired to
get an agency to sell their property.
This property, at the time of the sale, as
near as we are able to judge from the evidence, was worth $30,000— some of appellees'
witnesses place It as high as $35,000, while
appellant's witnesses fix its value at $21,000
Burt, who owned the east half
to $22,000.
of the same lot, testifies he fixed the price
of his lot at $30,000, but withdrew it from
market, and would not sell at that price, and
his opinion Is this lot is worth that amount.
White had several interviews vsrith the
He wanted to act as their agent;
Lesers.
advised them to sell; claimed that property
would depreciate rather than increase in
value.
He never informed them that Farwell & Co., and others, were buying and preparing to build in that neighborhood,— a fact
that was well known to business men.
Johanna Leser, in her evidence,
says:
"White came again; said he had a man to
buy the lot, and he would give $20,000, and
we told him we wonld not sell for that;
he said It would not be worth more in ten
years.
My husband said, if you give me
$21,000 I will sell to you.
This he refused.
White told me to coax my husband to take
$20,000.
I told him I would not. He then
said, well, I will not take another step towards selling your lot, and before spring you
will offer it to me for $18,000."
L">uring this time appellant was frequently
at White's office, ana he and White were
negotiating

on the lot.

White, in his testimony, says, they had
given him verbal authority to sell the lot;
that, after having several
interviews, he
called on them with an offer from appellant
of $20,000 cash for the property.
This they
did not decide to take, but the next day he
called again to see if they would accept the
offer he had made them for appellant.
He
prepared and took with him a paper for them
to execute, authorizing him to sell the lot.
After discussing the matter some time, they
would not accept appellant's offer, but they
made this proposition:
they would take $16,000 cash, and the purchaser assume and pay
a mortgage of $5,000 that was on the lot,
and pay commissions to White; he informed
them he did not believe appellant would give
that, but he would make him the offer.
The next day, which was November 1st,
White called on John Leser, where he and
his two sons were at work, and obtained his
signature to a paper, which turned out to
be authority to sell the lot, which reads as
follows:
'Chicago,

Oct. 31, 1871.

"John P. White, real estate agent.
In
consideration of one dollar, by us received.
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we hereby

authorize

you to sell our lot, be-

ing the west half of lot 7, in block 94, in the
school section addition to Chicago, for the
sum of twenty one thousand
dollars ($21,you to hare all over that amount
000) net;
for sruch
you can get, for your commissions
sale.
The terms- of payment we require is
all cash, except the assumption of a mortgage of $5,000 by the buyer, now upon said
lot; we to furnish abstract showing title
good in us, subject to the said $5,000 mortgage.
This proposition good for ten days
from date hereof.
"Yours, etc.,
"John Leser.
[Seal.]
"Johanna Leser.
[Seal.]"
White testifies that the paper was read to
and he and his two sons understood
what it was.
But in this he is contradictThey swear
ed by Leser and his two sons.
a portion of it was read in a low tone, but
none of them imderstood it.
They did not
know that Leser was giving any authority to
White to sell the lot; supposed It was a
writing that Leser would wait ten days before making a sale, but did not know it was
anything further.
White then carried the paper to Johanna
Leser, and she, as she testifies, saw her husband had signed it, and not knowing what it
Leser,

was, also executed the paper.
On November 8th White sold the property
to appellant, by written contract, as follows:
"Chicago,

Nov. 8, 1871.

of John Fish five hundred dollars ($500) to apply as a payment on the following described real estate, this day bargained and sold to the said Fish, to wit: the
west half of lot seven (7), In block ninety-four
<94), in the school section addition to Chicago,
sold at and for the price or sum of twentyone thousand dollars ($21,000), upon the following terms of payment, to wit: the said
Fish is to assume and pay a certain mortgage
of five thousand ($5,000) dollars, which is
now upon said property, with interest from
date hereof, according to its tenor and effect,
and the remainder of the purchase money, to
wit: fifteen thousand five hundred ($15,500)
as we deliver him
■dollars, as soon hereafter
to
& good and sufficient deed of conveyance
the said described real estate, with release
of dower, free and clear of aU liens or incum"Received

brances, except the above mentioned $5,000
mortgage, which the said Fish assumes;
we
to furnish an abstract showing title good in
us, said abstract to be delivered within ten
days from date hereof, and the said deed to
be delivered within thirty days from date
hereof.
"Witness our hand and seals this day and
date first above written.
"John Leser,
[Seal.]
"Johanna Leser.
[Seal.]
"By John P. White, Their Agent

"John Fish."
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When appellees were notified of the contract, they refused to ratify it.
Can it be said that this contract,
which
appellant is seeking to enforce, has been entered into with fairness, and without misapprehension?
Important facts were artfully
concealed from the Lesers by one who claimed to be their agent, and if they had been
known, it cannot be pretended the authority
would have been given to sell.
The fact is apparent, the Lesers, who were
weak-minded and unacquainted with business,— terror-stricken
with the great fire
which, in a moment, swept away the home
they had occupied for years, — were overreached by a shrewd real estate dealer, who acted
in the interest of another, under the guise of
a friend and agent of them.
The contract can neither be said to be fair,
equitable, or just.
To take from them property worth $30,000 for $21,000, when considered in connection with the other facts disclosed by this record, is an outrage that a
court of equity cannot for a moment tolerate
or sanction.
There is, however, another principle which,
when applied, to this case, forbids a court of
equity from decreeing a specific performAn agent employed
ance of this contract.
to sell, cannot himself become the purchaser;
or an agent employed to buy, cannot be the
And, upon the same principle, it is
seller.
held that a contract made by one who acts
as the agent of both parties may be avoided
by either principal. Story, Ag. § 211.
Before this written authority to sell was
given. White came to the Lesers with a proposition from appellant of $20,000, and urged
them to accept it. His commissions
were
to come from appellant.
As soon as he executes the contract of sale, he goes with appellant to the recorder's office and has it
placed on record.
Under his counsel and advice, appellant makes a tender of the purchase money.
He takes appellant to an attorney for advice, and introduces
him; nor
does he stop at this. He offers to pay appellees' counsel their fees, not to exceed $1,000,
if, upon an examination of the papers, they
should advise and effect a ratification of the
contract by appellees.
These facts tend to show that this agent
was employed to buy as well as to sell. Appellees had bargained for the skill and labor
of White, their agent, and had a right to expect and demand his undivided services In
their behalf and for their Interest.
This
they have not secured, and a court of chancery will not lend its aid to enforce a contract which. In equity, is regarded as constructively fraudulent.

Other questions have been discussed by the
counsel on each side of this case, but, in the
view we have taken of the case, it becomes
unnecessary to decide them.
The decree of the superior court will be
affirmed.
Decree affirmed.
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V.

PRATT.
April Term,

1860.

Pratt

should make and deliver to
a quitclaim deed for the premises,
with covenant of warranty as to the acts of
Pratt only, and also provided for a forfeiture of the agreement,
at the election of
Pratt, in case of default of any of the payments, in which event D'Wolf was to be
treated as tenant of Pratt.
The bill then charges that on September
23, 1853, Amos Pratt purchased
certain other lands of one Warren Parker, for the sum
of $8,000, payable as follows: $2,666.66 on
October 10, 1853, the like sum on September
23, 1854, and the same sum on September
23, 1855; that, to secure the payment of the
first installment, he assigned to Parker his
agreement
with D'Wolf, before stated, and
the same, with hia written agreement with
Parker, was deposited with Brown & Hurd,
to be held by them till Pratt's first installand If Pratt paid the
ment became due;
same when due, the papers were to be returned to him, otherwise to be delivered to
Parker, who was to have the right to sell
at public sale the agreement between Pratt
and D'Wolf, and retain out of the proceeds
$1,000 as liquidated damages for Pratt's default; that Pratt failed to pay Parker the
first installment, and that he, on January
24, 1854, sold said agreement at public auction, having first given due notice of the sale,
and that complainant became the purchaser
of the same for the sum of $1,000.
The complainant insisted that by said purchase he became the owner of all Pratt's
right, title, and interest in the land, and the
said agreement with D'Wolf, with power to
enforce the same, and that if Pratt had any
interest in the land, he held only a naked
legal title as trustee for the complainant.
The bill then charged that on January 15,

D'Wolf

the complainant bought of Clement H.
fifteen acres of land for
to be paid in the manner following:
$4,225
$275 cash;
$600 on September 28, 1853, and
$670 on September 28th in each of the years
and 1858; that the
1857,
1854,
1855, 1856,
contract gave complainant the right to make
all the payments, except the first, to Amos
Pratt, upon his agreement with D'Wolf, and
that, upon payment in either way D'Wolf
was to convey the fifteen acres to complainant; that after the purchase, by complainant, of the agreement between Amos Pratt
and D'Wolf, the latter made a deed of the
land to complainant, and the agreement between the complainant and D'Wolf was canceled; that complainant had requested Pratt
to execute to him a deed for said fifteen
acres of land, which he refused to do, and
that the complainant had been informed that
he had conveyed the premises to Jeremiah
H. Pratt, his brother, and that the deed to
and made
him was mthout consideration,
to defraud the complainant, and that Jeremiah H. Pratt had full notice of the rights
and equities of complainant; that complainant had demanded a conveyance also from
said Jeremiah H. Pratt, but that he refused
to make it, and claimed to own the land.
The bill prayed for a decree compelling
the Pratts to release and quitclaim the fifand for
teen acre tract to the complainant,
general relief.
Jeremiah H. Pratt answered the bill, and
H.
also filed a cross-bill, making Clement
D'Wolf a party, praying for the cancellation
of the agreement between Amos Pratt and
D'Wolf as rescinded for nonpayment of the

D'Wolf the said

Appeal from the superior court of Chicago.
This was a bill of chancery, filed by Horatio O. Stone against Jeremiah H. Pratt and
Amos Pratt.
The bill charges, in substance, that, in
1849, one Calvin D'Wolf was the owner in
fee of the north fifteen acres of the W. %,
S. W. qr., see. 34, T. 39 N., R. 14 E., in
Cook comity. 111., and that, in May, 1852,
by subsequent sales and conveyances, Amos
Pratt acquired the title to said land; that
on September 28, 1852, Amos Pratt, by an
agreement
in writing, sold the same, with
other lands, to Clement H. D'Wolf for the
sum of $4,050, of which sum $100 was paid
in hand, and said D'Wolf agreed to pay the
balance, as follows:
$600 in one year, $670
in two years, $670 in three years, $670 in
four years, $670 in fi^ve years, and $670 in
six years from the date of the agreement,
and to pay all assessments and taxes on
the land.
The agreement provided that, upon the performance on the part of the purchaser,
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purchase

money.

The complainant answered the cross-bill,
and replications were filed to the several answers.
The original bill was taken as conThe cause was
fessed as to Amos Pratt.
heard by the court upon the pleadings and
proofs, and a decree entered, dismissing the
original bill.
Scates, McAllister & Jewett, for appellant.
S. W. Randall and Snapp & Cone, for appellees.

CATON, C. J. On the 23d of September,
A. Pratt by Indenture, agreed to sell, and
convey to D'Wolf, or his assigns, several parcels of land for the gross sum of four thousand
and fifty dollars, all on time except one hundred dollars; and D'Wolf, by the same instrument, agreed to pay the purchase money as
therein stipulated.
On the 23d of September, 1853, Pratt agreed
that certain covenants with one Parker should
be performed
on the 10th of October. 1853,
and, upon his failure to do so, was to forfeit
and pay the sum of one thousand dollars as
stipulated damages, to secure which he deposited with Brown & Hurd the obligation
of D'Wolf to pay him the purchase money,
and they were authorized
to deliver it to
Parker, in case Pratt failed to perform or to
1852,
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pay the thousand dollars. And Parker was
authorized to sell this contract of D'Wolf, in
open market, and thus raise the money with
which to pay himself the thousand dollars.
Before the 11th of October, 1853, Pratt,
alleging that he had been defrauded by

Parker,

forbade Brown

& Hurd

delivering

the contract, which had been deposited with
them, to Parker.
On the 15th of January,
1853, Stone purchased of D'Wolf fifteen acres,
part of the premises which Pratt had sold
and agreed to convey to D'Wolf.
Brown &
Hurd delivered the contract which Pratt had
left with them, as above stated, to Parker,
who, on the 28th of January, 1854, sold it
in pursuance of his original contract with
Pratt, and Stone became the purchaser for
one thousand dollars, which was just sufficient to pay the forfeiture provided for in the
contract between Pratt and Parker.
Stone, insisting that by the purchase of the
contract, he was entitled to recover the money due thereon in place of Pratt, and that
Pratt was thereby in effect fully paid the
purchase money for which he had agreed to
convey the premises sold to D'Wolf, filed this
bill to compel Pratt to convey to him the fifteen acres,
which he had purchased
of
D'Wolf, parcel of that which D'Wolf had
bought of Pratt.
With the view we take of the case, it is
unnecessary
to advert to the sale of the
premises by A. Pratt to J. H. Pratt.
It is a well settled rule of law, that an
entire contract cannot be divided so as to
compel a party to perform it in parcels, either to different persons or at different times.
When D'Wolf sold a part of the premises to
Stone, he could not thereby impose the legal
obligation upon Pratt to convey that portion
to Stone, and the balance to himself.
That
would be making it in fact two contracts instead of one. It was asking him to make
satisfaction of two instead of one.
In case
of disagreement it exposed him to two prosecutions instead of one, and required him to
make two deeds instead of one.
This is a
hardship which the common law will never
allow to be imposed upon a promisor or an
Nor is this principle of the common
obligor.
law ignored by courts of equity, although in
exceptional cases they will overlook it, where
it is necessary to protect the rights of an
fair, and bona fide purchaser
innocent,
against a contemplated fraud.
This is a bill for the specific performance
of an agreement by one who at law has no
claims whatever upon the defendant, at least
in his own name. Such a bill is always addressed to the sound discretion of the court,
which must be governed by the circumstanIn the
ces of each case as it is presented.
case of Lear v. Chouteau, 23 111. 39, this court

said: "In order to induce a court of equity to
enforce specifically a contract,
it must be
founded on a good consideration,
it must be
reasonable,
fair and just. If its terms are
such as our sense of justice revolts at, this
court will not enforce it, though admitted to
be binding at law."
It may be added that
the complainant must show no oppression or
unconscionable
advantage, when he comes into a court of conscience asking for a remedy
beyond the letter of his strict rights. He
must not ask for a favor beyond his technical
legal rights when he bases his claim to that
favor upon a hard, oppressive, technical advantage.
He must stand before the court
prepared to meet its scrutiny without a blush,
relying upon the advocacy of a well regulated
conscience in his favor.
Such must not only
be his own position, but he must show that it
is not unjust or oppressive to the defendant,
to compel him to perform specifically.
Let us then examine for a moment the position of these parties respectively.
Waiving
the question of the division of the contract,
the complainant,
before he could call on the
defendant to convey to him this land, was
obliged to satisfy an obligation which secured
to the defendant about four thousand dollars.
He attempts to do this, not by paying him or
any one else having a right to receive the
money, the actual amount due, or to become
due, on the contract, but he purchases
the
contract at a forced sale for one thousand
dollars.
This is the extent of his merit. The
defendant, by his contract with D'Wolf, was
entitled to receive about the sum of four
thousand dollars, before he could be asked,
even by D'Wolf himself, to convey any portion of the premises.
Now, what has he realized for this four thousand dollars' worth of
land? Absolutely nothing.
His claim, or
right to receive the money, was sold (and upon the validity or effect of that sale we pass
no opinion) to pay a forfeit.
Nothing more,
— nothing for which he had received value.
Now all of this may have been a strictly legal transaction. The defendant, by his own
folly, may have frittered away his legal right
to this money or to the land, but it is not
such a transaction as should induce a court
of equity to throw down the legal barriers
which surround the defendant, and compel
him to do more for the ease and benefit of
than the strict rules of law
the complainant
will give him. Equity will never give the
pound of flesh, although it Is in the bond, but
will leave the law to give its value only.
We shall not compel the defendant to recognize a dividing up of his obligations under
this contract, but shall allow him, without
regret, to insist upon his legal rights.
The decree of the court below is affirmed.
Decree affirmed.
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GiLFiiiLAN, C.
This
an action to
compel speciflc performance of contract in
the nature of one to convey real estate. The
defendant had purchased the land from the
state, paying 15 per cent, of the purchase
price, and receiving certificates of purchase.
1886, these parties entered into
February
contract In writing, whereby defendant
agreed that, upon full performance on the
part of the plaintiff, he would transfer by
deed of assignment the said land certificates.
Plaintiff was to pay therefor $590, according to two promissory notes, — one for $190,
1886, with interest at IX) per
due October
cent., and one for $400, due two years from
1886, with interest at per cent.,
February
— and pay all taxes and assessments, and the
The
unpaid purchase money to the state.
plaintiff fully performed this contract on his
part. In March, 1886, the parties made an
oral agreement, by wliich defendant agreed
to make certain improvements for the plaintiff on the land, by breaking, erecting buildwell, for which plaintiff
ings, and digging
agreed to pay him the cost thereof, with interest; such payment not to be made before
the expiration of five years from the time of
making the improvements' Afterwards, pursuant to such agreement, defendant made
such improvements to the amount of $500,
The plainno part of which has been paid.
tiff was insolvent. On these facts the court
below denied speciflc performance.
From the memorandum filed by the court
below
appears that the speciflc performance was refused, in the exercise of what the
court deemed its discretionary power, the
reasons for so exercising that power being
stated; that plaintiff has become insolvent;
equal
tliat the value of the improvements
to the purchase price; and that plaintiff can
The mere fact
be compensated in damages.
contract for the conveythat
person has
ance to him of real estate does not entitle
him, as of right, to the interposition of
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Appeal from district court, Redwood county; Webber, Judge.
/. M.
John H. Bowers, for appellant
Thompson, for respondent.
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Court of Minnesota.

court of equity to enforce it. The matter of
compelling specific performance is one of
sound and reasonable discretion,— of judicial, not arbitrary and capricious, discretion.
There must be some reason, founded in
equity and good conscience, for refusing the
relief. Such reason has been generally found,
by the court refusing it, in some mistake or
fraud or unconscionableness in the contract,
or in some laches on the part of the plaintiff
changing the circumstances so as to make
conveyance, or where
inequitable to compel
the claim is stale, or there is reason to beBut, whatever the
lieve it was abandoned.
must have some reference
reason may be,
to, some connection with, the contract itself,
or the duties of the parties in relation to it.
case where the court
We have never found
means of enforcing
refused the relief as
some independent claim of the defendant
against the plaintiff, nor because the defendant had some iniiependent claim which he
might not be able to enforce against the
If such could be regarded as an
plaintiff.
equitable reason for denying relief, every action of the kind might involve the investigation of all unclosed transactions between the
parties, whether relating to the contract or
subject-matter of the action, or entirely distinct from it. In this case there is no reason
fair one.
to suppose the contract other than
The plaintiff has been prompt in performing
The
on his part, and in seeking his remedy.
defendant has
claim against plaintiff, entirely independent of the contract to convey,
which claim, by the terms of the agreement
arose, was not to become due
under which
for more than three years after the time
when he was to convey.
The possibility
that when
becomes due he may not be able
to enforce it, by reason that plaintiff's insolvency may continue, does not make
inequitable to enforce this contract already
matured.
That
purchaser may have an
adequate remedy by action for damages, although
reason for not holding what he has
done to be part performance to take the case
out of the operation of the statute of frauds,
of itself no reason for withholding the
proper remedy, where the contract is valid
under the statute.
The order is reversed,
and the court below will enter judgment on
the findings of fact in favor of plaintiff for
the relief demanded in the complaint.
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High Court of Chancery.

1859.

In this

case the bill was filed for a specific
performance of a contract entered into between the plaintiff, Mr. Falcke, and Mrs.
Gray, one of the defendants, by which Mrs.
Gray had agi-eed that, at the expiration of a
six-months lease to the plaintiff of her furnislied house, he should have the optionj)f
purchasing two china"^ jars at the price of

—~

^

£40.

In January,

plaintiff, being desirous of finding a furnished house, applied
to Mrs. Gray, who was willing to let hers,
and, on looking over it, he observed the two
jars, the subject of the suit. He had for
twenty-five years carried on the business of
china, etc., and was
a dealer in curiosities,
eminent in his trade, and was well acquainted with the prices which articles of this kind
would fetch.
Shortly afterwards he had an interview
with Mrs. Gray at her house; and Mr. Brend,
from the office of Boyle & Bryden, estate and
house agents, who were Mrs. Gray's agents in
the matter, attended to advise Mrs. Gray. A
discussion
arose as to the terms of letting,
and ultimately a rent of seven guineas i>er
weeli was agreed upon, with an option to the
plaintiff that he should, at the end of the
term, be at liberty to purchase certain articles of fm-niture at a valuation, to be inserted
in the agreement, including the two china
jars, which were valued at £40.
With regard to the valuation of these jars
at £40, it appeared from the evidence that Mr.
Brend told Mrs. Gray that he did not know
the value of the jars, but he should think
they were worth £20 apiece; and the agreement was drawn up, putting the value of £40
on the jars, and was signed by Mrs. Gray
On the 26th of January
and the plaintiff.
the plaintiff went to the house while his agent
was taking the inventory, and then the jars
had been removed; and on the same day Mrs.
Gray came to Mr. Falcke's house, and informed him of the removal of the jars. During
the interval between the 19th and the 26th
of January Mrs. Gray, having begun to doubt
whether the price placed on the jars was
fair, was advised that it would be as well to
take the opinion of Mr. Watson, also a dealer
in curiosities; and, on the 26th, she accordingly w-ent to Mr. Watson, and desired him
to come in the evening to value the jars.
This he did; and on seeing the jars he was
so much struck with their beauty, etc., that
he offered Mrs. Gray his check for £200 for
them at once. Mrs. Gray then asked Mr.
Watson if he thought she would be doing anything wrong in so selling them, and he told
her it was all right; and she then took his
check and Mr. Watson took away the jars.
Mr. Watson was made a defendant to the bill.
The plaintiff now insisted that he was entitled to a decree for specific performance
1859,
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against Mrs. Gray, and to delivery of the
jars as against Mr. Watson; and on that part
of the case the question was whether the
transaction was a bona fl^e one on the part
of Watson, or whether he knew of the contract between Mrs. Gray and the plaintiff.
The defendant insisted that it was a contract
for chattels, and could not be enforced.
The evidence as to the actual value of the
but, putting it at the
vases was conflicting,
lowest, it greatly exceeded £40.
Mr. Baily and Mr. Waller, for plaintiff.
Mr. Glasse and Jones Bateman,
for Mrs.
Gray. Mr. Greene and Mr. Speed, for Mr.
Watson.

THE VICE CHANCELLOR (after stating
the facts above stated).
The first ground of
defense is that, this being a bill for the specific performance
of a contract for the purchase of chattels, this court will not interfere;
but I am of opinion that the court will not
refuse to interfere simply because tlie contract relates to chattels, and that if there
were no other objection the contract in this
case Is such a contract as the court would

specifically perform.
What is the difference in the view of the
court between realty and personalty in respect
to the question whether the court will interUpon what principle does the
fere or not?
court decree specific performance of any eontract whatever? Lord Redesdale in Harnett
Yeilding, 2 Schoales & L. 549, says:
V.
"Whether courts of equity in their determinations on this subject have always considered
what was the original foundation for decrees
I believe
of this nature, I very much doubt.
that, from something of habit, decrees of this
kind have been carried to an extent which
has tended to injustice. XJnqliestionably the
original foundation of these decrees was simply this, that damages at law would not give
the party the compensation to which he was
entitled; that is, would not put him in a situation as beneficial to him as If the agree;
performed." So that
ment were specifically
the principle on which a court of equity pro"A court of law gives damages
ceeds is this:
for the nonperformance, but a court of equity
says, "that is not sufficient, — justice is not
satisfied by that remedy"; and therefore a
court of equity will decree specific performance, because a mere compensation
in damages is not a sufficient remedy and satisfaction for the loss of the performance of the

contract
Now why should that principle apply less
If in a contract for chattels
to chattels?
damages will be a sufficient compensation,
Thus if a
the party is left to that remedy.
contract is for the purchase of a certain quantity of coals, stock, etc., this court will not
decree specific performance,
because a person,
can go into the market and buy similar articles, and get damages for any difference in
the price of the articles In a court of law;
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damages would not be a sufficient compensation, the principle on wliicli a court of
equity decrees specific performance is just as
applicable to a contract for the sale and purchase of chattels as to a contract for the sale
and purchase of land.
In the present case the contract is for the
purchase of articles of unusual beauty, rarity, and distinction,
so that damages would
for nonnot be an adequate compensation
performance; and
am of opinion that a
contract for articles of such a description is
such a contract as this court will enforce;
and, in the absence of all other objection,
should have no hesitation in decreeing spe-

iDUt,

I

I

cific performance.
The next ground of defense is that the
contract in the present case is a hard bargain between the plaintifE and Mrs. Gray;
and it is insisted that the inadequacy in
price is so great that on that ground the
court will not decree specific performance.
Now the price put on these jars was £40.
What was their actual value? Certainly to
talk of their value is to talk of something
which is very artificial and fluctuating, depending upon the taste and caprice of the
community; but still the jars derive their
value from their beauty, distinction, and
rarity, and those qualities give them a sellThey have a value in the maring value.
According to the plaintiff's own stateket.
ment their value would be £100, or, if between persons not brokers, £125; and it is
the interest of the plaintiff to represent their
A better test of
value as low as possible.
their value is what Mr. Watson has given
for them; and I think I may assume that
£200 at least would be a fair price, though I
cannot help thinking that their real value
rather exceeded than fell short of that sum;
but, taking £200 as the fair value, the price
placed on the jars by Mr. Brend was only
That this
one-fifth of their selling value.
was a hard bargain in the sense of its being for a very inadequate price there can be
no doubt; and the defendant insists that, on
this ground, the court will not enforce specific performance.
On the other hand, the plaintiff insists
that, although it is true that in hard bargains, using the terms in one sense, the
court will not decree specific performance,
still that that does not apply to cases of
mere inadequacy of price; and this is the
question I have now to consider.
The general rule with regard to hard bargains is that the court will not decree specific performance, because specific performance is in the discretion of the court for
the advancement of justice; such discretion,
indeed, to be exercised, not according to caprice, but on strict principles of justice and
equity. In the case of White v. Damon, 7
"I agree with
Ves. 30, Lord Eldon says:
Lord Rosslyn that giving a specific perform-

ance is matter of discretion, but it is not an
It must be
arbitrary, capricious discretion.
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regulated upon grounds that will make it
The principle upon which the
judicial."
court acts with respect to hard bargains appears to me to have been truly expressed by
Lord Langdale in the case of Wedgwood v.
Adams, 6 Beav. 600; and the passage in
which he enunciates the principle has been
quoted with approbation by Lord Justice
Turner in Watson v. Marston, 4 De Gex, M.
Lord Langdale in Wedgwood v.
& G. 239.
that the court exercises its dissays
Adams
cretion and decrees specific performance unless it would be highly unreasonable to do
so, and that what is more or less unreasonIt must depend
able cannot well be defined.
on the circumstances of each particular case.
As it Is admitted by the plaintifE that in
cases of hard bargains generally the court
will not interfere, it is not necessary to go
into any of the cases on the subject other
than those which turn more or less on inadequacy of price; and here I may observe
that in some cases the court has refused
specific performance on the ground of the
of the bargain, where there has
hardness
been not the least impropriety of conduct on
the part of the person seeking specific performance. In most of the cases there has
been some other ingredient besides mere inadequacy of price, but I will refer to those
in which I find the opinion of the judges
- 1
express on that particular point.
Young
Clerk,
In
v.
Prec. in Chan. 538, the
defendant agreed to grant a lease of certain
lands to the plaintiff for fom'teen years at a
rent of £40. The plaintiff had already beea
lessee of the same lands for many years,,
and knew that the value of the lands was
not £40, but £167, and in that case specificperformance was refused; but there was im
that case the circumstance that the defendant, having recently come into possession of
the land, came to look at it, and stayed at
the plaintiff's house, and desired to see the
plaintiff's underleases, in order to ascertain
what the plaintiff had realized from the
property. The plaintiff evaded showing him
the underleases, and the defendant remained
in ignorance of the true value of the land.

If

the

bill

had

been

to

set aside

the

con-

that

this

tract, it would not have succeeded.
Lord
Thurlow said: "I must take it to be the
law that if a man contracts to purchase an
estate for a certain price, and the intending
purchaser knows at the time that there are
mines under the estate of which the vendor
is ignorant, still, as this court is not a court
of honor, the court will not set aside the
but nocontract on a bill by the vendor;
body can doubt that the court would not
decree specific performance of such a contract, and there is a wide distinction between
a case in which the court would, on the one
hand, decree specific performance of an incontract, and, on the other, set
complete
aside a complete contract." And in giving
judgment

the

lord

chancellor

said

court was not bound to decree a specific exe-
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cutlon of articles where they appeared to be
unreasonable or founded on a fraud, or
where it would be unconscionable to assist
them.

The next case is Kien v. Stulieley, 1 Brown,
Pari. Cas. 191; Gilb. 155, which was a bill
in the equity side of the court of exchequer
by the vendor for the specific performance
of an agreement for the purchase of land, for
which the purchaser had agreed to pay forty
years' value.
It was proved in the case that
the plaintiff bad left his deed with the defendant, and that there were no objections
to the title; but a decree was made for specific performance.
On appeal, the house of
great doubt whether such
lords entertained
a bargain should be carried out by a court
of eq'i'ty. but they came to no decision on
that point
The next case is Southwell v. Nicholas, reported in a note to Howell v. George, 1 Mad.
9.
In this case the plaintiff's father and the
brother,
having some
defendant
Nicholas'
houses in Spring Gardens, agreed to purchase
two old houses and pull them down to make
an entrance into Spring Gardens.
The houses
were pulled down, and the plaintifiE's father
paid his share of the purchase money.
The
defendant's
brother died, and his estates
were sold for the payment of his debts.
On
a bill by the plaintiff for the specific performance of the agreement
as to the two
houses, it was contended by the defendant
that there should be no specific performance,
as his brother's estates had been sold, and
accruing to
there would be no consideration
him for the expense he would be at. The
master of the rolls was inclined to decree
that the parties should pay for the two houses
in proportion to the value of their houses to
be benefited, but the matter was compromisby parties agreeing that the plaintiff
ed
should pay two-thirds and the defendant onethird for the two houses.
The next case Is Vaughan v. Thomas, 1
Brown, C. C. 556. In this case the defendant agreed with the plaintiff for the sale to
him of an annuity of £300 a year for the
The
defendant's life,' at five years' purchase.
defendant then represented himself as being
only fifty-five of age, and the plaintiff Insured
the defendant's life on that footing; but two
years afterwards he discovered that the defendant was sixty-one years of age at the
time of granting the annuity, and the plaintiff was obliged in consequence to increase
the insurance. Upon his representing this to
the defendant, it was agreed that the plaintiff should grant to the defendant an additional annuity, which was expressed to be
granted for £250, but in fact no money was
In December, 1779,
paid on that occasion.
the defendant applied to the plaintiff to repurchase the annuity, and an agreement was
entered into by them by which the plaintiff
agreed to give up the annuity on payment
of £1,500, the original purchase money, and
all arrears then due, deducting the sum of
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the amount for four years of the additional annuity of £50. The arrears then due
were £475, so that the sum settled for the
repurchase was £1,775.
After the agreement
had been signed the plaintiff struck out his
name, and two days after another agreement
was prepared, whereby the plaintiff relinquished the annuity and all arrears for £2,000.
The plaintiff filed a bill for the specific performance of this agreement.
It was referred
to the master to find the value of the original
and additional annuity and the defendant's
age. The master found that the annuity was
worth nine years' purchase when it was
granted.
The plaintiff contended that the
bargain was fair, and that he was entitled to
the assistance of the court to carry it into
execution;
but the master of the rolls was
of opinion that if they assisted the plaintiff
they would be sanctioning a very unconscientious bargain, and that the plaintiff was not
The bill was
entitled to the aid of the court.
£200,

therefore dismissed.
In the case of Heathcote v. Paignon, 2
Brown, 167, there was nothing but inadequacy of price, and the master of the rolls
referred it to the master to report on the
actual value.
The master found a value of
£500, for which only £200 had been given,
and the court refused specific performance.
On appeal, this decision was aflirmed by Loi'd
Thurlow, and the contract was set aside as
being unjust.
The next case 1 shall mention is Day v.
Newman, 2 Cox, 77. In that case the court
but
refused to decree specific performance,
left the parties to their remedies at law on
That
the ground of Inadequacy in price.
case appears to me to be a distinct decision
on the question.
White V. Damon, 7 Ves. 30, was a case of
a purchase at an auction; yet Lord Rosslyn,
on the simple ground of inadequacy in price,
refused specific performance.
This case
therefore shows that inadequacy
in price is
a suflicient ground for refusing specific perLord Eldon took a different view,
formance.
but it was on the ground that the sale was
by auction.
Now these two last-mentioned
cases appear to me to be decisive on the point; and
I am of opinion that in the present case I
ought to refuse specific performance on the
mere ground of inadequacy of price, even if
there were none other.
But there is another circumstance in this
case besides mere inadequacy.
What was
the nature of the transaction? It was not
the case of a bargain between seller and buyer, the one trying to get the highest, and the
other to give the lowest, price.
The intention
of the parties was that a fair and reasonable
price should be placed on the articles, and
that the plaintiff should have the option of
purchasing at such fair and reasonable price.
Mrs. Gray, though she was told by Mr.
Brend that he was not a judge of the value,
thought that the £40 mentioned by him was
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such a fair price as a competent person would
place on the jars; and it was upon that footing that she made the agreement.
She was
not herself a competent judge, though she
knew they were of considerable value.
Mr.
Falcke knew that she was contracting on that
footing, and he knew that the price put upon the jars by Brend was not a fair price.
(The vice chancellor, after going through the
plaintiff's evidence, from which it appeared
that he, knowing that £40 was greatly insufficient, it being only two-fifths of the value,
as he said, allowed the contract to be signed on that footing, proceeded:)
The question
is whether he can come to the court to compel Mrs. Gray to sell the jars to him for £40.
I admit that this court is not a court of honor, but it appears to me that, although Mr.
Falcke has done nothing he was legally
bound not to do, yet, consistently with the
and justice of the case, I must
authorities
refuse specific performance.
It has, however, been contended

that Mrs.
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Gray, having sold the jars to the defendants
the Watsons, should not have been made a
defendant; but Mrs. Gray has placed herself
in such a position that the suit could not go
The bill,
on without her being made a party.
therefore,
without costs
must be dismissed
as against her.
With regard to the defendants the Watsons, the question is whether they had notice, when they purchased
from Mrs. Gray,
that she had entered into an agreement by
virtue of which she could not sell them to
another person.
Now I cannot help entertaining some suspicion that the Watsons
knew something more than that a mere question had arisen as to value; but the onus
of proving that they had notice lies on the
plaintiff, and I think that, although there
is some doubt on the evidence, notice to them
has not been sufliciently proved.
Under all
I think the bill, as against
the circumstances,
the Watsons, must be disthe defendants
missed, with costs.
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PAINE

V.

MELLER.

(6 Ves. 349.)

Chancery.

July

22, 1801.

Upon tbe 1st of September, 1796, the plaintiffs sold to the defendant, by auction, some
houses in Ratcliffe Highway, upon the usual
terms, a deposit of 251. per cent, and a proper conveyance to be executed upon payment
of the remainder of the purchase money at
Michaelmas next.
The premises were with
others subject to certain annuities: but a
trust of stocli was declared for the payment
of these annuities.
The first abstract deso that the
livered was clearly defective:
purchase could not be completed at that
A further abstract was delivered to
time.
the solicitor for the defendant,
at the end
of September, or the beginning of October.
He insisted upon having a release fi'om the
The treaty continued through
annuitants.
October;
and about the end of that month
solicitor agreed to waive all
the defendant's
ii the plaintiff would allow him
objections,
eleven guineas, and if the trustees of the
and restock would join in the conveyance;
fused a proposal to give up the purchase.
The plaintiff agreed to make the allowance
desired.
On the 4th or 5th of November the
solicitor sent a draft of a condefendant's
The trustees of the stock were preveyance.
vailed upon to join in the conveyance by a
new declaration of trust. The draft was returned to the defendant's solicitor; the deeds
were engrossed;
and upon the 16th or 17th
of December he declared himself satisfied
with the title; and said, the deeds would be
and that he
ready in two or three days;
complete
the purchase
under
the
should
Upon the
of the eleven guineas.
promise
ISth of December the houses were burnt:
the insurance having been suffered to expire
at Michaelmas 1796. On the 20th of Decemsolicitor wrote a letter;
ber the defendant's
observing, that he had taken an objection to
title; and should not have
the freehold
thought anything more of the purchase, but
for the covenant of indemnity from the trustees, inserted in the draft by him, and approved by one of the trustees of the stock:
but as that had been struck out by another
trustee, he could not advise his client to accept the title; and he should call for the
deposit.
The bill was then filed, praying a specific
performance of the contract; and a decree
was made by the late lord chancellor, simply
referring it to the master to see whether a
This decree was
good title could be made.
dissatisfactory to both parties, as not decidand a petition of rehearing
ing the question;
was presented by the plaintiff.
Mr. Mansfield and Mr. Cox, for plaintiff,
Insisted, that the objection to the title from
the charge of the annuities was frivolous:
there being a fund of stock with a trust declared upon It.

Mr. Sutton

— The

delay

and lur. Lewis, for defendant.

in

performing

this

contract

arose from the defect of the title; and the
plaintiff ought to have acquainted the defendant with the circumstance of the insurance expiring. In Stent v. Baylis, 2 P. Wms.
3
217, referred to in Mortimer v. Capper,
Brown, Ch. 156, Sir Joseph Jekyll expresses
a clear opinion upon this case. 2 P. Wms.
Pope V. Roots, 7 Brown, Oh. 184.
220.
Mr. Mansfield, in reply. — All the cases referred to are got rid of by Jackson v. Lever,
3 Brown, Ch. 605.
The former cases proceeded upon this fallacy, that the party could
not have the thing bought; for chance had
decided against him: but he had the chance;
In the case
and he must take it each way.
of a life it might last fifty years, and might
drop the next day.
But this is not a purchase of property depending upon the contingency of life, like an annuity. A man purchasing a house is to consider with himself,
whether he will insure or not. Not a word
was said about insurance:
therefore notice
was not incumbent on the plaintiffs; and
there was as much negligence in the defendant in not inquiring about that.
Such an
accident did not occur to either of them.
in the sale of a house nothing is said about
insm-ance, it could not enter into the bargain.

If

LORD CHANCELLOR.— The abstract first

imperfect in cerdelivered was undoubtedly
tain respects.
It did not go back further
than forty-three years;
and there was no
specific mention of the property in Ratcliffe
Highway in the abstract.
There was also
upon the annuities.
the objection
Unquestionably that abstract was not satisfactory;
and the express condition of the sale could
not be complied with. Harrington v. Wheeler, 4 Ves. 686; Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 265.
Of course the defendant could not be called
on to pay his purchase money.
Then it was
with the vendee to choose to go on with the
bargain, or to put an end to the contract.
The agent however chose not to put an end
to it; and though a circumstance took place
at Michaelmas sufficient to put an end to any
action of law, the contract was kept alive,
at least to the 10th of December.
It Is
clear, the objection was given up as to the
freehold title; and the only difference was as
to the indemnity against the annuities,
affecting these with other premises.
I do not
consider whether this objection is of form
or substance: but leave it to be determined,
when it may be necessary, whether the purchaser under such circumstances has not a
right to insist, that the annuitants shall release the premises;
or whether this court
will say, under all circumstances the purchasers shall take the premises burthened
with the annuities, with a great number of
others, and seek their indemnity against the
trust property and the trustees, if they preferred a personal covenant by the trustees.
If in equity these premises belonged to the
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have a title to the rents and
Michaelmas by relation; and he
the purchase money with interest
First, It is said, tbe title
time.
accepted In fact: 2dly, If not, under these circumstances
a court
of equity
will not compel a specific performance.
As
to the second point, the objection is grounded upon two circumstances: 1st, the simple
fact of the fire; 2dly, that the premises had
been insured prior to the contract; that that
fact, and the fact that the insurance expired at Michaehnas 1796, were not disclosed;
and that the premises
afterwards remained uncovered by any insurance.
The
authority of Sir Joseph Jekyll has been menvendee, he woulcl

profits at
must pay
from that
was never

tioned:

but no case has been cited in support

of that dictum ; and it is in a degree suggested, not admitted, at the bar, that it may be
considered
by subsequent
over-ruled
cases.
As to the mere effect of the accident itself
no solid objection can be founded upon that
simply; for if the party by the contract has
become in equity the owner of the premises,
they are his to all intents and purposes.
See
Foster v. Foust, 2 Serg. & R. 11. They are
vendible as his, chargeable as his, capable
of being incumbered
as his; they may be
devised as his; they may be assets;
and
If a man
they would descend to his heir.
had signed a contract for a house upon that
land, which is now appropriated to the London Docks,
and that house was burnt, it
would be impossible to say to the purchaser,
willing to take the land without the house,
because much more valuable on account of
this project, that he should not have it. As
to the annuity cases and all the others, the
true answer has been given; that the party
has the thing he bought, though no payment
may have been made; for he bought subject to contingency.
If it is a real estate,
Then as to the nonhe of course has it.
communication,
I cannot say that, in my
judgment, forms an objection; for
do not
see how I can allow it, unless
say this
court warrants to every buyer of a house
that the house is insured, and not only insured, but to the full extent of the value.
The house is bought, not the benefit of any
existing policy.
However general the practice of insuring from fire is, it is not imiversal; and it is yet less general that houses
are insured tg their full value, or near it
The question, whether instu-ed or not, is

I

I

6.51

with the vendor solely, not with the vendee;
unless he proposes something upon that; and
makes it matter of conti'act with the vendor,
that the vendee shall buy according to that
1 am therefact, that the house is insured.
fore of opinion, that if the agent on behalf
of this purchaser did accept this title previously to the destruction of the premises,
the vendors are in the situation in which
they would have been if the title aild the
conveyance were ready at Michaelmas 1796,
but by the default of the vendee were not
executed, but the title was accepted, and the
premises were burnt down on the quarter
day.
As to the fact, where there has been
a great deal of treaty, and a considerable
hardship must fall upon one party, if the
case is to be put entirely upon the fact, the
and I
court must guard against surprise;
am not sure, even the plaintiff's witnesses
accurately understand
the nature of the
facts they depose to. It is to be observed,
they are aU the plaintiff's agents, subject to
belonging to that
the influence necessarily
The case is therefore not suffisituation.
ciently clear upon the fact, and there ought
to be some reference to the master or an
inquiry before a jury; but that must not be
upon the validity of the title; for it is clear,
the objection to the freehold title, that it was
not old enough, and the other objection, that
the purchaser
had a right to insist upon a
release of the annuities, were waived.
The
question between them is, whether the parties agreed that an indemnity should be given in any form; and if so, in what form.
The inquiry must be, whether the title had
been accepted by the agent on behalf of the
defendant on or before the 18th of December
1796.
That inquiry'will miscarry, unless the
master, or the jury. If satisfied that there
was an acquiescence in the proposal, shall
be of opinion, that is an acceptance of the
proposal.
I should think, a court of law
would hold that: but if there is any doubt
of It,
would rather refer it to the master
to inquire, whether the agent on behalf of
the defendant had accepted or acquiesced in
the proposal;
with a direction,
that he
should be ijxamined;
and they will appreciate the credit due to him; and will not
forget, that he was bartering for himself for
if that appears.
eleven guineas;
The decree was reversed;
and the reference to the master directed accordingly.

I
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GOULD
(70

Supreme Judicial

V.

MURCH.

Me. 288.)

Court of Maine.

Oct

20,

1879.

C. L. Jones, for plaintiff.
ton, for defendant.

Walton & Wal-

LIBBBY, J. The notes in suit, mtli three
others, were given in payment for a lot of
land on which were a dwelling house and
other buildings; and on payment of the notes
at maturity, the plaintiff agi'eed to convey
the premises to the defendant.
The defendant was to have possession of the premises
till he made default of payment as agreed,
and he entered into possession under the
agreement.
Within a year from that time
the buildings were burnt without the fault of
either party.
The question presented to the court is
whether the destruction of the buildings can
be set up by the defendant as a defense to
the notes.
We think it can be.
When the owner of a lot of land with buildings upon it agrees to convey it at a future
day on payment of the purchase money by
the purchaser, and before payment and conveyance the buildings are destroyed by fire
without the fault of either party, the loss
must fall upon the vendor; and if the buildings formed a material part of the value of
the premises,
the vendee cannot be compelled to take a deed of the land alone, and
pay the purchase money; and if he has paid
it he may recover It back. Thompson v.
Gould, 20 Pick. 134, and cases there cited.
4 Mete.
Gould V. Thompson,
(Mass.) 234;
Wells V. Calnan, 107 Mass. 514.
In Thompson v. Gould, the authorities bearing upon the question were elaborately examined and considered, and Wilde, J., in the
"In respect to the
opinion of the court says:
loss of personal property, under the like circumstances, the principle of law is perfectly
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clear and well established by all the authorities.
When there is an agreement for the
sale and purchase of goods and chattels, and
after the agreement and before the sale is
completed the property is destroyed by casualty, the loss must be borne by the vendor;
the property remaining vested in him at the
Tarling v. Baxter, 9
time of the destruction.
7
Dowl. & B. 276; Hlnde v. Whitehouse,
East, .558; Rugg v. Mmett, 11 East, 210. No
reason has been given, nor can be given, why
the same principle should not be applied to
real estate. The principle in no respect depends upon the nature and quality of the
property, and there can therefore be no distinction between personal and real estate."
In Wells V. Calnan the same rule was afGray, J., In the opinion of the court,
firmed.
very clearly and tersely states it as follows:
"When property, real or personal, is destroyed by fire, the loss falls upon the party who
is the owner at the time; and if the owner of
a house and land agrees to sell and convey it
upon the payment of a certain price which
the purchaser agrees to pay, and before full
payment the house is destroyed by accidental
fire, so that the vendor cannot perform the
agreement on his part, he cannot recover or
retain any part of the purchase money."
The reasons upon which the rule is based
are clearly and fully stated In the cases cited,
and it is unnecessary to repeat them here.
But the use and occupation of the premises
by the defendant, from the time the agreement for the sale and purchase was made,
formed a part of the consideration for the
notes; and the plaintiff can recover in this
action a sum equal to the value of the use of
occupied
the premises while the defendant
them.
Wells v. Calnan, supra.
In accordance with the stipulations In the
report, the action must stand for trial.

APPLETON, C. J., WAI/rON, BARROWS
DANFORTH, JJ., concurred.
SYMONDS, J., did not sit.

and

ir'
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MARKS

et al. v.

(4 S. W. 225,

TICHBNOR.i
85

Ky.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

536.)

May

5,

1887.

Appeal from circuit court, McLean comity.
Owen & Ellis and W. B. Noe, for appellants. Jep. C. Jonson, for appellee.

LEWIS, J.

Appellee having sold, and by
October 24, 1884, conveyed, to
appellants three tracts of land adjoining,
and constituting one farm, instituted an action to recover judgment on the notes given
for the purchase money, and to subject the
land to satisfy it. In defense, appellants
state that the deed as written does not contain the whole contract entered into between
the parties, but a portion of it was by mistake omitted, and that they accepted the
deed upon the condition of the execution by
appellee of the following writing, which embraces the omitted part:
"I have this day sold to James A. and
Samuel C. Marks my farm known as the
'Daniel McParland Farm.' I agree to cover
said house, and put two coats of paint on
deed executed

the

outside,

and

deliver

the

same

to

said

parties by or on the first day of January,
Eleven thousand of the shingles is to
1885.
be hand-shaved shingles, and the remainder
I also agree to furnish
to be cut shingles.
as much as 200 feet of sheeting if needed on
said house; and, if any more is needed, said
T. C. Tichenor."
Marks is to furnish it.
It is further stated that about November
was
29, 1884, the dwelling-house mentioned
destroyed by fire, in consequence of which
appellee never did deliver it, and they therefore ask that the notes sued on be credited
1 The purchaser under an executory contract
for the sale of land is the equitable owner.
Burkhart v. Howard (Or.) 12 Pac. 79 ; Gilbert
Id. 172; Alpers v. Knight
V. Sleeper (Cal.)
(Cal.) 8 Pac. 446; Taylor v. Holmes, 14 Fed.
498; Martin v. Carver (Ky.) 1 S. W. 199;
Bartle v. Curtis (Iowa) 26 N. W. 73. Any ac-

cidental loss accruing between the time of his
purchase and the conveyance of the legal title
must be borne by him, and he is entitled to all
the benefits. Martin v. Carver (Ky.) 1 S. W.
199.
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by the value of the house, which they aver
was $1,000.
It is stated in the reply, and
that, at the time of the
not controverted,
sale of the land, it was in the possession of a
tenant of appellee, whose term did not expire until January 1, 1885, of which fact
appellants were aware, and that time was
agreed on in view of such tenancy.
In the sale of land it becomes the real
property of the vendee from the execution,
delivery, and acceptance of the written contract. "It is vendible as his, chargeable as
his, and capable of being devised or descending as his." Consequently it is a well-established and reasonable rule that the destruction of buildings thereon by fire, between
the time of such contract of sale and the
time fixed upon in the contract for the delivery of possession by the vendor to the
vendee, must be the loss of the latter and
not of the former.
Calhoon v. Belden, 3
Bush, 674.
There are only two exceptions
to this rule.
The first is when, as was the
case in Combs v. Fisher, 3 Bibb, 51, there is
an express contract to deliver the possession
of the land, with the improvements or buildings thereon, in the same situation as was
the case when the sale was made.
The
second is when, as was in Cornish v. Strutton, 8 B. Mon. 586, the building has been
destroyed by the culpable negligence of the
vendor.

There is no allegation or proof that the
destruction of the dwelling-house in this case
was caused by the negligence of the vendor,
or any other person; nor do we think the
contract, fairly construed, amounts to an express agreement by the vendor to assume
the risk of the destruction of the buildings
by fire.
The purpose of the supplemental
contract executed by appellee was to provide
for the repair by him of the house as therein agreed, and which the evidence shows
he did do, but not to insure it against destruction by fire, or to shift the risk from
appellants to himself. He simply covenanted
to deliver possession,
without any express
undertaking to sustain any loss that might
arise from the burning of the house.
Judgment afiirmed.
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05J.

BOSTWICK
(12

N. B.

V.

BEACH

32, 105 N.

T.

et al.
661.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

April

26,

1887.

Application

to modify

interlocutory judg-

ment.

This was an action for specific performas execuance, brought against defendants,
tors, upon a contract for the sale of land,
in pursuance of a power in the testator's
will. The plaintiff deposited the unpaid portions of the purchase money at the time
when the conveyance should have been exeUpon a former appeal (9 N. E. 41)
cuted.
the interlocutory judgment against the executors was, with some modifications, affirmed,
by which the plaintiff's prayer for specific
performance was granted, and he was not
required to pay interest on the purchase
money.
The object of this application is to
have such interest allowed the executors.
Milton A. Fowler, for appellants.
for respondent.

O. D.

M. Boker,

RAPALLO, J. When this case was before us on the appeal from the interlocutory
judgment, it appeared from the findings that
the unpaid portion of the purchase money
had been tendered to the executors
($10,500)
on the first of March, 1882, and that, on
their refusal to accept the same, and deliver
the deed, that sum had been deposited by
the plaintiff in the First National Bank of
Lowville to the credit of the executors, to be
paid to them on the delivery of the deed.
There was nothing to show that after that
deposit the plaintiff had derived any benefit from the use of the fund, and presumptively it had lain idle and unproductive.
Therefore the purchaser was not charged
with interest on the purchase money.
It is now shown, by affidavits, that, shortly after this deposit, the fund was wholly
or in part withdrawn from the bank by the
plaintiff, and we are now asked to add to
the modifications directed in the opinion a
further provision charging the plaintiff with
If the
interest on the amount so withdrawn.
fact had appeared in the case when before
us on appeal, this modification would doubtless have been proper, and even now we
might find means to make it, if no other
facts were shown on the part of the plainBut, in optiff raising a counter equity.
position to the application of the defendants, the plaintiff presents affidavits showing
that during the pendency of this action, in
consequence of neglect and mismanagement
the ditches
on the part of the defendants,
have been allowed to be
on the premises
filled up, the buildings to become dilapidated,
the water-works to go to decay, the fences
to be destroyed, and the value of the property to be thus depreciated to an amount exceeding the interest on the unpaid purchase
If these facts had appeared, they
money.
undoubtedly would have influenced our judg-
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ment in respect to allowing interest tipon the
purchase money, or making some other provision for compensating the plaintiff for the damWhere
ages alleged to have been sustained.
specific performance is decreed, the court
will, so far as possible, place the parties in
the same situation they would have been in
it the contract had been performed at the
tjme agreed upon, and by the application of
the rule of courts of equity, by which things
which ought to have been done are considered as having been done at the proper time,
the vendor is regarded as trustee of the land
for the benefit of the purchaser, and liable
to account to him for the rents and profits,
or for the value of the use and occupation,
and the purchaser is treated as trustee of
money unpaid,
and charged
the purchase
with interest thereon, unless the purchase
money has been appropriated, and no benefit has accrued from it to the purchaser.
But this is not the only manner which the
court has adopted to adjust the equities of
For instance, where the subthe parties.
ject of the piu-chase was a leasehold estate
in a mill, and the ielay of performance of
to the vendor
the contract was attributable
for his failure to show good r^ght to assign
had occurred, he
his lease, and dilapidations
was charged with the expenses of repairs
required to put the mill in tenantable condition, and of those which had been incurred
for keeping up the machinery until the purAnd
chaser could prudently take possession.
in Ferguson v. Tadman, 1 Sim'. 530, where
the estate had deteriorated in value by reaand neglect, during
son of mismanagement
five years which elapsed between the filing
of the bill for specific performance and the
decree, the amount of the deterioration, with
interest, was ascertained, and allowed to the
plaintiff out of the purchase money which
In Worrall v.
had been paid into court.
Munn, 38 N. Y. 137, these principles were
and the vendee, having obtained
recognized;
a decree for specific performance, was allowed the damages sustained, during the pendency of the suit, by deterioration from
waste committed by the defendant during
the pendency of the suit.
If the matter should now be opened for
in to
the purpose of letting the defendants
claim interest on the purchase money, it
would be no more than just that the same
indulgence should be extended to the plaintiff, to let him in to prove the damages he
claims by reason of deteriorations
caused by
mismanagement and neglect.
These points
appear to be the only ones as to which the
parties have been unable to agree, in settling
From the affithe form of the judgment.
davits presented, it would seem that the
damages claimed by the plaintiff would about
equal the interest claimed by the defendants; but, if the judgment below i» modified
so as to admit the allowance of Interest, it
should also be modified so as to admit proof
If the statements
of the damages claimed.
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In the affidavits are

correct, justice would
apparently be done by leaving the matter as
it is, and confining the modifications of the
interlocutory judgment to those directed in
the original opinion of this court, which appear to be substantially contained in the
modified judgment as proposed on the part
of the plaihtlfC.
The details, however, are
subject to settlement in the supreme court.
But If the defendants desire to insist upon
their claim to be allowed Interest, and to
contest the amount of damages resulting
from deterioration and mismanagement,
the
modified judgment should contain provisions
referring it to the referee to ascertain what
amount
of the sum deposited in the bank
was withdrawn by the plaintiff, or subject
to his control, and for what length of time,
and charging him with interest thereon during that time. The amount of deterioration
of the property, by reason of mismanagement and neglect, between
the first of
March, 1882, and the time of plaintiff's obtaining possession, should also be ascertained and charged, either to the defendants,
as
executors,
or to the 'defendant Emily P.
Beach, as the equities may appear.
She certainly has no reason to complain of any loss
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she may sustain through this litigation, as
to have been caused by her persistent refusal^ to carry out the contract,
which, according to the findings of fact, was
Intelligently entered into by her, and was a

it appears

fair contract for the full value of the farm,
and was beneficial to all concerned in the
By this unjustifiable refusal on her
estate.
part, all parties have been subjected to damage, and there Is no reason why the loss
should fall upon the plaintiff, who seems to
have been always ready to perform' his part
of the contract.
It is to be hoped that, upon the principles
here indicated, the counsel for the respective
parties may be able to agree upon the form
of judgment to be entered.
Otherwise it
may be settled by the supreme court, and
the interlocutory judgment may be modified
so as to provide for the ascertainment and
allowance of the interest claimed by the
defendants, and also of the damages claimed
by the plaintiff, at the election of the defendants. If the defendant shall not conand
sent to have the damages ascertained
allowed, the application for the allowance of
interest is denied.
(All concur.)
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LEWIS
(23

Wall.

V.

HAWKINS

119, 23

L. Ed.

Supreme Court of the United

et al.
113.)

States.

from the Circuit Court
AVestern District of Arkansas.
Appeal

A. H. Garland, for appellant

Oct. 1874.

for

the

Pike & John^

son, for the widow.

SWATNE, Justice. Upon the execution of
the notes and the title-bond between Lewis
aud Hawkins, Lewis held the legal title as
and Hawldns was a
trustee for Hawkins;
trustee for Lewis as to the purchase-money.
Hawkins was cestui que trust as to the former and Lewis as to the latter. 1 Story, Eq.
Jur. § 789; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1212; 1 Sugd.
Swartwout v. Burr, 1 Barb. 499;
"Vend. 175;
Champion v. Brown, 6 Johns. Ch. 402. The
has a venseller mider such cii'cumstances
dor's lien, which is certainly not impaired by
The equitable
withholding the conveyance.
estate of the vendee is alienable, descendible,
and devisable In like manner as real estate
held by a legal titla The securities for the
and in the
are personalty,
purchase-money
event of the death of the vendor, go to his
2 Story, Eq. Jur. §
personal representative.
1212.
It does not appear that the title-bond
Hawkins to take possession, or
authorized
that he did so. If there were no such authority, and he entered into possession, he
Suffam
held as a licensee or tenant at will.
V. Townsend, 9 Johns. 35; Dolittle v. Eddy,
The vendee cannot in such cases
7 Barb. 75.
dispute the title of his vendor any more than
the lessee can dispute that of bis lessor.
Whiteside v. Jackson, 1 Wend. 422; HamilAny
ton V. Taylor, 1 Litt. Sel. Cas. 444.
other person coming into possession under the
vendee, either with his consent or as an intruder, is bound by a like estoppel. Jackson
Hamiter, having
v. Walker, 7 Cow. 637.
bought and assumed the payment of the purchase-money stipulated to be paid by Hawkins, took the property subject to the same liabilities, legal and equitable, to which it was
1 Story,
subject in the hands of Hawkins.
Eq. Jur. § 789; 1 Sugd. Vend. (Perkins' Ed.)
175; Champion v. Brown, 6 Johns. Ch. 402;
Muldrow's Ex'rs v. iluldrow's Heirs, 2 Dana,
387; 2 Har. & J. 64; Shipman v. Cook, 16 N.
J. Eq. 254.
The discharge in bankruptcy released
Hawkins from personal liability for his debt,
but the statute of limitations cannot avail to
protect the land from the vendor's lien upon
which Hawkins
it, for the purchase-money
agreed to pay, and which Hamiter, when he
bought the land, assumed and agreed to pay
for hun.
We have already shown that as between
Lewis and Hawkins there was a trust which
embraced

the purchase-money

and

fastened

itself upon the land. The debt did not affect
his assignee personally, but as we have shown
also it continued to bind the land In all re-
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spects as if the transfer had not been made.
The trust was an express one. Its terms and
purposes were evinced by the title-bond, and
the promissory notes to which that instru-

"As between trustee and cesment referred.
tui que trust, in the case of an express trust,
the statute of limitation has no application,
Accounts
and no length of time is a bar.
have been decreed against trustees extending
over periods of thirty, forty, and even fifty
years.
The relations and privity between
trustee and cestui que trust are such that the
of the
possession of one is the possession
other, and there can be no adverse possession
during the continuance
of the relation.
* * * A cestui que trust cannot set up the
statute against his co-cestui que trust, nor
against his trustee.
These rules apply in all
Perry, Trusts, §
cases of express trusts."
863.

"As between trustees and cestui que trust,
an express trust, constituted by the act of the
parties themselves, will not be barred by any
length of time, for In such cases there is no
adverse possession, the possession of the trustee being the possession of the cestui que
trust." Hill, Trustees, 264*.
The same principle applies where the cestui
que trust is in possession.
He is regarded as
"Therefore,
a tenant at will to the trustee.
until this tenancy Is determined there can be
no adverse possession between the parties."
Id. 266"*. The relation once established is
presumed to continue, unless a distinct denial, or acts, or a possession inconsistent with
Whiting v. Whiting, 4
it are clearly shown.
Gray, 236; Creigh's Heirs v. Henson, 10 Grat.
231; Spickerneln v. Hotham, Kay, 669; Garard V. Tuck, 65 E. C. L. 249, 8 Man. G. & S.
231; Decouche v. Savetier, 3 Johns. Ch. 190;
Anstiee v. Brown, 6 Paige, 448; Kane v.
Bloodgood, 7 Johns. Ch. 90.
In many of the cases it is held that the
lien of the vendor under the circumstances of
this case is substantially a mortgage.
Lingan V. Henderson, 1 Bland, Ch. 236; Moreton
V. Harrison, Id. 491; Relfe v. Relfe, 34 Ala.
504.
It is well settled that the possession of
the mortgagor is not adverse to that of the
In the case last cited it is said
mortgagee.
that to apply the statute of limitations
"would be like making the lapse of time the
origin of title in the tenant against his landlord." That the remedy upon the bond, note,
or simple contract for the purchase-money
is
barred in cases like this, in no wise affects
the right to proceed in equity against the
As in respect to mortgages, the lien
land.
will be presumed to have been satisfied after
the lapse of twenty years from the maturity
of the debt, but in both cases laches may be
explained

and

the

presumption

repelled.

Moreton v. Harrison, supra.
The principles
upon which this opinion proceeds are distinctly recognized in Harris v. King, 16 Ark. 122.
That case alone would be decisive of the case
before us. The considerations
which apply
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where the vendor In such cases resorts to an
action of ejectment were examined by this
court In Burnett v. Caldwell, 9 Wall. 290.
The bill avers the tender of a deed by the
complainant to Hawkins before the bill was
filed.
The answer of Hawkins denies the allegation. The testimony of Lewis sustains
the bill; that of Hawkins the answer.
The
Except as to
averment is not established.
If
the costs the point is of no significance.
the tender of a deed had been properly made,
and there had been no unjustifiable resistance
to the taking of the decree by the complainant, to which he is entitled, he would have
There bebeen required to pay all the costs.

HUTCH.& BUNK.BQ.-^2
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ing a contest, and it appearing that a tender
would have been without effect, the costs
must abide the result of the litigation. Keisselbrack v. Livingston, 4 Johns. Ch. 144; Hanson V. Lake, 2 Younge & C. 328.
TheM is manifest error in the decree, but
the bill is defective in not making the heirsat-law of Hamiter parties, unless there is
some statutory provision of the State of Arkansas which obviates this objection.
If necessary the bill can be amended in the
court below.
Decree reversed, and the cause remanded
with directions to proceed in conformity with
this opinion.
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BISSELL

V.

HEYWARD.

(96 U. S. 580, 24

L. Ed.

Supreme Court of the United

678.)

States.

Oct. 1877.

Appeal from the circuit court of the United
States for the district of South Carolina.
William C. He.yward, who was seised in
fee of certain lands in the state of South
Carolina, made his last will and testament,
bearing date Jan. 20, 1852.
So much thereof as relates to them is as follows: "I give
to my brother, Henry Hey ward, of New Yorli"
(here is a description of the lands), "for and
during the term of his natural life, and, after
the determination of that estate,
give the
same to my friend, WilUam C. Bee, and his
heirs, to prevent the contingent
remainders
hereinafter limited from being barred; in
trust, nevertheless, during the lifetime of my
said brother, to apply the income thereof to
his use and benefit; and, from and after his
decease, I give the use of the same estate,
real and personal, to his eldest son, Henry
Heyward, Jr., if then living, until he attains
the age of twenty-one years; and if he should
survive his father, and attain the age of
twenty-one years, to him and his heirs for
ever: but in case the said Henry Heyward,
Jr., should not survive his father, and attain
the age of twenty-one years, then I give the
whole of the said estate, real and personal,
after the decease of my brother, Henry Heyward, for the use of the person who may
thereafter,
from time to time, sustain the
of heir male of the body of my
character
said brother, Henry Heyward, as such term
was used in the common law before the
unabolition of the rights of primogeniture,
til such person shall attain the age of twenty-one years, or the expiration of twenty-one
years from the death of my said brother,
whichever may first happen; and, after the
happening of either of those events, to the
then heir male of the body of my brother,
absolutely and for ever."
On the eighteenth day of June, 1863, Wilto sell, for
liam C. Heyward contracted
said lands, to John B. Bissell; who
$120,000,
tools; immediate possession of them, which he
On July 31, followhas ever since retained.
ing, he paid $20,000 of the purchase-money.
During that year, and before the completion
of the purchase, Heyward died, and said
Bee, appointed the executor of his will, duly
qualified as such. Owing to the civil war
and other causes, matters remained unaltered
in their main features until March, 1870,
when said Henry Heyward, a citizen of New
York, filed his bill against said Bissell and
said Bee, citizens of South Carolina, to comby Bissell, of
pel the specific performance,
The answer of
his agreement to purchase.
Bissell admits the agreement and his possession of the property, and his payment of
$20,000; and alleges that he was provided
with the means of paying the balance of the
that neither said William
purchase-money;

I

OF CONTRACTS.

C. Heyward, nor, since his death, said Bee,
tendered him a conveyance;
and that he was
willing to pay when he should receive a
valid conveyance;
that he sold sixty-three
bales of cotton, for cash in Confederate notes,
and on Feb. 11, 1864, tendered the said balance, in said notes, to the executor, who declined to receive them, on the ground that
he could not malie a good title. Bee, in his
answer, admitted the tender to him by Bissell, and his refusal to accept it, on the
ground that he was advised that he could
neither malse a title nor safely accept payment in Confederate
currency.
It was admitted, on the hearing below, that said money was tendered at that date, in such currency; that the parties through whom a good
title could be made lived in New Yorii; and
that, after Bee's refusal to accept the notes
tendered, Bissell used them for other purposes.
It does not appear by the pleadings, the
evidence, or the agreed statement of facts
on file, whether Henry Heyward, Jr., who
was living when the bill was filed, and had
years,
then attained the age of twenty-one
is now living. There is neither allegation
nor proof of his death.
The court decreed that Bissell should perform his contract of purchase, and pay, in
United States currency, a sum equal to the
value of $100,000 in Confederate currency on
June IS, 1863, the day of sale, with interest
thereon until Feb. 11, 1864; from and after
which day he should pay interest only on
such a sum as was the value of $100,000 on
said 18th of June, less its value on said 11th
of February; said values and interest to be
ascertained by the clerli of the court to whom
the cause was referred, as master, to state
and report the same;
that upon Bissell's
maliing the payment as stated and reported,
that the clerl£, "as master to said WilUam C.
Bee, executor of William C. Heyward," convey the premises In fee-simple;
but that, upon his failure so to pay, the master should
sell the property, at public auction, for cash.
Said Henry Heyward died before the execution of the decree.
On Nov. 23, 1874, Zef a
Heyward, his wife, Zefita Heyward, his
daughter, and Franli Heyward, his son, filed
their bill of revivor, reciting the original bill,
the proceedings thereunder, the reference to
the master, the death of said Henry,— leaving a last will and testament, which was duly proved before the surrogate of the county
of New York,— their appointment to execute
the same, and that said Zefa alone took upon herself the execution thereof, and qualified accordingly, and praying that the bill
might be revived.
This bill was duly served; no answer was made, and an order of revivor was entered accordingly.
The master subsequently reported that the
balance found by him to be due upon the
contract was $28,353.50; and that, in reaching that result, he compared the value of the
currency, in which the contract
Confederate
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was payable, with United States paper currency at the date of the contract and of the
tender.
He found that, on the 18th of June,
1803, $1 In United States currency was worth
currency; and that on
$5.20 in Confederate
the 14th of February, 1864, the value was
§1 to $13.01. The court confirmed the report,
Dec. 15, 1874; and decreed that the Inteiv
locutory decree previously rendered be carried into execution.
Bissell thereupon appealed to this court. Bee declining to join in
the appeal.

William A. Maury, for appellant.
McCrady, for appellee.

Edward

MR. JUSTICE HUNT, after stating the
case, delivered the opinion of the court.
It is objected that there is a fatal defect
of parties complainant.
The point of this ob-

jection is that Henry Heyward and William
C. Bee were not able together to make a title
that ought to be satisfactory to Bissell, and
hence that the decree should be reversed.
The will of William C. Heyward took effect only upon his death. Until the occurrence of that event, the devisees therein named had no more title to or interest in the
property in question than If their names had
in the will. If he had
not been mentioned
consummated
his contract with Bissell by
executing a deed of the property, this would
have worked an absolute revocation of the
The execution of
devise as to this property.
the contract (with the partial payment thereon) was a transfer in equity of the title of
the land to Bissell; leaving in the representatives of William 0. Heyward simply a naked
title as trustee for Bissell, to be conveyed
By the terms
upon performance on his part.
of the will, this legal title was vested in

William

C. Bee,

the trustee

to preserve

re-

mainders.

Henry Heyward was tenant for life, and as
such offered to convey to Bissell, "by feoffment, and livery of seisin, and to procure the
release of right of entry and action by Wilfor preservliam C. Bee, the remainder-man
ing contingent remainders;" and he avers in
his bill that this would have made a good
and effectual conveyance of the legal estate.
Bee held the legal title under the will, and
his title to the legal estate continued in force
as long as the remainders were contingent;
and there is nothing in any part of the record showing that such was not the condition of tlie title when Heyward offered to
convey, and that it is not so at the present
time.

Chancellor Kent says (4 Kent, Comm. p.
"The trustees are entitled to a right of
entry in case of a wrongful alienation by the
tenant for life, or whenever his estate for
hfe determines in his lifetime by any other
The trustees are under the cognimeans.
zance of a court of equity, and it will con25G),
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trol their acts, and punish them for a breach
of trust; and if the feoffment be made by
the purchaser with notice of the trust, as was
the fact in Chudleigh's Case, a court of chancery will hold the lands still' Subject to the
former trust. But this interference of equity is regulated by the circumstances and
justice of the particular case. The court
may, in its discretion,
forbear to interfere;
or it may and will allow, or even compel,
the trustees to join in a sale to destroy the
contingent remainder, if it should appear that
such a measure would answer the uses originally intended by the settlement."
To this
he cites many authorities.
We think this objection is not well taken.
Was there error in the amount decreed to
be paid?
One of the statements of fact in the case
sets forth that Bissell tendered the money;
and fails to state that he deposited it, or in
any manner set it apart or appropriated it
for the purpose of the tender.
The other
states that he used the money he had thus
provided.
The legal effect is the same. To
have the effect of stopping interest or costs,
a tender must be kept good; and it ceases
to have that effect when the money is used
by the debtor for other purposes.
Roosvelt
V. Bank, 45 Barb. 579;
Giles v. Hart, 3
Salk. 343; Sweatland v. Squire, 2 Salk. 623.
The defendant insists that the value of the
Confederate notes should be reduced to gold
or sterling exchange, which would still farther depreciate their value.
By
This objection cannot be sustained.
the laws of the United States, all contracts
between Individuals could then be lawfully
in the legal-tender notes of the
discharged
United States. These notes, and not gold or
sterling exchange, were the standard of value to which other currencies are to be reduced to ascertain their value.
Knox v. Lee, 12
Wall. 457; Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1;
Dooley v. Smith, 13 Wall. 604; Rev. St. S. C.
p. 285.
notes, although without the
Confederate
authority of the United States, and, indeed,
in hostility to it, formed the only currency
of South Carolina at the date of the transactions in question.
United States currency
was unknown, except when found upon the
person of the soldiers of the United States
taken and held as prisoners.
Confederate
notes can in no proper sense
be treated as commodities merely.
The contract in question was made payable in terms
in dollars; but both parties agree in writing
that Confederate-note
dollars were intended.
The $20,000 was paid in Confederate notes;
and, when the defendant tendered his $100,000, he tendered it in Confederate
notes as
dollars, and he obtained them by selling sixty-three bales of cotton for Confederate dollars. Stewart v. Salamon, 94 U. S. 434.
Decree affirmed.
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WETZLER
(47 N.

Supreme

J.

W.

184,

V.
78

DUFFX.
Wis.

Court of Wisconsin.

170.)

Nov.

25,

1890.

Appeal from circuit court, Asliland county;
K. Parish, Judge.

Cole & O'Keefe, for appellant.
Foster, for respondent.

Sleight

&

TAYLOR, J. The facts in this case are
substantially as follows:
On the 14th of
j\Iay, 1887, the plaintiff agreed to convey to
the said defendant a certain lot of land situate in Ashland county, described as follows:
"Commencing at the north-west corner of lot
No. one, (1,) in block No. six, (6,) of the village of Hurley, according to the recorded
plat thereof; thence east twenty-five (25)
feet; thence south ninety (90) feet; thence
west twenty-five (25) feet; and thence north
ninety (90) feet to lue place of beginning,"
—for the consideration of $2,500 agreed to be
paid by the defendant.
That on the same
day the plaintiff executed a deed of conveyance to the said defenaant, which both parties supposed contained a correct description
of the property sold to the defendant;
but,
in fact, the description was imperfect, and
does not describe the land sold and intended
to be conveyed.
The description in the deed
is as follows:
"The following described real
estate situated in the county of Ashland, and
state of Wisconsin, — to-wit: commencing at
the north-west corner of lot number one, (1,)
in block number six, (6,) in the village of
Hurley, according to the recorded plat thereof; running thence west twenty-five
(25)
feet; thence south ninety (90) feet; thence
east twenty-five (25) feet; thence north ninety (90) feet to the original point of beginning." Said deed was recorded in the proper
olBce, and on the same day the
executed
and delivered
to the
plaintiff a mortgage upon the property sold
by the plaintiff to the defendant, in which
mortgage the property is correctly described,
to secure the payment of $1,000, part of the
The complaint alleges the
purchase money.
non-payment of a part of the money due upon the mortgage, and asks judgment, first
to correct the description in the deed from
the plaintiff to the defendant, and for a judgThe
ment to foreclose the said mortgage.
answer admits all the material allegations
of the compla!int, and further admits that,
supposing the plaintiff's deed had conveyed
to her the land she purchased, she went into
the possession of the same, and paid $300
of the sum secured by said mortgage; that
on the 27th day of June, A. D. 1887, a fire
broke out In the frame store building situate on said lot, and It was wholly destroyed
having no insurance
by fire, the defendant
thereon, thereby destroying the greater part
It
of the value of saidilot to the defendant.
is admitted that this frame building was on
the lot when the plaintiff agreed to convey
recorder's
defendant

the same to the defendant, and at the time
the deed was in fact made, and the mortgage back to the plaintiff given to secure
the $1,000, part of the purchase price.
The
defendant
also alleges in her answer that,
at the time she purchased
the lot of the
plaintiff, the building on said lot was insured by the plaintiff for the sum of $800,
in a reliable insurance company;
and that
he agreed to transfer said Insurance policy
to the defendant, for the sum of $40, to be
paid by the defendant;
and that the plaintiff neglected and refused to transfer said
insurance policy to the defendant, to her
damage.
The defendant also alleges a refusal on the part of the plaintiff to make a
good deed of conveyance
of the property
actually purchased by her, and sets up, as
a counter-claim,
a demand for the money
actually paid by her upon such purchase.
The action was tried by the court, and, after
hearing the testimony
offered by the respective parties, the court decided in favor
of the plaintiff and gave judgment reforming the deed and for a foreclosure of the
mortgage.
The defendant excepted to the
findings of fact and conclusions of<law. After a careful reading of the testimony,
we
think it veiy clear that the findings of fact
are fully sustained by the evidence, and th^
conclusions of law, and the judgment thereon in favor of the plaintiff, are clearly right.
The learned coimsel for the defendant contends that the judgment is erroneous, because it clearly appears from the findings
and the evidence that, before the commencement of this action, and before a perfect
deed had been given by the plaintiff to the
defendant, for the real estate in dispute, the
building situate thereon had been burned;
and so the plaintiff could not make a perfect
title to the premises sold to the defendant,
the house burned being a very material part
of the lot sold. He argues that when a party
agrees to convey real estate to another for a
fixed price, and when a considerable portion
of such price is paid for the buildings situate
thereon, and such buildings are destroyed by
fire, without the fault of the purchaser, before the title is conveyed to him, he may
refuse to take a conveyance,
and recover
the purchase money already paid, and to this
he cites Thompson v. Gould, 20
proposition
Pick. 134, and Wells v. Calnan, 107 Mass.
514.
We think this case is clearly distinfrom the cases cited.
guishable
In those
cases the buildings on the premises were destroyed before the time for making the deed
had arrived, and It does not appear in the
case last cited that the purchaser had taken
In the case
possession under his contract.
at bar, the contract was a sale to be paid
for on delivery of a deed, and the deed was
to be delivered immediately.
A deed was delivered which was supposed to convey the
land to the defendant, and she took actual
possession, as owner thereof, gave back a
mortgage
to secure part of the purchase
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money, the other part having been paid in
cash.
We think it very clear that, when
this imperfect deed vs'as given, the pmrchase
price paid, and possession taken of the property intended to be conveyed by the defendant, the whole equitable title, at least to the
land, vested in the defendant; and while
such equitable title was vested in the defendant, the house was destroj^ed by fire.
Upon its destruction the defendant did not
seek to avoid her contract, but rebuilt on the
lot, and continued in the actual possession of
the same up to the time of the commencement of this action.
Under such a state of
facts, we think the defendant must be considered the owner of the premises at the
time of the fire, and the loss must fall on
her. Whether we would feel bound to follow
the decisions of the court of Massachusetts,
had the defendant been in possession of the
lot under a contract for a deed to be executed at some future time, and before that time
had arrived the house had been destroyed
by fire, without the fault of either party,
need not be determined In this case. For all
practical purposes, the defendant was the
owner of the house and lot when the fire
occurred, and the Massachusetts
cases place
their decision upon the ground that the actual owner must stand the loss. In addition
to this, when the court by its judgment corrected the deed, the legal estate became vestfrom the time of the
ed in the defendant
execution and delivery of the deed.
The learned counsel for the appellant urges
another point as error, viz.: That the court
did not make any findings upon his counterclaim for damages for a breach of contract
on the part of plaintiff to transfer to her the
policy of insurance he held upon the building
at the time the same was burned.
We have
looked into the testimony which bears upon
that question, and think it ig entirely insufli-

clent to sustain a finding thereon in favor of
But the counsel for the dethe defendant.

OF CONTRACTS.

661

fendant insists that, if It be admitted that
is insufficient to sustain a finding in favor of the plaintiff, still, it was error
for the court not to make a finding on the
question.
The exceptions of the defendant
are not sufficient to raise that question in
this court.
The record does not show that
he called the attention of the court to the
matter, or that he asked the court to make a
finding on that point.
All he did was to
except to the findings because there was no
finding on that question.
These exceptions
are not made in court, and probably never
came to the knowledge of the court until he
was asked to sign the bill of exceptions in
the case.
The rule was established in this
court in Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 59 Wis.
557, 560, 18 N. W. 527; Barry v. Schmidt,
57 Wis. 172, 15 N. W. 24; Wrigglesworth v.
.Wrigglesworth, 45 Wis. 255-257; Mead v.
Supervisors,
Wis. 205; Williams v. Lumber Co., 72 Wis. 487, 40 N. W. 154r— that,
if a party to an action desires any particular
finding of fact, he must call the attention
of the court to the matter of fact upon which
he desires a separate finding; otherwise, he
cannot avail himself of the neglect of the
court to make such finding. This rule is
only applicable to a case where the testimony sustains
the findings made by the
the evidence

tl

court, and there is not sufficient evidence in
the case to require, as a matter of law, a
finding different from those found by the
In
court upon some other material matter.
this case, the court having omitted to find
for either party on the counter-claim made
by the defendant in her answer, and the evidence being of such a character as would
have clearly justified the court in finding
against such counter-claim,
we must infer,
from his omission to make a special finding
on that point, that he found against the defendant's claim.
We think the case was
fairly tried, and that the judgment is right.
The judgment of the circuit is affirmed.
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PHIXIZT

V.

GUERNSEY

(36 S. B. 796,

Supreme Court

et al.

111 Ga. 346.)

of Georgia.

July

12, 1900.

Error from superior court, Richmond county; E. L. Brinson, Judge.
Action by Leonard Phlnizy against C. H.
Guernsey and others.
From a Judgment sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, plaintiff brings error. Reversed.

J. S. Lamar, for plaintitC in error. Jos. B.
& Bryan Gumming, for defendants in error.
C0j3B, J, This was an action brought for
the purpose of compelling
the specific performance of a contract for the sale of land.
According to the allegations of the petition,
the defendants,
who were the owners of a
city lot upon which was situated a building,'
entered into a written agreement to sell the
same to the plaintiff for the sum of $16,000, of
which $5 was paid when the writing was
signed, and the balance was to be paid when
the vendee should satisfy himself that the
vendors' title to the property was good. The
plaintiff had agreed to take the property, but,
though It is not affirmatively stated in the
petition, it Is clearly inferable therefrom that
The writhe never entered into possession.
ten agreement to sell the property was signA conveyance of
ed on January 28, 1899.
the property was delayed while the plaintiff
was investigating the title, and after this ina further delay was occasioned
vestigation
could not
by the fact that the defendants
have canceled a security deed which they
had given to the property, for the reason that
the holder thereof refused to cancel the same
until his bond for titles was surrendered, and
that paper had been lost by the defendants.
/ Pending this delay, on June 8, 1899, the building on the bargained premises was destroyed
no fault of the defendants.
I by fire through
1 There were at the date of the fire in full
force policies of fire insurance for amounts
The plainthe sum of $10,000.
aggregating
tiff avers his desire to comply with the contract of sale, so far as it is possible, in the
changed condition of affairs, to carry the
same into effect He alleges that he Is willing to take the land, and that the amount
to be paid by him should be ascertained by
There
the application of equitable principles.
was no agreement between the parties with
reference to the ownership of the policies of
insurance prior to the actual conveyance of
the property, though it was agreed that when
was conveyed In accordance
the property
with the terms of the contract the policies of
should be assigned to the plainInsurance
tiff. The prayers of the petition were tbat
the defendants be decreed to make to plaintiff a conveyance of the land under the terms
set forth in the contract of sale, the court
to make an abatement in the purchase price
to the extent of the value of the improvements destroyed by fire, and for general reBy amendment, prayers were added
lief.
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that, in the event the court should be of opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to an
abatement of the purchase money by reason
a
of the destruction of the improvements,
decree should be entered that upon payment
of the purchase money the defendants should
be required to make to plaintiff a deed to the
land, and turn over to him the insurance
There was a demurrer to
money collected.
the petition on the ground that the facts set
forth did not entitle the plaintiff to the relief prayed, and that on account of the chanin affairs a specific perfoi-mged condition
ance of the contract was imt)racticable.
The
court sustained the demurrer and dismissed
the petition, and to this ruling the plaintiff
excepted.
is entered
1. "When a binding agreement
into to sell land, equity regards the vendor
as a trustee of the legal title for the benefit of the vendee, while the latter is looked
upon as a trustee of the purchase money for
Bisp. Eq. (5th
the benefit ef the former."
Ed.) § 864. This rule, however. Is not applicable unless there is an ability as well as a
willingness on the part of the vendor to
convey; the purchaser not being considered
as the owner from the date of the contract
unless the vendor is prepared to convey a
1 Warv.
clear title and is not in default.
In the case of Mackey v.
Vend. p. 195.
Bowles, 98 Ga. 730, 25 S. H. 834, it was
held that if, after the parties had entered
into a binding executory contract to sell, the
property
was damaged before the vendor
was in a condition to convey, the loss fell
upon the vendor, and not on the purchaser.
The loss in that case arose out of the destruction by fire of a building situated upon
the land which was the subject-matter of the
sale. See, also, in this connection, Kinney v.
Hiekox, 24 Neb. 167, 38 N. W. 816; Thompson
Applying the princiv. Gould, 20 Pick. 134.
ples above alluded to to the. present case, as
the vendee had not gone into possession before the fire, and the vendors were not,
prior to that occurrence, in a position where
they could make to the vendee an unincumbered title to the property, they were the
owners of the property at the date the fire
occurred, and the loss resulting therefrom
If the contract has
must fall upon them.
been so far completed that the vendee Is to
be treated as the owner of the premises, then
the loss falls upon him, as was the case in
Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. 349, where it was
held that when there was a contract for the
sale of houses, which, on account of defects
in the title, could not be completed, — the
treaty, however, proceeding upon a proposal
to waive the objection upon certain terms,—
and the houses were burned before the conveyance, the purchaser was bound if he accepted the title; and the fact that the vendor allowed insurance on the houses to expire on the day on which the contract was
originally to have been completed, without
notice to the vendee, makes no difference.
Is,
2. The next question to be determined

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
was entitled to collect the insurance?
As has been seen, the loss occasioned by the
flre fell upon the vendors, and it would seem
that the Indemnity against loss should belong
to them.
This is, we believe, the rule in
such cases. If the contract of sale had been
so far completed
that the vendors would
have held the legal title as trustees for the
vendee, thdn they would likewise have held
title to the policies in the same capacity.
But, as they were the owners of the property to the extent that the loss occasioned
by the fire fell upon them, they will also be
treated as owners of the property so far as
the right to the insurance on the building
In Poole v. Adams, 33 L. J.
Is concerned.
(N. S.) 089, it was held that a purchaser of
property insured, which was destroyed by fire,
does not by the mere fact of purchase acquire a right to the insurance money. It has
been held in some cases that, where a contract of sale is so far completed that the vendor Is to be treated as the trustee of the
vendee, I'.ie vendor would also hold in trust
for the vendee a pciicy of insurance which
was on the property at the time the contract
was made, and that, if a loss by fire occurred between the date of the contract and
the time fixed for the delivery of the deed,
the vendor would be compelled to account
to the vendee for the insurance money collected on the policy, as he was in equity the
owner of the property at the time of the
Keed v.
fire, and the loss fell upon him.
See, also, InsurLukens, 44 Pa. St. 200.
21 Pa. St. 513; Wilance Co. V. Updegraff,
liams V. Lilley, 67 Conn. 50, 34 Atl. 765, 37 L.
R. A. 150; Grange Mill Co. v. Western Assur.
The rule is thus
Go. (111. Sup.) 9 N. B. 274.
stated by the supreme court of Ohio in Gilbert V. Port, 28 Ohio St. 276 (Syl., point 8):
"As between vendor and vendee under a
valid and subsisting contract of sale of real
of insurance,
by a policy
estate, covered
where a loss insured against occurs after the
date of the contract and before conveyance,
the true test for determining for whom the
money recovered on the policy belongs, in the
absence of stipulations governing, is to determine who was the owner, and which party
actually sustained the loss." As in the present case the loss fell upon the vendors, they
were entitled to collect and hold the money
due by the insurance companies on the poli-

■who

cies Issued on the property.
3. When there has been a binding agreement to sell Improved real estate, and before
the property is conveyed the Improvements
by fire
upon the property are destroyed
without the fault of the vendor, will a court
of equity compel, at the Instance of the vendee, a specific performance of the contract?
of the Civil Code declares:
4041
Section
"The vendor seeking specific performance
must show an ability to comply substantially with his contract in every part, and as to
all the property; but a want of title, or other inability as to part, will not be a good

answer to the vendee seeking performance,
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who Is willing to accept title to the part,
If
for the other.
receiving compensation
the defects in the vendor's title be trifling
or comparatively small, equity will decree
for
at his instance granting compensation
such defects." The section quoted is but a
modification of the general rules recognized
by courts of equity in reference to application for the specific performance of con"It is settled that immaterial detracts.
ficiencies will not deprive the vendor of his
right to have the contract performed as
against the vendee, provided that the deficiencies are such as may be compensated in
money.
Under such circumstances, the vendee may be compelled to take the property,
and a suitable deduction will be made in the
But, if the deficiencies are material
price.
and important, the vendee will not be compelled to take the property. He is entitled
to have what he bargained for. and it would
obviously be extremely unjust to force anything upon him which he had not designed
or contracted to buy. If there is a failure in
that which is an inducement to the purto take."
chase, he will not be compelled
Bisp. Eq. (5th Ed.) § 389. In Gould v. Murch,
70 Me. 288, it was held:
When the owner
of land with a building thereon agrees to
convey it at a future day on payment of the
purchase money, and before payment and
conveyance the building is destroyed by flre
without the fault of either party, the loss
must fall upon the vendor; and, if the building formed a material part of the value of
the premises; the vendee cannot be compelled to take a deed to the land alone, and pay
See, also. Smith v.
the purchase money.
Cansler, 83 Ky. 367; Wells v. Calnan, 107
Mass. 514; Powell v. Railroad Co., 12 Or.
488, 8 Pac. 544;
Kinney v. Hickox, 24 Neb.
167, 38 N. W. 816; Huguenin v. Courtenay,
21 S. C. 403.
It may be stated as a general
rule that, where property which is the subject of a contract of sale has been substantially damaged or materially changed between the date of the contract of sale and
the time when the vendor offers to convey,
the courts will not decree a specific performance of the contract at the instance of the
vendor.
The reason for this Is apparent.
The vendor has no right to force upon the
vendee something which he has not agreed
to buy. The rule is different, however, when
the application for specific
performance
comes from the vendee. There is a manifest
reason for this difference.
The vendee has
a right, if he sees proper to do so, to accept
less than he bargained for, and compensation for the loss of that which he does not
If, for any reason, the vendor canobtain.
not convey to the vendee substantially what
the contract calls for, of course a specific
performance of the contract according to its
terms Is Impossible.
Such obstacles to a
specific performance may arise from a defect in the title to some portion of the premises bargained for, or from the fact that
the interest of the vendor is different from
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that described In the contract, or the property may be subject to liens or incumbrances, or, if the subject of the contract Is land.
It may be deiicient in quantity or quality
"In such a case there are only
or value.
three possible alternatives for a court of
equity to pursue: Either to refuse its remedy entirely; or to enforce the contract Vfithout any regard to the partial failure, compelling the purchaser to take what there is
to give, and to pay the full price, as agreed;
or to decree a conveyance of the vendor's
actual interest, and allow to the vendee a
pecuniary compensation or abatement from
the price proportioned to the amount and
value of the defect In title or deficiency in
the subject-matter."
Pom. Cont. § 434. In
the same connection the author just quoted
says:
That the first alternative might often
contravene the wishes and interests of both
parties, and cannot, therefore, be taken as
the universa. rule.
That the second one
would be extremely unjust and inequitable,
though it is occasionally resorted to when
the vendee is not in a situation which entiThat
tles him to favorable consideration.
the third is based upon equitable principles.
It endeavors to preserve the rights of both
parties, and is therefore constantly resorted
to and applied by courts of equity in aid of
although under
a vendee, and sometimes,
more and greater restrictions, in aid of the
vendor.
But that there are circumstances
under which even a vendee is not allowed
In section
to avail himself of the doctrine.
"If the purchas435 the same author says:
er is willing and desirous to take the partial
interest which the vendor can convey, and
especially If ue is the party calling upon the
court for relief, there can be but little difficulty in granting him the remedy of performance,
with a reasonable compensation
Mr. Bispham, In his work
for the defects."
on the Principles of Equity, thus states the
rule: "It may sometimes happen that defects exist which render the property less
valuable than the contract price, but which
nevertheless may not be of so vital a character as to induce the purchaser entirely to
throw up his bargain. In such a case the
equity of specific performance with compensation comes mto play for the benefit of the
He is entitled to have the agreement
vendee.
carried out, and yet at the same time to
or allowance made by
have an abatement
Bisp. Eq. (5th Ed.)
reason of the defects."
See, also. Fry, Spec. Perf. (3d Ed.)
§ 390.
2 Story, Bq. Jur. (13th Ed.) §
§§ 1222, 1223;
7T9; 2 Suth. Dam. (2d Ed.) § 589, p. 1311;
22 Am.
2 Beach, Mod. Eq. Jur. §§ 624, 627;
& Eng. Enc. Law (1st Ed.) pp. 942, 943; Barbers V. Gadsden, 6 Rich. Eq. 284, 62 Am.
The text-books and cases cited
Dec. 390.
show that the doctrine of specific performfor defects when
ance, with compensation
the vendor cannot convey exactly what his
contract calls for, is thoroughly established,
and it is in rare cases where the court will
refuse such relief at the instance of the
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It is true that In nearly If not
vendee.
quite all of the cases the inability on the
part of the vendor to convey what the contract called for arose from some fact which
was In existence at the time the contract of
sale was made, such as defects in the title
to a part of the premises, deficiency In quantity or quality or value of the property
which was the subject-matter of the contract, and the like. There does not seem,
however,
to be any good reason why the
principle should not be applicable where the
inability of the vendor to convey a part of
that which his contract stipulated for arose
subsequent
to the making of the contract,
out of some transaction in which the vendee
was not involved; and the fact that the
vendor was himself without fault would not
seem to be an obstacle which would prevent
Requiring a
the application of the rule.
vendor to pay damases to his vendee for a
failure to convey property which subsequent
to the execution or the contract of sale was
destroyed by fire is no greater hardship than
requiring a vendor to pay damages on account of his having ignorantly, though honestly, and after the exercise of all possible
diligence, bargained away something which
he did not own, but which he believed was
his own. That he would be required to pay
damages in the latter case, no one will
That he should be in the former
doubt.
case, ought not, it would seem, to be questioned, upon principle. In Lombard v. Chicago Sinai Congregation,
64 111. 477, which
was a case of an executory contract for the
sale of real estate, where the vendor was
to furnish an abstract of title, and, if not
satisfactory, he was to have the option of
perfecting the title, or annulling the contract
and returning the money paid, and the abstract failed to show title, and the vendor
failed to exercise his option, after notice to
do so, until after buildings thereon were destroyed by fire, the vendor still remaining in
possession, it was held, on a bill by the vendee for the specific performance of the contract as to the land, and compensation for
the buildings and property destroyed, that
the contract was not so complete as to make
the land the property of the vendee, so as to
throw upon him the loss of the buildings,
and that upon specific performance being
ordered the vendee was entitled to compensation for the loss, to be deducted from the
purchase money, and that the vendor was
I
j entitled to Interest on the unpaid purchase
' money only irom the time a good
title to
the property was shown, the vendor being
entitled to the rents and profits up to such
time.
The case just referred to is the only
one which has been called to our attention
which is at all similar to the present case.
Upon principle, however, we have no hesitancy In holding that the vendee in a case
like the present is entitled to have a conveyance made to him of the land, and compensation for the loss of the building, provided the loss thus sustained Is capable of
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computation.
If the plaintiff sustains liis
allegations, a decree should be entered that
the defendants convey to him the land
which was the subject-matter of the contract, and that the purchase price be abated
in such an amount as is just and reasonable
in view of the changed condition of the
property.
4. If the difference
in value between the
interest contracted for and the interest that
can be conveyed is incapable of computation,
of course the court will not undertake to enter a decree for specific performance,
with
compensation
for defects.
But, as has been
said, in the light of many adjudicated cases,
"It is conceived that the court will seldom
now consider a difficulty of this kind insuperable." Fry, Spec. Perf. (3d Ed.) § 1240. We
do not think the present case falls within
the rule above referred to, as it seems to us
that the amount which should be allowed to
the plaintiff as compensation
for the loss
sustained by him in not obtaining a conveyance of the land with the building on it can
be made the subject of exact computation.
Let it be kept in mind that the pV.mtiff is
entitled to be placed, so far as property and
money will place him, in exactly the same
position that he was in on the day that the
contract of sale was entered into. If on that
day the property was worth more than he
agreed to pay for it, he is entitled to the
profit on his bargain. If, on the other hand,
the property was worth less than he agreed
to pay for it, he must suffer the loss.
Let
it be ascertained what was the market value
of the property with the building on it on the
day that the contract was entered into.
Let
it also be ascertained what was the market
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value of the lot without regard to the building on that day. If the market value of the
improved
lot was more than the contract
price, the difference between these two sums
would be the profit that the plaintiff would
Deduct the
have realized on his bargain.
amount of profit from the market value of
the lot alone, and the sum remaining will be
the amount
which the plaintiff should be
If the market value of the
required to pay.
property and the contract price are the same,
then the plaintiff should be required to pay
a sum which would equal the market value
of the lot without the building. If the market value of the whole property was less
than the contract price, then the plaintiff
should be required to pay the market value
of the lot without the building, and in addition to this the difference between the market value of the lot and building and the
contract price, provided that in no event
should the plaintiff be required to pay more
than $16,000.
While we find no rule for computing the amount of compensation in such
cases, we think the above rules are in accordance with equitable principles, and are deducible from the general rules which seem
to have been recognized by the courts and
See, in this connection.
text writers.
Smith
79 Ga. 410, 7 S. E. 258; 2
V. Kirkpatrick,
Suth. Dam. (2d Ed.) pp. 1311, 1312; 2 Beach,
Mod. Eq. Jur. § 629; Wilcoxon v. Calloway,
67 N. C. 463; Fry, Spec. Perf. (3d Ed.) §
1239.
The prayers of the petition were broad
enough to authorize
relief along the lines
above indicated.
The court erred in sustaining the demurrer, and the case should be tried
in the light of what is here laid down. JudgAll the justices concurring.
ment reversed.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

666

LEONARD

V.

(35 N. m 474,
. Supreme

Court

CRANE
147

of Illinois.

et

al.

111. 52.)

Oct. 27, 1893.

Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson county; E. D. Youngblood, Judge.
BiU by Elizabeth A. Leonard against J. McKendree Crane and others. A cross bill was
A decree was entered
filed by Isaac Crane.
dismissing the biU and granting the prayer
Afof the cross biU. Complainant appeals.
firmed.

The other facts fuUy appear in the following statement by PHILLIPS, J.:
A biU was filed by appellant for specific
performance, and substantially alleges that
complainant, in consideration of certain personal property and a certain amoimt to be
paid in cash, purchased a house and lot occupied by J. McKendree Crane and wife.
It is alleged by the complainant that the contract was consummated by a deed having
been signed by the parties, which was delivered to the husband of complainant, %iho
v/as present with a notary public, by ■whom
the acknowledgment was to be taken; and it
is further claimed that the deed was acknowledged.
It is further averred by the
complainant that the wife of J. McKundree
Crane, on the morning after the trade was
consummated, got possession of the doyd for
the purpose of examining it, and refused to
surrender the same, and subsequ..'ntly debUl was filed, in
stroyed it. A supplemental
which it is alleged that J. llclveudroo Crane
and wife made a conveyance of same lot to
Isaac Crane, who at the time held a. mortIt is further averred
gage on the premises.
that after the conveyance to Isaac Crane
the premises were occupied by his tenant,
in
and appellant commenced a proceeding
forcible detainer, and recovered a Judgment
against the tenant, which was not appealed
from; and that said Isaac Crane had notice
of the claim of appellant at the time he received a deed conveying the premises to him.
The answer denies the execution and delivery of a deed conveying the premises to
complainant, as alleged in her biU, and avers
the premises were occupied as a homestead;
and that the signing of the deed by the wife
of J. McKendree Crane was procured by
threatening to institute a lawsuit against
her; and that at the time of the signing of
the said deed by said McKendree Crane he
was so intoxicated as to be wholly incapable
to do business, and the
and incompetent
complainant had potice thereof. A cross bill
was filed by Isaac Crane, which averred the
conveyance of the premises to him by J. McKendree Crane and vife, and that he entered
into possession of the same by placing on
said premises his tenant, against whom pro-

ceedings were instituted in forcible detainer;
and that said tenant conspired and colltided
with the appellant to deprive the said Isaac
Crane of possession, and neglected to sign
an appeal bond; and prays in said cross blU
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for an accounting for rents, and that the
possession of the premises may be restoi-ed
A decree was entered dismissing the
to him.
original and supplemental bills and granting
the relief prayed in the cross bill of Isaac
Crane, and appellant excepted, and brings
the record to this court by appeal.
Albert Watson and John W. Bm-ton, for
appellant. J. M. Durham and C. H. Fatten,
for appellees.

PHILLIPS, J.,

(after stating the facts.)
of this record clearly shows
the premises were occupied by J. McKendree
Crane and wife as a homestead, and were in
The testimony shows
value less than $1,000.
that a deed signed by J. McKendree Crane
and wife contained a clause relinquishing the
homestead right, but there Is no evidence to
as claimed
show that the acknowledgment
to have been made by the notary public contained any clause with that relinquishment.
By the conveyance act it is requisite that In
the deed there shall be contained a clause
waiving the right of homestead, and a similar clause must be contained in the acknowlodgmi'nt of both the husband and wife; and
the estate of homestead thus created can be
relinquished only in the mode pointed out by
This rule
the statute, or by abandonment.
is sustained by the uniform decision of tnis
Richards v. Greene, 73 111. 54; Eldcourt.
ridge V. Pierce, 90 111. 474; Trustees, etc., v.
Hovey, 94 111. 394; Browning v. HaiTis, 99
111. 459.
Where a hill is filed to restore a
of the
deed, by which deed a conveyance
homestead is sought to be consummated, the
proof must be such that it must show a deed
that would be sttfficient to convey the homestead; not only by evidence of the relinquishment of the homestead in the body of
the deed, but the acknowledgment must contain a relinquishment of the homestead, acThe
knowledged
by the husband and wife.
evidence also shows that the husband of the
complainant,
with a notary, accompanied J.
McKendree Crane to his house, and that others subsequently came to the house, and for
more than one hour efforts were made to induce the wife to sign the deed, which had
been prepared before the visit of the husband with the notary to the hotise; and the
proof clearly shows that at tlie time J. McKendree Crane was much intoxicated,
and
that both he and the complainant's husband
sought to induce Mrs. Crane to sign the deed
by persuasion; and that further, complainant's htisband said that he had purchased the
property, and that it would save her trouble
if she would sign it, and that threats of abandonment were made by her husband,
and
other threats were made by him unless she
signed the deed, and during this period of
time of more than an hour in which these
efforts were made to induce the wife to sign
this deed she was seeking to have the execution of the deed put off until next morning, claiming that her husband was too much
The evidence
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Intoxicated to do business, and claiming that
the only borne she had, and, in tears,
begging for time to be allowed to consult
with her father-in-law, but, overcome by the
persistence
with which the demand on her
to execute the deed was made, she signed the
deed, and ,1ust before signing her husband
gave her $20, which was to be her own, and
that sum she tendered the husband of the
complainant when on the next morning he
offered to pay the balance of the purchase
money, he having previously paid Crane $20.'
There is no evidence in the record showing
any acknowledgment of the deed by her other
than the simple signing of the same, nor is
there evidence showing any inquiry made of
her by the notary.
On this state of facts a court of equity may
well refuse specific performance.
It was
held in Fitzpatricli v. Beatty, 1 Gilman, 454:
"Nor will a court of equity decree a specific
performance where the contract is founded
in fraud, imposition, or mistake, or where it
would be unconscientious to enforce it." In
Prisby v. Ballance, 4 Scam. 287, it was held:
"An application for the specific performance
of a contract is addressed to the sound legal
discretion of the court, and it is not a matter
of course that it will be decreed, because
Indeed,
a legal contract is shown to exist.
the origin and ground of this jurisdiction is
that a compensation for damages is inadequate to the full measure of the parties' equitable rights. It Is not necessary to authorize this court to refuse a specific performance that the agreement should be so
tainted with fraud as to authorize a decree
that it should be given up and canceled on

it was
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account * ♦ * A specific performance wiU. not be decreed unless the agreement
hfls been entered into with perfect fairness,
misrepresentaand without misapprehension,
To the same effect are
tion, or oppression."
Race V. Weston, 86 lU. 91; Proudfoot v.
There is some conWightman, 78 111. 553.
flict In the evidence as to whether the deed
was taken from the table, after it was
signed, by the notary public or by the husband and agent of the complainant, but from
the view we take of this record that questhat

tion is immaterial.
The evidence in this record shows the personal property which was sought to be transferred as a part consideration was valued at
Leonard and Crane, and the
$300 between
weight of proof shows that tlie value of
the pro'perty was not to exceed $150; and
this fact, in connection with»the condition
in which J. McKendree Crane was, and
the circumstances imder which the signature
of the wife was obtained, are such that it
for a court of eqwould be unconscionable
uity to order a conveyance to be made. In
the absence of proof that the acknowledga clause relinquishing tlie
ment contained
rights of homestead, a court of equity cannot decree the title as vested in the complainant by reason of execution of the deed
Thus, it was not ershown by the evidence.
ror to dismiss the original and supplemental
bills of complainant; and, the complainant
having wrongfully obtained possession of the
premises as against Isaac Crane, and he being entitled to the same, it was not error to
grant the relief prayed for in the cross bill.
The decree is aflirmed.
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GRATBILL

et al. v.

BRAUGH.

20,

of Virginia.

April

1893.

Appeal from circuit court, Botetourt county.

Bill by B. J. Braugh against Mary W. T.
Graybill and otliers for the specific performance of a contract for tlae sale of land.
From a decree in complainant's favor, defendants appeal.
Reversed.
E. & E. N. Pendleton,
Benj. Haden, for appellee.

for

set aside, vacated,
and annulled, and
charging Mrs. Graybill, Lewis H. Graybill,
A. Nash Johnston, and J. H. H. Figgatt, commissioner, with notice of his option, and
with fraud in the execution of the deeds
aforesaid.
The said parties filed their demurrers and
answers, and denied the allegations and equities of the bill, and the circuit court of
Botetom-t county, by the decrees complained
of, decided that both Mrs. Graybill and A.
Nash Johnston had notice of the said option
at the time of receiving their respective
deeds, and that said option Is an enforceable
contract, and binding on all the parties, including A. Nash JchnsttJii. iuid directing A.
Nash Johnston to convey the land to E. J.
Braugh, without retaining a lien on the land,
upon the payment by E. J. Braugh of the
cash payment and first deferred payment,
and executing
bonds for the second and
third deferred payments of the purchase
money, "with security approved by the clerk
of this court," etc., "thereby substituting for
the vendor's lien to secure the deferred payments of the purchase money mere personal
security,
and that, too, not such as might
be satisfactory to the parties Interested, nor
such as should be approved by the court, but
with security approved by the clerk," etc.
Johnston did not buy the land from Lewis
H. Graybill, but from Mrs. Mary W. T.
Graybill. Lewis H. Graybill never had any
title to the land, and the interest of Braugh,
if any, by virtue of a mere naked option
to buy, which did not bind him to buy in
any event whatever, was not such an interest in the subject of which a purchaser
for value is bound to notice, or which equity
will regard. 2 Pom. Bq. Jur. § 692. Unilatbe

(17 S. E. 558, 89 Va. 895.)

Supreme Court of Appeals
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appellants.

FAUNTLEROY, J. This is an appeal
from decrees of the circuit court of Botetourt county, rendered on the 20th day of
May, 1890, and the 27th day of January,
in a chancery suit in said court de1891,
pending, in wftich B. J. Braugh is complainant and Mary W. T. Graybill and Lewis
H. Graybill, her husband, and A. Nash Johnston, are defendants.
It appears from the
record in this case that on the 12th day of
March, 1888, Lewis H. Graybill bought of
J. H. H. Figgatt, special commissioner of
the circuit court of Botetourt county, in the
cause therein pending of J. P. Thrasher vs.
Brierly and others, a tract of land in Botetourt county, Va., containing about 50 acres;
that on the 3d day of February, 1890, before the purchase money had been paid, and
before any deed had been made to Graybill
for the land, the said Graybill gave to B.
J. Braugh an option in writing and under
seal for the purchase of this land by Braugh
for the nominal consideration of one dollar,
but, in fact, nothing, it is admitted,
was
ever paid to Graybill by Braugh, not even
the one dollar for the said option.
On the
20th of March, 1890, J. H. H. Figgatt, the
commissioner aforesaid, upon the payment of
the purchase money for the land by the
judicial purchaser, Lewis H. Graybill, conveyed the land to Mary W. T. Graybill, the
wife of Lewis H. Graybill, by the direction
of said Graybill, as he was ordered by the
decree of sale to do. On the 22d of March,
1890, Lewis H. Graybill and wife conveyed
this land to A. Nash Johnston for $2,000.
At the time of this purchase Johnston was
informed that Lewis H. Graybill had given
an option to E. J. Braugh on this land for
the period of 10 months from February 3,
1890,
but that nothing had been paid by
Braugh on said option, and that it bound
Braugh to pay or do nothing whatever, and
It was therefore not binding on Lewis H.
At the April rules, 1890, of the
Graybill.
circuit court of Botetourt county B. J.
Braugh filed his bill in this suit, asserting
the said option as a binding contract, which
he prayed to have specifically performed, and
that the deed from J. H. H. Figgatt, commissioner, to Mary W. T. Graybill, and the
deed from Lewis H. Graybill and Mary W.
T. Graybill, his wife, to A. Nash Johnston,

eral or option contracts are not favored in
equity, and the want of mutuality of obligation and risk may generally be urged as bar
to their specific enforcement.
2 Warv. Vend,
"Equity requires an actual considerp. 769.
ation, and permits the want of it to be
shown, notwithstanding the seal, and applies
the doctrine to covenants,
and
settlements,
executory agreements of every description."
1 Pom. Bq. Jur. § 383.
In respect to voluntary contracts, or such as are not founded
on a valuable consideration, courts of equity
do not interfere to enforce them as against
the party himself, or as against volunteers

claiming under him. 2 Story, Bq. Jur. §
In Duval v. Bibb, 4 Hen. & M. 116,
706a.
it was held that in equity either party to a
deed may aver and prove against the other
the true and actual consideration on which
though a different
the deed was founded,
Equity
consideration be expressed therein.
disregards the form and looks to the subThe nominal consideration of one
stance.
dollar in the option, it is admitted, was never
"It is agreed by
paid, and the option says:
the parties hereto that there shall be no
obligation upon the said B. J. Braugh by
virtue of this agreement, unless within the
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period of the said ten months he pays one
third of the purchase money." He did not
sign the option, and it did not bind him to
do anything.
He attempted to make a large
profit on an investment of nothing, and without the obligation to do anything, and he
simply failed. The complainant's bill should
have been dismissed in the circuit court for
want of mutuality of obligation in the option sued upon. It professes to bind one of
the parties absolutely, and stipulates only
for the indefinite pleasure of the other; and
it cannot, therefore, be specifically enforced.
Ford V. Euker, 86 Va. 79, 9 S. E. 500. It,
moreover,
appears that neither party contemplated a sale subject to the wife's (Mrs.
Graybill's) contingent right of dower, and
in this respect this case is ruled by the case
of Dunsmore v. Lyle, 87 Va. 391, 12 S. E.
610, where specific performance was refused,
even though the bill offered to take a deed
from Lyle subject to the wife's dower. In
this case the complainant Braugh seeks to
enforce a conveyance of the land free from
the dower Interest of Mrs. Graybill, who
never signed the option, and who, on hearing of it, interposed her remonstrance immediately, and communicated her refusal to
"Specific execube bound by it to Braugh.
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tion of an agreement to sell and convey will
not ordinarily be decreed against the vendor,
a married man, whose wife refuses to join
in the deed, when there is no proof of fraud
on his part in her refusal, unless the purchaser is wUling to pay the full purchase
money,
and accept the deed without her
joining." 2 Warv. Vend. p. 769. See Clarke
Mrs. Graybill held
V. Reins, 12 Grat. 98.
the legal title to the land, and she is in no
manner bound by the option of her husband,
to which she was not a party, and against
which she protested, from the first moment
that it came to her knowledge.
Dunsmore
V. Lyle (Va.) 12 S. E. 611; McCann v. Janes,
1 Rob. (Va.) 256; Clarke v. Reins, 12 Grat.
98; Booten v. SchefEer, 21 Grat. 474; Iron
Co. V. Gardiner, 79 Va. 305; Litterall v.
Jackson, 80 Va. 604; Cheatham v. Cheatham's Ex'r, 81 Va. 395; Railroad Co. v.
Dunlop, 86 Va. 346, 10 S. E. 239. The circuit court erred in overruling the demurrer
of Graybill and wife to the complainant's
bill, and we are of opinion that the decrees
appealed from are wholly erroneous, and oui'
judgment is to reverse and annul them', and
to enter a decree here dismissing the complainant's bill.
Reversed.

'
I

'
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HALL
(16

Supreme

et al. v.

HALL

et al.

N. E. 896, 125 111. 95.)

Court of Illinois.

May

9,

1888.

Appeal from cii-cuit court, Kane
Charles KlUum, Judge.
This Is a bill for the specific performance
of an agreement entered into between the
heirs of Alexis Hall, to set aside a will made
by him, brought against the widow and minor
heirs of Eugene Hall, one of the parties to the
county;

agreement.

Sherwood & Jones, for appellants.
A. J.
Hopkins, N. J. Aldrleh, F. H. Thatcher, and
Charles Wheaton, for appellees.

SHELDON, C. J. The defense set up in
this case is that the contract of January 19,
and that,
1883, was not a complete contract,
not being complete, it is as no contract, and
so that alleged agreement cannot be specifically enforced; that the only complete contract
there could have been in the case would hare
been that of February 10, 1883, had the papers of that date all been executed and delivered, but as they were not, the attempted
contract of February 10th was not completed, and hence there is no contract whatIt would
ever to be specifically performed.
seem from the evidence that the will of
Alexis Hall, made on December 7, 1881, had
come to the knowledge of his children, and
had created a family dissatisfaction from its
giving to Eugene the larger part of the estate,
and its being executed under the circumstances it was; and that threats had been
made by the other children that they would
To reconcile this family difcontest the will.
1882, apference, the writing of November,
pears to have been made, and signed by all
the children, whereby they agreed that there
should be an equal distribution of their father's estate between his four surviving children when the time for such distribution
should come. It seems that another cause of
difficulty had sprung up between Eugene and
his sister Matilda, and her husband, from a
note for $2,300 which had been
long-standing
given by the two latter to Eugene, and was
unpaid, and for which the latter had taken
collateral securities, which had failed to be
collected from the negligence of Eugene, as
was contended. This additional difficulty was
amicably composed by these brothers and sisters by their all generously sharing equally
among them and the widow the burden of
and soon after
this Plummer indebtedness;
the death of Alexis Hall they came together,
and executed this second agreement, of JanBy this agreement aU the
uary 19, 1883.
four children and the widow agreed to settle
the demands of Eugene on Matilda Plummer
and her husband, by each bearing one-fiftiti
and they
part of the Plummer indebtedness;
renew their former agreement of November
previous to set aside the will of Alexis Hall,
and that there should be a distribution of his
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This agreement is
estate as intestate estate.
signed by the widow, who did not sign the
November agreement.
This is an agreement of a most praiseworthy
kind,— an
arrangement
amicable
among brothers and sisters of difficulties between them, which would have been carried
out to the entire satisfaction of them all but
for the sudden death of Eugene.
It is an
agreement which a court of equity will look
upon favorably, and readily interpose its speunless there be some Incific performance,
The written agreesuperable bar to prevent.
ment of January 19th is plain, clear, and full;
it bears upon its face evidence of ample consideration, and is of itself a complete contract.
That this would be an obligatory contract, although it was understood at the time
that there should thereafter be a more formal
instrument drawn up and executed to express
estabthe parties' agreement, is abundantly
Fowle v. Freeman,
lished by the authorities.
9 Ves. 351; Chinnock v. Marchioness of Ely,
4 De Gex, J. & S. 638; Pratt v. Ra!ilroad Co.,
21 N. Y. 305;
Wharton v. Stoutenburgh, 35
All there is that can be urged
N. J. Eq. 266.
against the completeness of this written contract of January 9th is that it omits to state
one alleged term of the contract which was
then made, viz., that Eugene was to have the
home farm at an appraisal to be fixed by apmatter,
praisers.
This is an independent
separate and distinct from the two subjects
of agreement named in the writing, — the
Plummer indebtedness, and the setting aside
of the will. The bill does not ask to have
performed a contract resting partly in a writing and partly in parol.
It does not depend
upon, or seek anything whatever resj^ecting,
but it
the alleged parol part of the contract;
is the defendants
who are placing reliance
upon this parol part of the contract, setting
it up in defense, and in defeat of the performance of the contract in writing. If the
defendants would not have the enjoyment of
the parol part of the contract,
and so not
have the benefit of what they contracted for,
there would be some equity in such a defense.
The heirs of Eugene allege, against
the performance of tliis written contract, that
he was to have the home farm, and that this
is not expressed in the writing. But if he
does not get the home farm, and the other
children convey their interest in it to him or
his heirs, there would seem to be no equity
in such a defense of the mere omission of the
vmting to say that Eugene was to have the
home farm at a price to be fixed by appraisers. And just such is the case presented
here.
Two of the children, Stephen A. and
Matilda Plummer, have executed agreements
for conveying to Eugene their interest in the
home farm. The other of the three children,
Mrs. Summers, is ready and willing, and
offers by the bill, to make a like agreement
for conveyance of her interest in the home
farm; so that the defendants do or will, under the offer of the bill, get the entire benefit
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the parol part of the contract
There is no
equity, then, in the defense which is set up,
that this parol part of the contract was not
expressed in the writing of January 9th; and
we think the authorities establish that such a
defense is not sustainable where the defendant gets secvu-ed to him all the benefit of the
parol portion of the contract. In Railway Co.
V. Winter, 1 Craig & P. 57, a bill by the company for the specific performance of a written contract for the purchase of real estate,
where there had been a subsequent parol
agreement that the company should also pay
for timber on the land, and for certain expenses, performance was decreed, subject to
the parol variation; and Lord Chancellor Cottenham said: "This is not a case within the
meaning of those decisions in which the court
tias said that it' will not specifically perform
the contract with a variation. If the court
finds a written contract has been entered into, and the plaintiff says, 'That was agreed
upon,' but then there were certain other terms
added, or certain variations made, the court
liolds that in such a case the contract is not
in the writing, but in the terms which are
verbally stated to have been the agreement
between the parties, and therefore refuses
specifically to perform such an agreement.
On the other hand, it is quite competent for
the defendant to set up a variation from the
written contract; and it will depend upon
the particular circumstances
of each case
whether that is to defeat the plaintiff's title
to have a specific performance,
or whether
the court will perform the contract; taking
care that the subject-matter of this parol
agreement
or understanding is also carried
into effect, so that all parties may have the
benefit of what they contracted for."
See
Robinson v. Page, 3 Russ. 114; Price v.
Dyer, 17 Ves. 357. In 3 Pars. Cont. (5th
Ed.) 389, the author says: "It is a principle
of equity jurisprudence that parol evidence is
admissible to rebut, but not to raise, an equity; and this principle or rule gives rise
Although,
here to an important distinction.
a defendto resist a specific performance,
ant may show by parol that the written document does not fully represent the contract
between the parties, and thus defeat the bill,
or compel the plaintiff to accept a performance with a variation, yet a plaintiff cannot
have a decree for a specific performance of
contract with a variation upon
a written
In Park v. Johnson, 4 Alparol evidence."
len, 259, after a review of the English cases
the court says:
"The
upon the subject,
weight of authority seems clearly with the
plaintiff on this point, [of having specific
performance, where ready to take the written
agreement, and fully to perform the omitted
stipulation;] and, while the court would refuse to give them aid in compelling the lit-
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eral execution of a written contract which
does not contain the whole agreement, they
allow the objection to operate no further
than to require the party seeking the aid of
the court to modify the written contract so
as to embrace all the stipulations that are
alleged to have been omitted or subsequently
varied."
When Mr. Aldrich met the parties on February 10th he brought with him five papers, namely: (1) The agreement between the
four children to set aside the will; (2) an
agreement between the widow and children
to settle the Plummer indebtedness;
(3) a
renunciation of the will by the widow; (4) an
agreement
Stephen
between
A. Hall and
Eugene A, Hall for a conveyance by the
former of an imdivided one-fovirth of the
Alexis Hall farm; (5) a like agreement between Mrs. Plummer and Eugene A. for conveyance of a like undivided one-fourth.
The
first three were on that day executed by all
the

parties

there

present,

and

delivered

to

Mr. Aldrich; Mrs. Summers being the only
party absent.
The first three papers contained, essentially,
nothing more than the
agreement
by
of January 19th, amplified
legal verbiage;
and the signing of them by
Mrs. Summers was of no moment, as she had
signed the 19th Januaiy agreement.
The
other two agi'eements for conveyances
by
Stephen A. and Mrs. Plummer were also
signed by them, respectively,
on February
10th.
A like agreement for a conveyance
by Mrs. Summers,
who was absent, was
thereafter to be executed by her, which she
has ever been ready and willing, and offers
by the bill, to execute.
Whatever of incompleteness there may be in these papers
of February 10th, or any one of them, has
no bearing, as we conceive, upon the present
bill. It does not call in aid that transaction,
and in no way depends upon it.
The bill
is rested wholly upon the agreement of January 19, 1883, and asks the specific performance of that agreement.
As the specific performance is only asked subject to the defendants having all the benefit of the alleged
parol part of the agreement which is claimed
to have been made, we are of opinion the
complainants
are entitled to have the agreement of January 19, 1883, specifically performed.
It is claimed that the defendant Marion
O. Hall has a dower interest in the land.
Whether that be so or not is no objection to
a decree of specific performance against the
heirs of Eugene A. Hall. Any decree of
conveyance might be made subject to whatever right of dower, if any, Marion O. Hall
may have in the land.
The decree will be reversed, and the cause
remanded
for further proceedings
in conformity with this opinion.
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KBLSET

et al. v.

CROWTHER

(27 Pac. 695, 7 Utah,

Supreme Court of Utah.

et al.

519.)

Sept. 12, 1891.

Appeal from district court. Salt Lake county; Elliot Sanford and T. J. Anderson,
Judges.
Suit in equity by Lewis P. Kelsey and J.
K. Gillespie against W. J. Crowther, J. T.
Lynch, and William Glassman, to enforce a
specific performance of a contract to sell land.
Complaint was dismissed, and plaintiffs appeal.
Affirmed.
P. L. Williams,

Waldemar Van Cott, and
Arthur Brown,

O. W. Powers, for appellants.
for respondents.

BLAOKBURX, J.

This is a suit In equity
performance
of the
following contract: "Salt Lake, Utah, September 13, 1887.
Received of Lewis P. Kelsey and J. K. Gillespie the sum of fifty dollars, being part consideration of the purchase
price, to wit, $2,750.00, at which the undersigned agrees and contracts to sell, and by
good and sufficient warranty deed convey,
free of all liens, to said Kelsey & Gillespie,
the following described lot of ground, to wit:
The east thirty (.30) acres of the south half
of the southwest quarter of section three, (3)
township one (1) south, of range one (1) west,
of Salt Lake meridian. Said purchaser to
have after this date thirty (30) days for the
examination of the title of said premises, and.
In case said title is adversely reported on by
the attorneys of the said purchasers, then the
hereby receipted shall
said part consideration
be at once returned to said purchasers;
but
if said title is approved I hereby contract
and agree to and with said Kelsey & Gillespie that I will at once, on the payment of
said balance of agreed purchase money, towlt, ?2,700.00, duly execute, sign, and acknowledge a full and perfect warranty deed
conveying to said purchasers the entire title
to said premises, and I agree to at once furnish an abstract of title to said premises
The complaint
and other needful papers."
alleges a tender of the money, although an
abstract was not fmrnished, a demand for a
The andeed, and the failure to make same.
swer is a specific denial of the allegations of
A trial was had by the court,
the complaint.
findings of fact, and a judgment that the
complaint be dismissed, from which judg^
The testimony
ment the plaintiffs appeal.
is all In the record, and we do not deem it
important to review the findings of fact made
by the trial court. The claim of the appellants is that the evidence does not justify
the judgment. It shows that the contract
was signed and delivered on the 13th day of
to

enforce

the

specific

September, 1887 r that the defendants
failed
altogether
to furnish an abstract; that at
no time within the 30 days did the plaintiffs
offer to pay the purchase money and demand
a deed, but on the 31st day, October 14, 1887,
defendant Crowther went to the office of
plaintiffs, and told Kelsey, one of the plaintiffs, that he did not come round yesterday,
and that his time was up, and Kelsey said
that he had forgotten it, and Crowther further told him that he had forfeited his $50;
but he further said— but this Kelsey denies
—he offered him back the $50.
This occurred on the street in front of the office of
plaintiffs, Crowther being in his buggy with
his wife; and Kelsey went immediately into his office, and brought a bag with money
in it, and said, "Here is your money," but
Crowther drove off, and refused to wait.
Kelsey says the amount of money required
was in the bag. Kelsey further says that
the offer of the money was on the condition
that Crowther's wife would also sign the
deed. We think this judgment must be affirmed.
1. The contract Is an option.
The plaintiffs had 30 days in which to tender the money and demand a deed. By the terms of the
they did not have 31 days, and,
contract
having failed in that time to tender the money, they lost their right to enforce the conNor do we think the failure of the
tract.
defendant to furnish an abstract extended the
time.
It might make him liable for damages, but not enlarge or change the terms
of the contract.
2. It does not appear from the evidence in
this case that the plaintiffs have not a full
and complete remedy at law for all the damages they may have suffered by reason of
any and all breaches of this contract, if any
were committed by the defendant Crowther;
and as a rule specific performance of contracts Is not enforced in equity, where the
parties injured by breach of contract can be
completely compensated in a suit at law.
3. The plaintiff Kelsey says that he offered the money on the condition that the wife
of the defendant Crowther would sign the
deed. A husband cannot contract away his
wife's right of dower.
A court of equity has
no power on the husband's contract to compel a wife to relinquish her dower rights.
Therefore the offer of the money was upon a
condition that could not be compiled with,
and that was not obligatory upon the defendant, and that a court of equity could not
enforce, and was no offer at all. 3 Pom.
Bq. Jur. § 1400 et seq. We see no reason for
the reversal of this judgment
It is therefore affirmed.

ZANE,

C.

J.,

and

MINER, J.,

concur.
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COMBS
(45 N. W.

V.

SCOTT

532,

et aJ.

76 Wis. 662.)

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

April

29,

1890.

Appeal from circuit court, Liincoln coun; Ghakles M. Webb, Judge.
Curtis & Curtis, for appellants.
Courta of equit.y will not decree specific
performance in the case of stale or suspiWalker y. Jeffreys, 1 Hare,
cious claims.
348; Heaphy v. Hill, 2 Sim. & S. 29; Williams V. Williams, 50 Wis. 311, 318, 6 N. W.
Rep. 814; Anthony v. Leftwich, 3 Rand.
fVa.) 238; Pigg v. Corder, 12 Leigh, 69;
Madox V. McQuean, 3 A. K. Marsh. 400;
Ruff's Appeal, 117 Pa. St. 319, 11 Atl. Rep.
553; Railroad Co. V. Bartlett, 10 Gray, 384;
Haughwout V. Murphy, 21 N. J. Eq. 118;
Merritt v. Brown, Id. 401; Johns v. Norris,
22 N. J. Eq. 102; White v. Bennett, 7 Rich.
Ea. 260; McDermid v. McGregor, 21 Minn.

ty

111.

Bump & Hetzel, for respondent.

Oeton, J. This is an action for specific
performance, brought by the plaintiff,
Harrison Combs, against Walter A. Scott,
trustee of the estate of Thomas B. Scott,
deceased, and his heirs as defendants, of
" May
1, 1882.
the following contract, viz. :
In consideration of one dollar and other
valuable considerations, to-wit, settlement
of all suits, actions, differences, and matters of difference, I agree to give to Harrison Combs, of Applington, Iowa, on or
before July 1, 1882, a good and sufficient
deed in fee-simple of all my right, title, and
interest of, in, and to the stump lands
now own, lying within one and
vsrhich
one-halt or two miles of Hay Meadow
creek, in Lincoln county, Wisconsin, not
being adjacent to and along Prairie river,
all in town thirty-two, in ranges six and
seven, and town thirty-three, in ranges six
and seven ; the intention being to conve.y
to said Combs all the lands lying on and
along Hay Meadow creek from below, adjacent, and above the dam on said creek,
not including cedar lands on lower end of
Hay Meadow, or lands below the meadow; the intention being to include all
stump lands opposite, above, and in the
vicinity of the dam of Combs, on Hay
Meadow creek, — lands that the outlet of
hauling off timber that would go to Prai[Signed]
rie river not to be included.
Thomas B. Scott, [Seal.] In presence of
"
The plaintiff alleged in
D. W. McLeod.
his complaint that he demanded a conveyance of said lauds of Thomas B. Scott in
his life-time, and that he refused so to convey the same ; and that he demanded a
conveyance of the same of the defendant
Walter A. Scott, the trustee of said estate,
and that he also refused so to do; and that
he has no adequate remedy at law for the
breach of said contrar-t, and that said
lands have greatly increased in value since
the breach thereof; and that he owns a
mill in the vicinity of said lands, built for
the purpose of manufacturing the timber
thereon, which will be greatly depreciated
in value in case said lands are not conveyed to him. The plaintiff also alleged
the location and description of said lands,
according to the terms of the contract, to

I

HUTCH.& BUNK.BQ.— 43

OP CONTRACTS.

673

consist of certain 40 acre tracts lying in
townships 32 and 33, ranges 6, 7, and 9, in
Lincoln county. Wis., appended to the
The defendant Walter A.
complaint.
Scott, as such trustee, answered said complaint, and alleged that said contract was
incomplete, and that it was intended thereby that the plaintiff and Thomas B. Scott
should thereafter select and locate said
lands, and agree to such selection, and
that the plaintiff neglected to cause such
selection to be made for more than four
years, and until the death of said Scott,
and that now it is impossible to ascertain
what la.nds were intended by said contract.
He denied that said list of lands, so appended, contained the lands contemplated
by the agreement, excepting, perhaps,
about seven 40-acre tracts in township 32,
In range 6; and alleged, further, that he is
ignorant of many of the facts alleged in
the complaint, and that it is now impossible, by reason of the death of his father,
Thomas B. Scott, to execute said memorandum, and that the plaintiff ought not
to have specific performance of the same,
on account of his laches and unreasonable
delay in attempting to enforce the same.
On the trial both parties introduced testimony to show what lands were intended
as "stump lands, " and what lands come
within the boundari s mentioned in the
contract, and the testimony relating thereto was quite contradictory, but the circuit court found, upon what appears to
have been, perhaps, a preponderance of
the testimony, and as correctly and accurately as practicable and possible, thatcertain 29 of said 40-acre tracts were the lands
witliin theintent and meaning of said contract; and rendered judgment that the defendant Walter A. Scott, as such trustee,
convey the same to the plaintiff. From
that judgment this appeal is taken.
The objection to this judgment that has
peculiar force, and makes the strongest
appeal to a court of equity, is that specific
performance ought not to have been adjudged in this case on account of thelaches
and unreasonable delay of the plaintiff in
bringing his suit. The contract is dated
May 1, and was to be performed July 1,
Thomas B. Scott died October 7,
1882.
1886, and this action was commenced in
April, 1888. These lands, July 1, 1882, when
the contract was to have been performed,
according to the testimony of the plaintiff
himself, were of the value of only $10 for
each 40-acre tract, and at the time of the
trial they were worth from 20 to 50 times
as much, or from $200 to $500 for each 40acre tract. The timber on these lands has
become much more valuable by the long
dela.y, and a railroad has been built, and
is in operation, through these lands, and
the country generally has been greatly improved since July 1, 1882. The plaintiff
has never taken any care of the lands,
and has neglected to pay any taxes on
them, and has allowed many of them to
be sold for taxes; and Thomas B.Scott,
in his life-time, paid all the taxes on them,
and redeemed them trom previous sales for
taxes; and the defendant, as trustee, has
paid all the taxes since the death of Thomas B.Scott, at an expense of many hundred
dollars, — many times as much as the value
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of the lands when the contract was made.
The enforcement of the contract at maturity would have been of merely nominal
expense and damage to Thomas B. Scott,
but w^ill now impose an enormous claim
upon his estate of many thousands of dollars. There was a delay of over four
years while Thomas B. Scott was living,
and nearly two j'ears since, before bringing the suit, and without extenuation or
It would be difficult to find a case
excuse.
in the books of greater change in the situation and value of the lands, and the circumstances material to the relief occasioned by the delay, or in which specific performance has ever granted under such circumstances. Although it may not be impossible to select, locate, and identify the
lands within the intention of the contract,
It has certainly been rendered much more
difficult and uncertain by the death of one
of the parties whose personal knowledge
would seem to be requisite, if not necessary , to determine what lands were meant
by "stump lands," and the meaning of the
other unusual conditions of the contract.
The material testimony of Thomas B.
Scott has been utterly lost by the delay.
He refused to convey the lands, and could
do no more than to await the suit of the
plaintiff for the .specific performance or for
the breach of the contract. The plaintiff
waited until the statute of limitations had
nearly run on the contract before bringing
his suit. " It is a settled principle that a
specific performance of a contract of sale
is not a matterof course, but rests entirely
in the discretion of the court, upon a view
of all the circumstances. " Chancellor
Kent, in Seymour v. Delancey,6 Johns. Ch.
"A matter not of absolute right in
222.
the party, but of sound discretion in the
court." 1 Story, Eq. .lut. § 769. "Specific
performance will not be decreed when for
'
It is
any reason it would be inequitable.
an application to sound discretion.'"
Chief Justice Ryan, in Williams v. Williams,
"The unques50 Wis. 311, 6 N. W.Rep. 814.
tionable jurisdiction * » » Is not compulsory upon the court, but the subject of
discretion." Lord ERSKixE.in Eadcllffe v.
AVarrington,
12
Ves. 331. The learned
counsel of the appellant has cited in his
brief numerous authorities to the same
effect, but the principle is elementary, and
the above authorities are sufficient. In
consideration of the peculiar circumstances
of this case, we cannot but think that it
would be an abuse of sound discretion to
grant such relief. "Unreasonable delay in
bringing suit for the specific performance
of a contract to convey will be a, defense to
the relief, especially where the other party
has made improvements in the mean time,
or the property has greatly increased in
value. " Johns v. Norris, 22 N. J. Eq.
The delay of only about two years
102.
was held sufficient to defeat the action in
Haughwout V. Murphy, 21 N. J. Eq. 118, and
Merrittv. Brown, Id. 401. Where one party
to the contract has notified the other party
that he will not perform it by refusing to
convey as in this case, acquiescence in this
by the other party, by a comparatively
brief delay in enforcing his right, will be a
bar to this remedy. McDermid v. McGregor,
Change in the circumstances
21 Minn. 111.

OF (CONTRACTS.

of the parties, and in the situation of the
subject-matter of the contract, the destruction of evidence, and the death of one of
the parties to the contract, who if living
could makcclearwhat his successor might
not be able to explain, are mentioned in
Anthony v. Leftwich, 3 Rand. (Va.) 238, as
reasons for denying the relief. InEuff'sAppeal, 117 Pa. St. 319, 11 Atl.Eep. 553, a railroad had been built, which brought the
lands within reach of market, and greatly
enhanced their value, andsome ofthelands
had been sold, and the plaintiff laid by
for years while these changes were going
on. It was held inequitable to decree speThat was very much
cific performance.
like this case. The lands have been sold
for taxes, and yet the plaintiff waited until they became vastly enhanced in value
by railroad and other improvements.
Specific performance will not be enforced if
for any reason it is inequitable to do so.
Williams v. Williams, supra. The following authorities enforce the principle that
laches and unreasonable delay in bringing
suit will defeat an action for specific performance of a contract to convey. Pom.
Spec. Perf . §§ 407, 408, and cases cited ; Frv
Spec. Perf. §§ 1072, 1078, 1079; Eads v.
Williams, 4 I)e Gex, M. & G. 691; Watson
V. Eeid, 1 Russ. & M. 236: Southcomb v.
Bishop of Exeter, 6 Hare, 2^6; Harrington
V. Wheeler, 4 Ves. 686; Alley v. Deschamps,
13 Ves. 225; McWilliams v. Long, 32 Barb.
194; Delavan
v. Duncan, 49 N. Y. 485;
Davison v. Associates, 71 N. Y. 3.S3; Henderson V. Hicks, 58 Cal. 364; Taylor v.
Merrill, 55 111. 52; Smith v. Lawrence, 15
Mich. 499; Holt v. Rogers, 8 Pet. 420; Preston V.Preston, 95 U.S. 200; State v. West,
See other cases cited in appel68 Mo. 229.
lants' brief. The reasons are abundant
why equitable relief should be denied in
this case. The disparity in the value of
the lands, of from 20 to 50 fold over their
value when the contract was made, as of
when it was to have been performed, is ample reason to leave the plaintiff to his legal
remedy for the breach of the contract.
In analogy to all other like cases, as in
the sale of personal property, or for breach
of the covenant of seisin in deeds, the plaintiff would be entitled only to recover the
consideration paid and interest, or the difference between that and the value of lands
when they ought to have been conveyed,
or at most, and by the most liberal rule,
the value of the lands at the time of the
breach of the con tract. The equitable remedy in this case would be so extravagantly
greater than at law that it would scarcely
seem to be in the same case.
Being compelled to remit the plaintiff to his remedy
at law, the rule of damages in such a case
may as well be considered. The rule seems
not to be uniform in the different courts.
In Loomis v. Wadhams, 8 Gray, 557, a case
much like this, where the lands had to be
selected, the rule was that the plaintiff
might recover the value of the lands that
might have been selected at the time the
conveyance ought to have been made.
Where the vendor acted in bad faith in refusing to convey on account of the enhanced value of the land, the damages
were the difference between the contract
price and the enhanced value when the
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conveyance
should have been made. 1
Sedg. Dam. top p. 368; Baldwin v. Munn, 2
Wend. 399; McNair v. Compton, 35 Pa. St.
23. In Key v. Key, 3 Head. 448, the rule
was the consideration paid and interest,
whether the vendor acted in bad faith or
not. The rule in the supreme court of the
United States is the price of the land as
settled by the contract at the time of its
breach. Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109.
This is in analogy to the sale of personal
property. In Gale v. Dean, 20 111. 320, the
rule was the value of the land at the time
of the breach of the contract. It would
seem that in the majority of fases the rule
is the consideration money and interest,
or the difference between the consideration
and the value of the land when it should
have been conveyed. It would be fruitless to examine the cases to any greater
extent. In cases of property consideration,
or cases where the consideration is other
than money, or barter contracts, the value
x}i the land at the time of the breach is the
rule from necessity, and as approximating
nearer to what the plaintiff has lost.
Brigham v. Evans, 113 Mass. 538. The rule
in such a case as this has not been settled
in this state. For non-delivery of chattels, the damages are their value at the
time when they shall have been delivered,
and interest to the time of trial.
Ingram V. Rankin, 47 Wis. 406, 2 N. W. Rep.
755.
In Hall v. Delaplaine, 5 Wir-. 206, it
was a contract to convey, but with some
peculiar features, and the rule was the conIn Yenner v.
sideration and interest.
Hammond, 36 Wis. 277, the penalty was
fixed in the contract, but Chief Justice
Ryan discusses the rule in such cases, and
leaves the question open whether, in some
cases, the vendee may recover damages in
excess of the consideration and interest.
The rule, so far as it has been considered
by thiscourt is, unquestionably, that nothing in excess of the consideration and interest can berecovered, or perhaps I ought
to say that such is the general rule. This
Tule is in harmony with cases of breach of
the covenant of seisin. Rich v. Johnson,
2 Pin. 88; Messer v. Oestreich, 52 Wis. 684,
In this case the considera10 N. W. Rep. 6.
tion is very small and indefinite. The contract is based on a final settlement of suits
and other matters between the parties.
The learned coun.sel of the " appellant has
of course the
well said in his brief that
amount claimed in these suits would afford no criterion as to the amount the
plaintiff was to receive, " or, I may add,
that it was understood by the parties he
did receive, by the contract. The best, if
not the only, criterion of that amount,
would seem to be the value of the lands at
the time the contract was made, or when
the deed was to be made, which would be
the same thing; for there is no evidence
that their value had changed in the mean
time. That would be the most favorable
rule to the plaintiff that could be adopted
Such a rule, we have seen,
in this case.
has been sanctioned in many cases, and, If
applied to this case, must stand as an exception to what I understand is the general rule already estabhshed by this court,
in consequence of the impossibility of ascertaining with any certainty the consid-
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eration of the contract In money or values.
The real consideration must have been
very small in amount,

and scarcely more

than nominal, for it appears that Thomas
B. Scott paid the plaintiff, on such settlement, the sum of $5,000 in money. The
value of the lands, at the time the deed
was to be made, was only $10 for each 40
acres, or $290 in gross, according to the
testimony of the plaintiff himself. That
sum, and interest thereon to the time of
the trial, is all the compensation in money
the plaintiff is entitled to recover, and of
this he, at least, has no reason to complain.
The question remains, what can be done
with this suit? The usual practice would
be to dismiss this complaint, and leave the
plaintiff to proceed in an action at law to
recover his compensation in money for the
breach of the contract by the defendant. But it seems that the statute o(
limitations has already run on the contract, and the plaintiff has no remedy at
law. We have concluded, therefore, that
the circuit court ought to retain this suit
in equity, to do complete justice between
the parties.
The usual rule in equity is, if
the court cannot grant the relief prayed,
to grant such relief as the party is entitled
to upon the facts, and in cases of specific
performance, if for any reason the title
cannot be conveyed, to hold the case for
compensation to the plaintiff. Story, Eq.

Hall
§ 19, and cases there referred to.
Delaplaine, supra. But in this case the
court deems it inequitable to adjudge the
conveyance of the land, notwithstanding
the defendant is able to convey. This is
an unusual case for retaining jurisdiction
in equity to grant compensation, but
there does not appear to be any reason
why it may not be done as well as in cases
of inability of the defendant to convey, on
the w^ell-known principle that a court of
equity, having obtained jurisdiction for
one purpose, may retain it for another, to
give full relief, or to do justice between the
parties, pertinent to the facts of the case.
"
When the impossibility of a specific performance is disclosed at the hearing, and
the suit was brought by the plaintiff in
ignorance of such fact, the court will
award the remedy of damages. " Pom.Eq.
Jur. § 1410, and note. In Hopkins v. Gilman, 22 Wis. 476, a bill was filed for specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate, and to execute a lease, and the court
held that such relief could not be granted.
The present chief justice says in his opinion : "Now, although the facts alleged are
insufficient to justify a decree for specific
performance, yet we think a court of equity may retain the suit for the purpose of
awarding compensation for the value of
Undoubtedly an acthe improvements.
tion for damages for non-performance of
the contract would be the usual remedy.
But must this suit be dismissed, and the
plaintiff turned overto that remedy alone?
It seems to us not, but that the court,
having acquired jurisdiction of the cause,
should provide and grant any relief consisten t with the case made by the complain t and embraced within the issue;"
citing Tenney v. Bank, 20 Wis. 152; Leonard V. Eogan, Id. 540 ; Greason v. KetelJur.
V.
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tas, 17 N. Y. 491 ; and Barlow v. Soott, 24
N. Y. 4ft. We think this case comes within the principle and practice of that case,
and may be retained for the purpose of
awarding compensation as above determined. The circuit court applied the same
principle in giving compensation to the
plaintiff for one 40-acre tract, which had
been sold and conveyed for non-payment
of taxes, but in doing so adopted a rule of
by any authority,
damages unsupported
by giving the plaintiff the present value
thereof. The present attitude of this case
was not anticipated sufficiently for the
counsel to argue or cite authorities upon
the above question, but to save time and
expense, and make a full disposition of the
case in this court, and determine the mandate to be sent to the circuit court, we
have concluded to decide all questions necessary to a full disposition of the case.
We think that the selection and location
of the lands, and the identification thereof,
made by the finding of the circuit court,
should be taken as the lands within the
meaning of the contract, and $10 for each
40-acre tract thereof should be taken as
the value of said lands at the time when a
conveyance thereof was to be mode according to the contract, and interest thereon from that time to the time of the trial,
as full compensation and damages for the
breachof said contract by the said Thomas
B. Scott, deceased, and by the defendant
as trustee of his estate, and judgment
But this,
should be rendered accordingly.
we think, should be left optional with
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said defendant, or to have a new trial
to determine what lands are within the
intent and meaning of said contract, and
the value thereof on the 1st day of July,
1882, the time fixed in said contract for
We do not think
the conveyance thereof.
that the contract is so uncertain that
it cannot be executed or enforced, and
we think that the finding of the circuit
court as to the lands embraced in the contract, and the value thereof at $10 for each
40-acre tract at the time aforesaid, are supported by the evidence, and are as near
It is doubtful if
correct as practicable.
the result of another trial to determine the
same facts would be of any advantage to
either party. But inasmuch as the defendant contends that the finding of what
lands are embraced within the contract is
not supported by the evidence, and as the
retaining of the suit for damages to avoid
the operation of the statute of limitations,
and the rule of damages established, are
favorable to the plaintiff, we have concluded to make a new trial in the case optional with the defendant. The judgment
of the circuit court is reverse<l, and the
cause remanded, with directions to render
judgment for the plaintiff in accordance
with this opinion, or to grant a new trial
at the option of the defendant, to determine the above facts, viz. : (1) Whatlands
are embraced in the contract; and (2)
their value on the 1st day of July, 1882;
and to render judgment accordingly.

Lyon,

J., took

no part.
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Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
June 26, 1889.
Appeal from circuit court, Braxton county; Henry Bkannon, Judge.
This was a chancery suit, brought September 12, 1887, in the circuit court of Braxton
county. The bill was filed at October rules,
1887, and it alleged that the plaintiff, L. M.
Frame, was the son of "William B, Frame,
deceased, who was a former resident in said
That the plaintiff lived with his
county.
father, and worked, aided, and assisted Iiim
on his farm till the plaintiff married, on May
1, 1855.
That the said father owned seven
or eight different tracts of lands in said
county, and, being desirous of compensating
the plaintiff for his services and of starting
him in life, proposed to him, if he would go
upon a certain tract of land, situated on the
south side of Elk river, aljoiit one mile from
Frame's mill, in said county, — containing
100 acres, — and cultivate and improve the
same, that he would give him said land, and
make him a deed therefor.
This tract was
granted to said William B. Frame by the
commonwealth of Virginia, by patent dated
September 30, 1846, a copy of which is filed
with the bill, and shows the metes and
bounds of this tract. That the plaintiff accepted the proposition, and, on or about May
12, 1855, moved upon said tract of land, and
has ever since lived upon said land, claiming, as the bill says, and holding, the same
adversely to all the world, — and further alleged that the plaintiff's possession has been
open, notorious, und exclusive from that day
to this, — a period over 32 years, — and he
still owns, possesses, and claims the same.
Some years after the plaintiff moved upon
said tract of land, his father became the
surety of one A. W. Wilson, on a constable's
bond, in the month of May, 1868. Being apprehensive that he might be made liable, by
reason of such suretyship, for the default of
said Wilson, he determined to convey all of
his lands to his two sons, John W. Frame and
Thomas J. Frame; and accordingly, by deed
bearing date the 26th of May, 1868, — a copy
of which was filed with the bill, — he conveyed to his said two sons seven different
tracts of land, one of the said tracts being
the same tract which 13 years previously he
had granted to the plaintiff, and placed him
in possession of. Why his father, William
B. Frame, included the plaintiff's tract of
land in said conveyance, the plaintiff is not
advised.
"Certain it is that it was never intended by his father or by his brothers to deprive him of the ownership or possession ol
said tract of land, even if tliey could legally
His said brothers well knew
have done so.
all the facts in relation to the agreement unof said
der which he went into possession
imland; well knew his long possession,
provement, and cultivation of the same, and
well knew he was entitled to a deed therefor.
In fact, they never disputed the plaintiff's
Supreme

right to said land, never attetnpted to oust
him from the possession thereof, never set
up any claim thereto, not did any act in the
least tending to assert a claim thereto, exThe character of
cept as hereinafter stated.
said conveyance was well understood by the
said William B. Frame and his said two
sons, the said William B. Frame remaining
in possession of said lands, except the tract
sold to the plaintiff, until his death, and paying taxes therein, except the tract owned by
the plaintiff, the taxes upon which were paid
It was not until July,
by the said plaintiff.
1886, that either of said brothers did any act
which in the slightest asserted any cliiim to
the plaintiff's land. On the 1st day of July,
1886. John H. Frame, by deed of that date,
conveyed an undivided half of five of said
tracts of land, including the tract owned by
the plaintiff, to George Goad, trustee, to secure to Jelenko & Bro. the sum of $482.54,
evidenced by a negotiable note of that date
and payable six months after date, also to secure to Jelenko <& Loeb the sum of $536.54,
evidenced by note of that date, payable six
months after date, with provision that upon
default of payment of said notes, or either of
them, said trustee should, upon request of
the holder of said notes or either of them,
sell the said undivided half of said land acA copy of said
cording to law, for cash.
deed is here filed as part hereof, marked 'ExBro.
hibit Ko. 3.' The firm of Jelenko
Jacob Jelenko
composed of the defendants
and Gustavus Jelenko, and the firm of Jelenko & Loeb is composed of the defendants
William Jelenko and Charles Loeb. At the
time of the conveyance by John H. Frame
to said George Goad, trustee, the plaintiff
was still in the open, notorious, and exclusive possession of said 100 acres of land, and
by law the said George Goad and Jacob
Jelenko and Guslavus Jelenko and William
Jelenko and Charles Loeb had constructive
notice of the rights of the plaintiff to said
100 acres of land, and his ownership thereof,
and, in addition thereto, hacl actual notice of
That on the 22d
such right and ownership.
day of August, 1877, the said John H. Frame
having made default in the payment of said
notes, the said George Goad, as trustee, sold
the said undivided one-half of said five tracts
of land, including the plaintiff's tract of 100
acres, at public auction, to the highest bidder, at which sale the said defendant Charles
Loeb became the purchaser of said undivided one-half of said five tracts of land, including the land of plaintiff, at the price of $700.
about to conThat the said George Goad
vey the same to the said Loeb by a deed
The plaintiff says that the
as such trustee.
said deed from William B. Frame to his sons
Thomas J. and Jolm H. Frame, and the
trust-deed from the said John H. Frame to
the said Goad, constitute
cloud upon the
title of the plaintiff to said 100 acres of land;
and the deed from Goad to Loeb, when made,
adwill still further cloud his title. He
vised that he has
right to have said clouds
removed, and to have specific execution of
cS;

et al.
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his said contract, made with his said father,
and the legal title to said land conveyed to
him. He therefore asks that said contract
be specifically executed ; that the said George
Goad be restrained and enjoined from conveying the undivided one-half of said 100
acres to the said Charles Loeb; that the said
Frame, George
John H. Frame, Thomas
Goad, and the parties secured by said deed of
trust, be held to have no interest in said 100
acres of land; that the clouds arising from
the conveyance
hereinbefore set out be removed by this honorable court; that the said
Frame, and
John H. Frame, Thomas
George Goad be required to unite in a deed
conveying said 100 acres of land to the plaintiff, and that he have such other, further,
and general relief as the court may see fit to
grant."
The parties defendant to this bill were the
plaintiff's said two brothers, and the trustee
George Goad, and said two firms secured by
said deed of trust, and Charles Loeb, the purchaser of this tract of land at the public sale
under the deed of trust. The exhibits referred to in tOe bill were all filed witli it.
The following is the answer of Thomas J.
Frame, filed December 5, 1887: "To the
Hon. Henry Brannon, etc. — Defendant, for
answer to said bill, says that he does not desire to controvert the right of the said L. M.
Frame to have specific execution of his contract, as set out in said bill, and he here tenders a deed for all his right, title, and interest in the said 100-acre tract of land, and,
having answered, asks to be hence dismissed,
with his costs.
Thomas J. Frame."
The
deed referred to in this answer was filed with
this answer, and thereupon this order was
made: "Thomas J. Frame this day filed his
answer to plaintiff's bill, to which the plaintiff replies generally, and the said Thomas
Frame, having by his answer tendered a deed
for all his right, title, and interest in the
tract of 100 acres of land in the bill mentioned, which deed is accepted by the plaintiff, it is ordered that this cause be dismissed
as to the said Thomas J. Frame, but be retained for further proceedings against the
other defendants; and said L. M. Frame
hath leave to withdraw said deed from the
"
papers of this cause.
rules,
1887, all the other
At the October
other than John W. Frame filed
defendants
their joint and several answers, which were
as follows: "These defendants,
for answer
to said bill, say that it is true, as alleged in
the plaintiff's said bill, that defendants Jelenko & Bro. and Jelenko & Loeb were creditors of .John H. Frame in the sums and at
the times set out in the plaintiff's biU, respectively, and for which the said John H.
Frame, in order to secure them in their re,
day of
spective sums on the
to the defendant George
188-, conveyed
Goad, trustee, his undivided half interest in
the five tracts of land in the plaintiff's bill
mentioned, situated on Elk river, near
Frame's Mill, in Braxton county, among

J.

J.
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which was a tract containing 100 acres,
claimed by plaintiff in his bill filed in this
cause.
It is also true that the said undivided half interests in the said five tracts of
land conveyed to the sp.id George Goad, trustee, as aforesaid, were on the 22d day of August, 1887, by order of the defendants Jelenko & Bro. and Jelenko & Loeb, sold by the
said George Goad, trustee, after giving notice
as required by law, at public auction, at the
front door of the court-house of Braxton
county, for cash, to Charles Loeb, at the
price of $700.00, he being the highest bidder
therefor, which amount was paid on day of
said sale by said Loeb.
A deed was obtained
by said Loeb from said trustee, on 1st day of
October, 1887, which is here filed, marked
'Exhibit No. 1,' and made part of this answer.
These
respondents deny that the
plaintiff ever had any title, or semblance of
title, to the said 100 acres of land claimed by
him in his said bill, or that his possession
thereof was adverse and exclusive for the period of time alleged in his bill, or it ever was
so held by him for any period of time from
the time his said father obtained his grant
from the commonwealth of Virginia therefor to the present time.
These respondents
here expressly deny ever having had any notice, either actual or constructive, of any
claim of title by plaintiff to said tract of land,
or of any right thereto by him whatever.
for further answer, say
These defendants,
that they are advised and believe and charge
that plaintiff never had any contract of purchase with his said father for said 100 acres
of land, but that, if he had any such contract, it was without consideration, and cannot affect the title of either George Goad,
trustee, or defendant Charles Loeb, to said
land; that if the plaintiff ever occupied, resided on, or controlled in any manner said
tract of land in the life-time of his said father,
it was a mere tenancy at will, and not under
a contract of purchase.
These defendants
also deny that William B. Frame, in his lifetime, ever made plaintiff any proposition to
the effect that if he (plaintiff) would move
upon said 100 acres of land, and improve it,
that he would give said land to him. These
defendants, having answered fully all material allegations in the plaintiff's bill charged,
pray hence to be dismissed, witli their costs
in this behalf expended, and they will ever
pray," etc.
The exhibits referred to in this answer
were filed as exhibits with it. Depositions
were taken both by the plai ntiff and by the
defendants.
The plaintiff proved by one
witness, a nephew of William B. Frame, that
the plaintiff, L. M. Frame, had had possession of and lived upon the 100-acre farm
named and described in the bill for 31 years,
—ever since 1856. That he, the witness,
went to the residence of plaintiff's father one
morning in 1856, and William B. Frame told
him he had given the plaintiff, "Lemuel,
a farm yesterday morning, " and he pointed
out this 100-acre tract, which was in sight.
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"across the river, " as the farm he had given
him; and he said he had given his other
lands to John and Thomas, his sons.
He
said that "Lemuel could go to work, or
starve."
He said they would have to give a
woman who was in the house on this farm
two bushels of corn in order to get her to
leave and give up the house to Lemuel, so he
could move in. Lemuel Frame, the plaintiff,
moved on tiie place a week or 10 days afterwards, and has been in the occupation of it
ever since. The witness proved, also, that
he had since then gotten timber trees off this
tract of land. He got the timber trees of the
plaintiff, L. M. Frame, who always cluimml
this as his farm.
These trees were sawed
for the witness at the mill of the plaintiff's father, William B. Frame, who knew
where these trees came from, but set up no
claim to them. He never disputed about
them, and never claimed that the plaintiff,
L. M. Frame, did not own this tract of land,
as he claimed.
The members of William B.
Frame's family, — his wife, sons, and daughter, and a son of the plaintiff's family, — who
were all examined, all testified they had never
heard of William B. Frame's giving his sons
John H. Frame and Thomas J. Frame any
lands in 1856, as had been testified to by
their cousin. But the daughter testified that
she had lived with her father in 1856, up to
1864, and at that time she heard him say frequently he had given L. M. Frame the farm
he claimed in this suit; that he moved on the
land within a month after it was given to
him, and has lived on it ever since.
Her
father always called it "Lemuel's plaoe."
The widow of William B. Frame, whom he
married in 1864, proves the same statement
that she heard made by William B. Frame
She never heard him say he had
frequently.
given any other lands to his other children
in 1856. The plaintiff himself testified that
he had lived on the 100-acre farm in controversy since the 18th or 20th of May, 1856;
that his father gave it to him, and he moved
on it and occupied it as his own, and he did
not occupy it as a tenant of his father. His
occupancy of it has been open, notorious, and
visible. He has cultivated the land, cleared
it, fenced it, and cut saw-logs from it. He
Tlie
cleared and fenced on it some 72 acres.
whole of this was fenced prior to 1871. He
has planted on it 800 apple-trees, and some 50
peach-trees, and, while the house he lived in
was on the land when he went there, he had
put up another house on the land; also, a log
stable.
John H. Frame and Thomas J.
Frame, his brothers, to whom he had conveyed this and other tracts of land in 1868,
frequently got timber trees off of the land,
buying them from him and not disputing his
ownership of the land. John H. Frame had
in this way bought timber from him off of
this land in 1868 and 1869. The plaintiff's
son proved that about 18 months ago his
father. Lemuel M. Frame, had offered to sell
this farm of 100 acres to one T. A. Reip at
$50 for the house and garden, and $1 apiece
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for the bearing apple-trees and walnut-trees.
Witness told John H. Frame of this oH'er,
which he had declined.
John H. Frame said
witness' father had better have reduced the
price of the trees to 50 cents, rather than
miss the sale.
He knew of John H. Frame
on several occasions buying a stick of timber
off of this tract of land and paying witness'
father for it. He proved his father had li ved
on this land from his earliest remembrance,
and he was now 30 years old.
He always
claimed the farm as his own, and every one
spoke of it as his father's farm.
He had
cleared and inclosed about three-fourths of
it. On the other fourth was a maple-sugar
orchard of 15 or 16 acres, from which his
father made sugar every year.
He knew of
his father more than once selling a stick of
timber off of this land to his grandCather,
William B. Frame. He bought one of these
sticks of wood about 1866.
William B.
Frame died in 1876.
It was also proved by other witnesses that
the plaintiff, L. M. Frame, had lived on this
tract of land some 30 years; that during all
that time he claimed it as his own farm ; that,
although it was taxed to his father, William
B. Frame, till 1868, and after that to John H.
Frame, and Thomas J. Frame, yet the taxes
were always paid by plaintiff, L. M. Frame.
He testified that about 1882 he refused to pay
the taxes on this tract of land, unless the
sheriff made out a separate receipt for this
tract, and did not have it as it had been on
the receipt for the taxes of all the lands
owned by John H. Frame and Thomas J.
Frame, and after that a separate receipt was
made out by the sheriff for this tract of land.
The defendants Jelenko & Bro. and Jelenko &
Loeb were wholesale merchants, doing business in Charleston, Kanawha county, W. Va.
John H. Frame was a retail merchant at
Frametown, Braxton county, W. Va. He
purchased
goods of these two wholesale
firms in 1882, and continued thereafter to do
so.
When he commenced doing business
with these firms they made inquiry of the
clerk of the county court of Braxton with reference to his financial condition, and what
real estate he owned, and with what personal property he was taxed, and whether
there were any liens on his property.
They
were informed that he owned a moiety of
the seven tracts of land conveyed to him and
his brother Thomas J. Frame.
They included the 100-acre tract now claimed
by the
plaintiff, L. M. Frame.
At the foot of a
copy of this deed for these seven tracts of
land from William B. Frame to Thomas J.
Frame and John H. Frame was this memorandum, sent to a member of the firm by said
county clerk:
"The only lien on record
against the above, so far as
have been able
to find, is a judgment lien against John H.
Frame, in favor of Philip Frankenberger,
for $143.90, with interest from the 13th day
of June, 1885, and $1.90 costs.
find that
John H. Frame is assessed on the personal
property book of this county with the aggre-
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gate sum of S96, consisting of 3 head of cattle, at $40; 2 hogs, $4; 1 watch or clock, at
S2; farming implements, $5; household, etc.,
$45;
have given the boundary to each
"
tract as it is in the deed above mentioned.
A member of one of the firms, Charles
Loeb, went up to Braxton county, to try and
collect the amount due them for boots and
shoes they had sold to .John H. Frame,
which amounted to S536.54.
He said he
could not pay it, but was willing to secure
them on his real estate, if they would give
him six months' longer credit.
To this
Charles Loeb, one of the members of said
firm, agreed; whereupon John H. Frame
gave his note for the balance due the firm,
payable in six months, and a deed of trust
dated July 1, 1886, on an undivided moiety
of five tracts of land, including the 100-acre
tract claimed by the plaintiff.
"When I
made this arrangement for ray firm, Jelenko
also, as the agent of the firm of
& Loeb,
Jelenko & Bro., wholesale dry-goods merchants in Charleston, settled the balance due
them from him to Jelenko & Bro., bought of
them by John H. Frame.
This balance was
$482.54, for which he executed his note to
Jelenko & Bro., dated July 1, 1886, payable
in six months, which was secured by said
deed of trust on said five tracts of land, including the lOO-acre tract claimed by the
plaintiff." This deed was executed, and duly aclinowledged and recorded in the county
court clerk's oflBce of Braxton county, on
July 2, 1886, both by John H. Frame and
The trustee in
his wife, Amanda Frame.
this deed of trust, George Goad, pursuant to
the pi'ovisions in this deed of trust, sold the
said one undivided moiety of these five several tracts of land, and Charles Loeb became
the purchaser thereof for $700, which being
paid in cash, said trustee executed and delivered to him a deed for one undivided moiety of these five tracts of land, including this
This
100-acre tract claimed by the plaintiff.
deed is filed with the answer of the defendants, it having been recorded.
A lawyer, on
behalf of Lemuel M. Frame, when these
lands were being offered for sale and before
they were sold, publicly announced that the
party purchasing this 100-acre tract claimed
by Lemuel M. Frame could not get any title
thereto, as he had claimed the land for 30
years, and lived upon it, and the trustee.
Goad, said:
"Certainly, you can only get
such title as is in me."
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J. F. Brown, for appellants.
Byrne, for appellee.
Green, J., (after stating

W. B. R.

the fojcts as
The first question presented by this
above.)
record is, will a court of equity speciiically
enforce in any case, or against any one, a
verbal gift of land from a father to a child,
as in some cases it is difficult, if not impossible, in principle, to distinguish gifts and
will, before considering directly
sales?
this question, state briefly the law in refer-

I

ence to the specific enforcement of verbal
sales of land, and the principles on which it
is based.
By the statute of frauds, passed in
1677, and a similar statute to be found whereever the common law prevails, "No action
shall be brought upon any contract or sale of
Ian I, tenements or hereditaments, or interest
in or concerning them, unless the agreement
upon which such action shall be brought, or
some memorandum or note thereof, shall be
in writing and signed by the party to be
charged therewith, or by some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized." See Code
W. Va. 1887, c. 98. The English courts, very
soon after the passage of their statute of
frauds, took the view that, while the chancery courts were as much bound by this statute as the common-law courts, yet, as it was
the peculiar province of a chancery court to
relieve against fraud, a court of chancery,
despite this statute, would specifically enforce
a verbal contract for the sale of land when
the refusal to execute the contract would itself amount to the practicing of fraud by the
defendant on the plaintiff. In so doing, they
said, they were engrafting no exception on

this statute, but simply proceedingto prevent
fraud upon general principles which prevailed
universally in courts of equity, and it would
never do to so construe the statute of frauds,
as to promote instead of suppressing fraud,
as it was intended
to do.
See Browne, St.
Frauds, § 457. If the defendant has partly
performed his part of such contract, and his
act of part performance is incapable of compensation in damages, it would obviously be
fraud on the plaintiff to permit the defendant to refuse to execute such contract because
it was verbal; and in such case a court of
equity will compel the specific performance
of such verbal contract. If, for example, the
vendor of real estate, by a verbal contract, has
delivered possession of the land to the vendee,
this will entitle the vendee who is in jwssession of the land to compel a specific perform.ince of the contract by making a deed therefor on the payment of the purchase money;
for otherwise the vendor might sue the vendee as a trespasser, and to permit him to do
so after he has put the vendee in possession
under the verbal contract would be to permit
hiui to take advantage of his own wrong, in
repudiating his obligation, and it would be
punishing the vendee, who has complied with
his own obligation.
If the vendee has taken
possession of the laud, the courts regard that
the wrong done Isy compelling him to surrender
the possession of it as a trespasser is such an
injury as could not be compensated in damages, and hence there is no other way of punishing the recalcitrant vendor for committing a
fraud on the vendee, who has complied with
his contract, by treating him as a trespasser.
The authorities supporting these views are
numerous, both in England and America.
See 2 Lomax, Dig. p. (40,) 55; 1 Story. Eq.
Jur. § 761 ; Wat. Spec. Perf . § 270. It is also
settled, both in England and America, that,
if the vendee under a verbal agreement for
the purchase of real estate expends labor or
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money in improving the snme, the contract is
thereby partly performed, and the statute of
frauds has no application to it. In such a
case the improvements by the vendee in possession constitute valuable and equitable consideration, and entitle him to specific execution of the contract which he complies with
fully on his part. There is, then, First, the
verbal agreement; second, the delivery and
taking possession of the estate in accordance
with the agreement; and, third, the expenditure of money in consequence and in faith
of the agreement; and, fourth, a complete
compliance with the agreement by the vendee, by the payment of the entire purchase
money. If the first of these circumstances
alone exists, the statute of frauds denies all
When the second ensues, tlie venremedy.
dee has partly performed his contract, and
has taken a step which would render it a fraud
on the part of the vendor to divest him of his
possession and refuse him a deed.
When the
third circumstance .follows, in expenditures
to improve the land, all the powers of equity
are summoned into action to protect the vendee on several grounds, each sufficient and
each distinct in its nature.
It will then,
when the vendee fully complies with his contract, compel specific execution by the vendor
— First, because it would be a fraud in him
to refuse it; secondly, he would profit by his
own fraud, in acquiring the improvements
with the land he sold; and, thii-dly, because
the vendee has introduced a valuable consideration, which, if he lost it, could not be restored to him, and is not ordinarily of a nature to be compensatory in damages.
These
views are well sustained by both English and
American authorities.
See 1 Sugd. Vend.
(8th Amer. Ed.) p. (151,) 226; 1 Story, Eq.
Jur.§ 761; Browne, St. Frauds, §487a; Wat.
Spec! Perf. § 280; Rhea v. Jordan, 28 Grat.
If a
683; Tracy v. Tracy, 14 W. Va. 243.
donee, being a child, under a parol gift of
real estate by a father, take possession and
expend money or labor to improve it as
against the donor, he stands upon the same
footing as a purchaser for a valuable consideration. The statute of frauds has no application to the transaction, and equity will
compel its specific performance by requiring
him to execute his deed to consummate his
gift. We will now consider parol gift speIf A. points to a house and lot, and
cially.
says to his child, B., "I give you this house
and lot," and B. says, "I accept the gift,"
and nothing more passes in reference to the
matter, a court of equity will take no cogniB., if he had paid A. for the
zance of it.
house and lot, without taking possession,
could not compel him to execute a deed, because he could have his remedy in recovering
the money he had paid, with interest, in a
court of law. A fortiori, a court of equity
will not entertain B. when he has paid nothing; and, if B. should sue at law, he can recover nothing, because A.'s promise or gift
was without consideration, — a niidum "pacThe
tum, — and B.has suffered no damages.
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and
has not changed his situation,
there is no basis for an appeal to a court of
equity to interpose. But suppose B. enters
the house and makes it his home, and goes
on to act as owner, and improves the premises by the expenditure of money or labor.
He digs ditches and enriches the land. He
builds fences for its permanent protection.
He plants out trees, clears the land and
These acts change the
lives in the house.
situation and fix the gift. Why? Because
valuable consideration has now entered into
the transaction.
The agreement of gift has
been partly performed, by acts which cannot
be undone.
A valuaVjle consideration may
be a detriment to the promisee or a benefit to
the promisor.
What was in its inception?
A promise sustained only by a good consideration — the love and affection of a father to
a child — has by such acts become in effect a
promise sustained by a valuable consideration.
It may be regarded as settled law in this
state and in Virginia that a verbal donee of
land — a child, who, under the verbal gift, has
taken possession of the land and improved it
—has a right to demand in a court of equity
a specific performance of the contract by the
execution of a deed by the father, thereby
consummating his verbal gift. This was so
held in Shobe's Ex'rs v. Carr, 3 Munf. 10, decided as long ago as 1811, and this case has
been repeatedly followed or recognized as law
by numerous Virginia decisions ever since.
See Darlington v. McCoole, 1 Leigh, 36; Reed's
Heirs v. Vannorsdale, 2 Leigh, 569; Pigg v.
Corder, 12 Leigh, 69; Cox v. Cox, 26 Grat.
There are also numerous authorities
305.
in other states to the like effect.
Freeman
V. Freeman, 43 N. Y. 34; Lobdell v. Lobdell,
33 How. Pr. 347; Shepherd v. Bevin, 9 Gill,
32; Young V. Glendenning,6 Watts, 510; Galbraith v. Qalbraith, 5 Kan. 409; Kurtz v.
Hibner, 55111. 521; McLain v. School- Directors, 51 Pa. St. 196; Neale v. Neales, 9 Wall. 1;
If,
Hardesty v. Richardson, 44 Md. 617.
however, a father give his child verbally a
farm, and put him in possession thereof, but
he neither spends money nor labor in improving the land, it is very questionable in Virginia and in West Virginia whether the child,
in a court of equity, could compel the father
It was so decided in the
to make him a deed.
cases of Stokes v. Oliver, 76 Va. 72, and Keffer V. Grayson, Id. 517. In these cases it was
held that the love and affection of a father to
a child is not enough, of itself, to warrant a
decree for a specific performance, even when
the agreement to make the gift is in writing,
But
and the child in possession of the farm.
the contrary was held by this court in Marling V. Marling, 9 W. Va. 79. But, in delivering the opinion of the court, in that case, on
express my own opinion, that,
page 95,
while such agreement need not be undersea!,
it must be a formal agreement, in writing,
duly delivered as such, and while in such case,
the consideration being good, though not
valuable, a court of equity could properly disdonee

I

682

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

pense with the seal to it, yet it could not dispense with its being a formal agreement in
writing, and a verbal agreement to give a
farm to a child could not be enforced specifically, even when the child had been put in
possession of the farm, but such agreements
of gift, when performed in part by putting
the donee in possession, have been enforced
in some states.
See Tilghman, C. J., in
Lessee of Syler v; Eckhart, 1 Bin. 380; Big.
Fraud, 386; Smith, Eq. 254, 255; Mahon v.
Baker, 26 Pa. St. 519. And it must be admitted that the reasoning which supports the
enforcement of a verbal contract of sale partly performed by the simple delivery of possession appears equally applicable when there
is a verbal gift of land by a father to a child,
accompanied by the delivering of the possession of the land. See 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 761,
and articles of John W. Daniel in the April,
1883, number of Virginia Law Journal,
where the question we are considering is elaborately discussed in an able article. Many of
the views taken in said article
have adopted

in this opinion.
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I

have thus far been discussing the right of
a donee or vendee of real estate by a verbal
agreement to enforce specifically such verbal
agreement when the donor has put the donee
in possession of the land. We will now consider whether the law is modified when the
vendee or donee in possession of the land
seeks to have his contract specifically enforced
against a subsequent purchaser for valuable
consideration of the donor, or against a judgment creditor of the vendor or donor. In the
first place, it must be observed that when the
vendee or donee is in possession of the land,
openly and notoriously living upon it, for instance, there cannot be a purchaser of the
land for valuable consideration without notice from the vendor or donor, because such
possession by the vendee or donee of itself
notice to the whole world of the
conveys
equitable title of the vendee or donee, and of
his right to the legal title; the possession of
realty being the fact of most comprehensive
and far-reaching consequences that bears upThe perfect legal title was origion its title.
nally conferred by this delivery of possession
orJiveryof seisin. A fee was not perfect
without this delivery of possession, but, if
by such delivery of possession,
accompanied
it was perfect, even though it was a mere
verbal transfer. The earth has been described
as that universal manuscript, open to the
When, therefore, a man proeyes of all.
poses to buy or deal with realty, his first duty
is DO read this public manuscript; that is, to
look and see who is there upon it and what
And, if the person in
are his rights there.
possession has an equitable title to it, he is as
much bound to respect it as if it was a perfect legal title, evidenced by a deed duly reSee 2 Sugd. Vend. 866; Sedg. & W.
corded.
Tr. Title Land, § 717; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 400;
Big. Fraud, 293, 294; Eloyd v. Harding, 28
Grat. 410; Merithew v. Andrews, 44 Barb.
207; Grimstone v. Carter, 3 Paige, 421; Had-
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duck V. Wilmarth, 5 N. H. 181; Knox v.
Thompson, 1 Litt. (Ky.)350; Tuttle v. JackBon, 6 Wend. 213; Parks V. Jackson, 11 Wend.
442; Morgan v. Morgan, 3 Stew. (Ala.) 383.
When the sale or gift of the land is by a verbal agreement, the terms of such agreement
must be definite and made out with reasonable certainty.
See Wright v. Bucket, 22
Grat. 370. By reasonable ceitainty is not
meant a mathematical certainty; but what is
meant is that the evidence adduced must leave
the court satisfied and convinced as to the
terms of the agreement, and it must be so
definite as to guide the court safely into carThe plaintiff who
rying it into execution.
seeks a specific performance of a verbal contract or gift of land, or, indeed, who seeks
the aid of a court of equity to enforce any
equitable right, must show that he has used
reasonable
diligence, and that his claim is
not a stale claim. See 1 Bart. Ch. Pr. § 23.
As there stated, it is a familiar doctrine of
the courts of equity that nothing can call them
into activity but conscience, good faith, and
Where these are wantreasonable diligence.
ing, the court is passive, and does nothing.
We will assume, first, that a verbal gift of
this 100 acres of land, patented to William B.
Frame September 30, 1846, was by him,
about May 12, 1856, made to his son Lemuel
M. Frame, and the donee then took possession of this 100 acres, exercising an undisputed ownership over it from that time, selling
timber off it to his father and others, and had
lived upon it and cleared it up and cultivated
it ever since, and that considerable time and
money had been spent by him in improving
this tract of land.
These facts the counsel
of the plaintiff, L. M. Frame, regard as
If they are really proven,
clearly proven.
with the requisite degree of distinctness and
certainty, then, on the authorities we have
cited, it would seem clear that the son of L.
M. Frame had a right to specifically enforce
this agreement against his father, William B.
Frame, provided he used reasonable diligence
in instituting his suit, and did not permit
his claim to become too stale before he brought
his suit.
It is claimed by the plaintiff, L. M.
Frame, that he was in the exclusive and uninterrupted possession of this farm, claiming
against all the world, and esiiecially against
his father, the donor, — actually selling him
timber off this land. It was unnecessary for
him to institute tliis suit while this state of
The donee, L. M. Frame,
things existed.
was not called upon to act, no one disputing
his right to the same, and he having held
There is much
possession and use of it.
strength in this view; and, so long as this
state of things existed, the court might be
disposed to excuse the plaintiff, L. M. Frame,
for not instituting this suit for a specific
How long did this state of
performance.
things exist? The record shows until May
26, 1868.
But not thereafter, for William B.
Frame, the father, exercised the most decisive act of ownership over this lOO-acre tract;
for on that day, for a consideration stated on
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the face of the deed to have been $500, he ana
his wife conveyed to their sons Thomas
and John W. Frame seven different tracts of
land, including the tract of 100 acres claimed
to have been given verbally to said L. M.
Frame 13 years before.
This put it entirely
out of his power to make a deed of this land
to L. M. Frame, knowing that he could not
acquire a valid title for this tract of land, on
which he was living, except by instituting in
a court of equity a suit for the specific performance of the verbal agreement to give it
to him, made by his father some 13 years
before. He never could have acquired a good
title to this tract of land by living upon it,
claiming it as his own, and exercising rights
of ownership over it, no matter how notorious, undisputed, and exclusive such possesFor, as he entered upon the land
sion was.
by permission of his father, who had the legal
title, his possession was admitted in subordination to his father's title, and was not,
therefore, and could not become, adversary to
his father's title, or the title of those claiming by deed under his father. See Hudson v.
Putney, 14 W. Va. 561. He knew, therefore, as early as June, 1868, that if he wanted a title to this lOO-acre tract, on which he
lived, he would have to get it by asking a
court of equity to compel the legal owners to
convey the land to him, as the true equitable
owner. It was his duty, therefore, if he did
not mean to abandon his equitable title, to
have instituted this suit in a reasonable time
after January 1, 1868. It may be said that
he did not know that his father then conveyed this tract of land to his two brothers.
But though, perhaps, we cannot assume tliat
heknew this deed was made to his brothers by
his father simply because it was promptly put
on record, yet there is his own statement in
his deposition of facts, which shows that he
did know of the making of this deed to his
brothers, for he says he always paid the taxes
on this land, though it was taxed in his
father's name until 1868, and then in the
name of his brothers ; that the tax-bill was
thus made out, and he paid the taxes on this
tract, though the tax-bills were made out
against his brothers, and that he refused to
pay them after a while, if not differently
He was thus reminded each year
made out.
by these tax-bills, that the legal title of this
land was in his father till 1868; after that,
in his brothers. It was clearly his duty, when
it was thus made known to him that he could
not acquire legal title to this land except by
suit, for him to have brought such suit with
reasonable promptness, especially as 13 years
the
had already expired since he claimed
equitable right to this land. But he did not
institute such suit for more than 19 years,
and some 32 years after the alleged verbal
promise of his father to give him this land.
In the mean time his father had died, and
one of his brothers, to whom, in 1868, his
father had conveyed this land, and the records
of the clerk of the county court showed that,
upon the fact that he owns this land, this broth-
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er had acquired a credit, and been trusted, and,
on his giving security to pay debts so owed, In
the shape of a deed of trust on his interest in
this and other lands, the trustee had sold said
interest in said land at public auction for cash.
There is a strong contrast between the care
and diligence of the plaintiff in protecting his
rights and that of the defendants.
Before
they extended credit to the plaintiff's brother,
and took this deed of trust of him, they had
the clerk's records in the county court of
Braxton, where his brother lived, examined, to
ascertain what lands he owned, and whose
liens were upon them, and all they now ask
is that, as they have used every precaution in
conducting their business, the court will not
deprive them of the security theiy took by
setting up an equitable title of the plaintiff,
of which they had no actual notice and of •
which the plaintiff must have, in the nature
of things, known that they could take no notice. They were wholesale merchants, living remote from Braxton county, in Charles-

The defendant John H. Frame was
in the mercantile business in the
county of Braxton, and his brother, (tlie
plaintiff,) who lived near him, must have
known that in conducting such business
he would buy his goods of wholesale merchants, at a distance, and thus incur debts,
and such creditors would have no means of
knowing his pecuniary condition, except as
it was shown by the records in the clerk's
oflBce of the county court.
So, by his neglect
in bringing the suit the plaintiff must have
known he was furnishing his brother John
H. Frame the means of imposing on the
wholesale merchants, of whom he was buying his goods on credit, as to his pecuniary
condition. Just what might have been expected did occur, and loss must now be sustained. Should this loss be sustained by the
plaintiff, who was so gro.ssly careless, or by
the defendants,
Who acted with caution and
Vigilantibus non dormientibus
diligence?
jura subvemunt.
But the staleness of the plaintiff's claim is
not the only difficulty in making out this case,
as presented by this record.
I have heretofore assumed that he proved the verbal gift
of this 100 acres of land from his father in
But has he proven the agreement to
1856.
make this gift with the requisite degree of
certainty and distinctness, such as a court
of equity should require, especially when it
is borne in mind that the plaintiff, who alleges this verbal agreement, asks to have it
speciflcally enforced, to the obvious loss of
purchasers from his brother for valuable
consideration, without any actual notice of
such verbal gift? The bill alleges that the
plaintiff lived with his fatlier, and worked
and assisted him on his farm, until his marriage, which occurred on May 1, 1855; that
his father at that time was the owner of seven
or eight diflereut tracts of land in Braxton
county, W. Ya., and being desirous of compensating the plaintiff for his services, and
starting him in life, pro^josed to him that if
ton.

engaged
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he would go upon a certain tract of land,
situated on the south side of Elk river, about
one mile above Frame's mill, in said county,
containing 100 acres, and cultivate and improve the same, he would give said land to
him, and make him a deed therefor. The
plaintiff accepted this proposition of his
father and on or about May 12, 1855, moved

upon said land, and has since held and claimed
the same adversely to all the world.
This
possession has been open, notorious, and exclusive from that day to this, —a period of
over 32 years. "Some years after the plaintifE
moved on this land, — in the month of May,
1868, — being apprehensive that he might be
made liable by reason of his suretyship of a
constable named Wilson, because of his default, he determined to convey all of his said
land to his two sons, the defendants Thomas
and John H. Frame.
He made them a
deed, duly recorded, a copy of which is filed
with the bill. On the face of the deed the
consideration purports to be $500 cash."
Tliis verbal agreement by the plaintiff's
father to give him this tract of land was not
an absolute promise to give him the land,
and make him a deed therefor, but was only
a conditional promise that he would do so if
the plaintifE (his sou) would cultivate and
In what way he was reimprove the same.
quired to improve the same is not stated in
the bill, if it were specilied by the fatlier at
But, as the bill states that "the
the time.
plaintiff [the son] accepted the proposition,
moved upon the land, erected a house thereon, and commenced to cultivate and improve
the same," it is very probable that the building of a dwelling-house on this farm, as a
residence for his son and his family, (he liaving marrieJ,) was an improvement required
of the son by the father. This is the more
probable as we may infer from the proof in
the case that the house then on the land was
a very indifferent one, — in fact, one not fit to
be occupied
by his sou's family as tlieir
But even this very indifferent
dwelling.
house was then occupied by a woman, who
miglit not surrender the possession of it.
There is no direct proof as to the character of
this house that was on the land, but the
plaintiff's son proves that about a year before this suit was brought his father (the
plaintiff) offered to sell to T.A. lieip the house
and garden at $50, and his brother John said
his father should have taken less than he
think, fairly infer
We may,
asked for it.
from this that the house was hardly fit for a
man and his family to occupy.
The plaintiff
testified he built a house on this land. But
assume it was a very poor house, as he continued to live in a house worth less than .$50.
When he built this house does not appear.
It only appears that the son (the plaintiff)
moved into the house on the place when the
gift was made by the father. This, the
proof shows, was not at the time he was
married, on May 1, 1855. There is nothing
said about his marriage in the evidence.
If
the agreement
was that the father would

J.
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make the deed to the plaintiff, (the son,) if
he would build a residence
on the farm and
improve it, as the bill says, such an agreement was a conditional agreement.
The building of the residence and improving the farm being a condition precedent to
the son's acquiring a right to demand a deed
of the father, and if a time was named when
the house was to be built, if I he son failed to
build the house in the specified time, or of
the character named, he lost forever a right
to demand a deed of the father.
Keffer v.
Grayson, 76 Va. 517. Some 12 years after
this parol agreement to make a gift on certain conditions to his son, (the plaintiff,) the
father actually conveyed this land to two
other sons.
"Why he did so," the bill says,
"the plaintiff is not advised.
Certain it is
that it was never intended by his father or
his brothers to deprive him of the ownership
or possession of this tract of land." It seems
to me, a probable explanation of the conduct
of the father and brothers to the plaintiff is
that, he having failed to comply with the
condition on which only the father was to
convey him the land, — that is, as surmise,
to build in a certain specified time a house of
a particular character, — he had no right to
demand a deed of his father, and his father
was at liberty to convey it to his other sons;
and this he did because of the failure of the
plaintiff to comply with the condition imposed

I

on

him by

his

father,

the plaintifE,

and

his

family, after 12 years, still living in a house
worth less than $50. The answer of the defendants to the appellee's bill denied this verbal gift by the father to his son (the plaintiff)
of this land.
This put on him the burden of
proving this parol agreement of his father to
give him this land; and the law, we have
seen, required him to prove the agreement
with definiteness and accuracy.
Has this
been done?
It seems to me, it has not. No
one who was present when the alleged verbal agreement was entered into by the father
and son for the gift of this tract of land testifies in the case to what then transpired, or
as to the terms of, or conditions attached to,
the gift.
That it was a conditional agreement we only learn from the allegations in
There is not one particle of evithe bill.
dence showing what the terms or conditions
of this gift were.
The whole proof consists
of subsequent admission by the father that
he had given this land to his son (the plaintiff) or admission by conduct or by acts that
he regarded this farm as belonging to his
son (the plaintiff.)
But such statements and
conduct are what would naturally have occurred had the verbal gift of this farm to his
son (the plaintiff) been a conditional one,
such as is set out in the bill , or such as I have
above suggested. Naturally, the father would
haveexpectedthecondition precedent attached
to the gift would in good time have been
complied with by the son, and the gift thus
perfected; and, anticipating that this would
be the case, the father would naturally speak
and act as if this farm belonged to his son,
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and though he had no right to demand a deed
for this farm unless he complied strictly with
the conditions precedent to the gift, whatever they were.
The most direct and satisfactory evidence of this verbal agreement was
deposition of a nephew of the father, giving
what was said casually by the father to the
witness the day after this verbal gift of this
farm to his son, (tlie plaintiff.) This we will
He says in his deposition taken
analyze.
October 17, 1887: "L. M. Frame, the plaintiff, has resided on this farm of 100 acres
about 31 years,
went to his father's, William B. Frame's, one morning, and he said to
me:
have made way with ray land.'
said, ' Have you ?' and he said, ' Yes.
gave
Lemuel a farm yesterday,' — and he pointed
to the 100-acre farm across the river as the one
he liad given him.
He said he let John and
Tom have the balance.
He had owned six
or seven tracts of land. He said: <Now Lemuel can go to work, or starve.' He said too,
they would have to give Nancy Jones, to get
her out of the house, two bushels of corn, before Lem could move in." Though this witness is so definite as to what was said then,
still it is obvious that his testimony is far
from being satisfactory. It gives the details
of a casual conversation in which the witness
had had no interest and which occurred some
31 years before.
We know there must have
been very substantial errors in it.
For instance, the bill does not pretend that William B. Frame gave all his land to his three
sons at that time, in 1856; but it says he gave
this one farm of 100 acres to his son (the
plaintiff) then, and the balance of his land
to his two otlier sons, John and Tom, some
12 years afterwards, and not one member of
the family, or a sin'gle other witness, ever
heard of any gift at that time of any of his
lands by William B. Frame to any of his
children except this 100 acres to his son, (the
This,
suppose, was a mistake
plaintiff.)
made by the nephew as to what his uncle,
William B. Frame, then said to him. He
This
heard this many years afterwards.
witness said the fattier said, "Now Lemuel," (the plaintiff,) "must go to work."
This does not look as if the gift was made, as
stated in the bill, "to compensate the plaintiff for his past services, and to start him in
life." He had liv«d witli his father, but we
may infer from what his father said that he
did not think his, past services deserved compensation, but rather considered that he had
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heretofore supported htm in idleness, and he
proposed to do so no longer, but he must "go
There is in this converto work or starve."
sation corroborative evidence of the small
value of the house on this 100 acres of land,
for it was supposed Nancy Jones would let
the son move into this house, and she would
give it up, for the trifling compensation of
two bushels of corn. She could not have regarded the house at all desirable to live in, if
This conshe could surrender it so easily.
versation took place before the son (the
plaintiff) had taken possession of this farm,
and when, of course, the conditional gift
named in the bill was imperfect, and when,
of course, the son had no right to demand a
deed of the father; and, though the statements and acts of the father subsequently
show simply that he had given his son (the
plaintiif) this farm, and were made after he
had taken possession, yet none of tliem are
inconsistent with the gift being conditional
and the condition not complied with, and
this, one suspects, was the case, from his
father having some 12 years afterwards
made to two other sons a deed for this farm.
It seems to me, thereforfe, that the plaintiff
has failed to show with the requisite degree
of distinctness and accuracy the terms of the
verbal agreement made by his father, giving
him this land, because of the great lapse of
time (31 years) before the institution of this
suit.
The court below ought to have dismissed
his bill at his costs.
The court below, obviously, by its order made December 5, 1887,
properly dismissed the bill as to the defendant Thomas J. Frame, he tendering with his
answer a deed to the plaintiff for his moiety
of the land, which the plaintiff was willing
to accept, but the court below erred in its decree of May 2, 1888, speciflcally enforcing
said alleged verbal contract against the other
defendants.
This decree must be set aside,
annulled, and reversed, and the appellants
must recover of the appellee, L. M. Frame,
their costs in this court expended, and this
court, entering such order as the court below should have done, must dismiss the bill
of the plaintiff, and the defendants below,
other than Thomas J. Frame, must recover
of the plaintiff below their costs expended in
the court below.
Snydek,

Brannon,

p., and English,

J.,

absent.

J.,

concurred.
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March

3, 1890.

Appeal from the circuit court of the
United States for the district of Nebraska.
This is a suit to compel the specific performance by the appellant, Cheney, of a
written agreement entered into May 28,
1880, between him and the appellee, Libby,
whereby the former demised and let to the
latter the possession and use of, and contracted, bargained, and agreed to sell to
him, two sections of unimproved land in
Gage county, Neb. The defendant claimed
that the contract was forfeited, long before
this suit was brought, by Libby's failure
to comply with its stipulations. Upon
that ground he resists the granting of the
relief asked. The circuit court adjudged
tliat the plaintiff was entitled to a decree.
The question to be determined is whether there was any such default upon the
part of the plaintiff, Libby, as deprived
him of the right to specific performance.
The sum agreed upon for the possession,
use, occupancy, and control of the land
was $1,361.60 yearly, represented in Libby's notes, and in the taxes assessed and
to be assessed against the land. The price
for the land was $8,960, of which $1,600
The
was paid at the date of the contract.
balance was to be paid, "without notice
"
in annual installor demand therefor,
ments, at the times specified in promissory
notes, of even date with the contract,
which were executed by Libby to Cheney
at Tecumseh, Neb. The notes were made
payable to the order of Cheney, at the office
of Russell & Holmes, private bankers in
that city. Eight of the notes represented
the balance of the principal debt, — each
one being for $920,— and were payable, respectively, in 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. 9, and 10 years
after date. The remaining 10 notes represented the annual interest.
Libby agreed to meet the notes as they
respectively matured, pay the taxes on the
land for 1880 and subsequent years, and,
during that year, ( the weather permitting, )
break 200 acres, and build on the land a
frame barn of 16 feet by 20, and a frame
of a story and a half.
dwelling-house
Cheney undertook to pay the taxes of 1879
and previous years, and bound himself to
convey the land, in fee-simple, with the ordinary covenants of warranty, (reserving
the right of way that might be demanded
for public use for railways and common
roads,) upon the payment by Libby of the
several sums of money aforesaid at the
times limited, and the strict performance
of all and singular the conditions of the
contract.
It was further stipulated between the
parties that "time and punctuality are
essential ingredients in this
material and
"
contract.
That if Libby failed to perform and complete all and each of the payments, agreements, and stipulations in the agreement
mentioned, "strictly and literally," the
contract should become void; in which
event all the interests created by the con-
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tract in favor of Libby, or derived from
him, should immediately cease and determine, and revert to and revest in Cheney,
without any declaration of forfeiture or
re-entry, and without any right in Libby
of reclamation or compensation for moneys paid or services performed.
That, in case the contract was forfeited,
Cheney could take immediate possession of
the land, with all the crops, improvements, fixtures, privileges, and appurtenances thereon or appertaining thereto ;
Libby to remain bound for all taxes then
assessed against the premises, and all installments of principal or interest then due
on the contract to be regarded as rent.
That whenever one-half of the purchase
price was paid, with all accrued interest
and taxes, Cheney should execute a deed,
as provided for in the contract, and take
notes and a mortgage for the remaining
payments, to run the unexpired time.
That when Libby's right to purchase
the land terminated by reason of non-performance of his covenants, or his failure to
make the payments, or any of them, at the
time specified, he should bedeemedto have
only the rights of a tenant, and to hold
the land under the contract as a lease, subject to the statute regulating the relation
of landlord and tenant; with the. right in
Cheney to enforce the provisions of the
contract, and recover possession of the
land, with all the fixtures, privileges, crops,
and appurtenances thereon, as if the same
was held by forcible detainer.
these
The agreement also contained
stringent provisions: That no court
should relieve Libby from a failure to comply strictly and literally with thecontract;
that no modification orchange of thecontract could be made, except by en try thereon in writing signed by both parties; and
that no oversight or omission to take notice of any default by Libby should be
deemed a waiver by Cheney of the right to
do so at any time.
Ijibby went into possession under the
He, and those in possession uncontract.
der him, had, prior to the commencement
of this suit on the 26th of February, 1887,
broken up and cultivated most of theland,
and made improvements thereon of a perriianent and substantial character. Nearly
all of these improvements were made prior
to the 1st of January, 1885. He met all
the obligations imposed upon him with respect to the breaking up of the land and
its improvement by the erection thereon
His evidence, which is unof buildings.
contradicted, was : " We have brolten up
and cultivated aboutl, 200 acres; built five
houses and stable and outbuildings to each
house; made wells to each house; erected
two wind-mills ; fenced one whole section
with wii-e and posts, and fenced half of
other section with hedge; we have set out
some fruit-trees and shrubbery, — all to the
All
value of about ten thousand dollars.
was done under and in pursuance of this
"
contract.
He also met promptly all the notes given for principal and interest maturing prior to 1885. The total amount paid bj' him
prior to that date, including $1,600 paid at
the execution of the contract, was in excess of $5,000.
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But the defendant insists that tliere was
such default upon the part of the plaintiff,
with respect to the notes maturing May
28, 1885, as worked a forfeiture of the contract, and, consequently, that specific performance cannot be decreed.
The precise
grounds upon which this contention rests,
as well as those upon which the plaintiff
relies in support of his claim for relief, cannot be clearly understood without a careful scrutiny of all that passed between the
parties in reference to the lands in ques-

tion.
The plaintiff resided in Iowa, while the
defendant resided at Jerseyville, 111. The
notes given by the former were upon
blanks furnished by thelatter's agent, who
caused them to be made payable in Tecumseh, Neb., at the private bank of Rus-

sell & Holmes, through whom the defendant had, for many years prior to 1880,
made collections, and with whom he had
kept an account. The first payment under the contract was made in bank drafts
delivered to the defendant's agent in Tecumseh. All the other notes falling due in
1880 to 1884, inclusive, (except the interest
note maturing In 1882,) were paid by bank
drafts sent to Russell & Holmes, who
placed the proceeds to the credit of Cheney
in their bank. The checks of the latter
upon that bank, on account of those deposits, were always paid in current funds.
The draft to pay the interest note for 1882
was also sent to Russell & Holmes, but, as
Cheney had not transmitted that note to
them, the draft was forwarded to him.
He received it, and sent thenote to Libby.
In no single instance prior to 1885 did he
make objection to the particular mode in
which Libby provided for the payment of
his notes, or intimate his purpose to der
mand coin or legal-tender notes in payment. In every instance, except as to the
interest note for 1882, the notes were paid
at the banking-house of Russell & Holmes,
and by drafts sent to and used by them for
that purpose.
Butitis quite apparentfrom theevidence
that Cheney, in 1885, indulged the hope that
he could bring about a forfeiture of the
contra.ct for non-compliance upon the part
of Libby with its provisions, and that he
would, in that or some other way, get the
land back. It is proper to advert to the
circumstances justifying that conclusion.
On the 4th of March, 1885,— all previous
installments having been punctually met,
—Libby offered, in writing, to pay all the
principal notes mentioned in the contract,
as well as the interest note due May 28,
18S5, if a deed was made to him . To this offer Cheney replied, under date of March 19,
1885: "Your letter of the 4th has just
have no papers with me,
reached me.
and cannot attend to the matter as you
expect to go to New Orleans
request.
to the Exposition, and to be at home in
time to see to it properly. If I am behind
time, no harm will come to you." Libby
wrote again, under date of May 20, 1885,
renewing the offer contained in his letter
of March 4th. Under date of May 23, 1885,
— only five days before the notes for 1885
mature'd,— Cheney replied : "Tours of 20th
think it probable that
Is received.
will be in
can do as you suggest, but
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Beatrice [the county -seat of Gage county,
where the lands are] between the 1st and
10th of June on other business, and will
can lend
then make inquiries, and see if
the money to good hands, and will then
let you know more certainly."
On the 26th of May, 1885, Libby sent to
Russell & Holmes a draft upon the First
National Bank of Omaha, Neb., made by
one Stuart, a private banker doing business at Madison, in the same state, for
.fl,251.20, which was the amount of Libby's two notes for principal and interest
that matured May 28, 1885. It was sent
in payment of those notes, and was received
for that purpose by Russell &
Holmes. They accepted it for the amount
of money named in it, and were therefore
ready to take up Libby's two notes when
presented for payment at their office.
On the 28th of May, 1885, A. W. Cross, of
the First National Bank of Jerseyville, 111.,
— where Cheney resided, — appeared at the
banking-house of Russell & Holmes, and
made a deposit of $5,000, all in current
funds, and a good portion of it in bills of
his own bank.
While there he inquired of
Russell & Holmes (without disclosing the
reason for his inquiry) whether they kept
"
a legal-tender revenue, [reserve,] as national banks were required to do. " He
was told that they did not, but that a
supply of legal tender was on hand. About
2 o'clock of the 1st of June — which, as May
31st fell on Sunday, was the last day of
grace for Libby's two notes due in ]88J,
(Comp. St. Neb. c. 4], § 8)— one of Cheney's
attorneys went into the bank of Russell &
Holmes, and asked if he could be given 5,000 in legal-tender notes in exchange for
other currency. His request was complied
witi'
At a later hour of the same day
Cheney appeared in the bank, without having responded to Libby's offer, twicemade,
to pay all the notes for the principal debt,
and the interest note maturing in 1885.
He came there with checks, drawn by
Cross, to be cashed, and asked, as an accommodation to him, that they be paid in
legal-tender notes. He was promptly accommodated to the extent of $2,500. But,
when he asked for $2,500 more in legal-tender notes. Holmes suspected there was a
scheme to exhaust his bank of legal-tender
notes, and refused to comply with this request. After Russell & Holmes had thus,
by way of accommodation, paid to Cheney
and his attorney $7,500 in legal-tender
notes, — but not until the hour for closing
the bank, on that day, against the public
had passed, — Libby's two notes were presented by Cheney, and payment thereof demanded in coin or legal-tender notes. The
bank offered to pay in current funds, as
they had previously done in respect to Libby's notes, but Cheney declined to take in
payment anything except coin or legaltender notes. The notes were then placed
by him in the hands of a notary, who was
conveniently present, and the latter presented them for payment, announcing that
he
would not receive anytliing except
Dnited States notes or legal-tender funds.
Payment in such funds was refused by the
bank, and the usual protest was made.
The notary and Cheney then left the room,
"
the latter saying, before leaving, that he
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would call In the morning. " But he did
not call the next or upon any subsequent
day.

Within 15 or 20 minutes alter Cheney and
his notary left the bank, Holmes, of thefirm
of Russell & Holmes, went to the office of
the notary to findCheney and pay the notes
in the funds demanded. But Cheney was
not there, and the notes were in his hands.
Inquiry was made at the principal hotel
and at other places, but he could not be
found. Holmes was informed that he had
left town.
Libby having been notified of the protest
of the notes, notwithstanding he had, in
due time, sent a bank draft to Russell &
Holmes to be used in paying them, directed
Stuai-t, the banker at Madison, Neb., tc
go immediately to Tecumseh. The latter
arrived there on the 9th of June, and, having learned what passed 'betw^een Cheney
and Russell & Holmes, determined to pay
off the notes in such funds as Cheney demanded. He informed the notary, who
had protested the notes for non-payment,
that he was then ready, in behalf of Libby,
to pay them in gold. The latter did not
have the notes, did not know where Cheney
had gone, and said that the latter "did
not want the money, but that he wanted
the land back."
Stuart having knowledge ot Cheney's
letter, in which he notified Libby of his
purpose to visit Beatrice between the 1st
and 10th of June, went to that place in
search of Cheney, but could not find him.
Libby wrote to Cheney, under date of
June 12, 1885, informing him that gold was
deposited at Russell & Holmes' office to
pay the two notes due May 28, 1885. This
letter was received by Cheney in due course
of mail. On the 20th of June, 1885, the latter inclosed to Libby twelve unpaid notes,
(including the two due May 28, 18N5,) saying that the contract of May 28, 1880, was
"terminated and ended by your failure to
pay the two notes due May 28, 1885, and
otherwise to comply with the contract,
which is now null and void. " How Libby
had "otherwise" failed to meet his obligations under the contract does not appear.
Under date of June 23, 1885, Russell &
Holmes advised Cheney by letter of the
fact that they were authorized by Libby
to pay, and they were ready to pay, the
notes due May 28th, including protest fees;
in legal-tender notes or coin. Libby, under date of June 25, 1885, replied to Cheney's letter, sa> ing . " refuse to accept said
notes, excepting the two which vrere paid,
and have this day sent them to your bankers, Messrs. Russell & Holmes, of Tecumseh,
Neb., for your use and benefit, and subject
shall make payments as
to your order.
fast as they become due, and shall require
you to execute a conveyance of the land
in accordance with the terms of the contract. It will be useless for you to send
meany ofthesenotes,exceptyou
send them
for payment. " Under date ot.June 29,1885,
Russell* Holmes advised Cheney that they
had received from Libby his notes, amounting to $6,679.20, subject to his (Cheney's)
order. The latter wrote July 9, 1885, In reply to Libby's letter of June 25th, that he
did not recognize the notes placed with
Russell & Holmes as being subjeet to his
order.
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On the 20th of August, 1885, Libby, by his
attorney, made a tender to Russell &
Holmes of $120 in gold coin as a balance of

one-half of the purchase money, and offered
to surrender the contract and execute a
mortgage and notes for the balance of the
purchase money, as stipulated in the contract, and demanded a deed; of all which
Cheney was notified.
The latter replied,
under date of August 22, 1885, that he
would not receive any money from Libby,
and refused to make a deed.
It further appears that the plaintiff
punctually paid into the bank of Russell &
Holmes the amounts of the notes due In
1886 and 1887.
The funds remained in that
bank and are now there, subject to Cheney's order, on presenting the notes. Of
these payments he was promptly informed.
Shortly before the commencement of this
suit Libby again offered to Cheney to pay
in cash all the unpaid portion of the principal debt named in the contract, and all interest due at that date. He also renewed
his offer to execute a mortgage on the land
to secure all unpaid installments not due,
and demanded a deed. But those offers
being declined, the present
suit was

brought.

A. A. Goodrich, for appellant.
vidson, for appellee.

S. P. Da-

•Mr. Justice Haelan, after stating the
facts in the foregoing language, delivered
the opinion of the court.
The peculiar wording of the written contract renders itsomewhatdoubtful whether there was a sale of the lands to the appellee to be made complete by a conveyance of the legal title or defeated altogether, according to his performance or failure
to perform the conditions upon which he
was to receive a deed ; or whether he was
simply given possession, paying a fixed
amount, annually, for use and occupancy,
with the privilege of purchasing, and with
the right to demand a conveyance in feesimple, upon the performance of those
Taking the whole contract
conditions.
together, we incline to adopt the former
as the true interpretation.
Such was the
viewtaken bythe supreme court of Nebraska of a similar contract as to land between Cheney and one Robinson.
Robinson V. Cheney, 17 Neb. 673, 679, 24 N. W.
Rep. 378. But it is not necessary to express
any decided opinion upon this question ;
for, in any view, it is clear from the contract, not only that appellant could retain the legal title until the appellee's obligations under it had all been performed,
but that he could resume possession immediately upon the failure of the appellee
to meet, punctually, any of the conditions
to be performed by him. Time may be
made of the essence of the contract" "by
the express stipulations of the parties,
or it may arise by implication from
the very nature of the property, or the
avowed objects of the seller or the purTaylor v. Longworth, 14 Pet.
chaser."
172, 174; Secombe V.Steele, 20 How.94,104;
Holgate V. Eaton, 116 U. S. 33, 40, 6 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 224; Brown v. Trust Co., 128 U S.
403, 414, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 127.
The parties
In this case, in words too distinct to leave
construction,
room lor
not only specify
the time when each condition is to be per-
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formed, but declare that " time and punctuality are material and essential ingredients " in the contract, and that it must be
"strictly and literally" executed. However harsh or exacting its terms may be,
as to the appellee, they do not contravene
public policy; and therefore a refusal of
the court to give effect to them, according
to the real intention of the parties, is to
make a contract for them which they have
not chosen to msike for themselves. 1
Sugd. Vend. (8th Amer. Ed.) 410, (268;)
Barnard v. Lee, 97 Mass. 92, 94; Hipwell
V. Knight, 1 Tounge & C. 401, 415.
These
observations are made because counsel for
theappellant insists, witheomeconfidence,
that an affirmance of the decree below will
necessarily be a departure from the general principles just stated.
But there are other principles, founded in
justice, that m ust control the decision of the
presentcase. Even where timeis made material, by express stipulation, the failure of
one of the parties to perform a condition
within the particular time limited will not
in every case defeat his right to specific performance, if the condition be subsequently
performed, without unreasonable delay,
and no circumstances have intervened that
would render it unjust or inequitable to
give such relief. The discretion which a
court of equity has to grant or refuse specific performance, and which is always exercised with reference to the circumstances
of the particular case before it, (Hennessy
V. Woolworth, 128 U. S. 438, 442, 9 Sup.Ct.
Rep. 109,) may and of necessity must often
be controlled by the iconduct of the party
who bases his refusal to perform the contract upon the failure of the other party
to strictly comply with its conditions.
Seton V. Slade, 7 Ves. 265, 279; Levy v.
Lindo, 3 Mer. 81, 84; Hudson v. Bartram,3
Madd. 440, 447; Lilley v. Fifty Associates,
Mass. 432, 435; Potter v. Tuttle, 22
101
Conn. 512, 519. See, also, Ahl v. Johnson,

How. 511, 518.
To this class belongs, in our judgment,
the case before us. Although the contract
between Cheney and Libby called for payment in dollars, the latter might well have
supposed, unless distinctly informed to
tlie contrary, that the former would be
willing to receive current funds; that is,
such as are ordinarily received by men of
business or by banks; and such funds were
received in payment of all of Libby 's notes
falling due in 1880 to 1884, inclusive. While
this course of business was not an absolute waiver by Cheney of his right to demand coin or legal-tender paper in payment of notes subsequently falling due,
such conduct, during a period of several
years, was calculated to produce the impression upon Libby's mind that current
or bankable funds would be received in
20

payment at any of his notes ; and therefore, upon every principle of fair dealing,
Cheney was bound to give reasonable notice of his purpose, after 1884, to accept
only such funds as under the contract,
strictly interpreted, he was entitled to demand. No such notice was given. On the
contrary, the just inference from the testimony is that Cheney designed to throw
Libby off his guard, and render it impossible for the latter, or for the bankers to
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whom he sent drafts to be used In paying
his notes, to supply the requisite amount
of coin or legal-tender paper on the very
day the notes matured, and at the moment
The
of their presentation for payment.
efforts of Russell & Holmes, within a few
moments after Cheney left theirbank on the
1st of June to find him, and to pay off the
notes in legal-tender paper, and the efforts
of Libby, by his agent, as soon as he was
informed of Cheney's demand for payment
in coin or legal-tender paper, to reach him,
and to pay off the notes maturing In 1885,
in lawful money, and his repeated offers,
subsequently, to pay them in such money,
showed the utmost diligence, and sufficiently excuse his failure to pay in coin or
legal-tender paper on the very day his
notes matured.
To permit Cheney, under
the circumstances disclosed, to enforce a
forfeiture of the contract, would enable
him to take advantage of his own wrong,
and to reap the fruits of a scheme formed
for the very purpose of bringing about the
non -performance of the contract.
But it is contended that the provision in

thecontract forbidding its modification or

change, "except by entry thereon in writing signed by both parties, " coupled with
the provision that no court should relieve
Libby from a failure to comply strictly and
literally with the contract, stands in the
way of a decree for specific performance.
It is sufficient, upon this point, to say that
such provisions — if they could in any case
fetter the power of the court to do justice
according to the settled principles of law
— cannot be applied where the efficient
cause of the failure of the party seeking
specific performance to comply strictly and
literally with the contract was the conduct of the other party. If the defendant
had agreed, in writing, signed by himself
alone, to accept current funds, and not to
demand coin or legal-tender notes, and,
notwithstanding such agreement, he had
demanded coin or legal-tender notes, under circumstances rendering it impossible
for the plaintiff to meet the demand on the
day limited by the contract, would he be
permitted to say that the contract was forfeited for the failure to make payment according to its provisions? We suppose
not, although, according to his argument,
such an agreement, not having been signed
by both parties and indorsed on the contract, would not estop him from insisting
upon a strict and literal compliance with
its terms.
It results from what has been said that
the failure of the plaintiff, Libby, in person
or by agent, to pay the notes maturing in
1885 in coin or legal-tender paper, at the
time they were presented by Cheney for
payment at the banking-house of Russell &
Holmes, did not work a forfeiture of the
contract, and does not stand in the way of
a decree for specific performance.
In respect to the notes falling due in 1886
and 1887, the evidence satisfactorily shows
that the plaintiff, at the times and place appointed for their payment, offered, and
was then and there ready, to pay them in
lawful money, but, the notes not being on
either occasion in the hands of Russell &
Holmes for collection, he could not make
actual payment, but left the money at
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be paid over to Cheneywhenever the notes were presented at that
place. The notes due in those years were,
It is true, in the manual possession of Bussell & Holmes, but they were not in their
custody by direction of Cheney, for collection or for any other purpose. Libby did
all that he could do with respect to the
notes falling due iu those years in order to
comply "strictly and literally" with the
contract. Indeed, after the surrender by
Cheneyin 18S5 of the notes due in that ana
subsequent years, and his formal notification to Libby that he regarded the contract as forfeited and would not receive
any money from him, Libby was not
bound, as a condition of his right to claim
specific performance, to go through the useless ceremony of tendering payment at the
banking-house of Russell & Holmes of the
notes maturing in 1886 and 1887. Brock v.
lidy, 13 Ohio St. 306 ; Deichmann v. Deich.nann,49 Mo. 107, 109 ; Crary v. Smith, 2 N. Y.
In Hunter v. Daniel, 4 Hare, 420, 438, it
60.
"vassaid ■"The only remaining point insisted upon was that the making ofevery payment was a condition precedent to the right
of the plaintiff to call for the execution of
the agreement, or, in fact, to call for the
benefit of it ; and it was argued that the
bill could not properly be tiled before the
plaintiff had, out of court, fully performed
his agreement. The general rule in equity
certainly is not of that strict character.
A party filing a bill submits to do everyr.hingthatis required of him; and the pracr.ice of the court is not to require the party
to make a formal tender where, as in this
case, from the facts stated in the bill, or
from the evidence, it appears that the tender would have been a mere form, and
that the party to whom it was made
would have refused to accept the money."
"Whether that be a sound view or not with
reference to the particular contract here in
question, Libby did, in fact, make a proper
tender of payment as to these notes. Before the bringing of this suit he had paid,
and offered to pay, more than one-half of
the price for the land and all accrued interest and taxes, and therefore was entitled by the terms of the contract to a
deed, he executing notes and a mortgage
for the remaining payments to run the unexpired time, as stipulated in the agreement.
The court below found that the notes
falling due in 1885, 1886, and 1887 were
paid ; that the plaintiff had deposited with
the clerk for the defendant a mortgage on
the land to secure the payments due 8, 9,
and 10 years after the date of the contract;
and that he had fully done and performed
every obligation imposed upon him to entitle him to a deed. It was adjudged that
the defendant, within 40 days from the decree, execute, acknowledge, and deliver to
the plaintiff a good and sufficient deed,
with the usual covenants of warranty,
(excepting the right of way that maybe demanded forpublic usefor railways or common roads,) conveying to him the land in
question, and in default of which it was
adjudged that the decree itself should operate, and haye the same force and effect,
as a deed of the above description.
We are not able to concur in the finding

their bank to
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that the notes falling due In 1885,1886, and
1887 had been paid when this decree was

passed. If those notes had been placed by
Cheney with Russell & Holmes for collection, and the latter had collected the
amounts due on them^ then they would
have been paid; for, in such case, that firm
would have been the agent of the payee to
collect the notes, and the money received
by them would have belonged to him.
In Ward v. Smith, 7 Wall. 447, 450, the
question arose as to whether a bank at
which certain bonds were made xJayable
was the agent of the holder to receive payment. The court said : " It is undoubtedly true that the designation of the place of
payment in the bonds imported a stipulation that their holder should have them at
the bank, when due, to receive payment,
and that the obligors would produce there
the funds to pay them.
It was inserted
for the mutual convenience of the parties.
And it is the general usage in such cases for
the holder of the instrument to lodge it
with the bank for collection, and the party
bound for its payment can call there and
take it up. If the instrument be not there
lodged, and the obligor is there at its maturity with the necessary funds to pay it,
he so far satisfies the contract that he cannot be made responsible for any future
damages, either as costs of suitor interest,
for delay. When the instrument is lodged
with the bank for collection, the bank becomes the agent of the payee or obligee to
The agency extends no
receive payment.
further, and without special authority an
agent can only receive payment of the debt
due his principal in the legal currency of
the country, or in bills which pass as money at their par value by the common conIn the case at bar
sent of the community.
only one bond was deposited with the
Farmers' Bank. That institution, therefore, was only agent of the payee for its
It had no authority to receive
collection.
payment of the other bonds for him or on
his account. Whatever it may have received from the obligors to be applied on
the other bonds, it received as their agent,
not as the agent of the obligee. If the
notes have depreciated since in its possession, the loss must be adjusted between
the bank and the depositors ; it cannot fall
upon the holder of the bonds. " See, also,
Adams v. Commission, 44 N. J. Law, 638,
where this question is elaborately examined ; Hills V. Place, 48 N. Y. 520 ; Gas Co. v.
Pinkerton, 95 Pa. St. 62, 64; Wood v. Saving Co., 41 111. 267.
Russell & Holmes, then, did not become
the agent of Cheney to receive the amount
of the notes, by reason simply of the fact
that the notes were made payable at their
bank. The funds left by Libby with them
to be applied in payment of the notes of
1885, 1886, and 1887 are therefore his property, not the property of Cheney. The utmost effect of Libby's offer, within a reasonable time after June 1^ 1885, to pay the
note of that year in lawful money, and of
his offers, at the appointed times and place,
to pay the notes of 1886 and 1887, was to
prevent the forfeiture of the contract, and
to save his right to have it specifically performed, so far as that right depended upon
his paying those notes. But they must be
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actually paid by him before he is entitled
to a deed, or to a decree that will have the

force and effect of a conveyance. Under the
circumstances it was not absolutely necessary thathe should havebrought the money into court for the defendant at the time
he filed his bill. His offer in the bill to perform all the conditions and stipulations of
the contract was sufficient to give him a
standing in court. Irvin v. Gregory, 13
Gray. 215, 218; Hunter y. Bales, "24 Ind.
299, 303; Fall v. Hazelrigg, 45 Ind. 576, 579.
But the decree of specific performance ought
not to become operative until he brings
into court for the defendant the full amount
necessary to payoff the notes for principal
and interest falling due in 1885, 1886, and

Caldwellv.Cassidy,8Cow.271; Haxtonv. Bishop, 3 Wend. 13, 21; Hills v. Place,
supra; Wood v. Saving Co., supra; Webster V. French, 11 111. 254, 278; Carley v.
1887

Vance,

17

Mass.

389, 891 ;

Doyle v. Teas,

4
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Scam. 202, 261, 267 ; McDaneld v. Kimbrell,
G. Greene, 335. The defendant is not entitled to interest after the respective tenders were made, because it does not appear
that the plaintiff has, since the tenders,
realized any interest upon the moneys left
by him for Cheney at the bank of Russell
& Holmes.
Davis v. Parker, 14 Allen, 94,
104; January v. Martin, 1 Bibb, 586, 590;
Hart V. Brand, 1 A. K. Marsh. 159, 161; 2
Sug. Vend. (8th Amer. Ed.'' 314,315, (627,
3

628.)

The decree below is attirmed. But it is
adjudged and ordered that the said decree
be and is hereby suspended, and shall not
become operative until the plaintiff brings
into the court below for the defendant the
full amount of the notes for principal and
interest executed by him to the defendant,
and made payable on the 28th days of May,
1885, 1886, and 1887, Without interest upon
any note after its maturity.
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M. & ST. P. RX. CO. v. DURANT
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EX. & T. CO.

CHICAGO,
et

al.

(46 N.

W.

676,

44 Minn. 361.)

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Oct. 7, 1890.

Appeal from district court, Washington
county; McCluer, J udge.
Fayette
W. H. Norris, for appellant.
Marsh, for E. W. Durant and others. J.
N. & I. W. Castle, for E. L. Hospes and
Isaac Staples. Searles & Gail, for Union
Depot St. Ry. & T. Co.

Vandeebukgh, J. The demurrers to the
complaint interposed in behalf of defendants Durant, Hospes, Hersey, Staples, the
Union Depot Company, and O'Gorman,
receiver, were sustained by the trial court,
and the complaint held sufficient as to the
othpr defendants. From the order sustaining the demurrer the plaintiff appeals,
and the principal question presented for
our determination is whether the complaint states a cause of action in respect
to the defendants above named. Generally, in equitable actions of this liind, the

merits can be best determined upon proofs
after answer; but we will examine and
consider such questions as are fairly before us on this appeal.
1. If the action
were brought solely
against the defendants who executed the
contract for the right of way, whom, for
convenience, we will style "obligors,"
though equitable relief is demanded, a recovery might be had for damages, and
treating it as an action for damages, the
defendants would, if they required it, be
entitled to a jury trial. Davison v. Associates, 71 N. Y. 334.
But certain lots,
through which the right of way was bargained for, are alleged to have been conveyed to certain other defendants, who
are joined in the action, and who are not
parties to the agreement, and against
whom 'equitable relief, by way of specific
performance, is sought.
The two causes
of action — one for damages and one for
the special relief — cannot properly be united, and this is one ground of the demurrer.
The action, then, must be treated as an
one for specific performance,
equitable
with incidental relief, by way of compensation for such portion of the property
in question as cannot be reached ; and the
sufficiency of the complaint must be determined solely in respect to the right of the
plaintiff to such relief.
2. It is charged in the complaint that,
in order to induce the plaintiff to construct a line of its railroad from a point
on its River Division from Hastings to the
city of Stillwater, the defendants Staples,
Durant. Hospes, Hersey, and Sabin, with
one Torinus, since deceased, on the 15th
day of July, 1881, agreed in writing with
this plaintiff that the cits' of Stillwater
would and should give this plaintiff a
right of way, 56 feet wide, through certain
real property, as described in the complaint; and that on its part the plaintiff,
ill •■id by the same agreement, in considor. . (Ill
iif tlie nremises, undertook
and
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agreed, among other things, that It would
at once begin the construction of such
branch line, and continue the same with
all practical dispatch until the completion
thereof; and that it did in all things well
and truly fulfill and perform such agreement on its part. There is no doubt as
to the sufficiencj- of the consideration to
uphold the undertaking of the defendants,
or that the parties are mutually bound ,
subject to the conditions of the contract.
Railroad Corp. v.Babcock,6 Mete. (Mass.)
346.
3.

In resi)ect to the defendants in whose
favor the demurrer was sustained, it is
not claimed that any of them now own or
are interested in the property in question

Depot Company,
and O'Gorman, receiver. The last named
are not parties to the agreement, but are
properly joined as having some interest in
But the decree of the court
the property.
for specific performance of the contract
could only be made operative against
them, or anj' other persons than the
original obligors', in so far as they have
acquired from the latter portions of the
right of way contracted for with notice.
As to such lands, such parties would
stand in their shoes, and be bound ; but
as to the lots acquired by the Union Depot Company of other parties, by purchase or condemnation, the contract is entirely nugatory, and in respect to the several tracts of land designated in the complaint as having been so acquired by the
Union Depot Company, it could not be
bound in this action.
From the terms of
the contract providing that the city
would give a right of way, and the specification of the ownership of the several lots
set forth in the complaint, it will not be
implied that the defendants at any time
owned or had title to any of them, save
as therein set forth.
From the complaint
it appears that the Union Depot Company
acquired title to the north 49 feet of lot 2,
in block 28, from Helen M. Torinus and
Louis E. Torinus, her husband. What the
latter's interest was, does not appear.
The defendant Sabin, one of the signers of
the agreement in question, acquired, by
purchase from Torinus, an undivided half
of the south 35 feet, in width, of lot 7,
and of the north 56 feet of lot 8, September 16, 1881. Sabin also purchased of defendant Durant and another, September, 1881,
the north 15 feet in width of lot 7, and the
undivided halt of the south 35 feet in width
thereof, and the undivided
half of the
north 56 feet in width of lot 8; and at the
same time purchased of Torinus the other
undivided half of south 35 feet of lot 7,
and north 56 feet of lot 8. Sabin also purchased lot 5, and a portion of lots 5, 7, and
8, described In the complaint,
was conveyed by him to the Union Depot Company, and is included in the right of way, 56
feet in width, described in the agreement.
It is also alleged that the title in fee to the
south 30 feet in width of lot 8 to lot 9, and
the north 75 feet in width of lot 10, block
28, appear to be in the city of Stillwater,
since 1875, as and for a part of Nelson
street, and as part and parcel of the "Levee, "so called.
It further appears that
the depot company have acquired divers
here, except the Union
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other parcels of the same block from other
persons, not parties to the contract, and
have also granted to the plaintiff a certain portion of the lots 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, in block 28, lying witliin such 56-feet
strip, or right of way. The defendant Sabin is the only one of the signers of the
contract who appears to have title to any
of the land in question, in block 28, and his
interest is confined to that part of lots 5,
7, and 8, above described, and not already
conveyed to the depot company.
The only land in block 28, within the right of
way, which, in case specific conveyance
were decreed under the contract, would
be subject to be so conveyed, is the land
held by Sabln, and so much of the land of
the depot company within the right of
way not already conveyed to the plaintiff
by it as it derived from Sabin, as above
stated.
As before intimated, land procured by the depot company from strangers to the contract would not be affected
by it. As to block 27, the obligors, by the
same contract, further agreed to purchase
so much of block 27 as lay east of the alley, and to grant such right of way, as
aforesaid, through the same to the plaintiff. As respects the lots in this half block,
through which the right of way in question was in fact located, it appears that
on September 15, 1881, the Union Depot
Company, defendant, acquired title from
Isaac Staples to one-half of lot 1, and lots
3, 4, and 5 ; and March 1, 1882, from defendant Hersey and ottiers, to the other
half of lot 1 ; and March 23, 1882, to lot 2,
from Seymour, Sabin & Co., of which firm
defendant Sabin was .; member. It does
not appear, however, what Interest Hersey and Sabin had in the lots conveyed.
4. The city has not furnished the right of
way, as agreed, and the defendants have
not caused it to be done, or procured it
themselves, through either block.
The
question now arises whether, upon the
facts herein stated, a case is made for the
interposition of a court of equity so as to
warrant a decree for specific performance
as to the defendants tJnion Depot Company and Sabin, and to award a judgment for damages against other defendants, by way of compensation for the deficiency. The court will not undertake to
compel the defendants, jointly or severally,
to purchase the specific property, or to
procure the right of way from the city.
And it is not a case for compensation, because, conceding that the court might
compel the depot company and Sabin to
convey a partial interest representing a
relative or proportionate share of individual obligors, as above described, the same
would be relatively so small, as compared
with the whole amount embraced in the
contract, that the compensation or damages would apparently be the main object
of the suit.
In such cases a court of
equity will not assess damages as compensation, but only where they are incidental to the principal ground of relief,
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and the court will leave the
action at law, unless he will
accept the part subject to
without damages. Earl of
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party to his
consent to

conveyance
Durham v.
In some
Legard, 34 Law
Ch. 590.
cases, however, where the vendor shows
title to a portion only of the land contracted, or has wrongfully parted with
part, justice maybe done by an apportionment of the consideration, if the vendee
consent to take part with an abatement
of the price. 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. (4th Ed.)
pt. 2, p. 1146. So, where the vendee knows
at the time of entering into the contract
(as may be implied in this case from the
terms of the contract) that the vendor
has title to a part only of the land, compensation will be denied. Wat. Spec. Perf.
This is not
§ 506; 5 Wait, Act. & Def.781.
By
a case between vendor and vendee.
the contract the right of way was to be
procured by or from others by gift or purchase. The plaintiff did not contract for
It did
a conveyance from the defendants.
not rely upon the individual ownership of
the obligors.
The city was to give the
right of way ; and, as to block 27, the defendants were to purchase the entire half
block jointly, and jointly bear the burden.
It was not fairly within the contemplation of the parties that the interests
which the individual obligors might have
in some of the land embraced in the proposed right of way should be made subject to enforced conveyance under the contract, if unfulfilled in its scope and purpose by the obligors, who jointly entered
into it. Equity, it is true, looks at the
substance of the contract, and, when the
agreement can be substantially, though
not literally, carried out, without changing the nature of the contract, or substituting a new one, and do justice between
the parties, it will be so enforced. The
doctrine of compensation rests upon this
principle.
And so where land is held as
tenants in common by several persons,
who have jointly agreed to convey the
same, some of whom are not bound, or
are deceased, those who are liable, or
who survive, may be compelled, in a suit
on the contract, to convey their individual or proportionate interests as tenants
in common. Hooker v. Pynchon, 8 Gray,
550.
But such is not this case. The contract did not contemplate a conveyance
of individual interests, but the acquisition
of the right of way by the public, and by
the joint act or purchase by the obligors ;
and, as to block 27, an essential condition
and inducement to the parties was the
purchase of the half block, and not the
right of way merely. In any view of the
ease, and apart from the question of
laches, considering the nature of the contract, the state of the title, the indefiniteness and uncertainty in the description
set forth in the contract, we think that
the parties should be left to their action
at law, and the Interposition of a court of
eq uity is not warranted.
Order affirmed.

J.
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Action by Michael H. Haffey against Sarah
Lynch for specific performance of a conFrom a judgtract for the sale of land.
ment of the general term (23 N. Y. Supp. 59)
affirming a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
Charles Strauss, for appeUant.
Anderson, for respondent

Henry H.

EARL, J. At an auction sale of the defendant's real estate the plaintiff purchased a
parcel of land described in the complaint at
the price of $7,800, and paid 10 per cent, of
the purchase price, besides certain fees and
expenses.
The parties signed a written contract specifying the terms of sale, and the
time and place of full performance by the
By the written contract the defendparties.
ant was to convey the land "by the usual
deed containing full covenants with warranty." The defendant did not tender to the
plaintiff such a deed as he claimed he was entitled to, and then he commenced this action
against her to compel the specific performUntil the trial of the
ance of the contract
action it appeared that she had at the time
of the sale such a title to the land as she
was bound to give. But subsequently one
Nathaniel Jarvls, Jr., claiming the land in
fee, brought an action of ejectment against
her to recover the land, and filed a lis penThe plaintiff knew of this claim and
dens.
the lis pendens when he commenced this
action; and solely on account of the existence of the lis pendens, and such knowledge thereof, the court refused specific performance, and dismissed the complaint We
think the learned court fell into error, and
that, upon the undisputed facts found, it
should have given to the plaintiff judgment
for specific performance.
We must first notice the issue joined by
The plaintiff alleged in his,
the pleadings.
complaint the contract; that he had performed the same, and was ready and willing to
perform the same upon receiving such a
conveyance as he was entitled to; that after
of time for the perseveral postponements
formance of the contract at the request of
the defendant, her attorney tendered to him
a deed of the land, at the same time saying
to him that she could not give him a valid
and marketable title to the land, because it
was incumbered; that he rejected the deed
on the ground of the alleged incumbrance
upon the land, at the same time notifying her
that he was ready and willing to perform on
his part if she would give him such a deed
as he was entitled to; that she refused to
give him such a deed; that the title to the
land was incumbered and rendered unmar-
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ketable by the lis pendens filed in the ejectment action; that the defendant could at all
times have obtained the cancellation and discharge of the lis pendens, and could have
conveyed to him such a title as the contract
entitled him to. She, in her answer, admitted the making of the contract; denied
that he had performed, or was ready and
willing to perform, the contract, on his part;
admitted the commencement of the ejectment
alsuit, and the filing of the lis pendens;
leged that she had tendered to him such a
deed as she was bound to give; denied that
she was at any time unable or unwilling
to convey the land; and alleged that she
could at all times since the execution of the
contract have conveyed the title of the land
had she
to him according to the contract,
been so disposed, and that she has at all
It
times been ready and willing so to do.
thus appears that the issue between the parties was as to the performance of the contract, the plaintiff alleging that he had performed, and was ready and willing to perform, and the defendant alleging that she
had performed, and was ready, willing and
On the trial
able to perform, on her part.
the plaintiff was the sole witness sworn, and
the trial judge, after finding the ownership
of the land by the defendant, and the making
of the contract, found as follows: "That the
plaintiff has in all things performed all the
terms and conditions of said contract, and
has been, on his part, ready and willing to
fulfill the same, and accept a conveyance of
"That the
the fee of the said property."
said defendant, through her attorneys, has,
prior to the commencement of this action, refused to make said conveyance under the
said agreement, notwithstanding the plaintiff's frequent requests
therefor."
"That
such refusal on the part of the defendant to
make such conveyance was due to the fact
that one Nathaniel Jarvis, Jr., had, after
said sale, but before the day fixed for the
delivery of the deed thereunder, commenced
an action in ejectment in this court against
said defendant, claiming the ownership of
the premises in question, and had filed a
notice of the pendency of said action in the
office of the clerk of the city and county of
New York, on March 6, 1889." "That thereafter, and before the trial of this action, the
said ejectment suit was brought to trial,
and the complaint therein was dismissed, and
from the judgment entered on which dismissal an appeal was taken to the general
term of this court, which court affirmed said
judgment; and no appeal from said order of
the general term has been taken to the court
of appeals, and the time to do so has now
expired." "That the said plaintiff has expressed his consent at the trial of this action
to accept from the defendant a conveyance
of said land by the usual deed containing
full covenants with warranty, subject to the
reservations contained in the eighth paragraph of the said terms of sale." "That
less than three years have passed since the
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rendering of judgment and the filing of the
judgment roU in the said decision of Jarvis
V. Lynch."
And he found, as conclusions of
law, "that the sale having been made in
good faith, and the question as to the title
of the said premises having arisen since the
sale, the defendant should not be compelled
to give a warranty deed, or procure a policy
of title insurance of the Lawyers' Title Insurance Company, insuring the title to the
said premises to the plaintifC;" "that the defendant is entitled to judgment dismissing
the complaint upon the merits of the action;"
"that such judgment should be without prejudice to the right of the plaintifC to bring
an action for damages for breach of the contract set forth in complaint."
The plaintiff has been defeated In his action thus far on the ground that it was impossible for the defendant to perform her
contract at the time of the commencement
of the action, and that he knew it was. She
did not set up such a defense in her answer,
but, on the contrary, alleged that she was
able and ready to perform her contract, and
there was no proof showing that It was then
impossible for her to perform the contract.
There was no evidence showing what basis,
if any, the claim of title to the land by
Jarvis had. It may have been colorable, and
not real or substantial. It did not appear
that she had made any effort whatever to remove the incumbrance of the lis pendens.
It
was her duty to perform the contract, and
to make all reasonable efforts to remove any
obstacle which stood in the way of her performance.
The plaintiff was not In fault
for refusing to accept a deed which the defendant at the time declared would convey
an incumbered title. He was entitled to a
marketable title. Moore v. Williams, 115
N. Y. 586, 22 N. E. 233; Vought v. Williams.
120 N. Y. 257, 24 N. E. 195.
It is a general rule in equity that the specific performance of a contract to convey real estate will
not be granted when the vendor, In consequence of a defect in his title, is unable
In such cases specific performto perform.
ance is denied because the court cannot enforce its judgment, and because, also, it
But if
would be oppressive to the vendor.
the defect in the title existed at the date of
the contract, or was due to some fault or
to some act of the vendor subsequent to the
contract, the court will generally entertain
an action for specific performance, and retain jurisdiction for the purpose of awarding damages for the breach of the contract.
But where, as in this case, the defect in the
title arises after the making of the contract,
without any fault of the vendor, and the
vendee knew of the defect in the title when
he commenced his action, the court will not
retain the action for the purpose of awarding the damages.
Wiswall v. McGowan,
Hoff. Ch. 125; Morss v. Elmendorf, 11 Paige,
277.
This rule was adopted because the
vendee should not commence a fruitless action in equity simply to recover there his
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The rule
damages for a breach of conti^act.
has been modified since the Code practice,
which authorizes the joinder of legal and
equitable causes of action; and, while the
equitable relief will be denied in such a case,
now the action will be retained, and the issue
as to the breach of contract and dainages
will be sent to a jury for trial. Sternberger
v. McGovem, 56 N. Y. 12. But this rule was
adopted in equity not solely because at the
time of the commencement of the action the
defects in the title existed, to the knowledge
of the vendee, but also because the case was
such that at the time of the rendition of
the judgment the court could not grant the
equitable relief. The rule and the ground
upon which it is based have no application to
a case where the defect has disappeared
at
the time of the trial, and the court can then
give an effective judgment for the equitable
relief demanded; and no case can be found,
prior to this, where an equity court has denied specific performance because the vendor's title was defective at the commencement of the action, but valid and perfect at
the time of the trial. In such a case, why
should not the vendor perform? He is able
to, and the vendee is entitled to performance
unless some other defense has intervened,
and the court is able to enforce performance.
Here the plaintiff was willing to take such
a title as the defendant could convey at the
trial.
The ejectment suit had finally resulted in favor of the defendant.
The lis
pendens had ceased to be operative,
and
could, if necessary, have been removed.
The
fact that Jarvis could have paid the costs
and taken a new trial under the statute is of
no importance.
There was final judgment
against him, and the contingency
that he
might take a new trial is of no more importance
than the contingency that some
other person might at some time commence
an action to recover the same land. Equity
courts, in awarding relief, generally look
at the conditions existing at the close of the
trial of the action, and adapt their relief to
those conditions.
The plaintiff in an equity
action, as a general rule, should not be turned out of court on account of any defense
Interposed to his action, if at the time of the
trial the facts are such that if he then commenced his action he would be entitled to the
equitable relief sought
If a vendor has
no title, or a defective title, to laud which
he contracts to sell, and subsequently
obtains a perfect title, he can be compelled
by his vendee to perform his contract. Fry,
Spec. Pert. (3d Ed.) 480.
And why should
the vendor not be compelled to perform if
he perfects his title while the action for specific performance is pending? A perfect title
by the vendor is no part of the vendee's
cause of action, and he is just as much entitled to the equitable relief, and the equity
court is just as competent to give it, whether the title of the vendor was perfected beof the
fore or after the commencement
action. It does not appear that anything oc-
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curred after the commencement of the action which should bar the relief asked by the
plaintifC.
There are no complications growing out of the lapse of time, and no material
change In the situation of the parties, or
of the land in controversy.
We therefore
see no reason to doubt, upon the facts found,
that the plaintiff was entitled to specific per-
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formance of the contract; and the Juflg^
ment should be reversed, and a new trial
granted,

costs to abide

FINCH, O'BRIEN,
concur.

PBCKHAM

event.

and
and

BARTLETT, JJ.,
GRAY.

JJ.,

sent ANDREWS, C. J., not sitting.
Judgment reversed.

dis-
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GOTTHELF

v.

STRANAHAN.

(34 N. E. 286, 138 N. Y. 345.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

June

6, 1893.

Appeal from city court of Brooklyn, general term.
Action by Charles Gotthelf against James
S. T. Stranahan to compel specific performance of a contract for the sale of lands.
From a judgment of the general term (19
N. Y. Supp. 161) affirming a judgment for
plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Modified.
G. Dutcher, (Wm: C. De Witt,
for appellant.
George
G. &
Reynolds, for respondent.
George
coimsel,)

of

F.

ANDREWS, O. J. The original contract,
made on the 7th day of January, 1891, was
by its terms to be completed by a conveyance and payment of the unpaid purchase
money on the 9th day of February in the
same year.
The vendee was to pay for
the property the sum of $22,500, as follows:
$2,000 on the execution of the contract,
$4,750 on the execution of the deed, and the
balance of $15,750 in five years, with interest, to be secured by mortgage on the
land. The vendor was to convey the land
by warranty deed in fee simple, free from
The vendee, on the exeaU incumbrance.
cution of the contract, paid the sum of $2,000
If the contract had been peras provided.
formed on the 9th day of February, 1891,
according to its terms, the question now
presented would not have arisen. The ashad not then been laid and, if
sessments
the deed had been given on that day, they
would have become a charge on the land
to the conveyance,
subsequent
and the defendant would have been under no obligation, legal or equitable, to pay them.
They
would have attached as a charge upon the

But by the
title acquired by the plaintiff.
mutual assent of the parties the completion
of the contract was postponed from time to
time, in all for a period of three months,
The first postponement,
imtil May 4, 1891.
until February 16, 1891, was for the accommodation of the plaintiff; the others were
for the accommodation of the defendant, to
enable him to clear the land of squatters
who had gone upon it without permission
and erected shanties and hovels in which
they lived, and between whom and the defendant, in some cases, an irregular sort of
tenancy had grown up by the payment and
receipt from time to time of small sums as
During this period of three months
rent.
two assessments on the property for local
improvements were laid and confirmed by
the city of Brooklyn, —one on the 3d day of
March, 1891, for $901.12, for the grading and
paving of Bush street; and one on the 20th
day of April, 1891, for $1,079.33, for the
grading and paving of William street. This
action is brought by the vendee against the
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vendor to compel a specific performance of
the contract of sale. The defendant is ready
and willing and has offered to convey the
premises with covenant of warranty as of
the day
1891,
the 9th day of February,
originally fixed for the execution of the deed.
The plaintiff insists that the vendor is bound
to warrant the title as against the assessThis is the controversy
ments mentioned.
in the case, and the point for determination
is whether the plaintiff, upon equitable principles, is entitled to the relief he seeks, and
to cast upon the defendant the burden of
paying the assessments.
He does not ask
He elects
to be relieved from the contract
to have a decree for performance upon such
conditions as the court shall determine, in
case it shall be held that upon principles of
law or equity he is not entitled to demand
by the defendant covering the
a covenant
lien created by the assessments.
The premises contracted to be sold consisted of a block and part of a block of land
in one of the outlying wards of Brooklyn,
which, when the contract was made, was
partly covered by water, and was unfenced
Bush street, adjoining the
and commons.
southerly side of the land, was a traveled
road, and had been such for many years.
It was graded to some extent, but had not
It was an ordinary country
been paved.
One of the assessments
was for the
road.
improvement of Bush street.
contemplated
William street, to which the other assessIn
ment related, was mostly under water.
view of the peculiar system of local improvements prevailing in Brooklyn, one question
presented
is whether the assessments
in
question constituted incumbrances on the
land in May, 1891, when the defendant offered to convey, within the true meaning of
the contract of sale.
The charter of Brooklyn is unique in respect to its system of
local improvements. The district of assessment is to be prescribed, and the estimated
cost of contemplated
local improvements is
required to be assessed on the district benefited, and a warrant for the collection of the
issued, and at least one-third
assessments
of the aggregate assessment must have been
collected before any contract for making the
improvement is authorized to be made; and
the city may, even after the assessments
have been collected, decline to make a contract, or to go on with the improvement, and
may discontinue the proceedings, returning
the money collected on the assessments. Laws
In oth1888, c. 583, tit. 19, §§ 1-^, inclusive.
er cities, assessments for local improvements
In
follow the performance
of the work.
Brooklyn they precede the execution, and are
The contemplated imcollectible in advance.
provements of Bush and William streets, for
which the assessments in question were laid
have not yet been made. There is no explanation of the delay.
When the proceedings were
initiated does not appear, and, referring to
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tbe charter provisions, there can be no inference that any step whatever had been taken
when the contract of sale was executed, or
prior to the 9th of February, 1891, when, by
the original contract, the deed was to have
The parties entered into a conbeen given.
The
tract for the sale of unimproved land.
consideration to be paid and received was presumably based on the value of the land in its
existing condition.
William street had no existence except on the city map, and Bush
Whether this
street was an ordinary road.
condition would be changed at any time, and
whether William street would be raised and
made dry land, and Bush street be improved
and brought to the condition of an ordinary
city street, could not be known by the parties
If they anticipated that at
to the contract.
some time the city would enter upon the improvement of this section of the city, they
knew that any charge which might be imposed on the property embraced in the contract for the expense of such improvement
would represent the benefit received by it from
as the theory of such asthe improvement,
sessment is that the value of the land would
be enhanced by at least an equivalent amount.
It is impossible to suppose that the parties
contemplated when the contract was executed
created by the force of
that incumbrances
initiated after
public law for improvements
the making of the contract and intermediate
that date and the time fixed for the conveyIf the
ance should be paid by the vendor.
contract can have this construction, then the
plaintiff is entitled to property not in the condition it was in when he contracted to purchase it, but an improved estate, improved at
the expense of the vendor by the act of the
city, which he could not control, initiated aftThis construction
er the contract was made.
would compel the vendor to pay out of the
purchase money the cost of an improvement
which by so much has increased or will inand the
crease the value of the property,
vendee would acquire property which he did
not pay for.
The question as to the true meaning of the
contract to convey free from aU incumbrances
is quite different from that which would be
presented by an assessment made intermediate the date of the contract and the time
fixed for the conveyance for a local improvement made before the contract was entered
In that case the purchaser buys with
into.
the improvements made, and presumably pays
a price fixed with reference to the land in its
The case of periodical
existing condition.
taxes for the support of government, assessed
and laid between the date of a contract and
the time fixed for the conveyance, would constitute an incumbrance within the meaning of
The time of the imposition of
the covenant.
such taxes is known in advance, and unless
excepted from the covenant would be deemBut under the chared to be covered thereby.
ter of Brooklyn assessments for local im-

provements are made in advance of the execution of the work. They represent, or are supposed to represent, benefits thereafter to be
secured to the property assessed.
The time
will be initiated cannot
when improvements
be known.
The contract to convey free from incumbrances ordinarily has reference to incumbrances or liens actually existing when the
contract is executed, or thereafter created, or
suffered by the act or default of the vendor.
While the assessments in question constituted,
under the charter of Brooklyn, liens on the
lands assessed from the time of their confirmation by the common council, and are, in a
strict sense, incumbrances thereon, we are of
opinion that they are not incumbrances
withThey did not
in the meaning of the contract.
diminish the value of the subject of the conThe plaintiff will acquire what the detract.
fendant intended to sell and what he expected
to receive, and, but for the postponement of
the time of the execution of the deed, the
plaintiff would have taken his title before the
This incident ought
assessments were laid.
not to impose upon the defendant a loss pro
tanto of so much of the purchase money. But
even if the contract, by its true interpretation,
imposes upon the defendant the legal obligation to pay the assessment, this is not decisive of the right of the plaintiff to relief
This equiby way of specific performance.
table remedy cannot be claimed as a matter
with the court
of right. It is discretionary
to grant or withhold it in furtherance of jusWhere, by reatice or to prevent injustice.
son of circumstances attending the making of
the contract, such as fraud, accident, mistake,
advantage has been
or where unconscionable
taken, or where, by reason of circumstances
which have intervened between the making of
the contract and the bringing of the action,
of the equitable remedy
the enforcement
would be inequitable, and produce results not
within the intent or understanding of the parties when the bargain was made, and there
has been no inexcusable laches or inattention
by the party resisting performance, in not
and providing for contingencies
foreseeing
which have subsequently arisen, the court
may and will refuse to specifically enforce the
contract, and will leave the party to his legal
The cases are very numerous under
remedy.
this head, and no hard and fast rule can be
formulated by which it can be readily determined how the discretion of the court in a givBut it seems to
en case should be exercised.
us to be very clear that to enforce the contract in this case by requiring the defendant
to covenant against the assessments in question would violate the spirit of the contract,
and convert the equitable power of the court
of
into an instrument for the accomplishment
rank injustice. The case of Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 564, contains an able discussion
of the principles governing the courts in administering relief by way of specific perform-
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of contracts, and Mr. Justiqe Field, In
his opinion In that case, so fully cites the authorities that a further reference to them here
is unnecessary.
We think the judgment of
ance

the special and general terms should be modified by excepting from the scope of the cove-
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nant in the deed to be given by the defendant
and that, as
the assessments in question,
modified, the judgment should be affirmed,
with costs to the defendant in all courts. All
Judgconcur, except GRAY, J., not voting.
ment accordingly.
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OORBIN
(34

V.

TRACY

et aL

Conn. 325.)

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
Term, 1867.

Bill In eqiiity, brought

Sept.

by the petitioners,

joint stock corporation,
to the superior
court for Hartford county, to compel the
specific performance of a contract to as ^gn
a patent righ t. The superior court (jubomis,
~3.) passecTa^ decree in favor of the petitionerg, and the respondents
filed a motion for a
new trial and a motion in error.
The case
is sufficiently stated in the opinion.
a

C. E. Perkins, in support of the motions.
Mr. Hubbard and C B. MitcheU, contra.

CARPliiNTER, J. It appears that the contract set out in the plaintiffs' bill was not,
at the time of its execution, duly stamped
pm-suant to the laws of the United States.
On the 26tlj day of March, 1867, the collector of the first collection district of this state
caused said instrument to be stamped, and
then and there entered upon its margin the
following certificate:
"I have this day affixed the proper stamp,
required by law, to this instrument, and satisfactory evidence having been furnished
that the omission to affix a stamp at the
proper time was the result of inadvertence,
and without design to evade the law, the
Hartford, March 26,
penalty
is remitted.
H. A. Grant, Collector."
1867.
To the admission of this instrument, thus

obstamped, in evidence, the respondents
The corjected, but the court received it.
rectness of this ruling is the only question
presented by the motion for a new trial.
The law of the United States (Stat. 1865if executed
66, p. 142) makes the instrument,
without a stamp, "with intent to evade the
provisions of this act," "invalid and of no
The act fiulher provides that the
effect."
collector of the revenue shall, upon the payment of the price of the proper stamp required by law, and of a i)enalty of fifty dollars, affix the proper stamp to such instrument, and note upon the margin thereof the
date of his so doing, and the fact that such
penalty has been paid; and the same shall
thereupon be deemed and held to be as valid,
to all intents and purposes, as if stamped
But this provision
when made or issued.
does not apply to this case as the respondfor there is no preents seem to suppose;
tense that this instrument was executed
without a stamp with the Intent to evade
the provisions of this act, but, on the contrary, the proper officer has expressly found
that the omission to fix stamps was the result of inadvertence, and without design to
evade the law.
There is, however, a proviso In the act
which Is applicable to this case. That pro"That when It shall apviso is as follows:
pear to said collector, upon oath or other-
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wise, to his satisfaction, that any such in.
strument has not been duly stamped at the
time of making or issuing the same, by reamistake, inadvertence,
or
son of accident,
urgent necessity, and without any willful design to defraud the United States of the
stamp, or to evade or delay the payment
thereof, then and in such case, if such instrument, &c., shall within twelve calendar
months after the first day of August, eighteen hundred and sixty six, or within twelve
calendar months after the making and issuing thereof, be brought to the said collector
of revenue to be stamped, and the stamp
tax chargeable thereon shall be paid, it shall
be lavrful for the said collector to remit the
penalty aforesaid, and to cause such instruThe act further
ment to be duly stamped."
provides that such instrument "may be used
in all courts and places in the same manner
and with like effect as if the instrument had
been originally stamped."
The certificate of the collector brings this
case within the spirit and letter of this part
of the act, and the contract was properly
received in evidence.
A new trial is not advised.
2. Under the motion in error, It Is objected
that the petitioners have not made out a
case for the interference
of a court of equity,— that coiu:ts of equity in this state vnll
not interfere to enforce agreements to sell
personal property unless the circumstances
are such as to make a trust, because there is

in such a case a remedy at law by an action
for damages.
The objection assumes that there is a distinction, in questions of this character, be-

If any
tween real and personal property.
such distinction exists, it does not go to the
extent claimed.
The ground of the jurisdiction of a court of
equity in this class of cases is that a court of
law is inadequate to decree a specific performance, and can relieve the injured party
only by a compensation in damages, which, in
many cases, would fall far short of the remight require.
situation
dress which his
Whenever,
therefore,
the party wants the
thing in specie, and he cannot otherwise be
fully compensated, courts of equity will grant
They will decree
him a specific performance.
the specific performance of a contract for the
sale of lands, not because of the peculiar nature of land, but because a party cannot be
adequately compensated in damages.
So In
respect to personal estate; the general rule
that courts of equity will not entertain jurisof agreediction for a specific performance
ments respecting goods, chattels, stocks, choses in action, and other things of a merely personal nature, is limited to cases where a compensation in damages furnishes a complete
2 Story, Eq. Jur.
and satisfactory remedy.
§§ 717,

718.

The jurisdiction, therefore, of a court of equity, does not proceed upon any distinction
between real estate and personal estate, but
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upon the ground that damages at law may
not, in the particular case, afford a complete
remedy.
1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 716-718, and
cases there cited; Clark v. Flint, 22 Pick. 231.
When the remedy at law is not full and complete, and when the effect of the breach cannot be known with any exactness, either because the effect will show Itself only after a
long time, or for any other reason, courts of
equity will enforce contracts in relation to personalty.
3 Pars. Cont. (5th Ed.) 373.
An application of these principles to the
case before us relieves it of all difficulty. The
contract relates to a patent right, the value of
which has not yet been tested by actual use.
All the data by which its value can be estimatExperience
ed are yet future and contingent.
may prove it to be worthless, another and bet-
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ter invention may supersede it, or it may itself
be an Infringement of some patent already
existing.
On the other hand it may be so simple in its principle and construction as to defy
aU competition, and give its owner a practical
monopoly of all branches of business to which
it is applicable. In any event its value cannot
be known with any degree of exactness until
after the lapse of time; and even then it is
doubtful whether it can be ascertained with
sufficient accuracy to do substantial justice between the parties by a compensation in damages.
On the whole we are satisfied that
.iustice can only be done. In a case like this,

of the contract
by a specific performance
There is therefore no error In the decree
complained of.
The other judges concurred.
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N. W. 339,

TURCK
72 Mich.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

et al.
311.)

November 1, 1888.

Appeal from circuit court, Cllntou county,
in chancery; Vernon H. Smith, Judge.
This is a suit by John Hiclis, Robert M.
Steel, Josiah Upton, and Cornelius Bennett
against William S. Turcli and Townsend A.
Ely, for the specific performance of a conDefendants appeal from an order
tract.
overruling their demurrer to the bill.
James L. Clark and Geo. P. Stare, for apO. L. Spaulding, for appellees.

pellants.

SHERWOOD, C. J. The bill in this case
is filed to obtain a decree for the specific performance of a contract reading as follows:
"Riverton, Neb., October 81, 1885.
"Due David S. French, attorney in fact for
Hicks, Bennett & Co., eighteen thousand
three hundred and sixty-six dollars, ($18,366.00,) being the balance on consideration of
one-half interest in personal property and
lands this day sold Robert M. Steel, John
Hicks, William' S. Turck, and Tovcnsend A.
Ely; above sum to be paid by assignment
of a certain mortgage on lands in Gratiot
county, Michigan, to said David S. French,
attorney, for $2,000; and balance of sixteen
thousand three hundred and sixty-six dollars ($16,366) to be paid by promissory note
due and payable on or before five years from
date, with annual interest at seven per cent,
per annum, said note secm-ed by mortgage
on the undivided one-half interest in said
as collateral security for
ranch property,
of said sum of sixteen thousand
payment
three hundred and sixty-six dollars, and inWm. S. Turck.
terest as aforesaid.

"Townsend A. Ely."
The bill states that at the time the note
was given the complainants were a firm located and doing business under the name
of Hicks, Bennett & Co., in Michigan, and
were seized of a large quantity of lands in
the county of Franklin, in the state of Nebraska, the particular description of which
is fully set out in the bill; that on that day
said firm' by David S. French, its attorney
in fact, conveyed by full covenant warranty
deed the lands described in the bill to John
Hicks and Robert Steel, who resided at St.
Johns, Mich., and the defendants, who resided at Alma, Mich., for the sum of $32,732; that the purchasers upon said sale enand ever since
tered upon said premises,
have had the actual possession thereof; that
on the same day Hicks, Bennett & Co. sold
to the grantees in said deed all the cattle,
stock, hay, grain, farming implements, tools,
and other personal property on said land for
the sum of $10,000; that in consideration of
the premises, and in payment to the complainants for the undivided one-half of the
said real and personal property, Turck and
Ely, who knew all about the lands, the title

of complainants thereto, dnd the condition
of the personal property, agreed to pay to
complainants $21,366, being one-half of the
total purchase price of the land and personal property, the payments to be made as
follows: $3,000 in their promissory note due
in two years, and which they gave, and that
they would secure and pay the balance of
the purchase price by assigning to the said
French, who was attorney in fact of the
complainants, a certain real-estate mortgage
of $2,000 on lands in Gratiot county, Mich.,
and for the remaining siun of $16,366 would
for
at once execute and deliver to French,
complainants, their promissory note for that
amount, due on or before five years from the
date thereof, with annual interest at 7 per
cent, and secure the payment of the same
by mortgage on the undivided half of the
lands so deeded to them;
that the said
$2,000
mortgage was assigned, as promised
by the said defendant Turck, but the said
refused to and have not made
defendants
the note and mortgage to complainants for
the $16,366, as they agreed to do, and still
request
refuse to comply with complainants'
for them so to do. Complainants further
say and aver in their bill that they have
complied in all things with and fully kept
their agreement with said defendants, and
performed all its requirements on their part
in the premises, and are now entitled to
have said note and mortgage from said dein
as they promised to make
fendants
accordance with the written agreement hereinbefore referred to, and which was, after
duly given to
being made by defendants,
said French, for the complainants, who now
The complainants ask the
have the same.
court, upon the foregoing facts, to decree

that defendants specifically perform their
agreement with the complainants, and execute and deliver to them said note and
mortgage.
The defendants appeareji in the
case, and demurred to complainants' bill, assigning two grounds of demurrer: (1) That
the facts set up in the bill are not sufficient
to entitle complainants to the relief prayed;
complete and
have
(2) that complainants
adequate remedy at law touching all matters
The cause was heard
set up in the bill.
before Judge Smith in the Clinton circuit,
who made a decree overruling the demurrer,
and allowing defendants 20 days in which to
answer.
We are satisfied this decree was proper.
The defendants had received the full consideration for what the complainants asked.
The complainants might have had a remedy
at law; but we are by no means sure
would be an adequate one. On the contrary,
the remedy at law, when resorted to, is liable to a very great variety of perplexities
and embarrassments arising from the want
of the note promised, the refusal to give
which is a gross violation of their contract,
for which the demurrer concedes no excuse
The note was liable to run
can be given.

it
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live years, and. complainants had the right
to have the amount ovying thereon during all
the time it did run secured by the mortgage.
The land was not within the jurisdiction of
the courts in this state. It could he easily
transferred to bona fide holders, and the perils of insolvency are not beyond the possibilities among business men, as all experience
shows. All these are circumstances of more
or less embarrassment when the remedy at
law is resorted to. It is but equitable and
just that this contract should be specifically
performed upon the showing made in this
bill. This bill is not filed for an accounting,
nor to enforce payment of a debt, but to
compel a party to comply with his promise,
of+er receiving the full consideration upon
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it was made, to make and execute
and give security
evidence of indebtedness,
for the payment thereof. There is no proceeding at law which can accomplish this.
Equity alone can take cognizance of such a
case, and do justice between the parties.
The bill furnishes a clear case for the exwhich

ercise of that sound legal discretion which
the court must always use in awarding
and the learned circuit
specific performance,
The decree bejudge was right in so holding.
low will be affirmed, and the cause remanded,
with instructions to the circuit judge to allow defendants 20 days in which to answer
the bill after remittitur shall have been filed.
will recover their costs.
The complainants
The other justices concurred.
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GAGE
(65

N. W.

V.
809,

FISHER.
5 N.

D. 297.)

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Nov. 11,

1895.

Appeal from district court, Burleigli county; W. H. Winchester, Judge.
Action by J. K. Gage against Asa Fisher.
Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

Reversed.
S. L. Glaspell,
for apAlexander Hughes, (or respondent.

G. W. Newton and

pellant.

CORLISS, J. We have reached the conclusion in this case that we must decide
against the defendant and respondent, on
his own theory. Taking the view of the
facts which is most favorable to him, we are
yet compelled to hold that he has neither any
defense to the note sued on, nor any valid
counterclaim against the plaintiff for money
paid by him to plaintiff in part payment of
such note.
We will state our reasons for
this conclusion as briefly as the complicated
nature of the case wiU permit.
The action Is on a promissory note for $3,by defendant to plaintiff.
000 given
The
consideration for the note was the sale by
plaintiff to defendant of 10 shares of the
stock of the First National Bank of Bismarck, N. D. The date of this transaction
was December 19, 1893. The capital stock
of the bank was $100,000, divided into 1,000
shares of $100 each. For some time prior to
1888, plaintiff and defendant had both been
directors of this bank, and defendant had
been president thereof.
In 1888 plaintiff was
dropped from the directory, and in 1889 the
defendant also ceased to be a director.
The
control of the bank was then in the hands of
who acted In
a. number of stockholders,
unison, and who were more or less hostile
Among these
to defendant and plaintiff.
stockholders were George H. Fairchild, H.
R. Porter, and Daniel Eisenberg. This group
of stockholders will be designated in the
course of this opinion as the "Fairchild interest." The defendant, for the purpose of
securing control of the bank, began purchasing its stock, and in the summer of 1892 he
found himself the owner of 489 shares of
such stock, and in the possession of a proxy
to vote 16 shares more, owned by a Mrs.
Shaw. Had this condition of affairs reunchanged until the next annual
mained
stockholders' meeting, in January, 1893, the
defendant would have been master of the
situation, and would have secured full control of the bank, electing his own board of
directors, and, through them, such officers
of the corporation as he might see fit to
elect.
While this condition existed, the defendant claims that he was induced to part
with his control over the Shaw stock at the
suggestion of plaintiff, and under his promise to allow him (the defendant) to control,
or in other words to direct, the voting of this
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stock at the next annual stockholders' meeting, in January, 1893. Relying on this promise of the plaintiff to defendant,
who, unquestionably, could have voted the Shaw
stock at such meeting, had he so desired, defendant notified Mrs. Shaw that she could
sell this stock to the Fairchild interest. The
plaintiff, the defendant, and Mrs. Shaw were
all hostile to the Fairchild interest; and the
motive which prompted
defendant in releasing his control over the Shaw stock, and
in suggesting to Mrs. Shaw that she sell it
to the enemy, was apparently a desire to induce the Fairchild interest to assume the
possible burden, without at the
heaviest
same time giving them control of the majority of the stock. Defendant, having purchased 2 more shares, was now the owner
of 491 shares; and, when plaintiff promised
him control of his 10 shares, defendant felt
sure of a majority, and therefore permitted
the control of the Shaw stock to pass from
him.
Plaintiff now held the balance of power. The Fairchild interest began to bid for
his stock. Finding that plaintiff, despite his
promise to allow defendant to control his
stock at the meeting, intended to sell to the
enemy unless he (the defendant) purchased
It for the sum of $5,000, he finally yielded to
this demand, and the contract of sale was entered into on this basis.
It is not claimed,
however, that plaintiff, from the, start, intended

to inveigle

by

his

promises

the

de-

fendant into a position where he could take
advantage of the necessities of his situation
to extort from him an exorbitant price for
the stock.
Fraud is not claimed, except as it
Is urged that plaintiff's subsequent conduct
was fraudulent in contemplation of law.
Two thousand dollars of the purchase price
was paid at the time of the sale, and the
note m suit, for $3,000, was given for the
balance of the consideration. Subsequently
the defendant paid $1,000 on this note, and
thereafter this suit was brought to recover
the remaining $2,000 due thereon, with interest. The defendant interposed as a counterclaim a claim to recover back the $3,000 so
paid; having, as he insists, rescinded the
contract, and offered to restore to plaintiff
the 10 shares of stock delivered under it.
The trial court rendered judgment in his favor, both on the plaintiff's claim against him,
and on his claim against the plaintiff ; directing
that the note be canceled, and that defendant
recover from plaintiff the consideration paid,
namely, $3,000.
It is true that the plaintiff
claims, and he so testified, that the agreement
between him and the defendant was that he
would give defendant the preference in purchasing the stock, in case he offered as much
for it as the Fairchild interest; and, if this
be the case, he was acting strictly under the
contract, in demanding the sum of $5,000 for
his stock from the defendant. In that event,
both law and good morals would approve the
course.
But the trial court found that the
contract was as we have stated, and we will
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for the purpose of this decision,
that this finding is correct. The defendant
certainly cannot, and he does not, claim that
he proTed a case more favorable to himself
than the findings, nor does he pretend that
he can ever establish a stronger case on another trial.
Taking these findings as the basis of our
decision, we are very clear that the court
erred in deciding the case in favor of the defendant.
The court erred in its conclusions
of lav? that the facts found established a
defense to the note, and also a valid counterclaim for the $3,000 paid on account of the
purchase price. We regard the contract for
the sale of the 10 shares of stock for $5,000
as entirely legal, and we do not consider
that the defendant is in position legally to
assume,

claim

that,

because

an

unconscionable

price

was extorted from him on account of the necessities of the situation, he has any right,
after having, with full knowledge of the
facts, submitted to the demand, to rescind
the contract he deliberately made.
If it Is
true (but we express no opinion on this
question of fact) that the plaintiff, after having induced the defendant to part with the
control of the corporation, by letting the
Shaw stock slip from him on promise to substitute his (plaintiff's) stock for the Shaw
stock, and to allow defendant to use the
plaintiff's stock as he (the defendant) could
have used the Shaw stock at the next annual
meeting, his subsequent conduct in repudiating his agreement was an act of gross perfidy, and the using of his power, under such
circumstances, to coerce the defendant into
paying an exorbitant price for this stock,
which was worth in the general market not
was base and dishonorable
in
over $500,
But the decision of this case
the ecstreme.
turns on a larger question,— the question of
public policy.
There is no pretense that
plaintiff was guilty of any fraud in the sale
of the stock. The parties both dealt at arm's
length. There was no concealment of any fact.
Q'here was no misrepresentation. Whatever
relation of confidence which theretofore existed between the plaintiff and defendant
must have ceased, whatever esteem which
the defendant had entertained for the plaintiff must have instantly perished, when he
was confronted by the plaintiff with this, to
the defendant, unconscionable demand that
he pay him $5,000 for stock which, as defendant understood, the plaintiff had agreed
he was to have the right to use at the meeting without compensation.
Whatever defendant did at this time must have been done,
not cheerfully, in a spirit of confidence, but
reluctantly, with anger in his heart, and
therefore with no disposition on his part to
yield to any demand, except so far as coerced
by the necessities of his position.
It is said that plaintiff having, by his promises, induced the defendant to place himself
in the plaintiff's power, the plaintiff should
not be allowed to take advantage of the sit-
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uation to extort from him an exorbitant price
for the stock. The fallacy of this reasoning
lies in its untenable assumption that defendant, at the time he bought the stock for
could
$5,000, under the stress of necessity,
have maintained an action against plaintiff
to compel the specific performance by him
of his contract to allow defendant to vote his
If, at the time de(the plaintiff's) stock.
fendant agreed to pay $5,000 for this property, he was powerless to secure redress in
a court of equity,— if at that time the plaintiff could not be compelled to permit him
(the defendant) to vote the stock,— then plaintiff had a perfect legal right to sell to whom
he pleased, for such price as he could obtain, and therefore had an undoubted legal
right to sell to defendant for $5,000, so long
as defendant, being under no other pressure
than that of his necessities, agreed to pay
that sum for it. Defendant has no right to
insist that he was unexpectedly placed in
this peculiar position, relying on the promise
of plaintiff; for, if it was a promise which a
court of equity would not enforce, he had no
right to rely on such promise. He was bound
to know that the plaintiff might refuse to
carry out his agreement, atid that in that
event he (the defendant) would be powerless
to compel its performance, but must, to save
himself from being baflled in his scheme,
buy the stock at such a figure as it could be
purchased for. Even assuming the contract
to allow defendant to control the stock to be
valid, so that its breach would subject plaintiff to liability for damages, still defendant
cannot use the breach of that promise as a
basis for rearing upon it this argument
that plaintiff took advantage of his necessities, unless such contract could be specifically enforced in equity. Plaintiff had a legal right to take advantage of his necessities,
and exact such price as he could under the
circumstances secure, if he could not be compelled by a court of equity to allow defendant to vote the stock. If plaintiff could break
this promise without liability for damages,
because it was void, he could charge what
he chose for the stock, and defendant would
So if
have no legal ground for complaint.
the breach of this promise, assuming it to
be valid, subjected him to liability only for
damages, he yet could break it, and compel
the defendant to buy the stock and pay him
what he asked for it, without rendering himself liable to the charge of having, in legal
contemplation, extorted an unconscionable
contract from the defendant. Suppose that
the contract was valid, and that its breach
would have subjected the plaintiff to liability for $500 damages. He might have broken
it, and then have taken the position that,
while he was liable for these damages, he
yet had the undoubted legal right to break
such contract and incur such liability, and
thereupon sell the stock to whom he pleased,
without being liable for anything more; and,
if the defendant desired to purchase on the
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same terms as another person had offered,
he had a legal right to make a new contract
of sale with him (the defendant), and the
contract would be as valid as a sale to a

stranger. The defendant could not complain
that an unfair advantage had been taken of
him, for, if it Is the law that a court of equity will not enforce such an agreement as
the original one in this case, but will leave
the party to his action for damages, then
defendant was bound to know that he was
all the time at the mercy of the plaintiff,
who might at any moment repudiate the contract, without other liability than for damages; and the defendant was in this position because he had failed to take the precaution to secure a promise that would fully
protect him. He has no legal right to ap^
peal to equity for relief because the plaintiff took advantage of this struggle for supremacy to exact from him (defendant) an
enormous price for his stock. If he (the defendant) failed to secure from plaintiff such
a contract to protect him against such exaction as a court of equity would enforce for
his protection.
Before this promise to allow the defendant to vote the stock was
made, plaintiff might have sold his stock to
defendant for IfOjOOO without the possibility
If defendof any rescission of the contract.
ant saw fit to let the Shaw stock go, without
securing in place of it an agreement that he
could enforce in equity against the plaintiff,
and without securing the plaintiff's stock itself, he voluntarily relinquished his vantage
ground without taking the precaution to protect himself legally, and trusted himself and
his interests to the honor of the plaintiff;
knowing full well, as he testifies himself, that
the plaintiff, in the impending struggle for supremacy, would be sorely tempted to desert
him, and, being only human, might falL
If we should affirm this judgment, we
would give the defendant all the benefit he
could have obtained from a decree of specific
rendered before the stockholdperformance,
ers' meeting, that defendant be allowed to
Defendant would recover
vote the stock.
his money; plaintiff would have back his
stock; and it is undisputed that defendant
has in fact voted the stock in the manner he
desired to vote, and has, through the use of
this stock, secured control of the corporation.
We are satisfied that, both on principle and
under sound authority, the true rule is that
a court of equity should never specifically enforce a contract by which one person agrees
that another should control his stock without
purchasing it, where the sole ground of the
appeal to equity is the desire of the party
making the appeal to seciu-e control of a corporation through the use of the stock he is
thus seeking to control. It is a general rule
that a court of equity will not enforce a
specific performance of a contract for the
Corporate stock
sale of personal property.
comes within the scope of this rule, unless
there are peculiar features calling for the in-
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terposition of a court of equity. But, when
such peculiar features exist, equity will decree specific performance.
Eckstein v. Downing (N. H.) 9 Atl. 626; Appeal of Goodwin
Gas-stove & Meter Co. (Pa. Sup.) 12 Atl.
736; Cook, Stock, Stockh. & Corp. Law, 5§
737, 738; White v. Schuyler, 1 Abb. Prac. (N.
S.) 300; Treasurer v. Mining Co., 23 Cal. 390;
True V. Houghton, 6 Colo. 318; Bumgardner v. Leavitt (W. Va.) 13 S. E. 67. When
the only peculiar feature Is the desire of the
plaintiff, with the aid of the stock he is seeking to obtain, to secure the control of a corporation, this, perhaps, so far from being a
ground for taking the case out of the ordinary rule, may be a reason for denying the
relief sought.
While It Is not illegal for a
stockholder to buy up a controlling interest
in a corporation, and so absolutely rule Its
affairs, and while it is also true that agreements to vote stock together are not, when
carried out, illegal, in the sense that the law
regards the vo'te as void or voidable, yet it
may be contrary to public policy for a court
of equity to decree specific performance of
contracts touching the control of stock, where
the sole object of the person who Is seeking
to enforce the contract is thereby to secure
control of the corporation. We do not say
that such a contract Is necessarily void, as
repugnant to public policy, but we are by no
means clear that a court of equity would
specifically enforce it. It may be that sound
public i)olicy demands that a court of equity
should never lend its aid to the enforcement
of a contract relating to stock, when the sole
object of the person who wishes It enforced
Is to give that person control of the corporate affairs.
Efforts are often put forth to
secure the management
of a corporation,
which are Inspired by laudable motives. But
it is also true that many of these schemes
to obtain the control of a corporation are conceived and carried on in a spirit Inimical to
the interests of the minority stockholders,
and not infrequently for the purpose of so
m.anaging the affairs of the corporation as to
force them to sell their holdings at practically such a figure as the majority stockholders
should dictate.
Should courts of equity adopt
the practice of giving to a minority stockholder the right to enforce specific performance
of a contract to buy stock, simply to enable
him to control the corporation, or, what Is
still more Indefensible, the right to vote or
control the voting of stock that he does not
own, to enable him to secure control of the

corporation, they would find that In many
cases they had suffered their functions to be
perverted by designing rren; that they had
in fact been lending to dishonorable schemes
such effectual aid as to insure their consummation.
Proof that the object was legitimate, that the motive was pure, would furnish no guaranty that the real purpose was
not to wreck or mismanage the corporate affairs. In no case can a court determine with
certain^ just what course the minority
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Stockholder, when armed by the court with
this absolute power over the corporation, will
pursue when he has attained his vantage
ground.
It is therefore possible that the
question whether specific performance should
be decreed ought not to turn on the court's
surmise or guess as to the ulterior purpose of
the person who is seeking to secure control;
but because there is always danger that such
purpose may be dishonest, and because the
court can never surely know the truth as to
the real motive, it may be that courts of equity should inflexibly refuse to aid the minority stockholder in his effort to obtain control. In this case the defendant's motive appears to have been honorable, and we have
no doubt that such is the fact.
He was
merely seeking to take the management of
the bank from persons who, in his judgment,
were mismanaging it, and resume control of
its affairs, that it might be built up for the
benefit, necessarily, of all stockholders.
But
perhaps this fact should not influence us.
If the specific enforcement of such a contract
is to turn on the opinion of the court touching motives, it is obvious that in many cases
dishonest projects will receive effectual equitable aid.
The decision of the Pennsylvania supreme court in Poll's Appeal, 91 Pa.
St. 434, strongly supports the view that equity would not specifically enforce a contract
for the sale of stock where the only ground
for invoking the aid of the court is the peculiar value of the stock to the person who
has contracted to buy It, because of his desire to secure control
of the corporation.
The bill in that case was filed to compel
specific performance of a contract to purThe basis
chase stock in a national bank.
of the application to equity was the desire of
the plaintiff to secure control of the bank.
The court unanimously held that, on grounds
of public policy, the relief should be denied.
The court said: "While the legal right of the
complainant to buy up sufilcient of the stock
of this bank to control it in the interest of
himself and friends may be conceded, it is
by no means clear that a court of equity will
lend its aid to help him.
A national bank is
a quasi public institution.
While it is the
property of the stockholders, and its profits
inure to their benefit, it was nevertheless intended by the law creating it that it should
be for the public accommodation.
It furnishes a place, supposed to be safe, in which
the general public may deposit their moneys,
and where they can obtain temporary loans
upon giving the proper security. There are
three classes of persons to be protected,— the
depositors,

holders.

the

noteholders,

and

the

stock-

We have no intimation that the
bank, as at present organized, is not prudently and carefully managed. The stock, as now
held, is scattered among a variety of people,
and held in greater or lesser amounts. It is
dilfieult to see how the small stockholders,
who have their modest earnings invested in
It, the depositors, who use it for the safe-

OF CONTRACTS,

707

keeping of their moneys, or the business publie, who look to it for accommodation in the
way of loans, are to be benefited by the concentration of a majority of its stock in the
hands of one man, or in such way that one
man and his friends shall control it. * * ■*
We are in no doubt as to our duty in the
We are of opinion that the end
premises.
sought to be attained by this bill is against
public policy, and for that reason we refuse
our aid."
It is true that some stress was laid by the
court on the fact that the plaintiff was operating with borrowed capital, in his efforts
But this fact
to secure control of the bank.
was not treated as decisive, and it is clear
from the Whole trend of the opinion that the
absence of this fact would not have resulted
in a different ruling in the case. Moreover,
this fact was adverted to as tending to show
that the object was to speculate, and not to
Invest funds in corporate stock. But in the
case at bar the defendant never intended to
invest a dollar in plaintiff's stock until he was
compelled to do it to enable him to accomplish his real purpose, which. was to secure
control of the bank. In Moses v. Scott (Ala.)
4 Sohth. 742, after stating that a vote based
to vote as a unit
upon a prior agreement
would not necessarily be illegal, the court
say, at page 744: "Whether an agreement to
vote as a unit, or as an agreed majority may
dictate, for any given length of time, is a
contract so binding in its terms that no party
to it can withdraw from it or disregard it
vrithout the consent of his fellows, may be a
Possibly public policy
different question.
may exert an influence in the solution of this
And even if such a contract be
problem.
lawful, and on its face exert a continuing
force,

the

grave

question

comes

up,

will

a

court of chancery, in its enlightened discretion, lend its aid to the enforcement of a contract of so doubtful policy?" However, we
are not called upon to settle this interesting
The case before us
question in this case.
presents a stronger one against the exercise
of the equitable powers of the courts to enforce specific performance than a contract for
the purchase of stock; for here the contract
was to give the minority stockholder the
right to dominate and direct the judgment of
in the voting of
the plaintiff, as stockholder,
his stock, without owning the stock himself.
in the bank had
Evei-y other stockholder
the right to demand that the plaintiff should,
if he desired so to do, exercise at the very
time of the annual meeting his own judgment
as to the best interests of all the stockholders, untrammeled by dictation, and unfetterWe
ed by the obligation of any contract.
know of no case where a court of equity has
enforced such an agreement We regard as
controlling on this question the rule that an
irrevocable proxy to vote stock is revocable.
See Cook, Stock, Stockh. & Corp. Law, § 610,
note 6.

There is another reason, and to Our mind a
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still stronger reas(l»s, for holding that defendant could not have tecured in a court of equienforcing this conty a decree specfflcally
The plair'fiff's promise to allow the
tract.
defendant to cor irol his stock was based upon an illegal consideration, — one condemned
by public policy,—and the promise was thereThe trial court
fore not binding in law.
the
suffered
found that before defendant
Shaw stocli to pass beyond his control, and
before plaintiff had agreed to permit defendant to control his stock, defendant had informed the plaintiff that it was his purpose
to vote his own and the Shaw stock to make
plaintiff one of the directors of the bank,
and that it was also his purpose to cause him
(plaintiff) to secure employment in the bank
when the new board of directors was elected;
that he desired the advice and co-operation of
plaintiff in securing such control, and the selection of suitable persons to put in the directory to carry out his plans, etc. The court
also found that thereafter plaintiff representthat he did not need the
ed to defendant
Shaw stock "to accomplish his said purpose,"
that he had better let the Fairchild interest purehase that stock, and that he (the
plaintiff) would not permit his stock to be
bought or controlled by the Fairchild interest, but that he would vote his stock with
stock at the next annual
the defendant's
meeting, for the persons agreed
stockholders'
upon by plaintiff and defendant for directors,
and would in every way aid and assist defendant in the consummation of his plans for

securing the possession, control, and manageThese findment of the bank and its affairs.
ings make it apparent that one of the considerations,
if not the main consideration,
which influenced plaintiff in agreeing to give
defendant control of his stock, was the previous statement of defendant that he intended to make plaintiff a director, and see that
he was employed in the bank by the new
board of directors to be elected at the apThat both
proaching stockholders' meeting.
parties understood that at least a portion of
for plaintiff's co-operation
the consideration
with defendant in the project to obtain control of the corporation was the promise of
in the
to give him employment
defendant
bank is apparent from a written contract
entered into between the parsubsequently
On the 19th of December, but entirely
ties.
separate from the contract of sale, the defendant signed and delivered to plaintiff, who
accepted the same, the following memoran"Bismarck, N. D., Dec.
dum of agreement:
of J. R. Gage
In consideration
19, 1892.
joining me in effecting the controlling interest of the capital stock of the First National
hereby agree to furnish
Bank of Bismarck,
said J. R. Gage a position as cashier of said
bank at a salary of not less than $100 per
beginning at the
month, payable monthly,
11th day of January, 1893, and during his
ability to perform his duties as cashier, provided such control is assumed at such time.
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Asa Fisher." In connection with this agreement the court made a finding of fact which
conclusively shows that, all along, one of the
inducements to plaintiff's promise to vote his
stock with defendant's stock was the promise
of the latter to give him a place in the bank.
"That said agreement was signed by the defendant, Fisher, and was then and there, on
said 19th day of December, 1892, delivered to
plaintiff, J. R. Gage, by the defendant, and
was then and there accepted and retained
by said plaintiff, and he, the said plaintiff,
then and there promised to perform said
agreement on his part; that said contract,
interpreted
and explained by the circumstances under which it was made and the
subject to which it relates, was intended by
each of the parties thereto as follows: That
the plaintiff would vote his said ten shares
of stock at the annual meeting of the stockholders of said bank, to occur in the month
of January following, for the persons agreed
upon by the plaintiflf and defendant for the
directors of said bank, and that he would
aid, assist, and co-operate with the defendant
in carrying out the plans which they had previously discussed and agreed upon for the
management
of said corporation, as hereinbefore set forth, and that the defendant
would use his influence with the said persons proposed and agreed upon for directors,
when chosen, to elect the plaintiff to the position of cashier of said bank, at a salary of
not less than $100 per month, during his ability to perform said duties."
It is apparent from the findings that this
written agreement represents the previous
oral understanding
between the parties, reduced to writing.
It is not claimed that the
parties entered into three different contracts.
There were only two agreements made. One
related to the control of the stock by defendant without buying it.
The other was the
contract of sale.
The court expressly finds
that this written contract was no part of the
contract for the sale of the stock. That one
of the considerations which induced plaintiff
to enter into an agreement to vote his stock
with defendant's stock was the defendant's
promise to seciu*e his employment
in the
bank, is apparent from the findings to which
we have referred; and as it is not pretended,
and does not appear, that two different contracts relating to the control of plaintiff's
stock by defendant preceded the contract of
sale, we can find no escape from the conclusion that the promise on which defendant relied in parting with the Shaw stock was a
promise made by plaintiff under the expectation, justified by defendant's promise, that he
(plaintiff) was to have a place on the board
of directors, and also a position in the bank,
at a salary.
We are strengthened
in this
view by the consideration
that, unless the
promise to give plaintiff employment
was
part of the original arrangement, the subsequent written promise of defendant would be
without consideration.
If plaintiff, for a suf-
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fldent consideration,
had already promised
to let defendant control his stock, an agreement on the part of defendant to give him an
additional consideration for the right which
was already his would be a purely gratuitous
promise, not binding in law.
So far from its
appearing that defendant regarded that he
was making such a promise, he shows by
the written agreement signed by him that the
sole consideration running to plaintifE for liis
agreement to permit defendant to control his
stock was defendant's promise to secure him
a position as cashier in the bank.
It is impossible to conceive that so shrewd a man as
the defendant would have promised in writing to give plaintiff a position in the bank,
if such had not been part of the original understanding; for, unless it was part of it,
the defendant had already secured, by his
contract with plaintiff, all he could ever obtain by making additional promises.
The
case would be similar to that of a person, after having secured a contract for the sale to
him of stock for a specified consideration,
promising in writing that in consideration of
such sale he would give the owner of the
Such a
stock a place in the corporation.
promise would not be made by a reasonable
being under such circumstances.
The fact
that such a contract was made in this case
is convincing to our minds that the real consideration running to plaintiff for his original
control the stock
promise to let defendant
was the promise of defendant to give him employment in the bank. This was what inAt
duced plaintiff to make the promise.
least, we are satisfied that it was one of the
The contract was therefore coninducements.
trary to public policy and void.
At least a
portion of the consideration was illegal, and
hence the promise founded on it was a promThe law
ise which no court would enforce.
In such a case leaves both parties where it
finds them.
To neither will it give redress.
That a contract relating to the purchase or
control of corporate stock, founded in whole
or in part upon a promise to secure for the
in
person who owns the stock employment
the corporation,
and an office therein, is illegal and void, is a doctrine supported by the
Woodruff
unanimous voice of the decisions.
V. "Went worth, 133 Mass. 309; Noel v. Drake,
28 Kan. 265; Guernsey v. Cook, 120 Mass.
501; Forbes v. McDonald, 54 Cal. 96; Cone's
Ex'rs V. Russell (N. J. Oh.) 21 Atl. 847; West
V. Camden,
135 U. S. 507, 10 Sup. Ct. 838.
In the case last cited the court, referring to a
contract, one element of which was a promise
to give one of the parties to it permanent employment as manager of a corporation in
which he was a stockholder, said: "It was a
contract, the purpose and effect of which was
to influence the defendant, as a stockholder
and officer of the company, 'in the decision of
a question affecting the private rights of others, by considerations foreign to those rights,'
and the defendtait, by the contract, was placed under direci and very powerful 'induce-
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ment to disregard his duties to other memwho had a right to
bers of the corporation,
demand his disinterested action in the selecHe was to be in a
tion of suitable officers.'
relation of trust and confidence, which would
require him to look only to the best interests
by private conof the whole uninfluenced

tracts.
We think this salutary rule is applicable in this case, notwithstanding the alleged contract was not corruptly made for priThere
vate gain on the part of the defendant.
in the company.
were other stockholders
The defendant and the Standard Oil Company, for whose benefit it is alleged the contract was made, were not all the stockholders;
and it seems to us that it was certainly the
right of those other stockholders to have the
judgment, as an officer of the
defendant's
company, exercised with a sole regard to the
It cannot be
interests
of the company."
claimed that the illegal parts of this contract
could have been separated from the remainder, and the agreement sustained to that extent.
The case falls within no exception to
the general rule that where a part of a contract is illegal the whole agreement is void.
It was not a case where the contract had
been executed on one side, and the person
who had received the benefit of It was asked
I to pay only the legal consideration he had
agreed to pay, the illegal consideration being
waived. In such a case the agreement can
be sustained to the extent of the legal considCasady
v. Woodbury County, 13
eration.
Iowa, 113; 1 Pars. Cont. 380.
So far as any
ran to plaintiff, there was only
consideration
a single consideration to induce him to make
his promise to allow defendant to vote his
stock, 1. e. the promise to give him employ- ^
ment in the bank. But even if he had been induced to make this promise for money, in addition to the agreement to give him a position
In the bank, still the legal part of the consid- •
eration could not have been separated from
the illegal, for no court could say, in the light
of the actual contract, that he would have
made the promise to allow his stock to be voted by another solely for the cash consideration. To separate the legal from the illegal conand
sideration,
under
such circumstances,
then sustain and enforce the contract as so
radically altered, would be to make a new
contract for one wrongdoer, to enable him to
who
enforce against the other wrongdoer,
would be no more culpable, an agreement
which he never made. See Greenh. Pub. Pol.
p. 17, rule 21, and page 24, rule 25, and cases
cited; 2 Add. Cont pt. 2, bottom paging, 762,
and cases in note 1; Tobey v. Robinson, 99
111. 222-233; Comp. Laws, §3533.
For both of
the reasons set forth in this opinion, we are
clear that, at the time plaintiff and defendant
made the contract of sale sought to be rescinded by defendant, the latter was powerless to compel the plaintiff to carry out hl3
promise to allow defendant to vote his stock,
and that, therefore, as defendant, to secure
control of the bank, saw fit to buy the plain-
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tiff's stock for the sum of $5,000, he could
not, after availing himself of all of the advantages growing out of the possession of
such stock, rescind the sale, on the theory
that he was coerced by his necessities into
making a hard bargain.
The confidential relations existing betwe«i
the plaintiff and defendant would not transmute into a contract binding in equity a contract which otherwise would not be enforced
by a court of equity.
Equity will not grant
or withhold relief because the promisor was
or was not trusted by the promisee, but it
will withhold relief, in all cases of this character, irrespective of the question of confidential relations, because public policy demands
that equitable aid should not be extended to
what is in fact an illegal scheme.
Nor is
there any force in the contention
that the
case is brought within the scope of the doctrine that a court will relieve a party who
has made a contract under the stress erf great
necessity.
As we have already demonstrated, the defendant has only himself to blame
for trusting to a promise the fulfillment of
which equity would not compel.
He was in
no different position from that which he
would have occupied had the promise of plaintiff never been made. And it is too clear
to justify argument
that had plaintiff demanded $5,000 for this stock, without having
made any prior promise to permit defendant
to control it, the defendant, if he saw fit to
yield to this demand, would have been entitled to no relief on the ground that It was a
hard bargain, extorted from him by the neIt-would be a novel
cessities of his situation.
and dangerous doctrine that a party who, In
his anxiety to secure property, had paid more
than Its market value, could appeal to equity
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to relieve him, because he had been Impelled
by his desires to pay a large price for the
thing bought.
The cases cited by counsel
for defendant do not lay down any such docThey are cases where one person has
trine.
taken advantage of the financial distress of
another to extort from him an unconscionable contract.
See Hough's Adm'rs v. Hunt,
15 Am. Dec. 569, and note.
Neither can it
be said that the defendant was compelled to
pay more for the stock than the market price.
The strife of the controlling factions to secure control of the majority of the stock, to
be used at the approaching stockholders'
meeting, had temporarily given to this stock
a value above its Intrinsic value. To the purchaser of it, it meant victory and supremacy
in the management of corporate affairs. Why
should defendant
claim that an exorbitant
price had been extorted from him, if he was
paying only what plaintiff could have secured
from the opposing faction, had defendant declined to buy at that figure?
The counsel for
the defendant, in his learned and exhaustive
brief, and in his very able oral argument before the court, has presented everything that
could possibly be urged in favor of the case he
represents;
and this, too, with great ingenuity and force.
But while we fully agree with
him that, if the facts found be true, his client
has a just grievance in the forum of conscience, yet we are unable, because of the
considerations
of public policy to which we
have alluded, to give him any legal redress.
The judgment of the district court is in all
things reversed, and that court is directed to
modify its conclusions of law in accordance
with this opinion, and to enter judgment for
the plaintiff for the full amount due on the
note, for principal and interest.
All concur.
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NEW ENGLAND TRUST
(38

Supreme

CO. v.

ABBOTT.

N. E. 432, 162 Mass. 148.)

Judicial
SufEolk.

Court of Massachusetts.
Oct.

18,

1894.

Report from superior court, Suffolk county.
Action by the New England Trust Company against Abbott, executor of the will
of Josiah G. Abbott, deceased, to—comBel
a tr ansfer to th e company of certain share s
of its stock held by defendant's testaiQr,_and
to enjoin defendant from further prosecuting
an action at law to recover the dividends
on said shares.
Judgment for plaintiff.
W. G. Russell and J. L. Stackpole,
for
plaintiff.
L. S. Dabney and F. J. Stimsom,
for defendant

MORTON, J. This is a bill brought by
the plaintifC to compel the transfer to it, by
the defendant,
as executor of the will of
Josiah G. Abbott, of certain shares in the
plaintifC corporation, which were held by
said Abbott at his decease, and which, It
is alleged, he agreed, when the certificates
were issued to him, should be appraised at
his death by the directors, and transferred
to the plaintifC at the appraisal. If the directors so elected.
The bill also seeks to
enjoin the defendant from prosecuting an
action at law brought by him against the
plaintiff to recover certain dividends upon
said shares that have been declared by it.
The plaintiff was organized in 1869, under
a special charter (Acts 1869, c. 182), with a
capital of $500,000, which was afterwards
increased
to $1,000,000.
The terms of the
alleged agreement are found in the by-laws,
of which all that is now material Is as
follows:
"Art 7. Any member of this corporation
who shall be desirous of selling any of his
shares, the executor or administrator of any
member, deceased, and the grantee or assignee of any shares sold on execution, shall
cause such, their shares, respectively,
to be
appraised by the directors, which it shall
be their duty to do on request and shall
thereupon offer the same to them for the
use of the corporation at such appraised
value; and. If said directors shall choose to
take such shares for the use of the corporation, such member, executor, administrator,
or assignee shall, upon the payment or tender to him of such appraised value thereof,
and the dividends due thereon, transfer and
assign such slxai-e or shares to said corporation; prx)yided, however, the said directors
shall not bfi obliged to take said shares at
the appraised value, unless they shall think
it for the intCTests of the company; and if
they shall not, within ten days after sucU
shares are offered to them in writing, take
the same, and pay such member, executor,
administrator, or assignee the price at whicli
tlie same shftU have been appraised, such
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member, executor, administrator, or assignee
shall be at liberty to sell and dispose of the
same shares to any person whatever.

"Art 8. The directors shall have power,
and it shall be their duty, to sell and dispose
of the shares which may be transferred as
aforesaid to the corporation, whenever, in
their judgment. It can be done with safety
and advantage to the corporation; and in
all sales made by the directors, imder any
of the aforesaid provisions, it shall be their
duty to sell the shares to such persons as
shall appear to them, from their situation
and character, most likely to promote confidence in the stability of the institution;
no greater number than one hundred shares
being assigned to any one person, nor, in the
case of a person ah-eady a member, a greater
number than will be siiflicient to increase
his previous number to one hundred shares."
These by-laws were adopted before any
Aftercertificates of stock were issued.
wards, but before the capital was increased,
article 7 was duly amended by adding to it
the following:
"It shall be the duty of such executor, administrator, grantee, or assignee to offer
said shares for appraisal, and to be taken
by the corporation, if it shall so elect, whenever requested by the actuary or secretary,
and no dividends or interest shall be paid
or allowed after a failure to comply with
provided, that such request
such request:
shall not be made until after the payment of
one dividend and the expiration of six
months from the death of the owner or sale
as aforesaid, but the offer may be made at
any earlier period if the party shall prefer."
Every certificate contained on its face, as
part of the certificate, the provision that
"said shares are transferable only in person
or by attorney, duly constituted, on the
books of the company, and in the manner
and upon the conditions expressed in the bylaws of the company, printed upon the back
of this certificate." On the backs of the
certificates were printed by-laws 7 and 8.
By-law 7 was printed as amended on the
backs of those issued after the increase.
There were also on the stubs from which the
certificates were detached, in the certificate
books, two receipts given and signed by the
defendant's testator at the time the two certificates were issued to him In the original
and increased capital, which were each as
follows:
"Received the above certificate
subject to the conditions and restrictions
therein referred to, and to the by-laws of the
company,
to which I agree to conform."
The defendant contends that these by-laws
are void. We have not found it necessary
to consider that question, and we express no
opinion upon it. We think that the case
may well stand on the ground that the defendant's testator entered into an agreement
wipx the plaintiff to do what the plaintiff
now seeks to compel his executor to do. It
ip manifest that a stockholder may make a
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conti-act with a corporation to do or not to
do certain tilings in regard to his stoclc, or to
waive certain rights, or to submit to certain
restrictions respecting which the stockholders might have no power of compulsion over
him. In Adley v. Whltstable Co., 17 Ves.
says:
"It has been
315, 322, Lord Eldon
frequently determined that what may well
be made the subject of a contract between
the different interests of a partnership would
not be good as a by-law. For instance, an
among the citizens of London
agreement
that they would not sell except in the markets of London would be good; yet it has
been declared by the legislature that a bySee, also, Davis
law to that effect is void."
321;
etc., 8 Mete. (Mass.)
V. Proprietors,
Bank of Attica v. Manufacturers' & Traders'
Bank, 20 N. Y. 505, 6 Cook, Stocks & S. § 408.
In the present case the certificates were issued to the defendant's testator in consideration of the payment by him to the corporation of the amount due for the stock,

and of the agreements with it on his part
By accepting them
which they contained.
without objection, and by signing the receipts, he must be held to have agreed to
the conditions printed on the backs of the
certificates.
The fact that the conditions
were
contained
in by-laws which may
have been invalid as such does not render
his agreement void, if the contract was in
substance
one which the corporation had
power to make.
We think that it had such
It is held in this state that a corpower.
poration, unless prohibited, may purchase its
own stock (Dupee v. Water Power Co., 114
Mass. 37); and we see nothing opposed to
public policy in such an agreement as this,
with corporations like this. If honestly carried out by the directors, it tends to secure a
trustworthy
body of stockholders,
from
which those having the care and management of the affairs of the corporation naturally would be selected.
It certainly cannot be contrary to public policy that the
managers
of this and similar institutions
should be persons of skill who possess the
confidence of the public. The restraint upon
alienation is no greater than Is often agreed
In England it is not unusual to find in
to.
the deeds of settlement or articles of association under which corporations or joint-stock
companies have been organized, and which
correspond to the charter and by-laws here,
provisions requiring the stockholder, in case
he wishes to transfer his stock, to offer it to
the directors, or to submit to them the name
of the transferee for approval. Bargate v.
Shortrldge, 5 H. L. Cas. 297; Poole v. Middleton, 29 Beav. 646; Ex parte Penney, 8
Ch. App. 446; MofCatt v. Farquhar, 7 Ch.
Div. 591; ChappeU's Case, 6 Ch. App. 902.
No objections seem to have been made to
In this state, the legislathese provisions.
ture, in numerous instances, has provided, In
the charters of corporations like this, that
the shares shall be transferable according to
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such rules and regulations as the stockholdIt is
ers shall establish, and not otherwise.
hardly possible that the legislature was ignorant of the construction which has been
put upon the power thus conferred, and
which in the case of the first corporation of
the kind chartered in the commonwealth,

Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance
Company (Acts 1818, c. 180), was shown. It
is said, by the adoption of by-laws from
It is
which those in this case were copied.
true that this charter contains no provision
in regard to by-laws or to the transfer of
shai-es; but the policy of the legislature cannot be affected by such an omission, especially in view of the fact that many of the
charters since granted contain this provi-

the

sion.

Neither do we think that the agreement Is
void for the reason that it authorizes the
plaintiff to invest, as the defendant contends, in its own stock, or because it compels
the defendant to submit to the appraisal of
the directors. If the enumeration in its charter of certain things in which it may invest
Is to be construed as excluding, among others,
its own stock, we think that the object of
the agreement is not to secure the transfer of
the shares to the plaintiff as an investment,
but to enable the directors to dispose of it to
such person or persons as shall appear to
them, from their situation and character,
most likely to promote confidence in the stability of the institution; and though, pending
its disposition by the directors, it may, for
sake, be placed with the comconvenience's
pany's securities, and dividends, if declared,
collected upon it, that does not alter the essential character of the tenure upon which
the company holds it. It is settled that one
may agree to sell his property at a price to
be determined by another, and that he will
be bound by the price so fixed, even though
the party establishing it was interested; provided the interest was known, and no objection made by the parties, and no fraud or
bad faith is shown. Brown v. Bellows, 4
Pick. 179, 189; Palmer v. Clark, 106 Mass.
373, 389; Haley v. Bellamy, 137 Mass. 357,
359; Fox V. Hazelton, 10 Pick. 275; Strong
V. Strong, 9 Cush. 569; Benj. Sales (6th Am.
Ed.) § 88, note 3.
The defendant objects that there was no
real appraisal, and that he did not offer the
stock for appraisal. The records of the plaintiff show that at a directors' meeting, at
which were present 16 directors, it was voted
that the defendant's stock be appraised at
$220 per share, and taken for the use of the
corporation. The directors were not bound
to give the defendant notice or a hearing
(Palmer v. Clark, supra); and we must assume that they gave the matter such attention as, in their opinion, was necessary, and
that the appraisal correctly expresses their
judgment, after taking into account such
matters as they thought should be considered. There is nothing to show that they were
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so mistaken about the facts that what they
did was In no fair sense an appraisal of this
stock, but of something else. It is said that
they omitted the good will.
so, it was, at
most, an error of judgment, which would not
Invalidate the appraisal. It was not a condition precedent to the appraisal that the defendant should offer the stock. The agreement of defendant's testator was, in substance, that the stock should be appraised by
the directors, and that it might be taken at
the appraisal by them if they so elected; and
that has been done. The offer was for the
purpose of fixing a time from which the 10
days should begin to run at whose expiration
the stockholder could dispose of his stock
if the directors had not elected to take it.
the directors appraised the stock, and
voted to take it at the appraisal, an offer was

If

If

unnecessary.
Lastly, the defendant contends that the
plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance, because the stock was greatly undervalued, and because the plaintiff has a remedy at law. It is evident that to remit the
plaintiff to an action at law for damages
would defeat the very purpose of the contract, and would not, we think, furnish an
adequate remedy.
No stock in the plaintiff
company has ever been sold in the market,
and all the shares that have been transferred
have been transferred to the plaintiff, and
disposed of by the directors in the manner
provided. About three-fourths of the stock
of the original subscribers has been thus
transferred. There is no evidence that the
testator ever objected to this mode of dealing
with it; and we see no good reason why the
plaintiff should be obliged to accept damages for which it might be difficult to lay
down a clear rule, instead of performance.
Railroad Coi-p. v. Babcock, 6 Mete. (Mass.)
346; Cushman v. Manufacturing Co., 76 N.
Y. 365. The case would perhaps stand differently if the shares were bought and sold in
the market like most stocks. Adam v. Messlnger, 147 Mass. 185, 17 N. E. 491. The defendant does not charge the directors with
any fraud in the appraisal. He expressly disclaims that. It is well settled that where one
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agrees that another may fix the price for certain property, or the sum to be paid for material or services, the decision of the party
by showing
selected cannot be impeached
that he has committed an error of judgment,
or failed to avail himself of all the informal
tion which he might have obtained, or has
valued the property too high or too low.
Palmer v. Clark, supra; Flint v. Gibson, 106
Mass. 891; Robbins v. Clark, 129 Mass. 145;
Railroad Co. v. March, 114 U. S. 549, 5 Sup.
Ct. 1035; Stevenson v. Watson, 4 C. P. Div.
148; Sharpe v. Railway Co., 8 Ch. App. 597;
Richards v. May, 10 Q. B. Div. 400; Tullis v.
Jacson [1892] 3 Ch. Div. 441; Ranger v. Railway Co., 5 H. L. Cas. 72. The evidence that
was offered by the defendant relating to the
value of the stock was therefore rightly excluded.
It is equally well settled that specific
performance of an agreement to convey will
not be refused merely because the price is
inadequate or excessive. The difference must
be so great as to lead to a reasonable conclusion of fraud, mistake, or concealment in the
nature of fraud, and to render it plainly inequitable and against conscience that the
contract should be enforced.
Chute v.
Quincy, 156 Mass. 189, 30 N. E. 550; Lee v.
Kirby, 104 Mass. 420; Park v. Johnson, 4
Allen, 259; Railroad Co. v. Babcock, 6 Mete.
(Mass.) 346, 352; Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet.
271; Underhill v. Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns. Ch.
339; Belchier v. Reynolds, 2 Keny. pt 2, p. 87;
Weekes v. Gallard, 21 Law T. (N. S.) 655;
Fry, Spec. Perf. (3d Am. Ed.) § 424, note 1.
It is to be observed that this Is a suit directly between the company and a stockholder,
to enforce a contract made with the company by the latter, and that the rights of

third parties are not involved. Many of the
cases cited and relied upon by the defendant are cases where the rights of third parties are involved, and therefore inapplicable
to this.
The result is that the plaintiff is entitled
to a decree compelling the defendant jto convey the shares upon payment by it of the
ainount of the appraisal, with interest, and
enjoining him from prosecuting the action at
law. Ordered accordingly.
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CONGER

et al. v.

(23 N.

E.

Court of Appeals
sion.

NEW YORK. W.

S. & B.

R. CO.
983,

120 N.

Y.

29.)

of New York, Second DiviMarch

18,

1880.

Appeal from supremocourt,

Becond department.

general term,

Action by Clarence E. Conger and another against the New York, West Shore
& Buffalo Railroad Company.
A judgment in favor of defendant, entered npon
the decision of the special term, was affirmed at the general term, and plaintiff
again appeals.
Clarence R. Conger, for appellants.
Calvin Frost, for respondent.
Haight, J. This action was brought
to compel a specific performance of a contract. The Jersey City & Albany Railway Company was incorporated for the
purpose of constructing and operating a
railroad from Fort Montgomery, in the
county of Orange, to a point on the Hudeon river opposite to the city of New York.
As such incorporation it entered into a
written agreement with one Catherine A.
Hedges, the plaintiffs' grantor, in and by
the terms of which she gave to the company a right of way across her premises
in Rockland county upon certain conditions, one of which was that the company
should locate a station in the gorge cominonly known as the "Long Clove," and
stop thereat five express trains each way
daily. Subsequently the Jersey City & Albany Railway Company was consolidated
with the North River Railway Company,
under the name of the North River Railroad Company, and that company was
with the defendant, which
consolidated
was incorporated for the purpose of constructing and operating a railroad from
the New Jersey state line, through the
state of New York, to the city of Buffalo.
The defendant has entered upon the lands
of the said Catherine A. Hedges, and constructed its road-bed across the same, but
It has not constructed any station thereon in the Long Clove gorge, or stopped
any of Its express trains thereat.
The
trial court has found as facts that asuitable station for the accommodation of passengers, and the receipt and delivery of
freight, at the Long Clove gorge, could be
built by the defendant only at a considerable expense, because of the nature of the
ground at that point; that the place
where the plaintiffs demand that the station be located is near the mouth of a long
tunnel, and at a sharp curve in the defendant's railroad, upon the side of a steep
mountain approached by steep grades in
both directions ; that it is sparsely settled.
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and if a station were establlBhed there It
would be of no use to the public ; that
very little, if any, benefit would result to
the plaintiffs, by the erection of a station,
or the stoppage of the trains thereat;
that the public convenience would not he
promoted, but the public travel would be
delayed ; and, as a conclusion of law, that
a specific enforcement of the agreement
would work hardship and injustice to the
defendant, and such enforcement will not
subserve the ends of justice; that specific
performance should be denied, and the
plaintiffs left to their action for damages
for a breach of the contract. The evidence sustains the findings of the trial
court, which have been affirmed by the
general term. The questions for our consideration are therefore narrowed to a
determination as to whether the conclusions of law reached are justified under the
findings of fact.
It has been the well-settled doctrine of
this court that the specific performance of
a contract is discretionary with the court,
and that performance will not be decreed
where it will result in great hardship and
injustice to one party, without any consideration, gain, or utility to the other, or
in a case where the public interest would be
prejudiced thereby. Clarke v. Railroad Co.,
v. Thacher, 87 N.
18 Barb. 350; Trustees
Y. 811-317; Murdfeldt v. Railway Co., 102
N. Y. 703, 7 N. E. Rep. 404; Day v. Hunt,
112 N. Y. 191-19.5, 19 N. E. Rep. 414.
As we have seen, the Long Clovegorgeis
located upon the side of a steep mountain,
in a sparsely settled district, and is approached by a steep grade, and that a
passenger station, with an approach thereat, could be constructed only at a considerable expense.
These are reasons worthy of consideration, but, if there were no
others, the trial court might not have
deemed them sufficient to refuse specific
performance. But they are followed by
another, which gives additional force and
weight, and that is that the public travel
will be delayed by the stoppage of the
trains, and that the public convenience
will not be promoted.
The defendant is a
corporation organized under the laws of
the state, and is a common carrier of passengers and freight.
Its duties are largely of a public nature, and it is bound to so
run its trains and operate its road as to
promote the public interest and convenience, and, in view of the fact that but little if any benefit would result to the plaintiffs by the erection of a station and the
stoppage of trains thereat, as found by
the trial court, it appears to us that that
court properly refused to decree specific
performance and remanded the plaintiffs to
their action for damages. The judgment
should be aflBrmed, with costs. All concur, except Brown, J., not sitting.
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HOSS et

a}. V.

PARKS.

(8 South. 368, 93- Ala. 153.)
Supreme Court of Alabama.

Nov. 18, 1890.

Appeal from chancery court, Jackson county; Thomas Cobbs, Chancellor.
Bill to enforce specific performance of a
contract to convey land. The title to the
land in controversy was in one Jeremiah
French. On the 15th day of December, 1887,
French agreed, in writing, to convey the
land to the complainant. Parks, if Parks
would pay him $200 by December 15, 1888.
At the execution of this option, 50 cents was
paid, and expressed in the contract as the
This contract to sell, or opconsideration.
tion, was signed by French and his wife,
but was not signed by Parks. It was recorded in the probate office, and defendants,
Ross and McClendon, had actual notice of
After the execution of this
its execution.
contract, French moved to Texas. Subsequently, Ross and McClendon sent an agent
out to Texas where French was, and through
said agent ofEered French $300 for the land in
controversy,
and thereby, on November 21,
1888, procured a deed from French and his
wife, conveying to Ross and McClendon the
Belegal title to the land in controversy.
fore the expiration of his option, under the
contract of French, Parks paid French the
money aa therein agreed, and
$200 purchase
a deed to said lands from said
received
French and his wife, which was executed on
and bore the date of 2Sd of November,
1888.
On December 21, 1888, the said Ross
and McClendon brought an action of ejectment against Parks to recover the possesof which
sion of the land in controversy,
Thereupon, on
Parks was in possession.
January 29, 1889, Parks filed the bill in this
case against said Ross and McClendon, and
prayed to have the ejectment suit enjoined;
the deed made by French and wife to Ross
and to have Ross
and McClendon canceled;
and McClendon specifically perform the contract entered into by French and wife,—
making to the complainant a good and perOn a
fect title to the land in controversy.
final hearing upon the pleadings and proof,
the chancellor granted the relief prayed, and
now appeal, and assign this
the defendants
decree as error.

J. B. Brown and Watts & Son, for appellants. L. W. Days and D. D. Shelby, for
appellee.

A general rule governing
of specific performance is that the
contract must be mutual, and that either
party is entitled to the equitable remedy of
Exceptions to this
a specific performance.
and one
general rule are well established,
class of contracts to which the exceptions
may be applied are those which are unilateral in form. Pom. Cont. §§ 167, 168: The
exception as to unilateral contracts has been
COLEMAN, J.

cases
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recognized
and adopted in this state.
The ease of Moses v. McClaIn, 82 Ala. 370, 2
South. 741, was for a si>ecific performance of
the following contract: "For and in consideratioa of the gum of one dollar in hand paid,
I hereby give A. J. Moses an option on my
situated near Sheflands and improvements
field, and known as my 'House. Place,' containing one hundred and twenty acres, more
or less, for the sum of eight thousand dollars. * * * This option good for 2 days.
[Signed] J, W. McClain."
It was contended
that Moses, the covenantee, bound himself
by no writing, and not having bound himhold
self, he could not in this proceeding
McClain bound; that the contract not being
mutually binding, chancery will not compel
The court declared
its specific performance.
as follows: "Mutuality is frequently said to
of a rightful suit
be one of the conditions
The authorities,
for specific performance.
however, do not carry it to the length contended for. Where the contract is fair, just,
and reasonable in all its parts, and the party
sought to be charged has so bound himself
as to meet the requirements of the statute
of frauds, the election of the other contracting party to treat the contract as binding,
and to enforce it, meets all the requirements
of the rule;" citing Wilks v. Railroad Co.,
79 Ala. 180; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1405, and
notes; Wat. Spec. Perf. Cont. § 201; Cherry
The case of
V. Smith,
39 Am. Dec.
150.
Johnston v. Trippe (C. C.) 33 Fed. 530, is
an authority directly on the point in question,
the contract being almost identical in its provisions. The different authorities are very
generally quoted and commented on, and the
conclusion the same as held by this court.
The evidence fails to show that there w^as
such forcible entry and unlawful detainer
as to deprive complainant of his right to
file a bill to remove a cloud from title, but
the equity of the bill does not depend upon
that principle. "The complainants, holding _
the equitable title, bring their bill to comi>el
a conveyance of the legal title by those who
hold it in trust for them.
In such a case,
the jurisdiction in no wise depends upon posGray v. Jones (0. C.) 14 Fed. 83;
session."
Shipman v. Furniss, 69 Ala. 562.
The doctrine is well settled that when the
vendor, after entering into a contract of sale,
conveys the land to a third person, who has
knowledge or notice of the prior agreement,
such grantee takes the land impressed with
the trust in favor of the original vendee,
and holds it as trustee for such vendee, and
can be compelled, at the suit of the vendee,
to specifically perform the agreement by conveying the land in the same manner, and to
the same extent, as the vendor would have
been liable to do had he not transferred the
legal title. Pom. Cont. § 465, and note.
The
same rule Is declared in Dickinson v. Any,
25 Ala. 424; Meyer v. Mitchell, 75 Ala. 475.
It may be stated as a sound principle of
law, if an owner of land in writing gives
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another an option on land, for a valuable
consideration, whether adequate or not, agreeing to sell It to him at a fixed price, if accepted within a specified time, it Is binding
upon the owner, and upon those who pm'chase from the owner with a knowledge of
Moses v. JlcClain, 82 Ala.
such agreement.
MauU
370, 2 South. 741; 33 Fed. 530, supra;
and authorities.
134,
V. Vaughn, 45 Ala.
Under such circumstances, the fixed time Is
a material part of the contract, and when
the
supported hy a valuable consideration,
owner of the land cannot revoke the offer before the time has expired within which the
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may be accepted.
We do not declare
that if no specified, definite time was fixed
by the parties, and the contract of offer was
not supported by a valuable consideration,
such an offer could not be revoked.
We exJohnpress no opinion upon this question.
ston V. Trippe (C. 0.) 33 Fed. supra; Wilks v.
Railway Co., 79 Ala. 185; Falls v. Gaither,
9 Port. 617; Cherry v. Smith, 3 Humph. 19;
1 Story, Cont § 496; 1 Pars. Cent. *481, bottom p. 511; Bish. Cont. § 325; Benj. Sales.
offer

§ 42.

We find no error in the

chancellor.

AfiBrmed.

decree

of the
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(33 Fed. 530.)

December

19,

1887.

ill equity. Bill for specific performance by
complainant J. L. Johnston against R. B.
Trippe, defendant.
On demurrer.

if

G. A. Howell, for complainant.
Hopkins & Glenn, for defendant.

(i.

following written instrument:
"Georgia, Fulton County.
This agreement
witnesseth, that the undersigned E. B. Trippe,
of said state and county, agrees that if said
J. Lamb Johnston, of Charleston, S. C, or
any one for him, pays or causes to be paid
to the said R. B. Trippe, one thousand dollars,
on or before January 20, 1888, that the said
R. B. Trippe, for himself, his heirs and assigns, covenants and agrees that he will make
to the said Johnston good and sufficient title
to lots of land numbers 9 and 25, in 3d district. White county, said state. And it is further agreed that if a draft for $50.00 this day
drawn by R. B. Trippe, with this option bond
attached, is paid at sight, then said R. B.
Trippe will make said title, if nine hundred
and fifty dollars is paid him on or before January 20, 1888; if said sums of money are not
paid within the time mentioned, that is, $50.00
on sight draft and $950.00 within twelve
months from this date, then this bond to be
nuU and void; and it is understood that if
e.,
dollars
the balance of one thousand
$950.00) is not paid by January 20, 1888, the
$50.00 paid on sight draft is forfeited to said
R. B. Trippe, and that this option bond is
null and void, otherwise of full force and ef-

fect

"Witness my hand and seal, this January

20, 1887.

"[Signed]

E. B. Trippe.

"Witness:

"[Signed]
J. H. Curtright, M. L. Cohen."
This instrument was sent, about the time
of its execution, by defendant to complainant by mail to his home in Charleston, South
DeCarolina, and received by complainant.

;

5

2

a

1

That equity will not specifically enforce
contract wanting in definlteness or mutuality,
see Bourget v. Monroe (Mich.) 25 N. W. Rep.
514; Hall v. Loomis (Mich.) 30 N. W. Rep.
374; Mosea v. McClain (Ala.)
South. Rep.
741; Recknagle v. Sehmalz (Iowa) 33 N. AV.
Rep. 365; Durkee v. Cota (Oal.) 16 Pac. Rep.
Fogg y. Price (Mass.) 14 N. E. Rep. 741.

the complainant
refused to release defendant,
he instructed defendant to submit his deeds
and that, upon
to complainant's attorney,
their approval by him, complainant would pay
This defendant failed and
the balance, $950.
refused to do, but wrote complainant that he
declined to furnish the titles or convey the
land in accordance with his contract; and in
check payable to
the same letter inclosed
his, defendant's, order, and indorsed by him
in blank, which he tendered as repayment of
the $50.
This letter was received by complainant in Nacoochee, Georgia, on the night
of March 17, 1887. On the next day, March
18th, complainant went to Atlanta, the home
of defendant, sought an interview with him,
and immediately returned
to him the $50
check which he had received from him; stating to defendant that he refused to receive it;
and defendant now has the check in his posComplainant at the same time tensession.
dered to defendant $950 in cash, and demanda good
ed that defendant make complainant
and sufficient title to the land in controversy,
which tender defendant refused, and refused to convey, and repeatedly refused tp carry
A tender
out his contract with complainant.
is made in the bill of $950; and the prayer is
against
for
decree for specific performance
defendant, with an alternative prayer for damcanages, in the event specific performance
not be obtained. An amendment has been filed to this bill, which amendment alleges that
the property described in the bUl, bargained by
defendant to complainant,
is now worth the
sum of $3,000, and also that the damages to
resulting from such refusal and
complainant
the failure of the defendant to perform his
decontract, exceed $3,000.
To this bill
on
murrer has been filed, which demurrer
First, that this court has no
two grounds:
in the bill
jurisdiction of the subject-matter
stated; and, second, that the complainant has
right to any relief against denot shown
fendant.
The first ground is based upon the fact
that the amount in controversy, as shown
by the original bill, is not sufficient to give
this court jurisdiction; the bill having been
filed since the passage of the act of March
a

spondence and negotiation between complainant and defendant, relative to the sale of certain, land in White county, Georgia, by the
latter to the former, alleges that in January,
prepared and executed the
defendant
1887,

is

NEWMAN, J. This is a bill filed by complainant against defendant to enforce the specific performance
of a certain conditional or
optional contract for the sale of land.
The
bill, after stating some preliminary corre-

a

N. D. Georgia.

a

Circuit Court,

sight
fendant also drew on complainant
draft for $50, which was sent, veith the foreHis
going written instrument, to Charleston.
draft was honored and paid at once by comthe $50.
plainant, and defendant
received
Some time after this, defendant wrote to complainant, saying he had an offer of $1,500 for
the land, and offering, if complainant would
release him from his obligation, to return the
$50 paid him, and to pay complainant $50 in
In the
the other sale was made.
addition,
same letter defendant
stated that the bond
sent by him to complainant was not legally
binding anyway. Complainant promptly replied, both by wire and letter, to defendant,
refusing to release him from his obligation to
convey the land in pursuance of the before
In the same letter in which
stated contract.
a

TRIPPE.1

a

V.

717

a

JOHNSTON

OF CONTRACTS.

ri8

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

18S7.
This objection seems to be obviated by the amendment since filed, fixing the
value of the land at $3,000 and the damThere was
ages at not less than that sum.
very little discussion upon this point, in the
and it was not strongly urged.
argument,
The serious and main question in the case
arises under the second ground of the demurrer, that the complainant has not shown
a right to any relief against defendant. The
question made is that this contract between
defendant and complainant lacks the element of mutuality, which is necessary to authorize a court of equity to decree a specific performance. That is to say, that, as
complainant was not compelled by his contract to take the land and pay defendant
the remainder of the purchase money, defendant could not be required to carry out the
agreement.
There is a general rule of law, undoubtedly, that this element of mutuality must
of specific perexist to justify enforcement
formance. Fry, Spec. Perf. § 286; Wat
Spec. Perf. § 196.
It is also true that there
In Fry
are clear exceptions
to this rule.
on specific performance it is stated in section 291, as follows: "The contract may be
of such a nature as to give a right to the
performance to the one party which it does
not give to the other; as, for instance, where
a lessor covenants to renew upon the request
of his lessee, or where the agreement is in
But the more
the nature of an undertaking.
accurate view of such cases as the first, —
perhaps of all that could be treated as wanting mutuality,— seems to be that they are
conditional contracts; and when the condition has been made absolute, as, for instance,
in the case above stated, by a request to
renew, they would seem to be mutual, and
by either party
capable
of enforcement
3,

alike."

In Wat Spec. Perf. § 200, in discusslns
the matter of exceptions to this general rule,
the author says:
"But it is well settled that
an optional agreement to convey, or to renew
a lease, without any covenant
or obligation to purchase or accept, and without any
mutuality of remedy, will be enforced in equity if it is made upon proper consideration,
or forms part of a lease or other contract
between the parties that may be the true
consideration for it, though such an agreement can perhaps scarcely be called an exception; for, being in fact a conditional contract, when the condition has been made
by a compliance with its terms,
absolute
the Contract becomes mutual, and capable of
enforcement by either party. A contract for
the sale of real estate, at the option of the
vendee only, upon election and notice, may
not only be Specifically enforced, but the
refusal of the vendor to accept the purchase
money will not destroy the mutuality, though
withdraw his
the vendee could thereupon
election."
The decisions upon this question have been
nnmerous,
and it has been discussed ably
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and at length by many courts of high authority. The case very generally referred
to and relied upon to sustain the rule requiring that a contract must be mutually
binding to justify its enforcement,
is the
decision of Lord Redesdale in the case of
Lawenson v. Butler, 1 Schoales & L. 13.
A careful examination of that case and the
argument and reasoning of the Lord Chancellor will show that the decision was put
mainly upoil the ground that where parties
enter into an agreement, each supposing the
other to be bound thereby, and it transpires
that one was not bound, such party could
not have specific performance of the conHe says, in concluding
tract by the other.
(page 21:) "No man signs an
the opinion,
agreement but imder a supposition that the
other party is bound, as well as himself;
and therefore, if the other party is not
bound, he signs It under a mistake. That
mistake might be a ground for relief in
equity, but is surely not a ground for specific performance. Under these circumstances, the impression upon my mind is that I
must dismiss the bill. This agreement was
It Is manifest that Butsigned in mistake.
ler could not have executed a lease in compliance with it; and as he could not, it is
manifest that this is not the agreement he
meant to sign."
From a note to this case, (page 21,) it
would seem that the Lord Chancellor was
not himself entirely satisfied with the decision, as he proposed that the case lie over
until the next day to look into the cases
cited, when plaintiff's counsel stated that
they were content with a dismissal of the
bill without costs, and it was ordered accordingly. These comments upon and citations from this much-quoted
case, are not
made to question the existence of the general rule alluded to, but to show that its
application, even in its origin, was a matter
of difficulty, and its extent uncertain.
Counsel for defendant relied in argument
here mainly on the cases of Marble Co. v.
Ripley, 10 Wall. 339; Tyson v. Watts, 1
Md. Ch. 1; Duvall v. Meyers, 2 Md. Ch.
401; and Peacock v. Deweese, 73 Ga. 570.
In the case of Marble Co. v. Ripley, other
questions
were made growing out of complex and intricate partnership relations; but
one reason why specific performance should
not be decreed was want of mutuality.
After stating this as a reason why specific
performance should be refused in that case,
the court proceeds to give what is termed
a "still more satisfactory reason for withholding a decree for specific performance."
But want of mutuality was undoubtedly recognized as applicable to that case.
In the
later case of Butler v. Thomson, 92 TJ. S.
412, the Court, in the opinion, uses the following language:
"There may be an offer
to sell subject to acceptance,
which would
bind the party offering, and not the other
party until acceptance.
The samie may be
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said of an optional purchase upon a suflBclent consideration."
Tlie court then alludes
to a class of cases under the statute of
frauds where one party signed a contract
and the other did not. The language as
quoted

seems to me to indicate

a recognition

by the court of offers to sell subject to acceptance, and optional purchases upon sufficient consideration, as exceptions to this general rule requiring mutuality of obligation in
the contract. It would be far from clear
that Marble Co. v. Ripley, even standing
alone, should be regarded as controlling in
this case; but the language used in the later
case of Butler v. Thomson shows clearly, I
think, that that court would not so regard
it. The two cases from the Maryland Chancery Decisions referred to may be disposed
of with the remark that in neither case
cited were the facts at all like the facts that
are presented in the case now before this
In the case of Peacock v. Deweese,
court.
the supreme court of Georgia held that the
contract sought to be enforced in that case
lacked the element of mutuality, and stated
that as one reason why specific performance
would not be decreed. The court also stated,
however, that "the agreement Is gratuitous,
and entirely voluntary on the part of the
A court of equity never
defendant in error.
decrees a specific performance of a voluntary
Any
or gratuitous contract. Code, § 3189.
fact showing the contract to be unjust or
unfair or against good conscience, justifies
the court In refusing to decree a specific
performance. Code, § 3190." The undertaking of the two Deweeses in that case was entirely without consideration to them.
Peacock agreed to make such tests of the land
for the discovery of minerals as were "satisfactory to himself." The two Deweeses had
their land tied up by this option for six
any remuneration
months without receiving
therefor, and it was evidently the view of
the court that the agreement by Peacock
to make such tests as were "satisfactory to
himself" was not such a consideration as
would support the contract. This may be
gathered, I think, from the use of the lanor gratuitous contract."
guage "voluntary
This, then, was an optional agreement to sell,
wholly without consideration.
I have thus far given attention principallj*
to the authorities relied upon by the eminent
counsel for defendant
in this case, without
referring to the long line of decisions which, it
seems, hold that contracts such as the one beIn the case
fore the court will be enforced.
of Fowle V. Freeman, 9 Ves. 351, it was held
that an agreement in writing for the sale of
an estate was binding if signed only by the
vendor, and followed by direction to his attorney to prepare a proper agreement for both
parties to sign.
In the case of Ormond v.
Anderson, 2 Ball & B. 363, where the court
dismissed the bill upon another ground, the
following language was used in the opinion:

"An

objection

has been made

to the

execu-
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tion of this agreement, on the ground that it
has not been signed by the plaintiff, and that
it
have enforced
the defendant
could not
I am very well aware
against the plaintiff.
that a doubt has been entertained by a judge
in this court, of very high authority, [referring to Lord Bedesdale, in Lawenson v. Butler,] whether courts of equity would specifically execute an agreement where one party
There exists no provision in
only was bound.
the statute of frauds to prevent the execuand Sir James
tion of such an agreement;
Mansfield, who certainly had great experience
in courts of equity, lays it down in the case
of Allen V. Bennet, [3 Taunt. 169,] that a contract signed by one party would be enforced in
equity against that party, and that such was
the daUy practice of that court."
He proceeds to say that "in a case where
the court finds a party who has been and is
endeavoring to obtain some undue advantage,
or has been playing what is called 'fast and
In
loose,' the court would not assist him."
the case of Clason v. Bailey, 14 Johns. 484,
the chancellor, after discussing, among other
have just cited, concludes thus:
cases, those
"1 have thought, and often intimated, that the
weight of argument was in favor of the construction that the agreement concerning lands,
to be enforced in equity, should be mutually
binding; and that the one party ought not to
■
be at liberty to enforce, at his pleasure, an
agreement which the other was not entitled to
It appears to be settled (Hawkins v.
claim.
Holmes, 1 P. Wms. 770) that though the plaintiff has signed the agreement he never can
enforce it against the party who has not signed it. The remedy, therefore, in such cases is
But, notwithstanding this objecnot mutual.
tion, it appears from the review of the cases
that the point is too well settled to be now
questioned."
In a later case in New York— In re Hunter,
1 Bdw. Ch. 1 — ^the vice-chancellor
uses the following language:
"In the next place, it is
said the covenant to seU is not mutual, the
lessee not being bound to purchase, and that,
as this is a 'one-sided' agreement, the court
will not decree a specific performance.
The
cases of Parkhurst v. Oortlandi, 1 Johns. Ch.
282, and Benedict v. Lynch, Id. 370,
have
been referred to as esfablishing
this point.
Chancellor Kent there intimated that such was
the rule;
but in a subsequent case in the
court of errors— Clason v. Bailey, 14 Johns.
484— he had occasion to review that opinion,
which he found to be erroneous, and admits
that the point is too well settled the other way
to be questioned.
The court may, therefore,
in a proper case, where there is a covenant on
one side, and no mutuality, decree a performance.
Besides, in a case like the present, it
may be peculiarly proper.
The rent may have
been fixed at $500 as an inducement to the
power of purchasing the property.
This is a
fair inference."
In the case of Van Doren v. Robinson, 16 N.
J. Eq. 256, it is held that "the general prin-
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clple is that where the contract is
of being enforced against one party,
ty is equally incapable of enforcing
the other.
But the principle does

Incapahle
that parit against

not apply

the contract, by its terms, gives the
one party a right to the performance,
which
it does not give to the other party." And in
the case of Howralty v. Warren, 18 N. J.
Eq. 124, after stating the general rule as the
existence of mutuality, and that unilateral or
optional contracts are not favored in equity,
"But modern authorities
the court proceeds:
have narrowed this doctrine down to cases in
And
which there is no other consideration.
it is now well settled that an optional agreement to convey, or renew a lease, without
any covenant or obligation to purchase or accept, and without any mutuality of remedy,
will be enforced in equity, if it is made upon
proper consideration, or forms part of a lease
or other contract between the parties, that
may be the true consideration for it."
A number of cases are then cited by the
court to sustain this view, among them the
cases I have just referred to. The language
last quoted seems to me to be a very clear
statement of the correct rule in this matter.
In Smith's Appeal, 69 Pa. 474, the matter before the court being an optional contract for
the sale of land, it was held that the contract
In the case of Rogers v.
would be enforced.
Saunders, 16 Me. 92. 33 Amer. Dec. 63" t'lo
■where

Kent
court cites the decision of Chancellor
in Clason v. Bailey, and states tliac this uypears to be now the generally received docIn Vassault v. Edwards, 43 Cal. 458,
trine.
it is held that: "A proposal to sell real estate,
reduced to writing and signed by the vendor
alone, in which he recites that he has sold to
the vendee the land for a price named, and
has received a certain sum as a deposit, as
part payment, which the vendor was to refund
if the title was rejected or bad, the sale to be
subject to a search of and approval of title,
the vendee to have twenty days for the examination of the title, is a valid contract of sale
entered into between the parties."
To the same effect is the case of Schroeder
The court, after
V. Gemeinder, 10 Nev. 355.
stating that there are many exceptions to the
rule in the cases, as to mutuality, says:
"We
think it may now be considered as well settled by all, or nearly aU, of the modem authorities, that a court of equity, in actions for
the specific performance of optional contracts
and covenants to lease or convey land, will enforce the covenant, although the remedy is not
mutual, provided it is shown to have been
made upon a fair consideration, or where it
forms part of a contract, lease, or agreement,
-which may be the true consideration for it."
Entering into the discussion of this ques-
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tion, in many of the cases, Is that part of the
statute of frauds providing that contracts for
the sale of land must be in writing, signed by
the party to be charged thereby, or some person by him lawfully authorized.
(This law
as codified in Georgia, is in section 1950, Code
It is held in some of these cases that
1882.)
the question should be controlled by the language of the statute just quoted; and that, as
the contract need be signed by only one party, viz., the party to be charged thereby, it is
only necessary that he should be bound. It
seems to me, however, that the question of
mutuality is one distinct and apart from any
question that might arise under the sratute of
frauds. It is a matter separate from, if not
have considered it in
over and above it, and
thinli it is settled by the above
that view.
authorities,
and others that might be cited,
that where an owner of land gives another,
an option or
for a suflicient consideration,
privilege to purchase the land within a given
time, in writing, with full knowledge of the
fact that he is bound and the other party is
not, it is such a contract as will be enforced
in equity at the instance of the party holding
Does such a contract indeed lack
the option.
mutuality? The seller, for fair consideration,
agrees to give the proposed purchaser a certain fixed time in which to make the contract
mutual, by acceptance of the offer to sell. If
he accepts within the specified time, both parties are fully bound.
Now, as to this case.
Here, for a reasonthe sum of $50, the deable consideration,
agrees that the complainant shall
fendant
have the privilege of buying his land within a
year; that is, the defendant sells to him for
the land with$50 the privilege of purchasing
in a year. That contract, the sale by defendant to complainant of the privilege of purchasing, is executed by the payment by complainant of the sum agreed upon.
The remainder
of the contract is conditional upon the complainant's accepting within a year the continuing offer of the defendant to sell him the
land.
see no reason why a court of equity
should not enforce such a contract.
On the
contrary. It seems to me it would be inequitable to refuse its enforcement.
am clear,
therefore, that this case does not come within the class where lack of mutuality will prevent enforcement of the contract, and that it
does come within a well-recognized
exception
to that rule, of optional sales upon fair consideration.
This case is considered now, of
course, upon the facts as stated in the bill.
How it may be affected by what the defendant can hereafter show must be a matter for
future consideration.
My conclusion is that
the demurrer
must
be overruled
on both
grounds, and It wlU be ordered accordingly.
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Atl.

V.

1061,

Court of Chancery

TYRRELL
J. Eq.

St al.

53 N.

Jan.

21,

1895.

Bill by Lawrence O'Connor against Peter
Tyrrell and others for specinc performance

of a contract to convey land.
dismiss bill. Motion denied.

On motion

Charles L. Corbin, for the motion.
Garrlck, opposed.

to

John

McGILL, Ch. The motion is made in virtue of the 213th rule, and takes the place of
a demurrer to the bill. The case presented by
the bill is this: James Tyrrell, for himself,
and as attorney In fact for others, who are
cotenants
with him of certain land In the
city of Bayonne, on the 20th of April, 1894,
agreed to sell that land to the complainant
for $7,250, of which $250 was to be paid upon the execution of the agreement of sale,
and the balance was to be paid upon the delivery of the deed, on the 21st of the following May,— $5,000 in cash, and the remainder
by assumption of the payment of a mortgage
of $2,000, by which the property was incumUpon examination of the title, it was
bered.
discovered that the power of attorney under
which James Tyrrell assumed to act for his
cotenants, who lived in Ireland, though duly
executed, was defectively acknowledged
by
Therefore, it was
some of the cotenants.
agreed that, instead of having the power of
attorney reacknowledged,
the deed should be
directly executed by all owners of the property, and be sent to Ireland for that purpose.
As more time would be required in such execution than the terms of the contract of sale
would admit of, a new agreement was entered into on the 8th of May, by which the former contract was annulled, and the 26th of
June w?s fixed for the delivery of the deed,
and the full consummation of the transaction.
The lottcr agreement contains this stipulation.
"Said party of the second part [O'Connor] shall have possession of said premises
on the 14 th day of May, 1894; and, in the
event of the failure of said parties of the
first part to deliver the deed at the time and
in the manner hereinafter referred to, the
said parties of the first part hereby agree
to repay to said party of the second part the
said sum of $250, heretofore paid as part of
the consideration money, and, in addition
thereto, such sum, not exceeding $1,250, as
said party of the second part shall have paid
upon the examination or guaranty of the title to said premises,
or in the repair, improvement, or furnishing of the building, or
ground, or the survey thereof, or shall have
in any way Incurred or expended in the preparation for the purchase of and 'taking of title to said premises, not exceeding the said
sum of $1,250; such payment to be accepted
by said party of the second part as liquidated
damages for any breach of this agreement
by the said parties of the first part; and, in
HUTCH.& BUNK.EQ.^6
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of the failure of said parties of the
first part so to deliver said deed at the time
herein stated, said party of the second part
hereby agrees to surrender possession of said
premises, within fifteen days from June 26th,
1894, to James Tyrrell, one of said parties of
And said party of the
the first part hereto.
second part shall not, under any circumstances, be held to be liable for any rental for
the occupancy of said premises."
In piu-suanee of this agreement, the complainant paid
$250 in cash, broke up his home in the city
of New York, and moved to the premises contracted to be conveyed to him, upon which
he made repairs which have cost him nearly $2,000.
On the 26th of June, 1894, he duly tendered the $5,000 he was then to pay,
and demanded a deed, in accordance
with
the terms of the agreement.
To which tender and demand, James Tyrrell replied that,
as attorney In fact, he was unable to deliver
the deed, and that he desired a statement of

I event

15.)

of New Jersey.
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expenditures, contemplated
the complainant's
by the clause of the contract which has been
quoted, in order to ascertain and pay the sum
agreed upon as liquidated damages, and also
that he desired to fix a day, within the terms
of the contract, upon which the complainant
would surrender to him possession of the

land.
The only question presented In the argument was whether this court will compel a
conveyance to the complainant, notwithstanding the provision for the payment of liquidated damages upon the breach of the contract; the contention in behalf of the defendants being that by the agreement the parstipulated the measure
ties have expressly
of the damages which will result from the
defendants'
nonperformance
of the agreement, and therefore
equity will leave the
complainant to the recovery of those damages, on the ground that an appeal to equity
is unnecessary,
since the legal relief, by
agreeinent, has been rendered adequate.
For the breach of contracts the common
law gives a single remedy.
It requires the
wrongdoer to pay a sum of money as compensation.
When the contract broken is an
obligation to pay money, that remedy amounts
to specific performance.
But there are many
conti-acts, for the breach of which such a
remedy Is Inadequate;
and that inadequacy
has given rise to the jurisdiction of chancery
to enforce specific performance of contracts,
requiring the performance or omission of the
very acts agreed upon.
The remedy is thus
made identical with the right withheld, and
the defendant is thereby deprived of the option, which the legal remedy practically gives
him, to disregard the actual obligation by which
he is boimd, and pay a sum of money in the
place thereof.
Pom. Spec. Perf. Cont. § 3.
The inadequacy of the legal remedy, by compensation in damages, Is generally regarded
as conspicuous in cases of agreements for the
sale and piurchase of real estate, each parcel
of which differs In some respects from others.
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Such property Is usually bought because It
possesses some feature which attracts by personal gratification, and determines the purchaser to make some particular use of it.
The present case is not an exception to this
The description of the propusual condition.
erty discloses its boundary upon the shore of
the Newark Bay, with its expanse of water,
and the occupancy of it by the complainant
indicates that he has determined to make it
upon it
his residence, and his expenditures
give evidence of his appreciation of its situation and surroundings. It is thus made plain
in damages will not be
that compensation
the full measure of relief which a breach
of the contract by the defendants, in justice,
This situation primarily leads to
demands.
a critical examination of the contract and the
meaning of its clause which
have quoted, to
ascertain the correctness of the defendants'
assumption
that a stipulated sum has been
fixed as damages to be had for the mere nonof the contract by the defendperformance
That which was contracted fol* was
ants.
A portion of
the purchase and sale of land.
the purchase money was to be paid at once,
and the purchaser was to go into possession
pending the execution and delivery of the
deed, when the remainder of the purchase
It was in contemmoney was to be paid.
plation that he would proceed to repair, imIn the event
prove, and furnish the property.
of the defendants' failure to deliver the deed,
he was to surrender the possession of the
land to their agent; receive back the purchase money paid, together with his expenditures, not exceeding $1,250.
That repayment
and surrender were expressly made dependent upon the failure of the defendants to deliver the deed. In this arrangement, which
contemplated repayment upon the happening
of the one event, — failure to deliver the deed,
the parenthetical clause,
—was Interpolated
that such repayment was to be accepted by
the complainant as liquidated damages for
"any breach" of the contract by the defendants.
As the repayment was limited to a
single event, and made payable upon the happening of that event only, the words "any
breach,"
In the parenthetical clause, could
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not have a broader significance than failure
to deliver the deed, for the complainant was
bound to accept the repayment only in that
event.
It is to be noted that, upon the defendants' failure to deliver the deed, the complainant is to have merely pecuniary reimdamages.
biu'sement, and not compensatory
He is to have nothing for his disappointment,
trouble, and discomfort
The inference from
a submission to such inadequate damages Is,
think, that a stronger meaning was intended to be given to the word "failm'e" than
mere arbiti-ary refusal of the defendants
to
deliver the deed. "Failiu-e" is the result of
action which predicates earnest effort, and
not mere inaction and refusal to do. It is in
think, that the word was used
this sense,
in this contract.
It demanded from the defendants a bona fide effort to deliver the complainant a deed which would vest in him
the title to the property.
It was failure after
such effort that was to constitute the breach
for which reimbursement was to be accepted
as satisfaction.
It is obvious that the contract was not an alternative one, to convey
or pay damages.
Damages were to be paid
upon a "breach" of the conti-act, which primarily required an honest effort to perform,
and failure, and do not become a factor m the
consideration
of remedies until that precedent condition is performed.
The professed
inability of James Tyrrell to deliver the deed
required does not prove the inability of him
and his cotenants to carry out the contract
upon their part.
The case presented, then,
is this:
A certain sum is agreed upon as satisfaction to the complainant, if bona fide effort
to make him title fails. So far as it appears
by the bill, the defendants can make that
title, and the aid of this court is invoked to
compel them to do so.
think that, as the
facts now appear, the complainant is clearly
entitled to a decree, and that the case is not
brought within the controversy referred to
in Crane v. Peer, 43 N. J. Eq. 557, 4 Atl. 72,
or affected by the Intimation of Chancellor
Halsted in St Mary's Church v. Stockton, 8
N. J. Eq. 520, as the defendants' proposition
suggests.
The motion will be denied, with
costs.
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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
GRUBB
(20

Supreme

SHARKEY

et al. v.

S. E. 784,

al.

90 Va. 831.)

Court of Appeals
22,

et

of Virginia.

Dec.

1894.

Appeal from circuit court, Botetourt county.
Bill by one Sharkey and others against one
Grubb and others.
Decree for complainants,
and defendants appeal.
Afarmed.
Benj. Haden and John H. Lewis, for appellants. J. H. H. Figgatt and C. M. Lunsford, for appellees.

LEWIS, P. This was a suit for specific
In April, 1887, the appellees
performance.
conveyed to the appellants a tract of land containing about 19 acres, adjoining the lands of
the Lynchburg Iron Company, situate in BoBelow and contiguous to this
tetourt county.
land is a grazing farm owned by the appellees, which, at the time of the conveyance to
the appellants, was mainly, if not solely, watered by a stream flowing through both tracts.
The land was purchased by the appellants
for the purpose of erecting and operating
It was accordingly
thereon an ore washer.
covenanted in the deed of conveyance that If
the said stream should.be made continuously
muddy by the proposed ore washing, so as to
render the water therein unfit for stock, the
appellants would lay a %-inch pipe from a
certain spring branch above, so as to conduct
a supply of clear water over the land to a
designated point on the appellees' farm, and
there erect a trough for the use of stock.
The bill, which was filed in October, 1889,
after setting out substantially the foregoing
facts, alleges that this covenant has not been
observed by the defendants
(the appellants
here); that they have not laid a pipe and
erected a trough, as they covenanted to do,
notwithstanding the water in the said stream
has been continually muddy and unfit for
stock, in consequence of washing ores on the
and
land, since the date of the conveyance,
although they have often been requested so
The bill also states that the complainto do.
ants have been compelled, in consequence of
the defendants' default, to drive their stock a
considerable distance to water, whereby they
and damhave been greatly inconvenienced
aged. And the prayer of the bill Is that the
defendants be required to specifically perform
their covenant, and to make proper compensation to the complainants for the damage
sustained by them, etc.
there
The defendants being nonresidents,
was an order of publication. An attachment
was also sued out, which was levied on the
said 19 acres of land. At the May term, 1890,
a decree was entered for the specific performance of the contract, with a further provision
that the defendants pay to the complainants
$750 damages for the breach of the contract.
At the ensuing October term, the defendants
appeared, and filed their petition, praying that
the decree be set aside, and that they be al-
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They thereupon,
lowed to make defense.
with the leave of the court, demurred to the
bill, and also answered.
In their answer
they stated, among other things, that since
the commencement of the suit they had laid
the pipe and erected a trough as they had
agreed to do, and that this was done before
the decree was entered.
The cause was then
referred to a commissioner, with directions to
ascertain
and report, among other things,
what damages, if any, the complainants had
sustained by reason of the alleged breach of
the contract, in obedience to which the commissioner subsequently reported that they had
been damaged to the amount of $900.
This
finding was afterwards, upon exceptions to
the report, reduced by the court to $750, and
by the same decree it was ordered that "performance of said contract be confirmed to the

complainants."
1. A number of objections have been urged
to this decree, none of which, in our opinion,
are well founded.
In the first place, the case
stated In the bill is undoubtedly within the
jurisdiction of a court of equity. The contract therein sought to be enforced is not
one requiring personal labor, or the exercise
of any peculiar skill or judgment, or involving the performance of continuous duties
and supervision. On the contrary, it is such
a contract as could be readily performed by
almost any ordinary workman, and its nature
is such that the remedy at law for its breach
is inadequate.
This brings the case within
the general rule that a court of equity has
jurisdiction to enforce specific performance
of a contract by a defendant to do defined
work upon his own property, in the performance of which the plaintiff has a material interest, and which is not capable of
in damages; as, for
adequate compensation
example, an agreement on the part of a railway company to make an archway under its
tracks, or to construct a siding at a particular point for the convenience of an adjoining landowner. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 721a;
Storer v. Railway Co., 2 Younge & C. Ch.
48; Greene v. Railway Co., L. R. 13 Eq. 44.
It is, moreover, well settled that, as auxiliary
to its authority to decree specific performance, a court of equity may award damages
for a breach of the contract, to be assessed
either by an issue of quantum damnificatus
or by a master, at its discretion. Phillips v.
Thompson,
1 Johns, Ch. 181; Nagle v. Newton, 22 Grat. 814; Campbell v. Rust, 85 Va.
653, 8 S. B. 664.
This, indeed, is not dis
puted.
But the appellants contend that their
performance of the contract in question before the entry of the decree, although subsequent to the filing of the bill, left nothing
to be specifically enforced, and consequently
that the auxiliary power to decree damages
was likewise at an end. In other words,
the contention
is that, after the pipe was
laid and the trough erected, the suit was
nothing more than a suit to recover damages, of which equity has not jurisdiction.

724

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

But this Is a mistaken view. The court
having acquired jurisdiction
of the case
upon equitable ground, no subsequent act of
could oust that Jurisdiction.
the defendants
It is a familiar principle, as laid down by
Judge Staples in Walters v. Bank, 76 Va.
12, that, when a court of equity has once
acquired .iurisdiction of a cause, it may go on
to a complete adjudication, even to the extent of establishing legal rights and granting legal remedies, which would otherwise
be beyond the scope of its authority. That
is a very strong case. The object of the snit
was to subject the estate of a married woman
to the payment of a certain negotiable note,
upon which the appellant was indorser,
or
to require the appellant to pay it. In the
progress of the case, it appeared that there
was no separate estate, whereupon it was
insisted that, as the supposed existence of
a sejiarate estate was the sole ground for
going into equity, the court could proceed no
further, and that the bill should be dismissed. But this view was rejected, and a
against the appellant for
decree rendered
the debt, which this court affirmed, on the
principle above stated. So it has been held
that where the complainant was originally
but pendentitled to a specific performance,
ing the suit the subject-matter of the litigation is established or destroyed, he wUl not
be turned round to his remedy at law, but
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or damages will be decreed
compensation
Eq. Jur. § 794; Nelson v.
him. 2 Story,
Bridges, 2 Beav. 230; Chapman v. Railroad
Co., 6 Ohio St. 119.
2. As to the further point made by the
appellants in the petition for appeal, upon
the authority of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S.
that state courts have no power to
714,
render judgments or decrees in personam
defendants,
who are
against nonresident
it is
by publication,
merely
summoned
enough to say that here the defendants, after
rendition of the decree of the May term,
on the merits,
1890, appeared and defended
thus submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court; so that the case stands
upon the same footing, so far as the power
and jurisdiction of the court are concerned,
as if they had been personally served with
process at the commencement of the suit.
of
3. Both sides complain of the amount
damages awarded; the appellants
contending that the amount is excessive, while the
appellees insist that the sum reported by the
commissioner,
viz. $900, ought to have been
allowed, and that the circuit court erred in
reducing the amount to $750. Without reviewing the evidence before the commissioner, we deem It sufficient to say that we see
no reason to disturb the decree on this or
any other point. It is therefore affii-med.
Decree affirmed.

INJUNCTIONS.
ROGERS LOCOMOTIVE & MACHINE
WORKS V. ERIE RT. CO.
(20

N.

J.

Eq. 379.)

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Oct Term,

1869.

This was a motion for a preliminary injunction. The argument was had upon a
rule to show cause upon the bill filed and an
affidavit of James Fisk, Jr., in reply to the
allegation of the hill as to the insolvency of
the Brie Railway Company.
The bill sets forth that the Erie Railway
Company, by virtue of the provisions of the
charter of the Paterson & Hudson River
Railroad Company, of the lease of that road,
and the acts of the legislature giving validity
to that lease, and authorizing it to finish and
extend that road to the Hudson river, and
confirming the reorganization of the Erie
Railway Company under its present name,
became a common carrier between the city
of Paterson and the present termination of
its railway near the Hudson river, at the
Long Dock; that It was boimd to carry
freight from Paterson to Long Dock at the
rates fixed in these acts, which, for a locomotive engine of the size usually made and
would
away by the complainants,
sent
that
amount to $31.80 for each locomotive;
the company or some of its directors have
devised ■a scheme for the purpose of illegally increasing the rate to be charged for
such transportation; that they procured the
company to be chartered by the name of the
"Union Locomotive Express Company," with
power to forward and carry locomotives and
other property; and that the Erie Railway
Company or Its stockholders or directors are
using this express company, and combining
with its directors, for the purpose of increasing the rates of transportation from Paterson to Long Dock; and that it has entered
into an agreement with the express company
that it should have the exclusive right of
transporting locomotives over the road; that
company
have the power to
the express
charge
for forwarding without any limit
as to amount, and do actually charge $250
and asfor transporting each locomotive,
sume only the liability of forwarders, and
the Erie Railway Company refuses to accept
for transportation at its depot at Paterson
any locomotive to be transported to Long
Dock, or to transport the same, unless
through the express company; that the complainant built two trucks, on which it was
in the habit of placing its engines and drawing them over the street railway from the
manufactory to the depot of the Erie Railway Company at Paterson, which were suitable to run upon that road, and which could
be taken to Long Dock with the locomotives
thus loaded upon them; that the Erie Railway Company, when these trucks so loaded
were last tendered to it for transportation,
caused them to be taken over its road in
the opposite direction, into the state of New
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York, and detains and keeps them there, so
that the complainant has no means to offer
its locomotives to the Erie Railway Company for transportation, and that this Is done
intentionally to carry out the fraudulent combination with the express company, so that
the latter must be employed, at their exorbiand
tant rates, to carry all the locomotives;
that new trucks cannot be constructed or provided

under

several

months.

The bill further alleges that the manufacture of locomotives has become a large and
important business in Paterson, and that the
complainant and others have established their
works there on faith of the means of transportation provided by law over the railway
of the defendants; that being compelled to
pay such sum for transportation will compel
them to add the amount to the price of their
locomotives,
and will injure their business
in competition with other establishments, and
omission to deliver would make them liable
to damages.
The bill alleges that this combination of the
Brie Railway Company is a fraud upOn the
stockholders,
because they receive by the
only $10 for each locomotive
agreement
transported
by the express company, when,
by law, they would be entitled to receive,
and would receive from the complainant and
others, more than three times that amount
for the same service, if performed directly
for them.
The bill prays for an Injunction to direct
and compel the Erie Railway Company to return the two trucks to Paterson into the possession of the complainant,
and to transport
to the wharf, at Long Dock, all locomotive
engines of the complainant that may be delivered at the depot at Paterson, at the rates
prescribed by law, and to direct and compel
it to perform its duty as a common carrier;
also to restrain it from removing the complainant's trucks out of its possession, and
from preventing it from obtaining possession
thereof, and restraining the other defendants,
that is, Jay Gfould, James Fisk, Jr., the Union
N. Marsh
Locomotive Express Company,
Kasson, James G. Dudley, Henry J. Smith,
and C. Valletta Kasson, from entering into
any agreement or doing anything to prevent
or hinder the Erie Railway Company from
transporting the locomotives of the complainant over its road.
The bill charges that the Union Express
Company was got up by Jay Gould, James
Fisk, Jr., and Frederick A. Lane, three of the
directors of the Erie Railway Company, in
combination with N. Marsh Kasaon, James
6. Dudley, Henry J. Smith, C. Valletta Kasson, and P. K. Randall, as a contrivance to
shift the duties of common carriers from
and to enable
the Erie Railway Company,
the defendants, or some of them, to make illegal and exorbitant charges for transportation.

A. B. Woodruff,
briskie, opposed.

for the motion.

L.
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If

the allegations

of the bill are true, and they are supported
by the affidavits annexed, and are not denied by answer or aflJdavit, they present a
flagrant case of refusal to perform the duties imposed upon It by law, and for which
Its franchises were granted, by a corporation public in its object and almost such in
Railway companies have deleits character.
gated to them as part of their franchises
much of the sovereign power of the state,
in consideration of their discharging part of
what are the proper duties of government,
that is, providing the means of commerce
and intercourse
by constructing the roads
■which are the avenues
of that commerce.
And when, being authorized, they assume to
operate these roads, they have devolved upon them in consideration
of that franchise
the additional duty, which is not one of the
proper functions of the government, of common carriers, and are obliged to transport
all merchandise and passengers on the terma
fixed in the grant through which they obtain
In this case the wrong is
their franchises.
attempted to be aggravated
by the charge
that it is done through a corrupt combination between the directors of the company
and others, by which these directors, in violation of their duties and trust, conspire for
their own emolument to cause the company
under their control to refuse to perform the
duties imposed on it by law, in such manner
that the public are injured by extortionate
defrauded
of
charges, and the stockholders
their just dues, and also in such manner
that the state can cause the valuable franchises of which they are possessed as a right
of property to be annulled and forfeited for
the willful violation of the compact by which
they were granted.
These allegations may not be true, and may
be totally disproved at the hearing; but as
their truth is sworn to, and is not denied, I
am bound to treat them as true for the purSo far as they
poses of this application.
relate to dereliction in duty to the stockholders of the Erie Railway Company, the complainant cannot have here any relief based
upon them.
will also assume for the purposes of
this application that the Erie Railway Company having, as the legal assignees of the
Paterson & Hudson River Railroad Comr
pany, and of their franchises, including the
right to finish the road to the Hudson river
and to tunnel Bergen hill, constructed the
extension of the road to the Hudson river,
holds it as part of that road, and subject to
all the restrictions and duties imposed upon
that road by the charter of the original company; and that it is therefore a common carrier, bound to transport goods over this extension, as well as over the residue of the
road, at the rates fixed in the charter.
Whether this duty could be performed by
delegating to another person or company
who would discharge it in the same manner.
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and with
and for the same compensation,
the same liabilities, need not be discussed
They have attempted to delegate it to
here.
a company who do not attempt or offer to
perform the duty as common carriers, or
subject to the liabilities of common carriers,,
but only as forwarders, and who charge for
this imperfect performance more than four
times the rate authorized to be charged by
Company. They therethe Erie Railway
fore do not provide any one to discharge the
duty required of them, and they utterly refuse to perform it themselves,
and have
bound themselves by a contract that no one
but the express company shall perform it.
Such contract may be void, both as ultra
vires and contrary to law, yet It is proper
as showing the Intention
to be considered
of the company not to perform this part

of their duty.
too, is of
The injury to the complainant,
that nature, that while there may be a
remedy at law, as by recovery of damages
for injury, yet is such that cannot be adequately relieved by suits for damages.
It
is continually recurring, and will require
continued and repeated suits, and continued
litigation, and the expenses of each suit
would make the recovery of the excess paid
an Inadequate remedy.
I now assume that
the Erie Railway Company is, and will remain, solvent.
The affidavit of the proper
officer of the company, which Is legally before the court, clearly shows that the company is not solvent, or likely to prove so.
But, although the injury is proved, and
the subject-matter is such that a court of
equity will not refuse relief, on the ground
that there Is adequate relief at law, the
question
remains whether the injunction
here applied for can be granted, or any part
of it. There are Injuries which this court
cannot redress, although there may be no
satisfactory remedy at law, and those which
this court can redress, for which no preliminary injunction can issue.
The two chief objects for which the injunction is asked are to compel the railway
company to return to the complainant Its
trucks, and to compel It to transport the locomotives of the complainant from Paterson
to Long Dock at the legal rates of freight
These are to compel the company to act, not
to refrain from acting.
And the act commanded Is the whole duty of the company,
and its performance is the whole right of
the complainant
It is not the case of a
prohibition of keeping up a structure or
maintaining some material object, the erection and continuance of which is the act that
deprives the complainant of his right, and
the destruction or removal of which would
restore the enjoyment of It
It is contended by the defendant that a
mandatory injunction, or one which commands the defendant to do some positive
act, will not be ordered, except upon final
hearing, and then only to execute the decree
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or judgment of the court,
preliminary or interlocutory
if it ever does so issue, it
of obstruction to easements
nature, in vyhich a structure
as the means of preventing

will

be ordered

and never on a
motion. Or that,
is only in cases

or rights of like

erected and kept
such enjoyment
to be removed, as part of

the means of restraining the defendant from
interrupting the enjoyment of the right.
Although there is some conflict in the authorities and decisions,
I am of opinion,
after examining into them, that this position,
with the limitation, is the established doctrine of the courts of equity, and that it is a
proper and discreet limitation of the use of
the preliminary injunction, as well as sustained by the weight of authority.
Justice Story, in 2 Eq. Jur. § 861, says:
"A writ of injunction may be described to
be a judicial process, whereby a party is
required to do a particular thing, or to refrain from doing a particular thing, according to the exigency of the writ. The most
common form of injunction is that which
operates as a restraint upon the party in
the exercise of his real or supposed rights,
and is sometimes called the remedial writ
of injunction.
The other form, commanding
an act to be done, is sometimes called the
judicial writ, because It issues after a decree, and is in the nature of an execution
to enforce the same."
Mr. Eden begins his treatise on Injunctions by saying: "An injunction is a writ
Issuing by the order and under the seal of a
court of equity, and is of two kinds. The
one is the writ remedial; for, in the endless
variety of cases in which a plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief, if that relief consists in restraining the commission or cona
tinuance of some act of the defendant,
court of equity administers it by means of
The other species
the writ of injunction.
of Injunction is called the judicial vrrit, and
issues subsequent to a decree, and is properly described as being in the nature of an
execution."
In Drew, Inj. p. 260, it is laid down: "It
seems settled that equity has not jurisdiction to compel, on motion, the performance
of any substantive act."
In 3 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 1767, it is said: "It
is to be observed that the coiu-t will not, by
injunction granted upon interlocutory application, direct the defendant to perform an
act, but might, upon motion, order the defendant to pull down a building which was
clearly a nuisance to the plaintiff."
Lord Hardwicke, in an anonymous case
in 1 Ves. Jr. 140, restained the further digging of a ditch, but refused, on motion berore answer, to order the part dug to be
filled up.
Chancellor Vroom, in Attorney-General v.
New Jersey R. & Transp. Co., 3 N. J. Eq.
"The injunction Is a preventive
141, says:
It interposes between the complainremedy.
ant and the Injury he fears or seeks to
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avoid. If the Injury be already done, the
writ can have no operation, for it cannot
be applied correctively, so as to remove it."
In that case, the Injury done was driving
piles for a bridge, so as to obstruct navigation.
A mandatory injunction to remove
them would have remedied the whole evil.
In Hooper v. Broderick, 11 Sim. 47, a
preliminary injunction to restrain a tenant
from discontinuing to keep an inn was dissolved on the ground that it was mandatory,
the sam'e as if he was commanded to keep
an Inn.
in Blakeman v. Navigation Co., 1 Mylne
& K. 154, Lord Brougham, after a review
of the cases (page 183) and quoting with
approbation what Lord Hardwicke said in
Kyder v. Bentham, that "he had never
known an order to pull down on motion,
and but rarely by decree," refused so much
of the injunction prayed for as directed the
Powell, to fill up the collateral
defendant,
pond.
The cases of the East India Co.
Spencer v. London
2 Atk. 88;
V. 'Vincent,
and Birmingham Hallway Co., 8 Sim. 193;
and of Diu-ell v. Pritchard, 1 Ch. App. 244,
And in the last
are to the same efirect.
case. Lord Romilly, M. R., held that the
court, upon final hearing, could not issue a
mandatory injunction directing a wall to be
taken down; yet the lords justices on appeal held that it had the power, but that in
the case before them It should not be exercised, and dismissed the appeal.
There are cases in which mandatory Injunctions have been ordered on motion, but
they are ail, or nearly all, cases In which
some erection placed and maintained by the
aerendant to effect the Injury complained
of was ordered to be removed, or its maintethat the
nance forbidden, on the ground
defendant effected the act he was restrained
from doing by continuing such erection.
In Robinson v. Lord Byron, 1 Brown, Ch.
588, which is referred to as the leading case
for mandatory injunction. Lord Thurlow ordered an injunction to restrain defendant from
using his dams and other erections, so as to
prevent the water from flowing to the complainant's mill in such quantities as It had
ordinarily done before April 4, 1785. The effect of this may have been to compel the reBut as
moval of the part erected after 1785.
of to
the case states the injury complained
be that Lord Byron so used his dam and
gates as to let the water flow irregularly, to
injury, I do not see in the
the complainant's
express or implied, to
report any direction,
take down anything, or to do any act whatever.
In Lane v. Newdigate, 10 Ves. 192, the object of the Injunction was to compel the restoring of a stop gate which was wrongfully
Lord Eldon would not order it to
removed.
the preventing
but restrained
be restored,
the use of the water by complainant by the
removal of a stop gate, which was equivalent
to an order to restore it, and was so Intended.
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In Raaken v. Huskisson, 4 Sims. 13, the
restrained tlae defendant from permitting an erection to remain.
This was equivalent to an order to remove it; but it is lilie
the, others, simply removing that by wliich the
court

defendant
continued the nuisance to be restrained.
In JNIexborough v. Bower, 1 Beav. 127, Lord
Langdale ordered an injunction to restrain
permitting the communication complained of,
by which complainant's
mine was flooded, to
remain open. The injunction was to prevent
the flowing of the mine, by restraining or removing the means by which the defendant
continued to do it.
In North of England Ry. Co. v. Clarence Ry. Co., 1 Colly. 507, the injunction
prayed for was against maintaining a wall,
and after the rights of the parties had been
referred to, and settled in the court of the
exchequer. Vice Chancellor Bruce hesitated to
grant the injunction, although he held (page
injunctions might be
that mandatory
521)
granted;
yet he referred the case to Lord
Chancellor Lyndhurst, who, it is stated, granted the injunction in nearly the terms of the
prayer;
but whether it included this mandatory part does not distinctly appear. The case
established the right of the complainant
to
build a bridge over the railway of the defendant, and to rest the supports of the scaffolding
prayer was
on the soil; and the mandatory
that defendants should remove a wall placed
on their grounds to hinder it.
In Greatrex v. Greatrex, 1 De Gex & S. 692,
the injunction was against preventing
the
plaintiffs from having access to the books of
the firm, and against removing them from, or
keeping them at, any other place than the
as the
place of business of the partnership,
defendant had removed the books. This was
equivalent to an order to restore them, but
yet it did not command any act to be done.
In Heracy v. Smith, 1 Kay & J. 389, the
injury was covering with tiles the chimneys
from the butler's pantry of the complainant
Lord Hatherly (the present lord chancellor,
then vice chancellor. Sir W. P. 'Wood), on the
authority of Robinson v. Lord Byron, granted
an Injunction the effect of which was, and

was intended to be, to compel the defendant
to remove the tiles; but he declined to adopt
form, but restrained the dethe mandatory
fendant from doing any act to prevent the
The substance of the
smoke from arising.
judgment is grounded on the power of the
court to remove an erection made by the defendant to effect the injury to be redressed,
when that erection is the means by which the
defendant continues to inflict the injuries from
which the court intended to restrain; and the
of the genform of it is an acknowledgment
eral principle that an interlocutory injunction
should not command the doing of any positive
act.
A number of authorities and cases were cited on the argument to show that courts of
equity will, in certain cases, decree the restitution of particular chattels; hut these are all
cases where it was so ordered upon final
Tliere is no case of any interlocuhearing.
tory injunction being granted or even applied
It would be a simple
for, for such purpose.
and easy substitute for the 'action of replevin;
and there is nothing in this case to warrant
such order, even upon final decree. The value
of these trucks can be fully recovered at law,
and, as to the use of them in the meantime,
new ones could be built sooner than a suit in
equity be brought to final hearing.
I feel, therefore, constrained to refuse the
injunction so far as these mandatory prayers
are concerned.
As to so much of the prayer
as asks to restrain James Fisk, Jr., and the
other defendants named in it, from entering Into any agreement, or doing anything to prevent or hinder the Erie Railway Company
transporting the complainant's
I
locomotives,
think the injunction ought to be granted.
They are conspiring with the Erie Railway
Company
to injure the complainants
in a
way for which the redress at law is not adequate, and therefore should be enjoined from
doing any acts to that end.
do not intend to Intimate any opinion upon
the question whether this court has power on
the final hearing to give the complainants
the
relief they seek by compelling the Erie Railway Company to transport their locomotivea
at the established fares.
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MICHENOE

et al. v.
(37

N.

J.

et

al.

Eq. 6.)

Coutt of Chancery of New Jersey.

Mav Term,

1883.

Bill for injimction.
tory injunction.
On
On bill and answer.

On motion for mandaorder to show cause.

S. K. Robbins and B. D. Sireve, for complainants. R. S. Jenkins, for defendants.

THE CHANCELLOR.
The complainants
are Rev. Dr. Charles 11. Whitecar, a minister
of the Methodist Episcopal denomination,
who has been duly appointed for the present
conference year to the charge over the Methodist Episcopal Church at Moorestown, and
certain of the members of that church.
The
defendants are the trustees of that church.
The bill states that the defendants, on the
29th of March last, closed the church against
the members and congregation,
and have
kept it closed ever since.
It prays an injunction to compel them to open it for the
religious
uses to which it was dedicated.
It appears from the bill and the admissions
of the answer that the church was organized
under the rules, regulations, and discipline
prescribed by the general conference of the
Methodist Episcopal Church in the United
States,
and was duly incorporated on or
about the 21st of August, 1815, under the
act "to incorporate trustees of religious societies," by the name of "The Methodist Episcopal Church at Moorestown"; that Rachel
S. Andrews, in September, 1858, conveyed to
Deacon Brock, Caleb Penimore, Thomas Marter, James Moore, John Ireland, Isaac Browning, and Paul Crispin, "trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church at Moorestown, in the
■county of Burlington and state of New Jersey," the lot of land on which the church
ediflce is built, for the use and benefit of the
members of the Methodist Episcopal Church
at Moorestown, and that afterwards the
members
of that church buiJt thereon the
chm'ch ediflce in question as a place of worship, according to the rules of faith of the
Methodist Episcopal Church in the United
States, and subject to its discipline, and that
the church edifice has been used as such
from the time of its erection until it was closon the 29th of March
■ed by the trustees
last; that on the 27th of that month the
Rev. Dr. Wiley, one of the bishops of the
Methodist Episcopal Church of the United
States, and in whom, by the rules and regulations of the general conference, was reposed the power, and on whom was imposed
the duty, of appointing for the present conference year the ministers for the various
the New Jersey Annual
■churches constituting
Conference,
to which annual conference the
belongs, appointed Dr.
<?hurch at Moorestown
Whitecar to that church for that year (being
annual appointment to that
his second
chiu-ch) as minister in charge, and the latter
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accordingly entered upon the discharge of his
duties, and in the course thereof proceeded
to the church building on the 29th of March
for the purpose jf holding the usual prayer
meeting there, but found the doors of the
church locked and a notice thereon dated that
day, and purporting to be given by the board
of trustees and signed by its secretary, that
the church would remain closed until fm'ther notice; that he and the members of the
church there assembled were compelled to
disperse
without gaining entrance to the
church;
that the members present appointed
a committee of six of their number to call
with the minister upon the president of the
board of trustees and learn the cause of the
closing of the church and preventing the
minister and the members from holding service therein; that the committee called on the
president and made inquiry;
that at the
time another of the trustees was present
with the president;
that in reply to the inquii-y the president said that he had not the
keys and did not know where they were,
and, at the same time, said to the committee
that the trustees had the power and authority to close the church, but gave no reason for doing so; that the committee, on the
same occasion, asked him to show them the
deed of the church property,
but he, while
admitting that he had it in his house, where
the interview took place, refused to show it
to them.
It also appears, by like statement
and admission,
that the trustees have kept
the church locked ever since the date mentioned, the 29th of March, and have refused
to permit it to be used- for public worship or
even for the meeting of the quarterly conference, which is presided over by the elder
of the district. The defendants, by their answer, assert their loyalty to the Methodist
Episcopal Chiu-ch in all respects, and their
willingness to obey Its rules, regulations, and
discipline so far as they comport with their
as they understand them,
legal obligations,
under the before-mentioned
deed of trust,
and allege that their action in closing the
church against Dr. Whitecar is in accordance with the expressed wishes and determination of the majority of the members of
the church, and because they are of opinion that the welfare of the church demands
that he should not be its pastor.
On the argument of this motion it was stated in behalf of the defendants,
and it is so
averred in the answer, that their action in
closing the church was due to the fact that,
in view of the trust in the deed for the land
on which the church edifice is built, they considered it their duty to obey the wishes of the
majority of the members of the church as to
who should officiate as Its settled pastor, notwithstanding those wishes may be in conflict
with the rules, regulations, and discipline of
the Methodist Episcopal Church.
This view,
however, is entirely erroneous.
Not only so,
but there is, in fact, no ground whatever for
assuming that, by reason of anything in the

rso

INJUNCTIONS.

deed, they are under any obligation different
from that which would devolve upon them
merely as trustees of the church had the deed
been made directly to the corporation
and expressed no trust.
The deed, as before stated,
was made, not to the corporation,
but to
certain persons who, at the date of the conveyance, were the trustees .of the church.
It
conveys the property to them with the addition of "Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal
Church at Moorestown, in the County of Burlington and State of New Jersey," after their
names, in trust for that church, and the only
proper use and behoof of the members thereof.
Neither the defendants nor any of them
are parties to that deed, and neither they nor
any of them claim by descent, grant, or devise
They are merely
from the grantees therein.
ti'ustees of the corporation, elected in February, 1882.
Neither the legal nor the equitable title to the property is in them.
The
latter title is in the corporation,
and they
merely represent the corporation
as trustees
holding the title of the corporation on a simple trust which makes them bare depositaries
of the title. Morgan v. Rose, 22 N. J. Eq. 583.
And the case would not be different if they
held the legal title under the deed. But they
By the act of incordo not hold that title.
poration the trustees did not acquire the authority which they claim to close the church
building at their discretion.
Morgan v. Rose,
ubi supra.
Nor have they power, under the discipline
of the church, to close it against the duly appointed preacher, though a majority of the
members are desirous that they should do so.
Nor have they such power under the trust in
The trust is that the grantees
the deed.
of them,
therein named, and the survivors
their successors and assigns, will hold the
property for the only proper use and behoof
of the members of the Methodist Episcopal
Church at Moorestown, their successors and
It is admitted that that
assigns, forever.
church was organized under the rules, regulations, and discipline prescribed by the generof the Methodist Episcopal
al conference
Church of the United States, and it is not
denied that it has been so ever since. It was
seventy
in 1815, now nearly
incorporated
years ago. The very name of the corporation
indicates its character and connection.
As a
Methodist Episcopal church it is subject to
It is
those rules, regulations, and discipline.
of the
not alleged that the appointment
or irregular, but
preacher was unauthorized
that a majority of the members of the church
desire that the preacher appointed shall not
to act as the pastor of the
be permitted
church, — to discharge the duties of the place
It is
to which he has been duly appointed.
not claimed that there is any warrant in the
discipline of the church for the action of the
trustees, nor that the discipline provides that
the wishes of the majority of the members
shall determine whether the preacher appointIf
ed to the charge shall act as such or not.

the church belongs to the Methodist Episcopal
connection, as it is admitted it does, there is
no warrant of law, discipline, or usage for the
acts of the defendants.
What is known as
the itinerancy of the preachers, and the absolute power of the bishops over the appointments of the preachers to the churches, is part
of the discipline.
Chief Justice Gibson said, in Com. v. Cornish, 13 Pa. 288, 290, that in the Methodist
Episcopal Church in England and America the
election and ordination of the priesthood by
the general or annual conference, the ordination of them by laying on of hands by a bishop
and elders, and fixing of their appointments bjthe bishop, are cardinal points, the last of
them a distinctive one.
He adds that it is the
rock on which the church is founded and on
which it has prospered.
Remove the church
from it, he says, and it ceases to be Methodistic; and he also says that the election and
ordination of elders, and the fixing of their
appointments, are regulated by articles which
are fundamental.
Said Judge Edmonds,
in
the case of People v. Steele, 2 Barb. 397, 413:
"I am irresistibly conducted to the conclusion
that the itinerancy of the priesthood, enforced
by the power of the episcopacy, is now and for
more than a century has been the well-established practice of this church, is clearly defined
in the doctrines and discipline, and has been
again and again understandingly and advisedly justified and defended by the highest ecclesiastical tribunal known in its constitution." In
the case last cited, which is the leading case
on the subject, and which In its circumstances
was substantially identical with this, the very
question presented here as to the right of the
trustees of a Methodist Episcopal church to
exclude the bishop's appointee was judicially
decided against the trustees.
There, as here,
the trustees claimed to be supported in their
action by the majority of the members of
the church.
See,
also,
Brunnenmeyer
v.
Buhre, 32 111. 183.
But it is urged by the defendants that according to the practice of this court there
should be no mandatory injunction in this
case before the final decision of the cause.
On
the filing of the bill an injunction was granted, but it was not mandatory
in its character.
It indicated that in the judgment of the court,
on the case made by the bUl, the defendants
ought to be restrained from closing the church
building against the preacher and the church.
It did not, however, require them to open it,
and they refused to open it under the nonmandatory
prohibition.
Their refusal was
not a violation of the command of the writ,
and the application for an attachment against
them for contempt was therefore properly denied. The present application was subsequently made to me for a mandatory injunction.
thereupon granted an order to show cause
why such an injunction should not be granted,
and the defendants then put in their answer.
The whole case is now before me, and the defendants have been heard upon the applica-
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am of the opinion that judged by their
and assuming the truth of the facts
alleged, they are without justificathe act complained of; and
see no
either jurisdictional or prudential,
for
refusing the writ. While the jurisdiction of
the court to interfere by way of mandatory
injunction should be exercised with the greatest possible caution, yet where the right to restrain the violation of which the injunction is
asked for is clearly made out, and there is a
present want of the use of that right, the
The court is alcourt should not hesitate.
ways very reluctant to grant a mandatory
injunction on an interlocutory application, but
where extreme or very serious damage would
ensue from withholding it, as in cases of interference with easements or other cases demanding immediate relief, it will be granted.

tion.
answer,
therein
tion for
reason,

I
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Joyce, Prin. Inj. 57; Rogers Locomotive &
Machine Works v. Erie R. Co., 20 N. J. Eq.
379; Thropp v. Field, 26 N. J. Eq. 82; Longwood Valley R. R. Co. v. Baker, 27 N. J. Eq.
In this case it is not reasonable, under
166.
to permit the defendants
the circumstances,
to deprive the church of the use of the edifice
The property is held
imtil the final hearing.
by the defendants on a simple trust, and thej
are unwarrantably withholding the use of it
from those for whose use they hold it. They
have been heard and their defense fully laid
There will
before the court and considered.
be an injunction commanding them to desist
and refrain from continuing to keep the church
closed at such times as to prevent the preachof the
er, Dr. Whitecar, and the members
church, from using it for the purpose of religious worship and church business.
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WATSON
(5

Supreme

V.

SUTHERLAND.

that

Court of the United

States.

Dec,

1866.

Appeal from circuit court of the United
for the district of Maryland.
Watson & Co., appellants in the suit, having issued writs of fieri facias on certain
judgments which they had recovered In the
circuit court for the district of Maryland
against Wroth & FuUerton, caused them to
be levied on the entire stock in trade of a
retail dry goods store in Baltimore, in the
possession of one Sutherland, the appellee.
Sutherland, claiming the exclusive ownership of the property, and Insisting that Wroth
& Fullerton had no interest whatever in It,
filed a bill In equity, to enjoin the further
prosecution of these writs of fieri facias, and
so to prevent, as he alleged, irreparable Injury to himself.
The grounds on which the
bill of Sutherland charged that the Injury
would be irreparable, and could not be compensated in damages, were these:
that he
was the bona fide owner of the stock of
goods, which were valuable and purchased
for the business of the current season, and
not all paid for; that his only means of payment were through his sales; that he was
a young man, recently engaged on his own
account In merchandising,
and had succeeded In establishing a profitable trade, and if
his store was closed, or goods taken from
him, or their sale even long delayed, he
would not only be rendered insolvent, but
his credit destroyed,
wholly
his business
broken up, and his prospects in life blasted.
The answer set forth that the goods levied
on were really the property of Wroth & Fullerton, who had been partners In business
in Baltimore, and who, suspending payment
in March, 1861, greatly In debt to the appellants and others, had, on the 27th October,
1862, and under the form of a sale, conveyed
the goods to Sutherland, the appellee;
that
Sutherland was a young man, who came to
this country from Ireland a few years ago;
that when he came he was wholly without
property; that since he came he had been
salesman In a retail dry goods store, at a
small salary, so low as to have rendered it
impossible for him to have saved from his
earnings any sum of money sufficient to have
made any real purchase
of this stock of
goods from Wroth & Fullerton, which the
answer set up was accordingly a fraudulent
transfer made to hinder and defeat creditors.
It further stated that the legislature of
Maryland had passed acts staying executions
from the 10th of May, 1861, until the 1st of
1862; that previous to the Ist
NovembM",
November, 1862, Wroth & Fullerton had determined to pay no part of the judgments
rendered against them; and that from the
10th May, 1861, until the 1st November, 1862,
judgments, amounting to between $30,000
and $40,000 bad been rendered against them;
States

between

the date of the snsipenslon,
and the 27th October, 1802, they
had sold the greater portion of their goods,
and coUectad a great many of the debts due
them, but had paid only a small portion of
those which they owed; secreting for their
own use the greater portion of the money
collected, and with the residue obtaining the
goods levied upon.
It added that there was no reason to suppose that the levy aforesaid, as made by said
marshal,
would work Irreparable injury to
the appellee, even if the goods so levied on
were the property of the complainant, as
property of the same description, quantity,
and quality, could be easily obtained In market, which would suit the appellee's purpose
as well as those levied upon, and that a jury
would have ample power, on a trial at common law. In an action against the respondents, now appellants, or against the marshal
on his official bond, to give a verdict commensurate
with any damages the said appellee could sustain by the levy and sale of
the goods aforesaid.
On the filing of the bill a temporary Injunction was granted, and when the cause
was finally heard, after a general replication
filed and proof taken. It was made perpetual.
These proofs, as both this court and the
one below considered, hardly established,
as
respected Sutherland,
the alleged fraud on

March,

Wall. 74.)

1861,

creditors.
The appeal was from the decree of perpetual Injunction.
Mason,
fendants.

Campbell & McLaughlin, for
Wallis & Alexander, contra.

de-

Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion
of the court.
There are. In this record, two questions for
consideration. Was Sutherland entitled to
invoke the interposition of a court of equity?
and, if so, did the evidence
warrant the
court below in perpetuating the injunction?
It Is contended that the injunction should
have been refused, because there was a complete remedy at law.
If the remedy at law
Is sufficient, equity cannot give relief, "but
It Is not enough that there is a remedy at
law; It must be plain and adequate, or in
other words, as practical and efficient to the
ends of justice, and Its prompt administration, as the remedy In equlty."i
How could
Sutherland be compensated at law, for the
injuries he would suffer, should the grievances of which he complains be consummated?
If the appellants made the levy, and prosecuted it In good faith, without circumstances of aggravation, in the honest belief that
Wroth & B^illerton owned the stock of goods
(which they swear to in their answer), and
It should turn out. In an action at law Instituted by Sutherland for the trespass,
that
the merchandise belonged exclusively to him,
It is well settled that the measure of dam1 Boyce's

Ex'rs t. Grundy.

3

Pet

210,
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ages, If the property were not sold, could not
extend beyond the kijury done to it, or, If
sold, to the value of It, when taken, with interest from the time of the taking down to
the trial.!!
And this is an equal rule, whether the suit
is against the marshal or the attaching creditors, if the proceedings are fairly conducted, and there has been ho abuse of authority.
Any harsher rule would interfere to prevent
the assertion of rights honestly entertained,
and which should be judicially investigated
"Legal compensation
and
settled.
refers
solely to the injury done to the property taken, and not to any collateral or consequential damages, resulting to the owner, by the
trespass."3
Loss of trade, destruction of
credit, and failure of business prospects, are
collateral or consequential damages, which it
is claimed would result from the trespass,
but for which compensation cannot be awarded in a trial at law.
Commercial ruin to Sutherland might,
therefore, be the effect of closing his store
and selling his goods, and yet the common
law fail to reach the mischief. To prevent
a consequence
like this, a court of equity
steps in, arrests the proceedings
in limine;
brings the parties before it; hears their allegations and proofs, and decrees, either that
the proceedings shall be unrestrained, or else
perpetually enjoined. The absence
of a
plain and adequate remedy at law affords
the only test of equity jurisdiction, and the
application of this principle to a particular
case, must depend altogether upon the character of the case, as disclosed in the pleadings.
In the case we are considering, it is
very clear that the remedy in equity could
alone furnish relief, and that the ends of
justice required the injunction to be issued.
The remaining question in this case is
one of fact.

The appellants, in their answers, deny that
property was Sutherland's, but insist

the

* Conard v. Pacific Ins. Co., 6 Pet. 272, 282.
8 Pacific Ins. Co. v. Conard. 1 Baldw. 142,
Fed. Cas. No. 10,647.
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that it was fra,udulently purchased by him
of Wroth & Fullerton, and is subject to the
payment of their debts.
It seems that
"Wroth & Fullerton had been partners in
business in Baltimore, and suspended payment in March, 1861, in debt to the appellants, besides other creditors.
Although the
appellants did not recover judgments against
them until after their sale to Sutherland, yet
other creditors did, who were delayed in consequence of the then existing laws of Maryland, which provided that executions should
be stayed until the 1st of November,
1862.
Taking advantage of this provision of law,
the answer charges that Wroth & Fullerton,
after their failure, collected a large portion
of their assets, but appropriated to the payment of their debts only a small portion thus
realized, and used the residue to buy the
very goods in question, which Sutherland
fraudulently purchased from them on the
27th of October, 1862, in execution of a combination and conspiracy with them to hinder, delay, and defraud their creditors.
The
answers also deny that the injury to Sutherland would be irreparable, even if the stock
were his, and insist that he could be amply
compensated by damages at law. After general replication was filed, proofs were taken,
but, as In all contests of this kind, there was
a great deal of Irrelevant testimony, and very
much that had only a remote bearing on the
question at issue between the parties.
It is
unnecessary to discuss the facts of this case,
for it would serve no useful purpose to do so.
We are satisfied, from a consideration of the
whole evidence, that Wroth & FuUerton acted badly, but that Sutherland was not a
party to any fraud which they contemplated
against their creditors, and that he made the
purchase in controversy. In good faith, and
for an honest purpose.
The evidence also shows conclusively, that
had not the levy been arrested by Injunction, damages would have resulted to Sutherland, which could not have been repaired
at law.
The decree of the circuit court Is, therefore,

affirmed.
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McHENRT
(90

V.

JEWEOTT.

N. Y. 58.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

1882.

Appeal from order which afllrmed an orgranting a preliminary injunction, restraining defendant from voting upon stock
in person or by proxy, or from giving a
proxy pendente lite.
der

W. W. MacFarland, for appellant
Dmining, for respondent.

B. F.

ANDREWS, 0. J. The complaint shows
that the plaintiff is pledgor of shares of railroad stock transferred on the books of the
company to the defendant as trustee for the
pledgee, and the action is brought to restrain
the defendant from voting upon the shares
at the meetings of stockholders,
which it is
alleged he has heretofore done, and claims
the right to do in the future by reason of his
title and right as trustee of the stock. The
order from which this appeal is taken granted a temporary injunction restraining the
defendant, pendente lite, from voting on the
shares.
We think the injunction was improperly allowed, for the reason that it does
from the complaint that the
not appear
plaintiff is entitled to the final relief for
which the action is brought, and in such case
injunction is unauthorized.
a
temporary
Code, § 603.
It is claimed on the part of the
plaintiff that within the general rule that a
pledgee has no right to use the thing pledged,
the defendant is not entitled to vote upon
the shares, which it is insisted is a use of
the shares in violation of this rule.
On the
other hand, the defendant
claims that the
voting power passes to the pledgee of corporate shares transferred on the books of the
corporation
to the pledgee, as incident to
the pledge,

and

according

to the

presumed

intention of the parties.
Without considering this question, but conceding the plaintifC's claim, it does not follow that he is entitled to an injunction restraining the defendant from voting on the shares. It is
not sufficient to authorize the remedy by injunction that a violation of a naked legal
right of property is threatened.
There must
be some special ground of jurisdiction, and
where an injunction is the final relief sought,
facts which entitle the plaintiff to this remedy must be averred in the complaint and

established
on the hearing. The complaint
in this case is bare of any facts authorizing
final relief by injunction. It is true that it
is alleged that the defendant by the use of
the shares has been enabled to a great extent
of the corporato control the management

tion in the interest of the New York, Lake
Erie & Great Western Railway Company,
with little or no regard to the best interests
But
of the company issuing the shares.
there are no facts supporting this allegation,
nor is it averred that the interests of the latter company have been prejudiced, or that the
value of the shares has been impaired by the
So also it is alleged
acts of the defendant.
that it is greatly against the plaintiff's interest as a shareholder to permit the defendant to vote upon the shares, and that the
plaintiff will suffer great and irreparable in-

jury if

the defendant is permitted to do so.
these conclusions
no facts justifying
are stated, and the mere allegation of serious
or irreparable injury, apprehended or threatened, not supported by facts or circumstances tending to justify it, is clearly insufficient.
Neither injury to the plaintiff's property,
of the legal remedy, or any
inadequacy
pressing or serious emergency, or danger of
loss, or other special ground of jurisdiction,
The complaint
is shown by the complaint.
therefore does not show that the plaintiff is
entitled to final relief by injunction. Corporation, etc., V. Mapes, 6 Johns. Ch. 46; Printing Establishment v. Fitch, 1 Paige, 98;
High, Inj. §§ 22, 34, 35, and cases cited.
The preliminary injimction was granted upon the complaint, and an affidavit verifying
the statements therein, without stating any
additional facts.
It is doubtless sufficient
that a probable or prima facie case be made,
to justify the granting of an injunction pendente lite, but where, as in this case, it clearly appears that the complaint shows no cause
of action, then a preliminary injunction is
unauthorized,
and the granting of it is error
of law, which may be reviewed by this
Code, § 190, subd. 2; Allen
court on appeal.
V. Meyer, 73 N. Y. 1;
Wright v. Brown,
67 N. Y. 1; Collins v. Collins, 71 N. Y. 270;

But

Paul

V. Hunger, 47 N. Y. 469.
The order of the general and special terms
should therefore be reversed, with costs. All

except BAPALLO, J., dissenting,
and TRACY, JJ., absent.
Order reversed.

concur,

MILLER
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STEINAU
(27

Supreme

Error

v.

CINCINNATI GAS-LIGHT

N. B.

COKE 00.

545, 48 Ohio

Court of Ohio.

&

St. 324.)

May

5,

1891.

to circuit court,

Hamilton couuty.
Action was brought in the court of common pleas by the gas company against the
plaintiff in error to obtain an injunction.
In its petition the company alleged the execution of the following contract:
"This
contract, entered into this 16th day of March,
1886, by and between the Cincinnati
GasLight & Coke Company and Chas. J. Steinau, proprietor and occupant of the premises
Imown as 'The Palace,' and situated No. 80
West Fourth street, between Walnut and
Vine streets, witnesseth:
First. The said
the Cincinnati Gas-Light & Coke Company,
for and in consideration of the continued
use of not less than three-fourths the present average consumption of gas on said
premises, or other premises which the party
of the second pai"t may occupy or remove to,
hereby agrees and binds itself to supply, under existing rules and regulations, at the
premises above described, — except in cases
of unavoidable accident,— all the gas which
may be required to properly illuminate the
same, for a period of ten years next ensuing.
The gas so furnished shall at no time be of
less power or purity than the present legal
standard. That it will accept in full i)ayment for gas so furnished in accordance
with the terms of this contract the sum of
one dollar and thirty cents per thousand
cubic feet, if paid at the office of said gas
company within the first three business days
after presentation of bill for gas supplied
during the period covered by said bill, but
in case such payment is not made within
the time specified, then the price shall be
one dollar and forty cents per thousand
cubic feet.
Second. That the. said Charles
J. Steinau, for himself, his heirs, or assigns,
for and in consideration of the reduction in
price above specified, hereby agrees to receive from the said the Cincinnati Gas-Light
& Coke Company all the gas necessary for
of the premises
the proper illumination
or of other premises to
above described,
which he may remove, in quantity not less
than three-fourths of the present average
consumption; and that he will not, during
the period above named, introduce into or
use
on said premises oil lamps, electric
lights, or other material or power for genpurposes;
or any other
eral Illuminating
gas than that supplied by the said the Cin-

cinnati Gas-Light & Coke Company. Third.
It is further agreed and understood by both
parties to this contract that if during the
period above named the city council shall
pass, and the gas company accept, any ordinance by virtue of which the price of gas
to all private consumers in said city is reduced below the price above specified, then,
in that case, the said Chas. J. Steinau shall
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not thereafter be required to pay any price
in excess of that named in said ordinance;
but in all other respects this contract shall
continue in force during the period aforesaid." It further alleged, in substance, that
at the date of the contract the regular price
for gas to private consumers was $1.70 per
thousand cubic feet, with a discount of 10
cents per thousand on monthly bills paid
within 5 days after presentation. That price
continued until February 28, 1887, when the
price was fixed by the city council at $1.25,
with same rate of discount as before.
The
average monthly consumption of gas for the
current year on the premises would be over
18,000 cubic feet if the defendant fulfilled
his contract.
The plaintiff duly performed
all the stipulations and conditions of the contract on its part, and was ready, able, and
willing to continue to do so. But the defendant, disregarding his obligations under
the contract, refused to receive all the gas
necessary for the proper illumination of the
premises,
and has introduced and is using
for general illuminating pm'poses material
or power other than the gas supplied by
plaintiff, viz., the Edison incandescent light.
"By means of the light so created the consumption of gas for illuminating purposes
will be and has been largely reduced below
the quantity agreed to be consumed on said
premises, as stated in said contract, if not
wholly done away with, and the company
will lose the benefit of said contract and
the gain and profit it is entitled to therefrom, and will suffer irreparable damage."
Wherefore plaintiff asks that defendant be
enjoined from using said electric light, or
any material other than gas supplied by
plaintiff, for general illuminating purposes
on said premises,
and for such other and
further relief as the nature of the case may
require. A demurrer to the petition was
overruled,
and final decree of injunction
entered against the defendant.
This judgment was affirmed by the circuit court.
To
reverse both judgments this error proceeding
is brought.
Kramer & Kramer, for plaintiff in error.
E. A. Ferguson, for defendant in error.

SPEAR, J. (after stating the facts as
In consideration of the continued
above).
use of not less than three-fourths the present average consumption of gas by Steinau,
the company stipulated that it would furnish him, for 10 years, all the gas necessary for the lighting of his place of business
at a price much lower than the then regular
price, to be paid monthly.
Steinau stipulated to receive the gas in quantity not less
than three-fourths of the then average
monthly consumption,
for the time named,
and further stipulated not to introduce or
use electric lights or material for general
illuminating purposes otier than gas to be
furnished by the company.
No past consid-
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ei-ation appears.
The obligations of each
party are wholly in covenant, and are wholly
In other words, they are promises
executory.
merely.
The prayer Is for injunction to restrain Steinau from using the electric light or
any material for general illuminating purposes
other than the gas to be furnished by the comInjunction is frequently resorted to as
pany.
In
a means of obtaining specific performance.
this case the purpose intended is to prevent the
use of electric lights in order that Steinau
shall thus be compelled to comply with his conThe obtract, and use the company's gas.
ject thus sought is specific performance.
Against the demand of the company it is
insisted that a court of equity will not grant
an injunction to restrain a breach of negative covenants where the result will be to
performance of aflBrmative
effect specific
covenants iinless the affirmative stipulations
of the complaining party can be specifically
enforced against him, and that the petition
does not show but that the company has an
If either proposition
adequate remedy at law.
is sound, the demurrer was improperly overruled.
As already stated, the object of the
proceeding is, and the result reached, if it
Is successful, will be, to specifically enforce
the contract as against Steinau.- It seems
plain that, if the situation of the parties
were reversed, and specific performance were
sought against the company, the court would
have ro power to compel a full compliance
by the company with its stipulations to fm*nish all the gas needed for the period proIt might be in
vided for in the contract.
the power of the court to enjoin the company from turning the gas off from Steinau's
service pipes so long as he complied with
and it
its reasonable rules and regulations,
is possible that the company could, by mandamus, be compelled to furnish gas to Steinau while it continued to use the franchises
and privileges accorded it as a corporation
by virtue of the statute and the ordinances
But these pax-tial remedies,
of Cincinnati.
if they might be available, would be wholly
apart from the contract; and, be this as it
may, it admits of no question that, upon
any state of facts appearing by the allegations of this petition, it is beyond the power
of any court to compel the company to manufacture and supply gas for a period of 10
How can the court order the comyears.
pany to continue the manufacture of gas
for the purpose of supplying this consumer?
How can it prevent this company from dissolving and going out of business, or from
selling out to another which would not be
The incontracts?
bound by its personal
quiry, then, is, if the contract could not be
specifically enforced against the company,
may it be specifically enforced in its favor?
The authorities on the point are numerous,
and, to some extent, conflicting. Mr. Pomeroy, in his work on Contracts, § 163, ob"The peculiarly distinctive feature
serves:
is that the redoctrine
of the equitable

right to a specific performance must
mutual. If, therefore, from the nature
or form of the contract itself, from the relations of the parties, from the personal incapacity of one of them, or from any othmedial
De

er cause, the agreement devolves no obligation at all upon one of the parties, or if it
cannot be specifically enforced against him,
then, and for that reasim, he is not in general entitled to remedy of a specific performance against his adversary party, although
otherwise there may be no obstacle arising,
either from the terms of the contract or
from his personal status and relations, to an
enforcement of the relief against the latter
individually."
Again, (section Itio,) he says
that "it is a familiar doctrine that if the
right to the specific performance of a conThe
tract exists at aU it must be mutual.
remedy must be alike attainable by both
parties to the agreement."
To this general
have made an. exception
rule the courts
where peculiar skill and labor are involved,,
and this, apparently, upon the ground that
the element of personal and artistic skill
renders the chances of damages at law uncertain and conjectural. Of this class the
case of Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De Gex, M. &
G. 604, is perhaps
the leading case.
The
defendant was a celebrated singer.
She was
under contract to sing for a certain period
at the plaintiff's theater, and not to sing at
any other.
The court restained her from the
threatened
breach
of this negative
covenant.
Later cases have followed this, and
the exception appears to be quite well es-

tablished.
There are cases, besides those above referred to, both in England and in this country, which sustain the holding of the circuit
court, (2 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 286,) that "where
there is a clear and continuing breach of a
negative covenant in a contract, and where
an injunction against the breach of it will
do substantial justice between the parties
by obliging the defendant to carry out his
contract or lose the benefit of a breach of it,
and the remedy at law is not adequate, or
the damages for such a breach are not susceptible of proper assessment by a jury, a
court of equity may properly restrain the
defendant from such a breach, though the
court might not be able to enforce a complete specific performance
of the contract
against the other party." Singer SewingMach. Co. V. Union Button-Hole, etc., Co., 1
Holmes, 253, Fed. Cas. No. 12,904; Chicago,
etc., Ry. Co. v. New York, etc., Ry. Co. (C.
C.) 24 Fed. 516; People v. Gas-Light Co., 45
Barb. 137; Dietrichsen v. Cabburn, 2 Phil.
Oh. 52. However, after a somewhat careful examination of, the numerous cases cited
by counsel, and many others, we are inclined to the conclusion that the general
doctrine laid down by Mr. Pomeroy is sustained by the apparent weight of authority.
Hills V. Croll, 2 Phil. Ch. 60; Fothergill v.
Rowland, L. E. 17 Eq. 132; Bailey t. Col-
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lins, 59 N. H. 459; Pingle v. Conner, 66
Mich. 187, 33 N. W. 385; Iron Age Pub.
Co. V. W. U. Tel. Co., 83 Ala, 498, 3 Soutli.
449; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Texas &
P. Ry. Co., 4 Woods, 317, 11 Fed. 625; Meason V. Kaine, 63 Pa. 835; Tyson v. Watts,
1 Md. Ch. 13; Richmond v. Railway Co., 33
Iowa, 423.
It is important to note that an
essential element of the proposition
quoted
above is that the complaining party has no adequate remedy at law, and that his damages
are not susceptible of proper assessment by a
jury. It goes without saying that if this
element is foimd wanting the rule laid down
cannot apply.
On the part of the company
it is insisted that the condition referred to
is present in the case at bar. Let us see.
The stipulation of Steinau was that he would
receive gas in quantity not less than threefourths of the present average consumption.
The contract was to continue for 10 years.
It had been in force at the commencement
The "present
of the action about one year.
average consumption" was a quantity easy
of ascertainment.
So long as Steinau used
the quantity of gas specified he was in full
performance of his contract. When he ceased taking that quantity he violated the contract, and when he established electric lights
in his place, and proceeded to illuminate in
that way, it was clear that he intended to
wholly break and abandon the contract. The
company had the right to regard the contract as at an end, and no pretense or claim
of Steinau, so long as he refused to perform,
could avail to prevent the company from so
All conttactual relations betreating it.
tween the parties would then be terminated.
By force of the ordinance, and at prices fixand subject to all reaed by the ordinance,
sonable regulations, the company might still
be bound to furnish gas, but it could not be
required to furnish a foot of gas under the
contract. The contract being thus, by the
action of Steinau, at an end so far as he
was concerned, the company's cause of action was immediate. It could, if the damof proper assessment
ages were susceptible
at any time, have an action at once for its
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and this
entire damages for the breach,
remedy did not Involve a multiplicity of
suits.
James v. AUen Co., 44 Ohio St. 226,
6 N. B. 246, is a case, in principle, like this
one. This court there held that where the
ofCending party had wholly broken and abandoned the contract the party injured by the
breach could bring his action at once, and
recover his entire damages for the breach,
and that one judgment upon such claim
That
would be a bar to a future recovery.
What
rule, we think, applies to this case.
would stand in the way of adequate damages being awarded by a jury? The amount
of gas agreed to be used each month, the
duration of the time, the price to be paid
(subjeci to changes, if any,
per thousand,
produced by the new ordinance,) were all
If, added to these
shown by the contract.
facts, the jury should be put in possession
of the amount of "gain and profit" the company were making per thousand, what would
prevent a clear ascertainment of damages
upon that basis, reduced probably on account of payment in advance? iFothergill v.
Rowland, L. R. 17 Eq. 132; Chicago, etc.,
Ry. Co. V. New York, etc., Ry. Co. (C. C.)
24 Fed. 516.
it is doubted by some members
of the court whether a court of equity, in
where the
a ease of specific performance,
granting or refusal of relief may depend so
largely upon the court's discretion, should
exercise it in favor of the enforcement of
covenants which deprive a party of new and
valuable discoveries of science, and, in a
tend to create a monopoly by cona decision of this question is not
necessary to a disposition of the case at bar,
and that, as well as whether a court of equity should, in any case, where full performance cannot be enforced, decree performance of negative covenants of one party, may properly be left to be determined
when a case arises which necessarily requires a decision upon them.
We are content to rest the decision of this case upon the
ground that the remedy of the defendant in
error is at law, and not in equity.
Judgment reversed.
measure,

tract.

But
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MANHATTAN

TILIZING

MANUFACTURING & FERNEW JERSEY STOCK-

CO. V.

YARD & MARKET
(23

N.

J.

Eq.

CO. et aL

161.)

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

May Term,

18T2.

Bill for an injunction. Heard on a rule to
show cause why an injunction should not issue.

Mr.
Scudder

McCarter, for complainant
I. W.
and Mr. Winfield, for defendants.

ZABRISKIE, Ch. The complainant is a
corporation of the state of New York, doing
business
at Communipaw. The defendant,
the stock yard company, a corporation of this
state, owns a large and extensire abattoir or
slaughter-house
at Communipaw. It has not,
for some years, slaughtered animals there,
but let to butchers the privilege of slaughtering their animals in the abattoir. Previous to August, 1870, the blood and other remains of animals thus slaughtered there by
the butchers, not being removed or properly
cared for, had created a stench which became
a nuisance to the adjoining country, and the
company was restrained by an injunction
from permitting the business to be carried on
there, unless on condition of having the blood
and offal perfectly cared for.
The butchers
paid for the privilege of slaughtering there,
and left the blood and ofCal on the premises,
to be cared for by the stock yard company.
These difficulties became a serious embarrassment in the enterprise.
The complainant
undertook to manage this, and to remove and
manufacture the blood and other abandoned
refuse left on the premises by the butchers,
so as to prevent any public or private nuisance that might else arise from them.
To efCect the objects of this arrangement,
the stock yard company, on the 5th of August, 1870, made a lease to the complainant
of certain premises adjoining the abattoir, for
the specified business of manufacturing and
preparing fertilizers and manures, and the
The term was
materials for that purpose.
for twenty years from April 20th, 1867, with
privilege of renewal, and the rent to be paid
was fifteen per cent of the net profits of the
The lease contained this provision:
business.
"The parties of the second part shaU also
have the refusal and exclusive right of saving and taking all the blood of animals
in the abattoir and sheep-house
slaughtered
of the parties of the first part, and of saving
and taking the animal matter and ammonia
from the rendering tanks of the parties of
the first part, and of using the same in their
business;" and also this agreement on part
of the complainant: "S&id parties of the second part hereby bind themselves to save all
that is possible of the blood from the animals slaughtered, and the animal matter and
ammonia from the tanks, to prevent any ef-

fluvia or stenches from escaping, and to prevent any and all nuisance from being created in any manner whatsoever, either in saving the blood, animal matter, or ammonia, or
in converting the same into articles of commerce."
The lease was executed by the president of
the stock yard company, in the name of the
company, by affixing its common seal and
was duly
The execution
his signature.
in Hudson
proved, and the lease recorded
county clerk's office, August 20th, 1870.
on faith of the lease,
The complainant,
erected on the demised premises expensive
buildings and machinery for the purpose of
These were completed by
the manufacture.
In the meantime arJanuary 9th, 1871.
rangements had been made by the complainant with the stock company and its employes
for coagulating the blood on the premises,
arlKng from
and for preventing nuisances
slaughtering in the abattoir. Part of this
coagulated blood had, with complainant's acquiescence, been delivered to John J. Craven,
for makmg experione of the defendants,
ments or manufacturing it.
In April, 1871, the stock yard company
leased its abattoir to Henry R. Payson and
David H. Sherman, two of the defendants,
who have since carried on the business under the name of D. H. Sherman & Co. The
defendant, Isaac Freese, who was in the employ of the stock yard company as superintendent, and continued in the employ of D.
H. Sherman & Co. in the like capacity, entered into partnership with the defendant
Craven, who was also in the employ of the
stock yard company at the making of its
and with the delease to the complainant,
fendant Sherman, under the name of "The
Bergen Manufacturing Company," for the
purpose of manufacturing albumen and fer-

tilizers.

After January 9th, 1871, the complainant
demanded all the blood of the animals slaughtered at the abattoir, but Craven made an arrangement with certain butchers who slaughtered there, for saving and taking the blood
of the animals slaughtered by them, and this
was permitted by Sherman & Co., and Freese,
their superintendent; and a large part of the
blood is thus taken and delivered to Sherman, Freese and Craven, and is lost to the

complainant.
By the record of the lease to the complainant, Sherman,
Craven and Freese had constructive notice of its contents, and also it is
clear that they, as well as Payson, had acThey do not deny this, but take
tual notice.
the ground that the blood, like all other parts
of the animal slaughtered,
belongs to the
butcher, and that they or the stock yard company can no more control or deliver It than
they could control the flesh or hides. That
the butchers having discovered that the blood
has a merchantable value, have a right to
dispose of it for their own benefit; and that

INJUNCTIONS.

739

lU;

wben they had determined to sell It, and not ( tied to take. Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phila.
to abandon it, Craven was under no obligaDe Mattos v. Gibson, 4 De Gex & J. 2T6.
tion not to buy it, and his firm might receive
The facts that Freese and Craven U'ansferit through him without breach of faith.
red to the complainant their claim to a patThis defence, at first sight, is seemingly ent for making albumen from blood, and
good; but it wholly rests upon the correcttook part in the arrangements for the lease
ness of the premises, to wit, that the stock
by the company in whose employ they were,
yard company had not the right or power and that Craven interfered by these negotiato control the disposition of the blood.
It is tions with the butchers after he was repulsed
not claimed that it had, before the complainIn his attempt to get into the employ of the
complainant, do not give greater validity
ant's lease, granted to any one the privilege of slaughtering there.
If it had, for a to the complainant's right; they may show
term unexpired, it would have lost the conbad faith and vindictiveness, and that they
trol. Before that, they had permitted butch- are not entitled to any favorable consideraers to slaughter there without any provision
tion beyond their legal rights.
about disposing of the blood or offal. It
The injunction applied for is not a mandatory injunction; it is not to require the demay, by custom, have been the effect of such
contract, that the butcher might leave the livery of the blood, but to restrain Craven
from taking it, and the other defendants
blood and offal to be removed by the company. If left, the company was liable for from suffering or permitting any other person
any nuisance occasioned by it. It cannot be than the complainant to take it.
For this injury there is a remedy at law,
doubted that the company could have requirbut it is not an adequate remedy.
ed, as a condition, that the butcher should reThe value
of the blood is no measure of the injury, and
move the blood and offal. It had the right to
prevent any one from using the abattoir who it is hardly possible to compute the damages
which the injury may occasion.
would not comply.
Before the lease to the
And redress
at law could only be obtained by a continued
complainant, this condition would have been
series of suits ttirough the twenty or forty
deemed a burden on the butchers, and might
years of the complainant's term. It is a
have injured the business of the company.
It was in difficulty by reason of the nuisance case peculiarly proper for the preventive
remedy by injunction.
caused by leaving these matters, and the
Shreve v. Black, 4 N.
injunction growing out of it. It was re- J. Eq. 177.
The defendants, in their answers, deny
lieved by this lease.
The consideration was
the exclusive right to take the blood and that the seal of the stock yard company was
offal which was secured by covenant to the affixed to the lease by authority of the directors. The bill alleges that the stock yard
complainant. After that, the company had
the same right to demand of every one using company made and executed the lease under
the abattoir that he should leave these mat- its corporate seal, and sets out a lease with
ters for the complainant, as it had to require the seal affixed, and signed by the president.
The answer of the company is not verified by
This could have been
him to remove them.
any one who has knowledge of the facts.
annexed as a condition to every permission
The present secretary swears that he beto use the abattoir, as weU as the condition
lieves the facts to be true.
Any deed of a
And this, by its coveto pay for the use.
nant, the company was bound to do. D. H. corporation, under its corporate seal and
Sherman & Co., as the lessees, are bound by signed by the proper officer, is presumed to
And Freese, Craven and have been executed by authority of the corthe same covenant.
Sherman having notive of this obligation be- poration, until the contrary is clearly shown.
Leggett v. New Jersey Manuf'g & Banking
their business, are
fore they commenced
Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 541.
There is no proof here
bound to refrain from interfering with these
rights of the complainant, and from taking to overcome this presumption.
The injunction must issue as prayed for.
the blood and other matters which it is enti-
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GODFREY
(17 Pac. 849,

V.

BLACK.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Error to district
C. Reed, Judge.

court,

April

Godfrey for a real-estate office, and restraining Godfrey and his agents and employes from occupying the office of the hotel,
or any part thereof, as a real-estate office.
The petition was verified and introduced in
evidence in support of the application for a
temporary Injunction. In addition, the affidavits of several persons were offered, tending to show that the carrying on of a realestate business in the office of a first-class
hotel brings a crowd and an excitement which
interferes with the convenience and comfort
of guests, and tends to drive them away, and
to render the hotel unpopular.
C. E. Godfrey testified that he had leased from Roberts Bros, a space 8 by 20 feet. In the corner of the hotel office, and put a railing
around and furnished the same, and was
carrying on a real-estate business therein.
Upon a hearing had upon due notice, a temporary injunction was granted against Godfrey during the pendency of the action, enjoining him, and his agents and employes,
from further using any portion of the office
of the hotel as a real-estate office. To reverse the order granting the temporary Injunction, C. E. Godfrey brings the case to
this court.
to

39 Kan. 193.)
7,

1888.

Sedgwick county;

Action of injunction, commenced by Robert Black against F. S. Roberts and M. O.
Roberts, partners as Roberts Bros., and C.
E. Godfrey, to restrain Roberts Bros, from
subletting any portion of tbe Manhattan Hotel, situated in the city of Wichita, and to
restrain C. E. Godfrey from occupying the
and brokerage
hotel office as a real-estate
In his petition, Black stated, in suboffice.
stance, that he was the owner of the premises, and had constructed the building thereon to be used as a first-class hotel, and that
he let the same to the Roberts Bros., to be
used as an hotel, from the 1st day of July,
1885, to the 1st day of July, 1886, for a stipulated rent, payable in monthly installments.
It was further provided in the lease, which
was in writing, that Roberts Bros, might

elect to take the premises for the further
period of four years after July 1, 1886, upon the same terms, by giving to Black a written notice of such election at any time prior
In pursuance
to the 1st day of May, 1886.
of that stipulation, Roberts Bros., within the
time, elected to retain the lease for the additional four years, and gave written notice
It was further
to that effect to the plaintiff.
in the lease that Roberts Bros,
provided
might carry on any business in the building
incident to the hotel business; but it was expressly stipulated that they should not lease
nor underlet, nor permit any persons to occupy the premises, without the consent of the
plaintiff in writing having been first obtainHe alleges that he has never given Robed.
erts Bros, any consent to occupy the building for any purpose other than that of an
hotel, nor to lease or underlet the building
or any part thereof, nor to permit any persons to occupy the same except as guests of
He alleges that the premises were
the hotel.
to be occupied only as an hotel, and that
it is injurious to the hotel to carry on, in
the office thereof, the business of a real-esand that it is
tate agency and brokerage,
such an injury as cannot be compensated in
Notwithstanding the premises, he
damages.
avers that Roberts Bros, have leased to C.
E. Godfrey a portion of the hotel building
used as the hotel office; and that Godfrey,
his agents and employes, are occupying the
same as a real-estate office and place of busiHe further states that Roberts Bros,
ness.
are threatening and intending to continue
said lease and underletting to Godfrey, and
that Godfrey intends to occupy the room in
business,
the transaction of the real-estate
against the protest and without Black's conHe asks
sent, and to his irreparable injury.
that injunction issue prohibiting Roberts
Bros, from leasing or underletting the hotel
building and premises, or any part thereof,

Sankey
Campbell

& Campbell, for plaintiff in error.
& Dyer, for defendant in error.

JOHNSTON, J. (after stating the facts as
We see no reason to disturb the orabove).
der granting the temporary injunction.
The
building in question was constructed for
use as a first-class hotel, was rented for that
purpose, and it was expressly
specified in
the lease that the lessee should not sublet
the premises, or permit any one else to occupy the same, without the consent in writing of the lessor having first been obtained.
In direct violation of the terms of the lease,
Roberts Bros, sublet a portion of the hotel
office, to be used by Godfrey in carrying on
a business inconsistent with the hotel business, and which, the testimony says, detracts
from the reputation and popularity of the
house. They had no right to sublet or permit
the hotel to be used by Godfrey, and he acquired no right by the agreement made with
them.
It is claimed that injunction is not the
proper remedy in such case; and actions to
recover possession and to recover damages
for trespass, where the defendants
could
have the issues submitted to a jury, are suggested.
The lessor is not confined to these
remedies, nor are they adequate.
He has a
right to insist that the covenants of the lease
shall be observed, and that the premises
shall be used only for the purposes agreed
upon.
It does not appear that the lease was
to terminate upon a breach of the covenants;
but, even if the lessor had a right to re-enter,
that would not preclude him from obtaining
equitable relief to prevent a forbidden use
Presumably the continuof the premises.

INJUNCTIONS.
ance of the lease for the fiill term is beneficial to the lessor, and he Is entitled to a performance in accordance with the contract
Upon this ground the mere re-entry
made.
is held to he an inadequate
remedy, as it
does not leave the lessor in as good a posi-,
tion as the enforcement of performance by
tlie tenant would leave him in. Bodwell v.
Crawford, 26 Kan. 292, is cited as an authority against maintaining the action.
The two
cases are very dissimilar.
There no contractual relation existed between the parties,
and the possession of the premises by the
In givdefendant was wholly unauthorized.
ing the opinion in that case, the writer carefully distinguished it from those like the
present one; holding that injunction to restrain parties from putting leased property
by the lease could
to a use not authorized
be maintained. In speaking of a re-entry by
the landlord, it was there remarked: "True,
he may perhaps declare the lease forfeited,
and recover the property; but he may not
desire to do this. He may not be able to
lease for the same rent, or to an equally responsible tenant; and the lessee ought not
to be permitted to compel the lessor either
to take back the property or tolerate a forbidden use."
Stees v. Kranz, 32 Minn. 313,
20 N. W. 241; 2 High, Inj. §§ 1138, 1144.
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Neither is the right of the lessor to bring
an

action

to recover

compensatory

damages

for the trespass a sufficient ground for withEquitable
holding the remedy of injunction.
relief may be properly extended in some cases
against trespass.
An action at law against
the trespasser here would not be an adequate
A new cause of action would arise
remedy.
every day for the constantly recurring grievance, which would lead to a multiplicity of
suits; and the necessity of preventing these
is an exception which warrants the exercise
of the equitable jurisdiction of the court.
Besides, the lessor has a right to insist upon
his property being used in the manner fixed
by agreement in the lease; and the testimony
tends to show that the carrying on of the
real-estate business in the office of the hotel
will deteriorate its value, and seriously injure
the hotel; and in such cases equity will interfere to restrain the continuance of the injury. 2 High, Inj. § 1142; Steward v. Winters, 4 Sandf. Ch. 587; Macher v. Hospital,
1 Ves. & B. 188;
Stees v. Kranz, 32 Minn.
313, 20 N. W. 241.
Under the pleadings and the proofs, the
injunction was properly allowed,
temporary
and the order granting the same will be
affirmed.

All

the justices concurring.
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APPEAL OF
(58 Pa.

McCLURG.
51.)

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Jan.

20, 1868.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Chester
In equity.
county.
Dr. Benjamin Tliompson filed a bill against
Dr. Jobn K. McClurg, averring as follovs's:
That the defendant, being a practicing physiChester coimty, agreed,
cian at Ohandlerville,
on the 22d of January, 1859, with the plaintiff, to sell him his office fixtures and furniture, etc., with his good will in his profession,
for ¥125, and bound himself to remove not
less than twelve miles from the place, and
himself as a
never thereafter to establish
physician within twelve miles without the
plaintiff's consent, to use his influence to
throw his practice to the benefit of the plaintiff, and give countenance to no other in that
averring further that the defenddirection,
ant had established himself as a physician
within five miles of his former location withThe bill prayed
out the plaintiff's consent.
that he might be restrained from practice in
and from establishing
his present location,
himself elsewhere within the prescribed limits.
The answer alleged that the fixtures, etc.,
were worth at least $300; that the agreement
as written did not contain the whole agreement of the parties; that the restraint was to
have application only so long as the plaintiff
should remain on the property then occupied
that the plaintiff had ceasby the defendant;
ed to occupy that property, and the defendant
had not interfered and did not intend to uiterfere with the plaintiff's practice.
The case was referred to Joseph Hemphill,
Esq., as examiner and master.
The agreement given in evidence Is dated
January 22, 1859, and, besides the agreement
to sell to the plaintiff the defendant's fixtures,
etc., "with the good will of his profession,"
for $125, contains this covenant:
"The said J. R. McClurg hereby binds and
pledges himself to remove not less than twelve
miles from his present location, and for ever
hereafter not to establish himself in the practice of his profession, within twelve mUes,
without the free consent of the said Dr.
Thompson; also to use all his influence to
throw all his practice to the benefit of the
and to give countenance to
said Thompson,
no other in that direction."
The evidence of plaintiff was that defendant moved away in the spring of 1859, and
the plaintiff left his residence, gave up his
practice at another place, and went into the
property, where he remained till the summer
of 1864, when he moved to a house about
of a mile from It, and shortly
three-quarters
afterwards removed about a quarter of a
h" continued to practice as a
P-..-1.1 "nvther:
physician; defendant moved to PrestonviUe,
L.X or SIX miles from his former place, with
the declared intention of practicing as a phy-

sician;
that there was nothing in the article
to which the defendant had not assented.
The defendant gave evidence that $125 was
the price only of the articles sold, and the
added "good will"; also that the
scrivener
restraint was applicable only whilst the plaintiff' occupied defendant's former place.
The master reported that the evidence susof the bill, and that
tained the allegations
there was no evidence offered of fraud or mistake in drawing the agreement, and reported

In conclusion:
"Upon the whole, neither fraud or mistalse
having been established, the subscriber is of
opinion that the plaintiff having proven his
bill, and the defendant failed to establish any
effective answer thereto, the law and equity
of the case gives to the plaintiff the right to
the injunction prayed for and costs of suit."
Exceptions were filed by the defendant to
and the
the report, which was confirmed,
court (Butler, P. J.) decreed that "an injunction be issued restraining the defendant from
himself in the practice of his
estabUshlng
profession of medicine within the limits of
twelve miles from the location on the 22d day
of January, 1859, or remaining, as at present
established, within said limits, and from practicing his said profession within the circle
of his practice at the date aforesaid.
The defendant appealed, and assigned the
decree for error.

W. Darlington, for appellant. W. MacVeagh
J. S. Futhey, for appellee.

and

SHARSWOOD, J. That contracts restraining the exercise of a trade or profession in particular localities are valid, when there is a
fair and reasonable ground for the restriction,
as in the case of the sale of the good will of
a trade or business when the vendor covenants not to pursue the same business within
certain prescribed limits, is beyond question.
The leading case is Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P.
Wms. 181, in which C. J. Parker delivered a
The doctrine has
long and elaborate opinion.
been at rest ever since, as Dord Kenyon declared in Davis v. Mason, 5 T. R. 118, in
which a bond by a surgeon not to practice
within ten miles of the place where the obligee lived was held good, and a similar undertaking by an apothecary, not to set up his
business within twenty miles, was sustained
in Hayward v. Young, 2 Chit. 407.
The appellee had therefore a clear legal right under
his contract. • Ought a court of equity to enforce it by injunction?
When Mr. Eden wrote his valuable treatise
on the law of injunction, he stated that he
had not been able to find any reported cases
In which the court had Interfered by that process to restrain the breach of such a covenant.
He admits, however, that it may be Inferred
from Lord Eldon's observations in Crutwell
V. Lye, 17 Ves. 335, that there is no reasonable objection to the exercise of such a juris-
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Eden, Inj.

223,

224.

In that

case,

however, there was no contract, but merely
the sale of a trade with the good will, which,
without express covenant or fraud, was held
not to prevent the vendor from setting up the
same business.
Lord Elldon said, "A man
might stand by and give encouragement generating a confidence that he would not engage
in such a trade, inducing other persons to involve themselves, on the ground of which conduct this court might interpose."
If equity
would enforce an implied contract within reasonable limits, a fortiori they ought to interfere in the case of an express one. Accordingly several subsequent decisions both in
England and America have acted on this
principle.
Harrison v. Gardner, 2 Madd. 198,
was the case of a retiring partner, who, according to the statement of the bill, had given an assurance verbally that he would not
set .up in the same line of business In the
street in which it had been carried on before,
or its immediate vicinity.
The vice chancellor, Sir Thomas Plumer, said, "Suppose there
was no dispute as to the facts stated in the
bill, but that they were admitted, it is clear
the court would relieve."
In WilUams v. Williams, 2 Swanst. 253, Lord Bldon granted an
injunction in a similar case of a retiring partner where, however, there was an express
agreement in writing.
Butler v. Burleson, 16
Vt. 176, was like this, a contract between two
practicing physicians, and it was enforced by
injunction. "When there is an express covenant," said 0. J. Williams, "and an uncontroverted mischief arising from the breach of
it, equity wiU grant an injunction to restrain
In this case there is an express
the breach.
contract.
The mischief arising from the
breach of it cannot be repaired, nor can it
A suit at law would afwell be estimated.
ford no adequate remedy, and the damages
will be continuing and accruing from day to
day, and, furthermore, the object of the contract can only be obtained by the parties conforming expressly and exactly to its terms.
It seems, therefore, to be a very proper case
for a court of chancery to enforce the contract by granting an injunction to prevent the
breach of it, according to the acknowledged
principle on which courts of equity act in similar cases." The same doctrine was maintainJudge
ed in Beard v. Dennis, 6 Ind. 200.
King also recognized it as established in
Palmer v. Graham, 1 Pars. Bq. Cas. 476, and
awarded an injunction on the ground of the
inadequacy of an action at law to give the
party aggrieved a full and perfect remedy
for such a breach of good faith.
We see nothing to distinguish this from the
It has been objected that the
cases cited.
Upon that subconsideration was inadequate.
ject C. J. Tindal, delivering the opinion of the
court of exchequer chamber, in Hitchcock v.
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"If there is no
Coker, 6 Adol. & E. 438, said:
of no real
consideration,
or a consideration
value, the contract in restraint of trade, which
in itself is never favored in law, must either
be a fraud upon the rights of the party restrained, or a mere voluntary contract, nuBut if, by
dum pactum, and therefore void.
more is intended,
adequacy of consideration,
and that the court must weigh whether the
is equal in value to that which
consideration
the party gives up or loses Dy the restraint
under which he has placed himself, we feel
ourselves bound to differ from that doctrine.
A duty would thereby be imposed upon the
court, in every particular case, which it has
It is imposno means whatever to execute.
sible for the court, looking at the record, to
say whether in any particular case the party
restrained has made an improvident bargain
or not." This is not lilie a bill for the specific
performance of an unexecuied contract, where,
if the bargain is a hard one or founded on an
inadequate consideration, a chancellor will refuse to interfere, but leave the party to his
This agreement was fully exlegal remedy.
The appellant removed, and the apecuted.
pellee, on the faith of it, gave up his practice
at the place where he was before established,
He
and settled in the new neighborhood.
cannot be put in statu quo.
We cannot, by
our decree, restore to him the practice he has
given up, nor could any damages a jury would
Even if
give be an adequate compensation.
it should be a sum which would purchase a
life annuity equal to his former income, that
would not provide for that increase from year
to year which enlarged experience and widening reputation would, in all probability, have
insured to him had he remained where he
The appellant has returned and estabwas.
hshed himself within the prescribed limits in
violation of his agreement.
It was said that
he did not mean to interfere with the appellee's practice;
but how can he well avoid it
if he is called upon by his old patients and
others?
It was with a view to this that the
contract stipulated that he should not establish himself in the practice of his profession
within twelve miles. This distance was doubtless named because it was considered suflicient
old
to render the practice in the appellant's
circle, reaching a distance of five or six miles
on either side, secure to the appellee.
We
agree with the court below that such a restraint is not unreasonable, nor greater than
may require.
the appellee's protection
Decree affirmed at the costs of the appellant.

THOMPSON, C. J., dissenting, not on the
ground of want of power in the court, but because not a case in which specific performance should be decreed, but the party left to
his action at law.
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GRAND RAPIDS SCHOOL FURNITURE
CO V. HANEY SCHOOL FURNITURE CO. et al.
(52 N.

W.

1009,

92 Mich.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

558.)

July

28, 1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Kent county,
in chancery; William E. Grove, Judge.
Bill by the Grand Rapids School Furniture
Company against the Haney School Furniture Company, Elijah Haney, and George A.
BuUard for an injunction. There was a demurrer to the bill, which was sustained, and
complainant brings error. Reversed.
Taggart, Wolcott & Ganson, for appellant.
Taggart & Denison, for appellees.
LONG,

J.

The bill of complaint in this

case alleges that the complainant is a manufacturing corporation, having its office and
manufactory at Grand Rapids; that ever
since its organization, in 1887, the defendants have been engaged in circulating thousands of circulars, containing the statement
that the goods of complainant infringed a
certain patent issued to the defendant Haney, who was and is the president of the corpoi-ation, and threatening to bring suit against
any and all persons purchasing or using
goods of the complainant's manufacture;
that these claims and threats were made in
bad faith, and with full knowledge that the
patent was invalid, and that the complainant was in possession of facts and proofs
sufficient to defeat any suit that might be

brought for its infringement; that said
threats were made for the purpose of intimidating parties who were likely to be customers of the complainant, and had to a considerable extent accomplished
their object;
but no suits having been brought for infringement of said patent, the threats had
lost their force, and hence a fraudulent and
collusive suit had been instituted for the
purpose of obtaining a decree which could be
used to deceive and intimidate the public;
that such decree had been obtained, and the
defendants had begun to use it for the purpose aforesaid, and were Intending so to use
it continuously, and on a very large scale,
to the great injury of the complainant's business, though the amount of such injury was
very difficult to prove or determine by any
The prayer of the bill is
accurate measure.
that the defendants may be perpetually enjoined and restrained from stating, publishing, or claiming, in any manner, that the
said decree is anything other or different
from a decree obtained by collusion, and
from claiming that it is an adjudication upon the merits as to the validity of the said
Haney patent, and from using such decree in
or threaten
any way or form to influence
any person or party against purchasing the
school furniture manufactured and sold by
To this bill the Haney
the complainant.
School Furniture Company, one of the said
defendants, filed a general demurrer; and,

the case having come on to be heard thereon, the court held that the bill of complaint
did not set up any facts giving a court of
equity jurisdiction to grant relief, and entered a decree sustaining the demurrer,
and
dismissing the complainant's bill. From this
decree the complainant appeals to this court.
The English courts, by recent decisions,
have exercised the injunctive jurisdiction to

restrain injurious publications concerning
property which operate as a slander of the
owner's title, and libelous publications which
are injurious
business,
to the plaintiff's
trade, or profession, and the wrongful use
of a name by which the public would be misled, and the plaintiff injured in his business.
Thus far, however, most of the American
courts seem unwilling to follow the example
of the recent English decisions, and decline
to extend the jurisdiction, so as to restrain
such torts as libels on business, slanders of
title, and the like. In Massachusetts the
English decisions are expressly repudiated.
Boston Diatlte Co. v. Florence Manuf'g Co.,
114 Mass. 69;
Whitehead v. Kitson, 119
Injunctions to restrain libelous
Mass. 484.
publications concerning plaintiff's business
were also refused in Association v. Boogher,
3 Mo. App. 173; Mauger v. Dick, 55 How.
Prac. 132; and Singer Manuf'g Co. v. Domestic Sew. Mach. Co., 49 Ga. 70.
In the
case of Emack v. Kane, 34 Fed. 46, Judge
Blodgett allowed the injunction. It appears
that Kane issued and widely distributed circulars in which he claimed that Emack's
goods infringed his patent.
He stated that
he should not sue Emack, but should bring
suits against all customers of Emack, and
collect royalty and damages from all of
Judge Blodgett said: "The gravamen
them.
of this case is an attempted intimidation by
the defendant of complainant's cestomers by
threatening them with suits which defend■» "■ * If
ant did not intend to prosecute.
a court of equity cannot restrain an attack
like this upon a man's business, then the
party is certainly remediless, because an action at law in most cases would do not good,
and his ruin would be accomplished before an
adjudication could be reached." In the recent case of Casey v. Typographical Union,
45 Fed. 135, the case of Emack v. Kane, supra,
was cited and approved by Judge Sage. It
appeared in the Casey Case that parties had
conspired together to Injure the complainant
Circulars were gotten out
In his business.
and widely distributed, containing threats
of pecuniary loss and injury to those who
should do business with the complainant.
The claim was made in that case, as in
this, that equity had no jurisdiction, because
the injurious publication was merely a lib«l
on complainant's business, and, for any loss
which the union inflicted, he had a plain
and adequate remedy at law. Judge Sage
remarked, however, that it Is idle to say that
such publications are nothing more than
libels, and that the only remedy for the in-
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jury Inflicted Is an action at law; that, while

they have certain characteristics of libels,
they are more than libels, and there is no
plain and adequate remedy at law for such
injuries.
We think the bill in this case states a
case materially different from the Massachusetts cases and the other cases holding
that equity has no jurisdiction to restrain
Here it is claimed and alleged In the
a libel.
bill that Elijah Haney and the Haney School
Furniture Company entered into a conspiracy with defendant Bullard to obtain a decree
in favor of Haney and against Bullard,
which might and should be used by the conspirators to injure the complainant.
The
fact Is recited that, in pursuance of such
conspiracy, a bill was filed in the United
States court for the eastern district of Michigan, and a decree obtained by fraud and collusion, for the purpose of benefiting the
trade of the Haney School Furniture Company at the expense of complainant; that
the defendants well knew the patent was invalid; and that the complainant was in possession of facts and proofs sufficient to defeat any suit that might be brought for the
infringement of said patent. The prayer of
the bill is, not that defendants be enjoined
from making whatever claims they see fit
concerning their patent, nor from threatening to bring suits, even though such threats
be made in bad faith; but that the defendants be restrained from using a decree
fraudulently and coUusively obtained to the
injury of complainant, and from claiming
that such decree is an adjudication upon the
merits as to the validity of such patent; or
from using it in any way or form to influence
or threaten any person or party against purchasing the school furniture manufactured
and sold by complainant. The case, as stated in the bill, is certainly more than a mere
claim for an injunction arising out of a libel
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of complainant's business. A conspiracy is
claimed to have been entered into between
the defendants for the very purpose of injuring the complainant, and that by such
conspiracy a false and fraudulent decree
was obtained, settling the rights of the Hato the patney School Furniture Company
ent, under which the complainant was and Is
operating;
that the defendants are publishing to the world, and especially to the customers of the complainant, that such decree
was valid, the defendants well knowing it to
be false and fraudulent;
and that. In any
court where the complainant had the right
to appear and be heard, it could establish
the fact that such patent was absolutely
void, and that Mr. Haney and the Haney
School Furniture Company had no rights under it, and that complainant was legally entitled to its use. Admitting that the weight

of authority in this country is against the
proposition that a court of equity has jurisdiction by injunction to restrain the publication of a libel upon one's business, it is
no answer to the questions here raised.
The
complainant has no adequate remedy at law,
under the circumstances here stated.
It
cannot be said that it should lie by and wait
the slow and uncertain processes of a suit
for damages for its redress.
Under the
charge in the bill, which we must take as
true, the complainant is rightfully operating
under such patent, and it has no remedy
adequate for the fraud and wrong perpetrated upon it, except as aided by a court of
equity. The facts stated make a much
stronger case than those in Casey v. Typographical Union, supra, calling for the aid of
the injunctive power of a court of equity.
The decree of the court below must be reversed, with costs, and the demurrer overruled. The defendants will have 20 days
to answer the bill. The other justices concurred.
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THUM

(72 N.

W.

CO. V.

140,

114

Supreme Court of Michigan.

TLOOZTNSKI.
Jlich.

149.)

Sept. 14, ISST.

Appeal from circuit court, Kent county, In
chancery;
Allen C. Adsit, Judge.
Bill by the O. & W. Thum Company against
From a decree
AppoUonious A. Tloczynski.
AflBrmfor complainant, defendant appeals.
ed.

Certain of the secrets sought to be protected
by this hill were protected by patent, while
others were not.
C. Li. Fitch (Frederick W. Stevens, of counEarle & Hyde and Buttersel), for appellant.
field & Keeney, for appellee.

MOORE, J. The complainant is the successor of the firm of O. & W. Thum, who were
manufacturers
of sticky fly paper. It filed
a bill of complaint to restrain defendant communicating to others the secret processes and
methods, and the knowledge of secret machinery, which were learned by him while in
The court bethe employ of O. & W. Thum.
low granted an injunction, as prayed in the
Defendant appeals.
bill of complaint.
The testimony Is voluminous, and very conflicting.
We are satisfied, however, that It establishes, by a very clear preponderance, as
follows: The defendant entered the employ
They at that time
of O. & W. Thum in 1887.
were manufacturing sticky fly paper by ma^
chinery, and from formulae known only to
They at that time had but one
themselves.
The busiman and one boy in their employ.
ness was carried on in the attic of the house,
and in a small building in the back yard. The
processes and machinery that were regarded
as secret, and of great value to the firm, were
As
used only by the members of the firm.
the business grew, it became necessai-y to employ more persons, and among others employed was the defendant.
Because of the increase in the business and the employment of
more persons, other precautions were taien,
as the necessity grew for taking them.
The
public were excluded from the premises. The
employes at one machine were not allowed to
inspect other machines used in the manufacture, and were not allowed to visit aU portions
Very rigid and careful reof the premises.
quirements were made and enforced to guard
the formulae, the processes of manufacture,
and knowledge of the machinery used, so that
no one could learn them, or either of them, to
The business of
the detriment of the firm.
the firm steadily grew in magnitude, so that
when defendant left its employ, in 1892, about
$100,000 was invested in the business, and a
large number of persons were given employShortly before this bill was filed, comment.
plainant received the following letter: "Grand
The O. & W.
Kapids, Mich., Jan. 7, 1893.
Thum Co., City. Mr. Wm. Thum—Dear Sir:
left your
It is about fifteen months since
shops, and during that time have been more
or less troubled by outside people in regards

I

to fly paper and Its manipulations
at your
works; not so much so until lately, when there
were representatives
from two large firms,
one from Ohio, which was represented by the
president and their attorney, which
looked
up in G. R. Dun's, who quote them at $500,000, who were here for one week, and were
directed by some people here in the city to
They told me that they had sufficient
me.
artillery to put the paper on the market, but
were a little short on cavalry in its workings;
also told me that they were ready at any time
to make arrangements,— that Is, as soon as
say yes.
I can show letters from the above
firm and others. I have not said a single word
of its manufacture since
left you, but do not
think it's my place to keep mum unless you
reAwaiting your early reply,
desire it.
It
main, yours, truly, A. A. Tloczynski."
very soon became evident that defendant was
negotiating with others to engage in the manufacture of the same product the complainants
were making, and this bill was filed.
The terms of employment were not reduced
to writing, and there is a sharp conflict of testimony between the defendant and O. & W.
Thum as to the terms of his employment, so
that it becomes necessary to consider carefully all the testimony in the case to arrive at the
truth. One cannot read all the testimony,
in the light of the facts and circumstances surrounding the condition of the business at the
employof the defendant's
commencement
and
development
ment, and its subsequent
growth, without coming to the conclusion that
the defendant and his employer regarded his
relation to them as a confidential one, and that
use
he should not disclose or make improper
The conclusion
of the secrets of the business.
Is Irresistible that defendant would not have
been employed, and information which was
imparted to him would not have been conveyed, if it had been understood that he might
sever his relations with his employers at any
time, and sell the valuable information which
had been imparted to him whenever he could
The inception, growth, and defind a market.
velopment
of the business; the manner In
which it was conducted; the care taken to exclude the public from means of obtaining
knowledge
of the processes; the fact that,
when new machinery was to be constructed,
part of it was got at one place, and part at
another, so that no person outside of the members of the firm and their immediate employes, should see a completed machine in
operation;
the fact that employes in one deof the manufactory
were not alpartment
and the care
lowed in other departments;
which was taken to prevent employes from
obtaining knowledge of any branch of the
business, except that in which the employ^
was immediately engaged, of aU of which the
defendant had knowledge,— all indicate conclusively that the business and processes were
secret, and that no one knew that fact better than the defendant.
We think it clearly
established by the testimony that the employ-

I

I

I

I
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ment was upon the agreement that defendant
would not use the information imparted to
him to the harm of his employer.
In our view, the only important question involved in the case is whether an employs,
when his employment terminates, may make
use of secrets confided to him by his employer,
necessary to be confided to him in the conduct
of the business, when it is understood and
agreed that he shall not make use of the secret knowledge so imparted to the detriment
of the employer, and, if he attempts so to do,
may he be restrained by writ of injunction?
It is said by counsel that the remedy by injunction will not be granted in such a case as
this, where, from the nature of the subject,
there could be no decree for a specific performance; citing Newbery v. James, 2 Mer. 446;
WilUams v. Williams, 3 Mer. 157; Kimberley
V. Jennings, 6 Sim. 340.
It is also said that a decree for a specific performance will not be granted where the court
has not the means of seeing that its decree
shall be carried out; citing Voorhies v. Frisbie, 25 Mich. 482; Blanchard v. Railway Co.,
31 Mich. 43; Bumpus v. Bumpus, 53 Mich. 346,
An examination of the Michigan
19 N. W. 29.
cases cited shows that in those cases the court
was asked to decree the performance of an affirmative act, where the agreement was of an
indefinite and uncertain character, instead of
being asked to enforce a definite agreement
As to the other cases, if
not to do an act.
they tend to sustain the contention of the defendant, they are contrary to the great weight
of authority.
Is it not true that, if one discovers a process of manufacture or an invention which is of use to individuals and the
right in it,
community,
he has a property
and that an agreement which must be respected may be made in relation to keeping the
process of manufacture or the invention a secret between the discoverer or owner and an
employe, which agreement is made one of the
conditions of the employment?
It has been
said by a very able justice: "If one invents
or discovers and keeps secret a process of manufacture, whether a proper subject for a patent or not, he has not, indeed, an exclusive
right to it as against the public, or against
those who. In good faith, acquire knowledge
of it; but he has a property in it which a
court of chancery
will protect against one
who, in violation of contract and breach of
confidence, undertakes to apply it to his own
use, or to disclose it to third persons.
Peabody V. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452." And, again,
Mr. Justice Gray, who delivers the opinion,
says: "In this court it is settled that a secret
art is a legal subject of property, and that a
bond for the conveyance of the exclusive right
to it is not open to the objection of being in
restraint of trade, but may be enforced by action at law, and requires the obligor not to
divulge the secret to any other person. Vickery v. Welch, 19 Pick. 523; Taylor v. BlanchIn Jarvis v. Peck, 10
ard, 13 Allen, 373, 374.
Paige, 118, such a bond was held valid in eq-
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uity."
In Salomon t. Hertz, 40 N. J. Bq. 400,
of
2 Atl. 379, the court adopts the language
Justice Gray, and holds that there is a property in a secret process of manufacture. Hardware Co. V. Waibel (S. D.) 47 N. W. 814.
A recent and instructive case is that of
Eastman Co. v. Keichenbach (Sup.) 20 N. Y.
"To briefly summarize, then, the
Supp. 110.
established facts of this case, it appears that
the plaintiff is the owner of valuable trade secrets, which were either discovered by one or
or necessarily dismore of the defendants,
closed to them, while occupying a confidential
relation towards the plaintiff; that as to such
trade secrets as were discovered by either
they have underor Passavant,
Keichenbach
taken and agreed to give plaintiff the exclusive property in and control over the same;
and that, in violation of this agreement, they
are now proposing to make use of them, or
some of them, in such a manner as to materially injure the plaintiff's business. With these
facts established, the application of the legal
principles which must govern the disposition
of the case does not appear to be a very forIt may be safely asmidable undertaking.
think, that whatever
sumed at the outset,
remedy plaintiff may have does not reside in
a court of law.
The very nature of the case,
the peculiar character of the injury liable to
damages
and the incalculable
be inflicted,
which may possibly result, aU show most conclusively that legal relief is totally inadequate
for plaintiff's protection, and that its only resort must be to a court of equity.
The learned counsel for defendants has contended, witli
all the adroitness and skill at his command,
which is but another way of saying that such
contention has been put forth with all possible
adroitness and skill, that this case is not one
of which a coiu^ of equity can take jurisdiction; and several authorities of both English
and American courts are cited in support of
this claim.
am constrained, however, to hold
that the weight of authority is opposed to his
view of the law. The question presented is
an interesting one, and would justify a somewhat analytical review of the cases which bear
upon either aspect of it did time permit; but,
for the purposes of this adjudication, it vriU
be necessary to advert to such only as are
In Mordeemed conclusive upon this court.
ison V. Moat, 9 Hare, 241, which is an English case, it was held that an injunction would
issue to restrain the use of a secret in the
compounding of a medicine not being the subject of a patent, and to restrain the sale of
such medicine by a party who acquired knowledge of the secret in violation of the contract
of the party by whom it was communicated,
An apand in breach of trust and confidence.
peal was taken from the decision of the vice
chancellor, and in 1852 the case was affirmed
by the court of chancery, and it was there
held that 'there is no doubt whatever that
where a party who has a secret in trade employs persons under contract, either express or
implied, or under duty, express or implied,

I
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those persons cannot gain knowledge of that
secret, and then set It up against their emMorison v. Moat, 21 Law J. Ch.
ployers.'
In 1868 the supreme court of Massachu248.
setts recognized and followed the authority of
Morison v. Moat, and in the opinion of Gray,
J., the law is thus stated: If a party 'invents
or discovers and l£eeps secret a process of
manufacture, whether a proper subject for a
patent or not, he has not indeed an exclusive
right to it as against the public, or against
those who in good faith acquire linowledge of
it, but he has property in it which a court of
chancery will protect against one who, in violation of contract and breach of confidence,
undertakes to apply it to his own use, or to
The jurisdiction
disclose it to a third person.
in equity to interfere by injunction to prevent such a breach of trust when the injury
would be irreparable, and the remedy at law
inadequate, is well established by authority.'
The lanPeabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452.
guage above quoted was cited with approval
in Salomon v. Hertz, 40 N. J. Eq. 400, 2 Atl.
379, and it is almost identical with that emwriters of recognized
ployed by elementary
the same question.
In discussing
standing
Judge Story says: 'Courts of equity will restrain a party from making a disclosure of secrets communicated to him in the course of a
employment, and it matters not
confidential
in such cases whether the secrets are secrets of
trade or secrets of title, or any other secret&
of the party important to its interest.' 2 Story,
Eq. Jur. 952.
See, also, 1 High, Inj. (2d Ed.)
p. 15.
The same doctrine has obtained in this
state for at least half a century, and has been
enunciated by a line of decisions which, with
a single exception, is unbroken. Jarvis v.
Peck, 10 Paige, 118; Hammer v. Barnes, 26
How. Prac. 174; Champlin v. Stoddart, 30
Hun, 300; Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N. Y. 30,
23 N. B. 12.
The Champlin Case was decided by the general term of this department.
Smith, P. J., writing the opinion, in the course
of which he takes occasion to say that 'a secret in trade is fully recognized as property
In equity, the disclosure of which will be reBy a careful reading
strained by injunction.'
of the various decisions upon this subject, it
will be seen that some are made to depend
upon a breach of an express contract between
the parties, while others proceed upon the theory that where a confidential relation exists
between two or more parties engaged in a
business venture, the law raises an implied
contract between them that the employe shall
not divulge any trade secret imparted to him
or discovered by him in the course of his employment, and that a disclosure of such secrets, thus acquired, is a breach of trust, and
a violation of good morals, to prevent which
It should
a court of equity should intervene.
also be observed in this connection that the
word 'property,' as applied to trade secrets and
trade Inventions, has its limitations; for it is
undoubtedly true that when an article manufactured by some secret process, which is not

the subject of a patent, is thrown upon the
market, the whole world is at liberty to discover. If it can by any fair means, what the
process Is, and, when the discovery is thus
made, to employ it in the manufacture of simIn such a case the manufacturilar articles.
er's or inventor's property In his process Is
gone, but the authorities aU hold that, while
knowledge obtained in this manner Is perfectly legitimate, that which is obtained by any
breach of confidence cannot be sanctioned;
and this distinction is quite forcibly presented
in a recent decision of the court of appeals, to
which the attention of this court has been dibrief of defendrected by the supplemental
Judge Landon, in his opinion,
ant's counsel.
speaking of the plaintiff's claim, says: 'His
case is unlike those in which the injunctive
process of the court is sought to restrain the
disclosure of a secret or the publication of a
letter which may prove injurious to business
Bristol v. Society, 132 N. Y.
or character.'
But without multiply264-207, 30 N. E. 506.
ing citations or prolonging consideration of the
legal aspect of this case, it may be said, by
way of conclusion, that the principle contended for by the plaintiff is not only abundantly
supported by authority, but is likewise founded in good common sense, and is peculiarly apHere is a party,
plicable to the case in hand.
which, by the expenditure of large sums of
money, and the exercise of much skill and ingenuity, has built up a large and prosperous
business, the capital of which consists largely
in certain inventions and discoveries made by
The world
its oflBcers, servants, and agents.
at large knows nothing of these Inventions
and discoveries, because they are locked within the brains of those who conceived them.
The defendants, who have been largely inthem, while under
strumental
In perfecting
both an express and implied contract to give
plaintiff the benefit of their Inventive genius, propose now to disregard their legal and
moral obligations by creating a new establishment, where these inventions and discoveries
may be employed to plaintiff's serious injury.
This is not legitimate competition, which it Is
always the policy of the law to foster and encourage, but it is contra bonos mores, and
constitutes a breach of trust, which a court of
law, and much less a court of equity, should
Pralich v. Despar (Pa. Sup.) 30
not tolerate."
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Is argued in this case that there Is no express contract shown, and that an Implied contract Is not such a one as will be enforced.
We think the testimony discloses very clearly an express agreement between the employer and the employed, but. If It may be stated
that the only agreement is an implied one,
growing out of oral statements taken In connection with the facts and circumstances surrounding the business, the parties, and their
acts, still, if It Is clearly established by aU
that was said and done that the secrets confided to the defendant were not to be disclosed
by him to others, and were not to be used by
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him except when he was in the employment
of those who imparted to him the secret, or
their legal representatives,
and that was one
of the conditions of his employment, we do
not think it would make any difference in the
principle involved.
The knowledge came to
him in the course of a confidential employment, relying upon his using the knowledge
only for the benefit of the employer.
It is
said by an eminent writer:
"On the whole,
may be generally stated that
the doctrine
wherever confidence is reposed, and one party has it in his power, in a secret manner, for
his own advantage, to sacrifice those interests
which he is bound to protect, he will not be
permitted

to hold any such advantage."
Story,
The same authority, when
discussing the subject of what cases injunction will be issued in, says: "Upon similar
grounds
of irreparable mischief, courts of
equity will restrain a party from making a
disclosure, of secrets communicated to him in
the course of a confidential employment;
and
it matters not, in such cases, whether the secrets be secrets of trade, or secrets of title, or
any other secrets of the party important to his
Thus a party has been restrained
interests.
from using the secret of compounding a medicine not protected by patent, when it appeared that the secret was Imparted to him, to his
own knowledge, in breach of faith or contract
on the part of the persons communicating
it"
Story, Eq. Jur. § 952, and many cases there
cited.
10 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 949; High,
Inj. § 19; Davies v. Clough, 8 Sim. 262; Williams V. Assurance Co., 23 Beav. 338; Morison V. Moat, 9 Hare, 241; Yovatt v. Winyard, 1 Jac. & W. 394; Tipping v. Clarke, 2
Hare, 393; Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452";
Ohamplin v. Stoddart, 30 Hun, 300; Salomon
v. Hertz, 40 N. J. Eq. 400, 2 Atl. 379.
The case of Little v. Gallus (Sup.) 38 N. Y.
Supp. 487, is against the contention of the defendant.
In that case the plaintiff was a
maker of typewriter ribbons by secret processes
and formulae. The defendants entered his emThe court says:
ploy when they were minors.
"It seems, therefore, too plain for controversy
that the plaintiff was the owner of a process or
invention which possessed great value, and
which he had secured at the cost of much
time, trouble, and expense; that the defendants, G-allus and Bostwick, occupying a confidential relation towards the plaintiff, gained
a knowledge of the process and formulEe emhis business;
ployed by him in conducting
that they well understood the nature of his
business, their relations to it, and the care
which was used to keep the same secret; and
that, notwithstanding the knowledge thus obtained, and in violation of the faith and confidence reposed in them, they surreptitiously
made memoranda of thesQ formulae, and are
now using the same, as well as all the other
knowledge obtained while in the plaintiff's
service, to start and operate a rival establishThe only question therefore, to be dement.
termined UDon this state of facts, is whether or
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not they shall be permitted to carry out their
It is contended by the plaintiff
intentions.
that his case is brought directly within the
rule laid down in that of Kodak Co. v. Reichenbach, 79 Hun, 183, 29 N. T. Supp. 1143, recently decided by the general term in the Fifth
and the defendants, while condepartment;
ceding that the law of the case is there correctly stated, insist that the facts do not
We find ourwarrant its application here.
selves unable to concur in the view thus taken, and which was carefully elaborated upon
the argument by the learned counsel for the
The facts of this case differ
defendants.
from those of the Reichenbach
somewhat
Case, in that there was no written agreement
entered into between these parties by which
the employes undertook to give to their employers exclusive right in, or control over, any
inventions discovered by, or disclosed to, the
former; but we are unable to see how this
strengthens
the defendants'
In
contention.
the case cited there happens to be an express
it is asserted, in
contract, but, nevertheless,
the opinion of the court, and such is unquestionably the correct rule, that the law raises
an implied contract that an employ© who occupies a confidential relation towards his employer will not divulge any trade secrets imparted to him or discovered by him in the
and we do not see
course of his employment;
why the defendants, Gallus and Bostwick, are
not under just as strong an obligation to observe and keep sacred the trust reposed in
them as they would be had they reduced the
contract which the law implies to writing.
Nor does the fact that they entered the plaintiff's service while minors, and at first perunimportant In
formed duties comparatively
their character, relieve them from a faithful
observance of their obligation.
Gallus,
at
least, was ultimately advanced to a position of
great responsibility, and both of them had
attained their majority before attempting to
take improper advantage of the knowledge imparted to them while in the plaintiff's employ,
and their present experiments are not in the
direction of legitimate competition,
but involve a breach of trust which we think the
court should prevent."
Tabor v. Hoffman,
118 N. Y. 31, 23 N. E. 12; Tuck v. Priester, 19
Q. B. Div. 629; Pollard v. Photographic Co.,
40 Ch. Div. 345.
It is the contention of the defendant that
the contract sought to be enforced is void as
against public policy because it Is in restraint of trade; citing Richarson v. Buhl, 77
Mich. 632, 43 N. W. 1102; Association v.
These
Starkey, 84 Mich. 76, 47 N. W. 604.
They are cases where
cases are not In point.
the purpose of the contract was to create a
monopoly, by providing by contract that established industries should cease to do business, which, of course, is unlawful; but that
is not the purpose of the contract under conHere processes and machinery
sideration.
have been invented which the owners believe
would be of great value to them If they could
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To use them
be used upon a large scale.
upon a large scale required the employment of
a number of persons, to some of whom some
of the secrets of the business and the maIf these secrets
chinery must be disclosed.
were disclosed to others, who might use them
to establish a business of like character, they
Is
would cease to be valuable to the owner.
there anything unreasonable in enforcing an
agreement that such secrets shall not be disIt has been repeatedclosed by the employe?
ly held that contracts for the exclusive use of
a secret art are not in restraint of trade, for
See
the public has no right to the secret.
Taylor v. Blanchard, 13 Allen, 372, and cases
cited; Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Bq. 845.
We cannot see how It can be against public
interest to allow an employer to make such
conditions of employment with his employes
as will give him the fullest protection to his
property right in his process or invention, and
at the same time enable him to employ a great
To enable
many employes in its production.

one to do this would be a benefit to the public
in many ways. It would secure employment
to more persons than would otherwise be employed, and a larger output would be made of
The evidence discloses that
a useful article.
it does not require a man of special skill to
do the work done by defendant when In the
employ of the predecessors in business of the
complainants.
To restrain him from making
use of what he has not discovered is not an Injustice to him, and does not abridge his right
to work along those lines which would not be
harmful to those to whom he has sustained a
position of confidence.
It Is to the advantage of both parties that such a contract
By means of it the defendshould be allowed.
ant secured employment which he could not
have secured without it, and at the same time
his employers were secured against competiHeal v. Chase.
tion which might be ruinous.

Mich. 531.
affirmed,
The decree of the court below
with costs. The other justices concurred.

31

is.

750

INJUNCTIONS.
DUNCOMBE

V.

FELT.

(45 N. W. 1004, 81 Mich. 332.)
Supreme Court of Michigan.

June

6, 1890.

Appeal from circuit court, Van Buren
county, in chancery; George M. Buck,
Judge.
Spafford
F. J. Atwell, for appellant.
Tryon and A. J. Mills, tor complainant.
LONG, J. Tlie hill was filed In this cause
for an injunction to restrain the defendant
from cutting and removing any of the
timber or trees standing or growing upon
the premises described in the bill, and from
committing or permitting any waste of
said premises. The bill alleges that complainant is the owner in fee of the premises, containing about 160 acres subject to
a life-estate in the defendant. That the
complainant derived his title through a
sheriff's deed, upon an execution sale to
satisfy a judgment against Seth H. Felt.
That said Seth H. Felt derived his title
through a deed made and executed to him
by the defendant, Horatio O. Felt, and his
wife. That at about the time of conveyance of said premises to Seth H. Felt he
made, executed, and delivered a lease in
writing to Horatio O. Felt and wile. This
lease is set out in full in the record. The
bill also alleges that said Horatio O. Felt
is in actual possession and occupancy of
the premises under and by virtue of said
lease, and that his wife is now deceased.
That upon about nine acres of said premises is growing and standing a large
amount of valuable oak and other timber,
fit for sawing and lumbering purposes,
and that said timber constitutes a large
portion of the value of said premises. The
bill then states: "Tour orator further
shows that the sixid Horatio O. Felt has
caused to be cut, and is causing to be cut,
and is cutting, lumbering, and removing
from said premises, a large portion of said
timber and trees fjrowing thereon, and
threatens to continue so to do, and has
already cut about five acres of said timber.
Your orator further shows that thereby
the said Horatio O. Felt is committing
waste upon said premises and irreparable
injury thereto, and materially lessening
the value thereof. Your orator further
shows that if the said Horatio O. Felt is
permitted to continue to cut down said
timber and lumber, and commit waste
upon said

premises, as aforesaid, and is

not restrained from so doing by an order
and injunction of this honorable court, the
value thereof will be depreciated to the
amount of at least five hundred dollars.
And your orator further shows that said
cutting and removing of said timber and

said lumber upon said premises by said
Felt has been and is being done without
the authority or consent of your orator,
and against his wishes and direction thereon, and without any authority or right
All of which actIn said Felt so to do.
ings and doings of the said Horatio O.
Felt, who is made defendant herein, are
contrary to equity and good conscience,
and tend to the manifest wrong, injury,
"
The lease
and oppression of your orator.
get out in the bill of complaint was executed
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before the complainant derived his title under the sheriff's deed, and contains the following clause. "To have and to hold the
said demised premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said parties of the second
part, their executors, administrators, and
assigns, for and during and until thefull end
and term of their natural lives, so long as
either of them shall live, yielding and paying therefor, during the continuance of the
lease, unto the said party of the first part,
nothing ; this lease being given in consideration of the second parties having conveyed the premises herein described to the
first party, and under no consideration
whatever are the second parties to be removed from the possession of the said
premises except as they shall voluntarily
surrender their rights under this lease.
And it is expressly understood that the
second parties are to have as full and complete control of said premises, while they
or either of them shall live, as though such
conveyance had not been made. " A general demurrer was filed, and on the hearing in the court below was overruled, and
decree entered for complainant making the
injunction perpetual. Defendant appeals.
The claim of counsel forthe complainant
is that on the premises there are only
about nine acres of growing timber ; that
this timber is needed for the use of the
farm, and its destruction makes a case of
actionable waste, to be restrained by injunction. The rights of the parties must
be determined by the construction given
to these clauses in the lease above quoted.
The title to the premises was in defendant, Horatio O. Felt. When he and his
wife deeded the same, they took back this
lease, by the terms of which they were to
have and to hold the premises "for and
during and until the full end and term
of their natural lives, so long as either
of them shall live, yielding
and paying « » » nothing." The consideration was the conveyance of the premises to Seth H. Felt. It is further provided
in the lease that the lessees are not to be
removed from the premises on any consideration whatever, except as they might
voluntarily surrender their rights under
the lease.
Then follows the clause which
it is claimed gives the defendant the right
to take the timber in question. "And it
is expressly understood that the second
parties are to have as full and complete
control of said premises, while they or
either of them shall live, as though such
conveyance had not been made."
The
complainant acquired all the rights in
the premises under his purchase at the execution sale that Seth H. Felt had, but
with notice of all the conditions in this
lease. It is therefore contended by counsel that the lease gave defendant the same
interest or property in the estate as he had
before he and his wife conveyed the lands
to Seth H. Felt, and that he can deal with
it in all respects as though he was the
owner, the only limitation being that of
duration of the estate, and that the clauses
in the lease above set out in effect are
equivalent in meaning with the old clause
in leases without impeachment for waste.
Counsel for defendant insists that the
doctrine laid down in Stevens v. Rose, 69
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Mich. 2fi0, 37 N. W. Hep. 205, fully sustains
his claim that the defendant has the right
to remove this timber, and do all other
acts that he could have done as owner in
fee, and that the defendant's estate is not
His claim is not
impeachable for waste.
sustained by that case. It was there held
that the words "to have and to hold, and
to use and control as the lessee thinks
proper for his benefit during his natural
life, " clearly import a lease without impeachment for waste, and that the defendant had the right to do all those acts
which such a tenant may exercise, but
that the words were not to be treated as
importing a license to destroy or injure
the estate, but to do all reasonable acts
consistent with the preservation of the estate which otherwise might in law be
w^aste.
In the present case it is conceded
that there are only 9 acres of timber on
the whole 160-acre tract, that the defendant has already cut about 5 acres, and
threatens to cut and carry away the rehave never understood the
mainder.
rule of the common law to be so broad as
contended for by counsel for defendant.
for
The clause "without impeachment
waste" never was extended to allow the
very destruction of the estate itself, but
only to excuse permissive waste. 10 Bac.
Abr. p. 468, tit. "Waste." In Pacltington
In 1744, and cited
V. Packington, decided
by Bacon, (reported 3 Atk. 215,) the plaintiff alleged that the defendant. Sir H.
Packington, had cut down a great number
of trees, and had threatened to cut down
and destroy them all. Lord Hardwicke
the
granted an injunction to restrain
waste. The lease in the case was made
Mr.
without impeachment of waste.
Greenleaf in his Cruise on Real Property,
(volume 1, p. 129,) lays down the rule
thus: "The clause without impeachment
of waste, is, however, so far restrained in
equity that it does not enable a tenant for
as to delife to commit malicious waste so
stroy the estate, which is called ' equitable
waste,' for in that case the court of chancery will not only stop him by injunction,
but will also order him to repair if possi" In 10 Bac.
ble the damage he has done.
Abr. tit. "Waste," p. 469, it is said: "So,
where a lease was made by a bisliop for
twenty-one years without impeachment of
waste, of land that had many trees upon
it, and the tenant cut down none of the
trees till about half a year before the expiration of his term, and then began to
fell the trees, the court granted an injunction; for, though he might have felled
trees every year from the beginning of his
term, and then they would have been
growing up again gradually, yet it is unreasonable that he should let them grow
till towards the end of his term, and then
sweep them all away ; for, though he had
power to commit waste, yet this court
will model the exercise of that power;*

I

citing

Abraham v. Bubit, Freem. Ch.
the common law no prohibition
against waste lay against the lessee for
life or years deriving his interest from the
act of the party. The remedy was confined to those tenants who derived their
interest from the act of the law, but the
timber cut was, at common law, the property of the owner of the inheritance, and
the words in the lease " without impeachment of waste" had the effect of transferring to the lessee the property of the timber. Bowles' Case, 11 Coke, 79 ; Co. Litt.
220a. The modern remedy in chancery by
injunction is broader than at law, and equity will interpose in many cases, and stay
waste where there is no remedy at law.
Chancery will interpose when the tenant
53.

At

affects the inheritance in an unreasonable
and unconscientious manner, even though
the lease be granted without impeachment
of waste. 4Kent, Comm. (13th, Ed.) 78;

Perrot

v.

Perrot,

3

Atk.

94 ;

Aston

v.

Aston,

Ves. Sr. 264; Vane v. Barnard, 2 Vern.
738; Kane v. Vanderburgh, 1 Johns. Ch. 11,
In the case of Kane v. Vanderburgh, supra, it was said: "Chancery goes greater
lengths than the courts of law in staying
waste. It is a wholesome jurisdiction, to
be liberally exercised in the prevention of
irreparable injury, and depends on much
latitude of discretion in the court. " In
this state an action on the case for waste
is authorized by chapter 271, How. St.
This has superseded the common-law
remedy, and relieves the tenant from the
penal consequences of waste under the statute of Gloucester, as the owner no w recovers no more than the actual damages which
the premises have sustained, while that
statute gave by way of penalty the forfeiture of the place wasted, and treble damages; and this harsh rule was adopted by
many of the American states by the early
statutes.
This statute giving a right of action in courts of law for waste does not,
however, deprive the court of chancery of
jurisdiction in proceedings to restrain
threatened waste.
There can be no doubt that the defendant in the present case has much of the
character of a tenant in fee, but he cannot
destroy the inheritance.
He may taken
the timber for his own use, and do all
those acts which a prudent tenant In fee
would do. He cannot pull do wn the buildings or destroy them, or cut and destroy
fruit trees, or those planted for ornament
and shelter; neither can he be permitted
to entirely strip the land of all timber, and
1

convertitintolumber,and8ellitawayfrom
the inheritance. It Is not claimed that the
timber is being used for betterments on
the premises, but it is admitted that the lifetenant is selling it for his own gain and profit. The demurrer was properly overruled.
The decree of the court below will be affirmed, with costs.
The other justices
concurred.
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HILLIARD.
64 Vt 643.)
Term.

Appeal from chaocery court, Rutland
county; Taft, Chancellor.
Action by Silas L. Griffith against John
H. Hilliard. From a decree sustaining a
demurrer to plalntifl's bill for an injunction and diBmissing the bill pro forma,
orator appeals. Reversed and modified.
J. C. Baker, for orator. H. A. Harman,
for defendant.

START, J. The defendant, John H. Hilliard, by the demurrer contained in his
answer, claims that a court of equity has

is

Supreme Court of Vermont, General
Nov. 5. 1892.

the legal remedy be adequate for each single act
it stood alone. It is said by
Judge Story in his work on Equit.v Jurisprudence, (volume
§§ 928, 929:) "If the
trespass be fugitive and temporary, and
adequate compensation can be obtained
in an action at law, there is uo ground
to justify the interposition of courts of
equity.
Formerly, indeed, courts of equity were extremely reluctant to interpose
at all, even in regard to cases of repeated
trespasses;
but now there
not the
slightest hesitation
the acts done or
threatened to be done to the property
would be ruinous or irreparable, or would
impair the just enjoyment of the property
in the future. In short, it is now granted
in all cases of timber, coals, ores, and
quarries, where the party is a mere trespasser, or where he exceeds the limited
right with which he is clothed, upou the
ground that the acts are, or may be, an
irreparable damage to the particular species of property. " In Iron Co. v. Rey mert,
supra, it
said that mines, quarries, and
timber are protected by injunction, upon
the ground that injuries to and depredations upon them are, or may cause, an
irreparable
damage, and also with a
view to prevent a multiplicity of actions
for damages, which might accrue from
continuous
violations of the rights of the
owners; and that it is not necessary that
the right should be first established in an
action at law. In Erhardt v. Boaro, supra, Mr. Justice Field says: "It is now
a common practice in cases where irremediable mischief is being done or threatened, going to the destruction of the substance of the estate, such as the extracting of ores from a mine, or the cutting
down of timber, or the removal of coal,
to issue an injunction, though the title to
the premises be in litigation. The authority of the court is exercised in such cases,
through its preventive writ, to preserve
the property
from destruction
pending
legal proceedings for the determination
"
of the title.
When It appears that the title is in dispute, the court may, in its discretion, istemporary injunction, and continue
sue
it in force for such time as may be necessary to enable the orator to establish his
title in a court of law, and may make the
injunction perpetual when the orator lias
thus established his title; or the court
may proceed and determine which party
has the better title; or it may dismiss the
bill, and leave the orator to his legal remedy. Bacon V. Jones,
Mylne
C. 433;
Duke of Beaufort v. Morris,
Hare, 340;
Campbell v. Scott, 11 Rim. 31 Kerr, Inj.
209; Ingraham v. Dunnell,
Mete. (Mass.)
118; Rooney v. Soule, 45 Vt. 303; Wing v.
2,
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no inrisdict)t>n of the matters alleged in
the blli. The bill alleges, among other
things, that the orator is the owner of
tht! land in question; that its substantial
value is made up of the wood and timber
growing thereon; that some of the defendants, under a license from the defendant, Hilliard, have entered upon the land,
are engaged in cuttinganddra wing timber
therefrom, and threaten to continue to do
so. For the purpose of determining the
question now before the court, these allegations must be taken as true. To permit this wood and timber to be cut in the
manner the defendants are doing, and
threatening to do, under a license from
defendant, Hilliard, is to permit a destruction of the orator's estate as it has been
held and enjoyed.
The power of a court
of equity to interpose by injunction to
prevent irreparable injury and the destruction of estates is well established, and
this power has been construed to embrace
trespasses of the character complained of
In the orator's bill. Where trespass to
property consists of a single act, and it is
temporary in its nature and effect, so that
the legal remedy of an action at law for
damages is adequate, equity will not interfere; but
as in this case, repeated
acts are done or threatened, although
each of such acts, taken by itself, may not
be destructive
to the estate, or inflict irreparable injury, and the legal remedy
may, therefore, be adequate for each single act
it stood alone, the entire wrong
may be prevented or stopped by injunction. Smith V.Rock, 59 Vt. 232.9 Atl. Rep.
B51; Langdon v. Templeton, 61 Vt. 119, 17
Atl. Rep. 839; Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 D. S.
539,
Sup. Ct. Rep. §fj5; Iron Co. v. Reymert, 45 N. Y. 703; Power Co. v. Tibbetts,
31 Conn. 165; Irwin v. Dixion,
How. 28;
Livingston v. Livingston,
Johns. Ch.
(Law Ed.) 496; High, Inj. 724-727; Shipley
V. Ritter,
Md. 408; Scudder v. Trenton
Delaware Falls Co., N.J. Eq.694;
Pom. Hall, 44 Vt. 118; Lyon v. McLau&hlin, 32
Vt. 423- Hastings v. Perry, 20 Vt. 278;
245;
Eq. Jur.
Pom. Eq. Jur.
1357;
Murphy v. Lincoln, 63 Vt. 278, 22 Atl. Rep. Barnes v. Dow, 59 Vt. 530, 10 Atl. Rep. 258;
Barry v. Harris, 49 Vt. 392. In Bacon v.
418.
In the case of Murphy v. Lincoln, supra, Jones, supra,
Lord Cottenham says:
the bill charged the committing of several "The jurisdiction of this court is founded
trespaases by the defendants by drawing upon legal right. The plaintiff comingin to
wood and logs across the orator's land. court on the assumption that he has the
The defendants claimed a right of way. legal right, and the "court granting its asThe court Sound the issue of fact in favor sistance on that ground. When a party
court, the applicaof the orator, and held that a court of applies for the aid of
equity had jurisdiction to enjoin the com- tion for an injunction is made either durmisBion of a series uf trespasses, although ing the progress of the suit or at the hear-
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Ing; and In both cases, I apprehend, great
latitude and discretion are allowed to the
court in dealing with the application.
When the application is for an interlocutory injunction, several courses are open.
The court may at once grant the injunction simpliciter, without more,— a course
which, though perfectly competent to the
court. Is not very likely to be taken where the
defendant raises a question as to the valid-

ity of the plaintiff'stitle;

oritmayfoUow

cise ot the discretionary power which the
The orator, by his bill,
possesses.
makes out a strong case foreq.uitable con-

court

sideration.

The sole value of the premwood and timber
growing thereon. The orator has heretofore held and occupied them for the purpose ot manufacturing lumber and charHe has
coal from such timber and wood.
expended large sums of money in the erection of mills and coal kilns, in building
roads, and in procuring teams and workmen for the prosecution of said business,
and has made contracts for the sale of
The defendsaid manufactured products.
ants are engaged in cutting and removing
that which constitutes the chief value of
the estate, and threaten to continue to do
so. These acts, H continued, will work a
destruction ot the estate, and render it of
DO value for the purpose for which it has
The case is one
been held and enjoyed.
peculiarly within the province of a court
of equity, through its preventive writ, to
interpose and stop the mischief complained
of, and preserve the property from destruction. The defendant, John H. Hilliard, having, before any evidence has been
taken or hearing had, put in issue the orator's title, insisted that this issue be
tried in a court of law, the case is one In
which the court may properly, in its discretion, require the orator to establish his
title in such court before proceeding further with the cause, and such will be the
order of this court. The pro forma decree
of the court ot chancery is reversed ; the
demurrer contained in the answer of the
defendant, John H. Hilliard, is overruled;
tlie orator's bill is adjudged sufficient, and
defendant's (Hilliard's) answer is ordered
brought forward, from which it appears
that the orator's title to the premises is in
controversy; therefore the cause is remanded to the court of chancery, with direction to that court to retain the cause,
and continue in force the injunction for
such time as, in the opinion of said court,
may be necessary to enable the orator to
bring and prosecute to final judgment
such action or actions as may be necessary
to establish his title In a court of law;
and, in default of the orator so establishing his title within the time aforesaid, the
orator's bill to be dismissed, as against
defendant, John
the
H. Hilliard, with
'
costs. But if the orator shall, within the
time aforesaid, by a final judgment in his
favor in a court of law, establish hia title
to the premises as against the defendant,
John H. Hilliard, then the court will enter
a decree making perpetual the temporary
injunction, and make such order in relation to costs as to the court shall seem
ises in question is in the

the more usual, and, as I apprehend, more
wholesome, practice in such a case, of
either granting an injunction, and at the
same time directing the plaintiff to proceed
to establish his title at law, and suspending the grant of the injunction until the
result ot the legal Investigation has been
ascertained, the defendant, in the mean
Time, keeping an account.
Which of these
several courses ought to be takeu must
depend entirely upon the discretion of the
court, according to the case.
When the
cause comes to a hearing, the court has
also a large latitude left to it; and
am
far from saying that a case may not arise
In which, even at that stage, the court
will he of opinion that the injunction may
properly be granted without having recourse to a trial at law. The conduct and
dealings of the parties, the frame of the
pleadings, the nature of the patent right
and of the evidence by which it is established, these and other circumstances may
combine to producesuch a result, although
this is certainly not very likely to happen,
and I am not aware of any case in which
it has happened.
Nevertheless it is a
course unquestionably competent to the
court, provided a case be presented which
satisfies the mind of the judge that such a
course, if adopted, will do justice between
Again, the court may at the
the parties.
hearing do that which is the more ordinary course, — it may retain the bill giving
the plaintiff the opportunity of first establishing his right at law. There still
remains a third course, the propriety of
which must also depend upon the circumstances of the case, — that of dismissing the
bill atonee." Although Bacon v. Jones was
a case relative to a oatent right, the remarks of the lord chancellor are applicable
to any case in which the orator's title is
in dispute. The case of the Duke ot Beaufort V. Morris, supra, was a bill for an injtmction to protect the orator's coal mines
from injury from the water flowing into
them from the defendant's colliery; and it
was ordered that the bill be retained for
12 months, with liberty to the orator to
bring such actions as he might be advised
were necessary, and that the injunction issued In the cause be continued for such
time.
meet.
We think the granting of the temporary
TAFT,
injunction in this case was a proper exer-

I

J.,did not

sit.
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WHEELOCK
(15

N. E.

Oourt of Appeals

67,

V.

In the answer, and I doubt whether, under the
present system of pleading, the technical obr

NOONAN.

108 N.

Y.

of New York.

179.)

January

17,

1888.

Appeal from general term, superior court,
<?ity of New York.
Suit for mandatory injunction, by William
A. Wheeloek, respondent,
against Michael
Noonan, appellant.
B. Laflin Kellogg, for appellant.
Martin
& Smith and Geo. A. Strong, for respondent.

FINCH, J. The findings of the trial eorat
establish that the defendant, who was a total
stranger to the plaintiff, obtained from the
latter a license to place upon his unoccupied
lots, in the upper part of the city of New
York, a few rocks for a short time, the indefiniteness
of the period having been rendered deflBite by the defendant's •assurance
that he would remove them in the spring.
Nothing was paid or asked for this permission, and it was not a contract in any just
sense of the term, but merely a license which
by its terms expired in the next spring.
During the winter, and in the absence and without the knowledge
of plaintiff, the defendant covered six of the lots of plaintiff with
"huge quantities of rock," some of them 10
or 15 feet long, and piled to the height of
14 to 18 feet.
This conduct was a clear
abuse of the license, and in excess of its
terms, and so much so that if permission had
been sought upon a truthful statement of the
Intention it would undoubtedly have been refused.
In the spring the plaintiff, discovering the abuse of his permission, complained
bitterly of defendant's conduct, and ordered
him to remove the rocks to some other locality. The defendant promised to do so, but
•did not, and in the face of repeated demands
has

neglected

and

omitted

to

remove
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the

The court found as
rocks from the land.
matter of law from these facts that the original permission given did not justify what
was done either, as it respected the quantity
of rock or the time allowed; that after the
withdrawal of the permission in the spring,
^nd the demand for the removal of the rock,
the defendant was a trespasser, and the trespass was a continuing one which entitled
plaintiff to equitable relief; and awarded
judgment requiring defendant to remove the
rocks before March 15, 1886, unless for good
cause shown the time for such removal
should be extended by the court
The sole question upon this appeal is
whether the relief granted was within the
power of the court, and the contention of
the defendant is mainly based upon the proposition that the equitable relief was improper since there was an adequate remedy at
law. The plaintiff objects that no such deIf it arises upon the
fense was pleaded.
facts stated in the complaint, it can scarcely
toe said to be new matter required to be stated

jection, is good. It is better, therefore, to conOne
sider the defense which is interposed.
who would justify under a license or permission must bring his acts within the terms of
the license.
He exceeds them at his peril.
There is no equity in allowing him to strain
them beyond their fair and reasonable interpretation.
The finding shows permission asked for "a few stone," described as "a portion" of what defendant was getting from the
boulevard.
The plaintiff was justified in inferring that for the bulk of his stone the
defendant
bad a place of deposit and only
wanted additional room for a small excess, —
for a few stone. Under this permission defendant was not justified in covering six;
lots with heavy boulders to a height of 14
to 18 feet.
The thing done was gravely and
substantially in excess of the thing granted,
and the license averred does not cover or
Beyond that the permission
excuse the act.
extended only to the spring of 1880, and expired at that date. The immediate removal
of the stone was then demandedj and from
that moment its presence upon plaintiff's
lands became a trespass, for which there
Such
was no longer license or permission.
parol license, founded upon no consideration,
is revocable at pleasure, even though the licensee may have expended money on the
faith of it. Murdock v. Railroad Co., 73
N. Y. 579.
And this was a continuing trespass.
So long as it lasted It incumbered
the lots, prevented their use and occupation
by the owner, an^ interfered with the possibility of a sale. It is now said that the
remedy was at law, that the owner could
have removed the stone and then recovered
of the defendant for the expense incurred.
But to what locality could the owner remove them? He could not put them in the
street; the defendant presumably had no vacant lands of his own on which to throw
the burden;
and it would follow that the
owner would be obliged to hire some vacant
lot or place of deposit, become responsible
for the rent, and advance the cost of men
If
and machinery
to effect the removal.
any adjudication can be found throwing such
him to
biu'den upon the owner, compelling
do in advance for the trespasser what the
latter is bourid to do, I should very much
On the contrary, the
doubt its authority.
law is the other way. Beach v. Grain, 2 N.
Y. 97. And all the cases which give to the
injured party successive actions for the continuance of the wrong are inconsistent with
the idea that the injured party must once
for all remove it. Such is neither an adequate remedy nor one which the plaintiff
was bound to adopt.
But It is further said that he could sue
at law for the trespass.
That is undoubtedly true. The case of TJline v. Railroad Co.,
101 N. Y. 98, 4 N. E. 536, demonstrates
upon
abundant authority that in such action only
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the damages to its date could be recovered,
and for the subsequent continuance
of the
trespass new actions following on in sucBut
cession would have to be maintained.
in a case lilse the present, would that be an
In each action the damadequate remedy?
ages could not easily be anything more than
the fair rental of the lot.
It is difficult to
see what other damages
could be allowed,
not because they would not exist, but beIn
uncertain
cause they would be quite
speculative
amount and possibly somewhat
therein their character.
The defendant,
fore, might pay those damages, and continue
his occupation, and if there were no other
defiantly continue such
remedy,
adequate
occupation, and in spite of his wrong malse
of himself in effect a tenant who could not
The wrong in every such
be dispossessed.
case is a continued unlawful occupation, and
any remedy which does not or may not end It
Is not adequate to redress the injury or restore the injured party to his rights. On the
other hand, such remedy in a case like the
in
present might result to the wrong-doer
He
nearly akin to persecution.
something
is liable to be sued every day, die de diem,
for the renewed damages following from
of the trespass; and while,
the continuance
ordinarily, there is no sympathy to be wastyet such multiplicity of
ed on a trespasser,
suits should be avoided, and especially under
like those before us. The
circumstances
rocks could not be immediately removed.
The courts have observed that peculiarity
of the case, and shaped their judgment to
It may take a long time, and
give time.
during the whole of it the defendant would
For reasons of
be liable to daily actions.
this character it has very often been held
that while, ordinarily, courts of equity will
not wield their power merely to redress a
trespass, yet they will interfere under pecuand have often done so
liar circumstances,
where the trespass was a continuing one, and
a multiplicity of suits at law was involved
The doctrine was recogIn the legal remedy.
nized and the authorities cited in the Murdock Case, supra, and the rule deemed perfectly settled. That case, and those referred to, it is true, were cases of intrusion
where no consent had been given for the entry of the intruder, but whether the trespass

was such from the beginning, or became one
after a revocation of the license, can make no
difCerence, as it respects the adequacy
of
the legal remedy.
That is the same in either
event Two cases of the former character
Bowyer v.
were cited in the Uline Case.
Cook, 4 Man. G. & S. 236; Holmes v. Wilson, 10 Adol. & E. 503.
In one stumps and
stakes had been left on plaintiffs land and
in the other buttresses to support a road;
had been
in each an action of trespass
brought, and damages recovered and paid;
and in each, after a new notice to remove
a further action of trespass
the obstruction,
was brought and sustained,— so that, as I
have said, the legal remedy is identical, however the trespass originated.
It is a general rule that a court of equity
will act in such cases only after the plaintiff's
right has been established at law; but that
Troy & B. R. Co. v.
rule has its exceptions.
Boston, H.- T. & W. Ry. Co., 86 N. Y. 128.
Where the facts are in doubt, and the right
not clear, such, undoubtedly,
would be a
just basis of decision, though the modern
system of trying equity cases makes the
rule less important. Where, as in an intrusion by railroad companies
whose occupation threatens to be continuous, the injury
partakes of that character, an action at law
to establish the right has not been required.
Indeed, I am inclined to deem it more a
rule of discretion than of jurisdiction.
In
Avery v. Railroad Co., 106 N. T. 142, 12 N.
E. 619, to which we have been referred since
the argument,

we were disposed

to sustain

a

mandatory injtmction requiring defendant to
remove so much of a fence as obstructed
plaintiff's right of way, although the obstruction was not a nuisance, but an invasion of
a private right. In that case the equitable
remedy was not challenged by either counsel
or the court, and evidently stood upon the
grounds here invoked;
those of a continuing
trespass, the remedy for which at law would
be Inadequate, and involve repeated actions
by the injured party for damages daily occurring.
These views of the case enable us to sup-

port the judgment rendered.
It should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur, except BUGER, C. J., not voting.
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bill was overruled, and
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A demurrer
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pealed.

M. M. Cothren, for appellants.
Jones, for respondent

Wilson &

LYON, 3. It Is sufficiently averred In the
complaint that the defendant Weidenfeller,
acting under the authority and orders of the
regularly constituted authorities of the defendant city, is about to destroy fences,
fruit and ornamental trees and shrubbery
standing and growing upon premises owned
by the plaintiff and occupied by him as his
residence and homestead; that the pretense for
so doing is that such fences, trees and shrubbery are within the limits of public streets;
but that such pretense is unfounded in fact,
and the defendants have no lawful authority
to do the threatened acts.
On the facts averred it is clear that the
plaintiff is entitled to an injunction as prayIt Is quite true that
ed in the complaint
the courts will not interfere by injunction to
restrain the committing of a mere trespass,
for which. If committed, the recovery of damages in an action at law would be an adeIt is also true that the courts
quate remedy.
will interfere by injunction and prevent a
threatened injury, which, if inflicted, will be

irreiarable.
An injury Is irreparable when it is of such
a nature that the Injured party cannot be
therefor In damadequately compensated
ages, or when the damages which may result
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therefrom cannot be measured by any cerHigh, Inj. § 460,
tain pecuniary standard.
and cases cited.
It is said by Judge Story
that: "If the trespass be fugitive and temcan be
porary, and adequate compensation
in an action at law, there is no
obtained
ground to justify the interposition of courts
Formerly, Indeed, courts of equity
of equity.
were extremely reluctant to interfere at aU,
treseven in regard to cases of repeated
But now there is not the slightest
passes.
hesitation,
if the acts done or threatened to
be done to the property would be ruinous or iror would impair the just enjoyreparable,
2 Story,
ment of the property in future."
Bq. Jur. § 928.
That the threatened Injuries which this action was brought to prevent, would, If Inflicted, be Irreparable, In the legal acceptation of that term, and would greatly impair
the just enjoyment of the plaintiff's property,
is perfectly well settled. No one will seriously contend that a money compensation Is an
adequate remedy for the loss of the trees
and shrubbery which the complaint avers the
defendants threaten to destroy; and It would
be a denial of justice were the courts to refuse the plaintiff the protection he asks, and
thus permit his home to be permanently deSee High, Inj. § 467, and cases
spoiled.
cited.

We think the complaint states a cause of
and that
action against both defendants,
there Is no misjoinder of causes of action,
We do not decide
and no defect of parties.
whether or not the complaint states facts
sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover
damages, but only, that if the averments
therein contained are true, he Is entitled to
the Injunction prayed.
Order affirmed.

INJUNCTIONS.

THE CHANCELLOR. The statute under
which the ti'ustees of the village of Newburgh
are proceeding (Sess. 32, c. 119), makes adequate provision for the party injured by the
laying of the conduits through his land, and
to the owner of the
also affords security
spring, or springs, from whence the water is
But there is no provision for
to be taken.

it,

it
a

it

a

a

a

2

4

a

a

a

a

a

a

2

V. N. Yates, for plaintiff.

2

J.

ought not to be enforced, and
his case, and
was not intended to be enforced, until such
provision should be made.
It
clear principle in law, that the ownstream of
er of land is entitled to the use of
water which has been accustomed, from time
immemorial,
to flow through it, and the law
gives him ample remedy for the violation of
water
To divert or obstruct
this right.
and the books
private nuisance;
course is
are full of cases and decisions asserting the
Fitzh. Nat.
right and affording the remedy.
Brev. 184; Moore v. Browne, Dyer, 319, b;
Coke, 86; Glynne v. NichLutterel's Case,
Show. 507; Prick man v. Trip,
ols, Comb. 48,
Comb. 231.
concurrent
The court of chancery has also
jurisdiction, by injunotion, equally clear and
well established in these cases of private nuiWithout noticing miisanees arising
sance.
from other causes, we have many cases of the
application of equity powers on this very subject of diverting streams.
In Finch v. Resbridger,
Vern. 390, the Lord Keeper held,
long enjoyment of
that after
water course
running to
house and garden, through the
right was to be presumground of another,
ed, unless disproved by the other side, and the
plaintiff was quieted in his enjoyment, by injunction. So, again, in Bush v. Western Prec.
plaintiff who had been in possesCh. 530,
sion, for
long time, of
water course, was
quieted by injunction, against the interruption
of the defendant, who had diverted it, though
the plaintiff had not established his right at
law, and the court said such bills were usual.
These cases show the ancient and established
jurisdiction of this court; and the foundation
preof that jurisdiction is the necessity of
ventive remedy when great and immediate
mischief, or material injury would arise to the
comfort and useful enjoyment of property.
The interference rests on the principle of
clear and certain right to the enjoyment of the
subject in question, and an injurious interruption of that right which, upon just and equiAnon.,
table grounds, ought to be prevented.
Vern. 120; East India Co. v. Sandys, Id.
127; Hills v. University of Oxford, Id. 275;
Anon.,
Ves. 476; Anon.,
Ves. 414; Whitchurch V. Hide,
Atk. 391,
Ves. 453; Attorney General v. Xichol, 16 Ves. 338.
In the application of the general doctrines
2

Mr. Burr and

unintentionally, defective, in not providing for

2

obthe defendants, by false representations,
tained an act of the legislature, passed the
27th of March, 1809 (Sess. 32, ch. 119, vol. 5,
Webst. Ed. 489), to enable the said trustees
to supply the inhabitants of the village with
That the truspure and wholesome water.
tees applied to the plaintiff for leave to divert the stream, offering him a trffling and
very inadequate compensation, which he reThat the said trustees having obtainfused.
the
ed leave from the defendant, Hasbrouck,
owner of the spring, to use and divert the
water, or a part thereof, that is, a stream one
inch and a quarter in diameter, taken from a
great elevation, have commenced a conduit,
iind threaten to divert the stream, or a great
part thereof, from the plaintiff's farm. That
that if this is
the plaintiff is apprehensive
done, there will not, in a dry season, be waThe
ter suflBcient even for his cattle, &c.
plaintiff, therefore, prayed an Injunction to
prevent the defendants from diverting the water, &c. The bill was sworn to, and the plaintiff produced several aflBdavits, which stated
that the stream was not more than sufficient
for the distillery, brick-yard, &c., of the plaintiff, and if diverted through a pipe, or tube, of
the proposed diameter, would greatly injure,
if not render the works useless. One of the
affidavits stated, that the whole stream would
pass through a tube of one inch diameter, with
a bead of five feet.

or protecrted by the statute; and
of
and we cannot suppose
was intended he should be deprived of it, without his consent, or without
The act is,
making him
just compensation.
indemnified

he ought not to be deprived

a

The bill, whicli was for an injunction, statthat the plaintiff is owner of a farm, in
the village of Newbnrgh, through which a
stream of water has, from time immemorial,
run, having its source from a spring in the
adjoining farm of the defendant, Hasbrouck,
and after entering the plaintiff's land, continues its whole course through his farm until it
That this
empties into the Hudson river.
stream greatly fertilizes his fields, and, running
near his house, serves for watering his cattle,
and for various domestic and economical purposes. That It supplies water to a brick-yard
on the farm of the plaintiff, where most of
it
the bricks used in Newburgh are made;
also supplies a large distillery erected by him
at great expense, and a Churning mill, and water for a mill-seat, where the plaintiff is about
to erect a mill for gilnding plaster of paris.
That the trustees of tie village of Newburgh,
ed,

a

162.)

Aug. 22, 1816.

a a

Johns. Ch.

making compensation to the plaintiff, through
whoso land the water issuing from the spring
The bill charhas been accustomed to flow.
ges, that the trustees are preparing to divert
from the plaintiff's land, the whole, or the
most part of the stream, for the purpose of
The plaintiff's right to
supplying the village.
the use of the water is as valid in law, and as
useful to him as the rights of others who are

is
a

(2

Chancery.

OF VILLAGE
et al.

1

v. TRUSTEES
OF NEWBURGH

it

GARDNER

1
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of the ccrart to tiiis case, it appears to me
to be proper and necessary
that the preremedy be applied.
^•entiv«
Tliere is no
need, from what at present appears, of sending the plaintiff to law to have his title
first established. His right to the use of
the stream is one which has been immemorlally enjoyed, and of which he is now
in the actual possession.
The trustees set up
no other right to the stream (assuming, for the
present, the charges in the bill,) than what
is derived from the authority of the statute; and if they are suffered to proceed and
divert the stream, or the most essential part
of it, the plaintiff would receive immediate
and great injury, by the suspension of all
those works on his land which are set in
operation by the water. In addition to this,
he will lose the comfort and use of the
stream for farming and domestic purposes;
and, besides, it must be painful to any one
to be deprived, at once, of the enjoyment of
a stream which he has been accustomed
always to see flowing by the door of his
uwelling. A right to a stream of water is
as sacred as a right to the soil over which it
flows. It is a part of the freehold of which
no man can be disseised
"but by lawful
judgment of his peers, or by due process of
This is an ancient and fundam'ental
law."
maxim of common right to be found in
magna charta, and which the legislature has
incorporated into an act declaratory of the
rights of the citizens of this state. Laws,
Sess. 10, c. 1.
have intimated that the statute does not
deprive the plaintiff of the use of the stream,
until recompense be made. He would be
entitled to his action at law for the interruption of his right, and all his remedies
at law, and in this court, remain equally In
as
am not to be understood
force. But
denying a competent power in the legislature
or
to take private property for necessary
and, perhaps, even
useful public purposes;
for the purposes specifled in the act on which
But to render the exercise
this case arises.
of the power valid, a fair compensation must,
in all cases, be previously made to the individuals affected, under some equitable asThis is a
sessment to be provided by law.
necessary qualification accompanying the exercise of legislative power, in taking private
property for public uses; the limitation is
admitted by the soundest authorities, and is
adopted by all temperate and civilized governments, from a deep and universal sense

I

I

of its justice.
Grotius (De Jur. B. & P., bk. 8, c. 14, § 7),
Puffendorf (De Jur. Nat. et Gent. bk. 8, c.
5, § 7), and Bynkershccck (Quoest Jur. Pub.
bk. 2, e. 15), when speaking of the eminent
domain of the sovereign, admit that private
property may be taken for public uses, when
public necessity or utility require it; but
they all lay it down as a clear principle of
natural equity, that the individual whose
property is thus sacrificed, must be indemni-
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fied.
The lasit of those jurists insists, that
private property cannot be taken, on any
terms,
without consent of the owner, for
purposes
of public ornament or pleasure;
and, he mentions an instance in which the
Roman senate refused to allow the praetors
to carry an aqueduct through the farm of an
individual, against his consent, when inThe sense and
tended merely for ornament.
practice of the English government are
Private propequally explicit on this point.
erty cannot be violated in any case, or by
any set of men, or for any public purpose,
without the interposition of the legislature.
And how does the legislature interpose and
"Not," says Blackstone (1 Bl.
compel?
Oomm. p. 139) "by absolutely stripping the
subject of his property, in an arbitrary manner, but by giving him a full indemnification
and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained.
The public is now considered as an
individual treating with an individual for
All that the legislature does
an exchange.
is to oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price, and even this is
an exertion of power which the legislature
indulges with caution, and which nothing
but the legislature can perform."
I may go further, and show that this inviolability of private property, even as it respects the acts and the wants of the state,
unless a just indemnity be afforded,
has
excited so much interest, and been deemed
of such importance,
that it has frequently
been made the subject of an express and
fundamental article of right in the constiSuch an article is to
tution of government.
be seen in the bill of rights annexed to the
constitutions of the states of Pennsylvania,
Delaware, and Ohio; and it has been incorporated in some of the written constitutions
adopted in Europe, (Constitutional charter
of Lewis XVIII. and the ephemeral, but
very elaborately drawn, constitution de la
Republique Francaise of 1795.)
But what Is
of higher authority, and is absolutely decisive
of the sense of the people of this country, it
is made a part of the constitution of the
United States, "that private property shall
not be taken for public use, without just
I feel myself, therefore, not
compensation."
only authorized, but bound to conclude, that
is an indispena provision for compensation
sable attendant on the due and constitutional
exercise of the power of depriving an individual of his property; and I am persuaded
that the legislature never Intended, by the
act in question, to violate or interfere with
this great and sacred principle of private
right. This is evident from the care which
this act bestows on the rights of the owners of the spring, and of the lands through
which the conduits are to pass. These are
the only cases in which the legislature contemplated or intended that the act could or
should interfere with private right, and in
these cases due provision is made for its
There is
or for compensation.
protection,
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no reason why the rights of the plaintiff
should not have the same protection as the
rights of his neighbours, and the necessity
of a provision for his case could not have
occurred, or it, doubtless, would have been
Until, then, some provision be
inserted.
made for affording him compensation,
it
would be unjust, and contrary to the first
principles of government,
and equally contrary to the intention of this statute, to talie
from the plaintiff his undoubted and prescriptive right to the use and enjoyment of
the stream of water.
In the case of Agar v. Canal Co., Cooper,

injunction was granted, on filing a bill
supported
by affidavit, restraining defendants acting under a private act of parliament, from cutting a canal through the land
of the plaintiff, in a line and mode not supposed to be within the authority of the statute.
shall, accordingly, upon the facts charged
in the bill, and supported by affidavits, as a
measure immediately necessary
to prevent
impending injury, allow the injunction, and
wait for the answer, to see whether the merits of the case will be varied.
Injunction granted.
77, an

I

INJUNCTIONS.
SHERRY
(17

Supreme

N. E.

V.

PERKINS

307,

Judicial
Essex.

147

et al.

Mass. 212.)

Court of Massachusetts.
June 19, 1888.

Report from supreme Judicial court, Essex
county; C. Allen, Judge.
Bill in equity, by Patrick P. Sherry against
Charles E. Perliins and Charles H. Leach, for
an injunction to restrain the defendants, respectively president and secretary of the Lasters' Protective Union, from causing to be carried in front of the plaintiff's shoe factory a
banner on which veas the following inscription: "Lasters are requested to keep away
from P. P. Sherry's.
Per order L. P. U.;"
and also a banner on which was the following:
"Lasters on a strike; all lasters are requested to keep away from P. P. Sherry's until the present trouble is settled. Per order
L. P. U." The court, at the trial, found as
facts that members of the Lasters' Protective
Union entered Into a scheme, by threats and
intimidation, to prevent persons in the employment of the plaintiff, as lasters, from continuing In such employment, and in like manner to prevent other persons from entering into such employment as lasters;
that the defendants participated in the scheme; that the
use of the banner was a part of the scheme,
and its use an injury to the plaintiff in his
The court, after find
business and property.
Ing the facts, reported the case to the full
court.

H. F. Hurlburt,

borne, for plaintiff.

R. Lund, and T. M. Os-

The principal question in this case is whether this court, as a court of equity, has jurisdiction to enjoin the acts complained of, upon
the findings of facts reported by the justice
who heard the case. The carrying of a banner or placard before a person's place of business, which injures such person in his business
An auand property, is a private nuisance.
thority directly in point is Gilbert v. Mickle, 4
Sandf. Oh. 357, in which it was held that a
placard paraded or posted in a public street,
before the door of an auctioneer, cautioning
strangers to beware of mock auctions, constituted a private nuisance remediable by injuncThe injunction in that case was refused
tion.
upon grounds not affecting the jurisdiction of
If the highway is obstructed by
the court.
crowds of people in consequence of the banner's being carried as described in the bill,
such carrying of the banner is a pubUc nuiRex V. Cross, 3 Camp. 224; Rex v.
sance.
Carlile, 6 Car. & P. 636; Reg. v. Grey, 4 Fost.
& F. 73. But as the damage to the business
and property of the plaintiffs, found In the report, is special to the plaintiffs, they are entitled to an injunction. Walker v, Brewster,

Eq. 25; Stetson v. Faxon, 19 Pick. 147;
The
De Held, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 133.
entire scheme, "by threats and intimidation,
to prevent persons in the employment of the
L. R.

Soltau

5
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plaintiffs, as lasters, from continuing in such
employment,
and in like manner to prevent
other persons from entering into such employment as lasters," is a private nuisance to the
plaintiffs. Wood, Nuis, § 141, and cases cited.
Among the things which have been held to be
private nuisances are a market illegally conducted within the limits of an established market, (Yard v. Ford, 2 Saund. 172;) a ferry carried on, without right, near a duly-licensed
ferry, (Stark v. McGowen, 1 Nott. & McC,
387;) the use of a toll-bridge inside the limits
of a lawfully established toll-bridge, (Bridge
See 1 Com. Dig.
Co. V. Lewis, 63 Barb. 111.)
"Action on the Case for Nuisance," C. The
scheme in which the defendants are found to
have participated,
has the same elements of
injury as these cases of nuisance.
It is illegal, injurious to property, and continuous in
character.
See Railroad Co. v. Church, 108
This court
U. S. 317, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep, 719.
has full power to restrain a private nuisance
by injunction, both under the special provision
of the statute, (Pub. St. c. 151, § 2, cl. 9,)
and by virtue of its general equity powers
conferred by the statute of 1877, c. 178, which
is embodied in Pub. St. c. 151, § 4. The jurisdiction in equity now possessed by this court
is not limited by any restriction contained in
the last clause of Gen. St. c. 113, § 2, but is
in all respects as full as that of the English
1 Pom. Eq. .lur. §§ 311,
court of chancery.
In respect to private nuisances, the Eng312.
lish court of chancery has from early times
exercised the right to restrain by injunction.
This is not limited to cases in which there is
no redress at law. Indeed, the ability to redamages at law has been
cover substantial
declared to give the right to ask for an injunction against the continuance of the nuisance.
Lord Romilly, M. R., in Crump v.
Lambert, L. R. 3 Eq. 409, 412; 2 Story, Eq.
Jur. § 925 et seq.; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 252; 3
Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1350; Emperor v. Day, 3 De
Gex, F. & J. 240, 241, (Lord Campbell.)
The
scheme in which the defendants participated
was plainly illegal and criminal, both under
the statute and by common law. Pub. St. c.
74, § 2; Reg. v. Druitt, 10 Cox, Crim. Cas.
592; Com. v. Hunt, 4 Mete.
Com. v.
Dyer, 128 Mass. 70. But the illegality of the
nuisance, or its criminal character, does not
prevent the court from enjoining it.
Gilbert
V. Mickle, 4 Sandf.
Ch. 358, Lord Cairns in
Assurance Co. v. Knott, L. R. 10 Ch. 144. The
jurisdiction of courts of chancery over private nuisances is concurrent
with that of
courts of law. Fisk v, Wilber, 7 Barb. 395.
This court has repeatedly exercised its jurisdiction to restrain private nuisances. Cadigan
V. Brown, 120 Mass. 493; Mills v. Mason, Id.
244; Woodward v. Worcester, 121 Mass. 245;
Tucker v. Howard, 122 Mass. 529; Davis v.
Sawyer, 183 Mass. 289. But, whatever the injury complained of may be called, there is
of a
abundant authority for the intervention
court of equity to prevent injury to property
by unlawful or forcible acts, when the injury

Ill;
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Is continuous.
Macaulay v. Shackell, 1 Bligh, I 118 Mas^s. 179; 1 Daniell, Ch. Rr. (4th Ed.)
272, note 5.
(N. S.) 96, 127; Lord Eldon in Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402, 413; Emperor v. Day, 3
John R. Baldwin, for defendants.
De Gex, F. & J. 217, 240, 241, 253; Spinning
The carrying of the banner named in the
Co. V. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551, 87 L. J. Ch. 889,
report, in the manner stated in the bill of
and 19 Law T. (N. S.) 64. The various cases
in -which the unauthorized use of the plain- complaint, is not a nuisance.
If the words
printed on the banner are libelous, the comtiff's name has been restrained, go upon the
principle of the injury to property Involved.
plainants have an adequate remedy at law.
Equity wHl not restrain a libel.
Routh V. Webster, 10 Beav. 561; James v.
The man.Tames, L. R. 13 Eq. 421 ; Hooliham v. Pottage,
ner of the publication of the words on the
L. R. 8 Ch. 91; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1358. The banner cannot be restrained.
The case of
Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551, is not
case of Spinning Co. v. Riley, supra. Is almost precisely parallel to the present case, exa precedent that establishes the Injunctive jucept that in the present case the placards are
risdiction. That case has been expressly overparaded in a manner which makes them more
ruled by Assurance Co. v. Knott, L. R. 10 Oh.
distinctly a nuisance than if they were merely
145, and unfavorably noticed in Diatite Co. v.
Ijosted up. See, also, Dixon v. Holden, L. R.
Manufacturing Co., 114 Mass. 69. The prayer
7 Eq. 488; Assurance
Co. v. Knott, L. R. 10
of the bill Is so broad that no decree comportCh. 142; Mulkern v. "Ward, L. R. 13 Eq. 619;
ing wffh the terms thereof would be equitable.
Food Co. V. Massam, 6 Ch. Div. 582. In November, 1874, the judicature act went into efALLEN, J. The case finds that the defendfect, and in a decision nnder the act, in the
ants entered, with others. Into a scheme, by
case of Saxby v. Easterbrook, 3 C. P. Div.
threats and Intimidation, to prevent persons
339, it was held that, after the jury had found
In the employment of the plaintiff from conthe fact of libel, an Injunction would issue
tinuing in such employment, and to prevent
against the continuance of the libel. Thomas
others from entering into such employment;
V. Williams, 14 Ch. Div. 864, (1880,) Fry, J.;
that the banners, with their inscriptions, were
Loog V. Bean, 26 Oh. Div. 806. In this court
used by the defendants as part of the scheme,
the case of Spinning Co. v. Riley, was referand that the plaintiff was thereby injured In hi3
red to In the case of Diatite Co. v. Manufacbusiness and property.
The act of displaying
turing Co., 114 Mass. 69, and the dissent there
banners with devices, as a means of threats
expressed to the views ot Malins, V. C, must
and Intimidation, to prevent persons from enbe understood as applicable only so far as the
tering into or continuing In the employment of
language of the former case applies to the
the plaintiff, was Injurious to the plaintiff, and
illegal at common law and by statute.
question of libel, since the question of libel did
Pub.
not arise in that case. The same is true of
St. c. 74, § 2; Walker v. Cronln, 107 Mass.
tbe reference to the same case in Partridge v.
555.
We think that the plaintiff Is not reHood, 120 Mass. 403, 406.
stricted to his remedy by action at law, but is
See 3 Pom. Eq.
Jur. § 1358. As to private nuisance. Bridge v. entitled to relief by injunction. The acts and
tiie injury were continuous.
Bridge, 6 Pick. 376; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 925The banners
928.
As to the criminal character of the acts
were used more than three months before the
tiling of the plaintiff's bill, and continued to
complained of: The fact that the nuisance is
indictable as a nuisance does not prevent the
be used at the time of the hearing.
The Injury was to the plaintiff's business, and adecourt from enjoining Its continuance.
1 High,
Inj. §§ 745, 752, and cases cited; Attorney quate remedy could not be given by damages
The wrong is not as aTgued
in a suit at law.
General v. Hunter, 1 Dev. Eq. 12; People v.
by the defendants' counsel, a libel upon the
St. Louis, 5 Oilman, 351. The English judicaplaintiff's business. It is not found that the
ture act did not enlarge the jurisdiction of
Day v. Brownrigg, 10 Oh.
inscriptions upon the banners were false, nor
courts of equity.
do they appear to have been in disparagement
Div. 294; Gaskln v. Balls, 13 Ch. Div. 324.
of the plaintiff's business.
As to differences between this court, as a court
The scheme. In
of equity, and the English cbancery court be- pursuance of which the banners were displayed and maintained,
was to injure the plainfore 1874, see remarks of Wells, J., in Millnnan
The acts are tiff's business, not by defaming It to the pubV. Ordway, 106 Mass. 232, 255.
lic, bnt by intimidating workmen, so as to denot libelous, but calculated to injure trade by
See Bridge v. Bridge, 6
ter them from keeping or making engagements
direct interference.
with the plaintiff. The banner was a standPick. 398; Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1,
ing menace to all who were or wished to be In
15.
As to the parties against whom the Injunction should issue, inasmuch as the Last- the employment of the plaintiff, to deter them
from entering the plaintiff's premises.
ers' Protective Union is a voluntary associaMaintaining It was a continuous, unlawful act, Intion, and all its members cannot be ascertainjurious to the plaintiff's business and propered by the plaintiff, the same rule applies
ty, and was a nuisance, such as a court of eqwhich makes it proper for a few individuals
repuity win grant relief against.
Gilbert v.
to sue in behalf of such an organization
Mlckle, 4 Sandf. Ch. 857; Spinning Co. v. Riresented by and associated with the defendants named in the bill. See Birmingham v. ley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551. Diatite Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 114 Mass. 69, was a case of defamGallagher, 112 Mass. 190; Snow v. Wheeler,

rNJUNCEIONB.
ation only. Some of the il?inguage in Spinning
Co. V. Riley has been criticised, but the decision has not been overruled.
See Diatite Go.
V. Manufacturing Co., ubi supra; Assuranoe
Co. V. Knott, L. E. 10 Oh. 142; Saxby v. Eaeterbrook, 3 C. P. Div. 339; L,oog v. Bean, 26
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Ch. Div. 306; Foou Oo. v. Massam, 14 Ch.
Div. 763; Thomas v. Williams, Id. 864; Hill
Day v. Brown21 Ch. Div. 778;
V. Davies,
rigg, 10 Ch. Div. 294; Gaskin v. Balls, 13
Ch. Div. 324.
Decree for plaintiff.
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Court of MasKachusetts.

Suffolk.

Oct. 27,

1896.

Report from supreme judicial court, Suffolk
county; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Judge.
Bill by Fredericli O. Vegelahn against
George M. Guntner and others for an injunction.
An injunction issued pendente lite restraining the respondents from interfering with
the plaintiff's business by patrolling the sidewalk in front of or in the vicinity of the premises occupied by him, for the purpose of preventing any person in his employment, or desirous of entering the same, from entering It
or continuing in it; or by obstructing or interfering with any persons in entering or leaving the plaintiff's said premises; or by intimidating any person in the employment of the
plaintiff, or desirous of entering the same; or
by any scheme or conspiracy for the purpose
interfering with, or
of annoying, hindering,
preventing any person in the employment of
the plaintiff, or desirous of entering the same,
from entering it, or from continuing therein.
This injunction was approved.
Thomas H.
Hale & Dlckerman, for plaintiff.
Russell and Arthur H. Russell, for respondents.

ALLEN, J. The principal question in this
case is whether the defendants should be enjoined against maintaining the patrol.
The report shows that, following upon a strike of the
plaintiff's workmen, the defendants conspired
to prevent him from getting workmen, and
thereby to prevent him from carrying on his
business, unless and until he should adopt a
certain schedule of prices.
The means adopted
were persuasion and social pressure, threats of
personal injury or unlawful harm conveyed to
persons employed or seeking employment, and
a patrol of two men in front of the plaintiff's
factory, maintained from half past 6 m the
morning till half past 5 in the afternoon, on
one of the busiest streets of Boston.
The number of men was greater at times, and at times
showed some little disposition to stop the plaintiffs door. The patrol proper at times went
further than simple advice, not obtruded beyond the point where the other person was willing to listen; and it was found that the patrol
would probably be continued if not enjoined.
There was also some evidence of persuasion to
The patrol was mainbreak existing contracts.
tained as one of the means of carrying out
the defendants' plan, and it was used in combination with social pressure, threats of personal injury or unlawful harm, and persuasion
It was thus one
to break existing contracts.
means of intimidation, indirectly to the plaintiff,
and directly to persons actually employed, or
seeking to be employed, by the plaintiff, and
of rendering such employment unpleasant or inSuch an act is an
tolerable to such persons.
unlawful interference with the rights both of
An employer has
employer and of employed.

a right to engage all persons who are willing
to work for him, at such prices as may be
mutually agreed upon, and persons employed or
seeking employment have a corresponding right
to enter into or remain in the employment of
any person or corporation willing to employ
These rights are secured by the constithem.
tution itself.
Com. v. Perry, 155 ilass. 117,
People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y.
28 N. E. 1126;
3-9, 17 N. E. 343; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 ni. 71, 35 N. E. 62; Ritchie v. People,
155 m. 98, 40 N. B. 454; Low v. Printing Co.
No one can lawfully in(Neb.) 59 N. W. 362.
terfere by force or Intimidation to prevent employers or persons employed or wishing to be
employed from the exercise of tliese rights.
It is in Massachusetts, as in some other states,
even made a criminal offense for one, by intimidation or force, to prevent, or seek to prevent, a person from entering into or continuing
in the employment of a person or corporation.
Pub. St. c. 74, § 2. Intimidation is not UmIted to threats of violence or of physical injury
to person or property.
It has a broader signification, and there also may be a moral inPatrolling or picktimidation which is illegal.
eting, under the circumstances stated in the
report, has elements of intimidation like those
which were found to exist in Sheriy v. Perkins,
147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307.
It was declared
to be unlawful in Reg. v. Druitt, 10 Cox, Cr.
Cas. 592; Reg. v. Hibbert, 13 Cox, Cr. Cas.
82; Reg. v. Bauld, Id. 282.
It was assumed to
be unlawful in Trollope v. Trader's Fed. (1875)
11 L. T. 228, though In that case the pickets
were withdrawn before the bringing of the bill.
The patrol was an unlawful interference both
with the plaintiff and with the workmen, within the principle of many cases; and, when instituted for the purpose of interfering with his
business, it became a private nuisance.
See
Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1; Walker v.
Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Barr v. Trades Council
(N. J. Ch.) 30 Atl. 881; Murdock v. Walker,
152 Pa. St. 595, 25 Atl. 492; Chma Co. v.
Brown, 164 Pa. St. 449, 30 Atl. 261; Coeur
D'Alene Oonsol. & Min. Co. v. Miners' Union
of Wardner, 51 Fed. 260; Temperton v. Russell [1893] 1 Q. B. 715; Floyd v. Jackson,
[1895] 11 L. T. 276; Wright v. Hennessey, 52
Alb. Law J. 104 (a case before Baron Pollock);
Judge V. Bennett, 36 Wkly. Rep. 103; Lyons
T. WUkins [1896] 1 Ch. 811.
The defendants contend that these acts were
justifiable, because they were only seeldng to
secure better wages for themselves, by compelling the plaintiff to accept their schedule of
wages.
This motive or purpose does not justify
maintaining a patrol In front of the plaintiff's
premises, as a means of carrying out their conspiracy.
A combination among persons merely
to regulate their own conduct is within allowable competition, and is lawful, although others
may be indirectly affacted thereby.
But a combination to do injurious acts expressly directed
to another, by way of intimidation or constraint,
either of himself or of persons employed or seeking to be employed by him, is outside of allow-
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able competition, and is unlawful.
Various decided cases fall within the former class; for example: Worthington v. Waring, 157 Mass. 421,
32 N. E. 744; Snow v. Wheeler, 113 Mass. 179;
Bowen v. Matheson, 14 Allen, 499; Com. v.
Hunt, 4 Mete. (Mass.)
Hey wood v. Tillson,
75 Me. 225; Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. St. 420,
28 Atl. 190; Bohn Manuf'g Co. v. HoUis, 54
Minn. 223, 55 N. W. 1119;
Steamship Co. v.
McGregor [1892] App. Cas. 25; Curran v. Treleaven [1891] 2 Q. B. 545, 561.
The present
case falls within the latter class.
Nor does the fact that the defendants' acts
might subject them to an indi<rtment prevent
a court of equity from issuing an injunction.
It is true that, ordinarily, a court of equity
will decline to issue an injunction to restrain
the commission of a crime; but a continuing
injury to property or business may be enjoined, although it may also be punishable as a
Sherry v. Perkins,
nuisance or other crime.
147 Mass. 212, 17 N. B. 307; In re Debs, 158
V. S. 564, 593, 599, 15 Sup. Ct. 900"; Baltimore
& P. R. Co. V. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 XJ. S.
817, 329, 2 Sup. Ct. 719;
Cranford v. Tyrrell,
128 N. Y. 341, 344, 28 N. E. 514; Gilbert v.
Mickle, 4 Sandf. Ch. 357; Port of Mobile v.
Louisville & N. E. Co., 84 Ala. 115, 126, 4
South. 106; Arthur v. Oakes, 11 C. C. A. 209,
63 Fed. 310; Toledo, A., A. & N. M. Ry. Co.
v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 730, 744; Emperor of Austria v. Day, 3 De Gex, F. & J.
217, 239, 240, 253; Hermann Loog v. Bean,
26 Ch. Div. 306, 314, 316, 317; Monson v. Tussaud [1894] 1 Q. B. 671, 689, 690, 698.
A question is also presented whether the
with
court should enjoin such interference
of the plaintiff
persons in the employment
who are not bound by contract to remain
with him, or with persons who are not under
any existing contract, but who are seeking
A
or intending to enter into his employment.
to interfere with the plaintiff's
conspiracy
business by means of threats and intimidation, and by maintaining a patrol in front of
his premises, in order to prevent persons from
entering his employment, or in order to prevent persons who are in his employment from
continuing therein, is unlawful, even though
such persons are not bound by contract to
enter into or to continue in his employment;
and the injunction should not be so limited as
to relate only to persons who are bound by existing contracts.
Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass.
555, 565; Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1;
Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. B.
807; Temperton v. Russell [1893] 1 Q. B. 715,
11 L. T.
728, 731; Flood v. Jackson [1895]
276.
We therefore think that the injunction
should be in the form as originally issued.

Ill;

So ordered.

FIELD, 0. J. (dissenting). The practice of
Issuing injunctions in cases of this kind is of
very recent origin. One of the earliest authorities in the United States for enjoining, in
acts somewhat like those alleged
equity,
against the defendants in the present case, is
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Sherry v. Perkins (decided In 1888) 147 Mass.
It was found as a fact in
212, 17 N. B. 307.
that case that the defendants entered into a
scheme, by threats and intimidation, to prevent persons in the employment of the plaintiffs as lasters from continuing in such employment, and, in like manner, to prevent other persons from entering into such employment as lasters; that the use of the banners
was a part of the scheme ; that the first banner was carried from January 8, 1887, to
March 22, 1887, and the second banner from
March 22, 1887, to the time of the hearing;
and that "the plaintiffs have been and are injured in their business and property thereby."
The full court say: "The act of displaying
banners with devices, as a means of threats
and intimidation to prevent persons from entering into or continuing in the employment of
the plaintiffs, was injurious to the plaintiffs,
and illegal at common law and by statute.
Pub. St. c. 74, § 2; Walker v. Cronin, 107
"The banner was a standing
Mass. 555."
menace to all who were or wished to be in
of the plaintiffs, to deter
the employment
them from entering the plaintiffs' premises.
Maintaining it was a continuous unlawful
act, injurious to the plaintiffs' business and
property, and was a nuisance such as a court
of equity will grant relief against. Gilbert v.
Mickle, 4 Sandf. Ch. 357; Spinning Co. v.
Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551."
Gilbert v. Mickle,
one of the authorities cited in Sherry v. Perkins,
was a suit in equity by an auctioneer against
the mayor of the city of New York to restrain
him and those acting under him from parading, placing, or keeping before the plaintiff's
auction rooms a placard as follows: "Strangers, beware of mock auctions." A temporary
injunction was issued, but, on hearing, it was
Notwithstanding what is said in
dissolved.
his conthe opinion of the vice chancellor,
clusion is as follows: "I am satisfied that it
is my duty to leave the party to his remedy
Spinning Co. v. Riley
by an action at law."
is a well-known decision of Vice Chancellor
Malins. The bill prayed that the defendants
might be "restrained from printing or publishing any placards or advertisements
similar to
those already set forth." The defendants had
caused to be posted on the walls and other
public places in the neighborhood of the plaintiff's works, and caused to be printed in certain newspapers, a notice as follows: "WantCotton
ed all well-wishers to the Operative
Spinning, &c.. Association not to trouble or
cause any annoyance to the Springhead Spinning Company lees, by knocking at the door
between
of their oflice, untfi the dispute
them and the self -actor minders is finally terCarrodus,
32
By special order.
minated.
The case was
Street, Oldham."
Greaves
The vice chancellor
heard upon demurrers.
oversays:
"For the reasons I have stated,
ruled these demurrers, because the bill states,
and the demurrers admit, acts amounting to
of property." Of this case,
the destruction
"Some
the court, in Sherry v. Perkins, say:

I
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In Spinning Co. t. Riley has
but the decision has not been
The eases are there cited in
overruled."
which that decision has been doubted or critOf that decision, this court, in Boston
icised.
Diatite Co. t. Florence Manuf'g Co., 114
.\L;iss. 09, say:
"The opinions of Vice Chancellor Malins in Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R.
6 Eq. 551, in Dixon v. Holden, L. R. 7 Eq.
488, and in Rollins v. Hinks, L. R. 13 Eq.
with
355, appear to us to be so inconsistent
these authorities [authorities which the court
had cited], and with well-settled principles,
that it would be superfluous
to consider
of the language
been criticised,

whether, upon the facts before him, his decisions can be supported."
Much the same
language was used by the justices in Assurance Co. V. Knott, 10 Ch. App. 142, a part
of the headnote of which is: "Dixon v. Holden and Spinning Co. v. Riley overruled." In
Temperton v. Russell [1893] 1 Q. B. 435, 438,
Llndley, L. J., says of the case of Spinning
Co. v. Riley that it was overruled by the
court of appeal in Assurance Co. v. Knott.
Since the judicature act, however, the courts
of England have interfered to restrain, by injunction, the publication or continued publiparticularly
statements,
cation of libelous
the business or
those injuriously affecting
property of another, as well as injunctions
similar to that in the present case. St. 36 & 37
Vict. c. 66, § 25, subds. 5, 8; Monson v. Tussaud [1894] 1 Q. B. 671, 672; Lyons v. Wilkins [1896] 1 Ch. 811, 827. But, in the absence of any power given by statute, the jurisdiction of a court of equity, having only the
powers of the English high court of chancery,
think, extend to enjoining acts like
does not,
those complained of In the case at bar, unless
or threatened
they amount to a destruction
indestruction of property, or an irreparable
jury to It In England the rights of employers and employed with reference to strikes,
boycotts, and other similar movements have
not, in general, been left to be worked out by
principles, but
the courts from common-law
statutes, from time to time, have been passed
defining what may and what may not be perThe administration of these statutes
mitted.
largely has been through the criminal courts.
As a means of prevention, the remedy given
by Pub. St. c. 74, § 2, would seem to be adequate where the section is applicable, unless
the destruction of, or an irreparable injury
and there is the
to, property is threatened;
additional remedy of an Indictment for a
criminal conspiracy at common law, if the
If the
acts of the defendant amount to that.
acts complained of do not amount to intimidation or force, it Is not in all respects clear
what are lawful and what are not lawful at
It seems to be established in
common law.

I

this commonwealth that. Intentionally and
without justifiable cause, to entice, by persuasion, a workman to break an existing contract with his employer, and to leave his emwhether done with
ployment, is actionable,
actual malice or not Walker v. Cronin, 107

Mass. 555. What constitutes justifiable cause
undetermined.
in some respects
remains
Whether to persuade a person who is free to
choose his employment not to enter into the
employment of another person gives a cause
of action to such other person, by some courts
has been said to depend upon the question of
actual malice; and, in considering this question of malice. It is said that it is Important
to determine whether the defendant has any
lawful interestof his own in preventing the employment, such as that of competition in business.
For myself, I have been unable to see
how mali ce is necessarily decisive. To persuade
one man not to enter into the employment of
another, by telling the truth to him about
such f'her person and his busiiaess, I am not
convinced is actionable at common law, whatSuch persuasion,
ever the motive may be.
when accompanied by falsehood about such
other person or his business, may be actionable, unless the occasion of making the statements is privileged; and then the question of
actual malice may be important. This, X
think. Is the effect of the decision in Rice v.
When
Albee, 164 Mass. 88, 41 N. E. 122.
one man orally advises another not to enter
it would,
into a third person's employment,
I think, be a dangerous principle to leave his
liability to be determined by a jury upon the
question of his malice or want of malice, except in those cases where the words spoken
In the present case. If the estabwere false.
lishment of a patrol is using intimidation or
force, within the meaning of our statute, it
If it does not amount
Is illegal and criminal.
to intimidation or force, but is carried to such
a degree as to interfere with the use by the
plaintiff of his property, it may be illegal
and actionable.
But something more is necessary to justify Issuing an injunction.
It is in violation of any ordinance of the city
regulating the use of streets, there may be a
prosecution for that, and the police can enforce the ordinance; but if it Is merely a
peaceful mode of finding out the persons who
intend to enter the plaintiff's premises to apply for work, and of Informing them of the
actual facts of the case, in order to induce
them not to enter the plaintiff's employment.
In the absence of any statute relating to the
subject,
doubt If It is illegal, and
see no
ground for Issuing an Injunction against It.
As no objection is now made by the defendants to the equitable jurisdiction, I am of
opinion on the facts reported, as
understand them, that the decree entered by Mr.
Justice HOLiMES should be affirmed, without

If

I

I

I

modification.

HOLMES, J. (dissenting).
In a case like
the present, it seems to me that, whatever the
true result may be, it will be of advantage to
sound thinking to have the less popular view
of the law stated, and therefore, although,
when have been unable to bring my brethren to share my convictions, my almost invariable practice Is to defer to them la ^-

I
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depart from that practice in this
lence,
case, notwithstanding my imwillingness to do
so, m support of an already rendered judgment of my own.
In the first place, a word or two should be
said as to the meaning of the report'.
assume that my brethren construe it as
meant
it to be construed, and that. If they were not'
prepared to do so, they would give an opportunity to the defendants to have it amended
in accordance with what
state my meaning
to have been. There was no proof of any
threat or danger of a patrol exceeding two
men, and as, of course, an injunction is not
granted except with reference to what there
is reason to expect in its absence, the question on that point is whether a patrol of two
Again, the defendmen should be enjoined.
ants are enjoined by the final decree from intimidating by threats, express or implied, of
physical harm to body or property, any person who may be desirous of entering into the
employment of the plaintiff, so far as to preIn order
vent him from entering the sa-me.
to test the correctness of the refusal to go
further, it must be assumed that the defendants obey the express prohibition of the dethey do not, they fall within the
cree.
injunction as it now stands, and are liable to

I

I

I

If

summary punishment. The important difference between the preliminary and the final
injunction is that the former goes further,
and forbids the defendants to interfere with
the plaintiff's business "by any scheme * * *
for the purpose of * • * preorganized
venting any person or persons who now are or
may hereafter be * * * desirous of entering the [plaintiff's employment] from entering it."
quote only a part, and the part
This
which seems to me most objectionable.
includes refusal of social intercourse,
and
or argument, aleven organized persuasion
though free from any threat of violence,
either express or implied. And this is with
reference to persons who have a legal right
to contract or not to contract with the plaintiff, as they may see fit. Interference with
existing contracts is forbidden by the final
I wish to Insist a little that the only
decree.
point of difference which involves a difference of principle between the final decree
and the preliminary injunction, which it is
have mentionproposed to restore, is what
ed, in order that it may be seen exactly what
we are to discuss. It appears to me that the
opinion of the majority turns in part on the
assumption that the patrol necessarily carries with it a threat of bodily harm. That assumption I think unwarranted, for the reaFurthermore, It
have given.
sons which
think, that two men, walkcannot be said,
ing together up and down a sidewalk, and
speaking to those who enter a certain shop,
do necessarily and always thereby convey a
do not think it possible to
threat of force.
discriminate, and to say that two workmen,
of an organizaor even two representatives
tion of workmen, do; especially when they

I

I

I

I
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are, and are known to be, under the InjuncSee Stimson,
tion of this court not to do so.
Labor Law, § 60, especially pages 290, 298Reg. v. Shepherd, 11 Cox, Cr. Cas. 325.
300;
may add that I think the more intelligent
do that
workingmen believe as fully as
they no more can be permitted to usurp the
state's prerogative of force than can their opBut, if I am
ponents in their controversies.
wrong, then the decree as it stands reaches
the patrol, since it applies to all threats of
force.
With this I pass to the real difference
between the interlocutory and the final de-

I

I

cree.
agree, whatever may be the law in the
case of a single defendant (Kice v. Albee, 164
Mass. 88, 41 N. E. 122), that when a plaintiff
proves that several persons have combined
and
and conspired
to Injure his business,
have done acts producing that effect, he
shows temporal damage and a cause of action, unless the facts disclose or the defendants prove some ground of excuse or justification; and I take it to be settled, and rightly
settled, that doing that damage by combined
persuasion is actionable, as well as doing it
Walker v. Cronin,
by falsehood or by force.
107 Mass. 555; Morasse v. Brochu, 151 Mass.
567, 25 N. E. 74; Tasker v. Stanley, 153 Mass.
148, 26 N. E. 417.
Nevertheless,
in numberless Instances the
law warrants the intentional infliction of temporal damage, because it regards it as justified.
It is on the question of what shall
amount to a justification, and more especially
on the nature of the considerations which
really determine or ought to determine the
answer to that question, that judicial reasonThe
ing seems to me often to be inadequate.
true grounds of decision are considerations
of policy and of social advantage, and it is
vain to suppose that solutions can be attained merely by logic and general propositions
Propositions
of law which nobody disputes.
as to public policy rarely are unanimously
accepted, and still more rarely, if ever, are
capable
of unanswerable proof. They require a special training to enable any one

I

even to form an intelligent opinion about
them.
In the early stages of law, at least, they
generally are acted on rather as inarticulate
instincts than as definite ideas, for which a
rational defense is ready.
have said In the last
To illustrate what
paragraph:
It has been the law for centuries that a man may set up a business in a
small country town, too small to supiwrt
more than one, although thereby he expects
and intends to ruin some one already there,
and succeeds in his intent. In such a case
he is not held to act "unlawfully and without justifiable cause," as was alleged in Walker V. Cronin and Rice v. Albee. The reason,
of course, is that the doctrine generally has

I

been accepted that free competition is worth
more to society than it costs, and that on
this ground the Infliction of the damage Is
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privileged. Com. ▼. Hunt, 4 Jletc. (JIass.)
Ill, 134. Yet even this proposition noTvadays
Is disputed by a considerable
body of persons, including many whose intelligence
is
not to be denied, little as we may agree with
them.

I

have chosen this illustration partly with
reference to what
It
have to say next.
shows without the need of further authority
that the policy of allowing free competition
justifies ttie intentional inflicting of temporal
damage, including the damage of interference
with a man's business by some means, when
the damage is done, not for its own saJke, but
as an instrumentality in reaching the end of
victory in the battle of trade.
In such a
case it cannot matter whether the plaintiff is
the only rival of the defendant, and so is aimed at specially, or is one of a class all of
whom are hit.
The only debatable ground is
the nature of the means by which such damage may be inflicted. We all agree that it
cannot be done by force or threats of force.
presume, that it may be done
We all agree,
by persuasion to leave a rival's shop, and
come to the defendant's.
It may be done by
the refusal or withdrawal of various pecuniary advantages, which, apart from this consequence, are within the defendant's
lawful
control. It may be done by the withdrawal
of, or threat to withdraw, such advantages
from third persons who hsive a right to deal
or not to deal with the plaintiff, as a means
of inducing them not to deal with him either
as customers or servants.
Com. v. Hunt, 4
Mete. (Mass.)
112. 133; Bowen v. Matheson, 14 Allen, 499; Hey wood v. Tillson, 75
Me. 225; Steamship Co. v. McGregor [1S92]
App. Cas. 26.
have seen the suggestion
made that the conflict between employers and
employed was not competition.
But I venture to assume that none of my brethren
would rely on that suggestion.
If the policy
on which our law is founded is too narrowly
expressed in the term "free competition," we
may substitute "free struggle for life." Certainly, the policy is not limited to struggles
between persons of the same class, competing
for the same end. It applies to all conflicts
of temporal interests.
pause here to remark that the word
"threats" often Is used as if, when it appeared that threats had been made, it appeared
tliat unlawful conduct had begun.
But it
As a general
depends on what you threaten.
rule, even if subject to some exceptions, what
you may do in a certain event you may
threaten to do — ^that is, give warning of your
intention to do — in that event, and thus allow
the other person the chance of avoiding the
So, as to "compulsion," it deconsequence.
pends on how you "compel."
Com. v. Hunt,
133. So as to "annoyance"
4 Mete. (Mass.)
Connor v. Kent, Curran v.
or "intimidation."
Treleaven, 17 Cox, Cr. Cas. 334, 367, 368, 370.
In Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E.
307, it was found as a fact that the display of
banners which was enjoined was part of a

I

I

Ill,

I

I

Ill,

scheme to prevent workmen from entering or
remaining in the plaintiff's employment, "by
threats and intimidation."
The context showed that the words as there used meant
threats of personal violence and intimidation
by causing fear of it
Ho far, 1 suppose, we are agreed.
But there
is a notion, which latterly has been insisted
on a good deal, that a combination of persons
to do what any one of them lawfully might
do by himself will make the otherwise lawful
conduct unlawful.
It would be rash to say
that some as yet unformulated truth may
But,
not be hidden under this proposition.
in the general form in A\hich it has been presented and accepted by many courts,
thmk
it plainly untrue, both on authority and principle.
Com. V. Hunt, 4 Mete. (Mass.)
Randall v. Hazelton, 12 Allen, 412, 414.
There was combination of the most flagrant
and dominant kind in Bowen v. Matheson,
and in the Steamship Co. Case, and combination was essential to the success achieved.
But it is not necessary to cite cases. It is
plain from the slightest consideration
of
practical affairs, or the most superficial reading of industrial history, that free competition means combination, and that the organization of the world, now going on so fast,
might and scope of
means an ever-increasing
combination. It seems to me futile to set
our faces against this tendency.
Whether
beneficial on the whole, as I think it, or detrimental, it is inevitable,
unless the fundamental axioms of society, and even the fundamental conditions of life, are to be chan-

I

Ill;

ged.
One

of the eternal conflicts out of which
life is made up is that between the effort of
every man to get the most he can for his
services, and that of society, disguised under
the name of capital, to get his services for
the least possible return.
Combination on
the one side is patent and powerful.
Combination on the other is the necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a (air and equal way.
am unable to reconcile Temperton v. Russell [1893}
1 Q. B. 715. and the cases which follow it,
with the Steamship Co. Case. But Temperton v. Russell is not a binding authority here,
and therefore
do not think it necessary to

I

I

discuss it.
If it be true that workingmen may combine
with a view, among other things, to getting
as much as they can for their labor, just as
capital may combine with a view to getting
the greatest possible return, it must be true
that, when coiabined,
they have the same
liberty that combined capital has, to support
their interests by argument, persuasion, and
the bestowal or refusal of those advantages
which they otherwise lawfully control.
can
remember when many people thought that,
apart from violence or breach of contract,
strikes were wicked, as organized refusals to
suppose that intelligent economists
work.
and legislators have given up that notion to-

I
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flay.
feel pretty confident that they equally will abandon the idea that an organized
refusal by workmen of social intercourse
with a man who shall enter their antagonist's
employ is unlawful, if it is dissociated from
any threat of violence, and is made for the
sole object of prevailing, if possible, in a contest with their employer about the rate of
wages.
The fact that the immediate object ot
the act by which the benefit to themselves
is to be gained is to injure their antagonist
does not necessarily
mate it unlawful, any

this is the point of difference In principle, and
the only one, between the interlocutory and
final decree; and I only desire to add that
the distinctions upon which the final decree
was framed seem to me to have coincided
very accurately with the results finally reached by legislation and judicial decision in England, apart from what
must regard as the
anomalous decisions of Temperton v. Russell
and the cases which have followed it.
Reg.
V. Shepherd, 11 Cox, Cr. Gas. 325; Connor v.
Kent, Gibson v. Lawson, and Curran v. Tre-

more than when a great house lowers the
price of goods for the purpose and with the
effect of driving a smaller antagonist from the
Indeed, the question seems to me to
business.
have been decided as long ago as 1842, by
the good sense of Chief Justice Shaw, in
Com. V. Hunt, 4 Mete. (Mass.) 111.
repeat
at the end, as
said at the beginning, that

leaven, 17 Cox, Cr. Cas. 354.
The general question of the propriety of
dealing with this kind of case by injunction
I say nothing about, because
understand
that the defendants have no objection to the
final decree if it goes no further, and that
both parties wish a decision upon the matters
which
have discussed.

I

HTJTCH.& BUNK.EQ.-49

I

I

I

I

INJUNCTIONS.

770

HAMILTON-BROWN SHOE
SAXET et al.
(32 S.

W.

1106,

131

CO. v.

Mo. 212.)

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.
Nov. 26, 1895.

Appeal from St. Louis circuit court.
BUI by the Hamilton-Brown
Shoe Company to enjoin A. J. Saxey and others from
attempting, by threats and intimidation, to
force complainant's employSs to quit work.
A demurrer to the bill was overruled, and
defendants appeal.
Affirmed.

John F. McDermott, for appellants.
B. Jones, for respondent.

Silas

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from
the final judgment of the circuit court of the
city of St. Louis on a demurrer to the plaintiff's petition, which is as follows: "Plaintiff states that it is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the state of Missouri,
and is engaged in the manufacture of shoes
in the city of St. Louis, Missouri, at TwentyFirst and Locust streets in said city, at
which place its factory for the purpose of its
said manufacturing business is located.
And
plaintiff says that it has in its employ in
said manufacturing business, in its factory
as aforesaid, between eight and nine hunthat all of these persons are
dred persons;
at work as operatives in some department or
other of said factory; that of these employes
as aforesaid a large number, to wit, about
two or three hundred, are women and girls,
and a large number, to wit, about two or
three hundred, are young persons, many of
them not being of age, and the balance of
said operatives are adult men; that all nf
these persons are engaged in earning a livelihood at the business of this plaintiff aforesaid, and, on the other hand, this plaintiff
the services
of these persons to
requires
successfully carry on its business of manufacturing shoes as aforesaid. Plaintiff further states that all of these employes now
in the employ of this plaintiff are desirous
of continuing in the service of the plaintiff
in its said business as aforesaid. Plaintiff
further states that ten or fifteen days ago
some of its employes, including all the deexcept
the
defendants
fendants herein,
Thomas Beaty and P. J. McGarry, went out
of the employ of this plaintiff on what is
commonly called a 'strike,' claiming to have
some grievance against this plaintiff, and
which this plaintiff says was without any
reasonable ground to rest upon, and thereupon attempted to inaugurate among the
employes of this plaintiff what is commonly
called a 'strike' ; that thereupon the said defendants, lately employes of this plaintiff,
together with the defendants Beaty and McGarry and divers other persons, unlawfully
and wrongfully combined and confederated
by into terrorize, and thereby,
together

timidation and threats, to prevent the othet
employes of this plaintiff from peaceably or
otherwise prosecuting their work in plaintiff's factory; that thereupon all of the defendants hereto, together with their associates and confederates,
whose names are at
this moment unknown to this plaintiff, began and have constantly pursued in a course
of threats of personal violence and intimidation and persuasion,
for the purpose, by
means of such intimidation and threats and
fear, to prevent the other employes of this
plaintiff from peaceably or otherwise prosecuting their work in plaintiff's factory; that
all of the said defendants hereto, together
.with divers and sundry other persons, who
have
are their associates and confederates,
constantly hung about the plaintiff's said
factory at the place aforesaid, and upon the
streets in close proximity, for the purpose
of picketing the premises of this plaintiff,
and, by putting the employes of this plaintiff In fear of bodily injury, to thereby keep
them
from continuing their employment
with this plaintiff, and also for the purpose
of preventing other persons from entering
the employ of the plaintiff; and the said defendants and their associates and confederates, as a part of their policy of threats
of
and intimidation, and for the purpose
carrying on their unlawful combination, have
gone to the homes of divers of the employes of
this plaintiff at nighttime, and then and there
undertaiien

to induce,

by persuasion

and by

intimidation and threats, the employes of this
plaintiff from further prosecuting their work
And the plainin plaintiff's said factory.
tiff charges that the said defendants therein
named,

associates and confederof days, by the use of
threats and personal violence, intimidation,
and other unlawful means, have been and
are now, undertaking to prevent the emof this plaintiff from prosecuting
ployes
their ordinary work, and are endeavoring to
induce them, by the unlawful means aforesaid, to quit the employment of this plaintiff.
And plaintiff says that by reason of the fact
that a great many of its employes are women and girls and young persons, that tire
defendants aforesaid and their associates
and confederates have succeeded in exciting
in the minds of the plaintiff's said employes,
or many of them, fear for their bodily safety, to such an extent that they cannot happily, as they have a right to do, prosecute
their ordinary work; and plaintiff says, by
reason of the premises, it cannot peaceably
and successfully prosecute its said business.

ates,

and

their

for a number

And plaintiff says it is without remedy at
law, and can only be fully protected and
relieved in a court of' equity. Plaintiff therefore prays that the defendants, their associates and confederates,
be enjoined by a
temporary order of injunction, to be made
final upon the hearing of this cause, issued
out of this court, from in any manner interfering with the employes of this plaintiff

ESTJUNCSTIONS.
now in the employ of the plaintiff, and from
in any manner interfering with any person
who may desire to enter the employ of this
plaintiff, by the use of threats, personal violence, intimidation, or other means calculated to terrorize or alarm the plaintiff's employes, in any manner or form whatever,
and that said defendants and their associates and confederates aforesaid be restrained by the order of this court from undertaking, by the use of the means aforesaid, to induce or to cause any of the employes of this
plaintiff to quit the employment of this
plaintiff, and that the defendants aforesaid
and their associates
and confederates be
enjoined from congregating or loitering
about the premises of this plaintiff at the
place aforesaid, and that they be required
by the injunction of this court to go about
their ordinary business, and to abstain from
in any way interfering with the business of
this plaintiff, and for such other and further
and general relief as may to the court appear proper in the premises."
The case was tried before the Hon. L. B.
Valllant, one of the judges of that court.
Who, on overruling the demurrer, delivered
the following opinion:
"The amended petition states in substance
that the plaintiff conducts a large shoe
manufactory in this city, and has in its employ some eight or nine hundred persons,
all of whom are earning their living in plainand are desirous of so
tiff's employment,
continuing; that the defendants, except two
of them, were lately in plaintiff's employ,
but have gone out of the same, on a strike,
and are now, with the other two defendants,
engaged in an attempt to force the other
employes of plaintiff to quit their work and
join in the strike, and that to accomplish this
purpose they are intimidating them with
threats of personal violence; that among
the plaintiff's employes who are thus threatened are about 300 women and girls and two
or three hundred other young persons; that
the effect of all this on the plaintiff's business, if the defendants are allowed to proceed, would be to inflict incalculable damage. Upon filing this amended petition, and
the plaintiff's giving bond as required by
law, a temporary injunction issued, restraining the defendants from attempting to force
the plaintiff's employes to leave their work
by intimidation and threats of violence, or
from assembling for that purpose in the vicinity of plaintiff's factory. The defendants
and, by
have appeared by their counsel,
their demurrer filed, admit that all the statements of the amended petition are true; but
they take the position that, even if they are
doing the unlawful acts that they are charged with doing, still this court has no right
to interfere with them, because they say
that what they are doing is a crime, by the
state law of this state, and that for the
commission of a crime they can only be
tried by a jury In a court having criminal
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jurisdiction. It will be observed that the defendants do not claim to have the right to
do what the injunction forbids them doing.
Their learned counsel even quotes the statute to show that it is a crime to do so. But
he contends that the constitution of the United States and the constitution of the state
of Missouri guaranty them the right to commit crime, with only this limitation, to wit,
that they shall answer for the crime, when
committed, in a criminal court, before a jury,
and that to restrain them from committing
crime is to rob them of their constitutional
right of trial by jury. If that position be
correct, then there can be no valid statute
to prevent crime.
But that position is contrary to all reason. The right of trial by
jury does not arise until the party is accused of having already committed the
If you see a man advancing upon ancrime.
other with murderous demeanor and a deadly weapon, and you arrest him,—disarm him,
—you have perhaps prevented an act which
would have brought about a trial by jury,
but can you be said to have deprived him of
his constitutional right of trial by jury? The
train of thought put in motion by the argument of the learned counsel for defendants
on this point leads only to this end, to wit,
that the constitution guaranties to every man
the right to commit crime, so that he may
enjoy the inestimable right of trial by jury.
"Passing now to the question relating to
the particular jurisdiction of a court of equity, we are brought to face the proposition
that a court of equity has no criminal jurisdiction, and will not interfere by injunction
to prevent the commission of a crime.
These
two propositions are firmly established; and
as to the first, that a court of equity has no
criminal jurisdiction, there is no exception.
As to the second, that a court of equity will
not interfere by injunction to prevent the
commission of a crime, that, too, is perhaps
without exception, when properly interpreted, but it is sometimes
misinterpreted.
When we say that a court of equity will
never interfere by injunction to prevent the
commission of a crime, we mean that it will
not do so simply for the purpose of preventing a violation of a criminal law. But when
the act complained of threatens an irreparable injury to the property of an individual
a court of equity will interfere to prevent
that injury, notwithstanding the act may also be a violation of a criminal law. In such
case the court does not interfere to prevent
the commission of a crime, although that
may Incidentally result, but it exerts its force
to protect the individual's property from destruction, and ignores entirely the criminal
portion of the act. There can be no doubt
of the jurisdiction of a court of equity in
such a case. On this question counsel have
cited cases in which courts of equity have
been denied jurisdiction to enjoin the publication of a libel, and in those opinions are
to be found the general statement of the
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proposition above mentioned.
But the law
of libel is peculiar, and those cases turn upof the
on that peculiarity. The freedom
press has been so jealously guarded both in
England and in this country that our law
of libel is lilie no other law on the books.
Our constitution provides that a man may
say, write, and publish 'whatever he will,'
■
being answerable only for the 'abuse of liberty.' Libel is the only act injurious to the
rights of another which a man cannot, under proper conditions, be restrained from
committing;
and that is so because the constitution says he shall be allowed to do it,
Equity will
and answer for it afterwards.
not interfere when there is an adequate remedy at law.
But what remedy does the law
afford that would be adequate to the plaintiff's injury? How would their damages be
How compensated?
The defendestimated?
ants' learned counsel cites us to the criminal
statute, but how will that remedy the plaintiff's injury? A criminal prosecution does not
And,
propose to remedy a private wrong.
even if there was a statute giving a legal
remedy to plaintiff, It would not oust the
equity jurisdiction. The legal remedy that
closes the door of a court of equity is a
common-law remedy. Where equity had jurisdiction because the common law affords
no adequate remedy, that jurisdiction is not
affected by a statute providing a legal remedy. What a humiliating thought it would
be if these defendants were really attempting to do what the amended petition charges, and what their demurrer confesses, —
that is, to destroy the business of these plaintiffs, and to force the eight or nine hundred
men, women, boys, and girls who are earning their livings in the plaintiff's employ to
quit their worli against their will,— and yet
there is no law in the land to protect them.
The injunction in this case does not hinder the

defendants doing anything that they claim
they have a right to do. They are free men,

and have a right to quit the employ of plaintiffs whenever they see fit to do so, and no
one can prevent them; and whether their
act of quitting is wise or unwise, just or unjust, it is nobody's business but their own.
And they have a right to use fair persuasion
to induce others to join them in their quitting.
But when fair persuasion is exhausted
they have no right to resort to force or
The law will protect
threats
of violence.
their freedom and their rights, but it will
not permit them to destroy its freedom and
The same law which guarrights of others.
anties the defendants in their right to quit
of the plaintiffs at their
the employment
own will and pleasure also guaranties the

other employes the right to remain at their
These defendants are
will and pleasure.
their own masters, but they are not the masters of the other employes, and not only are
they not the masters of the other employes,
but they are not even their guardians. There
is a maxim of our law to the effect that one
may exercise his own right as he pleases,
provided that he does not thereby prevent
another exercising his right as he pleases.
This maxim or rule of law comes nearer
than any other rule in our law to the golden
rule of Divine authority: 'That which you
would have another do unto you, do you
even so unto them.' Whilst the strict enforcement of the golden rule Is beyond the
mandate of a human tribunal, yet courts of
equity, by injunction, do restrain men who
are so disposed from so exercising their own
rights as to destroy the rights of others.
The demurrer to the amended petition is
overruled."
The law applicable to the case is so clearly
stated in this opinion of>ithe learned judge
that to add anything to It would be a work
of supererogation. We adopt it as the opinion of this court, and affirm the judgment.

All

concur.
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Appeal from supreme

court,

Oct. 6, 1891.
general

term,

Second department.
Action by John P.

Crawford and others
against Martin B. Tyrrell, to restrain defendant from keeping a house of ill fame,
and to recover damages for injury sustained.
Judgment
for plaintiffs.
Defendant
appeals.
Affirmed.

J

as. & Thos. H. Troy, for appellant.
fred E. Mudge, for respondents.

Al-

GRAY, J. In this action, which was
brought to restrain the defendant from keeping a house of ill fame and from using his
premises as an assignation house, and to recover damages
for injuries sustained, the
trial court found as facts that the house, as
maintained by defendant, was a resort for
prostitutes and licentious men, and that the
persons occupying rooms acted in a bolsteroiis and noisy manner,
and indecently exposed their persons at the windows, "whereby the use and occupation of the plaintiffs'
premises have been interfered with and rendered uncomfortable, and whereby the occupants of the plaintiffs' premises have been
annoyed
and seriously
disturbed." Such a
finding was amply justified by the evidence,
and, indeed, It is not discussed by the appellant; but he argues that the plaintiffs
could not maintain a civil action of this nature, inasmuch as the damage they suffered
was a damage common to the whole community, and not special to them. If that
position had been sustained by the facts, I
do not doubt but that it would have been the
duty of the trial judge to have denied the
relief prayed for. The rule of law requires
of him who complains of his neighbor's use
of his property, and seeks for redress and to
restrain him from such use, that he should
show that a substantive injui-y to property is
committed.
The mere fact of a business being carried on which may be shown to be
immoral, and, therefore, prejudicial to the
furnishes of
character of the neighborhood,
itself no ground for equitable interference at
the suit of a private person; and, though the
use of property may be unlawful or unreasonable, unless special damage can be shown,
a neighboring property owner cannot base
It Is
thereupon any private right of action.
for the public authorities, acting in the common interest, to interfere for the suppression
See Francis v.
of the common nuisance.
Schoellkopf, 53 N. Y. 152. If the business
complained of is a lawful one, the legal
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question presented In a civil action for private damage Is whether the business is reasonably conducted,
as conand whether,
ducted, it is one which is obnoxious and hurtful to adjoining property.
If the business is
unlawful, the complainant in a private action must show special damage, by which
the legitimate use of his adjoining property
has been interfered with, or its occupation
rendered unfit or uncomfortable.
That the
perpetrator of the nuisance is amenable to
the provisions and penalties of the criminal
law is not an answer to an action against
him by a private person to recover for injury
sustained, and for an injunction against the
continued
use of his premises in a similar
manner.
The principle has been long settled
that the objection that the nuisance was a
common one is not available if it be shown
that special damage was suffered.
Rose v.
Miles, 4 Maule & S. 101; Rose v. Groves, 5
Man. & G. 613; Francis v. Schoellkopf, supra; Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9. One
who uses his property lawfully and reasonably, in a general legal sense, can do injury
to nobody.
In the full enjoyment of his
legal rights in and to his property the law
will not suffer a man to be restrained, but
his use of the property must be always such
as in no manner to invade the legal rights
of his neighbor.
The rights of each to the
enjoyment and use of their several properalways
ties should, in legal contemplation,
be equal.
If the balance is destroyed by
the act of one, the law gives a remedy in
damages, or equity will restrain. If the use
of a property is one which renders a neighphysically
bor's occupation
and enjoyment
uncomfortable, or which may be hurtful to
the health, as where trades are conducted
which are offensive by reason of odors, noises,
or other injurious or annoying features, a private nuisance is deemed to be established,
against which the protection of a court of
equity power may be invoked.
In the present case the indecent conduct of the occupants of the defendant's house, and the noise
therefrom,
inasmuch as they rendered the
plaintiffs' house unfit for comfortable or respectable occupation,
and unfit for the purposes it was intended for, were facts which
constituted
a nuisance, and were sufficient
grounds for the maintenance
of the action.
If it was a nuisance which affected the
general neighborhood, and was the subject of
an indictment for its unlawful and immoral
features, the plaintiffs were none the less
entitled to their action for any injury sustained, and to their equitable right to have
The judgment
its continuance
restrained.
appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur, except FINCH, J., absent.
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WEINSTOCK, LUBIN

& OO. v.

MAKKS.

(No. 18,375.)
(42 Pac.

142,

109

Cal. 529.)

Supreme Court of California.

Oct. 12, 1895.

Department 1. »Appeal from superior court,
Sacramento county; Matt. F. Johnson, Judge.
Action by Welnstock, Lubin & Co., a corH. Marks. There was a
poration, against
judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

in part.
Johnson,
HoU & Dunn, for appellant
Johnson & Johnson, for respondent
Reversed

GAROUTTB, J. Plaintiff is a corporation
carrying on a large clothing and dry-goods
Defendbusiness in the city of Sacramento.
ant is also a dealer in clothing of the same
general character, and is carrying on business
in a building adjoining plaintiff's place of
business. The present action is one of injunction, and by its decree, among other things,
the court ordered defendant to refrain from
further use of the name "Mechanical Store"
of his place of business,
as the designation
and further decreed that defendant maintain
and place in a conspicuous part of his store,
and also in a conspicuous place on the outside or front thereof, a sign showing the proof his said store, in letters suffiprietorship
ciently large to be plainly observable by passDeers-by and customers entering therein.
fendant appeals from the foregoing portions
of the judgment.
The judgment Is based upon certain findings of fact made by the trial court upon the
evidence offered at the trial, and no complaint is now heard that this evidence does
It therefore
not fully support these findings.
follows that the merit of this appeal presents
itself upon a consideration of those findings
and the decree based thereon. These findings
of fact are fuU and in detail, and, for present
purposes, we deem it sufficient to state the
general tenor and effect of some of them. (1)
The court finds that on or about the 8th day
of October, 1874, H. Wemstock and D. Lubin
under the firm
entered into a copartnership
name and style of Welnstock & Lubin, of the
city of Sacramento, and, as such partners,
engaged in the business of dealing in wearing
apparel for men, women, and children, and
that said Welnstock & Lubin selected as the
name of their place of business "Mechanics'
Store," and designated the same by that apby which name their said store
pellation,
thenceforth was continually known; that, m
the management and conduct of their business,
they fixed a price upon each and every article carried by them In the stock of said store,
and marked the said prices in figures upon
each article, and sold such articles at the
prices so marked, and never deviated therefrom; and they advertised the said method
of doing business extensively throughout the
entire Pacific coast by means of newspapers,
etc., by means whereof their said method of

doing business became wlddy known to the
trade and public throughout the entire Pacific
coast, and by reason whereof it became and
was well known to the trade and public In
California and the other states and territories
of the Pacific coast that at the store of said
Welnstock & Lubin only one price was charged for goods sold therein, and that no deviation from said price was permitted.
(2) That,
by care, attention, skill, and strict adherence
to business and the rules as aforesaid, this
plaintiff has materially increased the volume
and value of said business,
and Importance
and enhanced the good will thereof, and the
said plaintiff has established for the said store
and business throughout the said states and territories a wide and honorable reputation, and
thereby said business has become extensive
and the puband profitable,
and valuable
lic have become accustomed to plaintiff's said
method of doing business, and have been induced to rely, and do rely, upon the good faith
of the plaintiff in managing and conducting
its business In the manner aforesaid, and by
reason thereof have been induced to bestow
and do bestow upon the plaintiff their custom,
trade, patronage, and business.
(3) That on
or about 1SS5 the defendant, who had previously been engaged in business elsewhere,
and was without any established reputation
of his own, and whose business was unknown
to the trade and general public, removed his
business from the place he then occupied to
the premises on the east of and near the
premises of this plaintiff; and the defendant
then and there engaged in a similar line of
trade as this plaintiff, and ever since then he
has maintained and conducted, and still maintains and conducts, the said store at said
place, and carries on the said business therein;
and he named his store In the year 1887 or
thereabouts the "Mechanical Store." (4) That
the defendant,
well knowing the foregoing
facts, and contriving,
intending, and designing fraudulently to injure this plaintiff, and
to obtain undue advantage of plaintiff, and
to deprive the plaintiff of its business, and
fraudulently and unlawfully to increase his
own business, and to pirate and make use of
and appropriate to himself the good will of
the plaintiff's business, and the said reputation and honorable esteem and confidence that
the plaintiff enjoyed Iq the minds of the people of the Pacific coast, and in order to create
confusion In the public mind, and to take advantage of the standing that the plaintiff by
Its aforesaid acts had acquired in said territory, and fraudulently designing to deceive
the public and people intending to trade with
the plaintiff, and to divert the custom of the
plaintiff to himself, and to deprive the plaintiff of its customers and of the trade, and to
induce the people to trade with the defendant tmder the belief that they were trading
with the plaintiff, and for the purpose of deceiving plaintiff's customers and persons intending to trade with plaintiff Into believing
that the defendant's store was that of the
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plaintiff, and thereby Inducing them to enter
said store of defendant
to trade with said
defendant, to his profit, and In order to carry
out his fraudulent and corrupt designs as
aforesaid, — the defendant has persistently carried out a system of deceit and misrepresentations concerning his store and its ownership,
in connection with plaintiff's store and business, as follows: That in 1891 plaintiff, at its
place of business, erected a store, the front
of which is of pecuUar architecture, containing arches and alcoves, of which there was
none other similar in the city of Sacra,mento;
that afterwards the defendant, at his said
place of business, and adjoining plaintiffs
store, erected a building which, so far as the
first or lower story is concerned, was and is
similar in architecture in every respect to the
store of plaintiff, so much so that passers-by
were liable to go into the store of defendant
thinking that they were entering the store of
plaintiff, and that customers of plaintiff in
many instances did so enter the store of defendant thinking they were In the store of
plaintiff; that defendant had no sign inside
of his store or on the outside of his store by
which customers could for themselves ascertain the true proprietorship thereof; that the
building exactly
erection of the defendant's
the same as plaintiff's building in every particular, and the adoption of the use of the
words "Mechanical Store," and the absence
of any name or sign upon or in defendant's
of
store designating the true proprietorship
store, were all done by the dedefendant's
fendant for the purpose of deceiving the public, and more especially plaintiff's customers,
and enticing and pirating and securing the
patronage of said customers from plaintiff to
defendant (5) That, by the aforesaid means
the defendant has diverted from the plaintiff
a large part of plaintiff's trade and custom;
has induced many persons to trade with the
defendant who otherwise would have traded
with the plaintiff; has sold large quantities
of goods in his said store to persons who, but
for said acts of defendant, would have purchased said goods of the plaintiff; has deprived the plaintiff of a large share of its legitimate profits; has injured the business and
reputation of the plaintiff; has impaired the
confidence of the public in the plaintiff and its
and has deprived
method of doing business;
the plaintiff of a large number of its customers and patrons.
The foregoing chapter of facts makes Interesting reading, and we first turn our attention to that portion of the judgment restraining defendant from the further use of
the words "Mechanical Store" as a designaWe see but
tion of his place of business.
little difficulty in arriving at a conclusion
upon this branch of the case. Defendant
assails the judgment in this particular with
He insists that the
but a single weapon.
words "Mechanics' Store" are not the subject of trade-mark, and that, therefore, plaintiff can have no exclusive right to them.
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As we view the picture presented by the
findings of fact, the question as to what
may or may not be the subject of trade-mark
That these
Is not the problem to be solved.
words are of a kind that may be used as a
trade-name
we have no doubt, and, having
established that fact, we are required to
pursue the investigation no further. That
which may
certain names and designations
not become technical or specific trade-marks
may become the names of articles or of
places
of business, and thereby the use
thereof receive the protection of the law,
cannot be doubted, for the cases evei-ywhere
recognize that fact. The learned judge said
in Ijee v. Haley, 5 Ch. App. 155: "I quite
agree
that they [the plaintiffs] have no
property right In the name, but the principle upon which the cases on this subject
proceed is not that there is property in the
word, but that it Is a fraud on a person who
has established a trade, and carried it on under a given name, that some other person
should assume the same name, or the same
name with a slight alteration, in such a way
as to induce persons to deal with him in the
belief that they are dealing with the person
who has given a reputation to the name."
A similar doctrine is declared in Manufacturing Co. V. Hall, 61 N. Y. 226, and also in the
late case of Coats v. Thread Co., 149 V. S. 562,
This court said in Pierce v.
13 Sup. Ct. 966.
Guittard, 68 Cal. 71, 8 Pac. 645: "We are
of opinion that it Is not necessary to decide whether the plaintiff's label, with the
accompanying words and devices, constituted
a trade-mark, and, as such, the exclusive
property of the plaintiff, for the reason that
it Is a fraud on a person who has established
a business for his goods, and carries it on
under a given name or with a particular
mark, for some other person to assume the
same name or mark, or the same with a
slight alteration, in such a way as to induce
persons to deal with him in the belief that
they are dealing with a person who has
given a reputation to that name or mark."
The same general principle is also recognized
and approved in Schmidt v. Brieg, 100 Cal.
672, 35 Pac. 623.
While in these two cases
the fact appears that the defendants were
selling an inferior article, and thereby deceiving and defrauding the public, it is not
apparent that such fact was a necessary element in pointing the judgment. Neither do
we consider it so upon principle; and in cases
without number, restraining defendants from
trespassing upon the good will of plaintiff's
business, such fact was an element foreign
to the litigation.
It may be said that the
adjudged cases for relief are based solely
upon the ground of loss and damage to the
tradesman's business, by unlawful competition.
In Levy v. Walker, Cox, Man. TradeMark Cas. No. 639, the learned judge declared: "The court interferes solely for the
purpose of protecting the owner of a trade
or business from a fraudulent invasion of
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that business by somebody else. It does not
interfere to prevent the world outside from
being misled into anything."
While our statutes attempt to deal with
trade-marks, and provide for the filing thereof with the secretary of state, with accompanying affidavits, etc., yet trade-names are
equally protected upon analogous principles
of law. And that the words "Mechanics'
Store" may be made a trade-name, and the
user thereof become entitled under the law
to protection from pirates preying upon the
sea of commercial trade, we have no doubt.
^Ve think the defendant should be restrained
from the use of the words "Mechanical
Store."
The court has declared the fact to

by defendant,
be, and it is not challenged
that these words were used as a designation
of his store for the purpose of deceiving the
plaintiff's customers,
public, and especially
and
the advantages
and thereby securing
benefits of the good will of plaintiff's business. To say that such conduct upon the
part of defendant is unfair business competition is to state the fact in the mildest
In Celluloid Manuf'g Co. v. Celloterms.
nite Jlanuf'g Co., 32 Fed. 97, Justice Bradcourt of the United
ley, of the supreme
States, in speaking to the question of similarity in name, said: "It was not identical
with the plaintiff's name. That would be
too gross an invasion of the complainant's
rights. Similarity, not identity, is the usual
recourse when one party seeks to benefit
What
himself by the good name of another.
similarity is sufficient to effect the object has
to be determined in each case by its circumWe may say, generally, that a simstances.
ilarity which would be likely to deceive or
customer,
mislead an ordinary unsuspecting
is obnoxious to the law." In this case the
trial court determined that there was a sufficient similarity in the names to deceive the
public; that the defendant
the
adopted
name for the purpose of deceiving the public and securing plaintiff's business;
and
that such results had followed. These things
being true, the decree must go against him.
The remaining branch of the case presents
a novel and original proposition of law. In
its facts we apprehend no case like it can be
found, either In this country
or England.
The decree orders the defendant to place,
both upon the outside and inside of Ms store,
a sign, plainly legible to customers and passindicating his proprietorship; and,
ers-by,
while the power of the court to issue mandatory injunctions in many cases must be conceded, yet cases where such power has been
exercised have generally involved matters of
nuisance, or at least cases where courts have
ordered the subject-matter of the litigation
as, for
to be placed in its original condition;
instance, the removing of obstructions to anBut let us for a moment turn
cient lights.
oiu* attention to the facts of this case.
The
store of plaintiff was known as the "MechanBy various kinds of advertising,
ics' Store."

and attention, honesty, and skill In the cooduct of the business, it increased the volume
thereof and enhanced
its good will, and
throughout the Pacific coast established for
it a wide and honorable reputation as a fair
and
reliable house with which to deal.
Plaintiff erected a store building of peculiar
architecture,
there being none like it In the
city of Sacramento; and defendant thereupon
adjoinerected a store building, immediately
ing that of plaintiff's, in every respect of similar architecture.
It further appears that defendant erected this particular kind of building for the purpose of deceiving the public,
and securing the patronage of plaintiff's cus^
tomers; and for the same purpose he refrained from placing any sign in or upon the
building Indicating the proprietorship of the
business, or designating it in any way so
that It might be distinguished from the store
of plaintiff. And, by reason of these acts of
defendant, many of plaintiff's customers were
deceived into purchasing goods in defendant's
store, believing that they were trading In
plaintiff's store; and defendant thus diverted
from the plaintiff a large part of its trade
and custom, and thereby injured its business
and curtailed the value of its good will.
Upon this bald statement of facts, it cannot be
gainsaid that defendant has done the plaintiff wrong; and it is said that for every
wrong there is a remedy.
These facts certainly indicate a case of unlawful business
competition, and courts of equity have ever
been ready to declare such things odious.
It
is strange if plaintiff may be deprived of the
fruits of a long course of honest and fair
dealing in business by such wicked contrivances, and, upon appeal to the courts for relief, should be told there was no relief. This
cannot be so, for the whole law of trademarks, trade-names,
etc., Is recognized, approved, and enforced for the very purpose of
protecting the honest tradesman from a like
loss and damage to that which threatens this
plaintiff;
and the fact that the question
comes to us in an entirely new guise, and
that the schemer has concocted a kind of deception heretofore unheard of in legal jurisprudence, is no reason why equity is either
unable or unwilling to deal with him.
It
has been said by some judge or law writer
that "no fixed rules can be established upon
which to deal with fraud, for, were courts
of equity to once declare rules prescribing the
limitations of their power in dealing with It,
the jurisdiction would be perpetually cramped and eluded by new schemes which the fertility of man's invention would contrive."
By device, defendant is defrauding plaintiff
of its business.
He is stealing its good will,
—a most valuable property, — only secured after years of honest dealing and large expenditures of money; and equity would be impotent, indeed, if it could contrive no remedy
for such a wrong.

The fundamental principle underlying this
of the law Is that no man has
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the right to sell his goods aa the goods of a
rival trader. Mr. Browne, in his work upon
Trade-Marks, declares the wrong to be, "not
in imitating a symbol, deylce, or fancy name,
for any such act may not involve the slightest turpitude; the wrong consists in unfair
means to obtain from a person the fruits of
his own ingenuity or industry,— an injustice
that is in direct transgression of the deca•
•
* anylogue, 'Thou Shalt not covet

thing that Is thy neighbor's.'
The most detestable kind of fraud underlies the filching
of another's good name, in connection with
trafficking." We think the principle may be
broadly stated that when one tradesman resorts to the use of any artifice or contrivance
for the purpose of representing his goods or
his business as the goods or business of a
rival tradesman, thereby deceiving the people
by causing them to trade with him when
they intended to and would have otherwise
traded with his rival, a fraud is committed,
—a fraud which a court of equity will not allow to thrive. In Howard v. Henriques, 3
Sanf. 725, the court, in speaking of the competitor in business, said:
"He must not by
any deceitful or other practice impose on the
public, and he must not by dressing himself in
another man's gaiTaents, and by assuming
another man's name, endeavor to deprive
that man of his own individuality and of
the gains to which by his industry and skill
he is fairly entitled."
It may well be said
that the defendant, by duplicating plaintiff's
building, with its peculiar architecture and
immediately adjoining, entering into the
same line of business, with no mark of identification upon his store, has dressed himself
in plaintiff's garments; and, having so dressed himself with a fraudulent intent, equity
will exert itself to reach the fraud in some
way. In the leading case of Lee v. Haley,
supra, the whole question is condensed by
the final conclusion of the court into the
principle of law "that it is a fraud on the
part of a defendant to set up a business under such a designation as is calculated to
lead and does lead other people to suppose
that his business is the business of another
person." If the same evil results are accomplished by the acts practiced by this deby
fendant which would be accomplished
an adoption of plaintiff's name, why should
equity smUe upon the one practice and frown
upon the other? Upon what principle of law
can a court of equity say, "If you cheat and
defraud your competitor in business by taking his name, the court will give relief
against you, but, if you cheat and defraud
him by assuming a disguise of a different
your acts are beyond the law?"
character,
Equity will not concern itself about the
means by which fraud is done. It is the results arising from the means— it is the fraud
itself— with which it deals.
The foregoing principles of law do not apply alone to the protection of parties having
They reach
and trade-names.
trade-marks
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apply to all cases
by one in securing
and these ways are
as the ingenuity of
In Glenny
the dishonest schemer can invent.
V. Smith, reported in the Jurist of 1865 (page
"Where a tradesman, in
9(55), the court held:
addition to his own name upon his shop front,
placed upon his sunblind and upon his brass
plate the words 'From Thresher & Glenny' (in
away beyond that, and
where fraud is practiced
the trade of a rival dealer;
as many and as various

whose employment he had been), the court, being of opinion that this was done in such a
way as to be likely to mislead, and there being
evidence that persons had been actually misled,
granted an injunction to restrain such a use
of the name of the firm Thresher & Glenny."
In Knott V. Morgan, 2 Keen, 213, the "London Conveyance Company" had its omnibuses
painted green, and its servants clothed In the
same colors. Another adopted the same name,
and likewise its vehicles were so painted and
Its servants so clothed.
It was conceded that
plaintiff could have no exclusive property right
In any of these things, but the court issued
Its Injunction, declaring that plaintiff had "a
right to call upon this court to restrain the defendant from fraudulently using precisely the
same words and devices which they have taken for the purpose of distinguishing their property, and thereby depriving them of the fair
profits of their business by attracting custom
on the false representation that carriages really
the defendant's belong to and are under the
management of the plaintiffs."
The author,
by a note, approves the doctrine here declared,
saying:
"There was an obvious attempt to
trade upon the plaintiff's reputation, — a constructive fraud, — coupled with pecuniary loss,
which was made the ground for the Issuance
of a broad Injunction."
The same principle is
reiterated by the same learned judge in Croft
V. Day, 7 Beav. S4, in the following words:
"It Has been very correctly said that the principle of these cases is this : That no man has a
right to sell his own goods as the goods of another.
You may express the same principle in
a ditt'erent form, and say that no man has a
right to dress himself in colors, or adopt and
bear symbols to which he has no peculiar or
exclusive right, and thereby personate another
person, for the purpose of inducing the public
to suppose either that he is that other person
or that he is connected with and selling the
manufacture of such other person while he is
really selling his own.
It is perfectly manifest that to do these things is to commit a
fraud, and a very gross fraud."
In the very
recent case of Coats v. Thread Co., 149 U. S.
566, 13 Sup. Ct. 966, the court said:
"There
can be no question of the soundness of the
plaintiff's proposition that, irrespective of the
technical question of trade-mark,
the defendants have no right to dress their goods up in
such manner as to deceive an intending purchaser, and induce him to believe he is buying those of the plaintiffs. • • * They have
no right by imitative devices to beguile the
public into buying their wares under the Im-
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presslon they are buying those of their rivals."
To the same point, see System Co. v. Le BoutiUier (Super. Ct.) 24 N. Y. Supp. 890; Appolinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 Fed. 18; Burgess
V. Burgess, 3 De Gex, M. & G. 896; Von
Mumm V. Frash, 56 I'ed. 830.
Having decided that defendant's acts constitute a fraud upon plaintiff, and that a court
of equity will administer relief, the question
then presents itself, what shall be the form of
the decree/
How may the court reach the
wrong y The defendant had the right to erect
his building, and erect it in any style of architecture his fancy might dictate.
He had the
right to erect it in the particular locality where
it was erected. He had the right there to conduct a business similar to that of plaintiff.
He had a right to do all these things, for, of
themselves, they did not offend against equity;
but when they were done with a fraudulent
Intent, when they were done for the purpose
of tolling away the customers of plaintiff by
a deception, a fraud is practiced, and equitywill do what It can to right the wrong. The

decision of the trial court In effect ordered defendant to place signs both Inside and outside
his building, showing to the.world the proprietorship thereof.
We think this decree holds
defendant to a rule too strict, in that it requires the proprietorship
of the store to be
In this particular we think the decree
shown.
should be modified so as to require that, the
defendant, in the conduct of this business, shall
distinguish his place of business from that In
which the plaintiff is carrying on Its business,
In some mode or form that shall be a sufficientIndication to the public that It Is a different
place of business from that of the plaintiff.
For the foregoing reason, the judgment in this
respect only is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to the trial court to modify
the same, as heretofore suggested; and thereupon it is ordered that said judgment stand
Appellant is to pay the costs of this
affirmed.
appeal.

We concur:

HARRISON, J.; VAN FLEET,

REFORMATION.
PURVINES

et al. v.

HARRISON.

(37 N. E. 705, 151 111. 219.)
Supreme Court of Illinois.

Error

to circuit court,

June

Sangamon

16,

1894.

county.

BiU by Frances A. Harrison against Frances Purvines and others.
Complainant obtained a decree. Defendants bring error.
Affirmed.
Conkling & Grout, for plaintiffs in error.
Wm. J. Butler and Connolly & Mather, for
defendant in error.

MAGRUDER, J. This is a biU filed on
July 18, 1890, by the defendant in error, Frances A. Harrison,

the mother of Peyton Asbury Purvines, deceased, by a former husband, against Frances Purvines, the minor
daughter and only child of said Peyton Asbury Purvines, deceased; Samuel H. OlaspiU,
the guardian of said minor; Alfred B. Purvines, the administrator of said deceased;
and Edvrard Wyatt, a tenant occupying the
premises hereinafter referred to under a lease
from the complainant in the bill. The bill is
filed for the purpose of reforming a deed of
about 60 acres of land, executed by the defendant in error to her son, said Peyton A.
Purvines, in his lifetime. The deed sought
to be reformed bears date January 31, 1889,
Vfas acknowledged August 30, 1889, and recorded on September 2, 1889.
It is a warranty deed, and conveys about 60 acres of
land in Sangamon county to the grantee.
The bill alleges that it was the intention of
the complainant and her deceased son to insert words in the deed reserving to her a
life estate in the land, so that she could have
the use of it, and the rents from it, as long
as she lived; but that, by the mutual mistake of the parties to the deed, and by an
oversight on the part of the scrivener who
drew it, such reservation was unintentionally
omitted from the deed.
The prayer of the
bill is that the deed be reformed by inserting therein a reservation of the life estate to
the grantor.
A guardian ad litem was appointed for the minor, who answered; and
answers denying the allegations of the biU
were filed by said guardian and tenant, to
which replications were filed.
After proofs
taken and hearings had, the circuit com^t
rendered a decree finding the allegations of
the biU to be true, and directing that the
deed be reformed in the respect mentioned,
and that such reformation take effect as of
the date of the deed, and that the rents and
profits of the land after that date should belong to the complainant
Evidence was introduced showing that an
inquisition as to the insanity of the complainant was had in the county court of said county, and a verdict of the jury was returned
therein on January 25, 1892, finding her to be
an insane person; and thereafter her insanity was suggested in the present suit, and one
B. F. Irwin was appointed to prosecute the
Application had beea
same as next friend.
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previously made to the court. In March, 1890,
for the appointment of a conservator for defendant in error as a distracted person, but
upon the trial of the issue whether she was
a distracted person verdict had been returned
in her favor. Some evidence was introduced
tending to show that when she made the deed
her mind had begun to fail, and she showed
not theretofore
signs of absent-mindedness
noticeable in her. Her son, Peyton A. Purvines, had been divorced from his wife before he died, and his habits up to the time of
his death were those of a very intemperate
man.
There is no evidence, however, that he
practiced any fraud upon his mother in order
He lived with her at
to obtain the deed.
that time upon a farm of 80 acres, owned by
her, and the consideration as expressed in the
deed is "one dollar, and natural love and affection." He died unmarried and intestate
on February 22, 1890, leaving, as his only
child and heir at law, the minor plaintiff in
error, Frances Purvines.
After a careful examination of the evidence, we think that both
parties executed the deed under a common
or mutual mistake, and did what neither of
them intended to do.
Warrick v. Smith, 137
m. 504, 27 N. B. 709.
To justify the reformation of a written instrument upon the
ground of mistake, it is necessary — First, that
the mistake should be one of fact, and not of
law (Sibert v. McAvoy, 15 lU. 106); second,
that the mistake should be proved by clear
and convincing evidence (2 Pom. Eq. Jm*. §
862); third, that the mistake should be mutual and common to both parties to the instrument (Sutherland v. Sutherland, 69 111. 481).
A mistake of law is an erroneous conclusion
as to the legal effect of known facts.
Hurd
V. Hall, 12 Wis. 113.
The construction of
words is a matter of law. Sibert v. MoAvoy,
supra.
Where parties instructed an ofGlcer
to prepare a quitclaim deed for their execution, but he drew a deed containing language
which amounted in law to a covenant of title
in fee, and they signed the deed knowing that
such language was in it, they were held to
have been mistaken in the law, — that is to
say, in the legal effect of the language used, —
and in the legal consequences of retaining
such language in the deed. Gordere v. Downing, 18 lU. 492.
Mistake of fact has been defined to be a mistake, not caused by the neglect of a legal duty on the part of the person
making the mistake, and consisting in an unconscious ignorance or f orgetfulness of a fact,
past or present, material to the contract, or
belief in the present existence of a thing material to the contract which does not exist, or
in the past existence of a thing which has not
existed.
2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 839.
It is manifest that the mistake in the present case was
one of fact, and not one of law, because it
had reference to the accidental omission from
the deed of words which were intended to ba
inserted therein; that is to say, words reserving to the grantor a life interest
In Sibert
V. McAvoy, supra, we said: "It is where par-
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Intended to Insert words in a contract
wliich were by accident omitted that equity
can reform tlie contract by inserting them.
* * * The insertion of words is a matter
It is for mistakes of fact alone
of fact.
that contracts may be reformed." Nor can
it be said in this case that the mistalie occurred on account of any want of reasonable
diligence to ascertain the facts, or on account
of any neglect, amounting to a violation of
2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 856.
legal duty.
Where
the relation of the parties Is one of confidence, such as that which existed here between mother and son, and where a party
executing the contract has a failing or weak
mind arising from suffering or old age, the
same degree of vigilance and care is not expected or required as is expected or required in the ordinary dealings of men with
Day v. Day, 84 N. C. 408.
one another.
In
Day V. Day, supra, a deaf and aged father
made a deed to his son, in whom he reposed
confidence, conveying a tract of land in fee,
but omitting, either by mistake or contrivance of the son, under whose direction the
deed was drawn, to reserve a life estate to
the grantor; and it was held that an equity
arose in favor of the father to have such instrument reformed in accordance with the
original intention of the parties.
Counsel for
plaintiffs in error claim that the evidence
does not show want of mental capacity in the
defendant in error, or want of capacity on
her part to understand
the ordinary affairs
of life. This may be true.
The proof shows
merely a weakening of the mental povs^ers,
growing out of domestic trouble, and grief
for the recent death of her aged parents.
ties

This proof was not Introduced for the purpose of showing such insanity as would
avoid the deed; but in a proceeding to reform the deed It tended, in connection with
the relations of the parties and other attending circumstances,
to excuse any apparent
want of care in examining the phraseology of
the deed.
We think that the proof of a
mutual mistake was clear and convincing.
The burden of proof was upon the complainant, but the defendants offered no testimony
whatever to contradict her witness.
Some
time after the deed was executed the deceased applied for a loan of money to be secured by mortgage upon his interest in the
land. He then discovered for the first time
that his mother's life estate had not been reserved in the deed.
There is abimdant evidence, given by quite a number of witnesses,
that he admitted the mistake, and stated that
it was the Intention and agreement to retain
a life estate for her in the deed, and that he

intended to correct the mistake.
He died,
however,
without doing so. These declarations, made many times, and challenged by
no opposing evidence, were admissions against
his own interest.
It is well settled that parol
proof may be received to show a mistake in
a written instrument.
McLennan v. Johnston, 60 lU. 306.
For the reasons here stated, and deeming it unnecessary
to enter into
a detailed
discussion
of the evidence, we
think that the decree of the circuit court was
correct, and it is accordingly aflirmed.
Affirmed,

PHILLIPS, X, having heard this case In
the circuit court, took no part here.
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Appeal from an order of the general term
of the supreme court in the Sixth district,
affirming a judgment of the special term in favor of the plaintiff.
The action was brought for the reformation
of a deed executed by the plaintiff, he claiming that a reservation of certain timber had
been omitted, through mistake on his part;
and also for an accounting by the defendant
for timber talien from the premises conveyed.
An accoimt was ordered to ascertain the
value of the lumber taken since March 10,
1851.
The referee found the value at $2,041.72.

Upon the coming in of the referee's report,
judgment was entered for the plaintiff that
the deed be reformed and corrected, and that
he have judgment for the value of the timber removed by the defendant.
This judgment was affirmed by the general term in the
Sixth district, and the defendant appeals to
the court of appeals.
The facts appear from
the opinion of the court.
E. H. Benn, for appellant.
for respondent.
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sider in detail the fifteen points presented
the appellant,
and so ably argued by
counsel.
The discussion of a few of them
settle principles that may serve to decide

by
his

will
the

case.

The complaint, in substance, alleged that on
the 28th of May, 1846, the plaintiff was the
owner of one hundred and ten acres of land,
being lot No. 4; that on that day he sold the
same by executory contract, with the timber
thereon, to T. & T. Trevor, for $17 per acre.
That on the 7th day of December, 1846, he
was the owner of lot No. 5, containing one
hundred and forty-one acres, and then entered
into an agreement with the same parties, by
which they undertook to cut the timber standing thereon, manufacture the same into boards
and planks, and to give the plaintiff one-half
of the lumber thus manufactured.
Certain
other details were provided, which it is not
necessary to specify. At the same time, the,
plaintiff entered into an executory contract
with the same persons, for the sale of the one
hundred and forty-one acres, at $4 per acre.
That these two pieces of land were of the
same value; that the timber growing on the
latter piece was of the value of $5,000, and
that such timber, in the understanding of
the parties, was reserved to the plaintiff by
and
the manufacturing contract mentioned,
that the price of $4 per acre was for the land
simply, the timber reserved to the plaintiff.
That, after proceeding for some time in the
manufacture of the lumber, the purchasers
became embarrassed, and the defendant took
their place in the contract, and without new

That the defendant well knew all of the
facts in the complaint recited.
The plaintiff
then avers "that through and by mistake he
failed to insert in the said last-mentioned deed
(of the one hundred and forty-one acres) any
reservation of the timber mentioned and embraced in the contract secondly above mentioned;" and also avers demand and refusal
to amend.
The prayer is that the deed may
be corrected, so as to be made to contain a
reservation of the timber, and that the plaintiff may have an accounting as to the timber
taken and removed by the defendant.
The judge found that there was an error
and mistake on the part of the plaintiff, as
averred by him. He found also that there
was no mistake on the part of the defendant,
but that he well understood the plaintiff's error. He knew that the timber was not reserved, and he knew that the plaintiff supposed and understood
that It was reserved.
He received the deed, failing to correct the
plaintiff's error, but intending to reap the
profits of it. He knew that he received of
the plaintiff's estate $4,000 or $5,000 more
than the plaintiff Intended to give him, or than
he supposed he had given him. The mistake
was unilateral; on the part of the plaintiff
only.
On the part of the defendant, there was
no mistake, but something worse.
It was a
fraud, as palpable as if he had made affirmative representations to induce the error; as
gross as If he had put his hands in the plaintiff's pocket and feloniously abstracted his
money. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 187, 137, 140, 147,
152, 153, 167, 168, 191, 214-217;
Waldron v.
Stevens, 12 Wend. 100; Wiswall v. Hall, 3
Paige, 313; Hill v. Gray, 1 Starkle, 434; 2
E. C. L. 167.
The point here arises, can there be a judgment to reform the contract, there not being
a mutual error, but error on one part and
fraud on the other?
It is laid down in many authorities reported and elementary works, that there must be
a mutual error, to authorize this interposition
of a court of equity. See Story, Eq. Jur.
§ 155; Story v. Conger, 30 N. Y. 673; Nevius
V. Dunlap, 33 N. Y. 676; Lyman v. United
States Ins. Co., 17 Johns. 376. The cases where
this general statement is made are very numerous, and it is well said that to exercise this
power, where one party only has been in error
and the other has correctly understood
would be making
new contract for the parties, and would be doing Injustice to the party
who made no mistake. On this point two distinctions may be noticed.
1st. Those cases
wlU be found to have in them the element of
the honesty on the part of the one correctly
Where two parunderstanding the contract.
contract, and an error is
ties enter into

it,

N. Y. 525.)
of New York.

of Appeals

Commission

further negotiations, a calculation was
made of their payments, the balance found
and an absolute
due paid by the defendant,
deed of the two pieces of land, without reservation of the timber, made by the plaintiff
to the defendant.
or

a
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claimed by one party to exist on an Important
point, which Is claimed to be correct by the
other party, it cannot be amended, as against
the party correctly understanding it, he acting
in good faith, and supposing the other to have
understood the contract as he did. This rule
does not apply where there is fraud. Either
fraud or mutual mistake will authorize the
reformation. See authorities supra; De Pey-

ster V. Hasbrouck, 11 N. Y. 582; and Gillespie
V. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. 585; Barlow v. Scott,
24 N. Y. 40; Rider v. Powell, 28 N. Y. 310.
In his supplementary points the appellant expressly concedes this proposition.
of an existing
2. This is the consummation
contract, about the terms of which there was
no dispute.
This contract it was attempted
to perform. There has been a failure to perform it, by the misunderstanding, on the part
of the plaintiff, of the effect of the instrument
by which performance was attempted.
A reformation is permitted in such case, although
the mistake be not mutual. See the cases before cited, and Coles v. Bowne, 10 Paige, 534.
The result of the cases justifies a reformation of a contract, when there is either a mutual mistake, that is, a mistake common to
both parties, or when there is fraud. In his
complaint, the plaintiff has simply stated the
facts on which he claims relief. After setting forth the facts, he adds, that by mistake,
he failed to insert in the deed a reservation of
the timber.
He does not charge that it was a
mistake common to both parties. Nor does he
charge it to have been a fraud. He gives no
name to the conduct of the defendant.
The
facts, as found by the referee, and the judgment rendered by him, are in conformity to
They estabthe allegations of the complaint.
lish, not a mutual or common error, but an
error on the part of the plaintiff and fraud on
the part of the defendant.
The defendant, by the judgment of the court
upon the facts, occupied the place of the original contractors and undertook to perform
This was the finding of the
their contract.
judge, and the evidence, with the circumstanThe fraud was in
ces, justified this finding.
If the judgment of
the deceitful performance.
the court below is carried out, he wiU not be
made a party to a new contract, which he
would never have assumed. He did assume
He therefore became
the original contract.
bound by it. When the court now compel him
to abandon his fraudulent contract, he is remitted to the original agreement.
He has no
ground therefore to say that by being convicted of a fraud, he is compelled to enter
Nor is he to be relieved
into a new contract.
by the rule that a party seeking to be relieved
from fraud, must be ready, prompt and eager
In his demand for redress. When a party
seeks to rescind a contract, on the ground of
fraud, he must undoubtedly be prompt and
He has the elecready in his disaffirmance.
If he elects the
tion to affirm or disaffirm.
latter he must do it at once. He is not permitted to hesitate and balance advantages.
Masson v. Bovet, 1 Denio, 69; Beers v. Hen-

drlckson, 6 Rob. (N.
Miller, •42 N. Y. 517.

T.) 54; Tomllnson v.

In the present case the party does not ask
to have the contract rescinded.
He does not
seek to have it declared void. On the contrary
he insists that it Is valid. He asks that it
may read exactly as the parties originally
agreed, and that all its parts may be completely performed.
In such case the rule is that
the party must show himself ready and eager
for its performance.
1 Story, Bq. Jur. § 776.
The plaintiff has given sufficient evidence of
his readiness and eagerness to perform.
there has been an unreasonable delay in seeking relief, the court will refuse it. Id., and 1
Fonbl. Eq. bk. 1, c. 6, § 2, note e. It is a
question of discretion in the court whether
under all the circumstances of time, repeated
applications and refusals, the condition,
knowledge, expectations and hopes of the parties, the relief should be granted.
There is no
positive or rigid rule, like that existing in the
case of an attempted rescission.
am satisfied with the decision on this point of the court
below, and the judge trying the cause. 1
Story, Eq. Jur. § 529; Bidwell v. Insurance
Co., 16 N. y. 268.
The court having jurisdiction of the cause to
amend the contract, thereby acquired the right
incidentally to give relief in damages, or in
such mode as justice required.
Rathbone v.
Warren, 10 Johns. 587; Kempshall v. Stone,
5 Johns. Ch. 193;
Woodcock v. Bennett, 1
Cow. 711; Bidwell v. Insurance Co., 16 N.
Y. 263; Story, Eq. § 794; Bundle v. Allison,
34 N. Y. 180.
The defendant contends further, that no
damages can be recovered by the plaintiff for
timber that was cut more than six years before the commencement of the action. The
argument of the defendant's counsel is that
the reformation of the deed is merely a means
by which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for the timber taken, and that its correction is simply a part of the evidence to authorize him thus to recover;
that his claim
is therefore a legal one and cannot extend
back beyond six years. The authorities cited
by the defendant do not sustain this position.
The most plausible is that of Borst v. Corey,
15 N. y. 505, which was an action to enforce
In equity a lien for the unpaid purchase-money
of land. The court held that the action could
not be sustained, for the reason that the debt
sought to be enforced was barred by the statute of limitations. The debt they held to be
the principal, the lien the Incident, and the
principal being ended the incident could not
At the same time the court conbe enforced.
ceded that where a mortgage was given to secure the payment of a simple contract debt,
the lapse of six years was no bar to an action
to foreclose the mortgage.
The authority of
Mayor v.- Colgate, 12 N. Y. 140, was conceded, where an assessment was attempted, to be
enforced more than six years after the assessment had become due and payable.
In the
present case the question is not whs-t action
can be sustained after the deed Is reformed,
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Out what action could have been sustained before Its reformation? The reformation had
not occurred when the suit was commenced,
and the right of the parties was determined
by the unreformed deed. That deed conveyed
to the defendant without reservation, the one
hundred and forty-one acres In question. It
carried with It complete title to the trees.
The plaintiff could not have sustained an action for their conversion.
He would have
been told that defendant had a legal title. The
reformation of the deed In the present case
is the principal and not the Incident.
Damages are the Incident, not the principal. It is
the title which the judgment of reformation
gives that warrants the claim for damages;
not the claim for damages that creates the
legal title. Complete justice and nothing more
is done by the judgment in this respect as It
stands.
The defendant also Insists that In the view
that the recovery against the defendant is
sustained upon the groimd of fraud and not
of mutual mistake, the cause of action Is barred In six years from the discovery of the
fraud. He further says that the judge has
expressly found as a fact that the cause of
action has not accrued within six years from
the commencement of the suit.
have looked
through the testimony carefully, and do not
find any evidence that the plaintiff discovered
the fraud perpetrated upon him as early as
six years before the commencement of the

I

I

suit. He did undoubtedly discover his own
error soon after Its occurrence, and applied
to the defendant's agents for its correction.
He says that "he had confidence in them and
expected all would have gone on as though It
had been reserved." In other words, he had
discovered his own mistake and believed it
to be a mutual mistake, which the defendant
would willingly rectify. He says further of
"He seemed willing to
the defendant's agent:
They proposed leaving it out.
do something.
They never told me could not have the timber. They always gave me to understand that
they would settle it in some way. They always gave me to understand that they would
do something about It. Neither of them ever
should not have so given the deed,
told me
if did not mean to part with the timber."
This evidence does not show a knowledge of
the fraud. It does not show the plaintlfE's
knowledge that the defendant knew, when he
took it, that the deed conveyed the absolute
ownership of the trees, and that the plaintiff
was Ignorant of that fact, but supposed the
trees were reserved, and that the defendant
failed to correct his error. It does not even
show that he supposed the defendant meant
to Insist upon retaining the benefits of the error. It shows rather that the plamtlfC was
constantly deluded with the idea that the misThe judge has not
take would be corrected.
found that the plaintiff discovered the fraud
'within more than six years before suit brought,
and there was no evidence on which he could
have been justified in so finding.

I

I

I
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When the cause of action accrued In this
Is a question of law. It was either
when the transaction occurred or when the
fraud was discovered.
The judge has found that the cause of action did not accrue within six years before
suit brought. He states. In his opinion, that
the action being to reform the contract, and
the accounting being Incidental, the action
falls under the ninety-seventh section of the
Code, which requires It to be brought within
He fixes the
ten years after action accrued.
occurrence
of the transaction as the time
from which by law the statute begins to
run. The defendant now asks us to hold
this as a conclusive finding of fact, that the
fraud was discovered more than six years
before suit brought. This we cannot do.
Upon the theory that the running of the
statute begins with the date of the occurrence more than six years had elapsed, and
such was the theory of the judge trying the
cause. On the theory that it runs from the
discovery of the fraud, there is no such finding, nor is there evidence to prove It. All
presumptions are in favor of the judgment,
and the contrary must be taken to be the
fact.
I have thus considered the most Important
of the questions raised by the appellant.
There are several other objections stated in
the points, which
have also examined.
They furnish no valid ground for asking a
reversal of the judgment.
A majority of the court concur in the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. A
majority of the court do not concur with me
on the question of damages, and are of the
opinion that the recovery of damages for a
period exceeding six years prior to the comThe
mencement of the suit was erroneous.
judgment of the court will therefore be, that
the judgment of the general term be affirmed, without costs of the court of appeals to
either party, provided that the plaintiff shall,
within thirty days after the entry of this order, serve on the defendant's attorney a
stipulation, deducting from the judgment of
April 6, 1863, the sum of $2,407.45 as of that
If such stipulation be not served, then
date.
the judgment shall be reversed and a new
trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.
In case the attorneys do not agree as to the
details of the judgment, the same can be settled before one of the commissioners.
case

I

I

EARL, 0. (dissenting). As
cannot concur with my brethren in this case, I will
briefly give the reasons for my dissent.
No mistake is alleged In the contracts, and
And unno reformation of them is claimed.
der no allegations or proof could the contracts be reformed, as a cause of action, for
such purpose, would be barred by the statute of limitations.
If, as claimed by the plaintiff in his complaint, and by his counsel on the argument
before us, the deed was given in pursuance
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and In fulfillment of the contracts, then there
can be no reformation of the deed, as it Is
in precise conformity to the contracts. If
the two contracts of December 7, 1846, are
construed together, they must be read as if
embodied in one; and the timber is not reserved, and the contract does not provide for
any reservation in the deed. The vendees
were to get out certain lumber upon shares,
and were to pay $4 per acre besides.
The
contract In reference to the lumber was a
binding contract and, if performed as the
parties contemplated, it would be fully performed before the deed was required to be
given; and such was manifestly the intention of the parties, and hence no provision
was made for any reservation in the deed.
The deed was griven without any mention of
the lumber, and hence the only claim the
vendor could thereafter have, upon the lumber contract, was to sue for damages on ac-

count of its non-performance.
The only contract the defendant ever made
or intended to malie, as found by the referee,
is that which is embodied in the deed.
He
never intended or was willing to take a
deed with any reservation in it. What right
then has a court of equity to reform the deed,
so as to give him such a deed as he was
never bound to take? There was never a
time when, by action for specific performance, he could have been compelled to tate
a deed with a reservation, and the court has
no right to compel him to take such a deed
by the reformation of the one he did take.
If by fraud or mistake on his part, the
plaintiff was induced to give this deed, the
only relief he could have was to set aside
the deed; and to obtain this relief, it was
his duty, on the discovery of the fraud or
mistake, to proceed promptly and not ratify
the deed by taking the money on the note
given for the purchase-price, after he discovered the mistake or fraud.
As I understand the opinion in which my
brethren have concurred, it sustains the relief granted to the plaintiff, upon the ground
of fraud, and yet the complaint does not in
any way intimate even that the defendant
was guilty of any fraud, nor does it allege
that the defendant used any artifices to procure the deed to be drawn with the reservation omitted, or that he knew it was omitted.
The charge of fraud should have been distinctly made In the complaint, so that the defendant could have taken Issue jpon It.
And It does not appear that any claim was
made, at the trial, that the defendant was
guilty of fraud, and the case was manifestly
not tried upon any such theory. The judge
at special term did not put his decision upon
If he had, he would
the ground of fraud.
certainly have decided against the plaintiff,
under bis finding as to the statute of limita"That within a month
tions, as follows:
after the execution of said deed, the plainand shortly
tiff dlscov«-ed said mistake,
thereafter applied to the defendant to cor-

the same, which he neglected and refused to do; but proceeded to cut large quantities of said timber and appropriate the
same to his own use; that the cause of action
for which this suit is brought has not accrued to the plaintiff within six years before
the commencement
of this suit."
The learned judge evidently proceeded and
granted relief upon the ground that the scrivener made a mistake In drawing the deed,
and this was the ground upon which the general term placed its decision of affirmance.
The cause of action for the mistake was not
barred by the statute of limitations, because
the action was commenced within ten years
from the time the alleged mistake occurred.
A cause of action, for such a fraud as is
now alleged in this case, is deemed to accrue,
when the aggrieved party discovers the facts
constituting the fraud, and it is barred in six
years from that time.
Code, § 91.
All the
fraud, if any, that was perpetrated in this
case was in procuring and taking the deed
without the reservation, and this was discovered, according to the finding of the judge,
more than nine years before the suit was
commenced, and hence I cannot be mistaken
in saying that relief was granted at Special
Term upon the ground of mistake alone, and
not of fraud.
And still further, the counsel for respondent in his argument before us, did not claim
to sustain the judgment below upon the
ground of fraud, but upon the ground of mistake alone.
Hence under all the circumstances I cannot
consent to uphold this judgment, or any part
of it, upon the ground of fraud, against the
decisions of both courts below, the claims of
plaintiff's counsel, and the explicit finding of
the judge at special term, that the cause of
action for fraud was barred by the statute of
limitations. It was the duty of the plaintiff
to show that he discovered the fraud within
six years before the commencement of the
suit, and there can be no pretense that he
gave any evidence to show this.
I concur with my brethren in holding that
In any view of the case the plaintiff could recover only for timber cut within six years before the suit was commenced.
rect

For affirmance, as modified: LOTT, 0. C,
HUNT and LEONARD, CO.
For reversal: EARL and GRAY, GO., not

and

voting.

Judgment affirmed without costs to either
party In the court of appeals, provided the
plaintiff within thirty days after the entry
of this order, serves on the defendant's attorney a stipulation reducing the judgment
$2,407.45 and interest from the date of the
judgment, April 6, 1863. If such stipulation
be not served, then the judgment is reversed
and a new trial ordered, costs to abide the
event.

Judgment affirmed.

CANCELLATION.
TOWN OF VENICE v. WOOUKUFF.
(62 N. Y. 462.)
Cowt of Appeals of New York.

1875.

Appeal from supreme court, genei~dl term.
This was an action to secure the cancellation cf certain bonds issued by the supervisor
and railroad commissioners
of the plaintiff
town, and to restrain the defendants,
who
were the holders of those bonds, from transferring them. There was a finding of fact
by a referee, tlie material part of which appears in the opinion.

RAPALLO, J. The referee has found that
all of the bonds, which the plaintiff seeks by
this action to have' delivered up and canceled, were made and issued without the
requisite consent of two-thirds of the tax
payers of the town. That fact, according to
the decisions of this court, rendered the bonds
void, even in the hands of bona fide holders.
Starin v. Town of Genoa, 23 N. Y. 439;
People v. Mead, 24 N. Y. 114, 36 N. Y. 224.
It was further held in these cases that the
burden of proving the requisite consent of
the tax payers rested upon the party seeking
to enforce payment of the bonds, and that
the affidavit directed by the act under which
the bonds purported to be issued, to be filed
with the consent, was not evidence of the
requisite consent. It is therefore settled by
the adjudications of this court that no recovery can be had in an action upon these
bonds, without afiirmative extrinsic proof of
The fact being found
the requisite consent.
that such consent was not given, it is clear
that a perfect defense to the bonds exists,
should an action be brought upon them in
any court of this state, either by the present
holders of the bonds, or by any person to
whom they may be transferred.
Upon this state of facts the question arises,
whether an equitable action can be maintained by the town to restrain the holders of
the bonds from suing upon or transferring
them, and to compel the surrender and cancellation of the instruments.
The cases in which a court of equity exercises its jurisdiction to decree the surrender
and cancellation
of written instruments are,
in general, where the instrument has been
obtained by fraud, where a defense exists
which would be cognizable only in a court of
equity, where the instrument is negotiable,
and by a transfer the transferee may acquire
rights which the present holder does not poseess, and where the instrument is a cloud
upon the title of the plaintiff to real estate.
Under the chancery system, where a bill of
discovery was necessary to esti*)lish a defense, the court having acquired juri-idiction
of the case for the purpose of discovery,
might proceed and award relief, but this
ground of jurisdiction no longer exUts. It is
true that the jurisdiction of the «x)urt of
chancery has been asserted to decree the surrender of every instrument which ought not to
HUTCH.& BUNK.EQ.— 50
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whether void at law or not, and
whether void from matter appearing on its
face, or from matter which must be established by extrinsic proof. Hamilton v. Cummings, 1 Johns. Ch. 520-522, 523. But Chancellor Kent in the case cited, in asserting this
jurisdiction recognizes the necessity of showing strong grounds for the exercise of the
power, and endeavors to reconcile the apparently conflicting English authorities by adverting to the general principle that the exercise of the power is to be regulated
by
sound discretion,
as the circumstances
of
the individual case may dictate, and that a
be enforced,

resort to equity, to be sustained,
must be
expedient
either because the instrument is
liable to abuse from its negotiable nature;
or because the defense not arising on its
face may be difficult or uncertain at law;
or from some other special
circumstances
peculiar to the case, and rendering a resort
to equity highly proper.
And it is now well
established that equity will not interpose to
decree the cancellation
of an instrument,
the invalidity of which appears upon its face.
Story, Eq. Jur., § 700, a.
There must exist some circumstance
establishing the necessity of a resort to equity,
to prevent an injury which might be irreparable, and which equity alone is competent to avert.
If the mere fact that a defense exists to a written instrument were
sufficient
to authorize
an application to a
court of equity to decree Its surrender and
cancellation,
it is obvious that every controversy in which the claim of either party
was evidenced by a writing could be drawn
to the equity side of the court, and tried in
the mode provided for the trial of equitable
actions, instead of being disposed of in the
ordinary manner by a jury.
Whether therefore the question be regarded
as one of jurisdiction or of practice, it is established by the later decisions that some
special ground for equitable relief must be
shown, and that the mere fact that the instrument ought not to be enforced is insufficient, standing alone, to justify a resort to
an equitable action.
Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 374; Minturn v. Fai-mers' Loan
6 Trust Co., 3 N. Y. 498; Perrine v. Striker,
7 Paige, 598; Morse v. Hovey, 9 Paige, 197;
Field V. Holbrook, 6 Duer, 597; Allerton v.
Belden, 49 N. Y. 373; Reed v. Bank of Newburgh, 1 Paige, 215, 218.
In the present case in so far as the invalidity of the bonds results from the want
of consent of the tax payers, there is no
ground whatever shown for resorting to an
equitable
action. Not only is the want of
the consent a perfect defense at law, but the
onus of proving the consent is upon the
party seeking to enforce the bond; and the
court cannot assume that he will be able to
establish a fact that does not exist, and of
which there is no documentary evidence. If
it be said that the town may by delay lose
evidence now existing, which would be avail-
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able to meet and rebut false testimony, one
decisive answer is that the statutes now protestivide a summarj' mode of perpetuating
mony in all cases, and an action is not necessary for that purpose. The case Is analogous
6 Duer, 597,
to those of Field v. Holbrools,
and Allerton v. Belden, 49 N. Y. 373.
It is urged that the action should be sustained for the purpose of preventing a transfer of the bonds to a bona fide holder. This
court has held that such a transfer could
not prejudice the plaintiff, as the defense
would be available even against a bona fide
holder.
Starin v. Town of Genoa, 23 N. Y.
439.
But it is said that although such is
the rule in this state, a different rule has
been adopted in the courts of the United
States, and the bonds might be transferred
to a bona fide holder, who might sue in those
courts.
There would be force in this arguin the
ment provided it were established
(_ase that the present holders of the bonds
In that case it
were not bona fide holders.
might be proper for a court of equity to
prevent their subjecting the town to liability
by a transfer of the bonds. But if they are
themselves
bona fide holders, there is no
justification for interfering with the right of
transfer. In contemplation of law the transferees would acquire no greater rights than
are possessed by the present holders.
The real pui-pose of the litigation seems to
be to prevent a resort to the courts of the
United States for the collection of these
bonds; and the question is, whether it is the
province of a court of equity in a state to
a
interfere for the purpose of preventing
resort to the federal courts for the enforcement of obligations on the ground that they
may be held in those courts to be valid,
while according to the decisions of the state
are held to be
courts the same obligations
void. I apprehend that the power of a court
of equity to decree the surrender and canhas never
before
cellation
of instnrments
been appealed to or exercised for such a
purpose. Equity will interfere to control the
action of parties and restrain them from
transferring negotiable obligations,
on the
ground that it is against conscience to allow them to create in their transferee a right
or equity which they themselves ao not possess. But where the effect of a transfer is
not to change in any respect the rights or
am not prepared
equities of the parties,
to hold that the allegation that the transferee
might resort to a tribunal in which a rule of
or may prevail, differing
decision prevails,
from that of the court which is asked to enjoin the transfer, is sufficient to justify the
interference asked. The wrong sought to be
prevented by such a proceeding is not any
wrongful act of any party, but a decision of
another court. The facts of the case and the
abstract rights of the parties are not changed
by the transfer. The greatest effect it can
have is to enable a transferee to sue in a
court to which the present holder could not

I

This, In general, would not be reas any wrong which a court of equity
would restrain. If it is a wrong in this
case it must be on the assumption that the
federal court will render a decision at variI am
ance with the decision of this court.
of opinion that such an apprehension is not
a legitimate ground for the action of a court
of equity in restraining a transfer or directing the cancellation
of the instrument.
There is no finding that the present holders
are not bona fide holders of the Donds. As
the judgment entered upon the report of the
it
referee was in favor of the defendants
could not be disturbed
unless facts were
found showing that the conclusions of law
were erroneous.
We have held over and over
again that the facts showing error m the
legal conclusions
must be found, and that
the appellate court will not search for them
in the evidence. In this case the findings
are in favor of the bona fides of the defendants. As to five of the bonds it is found
that they were sold and delivered by the
supervisor and railroad commissioner
to
Hutchinson & Murdock, who paid for them
par in cash. This finding is not weakened
by the further finding that the money was
in the first instance advanced on a pledge
of the bonds which was subsequently converted into a sale. As to the twenty bonds
which were issued direct to the railroad company, the referee finds that the holders purchased them without being informed that
they had been delivered directly to the company.
No fact is found impeaching the bona
fides of the holders of any of the bonds, and
therefore it does not appear that any transfer
of them can be made which will confer upon
the transferees any greater equities than are
possessed by the present holders.
The fact that twenty of the bonds were
delivered directly to the railroad company instead of being sold by the railroad commissioners, is relied upon as a ground for
granting relief as to those bonds. In the
case of People v. Mead, 24 N. Y. 124, 125, it
seems to be considered that this fact would
not constitute
a defense, even in the state
court, as against a bona fide holder of the
bonds. But to entitle the town to atflrmative equitable relief on that ground, it should
have been made to appear that the defendants were not bona fide holders;
which, as
has already been shown, the plaintiff has
failed to do.
Another ground urged in support of the
claim to equitable relief is, that it is necessary for the purpose of avoiding a multiplicity of suits; and the case of New York
& N. H. R. Co. V. Schuyler, 17 N. Y. 592,
and 34 N. Y. 30, is referred to as an authority in point.
But that case was essentially different from the present. There the
defendants
all claimed shares in the same
corporation, which had authority to issue only
a limited number; shares had been issued
in excess of that limit, and some of them
resort.
garded
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The spurious shares were
held to be a cloud upon the title of the holders of the genuine shares, and the corporation was held to be the proper representative
of the genuine stockholders to seek the interposition of the court to remove that cloud.
Here was a solid ground upon which the
plaintifC could found its application for relief.
The plaintiff having this standing in court, it
was held that all the alleged spurious shareholders
properly joined as defendwere
ants. But jurisdiction was not entertained
on the sole ground that the holders of spurious shares were numerous.
In the present
case there is no question of any cloud upon
the title. The plaintiff seeks to nave canpurportceled certain written
instruments
ing to be obligations for the payment of
money, which are held by various independent owners.
If it fails to make out a case
which would sustain an action for that purpose against any one of them alone, the
mere fact that there are several such holders is not of itself sufficient ground for entertaining the suit. If the facts were such
as would have sustained the action against
one person had he been the holder of all the
bonds, then the case of the New Haven Railroad Company would be an authority in
favor of the position, that if there were several holders all might be joined as defendants. But it does not support the position,
that the mere fact that numerous independent parties hold separate instruments upon
which they might bring separate suits is sufficient to justify a court of equity in entertaining an action by the debtor to compel
them to litigate their claims in an action in
the form which he selects.
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I

am inclined
Under any circumstances,
to concur with Judge Talcott, in the opinion
that a court of equity would not interfere
affirmatively to relieve the plaintiff against
these bonds, except upon condition that it
surrendered
what it had received for them.
The relief sought is discretionary with the
court;
and the plaintiff is not entitled to it
as matter of absolute right. Actions of this
by the
class are in that respect governed
same rules which apply to actions for specific performance; and relief will never be
granted except upon equitable terms, where
the case is such as to call for the imposition
of terms. Story, Eq. Jur., §§ 692, 693, 696,
and cases cited section 742. But the reasons
before given
deem sufficient to sustain the
conclusion of the referee dismissing the com-

I

plaint.
There is great doubt whether the defense
of the statute of limitations is available in
this case. In respect to the limitation of
time it is analogous in principle to an action
to remove a cloud upon the title to land; and
in such cases I do not understand the rule to
be that the statute runs from the time the
See Miner v. Beekcloud was first created.
man, 50 N. Y. 338; Hubbell v. Medbury,
53 N. Y. 99; Arnold v. Hudson R. R. Co.,
55 N. Y. 661.
On the ground that the facts of the case
are insufficient to justify the interposition
of a court of equity to decree the surrender
and cancellation of the bonds, or to restrain
their transfer, so much of the judgment as
is appealed from should be affirmed, with
costs.

All

concur;

CHURCH,

Judgment affirmed.

C.

J.,

not sitting.
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We learn from the record of this case that
de la Camara recovered
a judgment
in the supreme court of New York, against
Ferdinand Clark, for $4,688.49, with interest
at seven per cent.; that a fieri facias was
issued upon the Judgment, and that there
was a return upon it of "no goods, chattels,
or real estate of the defendant to be levied
upon." Upon this return, Camara filed a
creditor's bill, before the chancellor of the
First circuit in the state of New York, setting
out his judgment and the return upou the
fieri facias, in which he seeks, under the
laws of that state, to subject the equitable
assets and choses in action of Clark to his
judgment; and he asks for a discovery of
them from Clark, for an injunction, and the
appointment of a receiver.
Notice of this
and of the action upon it were
proceeding,
served upon the solicitor of Clark, and the
bill of complaint was taken as confessed,
upon the defendant's default in not answerBooth, the present complainant, was
ing.
appointed receiver on the 3d August, 1842.
Clark had been previously enjoined under
the proceeding from making any disposition
of any part of his estate, legal or equitable.
Thus matters stood from the time of the receiver's appointment, in 1842, until June,
Then Booth, as receiver, reports that
1851.
no effects of Clark had come to his knowledge, except a claim upon Mexico, which had
been adjudged to Clark by the United States
commissioners,
under the treaty with Mexico; and that, as receiver, he was contesting it; and he asks from the court authority
for that purpose, which was
to proceed
Such is an outline of the case in
granted.
New York, containing every substantial part
of it.
We will now state the proceedings of this
suit at the instance of the receiver, in the
circuit court of the United States for the
District of Columbia, from the decision of
which, dismissing the receiver's bill, it has
been brought to this court for revision.
On the 29th May, 1851, Booth, the receiver,
filed his bill in the circuit court for the District of Columbia, reciting so much of the
of the New York courts as was
proceedings
deemed necessary to support his suit. He
declares that Clark, when the original suit
was instituted against him by Camara, and
from that time until after he had been appointed receiver, had resided in New York.

Juan

That his effects consisted principally, If not
wholly, of the claim upon Mexico, and that
he claimed that fund as receiver for the
purposes
of that appointment. Clark answered the bill. He denies that the proceedings against him in the courts of the
state of New York created any lien in behalf
of Camara, or the receiver, upon the fund
in controversy. He admits that no part of
his property ever came into receiver's hands,
under those proceedings, and that he had the
claim upon Mexico whilst the suits were
pending against him, and when the receiver
was appointed under Camara's creditor's
bill; but that all the evidences and papers
in support of his Mexican claim were then
He
in the public archives at Washington.
also states, that the board of commissioners
under the act of congress of March, 3, 1849
(9 Stat. 393, 992), entitled "An act to carry
into effect certain stipulations of the treaty
between the United States and the republic
of Mexico, of the 2d February, 1848," had
made an award in his favor for the sum of
which sum was then in the hands
$86,780.29,
of the secretary of the treasury of the United States.
He then alleges that, being a
resident of the state of New Hampshire, he
filed in the clerk's office of that district, on
the 28th .January, 1843, his petition to be
declared a bankrupt.
That he had been declared a bankrupt on the 22d March following, pursuant to the "A-^t to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the
States," passed August 19, 1841 (5
T^nited
Stat. 440).
He then recites that there had
been attached to his petition in the bankrupt's court, a schedule of his property,
rights, and credits of every kind and description, in which his Mexican claim had
been stated;
and that it was upon that
claim the commissioners had awarded to him
the sum before
mentioned.
He declares
that, under the decree of the court in bankruptcy, one John Palmer had been appointed
assignee;
and that, having given his bond
in compliance with the order of the court,
he was vested, as assignee, in virtue of the
opei'ation of the bankrupt law, of all the
defendant's property, for the benefit of his
creditors, including the Mexican claim. It
is also stated in his answer, that notice of
all the proceedings in his matter of bankruptcy had been published in the leading
newspapers of New Hampshire, and that
the name of Juan de la Camara, and his
residence, was placed among the list of his
creditors attached to his petition to be declared a bankrupt. And he avers that all
of his creditors had had notice of the proceedings in bankruptcy.
That neither Camara nor any other creditor had filed or made
any objections to those proceedings, or to the
action of the assignee, until after the award
had been made upon the Mexican claim.
It is not necessary, for the purposes of
this opinion, to state the defendant's recital
of the sale of his effects by Palmer, the as-
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signee; his purchase of them, including the
Mexican claim, or the rights claimed by
the defendant under his purchase, all relating to the same having been fully acted upon by this court at this term, in the case of
Ferdinand Clark v. Benjamin C. Clark and
W. H. Y. Hackett We state, however, that
Palmer, the original assignee in Clark's bankruptcy, having died, he had been succeeded
by the appointment of Hackett as assignee.
This suit, then, is substantially between
Hackett, as the assignee of Clark in bankruptcy, and Booth, the receiver under Camara's creditor's bill; that it may be determined by this court, which of them has the
official right to the Mexican fund, for the
distribution of it between the creditors of
Clark, or whether Booth, as receiver, shall
have from that fund a sufficient sum to pay
Camara's entire debt, leaving the residue of
it for distribution between Clark's other
creditors.
It appears also from the record that Booth,
the receiver, took no steps to execute his
official trust, from the time of his appointment in 1842, until 1851, after the award of
the Mexican claim had been made In Clark's
favor. And, also, that the court of chancery, acting upon the creditor's bill brought
by Camara, had not been applied to, either by
Camara or by the receiver, for any order upto coerce his comon Clark in personam,
pliance with its injunction and decree.
Upon this statement of the case, we will
now consider it. There is no dispute concerning the regularity or binding operation
of the judgment obtained by Camara against
Clark.
None in respect to the proceedings
under the creditor's bill. The leading point
in the case is the effect of the proceedings
under the last, to give a right to the receiver,
in virtue of a lien which he claims upon the
property of the debtor, to sue for and to
recover any part of it, legal or equitable,
without the jurisdiction of the state of New
In other words, as an officer of a
York.
court of chancery, for a particular purpose,
will he be recognized as such by a foreign
judicial tribunal, and be allowed to take
from the latter a fund belonging to a debtor,
for its application to the payment of a peltticuiar creditor within the jurisdiction of
the receiver's appointment, there being other
creditors in the jurisdiction in which he
now sues, contesting his right to do so. Or
can he as receiver claim, in virtue of a decree upon a creditor's bill given in one jurisdiction, a right to have the judgment upon
which the creditor's bill was brought, paid
out of a fund of a bankrupt debtor in a forbecause his appointment
eign jurisdiction;
preceded the bankrupt's petition.
It is urged that the receiver in this case,
by the decree of the court in New York, was
entitled officially to the entire property of
Clark, real, personal, or equitable, both within and without the state of New York. That
he could, as receiver, maintain any action
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for the property and rights of property of
the debtor which the latter could have done.
That the fund now in controversy was a
chose in action, belonging to the debtor when
the receiver was appointed, and, though not
within the state of New York, that it followed the person of the owner and passed to the
receiver, because the owner was domiciled
in New York.
And it was also said that,
having such official rights or liens upon the
property of the debtor, the comity of nations
would aid him in the assertion of them in
a foreign tribunal.
The counsel for the receiver cited from the reports of the state of
New York several cases in support of tlie
foregoing propositions.
We have perused
all of them carefully, without having been
able to view them altogether as the learned
counsel does.
Whatever may be the operation of the decree in respect to the receiver's
powers over the property of the debtor within the state -of New York, and his right to
sue for them there, we do not find any thing
in the cases in the New York reports showing the receiver's right to represent the creditor or creditors of the debtor in a foreign jurisdiction. It is true that the receiver in this case
is appointed under a statute of the state of
New York, but that only makes him an officer of the court for that state.
He is a representative of the court, and may, by its direction, take into his possession every kind
of property which may be taken in execution, and also that which is equitable,
if
of a nature to be reduced into possession.
But it is not considered in every case that
the right to the possession is transferred by
his appointment; for, where the property
is real, and there are tenants, the court is
virtually the landlord, though the tenants
may be compelled to attorn to the receiver.
Jeremy, Eq. Jur. 249. When appointed, very
little discretion is allowed to him, for he
must apply to the court for liberty to bring
or defend actions, to let the estate, and in
most cases to lay out money on repairs, and
he may without leave distrain only for rent
in arrear short of a year.
6 Ves. 802; 15
Ves. 26; 3 Brown, Ch. Cas. 88; 9 Ves. 335;
1 Jac. & W. 178; Morris v. Elme, 1 Ves. .Tr.
139;
Id. 165; Blunt v. Clithero, 6 Ves. 799;
Hughes V. Hughes, 3 Brown, Ch. Cas. 87;
5 Madd. 473.
A receiver is an indifferent person between
parties, appointed by the court to receive
the rents, issues, or profits of land, or other
thing in question in this court, pending the
suit, where it does not seem reasonable to
the court that either party should do it
Wyatt's Prac. Reg. 355. He is an officer of
the court; his appointment is provisional.
He is appointed in behalf of all parties, and
not of the complainant or of the defendant
only. He is appointed for the benefit of all
parties who may establish rights in the
cause.
The money in his hands is in custodia legis for whoever can make out a title
Delany v. Mansfield, 1 Hogan, 234
to it.
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It Is the court itself which has the care of
the property in dispute.
The receiver is but
the creature of the court; he has no powei's
except such as are conferred upon him by
the order of his appointment and the course
Verplanck v. Inand practice of the court.
surance Co., 2 Paige, Ch. 452. Unless where
he is appointed under the statute of New
York, directing proceedings against corporations (2 Rev. St. 438), and then he is a standing assignee, vested with nearly all the
powers and authority of the assignee of an
Attorney General v. Life
insolvent debtor.
In the
& Fire Ins. Co., 4 Paige, Ch. 224.
case just cited. Chancellor Walworth says,
that the receiver has "no powers except such
as are conferred upon him by the order of
his appointment and the course and practice
of the court." In the statement which has
been made of the restraints upon a receiver,
we are aware that they have been measurably qualified by rules, and by the practice of the courts in the state of New York,
as may be seen in Hoffman's Practice; but
none of them alter his official relation to the
court, and, so far as we have investigated
the subject, we have not found another instance of an order in the courts of the state
of New York, or in the courts of any other
state, empowering a receiver to sue in his
own name officially in another jurisdiction
for the property or choses in action of a
Indeed, whatever may be
judgment debtor.
the receiver's rights under a creditor's bill,
to the possession of the property of the debtor in the state of New York, or the permissions which may be given to him to sue for
such property, we understand the decisions
of that state as confining his action to the

state of New York.
Such an inference may be made from sevIt may be inferred from
eral decisions.
what was said by Chancellor Walworth, in
Mitchell V. Bunch, 2 Paige, Ch. 615. Speaking of the property which might be put into
the possession of a receiver, and of the power of a court of chancery to reach property
out of the state, he declares the manner in
which it may be done, thus: "The original
and primary jurisdiction of that court was
in personam merely. The writ of assistance
to deliver possession, and even the sequestration of property to compel the performance of a decree, are comparatively of reThe jurisdiction of the court
cent origin.
was exercised for several centuries by the
simple proceeding of attachment against the
bodies of the parties to compel obedience to
Its orders and decrees. Although the property of a defendant is beyond the reach of
the court, so that it can neither be sequestered nor taken in execution, the court does
not lose its jurisdiction in relation to that
property, provided the person of the defendBy the orant is within the jurisdiction.
dlnaiy course of proceeding, the defendant
may be compelled either to bring the property in dispute, or to which the defendant

claims an equitable title, within the jurisdiction of the court, or to execute such a
or transfer thereof as will be
conveyance
sufficient to vest the legal title, as well as
the possession of the property, according to
It is very obvious,
the lex loci rei sitae."
from the foregoing extract, that up to the
time when Mitchell v. Bunch was decided,
in the year 1831, it had not been thought
that a court of chancery in the state of New
York could act upon the property of a judgment debtor in a creditor's bill which was
not within the state of New York, but by
the coercion
of his person when he was
within the jurisdiction of the state;
and
that it had not been contemplated then to
add to the means used by chancery to enforce its sentences, in respect to property
out of the state of New York, the power to
a receiver to sue in a foreign jurisdiction for
the same. It is true that the jurisdiction of
a court of chancery in England and the
United States, to enforce e(luitable rights,
is not confined to cases where the property
is claimed in either country, but the primary
in the chancery courts of both
movement
countries to enforce an injunction, is the attachment of the person of the debtor, where
he is amenable
of the
to the jurisdiction
court.

We find in the second volume of Spence on
the Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery in
England (pages 6, 7), this language: "When,
therefore, a case is made out against a person resident within the jurisdiction of the
court, in respect to property out of it, but
within the empire,
or its dependencies,
which would call for the interference of
the court of chancery if the property were
situate in the country, the court, as it had
the power,
has assumed
the jurisdiction,
when such an interference is necessary to
the ends of justice, of enforcing the equitable rights of the parties to or over property
out of its jurisdiction, by the coercion of
the person and sequestration of his property
here, in the same manner as it would have
done had the property been situate in this

country." And Sir John Leach said: "When
parties defendants are resident in England,
and are brought upon subpcEna here, the
court has full authority to act upon them
personally, with respect to the subject of
the suit, as the ends of justice require, and
with that view to order them to take or to
omit to take any steps or proceedings in any
other court of justice, whether in this or
in a foreign country. This court does not
pretend to any interference with the other
courts."
It acts upon the defendant by
punishment for his contempt, for his disobedience of the court.
The court of chancery has no power directly to afCect property out of the bounds of its jurisdiction.
Roberdeau v. Rous, 1 Atk. 544; 2 Spence.
We believe such to be the proper course, in
chancery, in cases of injunction, and that its
jurisdiction, by injunction, rests entirely on
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the coercion of the person.
Such, however,
was not the course pursued in this case,
though the debtor was then a resident of
the state of New York, and amenable to the
jurisdiction of the court. No motion was
made to force Clark to comijly with the injunction which Oamara had obtained under
the creditor's bill. The matter was allowed
to rest for seven years, Camara being aware
that Clark had a pecuniary
claim upon the
republic of Mexico, at least as early as in
the year 1843.
The receiver during all that
time took no action. His first movement is
an application to be permitted to sue for the
fund in the hands of the government, which
had been awarded to Clark by the commissioners under the treaty with Mexico. Permission was given to sue. He has brought
his bill accordingly, and it directly raises
the question, whether he can, as an oflScer
of the court of chancery in New York, and
in his relation of receiver to Camara. be
permitted to sue in another political jurisdiction.
We have already cited Chancellor Walworth's opinion as to the course which is to
be pursued in New York upon an injunction
in a creditor's
bill.
Mr. Edwards, in his
excellent work on Receivers in Chancery,
after citing the language used in Mitchell v.
Bunch, says: "Still, the difficulty remains
as to a recognition of the powers or officers
of the court, by persons holding a lease upon
the property, especially realty, out of the
jurisdiction.
Then in Malcolm v. Montgomery, 1 Hogan, 93, the master of the rolls observed, that a receiver could not be effectually appointed over estates in Ireland, by
the English court of chancery, in any direct
proceeding for the purpose; and that attempts had often been made to do so by
serving orders made by the English court of
chancery, but that they had failed, because
the English court of chancery has no direct
means of enforcing payment of rent to its
receiver, by tenants who reside in Ireland.
The attorney-general and another counsellor
also said, that to their knowledge such attempts had been frequently made, but had
been uniformly given up as impracticable.
A conflict might also arise between the receiver out of the jurisdiction and creditors,
and also other persons out of the jurisdiction. The comity of nations and different
tribunals would hardly help a receiver."
We also infer, from the case of Storm v.
Waddell, 2 Sandf. 494, that the receiver's
right to the possession of the property of a
debtor in the state of New York, and his
right to sue for property there, is limited to
in the
The chancellor,
that jurisdiction.
last case mentioned, after having given an
epitome of the cause of proceeding in a creditor's bill, and speaking of equitable interests and things in action belonging to the
debtor,
without regard to the injunction,
says: "The property of the defendant is subjected to the suit, wherever It may be, if
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the receiver can lay hold of it, or the comThe
plainant can reach it by the decree.
injunction, when served, prevents the debtor

from putting it away or squandering it." This
locality of
language indicates the receiver's
action.
Taken in connection with that of
Chancellor Walworth, in Mitchell v. Bunch,
it shows that the receiver's right to the
possession of the debtor's property is limited
and
to the jurisdiction of his appointment,
that he has no lien upon the property of the
debtor, except for that which he may get
the possession of without suit, or for that
which, after having been permitted to sue
for, he may reduce into possession in that
way. Our industry has been tasked unsuccessfully to find a case in which a receiver
has been permitted to sue in a foreign jurisdiction for the property of the debtor.
So far as we can find, it has not been allowed in an English tribunal; orders have
been given in the English chancery for receivers to proceed
to execute their functions in another jurisdiction, but we are not
aware of its ever having been permitted by
the tribunals of the last.
We think that a receiver has never been
recognized by a foreign tribunal as an actor
in a suit.
He is not within that comity
which nations have permitted, after the manner of such nations as practise it, in respect
to the judgments and decrees of foreign tribunals, for all of them do not permit it in the
same manner and to the same extent, to
make such comity international or a part of
the laws of nations.
But it was said that receivers in New York are statutory officers,
as assignees in bankruptcy are. That being
so, he had, as assignees in bankruptcy have
upon the property of the bankrupt, a lien upon the property of a judgment debtor, under
an appointment in a creditor's bill. But that
cannot be so.
An assignee in bankruptcy
in England, and in this country when it had
a bankrupt law, is an officer made by the
statute of bankruptcy, with powers, privileges, and duties prescribed by the statute,
for the collection of the bankrupt's estate
for an equal distribution of it among all of
his creditors.
In England, the property of the bankrupt
is vested in the assignees in bankruptcy by
legislative enactment.
Where commissioners
have been appointed,
it is imperative upon
them to convey to the assignees the property of the bankrupt, wherever it may be
or whatever it may be, and it is done by
deed of bargain and sale, which is afterwards enrolled.
It vests the assignees with
the title to the property from the date of
the conveyance,
it having been previously
vested in the commissioners
for conveyance
by them to the assignees.
As to the bankrupt's personal estate, the statute looks beyond the debts and effects of a trader within the kingdom, and vests them in the commissioners in every part of the world. The
last is done in England, upon the principle
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that personal property has no locality, and
is subject to the law which governs the person of the owner.
As by that law the property of a bankrupt becomes vested in the
assignee, for the purposes of the assignment,
his title to such property out of England
is as good as that which the owner had, except where some positive law of the country, in which the personal property is, forbids it. CuUen, 244.
In claiming such a recognition of assignees
in bankruptcy from foreign courts, England
does no more than is permitted in her courts,
for they give effect to foreign assignments
made under laws analogous to the English
bankrupt laws.
1 H.
Solomons
v. Ross,
Bl. 131, note; JoUet v. Deponthieu, Id. 132,
note.
But such comity between nations has
It
not become international or universal.
was not admitted in England until the middle
of the last century in favor of assignees in
bankruptcy. Lord Raymond decreed it in
of bank1811, in the case of a commission
Sir Joseph Jekyll, in
ruptcy from HoUand.
1715, said, the law of England takes no notice of a commission in Holland, and therefore a creditor here may attach the effects
in the city of London, and proceed to condemnation.
3 Burge, 907.
Lord Mansfield,
in Warring v. Knight, (sittings in Guildhall,
after Hilary term, Geo. HI.) Cooke, Bankr.
Law, 200, 3 Burge, 907, ruled, that where
an English creditor proceeded subsequent to
an act of bankruptcy, by attachment in a foreign country, and obtained judgment there
and satisfaction by the sale of the debtor's
personal property, the assignees in an action
In England could not recover from such creditor the amount of the debt which had been
Again, his lordship ruled,
remitted to him.
that the statutes of bankrupts do not extend
to the colonies or any of the king's dominions out of England, Lut the assignments unare, In the courts
der such commissions
abroad, considered as voluntary, and as such
take

place

between

the

assignee

and

the

bankrupt, but do not affect the rights of any
other creditors.
So the law stood in England until the case
of Folliott V. Ogden, 1 H. Bl. 123, when
Chancellor Northington stimulated it into a
larger comity, by giving effect to a claim
to the creditors of a bankrupt in Amsterdam
over an attaching creditor in England, who
had proceeded after the bankrupt had been
declared to be so, by the proper tribunal in
Amsterdam. England had just then become
the great creditor nation of Europe, and of
her provinces in North America. Her interest prompted a change of the rule, and her
courts have ever since led the way in extending a comity which had before been deThe judicial history of the
nied by them.
change, until the comity in favor of assignees became in England what it now is,
is given in 3 Burge, c. 22; Bankr. Laws,
inclusive,
and from 912-929.
886, 906-912,
It may now be said to be the rule of comity

between the nations of Europe; but It has
never been sanctioned in the courts of the
United States, nor in the judicial tribunals
of the states of our nation, so far as we
know, and we know that it has been repeatedly refused in the latter.
Our courts,
when the states were colonies, had been
schooled, before the Revolution, in the earlier doctrines of the English courts upon the
subject.
The change in England took place
but a few years before the separation of the
two countries.
That comity has not yet reached our courts.
We do not know why it should do so, so
long as we have no national bankrupt laws.
The rule which prevailed whilst these states
were colonies still continues to be the rule
in the courts of the United States, and it is
not otherwise between
of the
the courts
states.
It was the rule in Maryland, before
the Revolution.
It is the rule still, as may
be seen in Birch v. McLean, 1 Har. & McH.
286; Wallace v. Patterso^,
2 Har. & McH.
463.
An assignment abroad, by act of law,
has no legal operation in Pennsylvania. We
find from McNeil v. Colquhoon, 2 Hayw. (N.
C.) 24, that it has been the rule in North
Carolina for sixty years. South Carolina has
no other.
1 Const. (S. C.) 283; 4 McCord,
519; Taylor v. Geary, Kirby, 313.
In Massachusetts,
the courts will not permit an
as^nment in one of the states, whether it
be voluntary or under an insolvent law,
to control an attachment in that state of the
property of an insolvent which was laid after
the assignment,
and before payment to the
assignees.
The point occurred recently in the
circuit court of the United States for that
district. In the case of Betton v. Valentine,
1 Curt. 168;
and it was ruled that the assignee of an insolvent debtor, appointed under the law of Massachusetts,
does not so
far represent creditors in the state of Rhode
Island as to be able to avoid a conveyance
of personal property in the latter state, good
as against
the insolvent,
but invalid as
against creditors, by the law of Rhode Island.
In New York, the "ubiquity of the operation
of the bankrupt law, as respects personal
property,"
was denied in Abraham v. Plestoro, 3 Wend. 538. Chancellor Kent considers it to be a settled part of the jurisprudence
of the United States, that a prior assignment
under a foreign law will not be permitted to
prevail against a subsequent attachment of
the bankrupt's effects found in the United
States.
The courts of the United States will
not subject their citizens to the inconvenience
of seeking their dividends abroad, when they
have the means to satisfy them under their
own control. We think that it would prejudice the rights of the citizens of the states
to admit a contrary rule.
The rule, as it is
with us, affords an admitted exception to the
universality of the rule that personal property has no locality, and follows the" domicile
of the owner. This court, in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, disclaimed the English
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doctrine upon this subject; and in Harrison
V. Sterry, 5 Orancli, 289, 302, this court declared that the banlirupt law of a foreign
country is incapable of operating a legal
transfer of property in the United States.
Such being the rule in the American courts,
in respect to foreign assignments in bankruptcy, and in respect to such assignments as
may be made under the insolvent laws of the
states of the United States, there can be
no good reason for giving to a receiver, appointed in one of the states under a creditor's bill, a larger comity in the courts of
the United States, or in those of the states
or territories. On the contrary, strong reasons may be urged against it.
A receiver
is appointed under a creditor's bill for one
or more creditors, as the case may be, for
their benefit, to the exclusion of all other
creditors of the debtor, if there be any such,
as there are in this case. Whether appointed as this receiver was, under the statute
of New York, or under the rules and practice
of chancery as they may be, his official relations to the court are the same. A statute
appointment neither enlarges nor diminishes
the limitation upon his action.
His responsibilities are unaltered.
Under either kind
of appointment,
he has at most only a passive capacity in the most important part of
what it may be necessary for him to do,
until it has been called by the direction of
the court into ability to act. He has no extra-territorial power of official action; none
which the court appointing him can confer,
with authority to enable him to go into a
foreign jurisdiction to take possession of the
debtor's property; none which can give him,
upon the principle of comity, a privilege to
sue in a foreign court or another jurisdiction,
as the judgment creditor himself might have
done, where his debtor may be amenable
to the tribunal which the creditor may seek.
In those countries of Europe in which foreign judgments are regarded as a foundation
for an action, whether it be allowed by treaty
stipulations or by comity, it has not as yet
In
been extended to a receiver in chancery.
the United States, where the same rule prevails between the states as to judgments
and decrees, aided as it is by the first section of the fourth article of the constitution,
and by the act of congress of 26th May,
1790 (1 Stat. 122), by which full faith and
credit are to be given in all of the courts
of the United States, to the judicial sentences of the different states, a receiver under
a creditor's bill has not as yet been an actor
as such in a suit out of the state in which
This court considered the
he was appointed.
effect of that section of the constitution, and
of the act just mentioned, in McElmoyle v.
But apart from the
Cohen, 13 Pet. 824r-327.
absence of any such case, we think that a
receiver could not be admitted to the comity
extended to judgment creditors, without an
entire departure from chancery proceedings,
the
as to the manner of his appointment,
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securities which are taken from him for the
performance of his duties, and the direction
which the court has over him in the collection of the estate of the debtor, and the application and distribution of them.
If he
seeks to be recognized in another jurisdiction,
it is to take the fund there out of it, without
such court having any control of his subsequent action in respect to it, and without
his having even official power to give security to the court, the aid of which he seeks,
for his faithful conduct and official accountability. All that could be done upon such an
application from a receiver, according to
chancery practice, would be to transfer him
from the locality of his appointment to that
where he asks to be recognized, for the execution of his trust in the last, under the
coercive ability of that court; and that it
would be difficult to do, where it may be asked to be done, without the court exercising
its province to determine whether the suitor,
or another person within its jurisdiction, was
the proper person to act as receiver.
Besides, there is much less reason for allowing the complainant in this case to be recognized as receiver for the fund out of the
state of New York, and in this jurisdiction,
even if the practice in chancery in respect
to receivers
was different from what we
have said it was.
The remedies which the
judgment creditor in New York had under
his creditor's bill against his debtor, were not
applied as they might have been in that
state, according to the practice in chancery
in such cases. When Clark had been enjoined under the creditor's bill, and the receiver had been appointed,
both judgment
creditor and receiver knew at the time, —

certainly, as the record shows, in a short
time afterwards,— that Clark had a pecuniary
claim upon the republic of Mexico. No attempt was made, according to chancery practice, to coerce Clark by the attachment of
his person under the injunction, to make an
assignment of that claim for the payment of
Camara's judgment. It cannot be said that
Clark had not property to assign, and that
it was therefore unnecessary to attach him.
That would make no difference; for whether
with or without property, he might have
been compelled to make a formal assignment, even though he had sworn that he had
none.
It was so ruled in Chipman v. Sabbaton, 7 Paige, 47, and in Fitzburgh v. Everingham, 6 Paige, 29.
There was a want of vigilance In this matter, which does not make any equity which
he may have in New York upon Clark's property, superior to that of Clark's creditors,
who are pursuing the funds in this district.
Nor, according to the rule prescribed in the
United States, that personal property has no
locality on account of the domicile of the
owner, to transfer it under a foreign assignment, can the receiver have In this case any
thing in the nature of a lien to bind the
property of Clark not within the state of
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New York. When we take Into consideration
also the origin of the fund in controversy,
from
the manner of its ultimate recovery
Mexico, the congressional action upon it, in
it, after the
to secure
every particular,
awards were made, to those who might be
entitled to receive It; the jurisdiction given
to the circuit court of this district, with an
appeal from its decision to this court, upon

the principles which govern courts of equity
to adjudge disputes concerning It, and that
such cases were to be conducted and governed in all respects as in other cases in equity,
we must conclude that the complainant in this
case, as receiver, cannot be brought under
the rule prescribed
for our decision.
We
concur with the court below in the dismission of the bill.
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Appeal from the circuit court for the West-

ern district of Texas, the case being thus:
The state of Texas had at the times hereinafter named, certain public lands.
A general land office was established at the capital of the state for the registration of titles

and surveys, and the lands were divided
when surveyed into sections of six hundred
and forty acres each.
One Kuechler was
the chief of this office, under the title of the
"commissioner
of the general land office."
All certificates for the public lands were issued by this commissioner; and all patents
were issued under the seals of the state
and

the

general

land

office,

and

were

re-

quired to be signed by the governor and countersigned by the said commissioner. These
certificates were evidences of obligation on
the part of the state to grant and give a
patent to the holder for a certain amount
therein mentioned of the vacant and unreserved public lands of the state; when the
certificates are located and surveyed, and the
surveys returned to the commissioner and
by him, a patent, conveying the
approved
fee, is executed as above mentioned.
In and about the year 1856, and for many
years thereafter the state of Texas, though
of great extent, was, as it still Is, sparsely
inhabited, while its public domain was far
from markets, and without connection with
the more settled parts of the country; and
It was greatly to the Interest of the state
to attract immigration and capital.
To produce this result It became the settled policy
of the state to make grants and reservations
of public lands to corporations, conditioned
upon the construction of certain amounts of
In pursuance
railroad within certain times.
of this policy the Memphis, Bl Paso & Pacific Railroad Company, was incorporated
February 4th, 1856, by the state of Texas,
to build a railroad across the state from
the eastern boundary to El Paso, with a land
grant of 16 sections to the mile; certificates
for 8 sections per mile to be issued on the
grading of successive lengths of road, and
8 more

per mile

upon the complete

construc-

tion of the same;
and a reservation was
granted of the alternate or odd sections of
land for eight miles on each side of the road,
within which the company should have an
exclusive right to locate its certificates,
while it also had the privilege to locate said
certificates on any other unappropriated publie lands.
This reservation, of course, was of the
greatest value, as it enabled the company
of the enhancement
to reap the advantage
ot price which the construction of the road
by them would cause in the lands along the
line.
In the same year of 1856 the company
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was organized in reliance on the grants, and
especially on the reservation, and duly accepted the same.
There were certain conditions precedent
to the vescing of the charter, land grant,
ana reservation; but they were all complied with, and at a cost to the company
for surveys of over $100,000. These and
subsequent
surveys resulted, for the company, in the official designation of the road line
and the center line of the reservation for some
800 miles, and the "sectionizing"
and numbering of the odd sections of land in said reservation In a belt of country some 250 miles in
length and 16 in width; and for the state
In the surveying and mapping of the same
belt of country and the "sectionizing" and
numbering of the alternate or even sections
for the benefit of the state. The company
also graded some 65 miles of road westerly
from Moore's Landing, in Bowie county, and
was interrupted in the work of construction
by the rebellion and so-called "secession" of
Texas; but resumed work after the war, and
graded between 20 and 30 miles further,
from Jefferson in Marion county, in the di-

rection of Moore's Landing.
There were certain conditions subsequent
annexed to the charter, viz.: That if the
company should not have completely graded
not less than 50 miles of their road by the
1st of March, 1861, and at least 50 miles
additional thereto within two years thereafter, then the charter of said company
should be null and void.
The first 50 miles
were graded within the required time; the
second 50 miles have never been graded.
Within two years after the performance of
the ifirst

condition,

however,

the

legislature

of Texas, by act "for the relief of railroad
approved February lith, 1862,
companies,"
enacted, that the failure of any chartered
railroad company to complete any section,
or fraction or a section, of Its road as required by existing laws, should not operate
as a forfeiture of its charter, or of the lands
to which the said company would be entitled
under the provisions of an act entitled "An
act to encourage the construction of railroads
in Texas by donation of land," approved
January 30th, 1854; provided that the said
company should complete such section, or
fraction of a section, as would entitle it to
donations of land, under existing laws, within two years after the close of the war between the Confederate States and the United
States of America.
Within the two years
after the close of the war, the provisional
legislature, by act of November 13th, 1866,
enacted, "that the grant of 16 sections of
land to the mile to railroad companies heretofore or hereafter constructing railroads in
Texas shall be extended, under the same restrictions and limitations heretofore provided
by law, for 10 years after the passage of
this act;"
and by article 12, section 33, of
the present constitution
of Texas, while declaring that the legislatures which sat from
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March ISth, 1861, to August 6th, 1806, were
without coustitutional authorltj-, yet enacted
that such declaration should not affect, prejudicially, private rights which had grown
up under such acts, and that though the legislature of 1800 was only provisional, its
acts were to be respected, so far as they
were not in violation of the constitution and
laws of the United States.
By act of July 27th, 1870, the Southern
Transcontinental Railroad Company was incorporated,
and it was enacted, in terms,
that it might "purchase the rights, franchises, and property
El
of the Memphis,
Taso & Pacific Railroad Company, heretofore
incorporated

by the state."

The laud grant was limited to fifteen years
from the 4th of February, 1856, but this
time had not yet expired, and by an act of
November 13th, 1866, for the benefit of railroad companies,
it was enacted, that this
grant of 16 sections of land to the mile to
railroads theretofore or thereafter constructing railroads in Texas, should be extended
under the same restrictions and limitations
provided
theretofore
by law, for ten years
after the passage of this act.
The land reservation was conditioned upon certain surveys:
(1) It was to be surveyed
from the eastern boundary of Texas, as far
as the Brazos river, within four years from
March 1st, 1850.
(2) The centre line of the
reser\e was to be run and plainly designated
within
from the Brazos to the Colorado
from February 10th, 1858.
fifteen months
(3) The whole reservation was to be surveyed
within ten years from February 10th. 1S,")8.
was to have a connection
(4) The company
with some road leading to the Mississippi
river or the Gulf of Mexico, within ten years
The first and
from February 10th, 1858.
second of these conditions were fulfilled withThe legislature, by act
in the times limited.
approved January 11th, 1862, enacted that
of the present
'•the time of the continuance
war between the Confederate States and the
United States of America shall not be computed against any Internal improvement company in reckoning the period allowed them in
their charters, by any law, general or special,
for the completion of any work contracted by
them

to do."

This act the company considered extended
the time for the performance of the third and
fourth conditions till the 10th of June, 1873.

In the years 1807 and 1868 the company
executed two series of bonds, known as land
grant bonds, amounting in the aggregate to
the par value of $10,000,000 in gold, and
also executed and delivered to one Forbes
and others, trustees as aforesaid, two mortgages to secure said bonds, by one of which
they mortgaged all lands actually acquired
or thereafter to be acquired by said company by grading, constructing, and equipping
the first 150 miles of the road of said company, from Jefferson in Jlarion county to
Paris in Lamar county, and by the other of

the like property for
from Paris to Palo
Pinto in Palo Pinto county.
These bonds
were put on the bourse in Paris, France, and
sold for value to the extent of $5,343,700 of
their par value, mostly in small lots, and to
persons of limited means.
The grants, guarantees, and assurances by the state of Texas
and
te said company of the said franchises,
especially of said land grant and land reservation, were recited in said mortgages, and
were also announced
and repeated to the
purchasers personally,
and by advertisement
and prospectus, and the purchasers took the
bonds relying on said grants, and upon the
exclusive right of the company to locate certiflcatea within the territory so reserved.
The bonds not being paid the circuit court
for the Western district of Texas, on motion
of Forbes, trustee under the mortgage, on
the 6th of July, 1870, enjoined the railroad
company from disposing of any of its effects,
and put the road into the hands of one John
"To take possesA. C. Gray, as receiver:
sion of the moneys and assets, real and personal; roadbed, road, and all property, whatEl Paso &
soever, of the said Memphis,
Pacific Railroad Company, wheresoever the
same may be found, with power under the
special order of the court, from time to time
to be made, to manage, control, and exercise
all the franchises, whatsoever, of said company, and, if need be, under the direction of
the court, to sell, transfer, and convey the
of said
road, roadbed, and other property
company, as an entire thing," &c.
On the 20th of January, 1871, it was fur"That the said
ther ordered by the court:
John A. C. Gray, receiver, as aforesaid, be,
and he is hereby, authorized and empowered
to defend and continue all suits brought by or
El Paso & Paagainst the said Memphis,
whether before or
cific Railroad Company,
after the appointment of said receiver, and
whether in the name of said company or
otherwise;
defend all suits brought against
him as such receiver or affecting his receivership, and to bring such suits in the name
of said company, or in the name of said receiver, as he may be advised by counsel to
be necessary and proper In the discharge
of
the duties of his office, and for acquiring,
and protecting
the assets, fransecuring,
chises, and rights of the said company and
of the said receiver, and for securing and
protecting the land grant and land reservation of the said company."
In November, 1869, the present constitution of Texas was adopted, and was approved
by congress.
The fifth and sixth [seventh]
sections of this constitution are as follows:
"Sec. 5. All public lands heretofore reserved for the benefit of railroads or railway companies shall hereafter be subject to location
and survey by any genuine land certificates."
"Sec. 7. All lands granted to railway companies which have not been alienated
by
said companies in conformity with the terms

which they mortgaged
the

second

150

miles,
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of their charter respectively
and the laws
of the state under which the grants were
made, are hfereby declared forfeited to the
state for the benefit of the school fund."
The constitutional convention which framed this constitution
passed an ordinance to
the effect that all heads of families actually
settled
on vacant lands lying within the
Memphis & El Paso Railroad reserve, shall
be entitled to and receive from the state of
Texas 80 acres of land, including the place
occupied, on payment of all expenses of survey and patent;
and that all vacant lands
lying within said reserve are declared open
and subject to sale to heads of families actually settled on or who may actually settle
on said reserve, at the price of one dollar
per acre; and that said vacant lands within
said reserve shall be open to pre-emption settlers, and subject to the location of all genuine land certificates.
There were in 18G9, and were on the 20th
of January, 1871, when Gray was ordered
by the court to bring such suits in the name
of the company as he might be advised by
and proper in the
counsel were necessary
discharge of the duties of his ofilce, a great
outstanding and
number of land certificates
unlocated in Texas. Since the passing of
the said ordinance, and the adoption of the
said constitution, many hundreds of the holders of certificates other than those issued to
had located their certificates
the company
on the sections reserved to the company, had
returned their surveys and locations to the
of the general land office, and
commissioner
Before
had applied for patents on the same.
1870,
Commisthe 19th day of September,
Davis, prosioner Kuechler and Governor
fessing to act under the said constitutional
On the
issued 2 of such patents.
provisions,
lOth of September, 1870, the receiver filed a
against issuprotest with the commissioner
ing any further patents for lands reserved to
the company, but the commissioner and govthe protest and issued 32
ernor disregarded
the
additional patents within the reserve;
whole of the land thus patented amounting
to nearly 20,000 acres.
Hereupon on the same 20th of January,
1871, Gray, who was a citizen of New York,
filed a bill in the court below against one
Davis, governor of the state of Texas, and
Kuechler, already mentioned as commissionThe biller of the land office of the state.
averring that "the Memphis, El Paso & Pacific Railroad Company" is "a corporation
created by and existing under certain statutes
of Texas," already referred to, and that it
had done "all acts and things necessary to
the full and complete vesting, securing, and
preserving of the franchises, rights, and privileges granted thereby"— set forth a history
It averred that the
much as above given.
was insolvent, and could not concompany
tinue the construction of the road, and that
the holders of said bonds would necessarily
be remitted to the security of the mortgages;
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that the said security was worthless unless
the receiver, under order of court, should be
able to sell the franchises and property of
said company to some party or parties who,
by constructing the road, should acquire the
lands referred to in the mortgages, and hold
It set
the same subject to the lien of them.
forth that the general laws of Texas authorized to the fullest extent the conveyance of
the franchises of a railway company by sale
under execution or foreclosure; and that by
act of July 27th, 1870, the Southern Transcontinental Railroad Company was created,
and, as before mentioned, was expressly authorized by its charter to "purchase the
rights, franchises, and property of the Memphis, El Paso & Pacific Railroad Company,
heretofore incorporated by the state;" that
Company
the
Southern Transcontinental
stood ready to do this, and to devote the
lands to be acquired by the exercise of said
Memphis & El Paso franchises to the setof the land grant mortgage debt,
tlement
provided the receiver could convey the charter, the land grant, and the grant of the
land reservation unimpaired and in full
force.
It set forth further, that the receiver, on
negotiating for a transfer of the franchises
of the company, found that the market for
them was peculiar, in the following respects:
It was limited, as the franchises are only of
use or value to those who desired and were
able to construct the road; it depended in
of and
great measure upon the reputation
in the enterprise, and a belief
confidence
among capitalists, outside of the state of
Texas, that the state could and would have
to abide by the grants contained in the charter; that it depended peculiarly and essentially upon the preservation of the land
grant and land reservation, inasmuch as the
country through which the road was to be

built was sparsely inhabited, without cities
or towns to furnish local traffic; that Texas
lands at a distance from railroads were of
but nominal value compared
with lands
along the line of the roads, and that the
Southern Transcontinental Railroad Company, to whom the receiver chiefly looked as a
purchaser, already had the right of way
across the state and parallel with the route
of the Memphis & El Paso charter, following "as near as might be practicable the old
survey of the Memphis & El Paso road;"
making the mere right of way of the latter
of comparatively little value without the
lands and the reservation.
It asserted that the acts of the governor
and commissioner of the land office, in executing and causing to issue patents for the
reserve, were, and their continuance
would
be. Irretrievable destruction of that portion
of the franchise of the company which consisted of the right to have the odd sections
of the reservation devoted exclusively to the
location and patenting of the company's certificates, would destroy all confidence in the

798

RECEIVERS.

other grants of the company, as well as In
the grant of the reservation,
and render the
franchise of the company valueless in the
hands of the receiver, doing irreparable injury to the interests committed to his charge.
It set forth further that the Southern
Transcontinental Company asserted and insisted to the receiver, that unless the said
acts were judicially declared unlavrful, and
perpetually restrained, the said franchises
would be valueless to them, and that they
would not carry out the purchase of the
same.
[It was an admitted fact in the case, that
the Memphis,
El Paso & Pacific Railroad
Company had never sectionized or numbered
the land reservation of the same west of
Brazos river, or any portion of said reservation west of said river; and that no work
had been done on the road of the said company before or since the year 1861, either
by grading or otherwise,
except those as already aflirmatively stated and set forth.]
The bill further asserted that the charter
of the company was a contract between the
state and the company, which contract was
now in the hands of the complainant as receiver, and under direction of a court of
equity, to be used for the benefit of the creditors of the company;
that the said provisions of the constitution
of Texas and the
said ordinance of convention impaired the obligation and value of the said contract, and
also of the said contracts of mortgage, and
were in so far contrary to article 1, § 10,
of the United States,
of the constitution
which declares that "no state shall pass any
law impairing the obligation of contracts,"
and were in so far null and void; and that
the acts of the governor of the state and
commissioner of the land office, in issuing
such patents, were without authority of law,
and illegal, and that any repetition of the
same should be perpetually restrained.
The
bill prayed an injunction accordingly.
As a reason for confining the bill to the
two defendants named, an amendment to
the bill alleged that the complainant had
applied at the general land oflice of Texas,
to have the number and names of the parties who had located land certificates other
than those issued to the Memphis, El Paso
& Pacific Railroad Company, on lands within and forming a part of the land reservation of the said company, and to obtain a
list of the same; that he had been informed,
on making such application, and by the defendant, Kuechler, the commissioner of the
general land office, that the number of the
same was very great, to wit, many hvmdreds,
and that a list could not be furnished withThe amendment
out great time and labor.
fm'ther alleged that parties were constantly
making locations and surveys of land certificates as aforesaid on the lands of said
reservation; and that parties who had made
months
such locations and surveys had
allowed them by law, after making the same,

before they were required to make returns
thereof to the commissioner
of the general
land office, and that the complainant was
consequently unable, and never would be
able, to obtain a correct list of such parties.
To this bill the defendants demurred:
(1) Because It did not appear from it that
the defendants, or either of them, had any
direct or personal interest in the lands which
were the subject-matters of this suit; but
on the contrary that they were sued in
their official capacities only; and that the
lands were a part of the public domain of
the state of Texas, which was not and
could not be made a party to this suit.
it did not appear that while
(2) Because
under the amendment 11 to the constitution
of the United States [which declares that
"the judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by citizens
of another state, or by citizens or subjects
of a foreign state"], the court could have
no jurisdiction as between the complainant
and the state of Texas, jurisdiction existed
in a suit against two of the officers of said
state in their official capacity alone, to decree portions of the constitution of the state,
which had been accepted by the congress
of the United States, and which the defendants were sworn to obey, void.
(3) Because it did not appear that the bill
was founded on fraud, accident, mistake,
trust, specific performance,
or any ground
of equity jurisdiction; or that the same set
out any equity against the defendants whatever; on the contrary, it appeared that the
bill was brought to have sections 5 and 7
of article ten of the constitution of the state
of Texas decreed void.
it did not appear that the
(4) Because
complainant, being an officer of the court,
had a right to sue the defendants therein,
nor that the court could have jurisdiction
as between the complainant, though a citizen of the state of New York, and the defendants, as citizens of the state of Texas,
in either their respective
official or individual capacities.
the
"act incorporating the
(5) Because
Memphis, El Paso & Pacffic Railroad Company," and the other acts referred to in
the bill, did not amount to a contract between the state of Texas and the company.
it did not appear that any
(6) Because
designated
third person or persons was or
were about to have a patent granted him or
them by the defendants, and that such third
person or persons was or were sought to be
made a party or parties, nor that said bill
was not too vague and indefinite.
(7) Because it did not appear that the creditors not specified of the company were made
parties thereto, nor that the persons not specified applying for patents on locations of certificates, within the limits of the lands that
were reserved, were made parties thereto; all
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of -whom, according to the bill, had equities
that ought to be aetermined in this suit, and
hence were necessary and proper parties to
this siilt.
(8) Because It did not appear that the complainant had any equities that he was not
bound to have litigated against such third persons not specified, and also against those not
specified who had located certificates within
the Umlts of the lands that were reserved, before he would have a right (which was not
conceded) to Invoke any action by means of
a bill in a court of equity, In case such a court
might have jurisdiction.
The demurrer was overruled, and, no answer
being filed, a decree pro confesso was taken
for the complainant, and on the 16th of February, 1871, a final decree was granted in accordance with the prayer of the bill, to the
following effect:
"That in July, 1870, and at
of Gray as rethe time of the appointment
ceiver, and at the date of the decree, the company was duly possessed of the franchise and
right of and to the land grant and land reservation of the company; that the said right
and the franchise of the company were unimpaired, and in full force and virtue; that the
provisions of the constitution of Texas, and of
said ordinance of convention, so far as they
impaired, or purported to Impair the said charter, land grant, or land reservation, were contrary to the provisions of article 1, section 10,
of the constitution of the United States, and
were in so far, null and void; and that the
enjoined
should
be perpetually
defendants
from Issuing, or causing or permitting to Issue, any patent of the lands of the odd sections of said reservation, except on the certificates granted to the company, or its assigns."
From this decree appeal was taken by the
to this court.
defendants

T. J. Durant and G. F. Moore, for appellants.
B. R. Curtis, J. A. Davenport, and C. Parker,
for appellees.

SWAYNE, Justice. This Is an appeal In
equity from the decree of the circuit court of
the United States for the Western district of
Texas. The appellee was the complainant In
The defendants demurred to
the court below.
The
The demurrer was overruled.
the bin.
A decree as prayed
defendants stood by it.
for was thereupon rendered pro confesso for
The defendants removed the
the complainant.
case to this court by appeal, and it is now before us, as it was before the court below, upon the demurrer to the bill. This brings the
whole case as made by the bill under review.
The facts averred, so far as they are material,
We
are to be taken as admitted and true.
The question
shall refer to them accordingly.
Is, whether
presented for our determination
the circuit court erred in overruling the demurrer. The appellants having elected not to answer, the decree for the complainant followed
as of course.
At the outset of our examination of the
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case, we are met by jurisdictional objections
as to the parties— both complainant and defendants—which, before proceeding further,
We will consider first,
must be disposed of.
and
those which relate to the complainant,
then, those with respect to the defendants.
The complainant was appointed to his office
of receiver, in the suit in equity of Forbes and
Ea Paso & Paothers against the Memphis,
cific Railroad Company, a corporation created
by the state of Texas. The suit was In the
In
same court whence this appeal was taken.
that case, on the 6th of July, 1870, it was,
among other things, ordered and decreed, that
the corporation should be enjoined from disposing of any of Its effects, and that John A.
C. Gray, the complainant in this suit, should
receiver;
be, and he was thereby "appointed
to take possession of the moneys and assets,
road, and all
roadbed,
real and personal;
property whatsoever, of the said Memphis, El
Paso & Pacific Railroad Company, wheresoever the same may be found, with power under the special order of the court, from time
to time to be made, to manage, control, and
exercise aU the franchises, whatsoever, of said
company, and, if need be, under the direction
of the court, to sell, transfer, and convey the
road, roadbed, and other property of said company, as an entire thing," &c.
On the 20th of January, 1871, it was further ordered by the court "that the said John A.
C. Gray, receiver as aforesaid, be, and he is
hereby, authorized and empowered to defend
and continue all suits brought by or against
the said Memphis, El Paso, and Pacific Railroad Company, whether before or after the apof said receiver, and whether In
pointment
the name of said company or otherwise;
defend all suits brought against him as such rehis receivership,
ceiver or affecting
and to
bring such suits in the name of said company,
or in the name of said receiver, as he may be
advised by counsel to be necessary and proper in the discharge of the duties of his office,
and for acquiring, securing, and protecting the
assets, franchises, and rights of the said company and of the said receiver, and for securthe land grant and land
ing and protecting
reservation of the said company."
It is to be presumed the receiver filed this
bill, as it is framed In accordance with the
12
Bank v. Dandridge,
advice of counsel.

Wheat. 70.
The authority given by the decree is ample.
Still the question arises whether it was
competent for him to proceed in his own name
Instead of the name of the company whose
rights he seeks by this bill to assert. A receiver Is appointed upon a principle of justice
Every kind
for the benefit of all concerned.
of property of such a nature that, if legal, it
might be taken in execution, may, if equitable,
be put into his possession.
Hence the appointment has been said to be an equitable execution.
He is virtually a representative of
the court, and of all the parties in interest in
the litigation wherein he Is appointed.
Jer-
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Davis v. Duke of Marlborough,
Shakel v. Duke of Marlborough, i Madd. 463.
He is required to take
possession of property as directed, because it
is deemed more fQr the interests of justice that
he should do so than that the property should
be in the possession of either of the parties in
Wyatt, Prac. Reg. 355.
He
the litigation.
is not appointed for the benelit of either of
Money or
the parties, but of all concerned.
property in his hands is in custodia legis. In
re Colvin, 3 Md. Ch. Dec. 278; Delany v.
Mansfield,
1 Hogan, 234.
He has only such
power and authority .as are given him by the
court, and must not exceed the prescribed limBank v. White, 6 Barb. 589; Verplanck
its.
452.
The court
V. Insurance Co., 2 Paige,
wiU not allow him to be sued touching the
property in his charge, nor for any malfeas(Miiy,

2 Swanst.

249;

12."j;

ance as to the parties, or others, v?ithout its
consent; nor will it permit his possession to
be disturbed by force, nor violence to be offered to his person while in the discharge of
In such eases the court will
his official duties.
vindicate its authority, and, if need be, will
punish the offender by fine and imprisonDe Groot v. Jay, 30 Riirb.
ment for contempt.
483; Angel v. Smith, 9 Ves. 335; Russell v.
Railroad Co., 3 JIacn. & G. 104; Parker v.
Browning, 8 Paige, 388; Noe v. Gibson, 7
Paige, 513; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 833, A. & B.
The same rules are applied to the possession
2 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 1433.
of a sequestrator.
Where property in the hands of the receiver
is claimed by another, the right may be tried
by proper issues at law, by a reference to a
master, or otherwise, as the court in its disEmpringham v.
cretion may see fit to direct.
Where property, in the
Short, 3 Hare, 470.
possession of a third person, is claimed by
the receiver, the complainant must make such
person a party by amending the bill, or the
receiver must proceed against him by suit in
8 Paige, 388; Xoe v. Gibthe ordinary way.
son, 7 Paise. 513; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. supra; 2
,Tac. & W. 170;
2 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 1433.
After tenants have attorned to the receiver,
he may distrain for rent in arrear in his own
In a suit
2 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 1437.
name.
between partners he may be required to carry
on the business, in order to preserve the goodwill of the establishment, until a sale can be
effected. Marten v. Van Schaick, 4 Paige, 479.
Here the property in question is not in the
The possespossession of the defendants.
He
sion of the receiver has not been invaded.
has not been in possession, is not seeking possession; and there is no question in the case
relating to that subject. But the order of the
court expressly requires the receiver to secure and protect "the assets, franchises, and
rights," and "the land grant and reservation
He is seeking to perform
of said company."
that duty by enjoining the appellants from
doing illegal acts, which the bill alleges, if
done, would render the rights and title of the
company to the immense property last men-

tioned, of greatly diminished
value. If not
wholly worthless.
We think it is competent for him to perform this function in the mode he has adopted.
The decree, in the case wherein he was
appointed, expressly authorizes him to sue for
that purpose in his own name. The order was
made by a court of adequate authority in the
No appeal
regular exercise of its jurisdiction.
has been taken, and the order stands unreversed.

This bill is auxiliary to the original suit.
Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 451; Jones v. Andrews, 10 Wall. .327. It is analogous to a petition by a receiver to the court to protect
his possession from disturbance, or the property in his charge from threatened injury or
No title in the receiver is necesdestruction.
or the
sary to warrant such an application,
administration by the court of the proper
There can be no valid objection to
remedy.
the receiver here, in analogy to that proceedIn the progress
ing, maintaining this suit.
and growth of equity jurisdiction it has become usual to clothe such officers with much
larger powers than were formerly conferred.
In some of the states they are by statutes
charged with the duty of settling the affairs
of certain corporations when insolvent, and
are authorized expressly to sue in their own
It is not unusual for courts of equity
names.
to put them in charge of the railroads of companies which have fallen into financial embarrassment,
and to require them to operate
such roads, until the difficulties are removed,
or such arrangements are made that the roads
can be sold with the least sacrifice of the inIn all such cases
terests of those concerned.
the receiver is the right arm of the jurisdicAs regards the statutes, we see
tion invoked.
no reason why a court of equity, in the exercise of its undoubted authority, may not accomplish all the best results intended to be
secured by such legislation, without its aid.
A few remarks will be sufficient to dispose
of the jurisdictional objections as to the appellants.
In Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, three
things, among others, were decided:
(1) A circuit court of the United States, in a
proper case in equity, may enjoin a state officer from executing a state law in conflict
with the constitution or a statute of the United States, when such execution will violate
the rights of the complainant.
(2) Where the state is concerned, the state
should be made a party, if it could be done.
That it cannot be done is a sufficient reason
for the omission to do it, and the court may
proceed to decree against the officers of the
state in all respects as if the state were a
party to the record.
(3) In deciding who are parties to the suit
the court will not look beyond the record.
Making a state officer a party does not make
the state a party, although her law may have
prompted his action, and the state may stand

RECEIVERS.
behind him as the real party in interest.
A
state can be made a party only by shaping the
bill expressly with that view, as where individuals or corporations are intended to be put
in that relation to the case. Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Bank v. Knoop, 16 How.
369; Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black, 436; Trust Co.
V. Debolt, 16 How. 432; and Bank v. Debolt, 1,8
How, 380, — proceeded upon the same principles, and were controlled by that authority,
with respect to the jurisdictional question aris-,
ing in each of those cases as to the defendant.
In Woodrufe v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190, a
writ of mandamus was issued to the proper
representative
of the state of Arkansas to
compel him to receive the paper of the Bank
of the State of Arkansas in payment of a judgment which the state had recovered against
The bank was wholly owned by
the relator.
the state, and the claim was made under a
clause in the charter which had been repealJudgment was given against the responded.
The question of jurisdiction does not
ent.
In Curran v.
appear to have been raised.
Arkansas, 15 How. 304, it appeared that the
A creditor's bill
bank had become insolvent.
was filed to reach its assets. The objection
was taken that the state could not be sued.
This court answered that the objection involved a question of local law, and that as the
state permitted herself to be sued in her own
tribunals, that was conclusive upon the subject. According to the jurisprudence of Texas, suits like this can be maintained against
the public officers who appropriately represent
her touching the interests involved in the controversy.
Ward V. Townsend, 2 Tex. 581;
Cohen v. Smith, 3 Tex. 51; Commissioner General Land Office v. Smith, 5 Tex. 471; McLelland V. Shaw, 15 Tex. 319; Stewart v. CrosIn the application of this prinby, Id. 547.
ciple there is no difference between the governor of a state and officers of a state of
lower grades. In this respect they are upon a
Whitman v. The Govfooting of equality.
ernor, 5 Ohio St. 528; Houston & G. N. R.
Co. V. Kuechler, Sup. Ct. Tex., not yet reported.
[36 Tex. 3821.
A party by going into a national court does
remedy of
not lose any right or appropriate
which he might have availed himself in the
The wise
state courts of the same locality.
policy of the constitution gives him a, choice
of tribunals. In the former he may hope to
escape the local influences which sometimes
And in the
disturb the even flow of justice.
regular course of procedure, if the amount involved be large enough, he may have access
to this tribunal as the final arbiter of his

rights.

Ex parte McNiel,

13

Wall.

236.

Up-

on the grounds of the jurisprudence of both
the United States and of Texas we hold this
bill well brought as regards the defendants.
It is insisted that the corporation, on behalf of which this suit was instituted, has
ceased to exist.
The bill avers that

"the Memphis,

HUTCH.& BUNK.EQ.— 51

El Paso
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*
* *
is
& Pacific Railroad Company"
under
existing
"a corporation created by and
certain statutes of the state of Texas hereinafter set forth," and that within the times
limited by the charter and extended by other
acts the company "did all acts and things
necessary to the full and complete vesting, seof the franchises,
curing,
and preserving
The
rights, and privileges granted thereby."
demurrer admits the truth of these averments
unless they are inconsistent with the statutes
The corporawhich bear upon the subject.
tion was created by an act of the legislature
By
of Texas, approved February 4th, 1856.
the first section certain parties are named and
created a body politic and corporate, and the
general powers inherent in all such bodies are
formally given.
The second gives the right
on the
to construct a railway, commencing
eastern boundary of the state, between Sulphur Pork and Red River, at the western
terminus of the Mississippi. Ouachita & Red
River Railroad, or of the Cairo & Fulton Railroad, and running thence westerly to the Rio
Grande, opposite to or near the town of El
Paso.
The twentieth section declares that
no rights shall vest under the charter until a
certain amount of stock therein named shall

have been subscribed, and the percentage prescribed shall have been paid upon it.
This
is covered by the averment in
requirement
the bill that the company had done everything necessary to secure the vesting of all
the franchises given to it. We do not underon this
stand that there is any controversy
All the other conditions prescribed,
subject.
involving the existence of the corporation,
They are found in
are clearly subsequent.
the fourteenth section of the charter, in the
first section of the act of February 5th, 1866,
and in the third section of the act of February 10th, 1858.
To any argument drawn
from these provisions there are two conclusive
answers:
(1) There has been no judgment of ouster
and dissolution.
Without this they are inoperative.
To make them effectual
they
must be grasped and wielded by the proper
judicial action.
See Ang. & A. Corp. § 777,
and the authorities there cited.
(2) The offences and punishment denounced have been condoned and waived by the
subsequent action of the legislature.
The act
of March 20th, 1861: the act for the relief of railroad companies, approved January
11th, 1862; the act for the relief of companies incorporated for purposes of internal
improvement,
approved February 18th, 1862;
and the third section of the "Act to incorporate the Transcontinental Railroad Company," of the 27th July, .1870, each and
all have that effect. The section last mentioned authorizes the company therein named to "purchase the rights, franchises, and
property of the Memphis, El Paso & Pacific
Railroad Company,
heretofore incorporated
by this state."
This is a clear affirmation,
by implication, of the existence of the cor-
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poratlon, and of the possession of the rights,
franchises,
and property conferred by its
charter.
What is implied is as effectual as
what is expressed.
IT. S. v. Babbit, 1 Black,
57.
These considerations
are so clearly conclusive, that it is needless to advert more
particularly in this connection to the legislation in question, or to pursue the subject
further. There is no warrant for the proposition that the corporation
had ceased to
exist.
The heart of this litigation lies In the immense land grant which is In controversy between the parties.
The objections we have
considered are only outworks thrown up to
prevent the conflict from reaching that point.
It is Insisted that the rights of the company
touching the entire reservation have become

forfeited.
The fifteenth section of the charter provides as follows: "All the vacant lands within eight miles on each side of the extension
line of said road, shall be exempt from location or entry, from and after the time when
such line shall be designated by survey, recThe lands hereby reognition, or otherwise.
served shall be surveyed by said company
at their expense, and the alternate or even
sections reserved for the use of the state.
And It shall be the duty of said company to
furnish the district surveyor of each district
runs, with a
through which said roadway
map of the track of said road, together with
such field-notes as may be necessary to the
and designation of the
proper understanding
same."
There are other provisions prescribing various details not necessary to be particularly
stated or considered.
A proviso in the seventeenth section declares that no title shall be permanently
vested In the company or their assigns for
land granted for the grading as contemplated
miles of the
by the act, until twenty-five
road shall have been completed and put in
running order. The proviso in the twentieth
section of the charter, that no rights shall
vest under It until the condition therein prescribed is complied with, has already been
Conditions of forfeiture of the
considered.
lands granted are prescribed in this and subThey are found in the foursequent acts.
teenth section of this act; in the first and
fourth sections of the supplemental act of
the same date; and in the third and fourth
sections of the act of February 10th, 1858.
will be considered hereThese conditions

after.
The act for the relief of internal improvement companies of February 18th, 1862, deof
clared that the time of the continuance
States and
the war between the Confederate
the United States should not be computed
company
against any internal Improvement
in reckoning the period allowed them for the
completion of any work they had contracted
to do.

The act of January 11th,

1862,

for the relief

of railroad companies
ure of any chartered

that the failrailroad company of
any part of its road,

enacted

the state to complete
as required by existing laws, should not operate as a forfeiture of its charter or of the
lands to which the company would be entitled, under the provisions of the act entitled "An act to encourage the construction
of railroads In Texas by donations of land,"
approved January 30th, 1854, and the several
thereto,
provided the
acts supplementary
company
should complete
such portion of
its road as would entitle it to donations of
land under existing laws within two years
from the close of the war.
The act for the benefit of railroad compa13th, 1866, declared that
nies of November
the grant of sixteen sections of land to the
or
mile to railroad companies theretofore,
thereafter,
constructing railroads in Texas,
should be extended under the same restricprovided
tions and limitations theretofore
by law, for ten years after the passage of the
act.
These several acts are valid.
See the
33d section of the constitution
of Texas of
1809, and Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700.
By an act approved July 27th, 1870, the
Southern Transcontinental Railroad Company
was Incorporated.
It was declared that the object of the
company thus created was to construct and
establish a railway line and telegraphic communication from the eastern boundary of the
state of Texas, "and thence as near as practicable to the route of the Memphis, El Paso
to, or near,
& Pacific Railroad Company,
the town of El Paso."
It was enacted that
"the main line of said road shall follow, as
near as may be practicable,
the old survey
of the Memphis & El Paso road." It was
further enacted that "the said company, hereby Incorporated,
may purchase
the rights,
franchises,
and property
of the Memphis,
El Paso & Pacific Railroad Company, heretofore Incorporated
by this state," as before
mentioned.
The first section of the ordinance of 1869
declared that all heads of families settled
on vacant lands ly. ,' within the Memphis
& El Paso railroad reserve, should be entitled to receive from the state of Texas
eighty acres of land. Including the place occupied, upon payment
of the expenses of
survey and patent.
By the second section It was declared that
all the vacant land within the reserve was
open to sale to settlers and pre-emption settlers, and subject to the location
of land
certificates.
The third section declared that
the company had forfeited Its right to the
land, and that certain certificates having been
Issued to the company
and patents Issued
thereon. It was made the duty of the attorneygeneral to Institute legal proceedings to have
such certificates and patents cancelled.
In November, 1869, the present constitution of Texas was adopted.
It was subsequently approved by congress.
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Sections 5 and 7 of tbis constitnition
are
as follows:
"Sec. 5. All public lands
heretofore reserved for tiie benefit of railroads or railway
companies
sball hereafter be subject to locatioja and survey by any genuine land cer-

tificates/'

"See. 7. All lands granted to railway companies which have not been alienated
by
said companies in conformity with the terms
of their charter respectively,
and the laws
of the state under which the grants were
made, are hereby declared forfeited
to the
state for the benefit of the school* fund."
This summary gives a view of the statutory and constitutional provisions necessary
in disposing of the questo be considered
tiou before us.
On the 20th of June, 1857, the company
filed in the land office at Austin surveys
showing the line of the road from the eastern
boundary of the state to El Paso, which line
was officially rgcognlzed by the commissionBy
er of the general land office of Texas.
had
the 1st of March, i860, the company
surveyed, sectionized, and numbered all the
sections and fractional sections of the vacant lands within the reservation, from the
eastern boundary of' the state to the crossing
of tlie Brazos, of which due returns were
and by him acmade to the commissioner,
cepted. By the 10th of May, 1859, the company had marked and designated the central
line" of the road from the Brazos to the
Colorado,
and made proper returns to the
by whom they
office of the commissioner,
The lands granted to the
were accepted.
company thereby became defined and officially recognized as such along the whole extent
of their line.
In doing this work the company surveyed,
numbered, and mapped each alternate or even
section of public lands for two hundred and
fifty miles in length, and sixteen miles in
It
width, in behalf of the state of Texas.
was of great benefit to her, and is reported
to the receiver to have cost the company more
than $100,000.
By consent of parties the bill was amended
The comnunc pro tunc in three particulars.
plainant admitted that no land within the reserve had been surveyed, sectionized, or numbered west of the Brazos river, and that no
work had been done on the road before or
since 1861, except as averred in the bill. He
averred that he applied to the general land
office for the number and names of those who
other than such as
had located certificates
were issued to the company upon lands within
and that Kuechler, the dethe reservation,
fendant, answered that the number was very
great, amounting to hundreds, and that a list
could not be furnished without great time and
labor.
He averred further that parties were
constantly locating certificates and making surand that they
veys within the reservation,
were allowed a specified time to make their
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returns, so thaf: it was impossible for him to
obtain a full list of such parties.
The company commenced work within one
year from the 1st of March, 1856, and before
the 1st of March, 1861, had completely graded
more thap fifty miles of its roadway, beginning at the eastern boundary line of the state
of El
and extending west in the direction
Paso.
See section 3 of the act of February

1^8.
We do not understand that up to that time
there was a breach of any condition touching
the existence of the corporation or its right to
Before that
the Jands within the reservation.
time the tracts east of the Brazos covered by
the grant were definitely fixed by the surveys
The title of
which the company had rnade.
10th,

the company to those west of the Brazos,
though the sections were not designated, was
equally valid.
The good will of a lease which
is
the landlord is in the habit of renewing
property, and rights growing out of it, whether
by contract or otherwise, will be protected and
Phyfe v. Warenforced by a court of equity.
deli, 5 taige, 268.
See, also. Amour v. Alexander, 10 Paige, 571.
The rights of the company west of the Brazos were of a much more substantial character
than those which were the subjects of judicial
action in the cases cited.
The real estate of a corporation is a distinct thing from its franchises.
But the right
to acquire and sell real estate is a franchise,
and the right to acquire the particular real
estate designated in the charter of this company, and here in question, is within that
category.
It might, therefore, well be doubted whether this right could be taken from the
company without an appropriate
proceeding
instituted for that purpose, and prosecuted to
judgment by the state. But the view which
we take of the case renders K unnecessary to
pursue the subject.
We will recur to the conditions of forfeiture
touching the land grant, and consider them Irrespective of that point.
The provisions tol
that effect, in the fourteenth section of the
charter, are expressly superseded by those in
the first section of the supplemental
act of
February 5th, 1856. The fom-th section of
that act prescribes a further condition.
These
provisions again are superseded by the third
and fourth sections of the amendatory act of
February 10th, 1858.
preThe conditions
scribed by the last-named act are:
the reserve as far as the
(1) To survey
Brazos river, within four years from the 1st

of March, 1856.
(2) To run and designate the centre line of
the reservation from the Brazos to the Colorado, within fifteen months from the 10th of
February, 1858.
(3) To survey the whole reserve within ten
years from February 10th, 1858.
with some road
(4) To have a connection
leading to the Mississippi or Gulf of Jlexico
within ten years from February 10th, 1858.

804

RECEIVERS.

shall have finished
(5) That the company
and in running order at least twenty-five miles
of their road within one year after it is connected with certain other roads mentioned in
the act, and at least fifty miles every two
years thereafter until the road is completed.
(6) That the right to acquire lands from the
state by donation shall cease at the expiration
of fifteen years from February 10th, 1858.
The two first conditions were performed
within the time prescribed.
These points are
covered by the averments of the bill. The
time limited for the performance of the third
and fourth is extended from February 10th,
1868, to June 10th, 1873, by addmg the time
of the continuance of the war, according to
the act of February 18th, 1862, before referred
to. ■^'hen the bill was filed there were no
such roads as those mentioned in the fifth
condition with which a connection could be
formed.
The fifteen years limited by the sixth
condition expired February 10th, 1873.
The
period that elapsed during the war is to be
added.
That extends the time so much further.
The title of the company is therefore unaffected by the breach of any condition annexed to the grant.
But suppose there had been such breaches,
as is insisted by the counsel for the appellants,
the result must still be the same.
Except as to a small portion of the land in
question the legal title is yet In the state.
Whatever may be the right of the company
With
it is wholly equitable in its character.
a few exceptions, which have no applicability
in this case, the same rules apply in equity to
equitable estates as are applied at law to legal
They are alike descendible, devisaestates.
Jicliling, Estates,
ble, alienable, and barrable.
17; Croxall v. Shererd, 5 WaU. 281.
There is wide distinction between a condition precedent, where no title has vested and
none is to vest until the condition is performsubsequent, operating by
ed, and a condition
way of defeasance. In the former case equity
The failm'e to perform is
can give no relief.
No right can ever vest.
an inevitable bar.
The result is very different wliere the condiThere equity will intertion is subsequent.
pose and relieve against the forfeiture upon
the principle of compensation, where that principle can be applied, giving damages, if damages should be given, and the proper amount*
Wells v. Smith, 2 Edw.
can be ascertained.
Ch. 78; see, also, as to the principle of compensation, Beaty v. Harliey, 2 Smedes & M. 568.
By the common law a freehold estate could
not be created without livery of seizin, and it
could not be determined without some act in
Conditions subsequent
pais of equal notoriety.
are not favored in the law (4 Kent, Comm.
129), and when they are sought to be enforced
in an action at law, there must have been a
re-entry, or something equivalent to it, or the
suit must fail. The right to sue at law for
The action must
the breach is not alienable.
be brought by the grantor or some one in priv-

ity of blood with him. Nicoll v. Railroad Co.,
12 N. Y. 121;
Ludlow v. Raih-oad Co., 12
Barb. 440; Webster v. Cooper, 14 How. 488.
In Dumpor's Case, 4 Reports, 119, It was decided that a condition not to alien without
license Is finally determined by the first license
given.

Here the controlling consideration is, that
the performance of all the conditions not performed was prevented by the state herself.
By plunging into the war, and prosecuting it,
she confessedly rendered it impossible for the
This
company tj fulfil during its continuance.
is alleged in the bill, and admitted by the demurrer.
The rule at law Is, that if a condition subsequent be possible at the time of making it,
and becomes afterwards impossible to be complied with, by the act of God, or the law, or
the grantor, the estate having once vested, is
not thereby divested, but becomes absolute.
Co. Lift. 206a, 208b; 2 Bl. Comm. 156; 4 Kent,
Comm. *130.
The analogy of that rule applied
here would blot out these conditions.
But this
Equity
would be harsh and work injustice.
will, therefore, not apply the principle to
that extent. It will regard the conditions as
if no particular time for performance were
specified.
In such cases the rule is that the
performance
must be within a reasonable
Hayden v. Stoughton, 5 Pick. 528; 4
time.
Kent, Comm. *125, 126; Com. Dig. tit. "Condition G, 5." We are clear in our conviction
that, under the circumstances,
a reasonable
time for performance
had not elapsed when
this bill was filed. As the state, by the act
of July 27th, 1870, created the Southern
Transcontinental
Railroad Company, and authorized
that company
to "purchase
the
rights, franchises, and property of the Memphis, El Paso & Pacific Railroad Company,"
it will be but right to allow a reasonable
time for that purchase to be made, if such
an arrangement
can be effected, and for the
vendee thereafter
to perform all that was
incumbent upon the Memphis, El Paso &
Pacific Railroad Company by its charter and
the supplementary
and amendatory
If
acts.
that arrangement cannot be made, tne latter company will have the right to provide
otherwise for the fulfilment of its obligations
to the state within such time, and thus consummate its inchoate title to the lands within the reservation.
Either will be in accordance with the principles of reason and
justice, and within the spirit of well-considered adjudications.
Walker v. Wheeler, 2
Beaty v. Harkey, 2 Smedes &
Conn. 299;
M. 5U3; Moss v. Matthews, 3 Ves. Jr. 279;
2 Vern. 366;
1 Vern. 83; 3 Brown, Ch. 2.jG;
Taylor v. Popham, 1 Brown, Ch. 168; 1 Bac.
Abr. 642; 1 Madd. Ch. Prac. 41, 42; Bank v.
Smith, 3 Gill & J. 265.
Both parties will thus be put in the same
situation, as near as may be, as if the breaches had not occurred.
Neither will be subjected to any serious hardship.
The state,
by her own acts, has lost the benefits of an
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earlier completion of the work. The company has lost the income which it might
have enjoyed, and has doubtless been thrown
into embarrassments it would have escaped.
The circumstances do not call for a severe
application of the rules of law upon either
side.

Breaches of such conditions may be waived by the grantor expressly
or in pais.
Dumper' s Case, 1 Smith, Lead. Gas. Eq. 85,
Am. note. Such waiver is expressed in the
statutes relating to the subject, to which we
have referred, except the act creating the
Transcontinental Company, and there it ex-

ists by the clearest implication.
That the act of incorporation and the land
grant here in question, were contracts, is
too well settled in this court to require disFletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 137;
cussion.
New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 166; Dartmouth College V. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518;
Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369. As such, they
were within the protection of that clause of
the constitution
of the United States which
declares that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.
The ordinance of 1869, and the constitution adopted in that year, in so far as they concern
the question under consideration, are nullities, and may be laid out of view. Von
Hoffman v. City of Qulncy, 4 Wall. 535.
When a state becomes a party to a contract,
as in the case before us, the same rules of
law are applied to her as to private persons
When she or her
under like circumstances.
representatives are properly brought into the
forum of litigation, neither she nor they can
assert any right or immunity as incident to her
political sovereignty.
Curran v. Arkansas, 15
How. 308.
A case more imperatively demanding the
exercise of jurisdiction in equity could hardly be imagined than that presented in this
bill. Should the interposition invoked be
the reservation would
refused,
doubtless
adverse
be thatched over with
speedily
claims. A cloud would not only be thrown
upon the title of the company, but the time,
litigation, labor, and expense involved in the
vindication of its rights, would very greatly
lessen the value of the grant and materially
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delay the progress of the work it was intended to aid.
The injury would be irreparable.
It is the peculiar function of a court
of equity in a case like this to avert such
results.
it has been insisted that those holding adverse claims should have been brought into
They are too numerthe case as parties.
ous for that to be done.
An application was
made to one of the defendants for a list of
The imtheir names, and it was not given.
portant questions
which have arisen between the appellants and the company can
all be properly determined without the presence of other parties than those before us.
The parties referred to are sufficiently represented for the purposes of this litigation by
the governor and the commissioner of the
general land oiBce.
We feel no difficulty in
disposing of the case as it is presented in the
record.

There are other points, ably maintained
by the learned counsel for the appellants, to
They are suffiwhich we have not adverted.
ciently answered by what has been said. It
would extend this opinion unnecessarily, and
could serve no useful
consider them.

purpose,

specifically

The circuit court decided correctly.
from is affirmed.

to

The

decree appealed

Mr. Justice

HUNT did not hear the ar-

gument in this case and did not participate
in its decision.

Mr. Justice DAVIS, with whom concurred the CHIEF JUSTICE, dissenting, said:
I am constrained to enter my dissent to the
opinion and judgment of the court In this
for the reason that this suit, although
case,
in form otherwise, is in effect against the
state of Texas. The object which it seeks
to obtain shows this to be so, which is to
deprive the state of the power to dispose,
in its own way, of its public lands, and this
object, by the decision just rendered, is acIn my judgment the bill should
complished.
have been dismissed,
because the state is
exempt from suit at the instance of private
persons, and on the face of the bill it is
apparent that the state is arraigned as a defendant.
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In re FLOWERS
(1 Q. B.

Div.

Court of Appeal.

et al.
14.)

Oct. 30, 1896.

Appeal from an order of a registrar in
bankruptcy dismissing a petition for a receiving order presented against the debtors.
The debtors were a firm consisting of five
members, some of whom, being desirous of
dissolving partnership, commenced an action
in the chancery division, and in that action
The
a receiver and manager was appointed.
members of the firm thereilpon ceased to attend at the place of business, and the busiThe
ness was carried on by the manager.
petitioning creditors,
who had previously
brought an action against the firm, obtained
Judgment and issued a bankruptcy notice,
■^hieh was served on four out of the five
partners.
The fifth partner could not be
found, and the notice was thereupon served
on the receiver and manager at the place of
On objection that no proper servbusiness.
ice of the notice had been effected, the registrar dismissed the petition.
The petitioning creditors appealed.

carrying on the bufeiness prbperly, and
is in no sense the servant of the partnership.
On the true construction of rule 260,
I think there is a necessary implication that
the person described in the rule as having
of the business
the control or manageinent
must be a person having authority from the
partners, and acting as their agent, and that
consequently the rule does not apply to a receiver and manager appointed by the court,
and deriving his authority from that appointThe servment, and not from the partners.
and the regisice was therefore ineffectual,
tra;r was right in dismissing the petition.

not
he

F. Cooper Willis, for petitioning creditors.
Muir Mackenzie, for debtors.

LOPES, L. J. I am of the same opinion.
The material words of rule 260 of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1890, are, "any person having
at the time of service the control or manageI
ment of the partnership business there."
agl-ee with the master of the rolls that these
words imply a person having the control or
mahagement of the business for and on account of the partners, and indicate some one
Havin the position of an agent or servant.
ing regard to the fact that the person served
in this case did not stand in any such relationship to the partnel-s, but was a receiver

I am of opinion that
this appeal should be dismissed, and I come
to that conclusion upon what I consider to be
of rule 260. As to the
the true construction
of the receiver appointed by the
position
court, he is the officer and servant of the
As I pointed
court, and not of the partners.
out In the case of Burt v. Bull (1895) 1 Q. B.
276, only the court can dismiss him, or give
him directions as to the mode of carrying on
the business, or interfere with him if he Is

RIGBY, L. J. A receiver and manager appointed by the court is certainly not the agent
but, admitting that to the
of the parties;
fullest extent,
do not know that, if I had to
decide this case sitting alone, I should have
arrived at the same conclusion as the other
members of the court, from which, however,
I do not dissent.
Appeal dismissed.

LORD ESHER, il. R.

appointed by and responsible to the court, I
think the decision of the registrar was right.
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SEJIPLE
(10

Court of Chancery

Bill for relief.

V.

PLTNN

Atl.

Alfred Hugg, for complainant.
drickson, for defendant

et al.

177.)

of New

Jersey.

June

30,

1887.

Od December
5, 1885, Semple and James
D. Flynn entered into an agreement for the
purpose of carrying on the saloon and restam-ant business at Mount Holly, New Jersey.
Semple was to furnish the money to
buy the necessary fixtures and chattels with
which to run the business, while Flynn was
to take charge of and conduct the business;
it being run in his (Flynn's) name.
Out of
the proceeds arising from the earnings
an
equal division was to be made between the two.
Semple bought the fixtures for $1,200, paying $850 in cash, and giving a chattel mortFlynn agreed
gage of $350 for the balance.
to pay $250 to Semple, and take up the $350
Flynn paid
mortgage in the spring of 1886.
Semple the $250, and took up the $350 mortgage, giving a $300 one in place of it, and,
according to the charge of the complainant,
has refused to cancel or pay off the $300
In November last, Flynn refused
mortgage.
The complainto further divide the profits.
ant alfeo charges that the defendant fraudin
ulently, and without any consideration,
February, 1887, gave a second chattel mortgage on the fixtures to his brother John J.
Flynn for the alleged securing of the payThe bill asks for an accountment of $500.
ing since last November, the appointment of
a receiver to continue the business until the
complainant is paid the money he advanced,
and the restraining of the selling or transferThe defendant
ring of the second mortgage.
denies part of the agreement respecting the
payment of the chattel mortgage, and also
cl&ims that the $850 advanced by Semple
was loaned to him, and that he has since
paid Semple the amount in full; that the
mortgage wais given to his brother to secure
The
moneys advanced by the said brother.
cause was heard on bill, answer, and proofs,
on motion foi' receiver and preliminary in-

junction.
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C. E. Hen-

BIRD, V. C. In this case I am asked to
appoint a receiver to take possession of goods
and of a business
which the complainant
claims are held and used in partnership.
I cannot advise such appointment.
by the proofs,
1. It is not at all established
by way of affidavits, that there is or ever
was a copartnership.
There are many circumstances tending to show that a partnership was never intended.
2. If there ever was a copartnership,
the
presumption,
from several circumstances,
is
that it was broken and abandoned according
to its original terms, and such settlement had
as to preclude the complainant from any further claim on the goods or interest in the
business as a partner.
3. These things being so, no sufficient cause
appears to justify the court in taking the
goods, and the business, too, out of the hands
of the defendant, to whom it was originally
committed, when so to do would totally destroy the business, and that necessarily,
because such business is carried on under a
license, which, of course, is personal to the
defendant,
and cannot be delegated nor assigned nor committed
to the care of a reBefore the court will
ceiver by any court.
take a step which will work such results, it
must be reasonably certain that the allegations upon which relief depends are true.
4. But
will advise an injunction restraining the defendant from selling, assigning, or
incumbering any of the goods, chattels, or
fixtures now in use in said business, or the
said business itself, or the good will thereof,
— not, however, to restrain him from managing and carrying on said business in the ordinary way in which he has heretofore been
carrying it on during the continuance of the
I feel justified, under
alleged copartnership.
the proofs. In going thus far in the interests
This
of the complainant, but no further.
will preserve the present status until final
hearing.
Costs to abide final decree.

I
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SIMMONS IIARD\YARE

CO.

v.

WAIBEL

et al.
(47 N.

W.

814,

1 S. D. 488.)

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Jan. 30,1891.

Appeal from district court, Beadle county.
A.
Mouser & VoUrath, for appellant.
Melville and E-. H. Aplin, for respondents.

B.

CORSON, P. J.
On March 1, 1889, the
plaintiff filed its verified complaint In the district court, in which it is alleged, in substance,
that it is engaged in the vrholesale and retail
hardware business In the city of St. L/ouis;
that it has a large amount of capital invested
in its said business, several hundred clerks,
and about 90 traveling salesmen engaged in
selling its wares and merchandise in nearly all
that it has preparthe states and territories;
at great expense, an illused and published,
trated and printed catalogue containing about
1,500
among its cuspages, for distribution
tomers; that it has invented and prepared, at
a cost of many thousand dollars, a secret code
or system, represented by letters, figures, and
characters, shciwing the cost and seUing price
of its many articles of merchandise, which is
marked in such of its catalogues as are intended for use in its said business by its traveling salesmen, and which said secret code
or system is not marked in the catalogues disthat in January,
tributed to its customers;
1887, it employed one Frank Jleech as one of
its traveling salesmen, and intrusted to him,
as such, one of its catalogues containing its
said secret code or system of letters, figures,
and characters marked therein, with the key
thereto; that in his business as such traveling
visited the
salesman said Meech frequently
tity of Huron, in Dakota, and made sales of
goods to the defendants, who were customers
of plaintiff, and engaged in the hardware business; that during the year 1888 the defendants. In collusion with said Meech, who still
continued in the employment of plaintiff as
wrongfully
and
salesman,
traveling
such
fraudulently obtained from said Meech the
said privately marked catalogue, containifig its
secret code or system of letters, figures, and
characters, showing the cost and seUing price
of its said wares and merchandise, with the
key thereto, and copied the same therefrom
into one of plaintiff's catalogues that had been
furnished to defendants as customers of plaintiff, and that defendants thereby wrongfully
and fraudulently became possessed of a knowledge of plaintiff's said secret code or system,
and a copy of the same; that plaintiff, upon
said fact, demanded of defendascertaining
ants the said copy of its secret catalogue so
wrongfully and fraudulently made by them,
and that on or about February 19, 1889, defendants returned to plaintiff said marked
copy, but before doing so they fraudulently
and wrongfully copied said secret code or system into one of plaintiff's said catalogues it
had furnished to Shefler Bros., also customers

whom defendants had obtained it, and that said defendants now retain
said last-mentioned or Shefler copy, refuse to
return same to plaintiff, and threaten to make
known said secret code or system, with the
key thereto, to customers of plaintiff, to the
great damage and injury of plaintiff; that to
invent and prepare a new code or system will
cost the plaintiff several thousand dollars, and
require at least six months' time, and that during such change of system plaintiff will be
greatly embarrassed in the transaction of its
An injunction, receiver, etc., are
business.
prayed for.
On filing the complaint, and two supporting
aflidavits, the court granted ex parte a temporary injunction, and appointed a receiver, to
whom defendants were required to deliver said
(Shefler) copy of the catalogue alleged to have
been copied by them from the former copy
On April 18th the dereturned to plaintiff.
fendants moved the court, upon the affidavit
pleadings, proceedof defendant Donaldson,
ings, etc., in the case, to vacate said order
The court on the hearing remade March 1st.
fused to vacate said order, but made an order
modifying it by directing that receiver to return said (Shefler) copy of catalogue to defendants.
From so much of said order of
April 18th as required the receiver to return
said copy of catalogue to defendants, plaintiff
appeals to this court, and assigns such modification of the original order as error.
or refusing
a receiver
is
The appointing
within the sound judicial discretion of the
court to which application is made, and this
court will not interfere with the exercise of
this discretion by the lower court when the
unless this court is
evidence is conflicting,
satisfied such lower court has abused its disMays V. Rose, Freem. Ch. 703; Chicretion.
cago & A. O. & M. Co. V. United States P.
Co., 57 Pa. 83; Whelpley v. Railroad Co., 6
Blatchf. 271; Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 831, 832;
High, Rec. §§ 7-25; Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1331.
Was there, then, a substantial conflict in the
evidence upon the material facts in this case?
and, if there was such conflict, was there an
abuse of discretion by the court?
The respondents contend that the affidavit of Donaldson denies all the equities of the bill relating
to the Shefler catalogue, and invoke the rule of
courts of equity applicable to injunctions, that,
when the equities of the bill are denied by
the answer, the injunction will be denied.
Anderson v. Reed, 11 Iowa, 177; Stevens v.
Myers, Id. 184.
But that rule does not apply
to this case, for the reason that the receiver
was appointed, not upon the complaint alone,
but upon the complaint and supporting affidavits, and upon the hearing additional
affidavits were read on the part of the plaintiff;
and the rule itself is subject to many qualifications and exceptions not necessary now to
be noticed.
This affidavit will therefore be
considered as the other affidavits in the case.
The only evidence introduced on the part
of the defendants on the hearing was the affi-

of plaintiff, from
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every allegation
in the complaint in general
terms, ■does not deny the various allegations
of the complaint and supporting affidavits in
that clear and specific manner that entitles it
to much vreight in a court of equity.
It is
evasive and unsatisfactory,
and leaves upon
the mind the impression that, while there is
an attempt to deny the allegations of the complaint and supporting affidavits, there is a
want of good faith on the part of Donaldson,
and an effort on his part to conceal the real
facts in the case.
All the material facts stated in the complaint were fully sustained by
affidavits introduced and read in evidence on
the part of the plaintiff. That defendant Donaldson did, in collusion with Meech, plaintiff's
traveling salesman, wrongfully and fraudulently obtain from said Meech the secret catalogue intrusted to him by the plaintiff, and
make a copy of the same, and that he did in
the same manner obtain the key to the same,
and did thereby become possessed of a knowledge of plaintiff's secret code or system to
which he was not entitled, is proved by too
clear and satisfactory evidence to admit of
any doubt. That he did return to plaintiff the
first copy so made is admitted. The only quesis, did Donaldson,
tion remaining
before returning the said marlced copy, make a second
copy therefrom in the Shefier catalogue now
After a careful examination
in controversy?
of the evidence, we think there cannot be
It may be
much doubt upon this question.
true that there were some slight changes made
in the letters, figures, and characters used by
plaintiff to represent the cost and selling
prices of plaintiff in the Shefler copy, but we
think it is equally true that in the changes
made, if any, defendant Donaldson had so arranged them that he preserved, in substance,
H. P. Huckins says
the plaintiff's system.
in his affidavit that he is one of the traveling
salesmen of plaintiff, and is fully acquainted
with the private and secret code of plaintiff,
represented by letters, figures, and characters
showing the cost and selling prices of plaintiff's goods, and the key thereto, and that he
had examined the Shefler catalogue in the
hands of the receiver, and that the basis of
the
the prices marked therein is throughout
said cost price to plaintiff, and that it would
for any one to have
have been impossible
marked the said Shefler catalogue with the
remarks
prices marked, and the, explanatory
therein contained, unless the person who so
marked the same had access to and copied
In
from one of plaintiff's private catalogues.
connection with this testimony are to be considered the efforts made by Donaldson to obtain one of plaintiff's catalogues from some
one of plaintiff's customers before he returned
After efforts by
to it his own marked copy.
himself and through his confederate, Meech,
he obtained one from George C. Shefler, who
says. In his affidavit, that he first loaned to
Donaldson his catalogue on February 15, 1889,

and that when, soon after, he requested Donaldson to return it, he replied: "I have marked the price of my goods in the catalogue, but
am expecting a catalogue from the Simmons
Hardware Company every day, and as quick
It is true
as it comes I will express it to you."
he couples the admission that he had marked
the Shefler catalogue with the qualification
that he had marked the price of his own
with
goods in
but this is not inconsistent
the fact that he had marked the prices contained in plaintiff's secret catalogue, as he was
customer of plaintiff, and was then in poscopy made from one of plaintiff's
session of
catalogues intrusted to Meech; and he subsequently took great pains to obtain
bill of
Why
sale of this catalogue from Shefler.
these efforts and this haste to get another
catalogue before he returned the flrst copy
marked by him,
he did not require
in
which to malte another copy? We are of the
opinion that there
no substantial conflict in
the evidence, and that upon the facts the court
below should have retained the catalogue in
question in the hands of the receiver.
It
contended on the part of respondents
that the catalogue in controversy was the absolute property of defendants,
and that the
court, under the established rules of equity,
was not authorized to take
from them, and
place
in the hands of
receiver.
It may
be conceded, as claimed, that the Shefler catalogue in its original condition was the absobut the catalogue
lute property of defendants;
in controversy had been changed from its original condition by the defendants by incorporating therein the private code or system invented
and prepared at great expense by the plaintiff.
The original catalogue was of itself of but
trifling value, but with the private code or
was of
system of plaintiff marked therein
That such
code or system as
great value.
was invented and used, by plaintiff in its business, and described in its complaint, was its
property, is well settled, both at common law
and under our own Code. Section 2676, Comp.
Laws. It was the product of the skill and
property,
labors of the plaintiff, and as such
and
entitled to the protection of the law;
and when the Injury threatened would be irreparable, and the remedy at law is inadequate,
court of equity will interfere to preparty who has wrongfully obtained
vent
or dispossession of the secret from using
closing
to others. And when, as in this case,
party has not only obtained knowledge of
the secret code or -system, but has wrongfully
court of
copy of the secret system,
made
of justice and to
equity will. In furtherance
prevent the party" from fraudulently making
disclosure of the secret, not only enjoin him,
but will, we apprehend, take into its possession, by means of
receiver, who is an officer
of the court, such copy, so wrongfully made,
to prevent fraud; and if on the trial the facts
alleged are established the court will be authorized to place such copy in the hands of the
plaintiff, or at least see that plaintiff's secret
a

davit of defendant Donaldson, before referred
to.
This affidavit, wtiile it denies each and
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t^io
marks

therein

shall

be

erased

or

canceled.

This accords with the spirit, if not with the
letter, of our Code.
See sections 3213-3221,
Comp. Laws. These sections embody the rules
of the civil law upon the doctrine of accessions
to personal

property,

except

perhaps

section

which is a rule of the common law. Silsbury V. McCoon, 3 N. Y. 379. That courts do
not hesitate to grant injunctions in such cases,
is well settled by the adjudged cases.
In
Yovatt V. Winyard, 1 Jac. & W. 394, the court
granted an injunction against one who had obtained a knowledge of a secret by a breach of
trust.
In Morison v. Jloat, 9 Hare, 241, the
lourt restrained the defendants from using a

3219,

secret in compounding
a medicine, surreptitiously obtained.
In Peabody v. Norfolk, 98
Mass. 452, the court held that an injunction .to
restrain a party from communicating
a secret
imparted to him in the court, of his business,
See 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 952.
The
was proper.
court was therefore clearly right in granting
and continuing the temporary injunction, and,
this being so, we are unable to see any legal
reason why the court should not have retained
in the hands of the receiver the marked catalogue in controversy in this action.
The powers of courts of equity over property, the title
to which is involved in litigation, is broad and
comprehensive, and its power to take into its
possession, through its receiver, any property
that is the subject of litigation, is ample and
unquestioned.
The contention of defendants th.it, as they
were the owners of the catalogue of trifling
value, into which they have copied plaintiff's
valuable secret code or system, it cannot be
taken into its possession by a court of equity

througli its receiver, and held pendente lite,
we cannot assent to. One of the grounds upon
which a receiver will be appointed is that there
In this case the
is no other adequate remedy.
remedy by Injunction is not adequate to accomplish the ends of justice.
The plaintiff, by
shows that its
its complaint and affidavits,
business extends over a large number of states
and territories, in which it has rnany customers. Enjoining a party, therefore, from using
or comnmnicating the plaintiff's secret code or
system, while effective so long as the defendants are within the jurisdiction of the com't,
would yet be of little efficacy in case defendants should go beyond the jurisdiction of the
court, and take with them the copy, where
they might use this secret by communicating
it to plaintiff's customers, to the irreparable
injury of the plaintiff. The flexible nature of
the equitable jurisdiction of courts of equity
enables that court to so mould and administer
its remedies as to prevent such fraudulent and
wrongful use of the catalogue in question, by
at once placing it within the control of the
court, and thus placing it beyond the power of
the defendants to make any improper disposition of it pending the suit, by taking it beyond
the jurisdiction of the court.
We are clearly
of the opinion that under the established jui'isdiction of courts of equity the power exists in
that court to take into its possession this catalogue, and we think under the evidence it
was clearly the duty of the court to do so,
and that its modification of its order of March
1st was an abuse of its judicial discretion.
The modified order, so far as it directed the
return of the catalogue to defendants, is reversed. All the judges concurring.
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SCHUYLER'S STEAM TOWBOAT 00.
(32 N.

E.

623,

136

N. Y. 169.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 29, 1892.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,
Third department.
Proceeding for the dissolution of the Schuyler's Steam Towboat Company.
From an order of the general term (19 N. Y. Supp. 565)
atfirming an order granting an injunction restraining the further prosecution
of suits
brought In the United States district court,
Michael J. Moran and others appeal.
Affirmed.

Carpenter & Mosher (Jofeeph F. Mosher, of
counsel), for appellants.
James W. Eaton,
for respondent.

PECKHAM, J. A receiver of the property
and effects of the above-named
corporation
was duly appointed by a special term of the
supreme court of the state sitting at Albany
on the 81st of July, 1891, and the order appointing him was filed and entered in the
proper clerk's office August 1, 1801, at 11
a. m.
The receiver eiecuied his bond, and it
was duly approved Augiist 3, and filed in the
clerk's office August 4, 1891.
The proceeding was one for the voluntary dissolution of
a corporation,
and the distribution of Its
property and assets among those entitled to
receive
the same.
Intermediate the time
when the receiver was appointed and the
execution and filing of his bond, and in the
afternoon
of August 1st, a Mr. Moran, in
his own behalf and in behalf of other creditors of the corporation, libeled several vessels which were the property of the corporation, by filing libels in the United States district coilrt for tlie Eastern district of New
York, and upon process issued from that
court the mai^shal
took possession of such
vessels.
When iloran instituted his proceedings he says he had been informed that application had already been made for the appointment of a receiver, but he was not Informed, and did not know, that one had been
Finding the marshal in possesappointed.
sion of file vessels, and as he refused to give
up such i)'ossessiori, the receiver
Instituted
to restrain fhie libelants
these proceedings
from further steps in {he United States district court.
The courts below have granted
the order restraining further proceedings, and
The
the other parties have appealed here.
courts below have held that by the proper
presentation
of a petition to a state court,
praying for the dissolution of the corporation,
of a receiver upon
atid by the appointment
due notice of the apjilication to the attorney
general, the cour{ acquired jurisdiction of the
subject-matter
of the proceeding,
and took
the property of the corporation Into the custody of the law for the purpose of due administration; and that, having thus acquired
jurisdiction of such subject-matter and taken
the property into tlie custody of the law, al-
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the receiver
had not actually arid
phj'sically seized and taken It Into his man-

though

ual possession, the state court acquired the
exclusive jurisdiction and right to take such
possession and make a final decree; and that
the libelants acquired no rights under their
process, and should not be permitted to further proceed in the district court. The libelants, on the other hand, contend that this is
a question of jurisdiction over the particular
property,
and that court obtains
it which
through its process and officer first actually
seizes and takes possession of the property
itself; and that, although the receiver may
h^ve had a prior right to take possession, it
was not exercised before actual possession
v\^as taken under the process from the Uiilted
States court, and hence the first manual possession must determine the question of jurisdiction.
We think the contention
of the
libelants ought not to prevail.
The question
of the etfect of the appointment of a receiver
upon the title to the property of the fierson
or corporation for which he was appointed is
not a new one. in Mann v. Pentz, 2 Sandf.
Ch. 257, it was said that when the appolhtment of a receiver was completed the title
to all property and ettects which were subject to the order vested in him. To the same
effect are Porter v. Williams, 9 N. Y. 142148, and Van Alstyne v. Cook, 25 N. Y. 489496.
The appointment of receiver is completed at the furtiiest by the filing and entering
of the order appointing him, although before
he proceeds to the discharge of his duties he
may be directed to execute and file a proper
bond.
When that is done, he can take actual, manual possession of the property, and
his title relates back to the time of his apIn re Christian Jensen Co., 128
pointment.
N. Y. ^50, 28 N. E. 665, and. cases cited by
Earl, J. In Storm v. Waddell, 2 Sandf. Ch.
494, it was said that property that was liable
to levy under execution at law could not be
levied upon subsequent to an order appointing a receiver, as such order was equivalent
to an actual levj; upon the property.
I think
tile proposition Involved in this case has been
held adversely to the claini of the llbelarrts
by the decision in Re Christian Jensen Co.,
supra.
The receiver was there appointed
March 10th, his bond filed March llth, and
on March 12th he took possession of some of
the property of the corporation.
On the llth
of March, intermediate the appointment and
quaiifieation
of the receiver, certain parties
colnmehced an action against the corporation,
and sued out process in replevin in a New
York district court, and under it took possession of certain property, which was then in
the possession of the corporation.
On the
same day an action against the corporation
was commenced in the New York common
pleas to recover a money judgment,
and a
warrant of attachment was Issued, and the
sheriff on the same day attached some of the
property
of the corporation.
The receiver
then asked for an order restraining the fur-

812

EECEIVERS.

ther prosecution of these actions, and, after
liearing, the order was sranted permanently
restraining such proceedings.
At the same
time the court directed the sheriff, who had

seized under his process in replevin certain
property in the possession of the corporation,
to surrender the same to the receiver.
Some
question was made as to the right of the corporation to the possession of the property taken in replevin, hut upon the facts it was held
the receiver was entitled to possession, and,
if any question arose as to whether the property seized under the replevin writ actually
belonged to the corporation at the time of the
appiintment of the receiver, that question
might be inquired of by some action or proceeding against the receiver, commenced or
taken with leave of the court.
What was intended to be asserted was that the appointment of the receiver vested the property of
in him, although he was to
the corporation
qualify by giving a bond;
thereafter
and
that, the title being in him, and the property
in the custody of the law, no other court
could obtain jurisdiction over the property
after such appointment, even under process
upon which possession was taken prior to the
qualifying of the receiver.
A diA srent rule does not prevail because
one court is a state and the other a United
It is a question of jurisdiction
States court.
in each case, and the same principles apply
in both.
The same rule obtains whether one
court is of common-law or equitable jurisdiction and the other is a court of admiralty, although the nature of the jurisdiction of these
Mr. Chief Justice
courts is so different.
Taney, in his dissenting opinion in Taylor v.
Carryl, 20 How. 583-600, endeavored to establish that such a difference in the nature of
tlie jurisdiction of common-law and admiralty courts over the vessel which was attached
and libeled ought to make a difference in the
The jurisdiction of the
decision to be made.
district court of the United States in that
case was invoked for the purpose of collecting seamen's wages by the enforcement of
the maritime lien upon the vessel given for
that class of services, and it was said that
authorities
such lien is by well-established
prior and paramount to all other claims on
the vessel, and must be first paid, and that
and laws of the United
by the constitution
States the district courts, acting as courts
of admiralty, were the only courts which had
jurisdiction over such lien or that were authorized to enforce it, and that it was the
dutj- of that court to do it. The chief justice
of the
then argued that, as the attachment
vessel under the state laws and by process
from the state court only bound the interest
of the owner, while the maritime lien upon
the vessel bound the res itself, the court
which had jurisdiction only of a subordinate
and inferior interest should not be able, by
virtue of such an attachment, to close all
proceedings to enforce the paramount lien for
wages for 12 months, as by the laws of the

state that period or more might elapse between the seizure of the vessel under the attachment
and its sale or release from the
process.
The case was decided upon what a
majority of the court held was no new principle, and It was solved by the application of
what was said to be a principle that was
comprehensive,
and just, and equal, and opposing no hindrance to the efficient administration of judicial power. The jurisdiction of
the state court was upheld, notwithstanding
its limited character, and that of the admiralty court was denied, although it was the sole
court where the lien of the seaman for his
wages could be originally enforced against
the vessel itself.
The case shows that the
fact that the different courts in the Christian
Jansen Co. Case, supra, were courts of the
same state, and of concurrent jurisdiction, is
immaterial, and the same rule would hold it
one court were a state and the other a United States tribunal.
The cases cited by the counsel for these appellants do not involve the question as to the
effect of the appointment of a receiver in an
action or proceeding where the court has obtained jurisdiction by the proper service of
This court has held that the effect
papers.
is, in a case of this kind, to take the propinto the custody of
erty of the corporation
the law, and that the court has power to preserve and protect it. As was said in Heidritter V. Oil Cloth Co., 112 U. S. 305, 5 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 135: "When the object of the action requires the control and dominion of the property involved
in the litigation, that court
which first acquires possession, or that dominion which is equivalent, draws to itself
the exclusive right to dispose of it."
That
dominion was acquired by the order appointin this proceeding.
ing the receiver
The
same principle was declared in Union Trust
Co. V. Rockford, R. I. & St. L. R. Co., 6 Biss.
197;
Steele v. Sturges, 5 Abb. Pr. 442: Railroad Co. V. Lewis, 81 Tex. 1, 16 S. W. 647.
Different considerations apply upon a motion
to punish as for a contempt an alleged interference of a third person with property in regard to which a receiver m.iy have been appointed, but which he has not yet taken actual possession of. In the case of Bank v.
Schermerhom, 9 Paige, 372, the chancellor reversed the decree of the vice chancellor adjudging the appellants to be in contempt, because the facts were not sufficient to enable
the chancellor to judge whether the parties
were or were not in contempt.
The question
was one of procedure,— whether it was proper to proceed as for a contempt for the purpose of enforcing the actual delivery of property to the receiver.
The court held such
proceeding was improper where the receiver
had never had actual possession, although his
right to possession flowed from the order appointing him. The question now before the
court was neither involved, discussed, nor deA party might not
cided in the case cited.
in taking control of
be guilty of contempt
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property not actually seized by the receiver,
and while such party was in ignorance that
a receiver had been appointed;
and yet the
property thus interfered with may notwithstanding have been in the custody of the law,
and jurisdiction over it may unquestionably
have existed in the court which appointed the
receiver.
Our decision here does not affect
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the legal rights of the libelants In the vessels
in question.
The receiver will be obliged in
this proceeding to distribute the proceeds arising from a sale of the property among the
as their priority
creditors of the corporation,
of rights may appear and be held valid.
We think the order was right, and it must
All concur.
be affirmed, with costs.
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ST. LOUIS. K.
(30

S.

& S. B.

CO. et al. v.
Judge.

W.

357,

185

Supreme Court of Jlissouri.

WEAK,

Mo. 230.)

June

15,

1896.

Application
by the St. Louis,
In banc.
Kennett & Southern Railway Company and
others for a writ of prohibition against Judge
Wear, judge of the circuit court.
Writ
granted.

The proceeding before Judge Wear was upon a petition in which Mr. Kerfoot was named as plaintiff, and the "St. Louis, Kennett &
Southern
Railroad Company, a corporation,
and Louis Houck, E. F. Blomeyer,
L. B.
Houck, Theophllus Besel, and E. S. McCarIn said railroad company,
ty, as directors
and the Pemiscot Railroad Company, a corporation, and Robert G. Ranney, Leo Doyle,
Robert T. Giboney, and John R. Jeannin, directors in said railroad company, and Louis
Houcli," defendants.
The substance of that
petition (according to the statement of the
counsel for defendants in the supreme court,
which statement is regarded as sufficiently
full for the purposes of the prohibition case)
is as follows:
"On the 17th of March, 1890, there was organized under the laws of this state the St.
Louis, Kennett & Southern Railroad Company, with a capital of $180,000, divided into
1,800 shares of the par value of $100 each, designed to be constructed and operated from
Campbell to Kennett, Dunklin county, MisOf this stock,
souri, — a distance of 19 miles.
A. J. Kerfoot held, and still holds, 108 shares,
and B. S. McCarty, Harry H. Ferguson,
Melvin L. Gray, and George Denison, respectively, held 108 shares. Prior to the
day of July, 1891, all the shares of the other
stockholders in said company were purchased
by said A. J. Kerfoot and E. S. McCarty. On
July 8, 1891, said Kerfoot and McCarty enwith relator Louis
tered into a contract
Houck, by the terms of which said Houck
agreed to transfer to said Kerfoot and McCarty ten interest-bearing extension bonds of
Railway
the Cape Girardeau Southwestern
Company, each for $1,(MX), which were represented to be worth si/ioo of their face value,
and also to organize a construction company
for the purpose of making a connection between the said railroads at the town of Campbeing of the approxibell, said connection
Of the stock of
mated length of 30 miles.
said construction company, said Kerfoot and
McCarty were to receive 49 per cent., and on
the construction of said connection, said Kerfoot and McCarty were to be superintendent
and general manager, respectively, at salaries
By the
of not less than $175 per month.
terms of this contract, one-half of the real estate belonging to said St. Louis, Kennett &
Southern Railway Company at Kennett was
to be transferred to said Kerfoot and McCarIn consideration of the foregoing, said
ty.
Kerfoot and McCarty were to transfer to said

300 shares of their stock In said railroad company, on the completion of the contract aforesaid. After the above terms of
said contract had been agreed on and set
forth therein, additional stipulations were inserted by said Houck in sp.id contract, without the knowledge and coiisent of said Kerfoot and McCarty, to the effept that In n(j
event was said Houck to be personally responsible for the fulfillment of said contiuct,
and that, if said contract should not be kept
on his part, such failure should not affect in
any wise the said contract, and that 1,360 additional full-paid shares of stock in said company should be issued to said Houck, and
that the 240 shares of said Kerfoot and McCarty should be considered full paid. While
the bonds above referred to were by said
Houck transferred to said Kerfoot and McCarty, not only were they not of the value
represented by said Houck, but of no value
whatsoever; and while said construction company was organized, and certain certificates
of its stock transferred to said Kerfoot and
McCarty, the purpose of its organization—
the construction of a connection between the
aforesaid
railroads — was not only never accomplished, but never attempted to be carried out, and said certificates are consequently of absolutely no value.
Shortly after the
transfer of the 300 shares of the stock of the
St. Louis, Kennett & Southern Railroad Company by said Kerfoot and McCarty to said
Houck on the faith of the performance of the
terms of said contract by said Houck, said
Houck held a meeting of the pretended shareholders holding shares in excess of those held
by said Kerfoot and McCarty, — to whom no
notice of said pretended meeting was ever
given,
or attempted
to be given,
and of
which they had no knowledge or information,
—whereat said pretended shareholders did attempt and pretend to issue to said Houck
1,3(30 additional shares of stock of said railroad company.
This action of said pretended shareholders, respondent, Kerfoot, claims
to be fraudulent, illegal, and void, against
which he has protested, and now protests,
and in afilrmance of which he has done and
By reason of the aforesaid
will do nothing.
facts, it is claimed that the consideration for
the transfer of said stock to Houck has failed,
and was only brought about by the false and
fraudulent representations
of said Houck,
with the intent to cheat and defraud said
Kerfoot and McCarty.
"It is also charged in said petition: That,

Houck

having thus fraudulently obtained control of
said raih'oad, said Houck and the other relators have mismanaged, and been guilty of
gross negligence
and misconduct in their
trust capacity as directors, officers, etc., and
fraudulently combined to cheat and defraud
respondent, Kerfoot, and to render his shares
of stock valueless, etc., together with those
of other of the stockholders. That the other
relators, as directors of said company, are
under tlie influence and control of said relator
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ana cpnrprm tneir aptiops to accomplish his fraudulent and illegal pui-poses,
and to carry out his unlawful designs.
That
said Louis Houek is the principal shareholder
in a company organized to construct a railroad through the counties of St. Genevieve
and Perr^, in the state of Missouri, which
said road is located many miles from the St.
Louis, Kennett & Southern, and that, being
entirely without credit, said Houck has used
in the construction of said road divers
funds belonging to said St. Louis, Kennett
& Southern Railroad Company, without any
authority so to do from the stockholders and
directors of said company, although with
the pretended authority of said board of directors. That said Houck is also the: principal
stockholder in a certain railroad in process
of construction through Scott county, Missouri, apd in the construction of this road
said Houck hfis illegally and fraudulently,
in like mannej- and to like ends, appropriated the funds of said St. Louis, Kennett &
Southern Railroad Company.
Th^t on or
about February is, 18^2, the Pemiscot RailCompany was organised, — and conroad
structed during the year 1894, — of which said
Houck was the real and substantial owner.
That in the construction of this road said
Houck wrongfully and fraudulently appropriated certain of the funds of said St. Louis,
Kennett & Southern Railroad Company, in
the manner and ^ith the purposes as aforesaid.
That on the 22d day of April, 1895,
said Houck, in furtherance of his said designs to destroy the value of said Kerfoot's
stock, and of the property of said St. Louis,
Kennett & Southern Railroad Company,
caused the said pretended
stockholders of
said company to adopt a contract attempted
to be entered into between the directors of
said last-named companies, whereby the two
said railroads should be consolidated into
one foad.
Of none of these proceedings was
said Kerfoot notified, and of none of which
did he have any knowledge or information,
nor did he in any manner participate therein.
Under this pretended contract of consolidation, the stock of the two companies
was to be called in, and new stock in the
consolidated company issued in lieu thereof.
That said contract was submitted to a pretended meeting of said shareholders of the
St. Louis, Kennett & Southern Railroad Company, and the minutes of said meeting purport to show that said contract was adopted
by a majority of its stockholders, all of
which is false. That a copy of said minutes,
and also the minutes of a similar meeting
of the shareholders of said Pemiscot Railroad Company, showing a like pretended
ratification of the same contract, have been
filed in the qffipe of the secretary of state of
The said attempted
the state of Missouri.
consolidation was fraudulent and void, in
that it was not effected in conformity with
the laws of the state of Missouri, and with
a fraudulent intent and purpose, and because
WpucE,
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said
Kerfoot, who was not present thereat, although in the copy of the minutes of said
meeting on file with the secretary of state he
as voting in favor of
is falsely represented
said consolidation. That the terms of said
contract of consolidation were not carried
out by said Houck, or the other relators.
That the earnings of said company are not
no notice of said meeting was gjven

sufflcient to discharge its accruing obligations,
and that the salaries and wages of its emplpyfis have not been paid for the last six
months, and that it is now in debt to its
said employgs to the extent of many thousand dollars.
That by reason of the acts
aforesaid said company is unable to secure
supplies needed in the operation of the road.
That the roUing stock and other properties
are in need of repair and replenishing, which
the relators have failed and refused to have
done.
That no provision has been or is now
being made for the extinguishment of the
outstanding debts and bonds hereafter to accrue.
That said Houck on the 2d day of
December, 1895, did remove respondent, Kerfoot, from his position as superintendent of
said road, and did appropriate his salary to
himself, through one of the relators, his
kinsman Louis B. Houck. That the said
Pemiscot Railroad Company is, and was at
the time of the attempted
consolidation
aforesaid, hopelessly
insolvent. That its
debts have not been paid, except such as
were paid out of the earnings of the St.
Louis, Kennett ^ Southern Railroad Company as aforesaid, and that said attempted
consolidation was but a part of the plan of
said Houck to secure and absorb both propThat by reason of all of which the
erties.
said St. Louis, Kennett & Southern Railroad
Company has become greatly embarrassed
financially, and that a continuation of such
acts of mismanagement will bring about
the insolvency and bankruptcy of said cor-

poration.
"The prayer of the bill is that relators, as
officers of said company, be restrained from
diverting further amounts of money from
the treasury of said company; that they be
suspended from office as directors, etc., and
that a new election be ordered to be held to
supply the vacancy thus to be created; that
an accounting be had with respect of the
funds diverted as aforesaid; that a decree
conbe rendered annulling said pretended
solidation, and restoring the funds so diverted from the treasury of the St. Louis, Kennett & Southern Railroad Company; that
said 300 shares of stock, or their proportionate interest therein, transferred by said Kerfoot and lyicCarty, be restored to them, and
that said contract under which the transfer
was made be annulled, for reasons aforesaid;
that said issuance of the 1,360 shares of
stock be annulled and canceled, for the reasons before mentioned; and that said Hou<5k
be required to account for the benefits that
have accrued to him by reason of the trans-
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fer of said 300 shares of stock, and the issuand that he be
ance of said 1,360 shares;
ordered to pay one-half of the same to said
An offer is made to return to said
Kerfoot.
Houck one-half of the shares of stock in the
construction company before mentioned, and
like offer with respect of said extension
The petition then asks for the apbonds.
pointment of a receiver pending the determination of the issues tendered, in order to
prevent the misappropriation, and to insure
the preservation of the properties involved."
The order of Judge Wear, appointing the
receiver, is as follows:
"State of Missouri, County of Dunklin— ss.:
In the Circuit Court, July term, 1896. A. J.
Kerfoot, Plaintiff, v. The St. Louis, Kennett
& Southern Railroad Company, a Corporation, and Ivouis Houck, E. F. Blomeyer,
L.
B. Houck, Theophilus Besel, and E. S. McCarty, as Directors in said RaUroad Company, and the Pemiscot
Railroad Company, a
Leo
Corporation,
and Robert G. Ranney,
Doyle, Robt. T. Giboney, Louis Houck, and
John R. Jeannin, Directors in Said Railroad
In
Company, and Louis Houck, Defendants.
Vacation. Order of Appointment of ReceivNow, on this 11th day of April, 1896,
er.
comes A. J. Kerfoot, and presents to me,
John G. Wear, judge of the circuit court of
Dunklin county, Missouri, in vacation, at
chambers, in the city of Poplar Bluff, in the
county of Butler, in the state of Missouri, a
certified copy of his petition filed in the office
of the clerk of the said circuit court of said
Dunklin county, in a certain cause entitled
above; and with it he presents his motion,
verified by his affidavit, by which he asks
the appointment of a receiver of the real
and personal property of the said defendant
corporations named above, which said motion is hereto attached.
And the said John
G. Wear, judge as aforesaid, having heard
said motion, and having duly considered the
same, together with the facts offered in connection therewith, does hereby order that
Samuel W. Fordyce, of the city of St. Louis,
Missouri, be, and he is hereby, appointed as
receiver of all and singular the real and personal property, wherever situate, of the said
St Louis, Kennett & Southern Railroad Company, and of the said Pemiscot Railroad
and that he shall immediately
Company,
qualify as such, by giving bond for the faithful performance of his duties as such receiver, in the sum of twenty-five thousand dollai-s, and that after his qualification as such
receiver, having duly taken the oath prescribed, he shall proceed to the county of
Dunklin, and to the county of Pemiscot, in
the state of Missouri, and shall take charge
of the said property of the said railroad companies, including the rolling stock, the depots, books, and papers of the said companies, and that he shall then take an inventory of all of the said property so taken
that he shall manage
charge of by him;
the said railroad properties carefully and

discreetly;
that he shall continue to fulfill
and perform all of the existing contracts of
the said railroad companies until the further
order of the court in the premises; that lie
shall discharge all of the cun'ent expenses
of the management as such receiver out of
the earnings of the said roads while they
are in his hands or custody; that he shall
keep an accurate and exact account of the
expenses and of the income of the two said
railroads, the one extending from Campbell, Missouri, fo Kennett, Missouri, and the

other extending from Kennett, Missouri, to
Caruthersville, Missouri, preserving the said
expenses and income separate in all of the
transactions of himself as such receiver, and

that

he

shall

keep

and

maintain

the

said

properties in good condition until the further
order of the said circuit court of Dunklin
county, or the judge thereof in vacation;
and that he make a full report of his acts as
such receiver to the next term of said court,
unless ordered to do so before that date. It
Is further ordered that each and every agent
and employe of the said defendant railroad
companies named above, whether regarded
as the employes of the said companies as one
corporation, or as two separate corporations,
shall, upon the demand of said Samuel W.
Ii''ordyce, after his qualification as such receiver, immediately yield to said receiver
the possession and control of all the property, books, and accounts of the said defendant railroad companies or company, and the
said Louis Houck and the other defendants
named as the officers and directors of said
defendant companies are hereby ordered to
turn over and deliver to the said receiver
all of the books and papers of the said company or comi>anies which pertain in any wise
to the management and business of the said
company or companies. It is further ordered
that in the event that any such employ^ of
said company or companies shall fail or refuse to so deliver to said receiver the property In his said care and custody, or should
said defendants
fail or refuse to so deliver
to said receiver the books, papers, or other
property of the said defendant comjjany or
companies, the said receiver shall at once
report the person so failing or refusing to
the undersigned judge for his further orders
in that behalf.
The said defendants
and
their employes are hereby enjoined and forbidden from in any manner interfering with
the said possession of the said receiver after he shall have obtained the possession of
the said property hereby ordered into his
iiands, until the further orders of the said
court, or of the judge thereof in vacation.
It is further ordered that this order be filed
in the office of the clerk of said court of said
DunkUn county, and that a certified copy
thereof be furnished the said Samuel W.
Fordyce, as such receiver, and that a dulycertified copy thereof be served upon the defendants named above. It is further ordered
that the said defendants be notified to ap-
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pear before me, the undersigned judge of
the circuit court, at the next term of the circuit court, in the county of Dunltlin, in the
state of Missouri, then and there to show
cause, If any they can, why the appointment hereby made should not be continued,
and the property liept by the said receiver,
pending a hearing upon the merits of this
controversy, and until the said defendants
may be heard upon the merits thereof.
And
the service of a duly-certified copy hereof
shall be deemed sufficient service of the said
notice.
Done at chambers in the city of Poplar Bluff, in the county of Butler and state
of Missouri, this 11th day of April, 1896.
John G. Wear, Judge."
The writ Issued by Judge Wear for the
seizure and delivery of the property of the
railroad company is as follows:
"State of Missouri, County of Dunklin— ss.:
In the Circuit Court, to July Term, 1896. A.
J. Kerfoot, Plaintiff, v. The St. Louis, Kena Cornett & Southern Railroad Company,
poration, and Louis Houck, B. F. Blomeyer,
L. B. Houck, Theophilus Besel, and E. S.
McOarty, as Directors in said Railroad Company, and the Pemiscot Railroad Company, a
Leo
Corporation, and Robert G. Ranney,
Doyle, Robt. T. Gibouey, Louis Houck, and
John R. Jeannin, Directors in said Railroad
and Louis Houck, Defendants.
Company,
To W. G. Petty, Sheriff of Dunklin County,
Whereas, It appears to me, John
Missouri:
G. Wear, judge of the circuit court of said
Dunklin county, Missouri, sitting in chambers,
in vacation, by the report of S. W. Fordyce,
whom I did on the 11th day of April, 1896,
appoint as receiver o£ all of the property of
the said St. Louis, Kennett & Southern
Railroad Company, and of the said Pemiscot
Railroad Company, which report is duly verified, that the said Samuel W. Fordyce did
on said 13th day of April, 1896, proceed to
the town of Kennett, in said Dunklin county, Missouri, and did then and there cause
to be served upon one Louis B. Houck, whom
of
he found in the charge and management
the said property of the said railroad comnamed above, a dulypanies or company
copy of my order made in the
certified
cause, appointing him, the
above-entitled
said S. W. F'ordyce, as such receiver, and
that he did then and there demand of the
and
said Louis B. Houck the possession
custody of the property of the said railroad
companies or company, and did demand that
the said Louis B. Houck relinquish the possession and control thereof to him, the said
receiver, and that said Louis B. Houck did
then and there fail and refuse so to turn
over and deliver, to said receiver the possession and control of the said railroad or railroads, and of the said property of the said
railroad company or companies, and did then
and there fail and refuse to relinquish the
thereof;
and
and control
possession
the said Louis B. Houck did willfully
violate the commands of my said order of

said
that
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of the said Samuel W. Fordyce
appointment
This is, therefore, to comas such receiver:
mand you that you do forthwith summon
the power of the said county of Dimklin, if
necessary, and that you proceed to the property of the said railroad company or companies named above, and to its railroad office
or offices, wherever situate or found in your
county, and that you put and place the said
Samuel
W. Fordyce, as such receiver, in
charge, custody, and possession thereof, and
and from
that you dispossess therefrom,
every portion or part thereof, the said Louis
B. Houck, or any other official or employ^
or agent of the said Louis B. Houck or of
the said railroad companies named above, or
of any defendants named herein above; tnat
you take and deliver to the said receiver all
of the engines and cars and other equipments of the said railroad or railroads, all
of its books and papers, its tickets and other
and ticket
its depots
property,
movable
offices, and every other property of every
You are furtlier commanded
description.
that you immediately take into your custody
the body of the said Louis B. Houck, and
him safely keep, so that you have him, the
said Louis B. Houck, before me, at chambers, in the city of Poplar Bluff, in the county of Butler and state of Missouri, on
Thursday, April 16, 1896, then and there to
show cause, if any he can, why he should
not be committed to the common jail of said
Dunklin county for his disobedience of my
said order of appointment
of said receiver.
And you are further commanded that if any
other person shall attempt to obstruct the
full and free execution of the above order,
or to aid or assist in the attempt to remove
any of the said property from the said county
of Dunklin, except by orders of the said receiver, you shall, by virtue hereof, arrest each
and every such person, and have him or them
before me at the time and place designated
above, then and there to be further dealt
with according to law. In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, at chambers, in the town of Bloomfleld, in the county
of Stoddard and state of Missouri, this 14th
day of April, 1896.
John G. Wear, Judge of
the Circuit Court of Dunklin
County, Mis-

souri."
The return of the sheriff upon the above
writ follows:
"Executed the within writ in the county
of Dunklin and state of Missouri on the 14th
day of April, 1896, by placing S. W. Fordyce, as receiver, in charge of the depot and
all of the property of the above-named
company or companies which were at that
time at the town of Kennett and in said
county, including one engine and two passenger coaches, which were afterwards taken
away by L. B. Houck, and carried eastward
into Pemiscot county, Missouri.
I did further on the 15th day of April, 1896, put the
said receiver in charge of all the remainder
of the property of the said companies or com-
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pany

in my said county.
Said Louis B.
Houek was not arrested as ordered above,
because lie left the said county of Dunklin.
W. G. Petty, Sheriff of Dunklin County,
Mo."
Other necessary facts appear in the opinion of the court.

M. R. Smith, for plaintiffs.

BARCLAY, J. (after stating the facts).
This action is original in the supreme court.
The plaintiffs are the St. Louis, Kennett «&
Southern
Railroad Company, Louis Houek,
and a number of other shareholders in said
company.
The defendants are the learned
circuit,
circuit judge of the Twenty-Second
and Messrs. Kerfoot and Fordyce, plaintiff
and receiver in the proceeding
before the
judge. The object of the action is to obtain
a writ of prohibition against the enforcement of certain orders entered by the judge
in vacation of the court. Copies of those orders will be printed in the official report.
The claim of plaintiffs here is that the
orders are void, because made without jurisdiction, or, at least, that they are in excess
of any jurisdiction which the circuit judge
might properly exercise in the proceeding as
it then stood. In response to a preliminary
rule in prohibition, defendants made separate
returns, and plaintiffs replied thereto.
It
will not be necessary to state the terms of
those pleadings at any great length.
The
facts on which the result of the action in
this court depends are few, and need not be
obscured by elaboration of the minor features of the controversy. Those facts are
also admitted by the pleadings.
The old St
Louis, Kennett & Southern Railroad Company (which we shall call the "Old Kennett
Road" for a short name) was incorporated in
1890 to operate
a railroad, about 19 miles
long, between
Campbell
and Kennett, in
Dunklin county.
A new company of the
same title was formed in 1895 by an alleged
consolidation of the old Kennett road and
the Pemiscot Railroad Company, which had
been organized In 1892 to extend the railroad
from Kennett to Caruthersville. The latter
place is in Pemiscot county, on the Mississippi river. The validity of that consolida- .
tlon is attacked in the petition filed in the
public
case on the circuit. The ostensible
evidence of the consolidation is the certificate issued by the secretary of state of Missouri, proclaiming a compliance
with the
statutory requirements in regard to the
union of such corporations. Rev. St. 1889,
The property formerly owned by
§ 25S7.
the two old companies was in custody of the
new Kennett road, which operated a line,
about 44 miles in length, from Campbell to
Caruthersville (via Kennett), when Kerfoot's
petition was filed. For the purpose of the
hearing in this court, the version which that
petition gives of the dealings between Kerfoot, Houek, and the companies will be ac-

In detnrmining tlie procepted as reliable.
which followed.
priety of the proceedings
The statements of that petition need not be
They will be referred to as occarepeated.
An ex parte application for
sion requires.
the appointment of a receiver was made to
the circuit judge, in vacation, on representations additional to the petition. The subis that if
stance of those representations
such appointment were not made the property of said railway companies would "be
wasted pending the determination of the
said litigation," and the rights of the plaintiff "suffer irretrievable injury," etc.
The
application excused the want of notice thereof to defendants on the ground "that the
giving of the said notice would tend to defeat the object sought to be obtained by the
said appointment,
in this, to wit: that the
said Louis Houek is in exclusive charge of
all of the books showing the condition of
the affairs of the said companies, and has
persons in charge of the various oflices and
property of the road, who are entirely under
his control; that the said Louis Houek would
so handle and dispose of the books and property of the said companies that the order
of appointment of a receiver, if made ui^on
notice, would not avail, and would not be
obeyed; the books and movable property of
the said companies would be removed from
the said counties in which said property is
situate, and would be removed from the
state, so that the said processes of the said
court would not be effectual to compel the
delivery thereof to the receiver which might
be appointed"; "that by the removal of the
said books of the said companies the object
of the appointment of such receiver would
be frustrated, and his performance of his
said duties would be made difficult, if not
impossible; that all of the said defendants,
directors in the said corporations, are under
the control of the said
defendant Louis
Houek"; and "that, If the said defendants
should have notice of this application for a receiver, they would resort to various tricks
and devices to delay this proceeding, and in
the meanwhile to further wreck said property; that the said defendants now are plotting to deprive this plaintiff of his property
interest in the St. Louis, Kennett & Southem Railroad Company, by means of a fictitious and fraudulent assessment upon his
said stock; and that the giving of the said
notice would have the effect to destroy the
benefits sought in the appointment of the
said receiver."
The circuit judge granted
the application, without notice to defendants, and made a vacation order, at Poplar
Bluff, in Butler county, the terms of which
are set forth at large In the statement accompanying this opinion.
The main features
of the order are that Mr. Fordyce, was appointed receiver of all the real and personal
property of defendant companies.
He was
directed to immediately qualify, by giving
bond, etc., and then to take charge of all
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the real and personal property of said companies, "including tlie foiling stock, 'the depots, books and papers, of the said companies",- to "manage the said railroad properties carefully," and "Continue to fulfill and
perform all of the existing contracts of the
said railroad companies until the further
order of the court in the premises"; to keep
accounts, make reports, etc. The order further directed defendants to deliver all said
property to said receiyer, and enjoined them
from interfering with the possession of the
latter. The defendants were further ordered
to appear before the judge "at the next term
of the circuit court in the county of Dunklin," then and there to show cause why the
receivership should not be continued "pending a hearing upon the merits." This order
was dated April 11, 1896. The next term
of the Dunklin circuit court, as appointed by
law, will begin on the second Monday (the
13th) of July; 1896. Sess. Laws 1892, p. 13,
An ordinary summons to defendants
^ 50.
to appear and answer the petition in the
cause at the opening of the July term of
was
the circuit court of Dunklin county
issued on the 10th of April, 1896. Mr. Fordyce, at the time of his appointment as receiver, was president of the St. Louis Southwestern Railroad Company, popularly known
as th« "Cotton Belt" route. It is alleged in
the petition for prohibition in this court that
the latter is "a competitive railroad company, whose policy has ever been hostile to
relator railroad company, for the reason
that it occupies the same teiTitory for business," and that the connection of the Kennett road with the Mississippi river secures
to the people of Dunklin and Pemiscot counties advantages of competition between that
road and the Cotton Belt. There is no denial of these allegations in the return of any
of the defendants to the preliminary rule in
as to the
this court, and like statements
roads being In competition appear in the
The above recital
replies to the returns.
shows the substance of the charges on that
point.
When Mr. Pordyce, in obedience to
the order for his appointment, demanded
possession of the Kennett road, the officers
in charge of the property refused to deliver
it. That demand was the first actual notification given to them of the receivership.
After the refusal to turn over the property,
an application was made to the circuit judge
for further action, whereupon he issued the
writ or warrant of date April 14, 1896, to
the sheriff of Dunklin county, directing him
to summon the power of his county to put
the receiver in possession of the property of
and to disposthe two railroad companies,
The
sess any oflicial of said companies.
warrant Is recited in full in the statement
accompanying the opinion. But it may be
properly noted here that the warrant was
issued in Stoddard county. It directed the
arrest of Louis B. Houck, and that he be
produced before the circuit judge, at cham-
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Bluff, Butler
bers, in the city of Poplar
County, April 16, 1896; 'to show cause why
he should not be committed to jail for disof the order appointing the reobedience
ceiver.
Under the last-described writ, the
into
Sheriff put Mr. Fordyce,' as receiver,
of the property of the Kennett
possession

railroad in Dunklin county, and otherwise
returned the order unexecuted, for the reasons appearing in his return. At that stage
of the case the application for a prohibition
was presented to the supreme court, and a
preliminary rule issued.
that prohibi1. It is urged by defendants
tion is not applicable to the situation existing on the circuit in the receivership case,
and that no review can occur at this time
as to the propriety of the disputed orders.
But, if those orders were beyond the legitimate authority of the judge, the enforcement
of them may be prohibited. Morris v. Lenox
The fact that the suit in
(1843) 8 Mo. 252.
the circuit court invokes the equity powers
thereof does not preclude the use of a prohibitory writ to keep the judicial action within the limits marked by law. A court of
equity, no ■less than a court of law, may
be called back within the boundaries of its
rightful jurisdiction by the process of prohibition. Where a court or judge assumes to
exercise a judicial power not granted by law,
it matters not, so fat afa coucerns the right
to a prohibition, whether the exhibition of
power occurs in a case which the court is
not authorized to entertain at all, or is merely
an excessive and unauthorized application of
judicial force In a cause otherwise properly
cognizable by the court or judge in question.
State V. Walls (1892) 113>Mo. 42, 20 S. W.
883; In re Holmes (1895) 1 y. B. 174. Prohibition, however, will not ordinarily be granted where the usual modes of review by appeal or writ of error furnish an adequate and
efficient remedy for the correction of an injury resulting from the unauthorized exerBut where those
power.
cise of judicial
remedies are inadequate to the exigency of
the situation, in a particular case, a supervising court may properly interfere by the
remedy now asked. If the orders in tie K.erfoot suit were in excess of the jurisdiction
of the learned judge who entered them, and
if they have resulted in the seizure of a large
part of a railroad line, and its detention from
those entitled to — and whose duty requires
of
them to— operate it for the convenience
the public, the case is one which would permit, if not demand, the application of a writ
of prohibition to correct the wrong complained of. The remedy of prohibition affords opportunity for a direct attack upon
upon the point of
proceedings questioned
jurisdiction. If the facts shown by a record
reveal an unwarranted application of judicial
power, causing an immediate and wrongful
invasion of rights of property, the writ of
prohibition may go to check the execution of
any unfinished part of the extrajurisdictional
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that may have been outlined.
lirogramme
Sometimes the writ may be so shaped as to
undo the steps that have been taken in such
To justify the use of the writ, it
a programme.
is not essential that the proceedings in dispute should be so entirely void as to warrant
a declaration of nullity upon a collateral Inquiry. The statute governing proceedings in
prohibition makes no change In the ancient
law on these points. Laws 1895, p. 95.
2. The plaintiffs in this court contend that
the learned judge had no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver for the railroad company upon
the showing made by the petition of Kerfoot,
and that the order of appointment is therefore a nullity. It is true that there are precof
edents declaring that, in the absence
statutory authority for so doing, the property of a solvent and going corpoi'ation
cannot rightfully be taiien from the control
of its officers at the suit of a mere creditor
at large, and be placed in the hands of a remereceiver, on account of mismanagement
of some
ly, or to secure the performance
engagement of the company, even in regard
Some decisions have gone so
to its shares.
far as to correct, and even to prohibit, such
proceedings, as entirely beyond the general
jurisdiction of courts of equity. Port Huron
& G. R. Co. V. Judge of St. Clair Circuit
Co. v. Wilder
31 Mich. 456; Iron
(1875)
Mason v.
(1892) 88 Ya.. 942, 14 S. B. 806;
Court of Baltimore City (1893) 77
Atl. 171; In re Binghamton General El. Co. (1894) 143 N. Y 261, 38 N. B.
297; People v. Welgley (1895) 1D.J 111. 491, 40
N. E. 300; State v. Superior Court of Pierce
County (1895) 12 Wash. 677, 42 Pac. 123;
Fischer v. Superior Court of San Francisco
But in view
(1895) 110 Cal. 129, 42 Pac. 561.
of the other seriods and sufficiently difficult
Supreme

Md.

483,

27

involved in the case at bar, and
question
of
the desirability of prompt announcement
the conclusion that has been reached, we shall
not now stop to Investigate the soundness of
plaintiffs' contention above stated.
3. A power to appoint receivers is expressly conferred upon judges of trial courts in
by section 2193, Rev. St. 1889,
vacation
which greatly broadened the terms of the old
law (Gen. St. 1865, p. 678, § 52) under which
State V. Gambs (1878) 68 Mo. 289, was deWe shall not be obliged to consider
cided.
whether the judge might not appoint a reby virtue of inherent
ceiver in vacation
power in the circuit court to make such an
order, for in the instance under review the
order was made in another county than that
in which the petition for a receiver had been
The inherent as well as the exfiled.
press powers of a court must be exercised

of that
the territorial jurisdiction
unless positive law enlarges the field
of their use. But, where a judicial power
is given by statute to a judge in vacation, he
may exert that power (at least within his
circuit) out of as well as in the county where
the cause is pending, unless there is somewithin

court,

j

thing in the statutory authority to forbid such
It may be conceded for the present,
action.
without examining the proposition closely,
that the power given to the judge to appoint
a receiver carries with It, as a necessary incident, a power in his court, if not in the
to
to enforce
obedience
judge personally,
made
within the ambit of that
orders
with established
power, and in accordance
principles of law governing the exertion
of such a power.
(As to the mode of
applying that power we shall have more
to say in the next section of this opinion.)
But the judicial authority to deal with property by means of a receivership is not unHarris v. Beauchamp
limited or absolute.
By a very late statute
[1894] 1 Q. B. 801.
of Missouri an appeal may be taken from any
order "refusing to revoke, modify or change
an interlocutory order appointing a receiver
The same statute further
or receivers."
provides for a very summary determination
of such appeals, and for that reason directs
that they shall, on motion, be advanced on
the appellate
docket.
Laws 1895, p. 91,
amending
Rev. St. 1889, §2246.
The purpose of this enactment is to moderate the
hardships resulting from the long continugranted on insufficient
ance of receiverships
grounds, when no review of interlocutory appointments was permissible.
The reports of
court proceedings in the United States prior
to the passage of that act afforded illustrations of the injuries possible from erroneous
judicial action in the matter of receiverships,
—injuries for which the law seemed to
afford no adequate redress.
The right to a
summary review of an interlocutory order
maintaining a receivership Is clearly given
by the statute cited.
It is a valuable and
right.
substantial
The administration
of the
law must conform to the intent of the legislature in regard to it. Andrews v. National
Foundry & Pipe Wofks (1894) 18 U. S.
App. 4.58, 10 C. C. A. 60, 61 Fed. 782.
It is
noticeable that a prompt review is allowed
by the act of 1895 only where the order continues, not where It dissolves, the receivership.
Thus the statute is plainly aimed at
the possible abuse of maintaining a receivership (without just grounds) beyond a period
required for an Investigation of its correctness.
If the purpose of the new law Is kept
in view and effectuated, the procedure in
such cases must be shaped so as to permit a
speedy review of Interlocutory orders appointing receivers In vacation as well as in
term.
Otherwise such orders, in many parts
of Missouri, might stand for nearly half a
year without the possibility of even a first
review, under the existing law In regard to
terms of court.
Laws 1892, p. 10, §30 and
following. In other states where statutes
allow appeals from interlocutory injunction
orders,
appointments
of receivers,
etc., it
has been held that the appeals may be taken
in vacation as well as in term.
Griffin v.
Bank (1846) 9 Ala. 201; Montana, etc., Co.
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T. Helena, etc., Co. (1887) 6 Mont. 416, 12
Pa'c. 916; Railroad Co. v. Dykeman (1892)
Such rulings ap133 Ind. 56, 32 N. E. 823.
pear necessary to conform to the plain design
The new
of the legislation on that subject.
provisions in this state most clearly Import
that persons whose possession is to be invaded by a receivership shall have at least
a prompt and fuU opportunity for a hearing
(both preliminary and by appeal) as to the
justice and equity of such a drastic remedy.
Keeping the purpose of the new statute in
mind, how must we regard the orders of the
learned circuit judge In the Kerfoot suit?
The appointment of the receiver was made
without notice to, or any hearing of, the
They had no opportunity to
defendants.
offer the facts which they assert, tending to
prove that the demand for any sort of re-

ceivership was without foundation. The
learned judge's order fixed a time, three
months distant, at which they might show
cause why the receivership "should not be
continued, and the property kept by the said
receiver, pending a hearing upon the merits."
The details of the order plainly contemplate
that meanwhile the railroad was to be operated and managed by the receiver;
at least,
until the next term of court, then three
The receiver was directed, for
months off.
instance, to perform existing contracts "until
the further order of the court."
The whole
framework of the order suggests that the
receiversliip was established for at least a
The facts which justify
three-months
term.
the appointment of a receiver, without notice
to the party whose possession is disturbed,
Nothing but the
are exceptional,
at best.
plainest showing of an imperative necessity
for such an order, to prevent a failure of
justice, should move a court to grant a motion to that end, though there is no hard and
fast rule, that we can give, prescribing when
the discretionary power to make such an
order may or may not be used. But of this
proposition we feel sure: that under our
existing law no temporary receivership can
rightly be set up, to last three months,
without affording first a hearing to the party
whose possession of property is determined
If the court had been in
by such an order.
session, so as to permit immediate application to modify the order, the relief then possible might affect the applicability of a
prohibitory writ. But the facts here are
In vacation, at least, a party
different.
should not be obliged to hunt up the judge
for a correction of an order made in excess
The right to
of his power in the premises.
appoint a temporary receiver in vacation is
limited by the necessity from which alone
springs.
the right to make such appointment
Larsen v. Winder (1896; Wash.) 44 Pac
123.
No court in Missouri may, without
pending suit,
notice, declare a receivership,
for a longer time than is fairly and reasonably requisite to allow the defendant, whose
possession is invaded, to show cause against
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further continuance of the receivership.
What is such reasonable time will depend on
But we
the circumstances of each case.
have no doubt that three months is beyond
day
(and very far beyond) any reasonable
for the showing of cause. The statute allowing appeals from interlocutory receiver-

a

It
ship orders must be given due force.
contemplates that an early opportunity shall
be allowed to combat, and, if desired, to
review, the appointment.
The courts must
yield to that obvious purpose, and permit no
receivership to stand without a summary
opportunity to review the equity of it.
When a judge in vacation deems the exigency sufficiently great to warrant an ex
parte order for a receivership of property,
such as that in question here, he should by
the same order appoint a very early day for
the showing of cause against the order by
defendants, so that the latter may then have
opportunity for the motion to vacate which
the statute permits.
Our law confers, indeed, power to appoint a receiver in vacation, but it also allows an appeal from an
order refusing to vacate an interlocutory appointment.
A reasonable construction of the
latter act would appear to permit in vacation
a motion to revoke the appointment
in vacation; otherwise one of the chief remedial
objects of the appeal statute on this subject
would be frustrated. It has been held by
some courts that a ix)wer to do a certain
judicial act out of term implies a power to
undo that act, if justice appears to require
that move.
Railroad Co. v. Sloan (1877) 31
Ohio St. 1; Walters v. Trust Co. (1892) 50
Fed. 316.
We hold that the learned judge's
order in the case on the circuit was in excess
of the limitations on the power of appointment without notice, which we think the law
imposes by the clearest implication.
4. But another patent infirmity is noticeable in the proceedings in question.
Had the
first order fixed a reasonable date to show
cause against it, the question of the jurisdictional validity of the second order (the order
to the sheriff) would demand serious attention.
That order was made after the refusal
of the superintendent of the new Kennett
road to surrender possession to the receiver.
The petition itself gave notice that the property over which the receivership was sought
to be established
was in possession of the
new company by virtue of the alleged consolidation.
The old Kennett Company and
its directors were parties defendant in the petition. The new company was not a party to
it, for the list of directors shows that only
the old company was pointed out as defendant.
The receivership asked of and granted
by the court reached for the property of the
old Kennett Company, and of the Pemiscot
Railroad Company.
The directions to the receiver exhibit that meaning of the order quite
clearly. Then it was evidently beyond the
iwwer of the learned judge to order a seizure
of property in the possession of the new com-
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pany without at least giving the latter an opportunity to show cause against the proposed
By that order the learned judge virorder.
tually decided that the transfer to the new
company was invalid, and the union of the
two old companies merely nominal. That
ruling was made without any but an ex parte
hearlDg, as against a stranger to, the case in
court.
The order to the sheriff was in the
nature of a writ of assistance, as known to
the chancery practice.
Such a writ could not
rightly be issued, even on a final decree (and,
for stronger reason, not upon an ex parte interlocutory order), as against one not a party
to the suit, without a chance .t6 the latter to
show cauge against the order therefor. People V. Rogers (1830) 2 Paige, 103; Howard v.
RaUroad Co. (1879) 101 U. S. 848; State v.
Ball (1892) 5 Wash. 387, 31 Pac. 975. , The
summary writ, issued from another county,
to seize the property and deliver it to the receiver, was beyond the jurisdiction of the
learned judge, so far as it concerned or affected the .rights of the new Kennett Company; and, as to the latter company, the effect of the writ should be checked by the prohibition now invoked.
5. The fact that no objection was inade on
the circuit to the want of jurisdiction is no
barrier to a prohibition, where the order complained of was entered in vacation, ex parte,
and the defect of jurisdiction appears on the
face of the papers.
Nor can the want of an
exception to the objectionable order have any
weight where no opportunity to except was
had by reason of the ex parte nature of the
order.

judge was
6. Assuming that the learned
without jurisdiction to require the immediate
deliyery of the property of the new Kennett
Company to the receiver without a hearing,
then the disobedience
of the order by Mr.
Houck, as superintendent of that company,
involves no contempt It is always permissible to show, upon process for contempt, that
the order disobeyed was beyond the jurisdiction of the authority from which it emanated. If that showing is successfully ma,de, no
In
punishable contempt has been committed.
re Sawyer (1888) 124 U. S. 200, 8 Sup. Ot
482; Smith v. People (1892) 2 Colo. App. 99,
Schwartz v. Barry (1892) 90
29 Pac. 924;
Mich. 267, 51 N. W. 279; State v. Winder
(1896; Wash.) 44 Pac. 125.
7. It is msisted by the plaintiffs in thjsj
court that the action of the learned circuit
judge was void because the appointee named
as custodian of the pr(q>erty could not law:
fully be appointed receiver of their railway
line.
The ccmstitution declares that: "No
railroad or other corporation, or the lessees,
purchasers or managers of any railroad, cor?
in any way control,
poration, shall * * *
any railroad corporation owning or having
under its control a parallel or competing line;
nor shall any officer of such railroad corporation act as an officer of any other railroad corIKiration owning or having the control of a

line.
parallel or competing
The question
whether railroads are parallel or competing
lines shall, when demanded, be decided by a
jury, as in other civil issues."
Const. 1875,
Two jections of the statute law,
art. 12, § 17.
in furtherance of the purpose of the organic
law quoted, are as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any railroad company, corporation
or individual owning, operating or managing
any railroad in the state of Jllssouri, to enter
any contract, combination or association,
* or, in any way whatever to any degree exercise control over, any railroad comor individual owning or
pany, corporation
having under his or their control or manageline in this
ment a parallel or competing
state, but each and every such railroad,
whether owned, operated or managed by a
company, corporation or individual, shall be
run, operated and managed separately by its
own officers and agents, and be dependent for
its support on its own earnings from its local
and through business in connection with other
roads, and the facilities and accommodations
it shall afford the public for travel and transportation under fair and open competition."
Rev. ^t. 1889, § 2569.
"It shall be unlawful
for any officer of any railroad company or corporation, or any individual owning, operating
or managing any railroad
in this state as
a common carrier, to act, as an officer of
any other railroad
company or corporation
owning,
operating or managing,
or having
the control of a parallel or conipeting line,
and the question whether railroads are parcompeting
lines shall be decided
aHel or
by a jury,
so
demanded."
Id. §
when
2570.
At various points in the state statutes concerning railroads, receivers are mentioned among other managing , operators
of
such lines.
Rev. St. 1889, §§ 2Q31, 2644, 2645.
So that it is obvious that the president of a
parallel or competing railroad, however high
his, business qualificatjons, is not eligible to
appointment as receiver of the competing railway line. In Missouri. The fact is alleged in
this court that Mr. Fordyce Is the president
of the Cotton Belt Route, and that it is a railway in competition with the new Kennett
road. The fact stands admitted by the pleadBut, to
ings here, in their present form.
make It available as the groundwork of a prohibitlMi, the fact should appear In some way
in the proceedings on the circuit. It does not
appiear in the record of those proceedings.
Nor does it appear that the learned circuit
judge was aware of the fact when the appointment was made. Hence we are not called upon to say whether or not the fact would
furnish of Itself a cause to prohibit the execution of the order of appointment.
8. The summary order for the seizure of the
property in possession of the new Kennett
road was, we think, in excess of the rightful
power of the learned circuit judge In vacation., We hence consider that the rule In
prohibition should be made absolute, and direct that judgment for a peremptory writ be
Into
*
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prohibiting the circuit judge from
enforcing ' any order heretofore made in the
Kerfoot case, under which said receiver lias
taken i)ossession, or is attempting to talie possession, of some part of the railway or other
property of the St. Louis, Kennett & Southern
Railroad Company, or of the Pemiscot Railroad Compaiy, and prohibiting him frotti
making any order (upon the pending petition
of said K6rfoot in said cause) directing or
permitting any receiver to take possession of
any property of said companies wlthotit first
allowing the' present St. Louis, Kennett &
entered,
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Southern Railroad CSompany an opportunity
to be duly heard; and by the writ the said receiver will tie prohibited from attempting to
take or hold possession of any property of
said railroad companies by virtue of said order, and the receiver will further be ordered
to restore forthwith any and all property of
the new'Kennett road that may be in his possession by reason of his said receivership.

BRACE, C. J., and GANTT, MacFARLANE, BURGESS, and ROBINSON, JJ., conSHERWOOD, J., dissents.
cur.
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et
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v.

NEELT.

(34 S. E. 828, 47 W. Va. 70.)

Supreme

Court

of Appeals of West
Nov. 28, 1899.

Virginia.

Appeal from circuit court, Tyler county; R.
H. Freer, Judge.
Bill by .J. M. Childers and another against
Judgment for plaintiffs, and deS. H. Neely.
fendant

appeals.

Reversed.

Robert McF. L. Blackmarr, for appellant.
Eldowney and G. M. JlcCoy, for appellees.

BRAXNON, J. Childers and Ramey filed
a bill in equity in the circuit court of Tyler
against Neely, praying that a partnership between them be dissolved, an account taken "of
all its accounts, dealings, and transactions
whatever,"
and that a manager be appointed
The business
to take charge of the property.
Neely admitted the joint
was oil production.
and he
enterprise, but denied the partnership;
joined in request for account, and did not reThe desist a dissolution, if a partnership.
crees made a partial account, decreed its balance against Neely, and denied him further
participation in the partnership, and he appealed.

This case raises an interesting and important subject In this mining state; that is,
whether, and when, joint tenants or tenants In
common, jointly operating for oil, are partThe bill asserts a
ners, or merely co-owners.
while Neely denies it; asserting
partnership,
that it is a case, not of partnership, but coownership.
In two leases of town lots for oil and gas
purposes, Childers owned a one-fourth interest; Ramey, a three-eighths interest; Neely, a
They were so far joint
three-eighths interest.
They agreed to develop the lots for
tenants.
oil, but made no written articles of partnership,— in fact, no oral express formation of a
They simply, by an indefinite
partnership.
understanding,
agreed to develop their common property, each giving his skill, paying his
to his ownershare of outlay proportionate
ship, and getting his share of the product proI use the word
portioned to such ownership.
"product," instead of "profits," because there
was no contract explicit on this point to distin"Partnership must
guish product from profit.
from joint management of
be distinguished
Where two partproperty owned in common.
ners own a chattel, and make a profit by the
use of it, they are not partners, without some
T.
special agreemeiit which makes them so."
Pars. Partn. § 76. Two heirs or other co-owners of a farm, jointly farming it for profit, are
There is a peculiar partnership,
not partners.
called a "mining partnership," partaking partly of the nature of an ordinary trading or general partnership, on the one hand, and partly
It is
of a tenancy in common, on the other.
an important question to those engaged in the
oil and other mining business whether each one
is jointly and severally liable' for all the doings
of every or any other of the associates in the

venture, as in ordinary trading partnerships.
15 Am. &
What is a mining partnership?
Eng. Enc. Law, p. 609,, says: "When tenants
in common of a mine unite and co-operate in
' working it, they constitute a mining partnerMany authorities there cited thus deship."
fine it.
See the California case of Skillman v.
Lachman, 83 Am. Dec. 96, and note discussing it fully; Lamar's Ex'r v. Hale, 79 Va.
I
147.
Mere co-working makes them partners,
Barring. & A. Mines
without special contract.
& M.
Courts of equity take jurisdiction of
2 Colly.
them as if general partnerships.
Partn. c. 35. Of course, owners of mines, oil
or farms can by agreement make an
j leases,
but "where ten; ordinary partnership therein;
ants in common of mines or oil leases or lands
actually engage in working the same, and
! share, according to the interest of each, the
profit and loss, the partnership relation subsists between them, though there is no express
agreement between them to be partners or to
Duryea v. Burt, 28
share profits and loss."
Cal. 569. The presumption in such case would
rather than
be that of a mining partnership,
an ordinary one, in absence of an express
agreement forming an ordinary general partPerhaps the case of Bank v. Osnership.
borne, 159 Pa. St. 10, 28 Atl. 163, and other
cases in that state cited in Bryan, Petroleum
& Natural Gas, 283, would justify the inference that the parties operated as tenants in
common;
but the current of authority elsewhere recognizes the inference of mining partnerships.
That state does not recognize such
Justice Field said in Kahn v.
a partnership.
Smelting Co., 102 XJ. S. 645, 26 L. Ed. 266;
"Mining partnerships, as distinct associations,
with different rights and liabilities attaching
to
to their members from those attaching
partnerships,
exist In
members of ordinary
Indeed, without them
all mining communities.
successful mining would be attended with difmuch greater
ficulties and embarrassments
One leading distinction bethan at present."
tween the mining partnership and the general
one is that the general one has, as a material
the delectus per; element of its membership,
sonse (choice of person), while the other has
Those forming an ordinary partnership
! not.
'■ select the persons to form it, always from
of personal confidence; but
{ fitness, worthiness
j we know such is not always or often the case
It is because of this delectus
I in oil ventures.
personse that the law gives such wide authority of one member to bind another by contracts, by notes, and otherwise.
One is the
Hence, when one
chosen agent of the other.
member dies or Is bankrupt, or sells his Interest to a stranger, even to an associate, the
partnership is closed, one chosen member Is
gone, the union broken, because he may have
been the chief dependence for success, and the
newcomer maybe an unacceptable person, who
would entail failure upon the firm. In the
mining partnership those occurrences make no
dissolution, but the others go on; and, in case
a stranger has bought the interest of a mem-
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ter, the stranger takes the place of him who
sold his interest, and cannot be excluded.

If death, insolvency, or sale were to close up
vast mining enterprises, in which many persons and large interests participate, it would
entail
disastrous
consequences.
From the
absence of this delectus personse in mining
companies
flows another result, distinguishing them from the common partnership,
and
that is a more limited authority in the individual member to bind the others to pecuniary liability. He cannot borrow money or
execute notes or accept bills of exchange
binding the partnership or its members, unless it is shown that he had authority; nor
can a general superintendent
or manager.
They can only bind the partnership for such
things as are necessary in the transaction of
and are usual
in
the particular business,
such business.
Charles v. Eshleman, 5 Colo.
107;
Skillman v. Lachman, 88 Am. Dec.
96, and note;
JlcConnell v. Denver, 35 Cal365; Jones v. Clark, 42 Cal. 181;
Manville
128, 2 Pac. 212;
CongV. Parks, 7 Colo.
don V. Olds, 18 Mont. 487, 46 Pac. 261; Judge
V. Braswell, 13 Bush, 67; Waldron v. Hughes,
In fact, it is a
44 W. Va. 126, 29 S. E. 505.
rule that a nontrading partnership, as distinguished from a trading commercial firm, does
not confer the same authority by implication
on its members to bind the firm; as, e. g. a
partnership
to run a theater or other single
Pease v. Cole, 53 Conn. 53,
enterprise only.
22 Atl. 681; Deardorf's Adm'r v. Thacher, 78
Mo. 128; Smith, Merc. Law, 82; T. Pars.
Partn. § 85; Pooley v. Whitmore, 27 Am. Rep.
A mining partnership is a nontrading
733.
and its members are limited to
partnership,
expenditures necessary and usual in the parBates, Partn. § 329.
Memticular business.
bers of a mining partnership, holding the major portion of property, have power to do what
may be necessary and proper for carrying on
the business, and control the work, in case all
cannot agree, provided the exercise of such
power is necessary and proper for carrying on
the enterprise for the benefit of all concerned.
Dougherty v. Creary, 89 Am. Dec. 116.
settle much of this case.
These principles
The demurrer was properly overruled, because
there was a partnership, and equity only has
5
jurisdiction to settle partnership accounts.
Am. & Eng. Dec. Eq. 74; 17 Am. & Eng. Bnc.
Law,

1273.

Neely excepted to the commissioner's report
to
of settlement because of the allowance
Ramey of an expenditure advanced by Eamey
of $369.75, as excessive, and because for reIf
pairs on two boilers without his consent.
the parties were mere joint tenants, consent
Ward v. Ward's Heirs,
would be necessary.
40 W. Va. 611, 21 S. E. 746, 29 L. R. A. 449.
But, being partners, as above stated, a partrepairs.
ner has power to order necessary
Besides, Ramey owned a majority interest.
The boilers were burnt badly, and it seems
that this outlay, though large, is proven, and
was necessary and usual in such a business,
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if unattended with other circumstances,
would be clearly allowable under principles
The commissioner reports that
above stated.
the injury to the boilers came from neglect of
and,

but much evidence tends to
the pumpers;
show that Ramey, without consent of Neely,
removed the boilers off the ground owned by
the firm, upon a lease of Ramey and Childers,
in which Neely had no interest, and used them
with another boiler in boring and operating
wells thereon in connection with these wells
of the firm, in Neely's absence, and put too
much work upon them, with inadequate supply of water, which, likely, by heavy firing,
If this is
caused the burning of the boilers.
so, how can Ramey expect pay for this outlay? Would so serious an injury have occurred to the boilers had this improper use of
them not been made? We cannot say so with
certainty, but it seems not likely. Ramey has
no just claim to be repaid expenditure for repairs caused by himself,— the diversion of the
firm property to his own work, from the work
of the firm. Losses from neglect of duty or
bad faith of a partner, or breach of duty, or
agreement, or imbreach of a partnership
proper diversion of its property to purposes
foreign to its business, will be charged to him,

17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law,
Partn. § 312; Story, Partn. §
T. Pars. Partn. § 151. Ramey does not

in accounting.
1217;
169;

1 Colly.

deny such use.
allowed
The exception for the $239.75
Ramey for three-eighths of expense seems not
The
well taken, and was properly overruled.
commissioner reports that Neely should be allowed nothing for such use of the boilers for
business of Childers and Ramey outside the
legitimate firm business, yet allows him $100
We are unable to say that such sum
therefor.
Is not correct in amount, and will have to sustain the commissioner as to it.
Neely excepted because the commissioner
reported that he was not entitled to any allowance on the claim made by Neely, that by
reason of the use of the firm's boilers in boring and operating wells of Childers and Ramey on adjoining leases owned by them, in
which Neely was not interested, the two wells
of the firm, which had been bored before the
others were, and were paying wells, were
often shut down and unproductive, while those
other wells were going on, and that by reason
of want of water and steam, and the inadequacy of the engines to run all the wells, five
or six in number, the production of the firm's
wells was diminished.
The commissioner says
injury
no appreciable
suffered
that Neely
If injured at all, it was appreciable,
thereby.
and to be estimated.
Ramey states, in short,
that Neely was not entitled to a cent on this
score. Neely's evidence is distinct that he was
there numerous times, and found these two
wells still.
He swears to a large loss from
this cause. He furnishes
considerable
evidence to sustain him in some loss from this
score, and it seems that equity should make
some compensation for it.
There is evidence
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that Ramey, when asked why the wells were
shut down, said that he had a larger interest
In the other wells. Ramey (having bought out
Childers' interest, and Neely being absent almost all the time of operation) had sole
charge.
The commissioner bases his opinion
of no injury to Neely from pipe-line reports,
which are not before us; but it does seem
from the evidence that the firm business was
neglected, and loss to it accrued therefrom to
an appreciable extent, for which some compensation should be made.
It is difficult to
say what should be allowed on this account,
it being a thing of only approximate estimate;
should be
and still it seems an allowance
made, as Ramey is claiming for outlay, and
himself controlled the business.
When this suit was brought, Childers and
Ramey obtained In it an injunction enjoining
the pipe-line companies transporting the firm's
oil from paying Neely for his share of the oil
to which he was entitled under his division orders, and enjoining Neely from any further
participation in the partnership, and from selling his share of the oil; thus taking from him
the wells and their proceeds, and leaving
Ramey in sole charge of them.
Neely conbplains that the court refused to dissolve this
injunction. His counsel says there was no
right to it, as the bill charged no insolvency.
The bill, however, did charge that Neely had
failed to contribute his part of the expense of
the business, and that Ramey and Childers
had made large outlays therefor, and that
Neely had refused to make settlement, and
was largely indebted to his associates from
This justhe ti'ansactions of the partnership.
tifies the injunction, if the oil of Neely were
for
social assets, as partners, in advancing
expenditures for the partnership, have a lien
on partnership property for advances.
Skillman V. Lachman, 83 Am. Dec. 109; Duryea v.
Burt, 28 Cal. 570; T. Pars. Partn. § 402, note.
But this lien is only on partnership property,
while distinctly such; for it is the law that If
there is a separation or division of the properIf two partty, or part of it, there is no lien.
ners consign goods for sale, and direct the
consignee to carry the proceeds to the account
of each, and it is done, neither partner has
any lien on the share of the other in those
proceeds, thougli it would haye been otherwise if they had remained part of the com2 Lindl. Partn. § 683; 1 Colly,
mon property.
Now, these partners
Partn. § 108, note!
agreed to have division orders when they began business (that is, the pipe lines to give
each a certificate of his share of the oil committed to them, which was a product of the
wells); and this effected a separation of that
product, making each one's share his several
property, and severing it from the social prop'X'here
erty, if it was such at any moment.
being no lien, there was no justification for
It perhaps disabled Neely
the injunction.
from paying as the bill demanded of him.
There is another error in the proceeding.
It showed
The bill demanded a dissolution.

shows
cause, and the evidence
abundant
The bill charabundant cause, of dissolution.
ges that the plaintiffs and Neely made a settlement to a certain date, but that they had
been unable to get Neely to make a settlethat he was violent and
ment since then;
abusive, had threatened them with' violence,
and declared he would. have nothing more to
do with them;
that he would not contribute
that bills remained unpaid; and
to expenses;
that because of the unsatisfactory condition
of the business, and the "disagreements, disbetween the partsensions, and disaffections
ners, the property' and business were suffering." The evidence shows these disagreeThus, it was plain
ments and dissensions.
that tbe business was hopeless of success and
prosperity, and the interests of all parties demanded absolute dissolution at the hands of
Reconciliation, ha!rmony, and sucthe law.
17 Am.
&
cess were utterly beyond hope.
Therefore the court
I^ng. Enc. Law, 1104.
should have decreed dissolution absolute, and
and
directed an account of the partnership,
wound it up. But it decreed no' dissolution,
but, on the contrary, suffered the partnership
still to subsist, and, indeed, go on in the sole'
hands and management of Ramey, excluding
Neely therefrom, and decreed that the settleshould only apply
ment by the commissioner
to its date, leaving it open to future account.
The decree perpetuated the injunction, forever
prohibiting Neely frcim participkt'i'on in the
business, and provided that when he should
pay $487.1.5 found due from him, and costs,
Thkt excellent,
the injunction should cease;
very late work', containing
the leading late
decisions in equity in America and England,
the American and English Decisions in Equity,
collecting decisions
with elaborate
notes
(volume 5, p. 52), lays down the rule that
equity can only entertain jurisdiction for ati
account when it can make a. final decree in
the suit: citing Randolph's Adni'x y. Kinney,
3 Rand. 894.
That work (page 109) says, "As
a general rule, a bill for aecoiinting between
partners which does not also seek a dissolution of the partnership will not be rhaintain-'
ed;"
citing cases^— among them, Coville v.
Gilman, 13 W. Va. 314. in which Judge Grre«n
fully sustains this position.
T. Pal's. Partn. g
If ever there were
206; 2 liindl. Partn. 948.
cases which, by bill and proof, called for dissolution and final account, not partial, this is
one. And, besides the showing of bill and
proof, a petition for , rehearing alleged that
Ramey had sold the boilers.
The' evidence so
This would charge Ramey to credit
shows.
There was partnership property in
of Ni'ely.
Ramey's hands.
There could only one adequate relief be given,— dissolution, sale of the
property entire, and full account.
But no provision was made for dissolution, sale, or full
and deaccount,— only a partial settlement
cree against Neely for the sum found by it.
The bill alleged that the property could not
be divided in kind.
If the injunction applied
to property belonging to the firm, on which a
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lien rested for the otlier partners,
it would
be proper to continue it until final account
and decree. Eobrecht v. Robreclit (this term)
34 S. E. 801.
But Neely's share of the oil
was his separate property.
And I do not see
why he should, without cause, be excluded
from participation, letting Ramey have sole
A. receiver, impartial between them,
control.
"It
was proper,, under the circumstances.
no, dissolution is sought, a receiver and manbut, with a view
ager will not be appointed;
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to a dissolution or winding up, a receiver and
manager will be appointed, if there are any
as are proper
such grounds for appointment
In other cases, or if the partners cannot agree
Colly.
until sold."
to working the mines
Partn. § 881. Therefore we dissolve the uiiunction, reverse the decree, overrule the de-

murrer to the bill, and remand

for further

as herein Indicated, and further
courts of
according
to pri,ncipies governing
equity in such cases.
propeed^i;igs
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S2S

FECHHBIMER
(37

et al. v.

BAUM

et al.

Fed. 167.)

Circuit Court, S. D. Georgia, W. D.

which is larger than the annual amount hanin business by the defendants.
The prayer is for an injunction and receivby defendants
er, and that goods purchased
from plaintiffs be kept separate for the benefit of plaintiffs, and for a general judgment,
and for general relief. The temporary injunction was granted upon consideration
of
plaintiffs' bill, and thereupon plaintiffs filed
This prayed that H.
an amendment thereto.
M. Comer & Co., a firm of cotton factors of
this district, be made parties; that the preferences to Comer & Co. are void, (they consist
of certain mortgages to secure an alleged
of $35,000, given upon stock
indebtedness
worth $43,000;) that in addition to these
have transferred
mortgages
the defendants
and assigned to H. M. Comer & Co. notes
and accounts in a sum largely in excess of
Comer's demand;
that on August 22d these
and plaintiffs
accounts were worth $50,000,
charge on information and belief that these
transferred choses in action have been increased by other transfers to $75,000; that
since the mortgage and preferences were given, the defendants, Baum & Bro., have paid
to Comer & Co. $18,000, which reduces their
dled

January

3, 1889.

lu equity. Motion for an injunction and
appointment of a receiver.
Tlie bill before the cbancellor was filed by
the plaintiffs, residents and citizens of Ohio,
against Baum & Bro., a firm doing business
at Toomsboro, Irwinton, and Dublin, in this
district, to assert the right to an injunction
and the appointment
of a receiver given by
Code, § 3149a. This
tlie laAv of Georgia.
"lu case any corporation,
section provides:
not municipal, or any trader or firm ot traders, shall fail to pay at maturity any one or
more matured debts, payment of which has
been properly demanded of such debtor and
by him refused, and shall be insolvent, it
shall be in the power of a court of equity,
under a creditors' bill, to which one or more
of the creditors who have matured debts unpaid shall be necessary parties, to proceed to
collect the assets, real and personal, including choses in action and money, and appropriate the same to the creditors of such traders, firm of traders, or corporation."
The averments of the bill made and sworn
to conform to the requirements of the statute
in all respects; and so far as they indicate
the existence of matured debts due by the
defendants to the plaintiffs, the demand for
payment, its refusal, and the insolvency of
are not dethe averments
the defendants,
In addition, the bill alleges other facts
nied.
not less important to the jurisdiction in equity. They are that on May 21, 1888, the
defendants, Baum & Bro., made a statement
which
to
Bradstreet's Mercantile Agency,
of prosperous solvency
showed a condition
upon their part, which statement is appended as an exhibit to the bill; that plaintiffs,
in the usual course of business, had knowledge of that statement, believed It to be true,
and knew this before their merchandise was
that the defendants
sold to the defendants;
owe $160,000; have made many fraudulent
that some of
and preferences;
assignments
upon
these are given to favored creditors,
the goods of the plaintiffs not yet paid for;
that the plaintiffs' debts were created for a
large stock of clothing, part of which is yet
that the
in possession of the defendants;
purchase was made by the defendants with
the deliberate intention not to pay therefor,
and with no reasonable expectation that the
defendants would be able to pay; that the
sales are void, and that the title did not pass;
that the statement made to the Bradstreet's
^Mercantile Agency as to the standing and
'ondition of the firm was made with intent
to deceive the public, and especially the plaintiffs, and was a part of a scheme to defraud
creditors who would extend credit; that the
amount
to $70,000,
fraudulent preferences

demand to $17,000, and yet Comer & Co. bold
as collateral and otherwise in mortgages on
real and personal property the full sum of
This was stated
$100,000 to secure this debt.
on the hearing, without objection, to be $24,600, and the chancellor,
for the present, assumes that to be correct.
The bill alleges that the transactions between Comer & Co. and the defendants were
the result of a fraudulent confederacy
to
hinder and delay creditors, and to compel
them to accept a small pittance in full satisfaction of large debts; that the demands
of Comer & Co. should not be paid by the
proceeds arising from the sale of the merchandise of plaintiffs and other creditors, not
yet paid for; that Comer & Co. had actual
notice of the defendants' insolvent condition
at the time of certain payments
made to
them from such proceeds.
The amendment
further alleges that, prior to the insolvency
of the defendants, or at some other time.
Comer & Co. obtained from the defendants
an agreement in writing that when the defendants
should become weak or insolvent
that they would execute and make to Comer
& Co. a mortgage covering their entire property, and should assign to them all of their
notes, accounts, and choses in action;
that
said mortgages and preferences were given
in pursuance of said agreement;
that Comer
& Co. permitted the defendants to retain possession of the notes and accounts and choses
in action transferred to him; that the large
amount of assets in the hands of Comer &
Co., over and above their lawful demand,
will be sacrificed to the injury of plaintiffs;
that the defendants bought a large stock of
goods on credit, with the intention not to pay
for them, and to defraud creditors.
The
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pi'ayer is that Comer & Co. be required to
produce the said agreement on the hearing,
and that they be enjoined from proceeding
to foreclose the mortgage or mortgages, and
that they be enjoined from collecting the
notes and accounts, or from any way interfering with the assets of the defendants, and
that a receiver be appointed to talie charge
of all such assets for the benefit of the creditors. The bill expressly waives discovery.
In reply to the motion for injunction, etc.,
Baum & Bro. deny, in their
the defendants
answers, that plaintiffs' debt was contracted after the financial statement was made;
that they gave the statement of the 21st of
May, yielding to the solicitation of the Bradstreet Company; that there were no mortgages or liens at the time the statement
was made; that the statement appended to
that their dealthe bill itself Is erroneous;
ings have been honorable and successful up
to the time of this failure; that their failure
is a thoroughly honest failure; that they have
not made any preference upon which suspicion or doubt can be cast as to its entire
good faith; that their creditors have given
uniform evidence of their entire and unintegabated confidence in the defendants'
rity; that they have paid large amounts to
their creditors, and have drawn out nothing
from their business except for the necessary
support of their families; that the mortgages
were given to secure bona fide debts; and
that, if a receiver is appointed, the loss in
winding up the business will be so great that
the creditors will get nothing.
H. M. Comer makes answer by affidavit.
He states that on the 10th day' of March,
he tooli the agreement
to the court
1S88,
shown, which was referred to in the bill.
This had been done every year previously.
It was talien in entire good faith, to protect
He gave
the advances that deponent made.
the creditors liuowledge of it on the 3d of
December,
to conceal
and never attempted
He denies utterly fraud and confederacy.
it.
That in his preferences defendants reserved
He never
no right or benefit to themselves.
had any reason to suspect fraud on the part
That in the spring and
of the defendants.
summer of 1888, before be liuew defendants
they sent to him notes
were embarrassed,
and accounts of the face value of $43,263.45,
as collateral for about $27,000 then due.
These notes and accounts he sent to the deThis collateral
fendants to collect for him.
was more valuable than that obtained in
Then the debt was increased,
November.
and Comer & Co. took by transfer the notes
Another affidavit
and accounts referred to.
It recites
was presented by H. M. Comer.
that his firm are cottcn factors and commission merchants' in the city of Savannah;
that they have been the factors of Baum &
Bro. and Baum & Co., the defendants, . for
five years; that they would make advancements in the spring and summer with the
understanding that they were to be paid off
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and winter; that the business
has been large, and the statement taken from
It shows an indebthis books is attached.
edness of $43,078.23, subject to credits from
Baum & Bro. ; also amounts due by the concerns at Dublin and Irwinton, all subject
to a credit of 521 bales of cotton, which,
estimated at $38 per bale, leaves Baum &
Bro. indebted to H. M. Comer & Co. $24,661.07.
This indebtedness is secured by a
mortgage on real and personal property, dated November 13, 1888, by a mortgage on the
personalty, dated November 17, 1888, by certain notes and accounts transferred by the
Baums to deponent's firm. This security was
given for the sole purpose of securing the
debt. He denies that the charges of the bill
were true.
Upon the hearing, several creditors were
among
made parties plaintifl: by intervention,
them, H. P. Claflin & Co., New York, whose
debt is $11,986.16; A. Gibian, about $1,600;
S. Waxelbaum; Culver, Moore & Culver and
others.
On the hearing plaintiffs put in evidence this statement of Baum & Bro. to their
3d, which is as
creditors, made December
in the fall

follows:

STATEMENT.
Liabilities.
$69,62580
81,277 64

Amount secured claims
Amount unsecured claims

$150,90544"

Total liabilities
Assets.
Toomsboro

$18,09536
Merchandise
at
17,900 45
Merchandise
at Dublin
6,540 00
at Irwinton
Merchandise
7,165 00
horses,
etc..
estate,
mules,
Real
Total notes and ac$105,15092
counts
lor worthless
Deduct
72,310 54
and doubtful claims..
and
accounts
Notes
value
Cash on hand
Total

available

at

actual

32,8(0 38
1,385 00
83,92619

assets

Recapitulation.
Total available
Deduct

tor

assets
secured claims

Leaving balance
Amount of unsecured

$83,92619
69,625 80
14,300 39
81,277 64

claims

Also the aflidavit of Albert

M. Holstein,

agent of plaintiffs, which proves the account
and demand of the plaintiffs, and states that
it was made on the faith of the statement to
This
Bradstreet, made by the defendants.
were entirely
showed that the defendants
The statement is as follows:
solvent.
"88

Exhibit A.

"[Late Report]
"Executive Offices, 270, 281, 283, Broadway,
New York.
"Bradstreet' s.
"No. 82 West Third Street.
"Cincinnati, July

19, 1888.

Give us in
Bradstreet Company:
confidence, for oui' exclusive use and benefit
in our business, under our agreement with
you, such information as you may have or
the re
may be able to obtain concerning
"The
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character,
credit,
sponsibility,
reputation,
etc., of
"Xame— N. B. Baum & Bros.
"Business— Gen. Store. ) July 20, I
"Sti-eet and No.
J
I 1888.
"City (or P. O. Address)— Toomsboro.
"County — Wilkinson.
"State— Ga.

"Signature of M. & L. S. F. & Co., Subscriber.
"2402— P. O. Address.
"13" Information will be furnished upon the
proper tilling up of this blank and the signature of the subscriber.
"2-13-8-lOm.
"Exhibit B.
"Baum, N. B. & Brc, Toomsboro, Ga., Wilkinson county.
"A. W. Baum, aged 36 years, and married.
"N. B. Baum, aged 39 years, and married.
Began business in 1875 in a small
"States:
way, and have been quite successful.
As
per inventory taken January 15, 1888, our
status is as follows: Stock of merchandise,
nineteen thousand dols. ; bonds and stocks,
par value, twenty-one thousand dollars; market value, twelve thousand dollars; notes
thirty-five thousand dollars;
and accounts,
real estate, town property and lands, ten
thousand dollars; making total assets of the
firm, seventy-six
thousand dollars. Liabilities:
Borrowed money for the year 1888,
twenty-four thousand dollars; mercantile and
other indebtedness, twelve thousand dollars;
total lialiilities, thirty-six thousand dollars.
Forty thousand dollars.
Net:
We have a
branch store at Irwinton, Ga.
The business
there is run under the style of 'Baum & Co.'
Stock on hand there, two thousand dollars;
dollars;
notes and accounts, four thousand
cash, five hundred dollars; total, six thousand
five hundred dollars; and owe three thousand
dollars. After allowing for shrinkages, bad
debts, etc., consider
ourselves
worth fully
dollars,
thirty
thousand
over
liabilities.
There are no mortgages or liens on any of our
Our stock
property, either real or personal.
is insured for thirteen thousand dollars; fixWhen we bortures, two thousand dollars.
row money from banks we deposit our bonds
From our cotton facand stocks as security.
tors we borrow on farmers' notes as collaterDo an annual
al, give no other security.
thoubusiness of seventy-five to eighty-five
sand dollars. In addition to the above we
sell 5 or 6 hundred tons of fertilizers per annum, which we buy outright. Give notes for
To only one comthe same, payable in fall.
pany do we give farmers' notes as collateral.
At this point we cleared ten thousand dollars
on guano alone.
"The Mercantile News Agency states: We
learn they carry an average stock of about
fifteen thousand dollars, and do a large business, sell largely on credit, and consequently
Said to borrow
have considerable due them.
money to use in their business,
considerable

and generally put up planters' notes as collateral. They are reputed to owri real estate
worth five to eight thousand dols. Would
be difficult to give correct estimate of their
net worth, but it is the general belief that
the firm is estimated
woiih fully twenty
They are of good
thousand dollars, or more.
character, and steady habits, and of fine busiAppear to do nearly all the
ness ability.
business that is done at this point, and are
generally prompt in meeting their obligations,
and are quoted in good credit.
"May 21st, 1888.
10-19-1888.
Bradstreet's.
"[Indorsed:]
To M. & L. S. Fechheimer & Co. The correctness of this report is not guaranteed;
but
having been obtained by us in good faith—
from authorities deemed reliable— it is transmitted to you in strict confidence for your
exclusive use and benefit, and in accordance
with the terms of the contract existing between us. Respectfully,
"The Bradstreet Co.
"State of Ohio, Hamilton County, ss.: Before me personally appeared Levi C. Goodale,
who, being duly sworn, says that he is the
superintendent
of the Bradstreet Co. Jlercantile Agency, office at 82 West Thii'd street,
Cincinnati, Ohio.
That on July 19, 1888, they
received a ticket of inquiry from M. & L. S.
Fechheimer & Co., of Cincinnati, Ohio, asking
for information concerning the responsibility,
character,
reputation,
credit, etc., of N. B.
Baum & Bro., whose post-office address was
Toomsboro,
Ga.
Said ticket of inquiry is
attached hereto, made part hereof, marked
'Exhibit A.' That on the 20th day of July,
1888, we made a report in answer to said inquiry, an exact copy of which answer is attached hereto, made part hereof, marked 'Exhibit B.' We obtained this information in
the regular course of our business, and for
our company in that section of Georgia in
which the business of N. B. Baum & Bro. is
located.
Levi C. Goodale.
"Sworn to before me, and subscribed in my
presence, this 19th day of December, 1888.
"William S. Little,
"Notary Public, Hamilton County, Ohio."

R. W. Patterson, one of the solicitors for the
plaintiffs, testifies that he was present at
the meeting of defendants'
creditors on December 3, 1888.
Baum offered to unsecured
creditors 12% per cent, of their claims in 30
days' time, and 12% per cent, additional in
12 months, neither secured.
Subsequently inquiry was made by Mr. H. M. Comer if the
offer would be accepted if he (Comer) would
guaranty the first 12% per cent. Some of
the creditors, and among them the plaintiffs,
declined to accept.
C. H. Cohen, attorney
for H. P. Claflin, testified that on November 23d he called on the defendants at Toomsboro;
that N. B. Baum told him that he
had been under contract to Mr. Comer for
some time to give the Comers a mortgage
whenever they demanded it, and he felt com-
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to,. do as he had previously agreea,
which deponent understood was to give the
mortgage upon all his assets, including the
gqods that deponent's clients had but receptly sold him.
This witness proves the acc^oijnt
of ,H. P. Claflin & Co. in the sum ,o£ $11,pelled

iSSG.lG.

R. W. Patterson, J. W. Lindsay, and 0. H.
testify th,at they heard H. M. Comer
state before the meeting of creditors that he
had, an agreement , with N. B. Baum, ot the
Cohen

to,, the effect that,
defendants,
Bai^m W9uld
execute a mortgage to him upon whatever assets he had, and that on this agreement Comer had made him advances, and that the
agreeraent had been in force for as mu|ch as
a, year prior to that time.
Deponents
further say that they heard N. B. Baum, at the
meeting, state that he was insolcreditors'
vent at the time he made his statement to
Bradstrqet's figency, in May of the present
year, althougla he did not linow it at the time.
C. A. Turner testified by affidavit that
after the deputy-marshal had closed the store
of the defendants at Toomsboro,, he heard N.
B. Baum say in a conversation with dethe
ponent that he had in his possession
notes, accounts, and assets of Baum & Bro.
■
and Baum & Co., which had prior to that
time been turned over to H. M. Comer & Co.,
of Savannah.
The bills for most of the plaintiffs' goods sold to Baum were dated on August ,6th, August 10th, August 13th, and a
renewal note was taken on October &, 1888.
It was shown by the evidence that this was
the manner in which the goods were sold:
The traveling agent of the plaintiff took the
order in July, subject to ratification by the
This inhouse, on inquiry as to solvency.
quiry was , made to Bradstreet. The goeds
were not shipped unless the reply was satisfactory. The sales were not completed until
the goods were sent.
For the defendants the following evidence
was submitted: The agreement entered into
between N. B. Baum & Bro. and Baum & Co.
and H. M. Comer & Co., dated March 10, 1888.
It recites that for and in consideration of certain advances to the amount of $18,000, as
evidenced by five promissory notes for $3,200
each, signed by N. B. Baum & Bro., and indorsed by Baum & Co., and payable at the
office of Comer & Co., as follows, respectively, on September 15th, October 1st, Novem10th; and one note^
ber 1st, and November
for $2,000, signed by Baum & Co., and indorsed by Baum & Bro., due October 20th next.
"Now, in order to secure these and any other
sum that may hereafter be due them, we
agree to deposit with them as collateral security, notes and mortgages of good planters
and others to whom we sell goods, in amount
equal to at least two dollars for every one
dollar due by us to the said Comer & Co. We
also agree to transfer to them as additional
security our insurance policies on our buildings and stocks of goods; and we further obli-
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gate and bind ourselves to give said H. M. Compr & Co. a first lien or mortgage _upon all our
stocks of goods and real estate, in case we
shall at any time become fanancially embarrassed while indebted in any way to them, or
in case our said notes above descpbed are not
paid promptly at maturity. It is also understood and agreed that all drafts drawn, or
money advanced upon account or otherwise,
over and above the eighteen thousand, dollars
herein named, sliall be paid out of the profirst and before
ceeds of cotton shipments
said proceeds are to be applied to said notes;
in other words, only credit balances as may
appear from open account are to be paid on
said notes unless by consent of said H. M.
, Comer &, Co. in writing.
It is understood
and agreed that 8 per cent, per annum will
[Signed]
be charged on all advances,
etc.
N. B. Baum & Bro., and X. B. Baum & Co."
The mortgage' dated the 17th day of November, to secure the payment
of $38,000,
including the five notes before mentioned and
, three other notes for $5,000 each, dated October 12, 1888, and due at various dates until, December 10, 1888, and one note for
due January 12, 1889, and one note
$5,000,
dated March 10, 1888, for $2,000, signed by
Baum & Co., indorsed by Baum & Bro., payable October 20, 1888, upon 150 half rolls of
bagging, 100 bundles cotton ties, 100 sacks
salt, all in the planters' warehouse at Dublin; and also all goods, merchandise,
dry
goods, groceries, etc., stored in the store of
L, C. , Perry & Co., at Dublin, Ga.; also, a
1888, to
mortgage made 13th of November,
being apparently the same
secure $30,000,
notes just mentioned, and given upon certain
lots of land situated in Toomsboro, and upon which is erected store-houses;
and also
certain stocks of general merchandise in said
and also
store, describing them particularly;
all such articles and things as may be hereafter placed in such stock; also the stock
in the store at Dublin, more particularly describing it, with the same provision as to
future acquisitions; also a lot of land, onehalf acre in Irwinton,
with store-house
thereon, and also the stock of goods therein contained.
The mortgages comprehend all
the safes, show-cases, and fixtures of every
kind in said three stores.
Numerous affidavits were presented as to the policy or impolicy of granting the prayer of the bill for
the appointment of a receiver, and an affidavit to sustain the good character of H. M.
Comer. — in the opinion of the court a depaltogether superfluous.
osition
Other portions of the testimony are not material or
necessary to the proper determination of the
After a full hearing and exhaustive
cause.
argument on Friday last the court took time
to consider, and has reached the following
conclusions:

Patterson & Hodges, for plaintiffs. Hill &
Harris and Denmark & Adams, for defendants.
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SPEEE, J. (after stating the facts as
Baum & Bro. anrl Banm & Co., two
above).
firms composed of the same individuals, are
traders, In the meaning of the statute of this
state quoted above.
That they are insolvent
it is conceded.
The plaintiffs are creditors,
whose demands, as the court is at present
advised, are within the class provided for in
the statute above quoted, (Code Ga. § 3149a,)
giving, in certain cases, the equitable right
to the extraordinary remedies applied for.
This right of the creditor to put the debtor's assets, when the latter is an insolvent
trader, in the hands of a receiver, is peculiar
to the law of this state.
It has no existence
in the general jurisprudence of equity which'
obtain in these courts.
It is now settled,
however, that the courts of the United States
may administer an equitable right granted
by the law of the state in suits of which,
from other reasons, they have jm-isdiction.
It was urged in argument for the defendant
that the creditors, without a judgment at
law, have no right to apply in equity for the
appointment
of a receiver.
That this is a
general rule in undeniable, but there are exceptions to it, and one of these exceptions ol
apparently clear distinctness
is where the
law-making power has enacted in terms that
the debt need only be mature, with payment
demanded and refused, as is the law in
(Jeorgia.
It is true, also, — as held in this
circuit, in Jaffrey v. Brown (C. C.) 29 Fed.
477,— that a party not intending to pay, by
inducing one to sell him goods on credit
through the fraudulent concealment of his
insolvency and of his intent not to pay for
them, is guilty of a fraud, which entitles the
vendor, if no innocent third party has acquired an interest in them, to disaffirm the
contract, and recover the goods.
See. also,
Crittenden v. Coleman, 70 Ga. 295; Donaldson v. Farwell, 93 U. S. 633; note to Jaffrey
V. Brown (C. C.) 29 Fed. 48.5, and authorities
The remedy at law must be quite as
cited.
complete as that in equity to defeat the powId.
er of equity to proceed.
The demurrer filed to the bill, while not
Anally overruled, is not deemed sufficient, as
the court is at present advised, to defeat the
relief sought by the bill, should that relief
The chancellor has given very
be granted.
anxious thought and careful inquiry to the
of his duty in the premises.
ascertainment
It is true that the prayers of the bill seek
to obtain perhaps the most vigorous and farreaching action in the power of the court—
action which should not be taken in cases of
except in the presence of
this character,
On the
plain fraud or irreparable injury.
other hand, the statements of the defendants

themselves show the most utter insolvency,
and a failure to comply with their duty to
their creditors, which evinces either neglicharacter,
or
gence of the most flagrant
and decided.
less marked
fraud scarcely
Upon the 21st of May, whatever may have
been the motive which led to the publication,

it is undeniable that the defendants gave to
the mercantile community, by means of a
news
usual and widely known commercial
agency, a statement
which shows remarkfor
able solvency,
and indeed prosperity,
their section of the country.
"Our total
assets,"

they said, "are seventy-six thousand
our liabilities, thirty-six thousand
dollars, net.
After allowing for shrinkages,
bad debts, and so forth, we consider
ourdollars
selves worth fully thirty thousand
over liabilities, etc. There are no mortgages
or liens on our property, either real or personal.
Our stock is insured for thirteen
thousand dollars.
When we borrow money
from banlv we deposit our bonds and stocks
as security.
When we borrow money from
our factors we give farmers' notes as collateral; give no other security." In a little
more than six months we find this firm in
debt $150,903.44,
with total assets of $83,926.19,
leaving debts to the amount $66,976.25,
altogether hopeless.
In other words,
in a half year there had been a change for
the worse in their condition of nearly $100,000,— if their respective statements to Bradsti'eet's and to their creditors is reliable.

dollars;

For this startling transformation

of their

condition they offer neither explanation
nor
excuse.
There had been no disaster from
flood or fire, no epidemic, none of those extraordinary circumstances
which at times
cause the stoutest business houses to tremIn May there is an indebtedness of
ble.
thirty-six thousand, in December a debt of
one hundred and fifty thousand.
In May
there are neither liens nor mortgages,
in
they approximate
December
seventy thouIn the spring creditors were
sand dollars.
assured of prompt payment, in the fall they
are met by hopeless insolvency; and yet the
court is asked to consider this an innocent
and unavoidable failure, and this, too, in the
absence of a syllable of proof to account for
it. What makes it more remarkable
is that
the business was conducted in quiet villages,
and among a rural population,
where all
legitimate trade was marked by careful purtransactions; where
chases and conservative
every purchaser is personally known to the
merchant,— his solvency
and disposition or
ability to pay debts as familiar as household words.
But this is not all.
In the
proclamation of Baum & Bro. to the busiof the country,
ness community
they say
"there are no mortgages or liens upon our
property."
At that moment it was all incumbered with a secret obligation
which a
court of equity in a proper case would declare to have all the effect of a mortgage.
In less than six months every cent's worth
of their stock or other assets, whether paid
for or not, is shingled with mortgages, made
in pursuance of that covert stipulation. In
the presence of such facts as these it woiild
seem futile to urge upon the court the considerations of business capacity and business
integrity and mercantile popularity, which

EEOEIVBRS.
form so large a part oi the defendants'
showing. "We give to our factors no security save farmers' notes."
As that public
pledge was being made their contract was
in existence, not only to give two dollars for
one, In notes and choses In action, for everj
dollar obtained from their factors, but to
give mortgages which are imdeniably other
and very different security.
"Our stock isi
insured for $13,000," said they to Bradstreet's,— they did not say the policies had
been pledged to H. M. Comer & Co., and out
of the reach of other creditors.
It would seem superfluous to analyze the
widely variant statements of the defendants,
and it reqjuires no elaborate inquiry to ascertain the law controlling the rights of the parties with such facts before the court.
The
explicit.
statutes of the state are sufficiently
Suppression of a fact material to be Isnown,
and which the party is under an obligation to
communicate,
constitutes fraud.
The obligation to communicate may arise from the confidential relations of the parties, or the peculiar
circumstances of the case. Code Ga. § 3175.
Can it be doubted that the fact that the defendants were under a written obligation
to
execute mortgages upon their entire stock and
all their other property, was "material to be
known" by those giving them credit?
Can It
be doubted that when the Baums undertook to
give to Bradstreet's,
for the information of the
business world, a statement of their assets,
liabilities, and methods of borrowing money,
that the obligation
was upon them to communicate the truth? "Will the most credulous
believe for a moment that Fechheimer & Co.
would have given them credit for $4,000; that
Claflin & Co. would have given them credit
for $11,000, — had they known the existence and
the nature of their obligation to Comer?
We
think not. The statements of such mercantile
agencies as Bradstreet's are intended to influence the action of merchants and others who
give credit.
It is well understood that the
mercantile community relies largely upon such
statements, and the persons giving them are
under the weightiest obligation, which will be
enforced in foro conscientisi,
to speak the
truth.
If there has been deliberate suppression
of a vital fact in a statement of this character,
which does mislead, it is a fraud upon the
person misled, which a court of equity will
Again, "misrepresentation
redress, if possible.
of a material fact, made willfully to deceive,
or recklessly without knowledge, and acted on
by the opposite party, or, if made by mistake,
and innocently, and acted on by the opposite
Code Ga. §
party, constitutes legal fraud."
See, also, section 2634.
3174.
Now, it appears from the evidence of Messrs.
Lindsay, and Cohen that N. B.
Patterson,
Baum admitted in their presence and hearing
that he was Insolvent, at the time the statewas made, although he
ment to Bradstreet
there asserted a net worth, above all liabilities
and doubtful assets, of fully $30,000, but that
he did not then know his insolvent condition.
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Conceding, therefore, that this statement was
honest, it is none the less fraudulent in contemplation
of these provisions of the Code.
It follows that, even in the absence of the Insolvent traders' act, before quoted, the plaintiffs would be entitled to the relief they seek
if it can be made to appear that there is a
prospect of redressing their wrongs thereby.
Much more, then, are they so entitled under
It is said, howthe provisions of that act.
ever, for the defendants, that the liens created
by Baum & Bro. to Comer and others will exhaust the assets, and that the unsecured creditors can get nothing through the action of a
receiver, however vigilant he may be. But the
defendants themselves admit that the assets
amount to about $86,000 more than the preferences he has given. It is true that he states
that $72,310.54 of notes and accounts
are
worthless and doubtful, but the court is not
inclined to accept this statement as final.
It
would be very remarkable
if his doubtful
debts in December should be as much as his
total assets in May.
A diligent receiver will
collect many of those claims, or the court will
know the reason why. Besides, by the same
statement there is a balance of $14,300.39 to
be divided
among the unsecured
creditors.
This is itself no mere bagatelle.
We have
known original suits to be brought for less.
But perhaps more important than either of
these is the fact that Comer & Co., who only
claim $24,671.07 as the; sum of their demands
against the Baums, have now in their possession $50,000 worth of good notes and accounts, and mortgages on $49,000 worth of
property consisting of merchandise and other
personalty and certain realty.
However valid
may be the demand of Comer & Co., when it
Is paid they will not be permitted to retain a
dollar in excess of their proven claims.
It is
true that by the law of Georgia, section 1953,
"a debtor may prefer one creditor to another,
and to that end he may bona fide give a lien
by mortgage or other legal means, or he may
sell in payment of the debt, or he may transfer negotiable papers as collateral security, the
surplus in such cases not to be reserved for
his own benefit or that of any other favored
creditor, to the exclusion of other creditors."
The large surplus conveyed to Comer & Co. to
secure their debt they hold as trustees for the
creditors of the defendants, the Baums.
Besides, the balance which Comer & Co. present
Is ascertained by estimating
more than 50O
bales of cotton shipped to them at $38 a bale.
They have turned over notes and accounts of
the insolvent firm to one of its members for
This will not be permitted.
collection.
The
insolvent debtor who has failed under such
circumstances
is not the best custodian for
convertible assets of this character.
This investigation
has satisfied the court
that this is a suit where it is manifestly the
duty of the chancellor to make the orders
prayed for. A receiver will be appointed, and
an injunction granted.
Comer & Co., who are
now formally made parties defendant to the
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to make proof of their
account, and If found just and true and a
valid lien, as It now appears to be, It will be
paid in full if the funds are sufficient.
This is
true of other debts of superior dignity, and the
remainder of the fund in the hands of Comer
& Co. and elsewhere within the reach of the

court

will

be

apportioned

to

the

creditors.

The court will appoint receivers of undoubted

qualifications,
who will at once take possession
of the assets of the insolvent firm, and as fast
as collected pay the ftmds into the registry
of the court, and the cause will proceed with
the utmost expedition.
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OGDEN CITY v. BEAR LAKE & RIVER
WATERWORKS & IRRIGATION CO. et al.
(55 Pac.

Supreme

385,

18

Utah,

Court of Utah.

279.)

Dec. 5, 1898.

Appeal from district court, Salt Lake county; Ogden Hiles, Judge.
Action by Ogden City against the Bear
Lake & River Waterworks & Irrigation Company, Bear River Irrigation & Ogden WaterJudgment for
works Company, and others.
plaintiff, and defendant Bear River Irrigation
Company appeals.
& Ogden Waterworks
Modified.

Harkness, Howat, Bradley &
Bennett,
Richards and Rogers &. Johnson, for appelE. M. Allison, Jr., C. C. Richards, and
lant.
J. H. Macmillan, for respondents.

ZANE, C. J. This is an appeal by the
Bear River Irrigation & Ogden Waterworks
Company, a defendant, from the order of
of
the court below approving the report
Thomas D. Dee, receiver, and allowing the
various items thereof, and ordering them to
As to the
be paid out of funds in his hands.
motion of plaintiff to dismiss this appeal for
the reason, as alleged, the order appealed
from was not a final judgment, we are of
the opinion the order requiring the compensation to the receiver and I. N. Pierce, and
the payment to Griffin and the Ogden Standard, out of funds in the receiver's hands, was
final, and therefore appealable, and we therefore overrule it.
It appears from the record that Mr. Dee
was apiK>inted receiver pendente lite of the
waterworks system in Ogden City on January 17, 1898, on the application of plaintiff,
Ogden City; that he immediately qualified
and took possession and charge of the sysand
tem and its buildings, and managed
operated it until April 20, 1898; that the order appointing him receiver was reversed by
this court, with directions to the lower court
to order a retura of the property to the appellant, which was done; that on April 27,
1898, Dee filed his report as such receiver,
showing a collection of water rents to the
amount of $11,247.07, and that he had diSr
bursed $1,266.45 for labor, $148.53 for material, and $90.50 for general expenses, and,
in addition, he asked the qourt to allow him
as
$750 out of the funds as compensation
receiver;
arid to I. N. Pierce, as inspector,
$219.30;. and S. G. Griffin, for a. stamp, $3.25;
and the Ogden Standard, for advertising,
To the allowance of these last four
$14.00.
iteriis the appellant objected, and it assigns
the order of the court allowing them and ordering their payment out of the fund as error.
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That the compensation to the receiver and
to Griffin were customary and reasonable for
their time and services, and that the charges
for the stamp and publication were reasonThe sole question
able, no question is made.
Is, was it error to order their payment out
of the fund? It appears the receiver was
appointed
on the application of the plaintiff, and over the objections of the appellant,
and that it would not have been necessary to
incur the items of compensation to the receiver, or to Mr. Pierce, or for the stamp
or publication, had the property remained in
appellant's hands and the business under its
control.
The appellant was wrongfully deprived of the possession of Its property, and
of the control of its business without its conIt
sent, upon the petition of the plaintiff.
would be inequitable to require the appellant
its
to pay the extra expense of conducting
business caused by the erroneous order obWe understand the
tained by the plaintiff.
rule supported by the weight of authority is
on the
is appointed
that when a receiver
application of one of the parties, and takes
is afterand the appointment
possession,
wards set aside because erroneous, and the
property is returned, all expenses incurred in
additional
consequence of the appointment,
to those that would have been necessary had
with such opposite
the property remained
party, ought not to be paid out of the fund,
but by the party at whose instance the apThe expenses incurpointment was made.
red by the receiver that would have been
necessary for .the appellant to incur had it
remained In the possession of its property,
and in the control of its business, were properly paid out of the fund, but such as it
would not have been necessary for it to
incur should be charged to the party procuring the order.
Such expenses should be regarded as incurred in consequence of an erWeston v. Watts, 45
ror at his instance.
Hun, 219; City of St. Louis v. St Louis Gaslight Co., 11 Mo. App. 287; Bank v. Bayne,
Moyers v. Coin140 N. Y. 821, 35 N. E. 630;
er, 22 Fla. 422; French t. Gifford, 31 Iowa,
428.

We hold that so much of the order appealed from was erroneous as authorized compensation to the receiver and to I. N. Pierce, and
the items for a stamp and for the publicaSuch extion of notice, out of the fund.
penses should have been taxed against the
plaintiff. The remainder of the order is afThe cause is remanded to the court
firmed.
below, with directions to tax the expenses
in accordance with this opinion, and to so
order them paid; costs of appeal to be taxed
against plaintiff.

BARTCH and MINER,

JJ.,

concur
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WHITNEY

V.

HANOVER NAT. BANK

et al.

(two cases).

SAJIE

V.

BANK OP GREENVILLE

(15 South.

Supreme Court

33, 71 Miss.

of Mississippi.

et al.

1009.)

April

9,

1894.

Appeal from chancery court, Washington
county; W. R. Trigg, Chancellor.
Proceedings between George Q. Whitney
and the Hanover National Bank and others
relative to the funds of the Bank of Greenville. From three adverse decrees, Whitney
Affirmed.
appeals.
Nugent & McWillie and S. H. King, for apYerger & Percy, for appellees.

pellant.

three
cases
C. J.
These
argued and submitted together,
and
will be so considered.
Their history is this:
The Bank of Greenville was found to be insolvent, and came to a stop, on the 22d day
of December, 1891, when the directors, headed by the president, applied, by petition to
the chancellor, to take charge of the assets
of the bank, by appointing a receiver to collect and manage its affairs.
The chancellor
appointed the president of the bank receiver, and, on his application, enjoined all perby suit against it.
sons from proceeding
The receiver appointed entered upon his duties as designated,
and continued
until he
resigned, on the 6th of July, 1892.
On the
11th July, 1892, the Hanover National Bank
and other creditors of the Bank of Greenville exhibited their biU, in the chancery court
in which the receiver had been appointed,
against the Bank of Greenville, and averred
the foregoing facts, and that since the 22d
December,
and directors
1891, the officers
of the bank had ceased to manage it, and
that its affairs had been managed wholly
by Pollock, as receiver, who had collected
a large sum of money due said bank, and
that the appointment of another receiver
was necessary for the preservation of the
assets of the bank and the protection of the
rights of its creditors; with other specific
designed to show the necessity
allegations,
for the immediate appointment of a receivUpon due notice to the defendant a reer.
ceiver was appointed in this proceeding on
the 18th July, 1892, and the former receiver
was directed to deliver to him all the assets
On July 23, 1892,
of the bank in his hands.
George Q. Whitney and others, creditors of
rmited in a bill
the Bank of Greenville,

CAMPBELL,

•were

against the bank and 6. D. Thomas, who
had qualified and was acting as receiver by
virtue of his appointment on July 18th, and
against other defendants, in said chancery
This bill set forth the suspension of
cotu-t.
1891, and
the bank on the 22d December,
the appointment by the chancellor of Pollock
as receiver on the application of the president and directors of the bank, and that Pollock took exclusive control of all the assets
of the bank, and acted as receiver, but that

defendant Thomas, at the time of exhibiting
said bill, claimed to be receiver of said bank
by virtue of an appointment by the chancellor of said coiu-t; that the application
to the chancellor on December 22, 1891, and
all the proceedings had, including the procurement of the appointment of Thomas as
receiver, were devices to hinder, delay, and
defraud creditors, and "invalid and void."
Discovery was sought by the bill as to all
the assets of the bank, of whatever kind,
and a lien upon them prayed to be established from the date of filing the bill, and
their appropriation to the demands of the
complainants.
The Bank of Greenville interposed a plea to this bill of the proceeding by the Hanover National Bank et al. v.
Bank of Greenville, and the appointment in
that case of Thomas as receiver, and that he
had qualified as such, and was in possession of the assets of the bank under that
appointment,
and relied on this plea as a
The
bar to the bill filed 23d July, 1892.
plea was set down for hearing upon its sufficiency, and was sustained, and the bill dismissed.
Prom that decree an appeal was
taken,

and case No. 7,460

this court is that appeal.

on the docket

of

On October 4, 1892, George Q. Whitney
petitioned the chancery com-t of Washington cotmty, in which these cases were pendseting, and which had been consolidated,
ting forth that he was a creditor to a large
amount of the Bank of Greenville, and had
recovered judgment for a large sum against
it in the court of the United States at Vicksbm-g. Miss., July 28, 1892, which had been
duly enrolled, and, he claimed, was a paramount lien on all the assets of said bank,
notwithstanding all the various proceedings
in the said chancery court, which are set
forth vrith detailed particularity, and denounced as void, and no obstacle in law to
the application of the assets of the bank to
the claim of the petitioner,
who prayed to
be allowed to be made a party defendant
to said cause.
At the same time he presented a petition and bond for removal of said
cause, in which he prayed to be made a defendant, to the United States court at Vicksburg.
The complainants in the cause In
which Whitney sought to intervene as a defendant opposed his application, and it was
denied by the court, and from this he appealed, and that appeal is contained In No.
7,459 on the docket of this court.
Defeated In his effort to be made a defendant as stated, Whitney made an abortive effort to have the United States court
at Vicksburg take charge of his suit, and
enforce his claim to be paid out of the assets of the Bank of Greenville In preference
to other creditors; but with that we have no
concern, and state the fact historically only,
being in the record before us.
On iFebruary
6, 1893, Whitney, who had been baffled
in
all his efforts to obtain payment as a creditor entitled to precedence out of the assets
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of the Bank of Greenville, exhibited an original bill in the chancery court of Washington
county against the complainants In the bill
of the Hanover National Bank and others
against the Bank of Greenville, exhibited
July 11, 1892, and the Bank of Greenville
and W. A. Pollock, receiver, and G. D.
Thomas, receiver.
In this bill is narrated
with detail the history of the dealing by and
vyith the bank from the time of its suspension and taking refuge from creditors in the
chancery court to the filing of this bill, which
also relates the persistent, but ineffectual, efforts of the complainant, in state and federal
coiu'ts, to secure recognition of his right, as
claimed, to be first paid out of the assets of
the Bank of Greenville. It assails the action of the chancery court of Washington
county as void for want of jurisdiction over
the subject-matter
dealt with, and seeks to
vacate all orders that stand in his way, and
the payment of his as a preferred claim out
of the effects of the bank.
The bill seeks injunction, which was obtained.
This bill was
answered, and most of its allegations admitted, but the claim made by It to the right of
the complainant to priority of payment out
of the assets of the bank was denied.
A motion was made to dissolve the injunction, and
some affidavits were taken, and some facts
were agreed on for the hearing of the motion
to dissolve, and it was agreed that the case
should be heard on the motion to dissolve,
and for final decree on such hearing.
The respondents gave notice of a claim for damages
to be allowed on dissolution of the injunction
to amount of $2,500 for attorney's fees in defense of the suit.
The case was heard in accordance with the agreement, and a decree
was made dissolving the injunction, dismissing the bill, and awarding damages against
the complainant in the sum of $2,000 as attorney's fees, the decree reciting that the court
had heard testimony in open court as to the
attorney's fees, and taxed the costs against
the complainant,
who appealed, and this is
No. 7,749 of the docket of this court
From this complete but succinct history of
this litigation, as disclosed in voluminous
form in the three cases before us, it is apparent that the only question presented for decision by the appeal in No. 7,459 is as to the
propriety of the action of the com-t in refusing to permit Whitney to intervene as a defendant in tlie case of Hanover National
Bank et al. v. Bank of Greenville, against the
objection of the complainants, who protested
earnestly against it. The court did right in
this refusal. "No such practice is known in
equity as making a person a defendant to a
suit upon his own application over the objec1 Daniell, Oh. PI.
tion of the complainant."
& Pr. 287, note 2, and cases cited; Stretch
V. Stretch, 2 Tenn. Ch. 140,— where the subject is fully treated, and the action of the
court in the case before us is fully vindicated
on principle and authority.
The question presented by cases 7,460 and
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7,749 is whether the chancery court of Washington county was so wanting in jurisdiction
of the case of Hanover National Bank and
others exhibited against the Bank of Greenville, July 11, 1892, as to render its action in
the case void, and liable to be assailed collaterally, and treated as a nullity, whenever
and however called in question; for, if it be
conceded that the action of the court was erroneous, unless it was void, the fact that it
and taken control
had assumed jm-isdiction,
Df the assets of the Bank of Greenville, and
appointed a receiver in the case, was an answer to the original biU exhibited by Whitaey and others on the 23d July, 1892, and
likewise to Whitney's bill of February 6,
1893.
We regard the action of the chancellor on the 22d December, 1891, appointing a
receiver on the ex parte application of the
directors of the bank, and his subsequent acas
tion in pursuance of that appointment,
It
utterly void, and of no legal effect.
collaterally, and disrecould be assailed
garded with impunity, by anybody.
The
proposition that an insolvent debtor can take
refuge in a chancellor's decree on his or its
own application, and obtain prot:caon a-ainst
pm-suing creditors, who may be enjoined
from pursuing their ordinary remedies, is
without foundation. We cannot account for
the mistake fallen into in the proceeding
of
December 22, 1891, and all that was done under it, except by supposing that what is provided for by statute in other states was considered admissible in the absence of statute
in this state.
The suit of Hanover Bank et
al. V. Bank of Greenville, instituted July 11,
1892, is evidence of the fact that it was considered necessary to strengthen the grasp of
the chancery court on the assets of the bank,
and that it was a timely proceeding for the
purpose of the complainants in that suit, for
it results from what we have said that all
that went before was of no legal validity;
and, but for that suit, there would have been
no barrier to his proper proceeding by any
creditor, the injunction issued to the contrary notwithstanding. But, if the court was
not wholly without jurisdiction in that suit,
it was inadmissible to inject into it other
suits, as sought to be done by the bill of July

and that of February 6, 1893.
The question, then, is as to the case of
Hanover Bank et al. v. Bank of Greenville,
begun by original bill July 11, 1892.
Was
the action of the court as to that case void?
It is to be observed that the bill in that case
is not one to secure any priority or advantage to the complainant in it, to the injury of
other creditors, but it is for aU creditors of
the Bank of GreenyiUe,
as shown by its
prayer for the appointment of a receiver to
preserve and collect the assets, and distribute the money among all the creditors, according to their rights as ascertained.
There
was no time when Whitney could not join in
this suit as a complainant, or assert his
right of priority as claimed, if he had chosen
23, 1892,
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hut his persistent effort was to obtain priority over other creditors and secure
full payment, if the assets were sufiScient;
and he was unwilling to make common cause
with all creditors, but, asserting the voidness
of all the proceedings in the chancery court
to do so;

as to these matters, he sought, as he had a
right to do, to obtain precedence as a creditor by getting judgment against the bank,
He got judgment, and, if
and enforcing it.
that entitled him to be paid out of the bank's
assets in the hands of the receiver, he might
have propounded his claim of priority in the
chancery
court, and demanded Its recognition and payment by an order therefor, but
he maintained his attitude of asserting the
nullity of all the proceedings in this matter
of the chancery court, and attacked them as
void; and the maintenance of his bill of
February 6, 1893, depends on maintaining the
legal proposition on which it rests.
His
learned counsel has been not only persistent,
but consistent, in the many methods employed to obtain for his client an advantage
over other creditors.
It remains to be stated
whether or not he shall succeed in secm-ing
the reward of his industry in behalf of his
By his biU of February 6, 1893, he
client.
has pursued the proper course to obtain an
adjudication of the question on which the
claim made by his client depends.
This bill
attacks the validity of the proceedings in the
chancery court in the case of Hanover Bank
et al. V. Bank of Greenville, on the ground
that it is not the province of a com-t of chancery to dissolve a corporation,
or interfere
with the exercise of its franchise, or displace
its officers, or appoint a receiver, or otherwise exercise jurisdiction over it, at the instance of creditors who have no judgment
against it. In this case there was no interference by the court with the bank or its
franchise, and the performance
of the ordinary functions of its officers.
There was no
attempt to dissolve or restrain the corporation.
Its directors had voluntarily surrendered its assets to the keeping of the chancellor, and ceased to perform their duties as
to them.
The chancellor had accepted the
trust,
and designated
a receiver
to take
charge of these assets, and care for them,
and had enjoined all creditors of the bank
from suing it, and had proceeded in the administration of the trust he had accepted, as
if there had been a creditors' bill; and, although this fell little short of being a mere
farce, saved from it only by the seriousness
of the performance with judicial gravity, in
good faith, it was, nevertheless,
the condition in which the complaining creditors found
the affairs of their debtor on the 11th July,
1892, when they instituted their suit representing the deplorable
conditions
existing,
and prayed the Interference of the chancery
court to take charge of the assets of their
debtor, the bank, thus abandoned by it, and
siU7rendered to the chancellor, who, though
without authority to receive them, had yet

taken control of them as if he did have the
right to receive them, and had been dealia„'
with them accordingly. The bill urged the
necessity
for the immediate appointment
of a receiver for the preservation of the
assets of the bank, which had suspended,
and ceased to care for them since December
22, 1891.
It is true that none of the complainants was a judgment creditor of the
bank, and none had a specific lien on the
assets of the bank.
Yet these assets constituted a trust fund, in a general sense, for
the payment of the creditors of thfi bank,
and, having been abandoned
by the managers of that corporation, and transferred
to the chancellor, who was dealing with
them as of right, when he had no more legal
authority over them than a private individual, who might have found them, if it may
be said that, under these circumstances,
it
was erroneous for the chancellor to entertain
the suit of general creditors of the bank,
and appoint a receiver, it certainly cannot
be
maintained that this proceeding
was
wholly unauthorized and void, so as to be
subject to collateral attack for want of jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Vanfleet,
Collat. Attack, § 100; Brown v. Iron Co., 134
U. S. 530, 10 Sup. Ct. 604; Mollen v. Iron
Works, 131 U. S. 3.52, 9 Sup. Ct. 781; Graham
v. Railroad Co., 102 U. S. 148; Goodman v.
Winter, 64 Ala. 410; Barbour v. Bank, 45
Ohio St. 133, 12 N. E. 5; Rouse v. Bank,
46 Ohio St. 493, 22 N. E. 293.
Many other books might be referred to in
support of the proposition asserted, but, if
the doctrine announced did not prevail elsewhere, there can be no doubt as to the law
here since the constitution of 1890. By section 160 of that instrument, "in all cases
where said court [chancery] heretofore exercised jurisdiction, auxiliary to courts of
common law, it may exercise such jurisdiction to grant the relief sought, although the
legal remedy may not have been exhausted,
or the legal title established by a suit at
law." This is in harmony with the scheme
of the constitution reversing the former relations of the courts, in which the circuit
court possessed general jurisdiction, and was
the repository of the power to administer
legal remedies, and the chancery court had
jurisdiction of certain designated
matters,
and where there was not a full, adequate,
and complete remedy at law. Now the circuit court has original jurisdiction "in all
matters, civil and criminal, in this state, not
vested by this constitution in some other
court." Section 156. A residuary grant is
thus made to the circuit court.
This manifests the policy of enlarging the domain of
chancery, and limiting that of the court of
law. What may be the effect of the provisions mentioned in widening the scope of the
courts of chancery cannot be determined
now, and is not necessary to be decided; but
that they will be influential in considering
the class of cases in which chancery courts
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may entertain Jurisdiction
is undeniable.
When we look to section 147 of the constitution, all doubt as to the proper resolution
of the question presented by this case vanishes. Because of that section, error is not
predicable of "any error or mistake as to
whether the cause in which it was rendered
was of equity or common law jurisdiction."
"No judgment or decree in any chancery or
circuit court, rendered in a civil cause, shall
be reversed or annulled on the ground of
want of jurisdiction to render said judgment or decree, from any error or mistake
as to whether the cause in which it was rendered was of equity or common law jurisdiction," is the mandate of the fundamental
law, and sweeps away all distinction between equity and common-law jurisdiction,
after it has been entertained, in a civil cause
in the chancery or circuit courts. It may
be an action of crim. con., or for libel or
slander, or trespass, or any other civil cause
in the chancery court, or an equity matter
In a court of law; if entertained there, error
is not predicable, and the decree or judgment shall not be annulled for want of jurisdiction. The chancellor or circuit judge
conclusively and finally settles the question
of jurisdiction, as between equity or common-law jurisdiction, of the particular case;
for it would be the height of absurdity to
hold that, while error may not be afi^med
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such judgment or decree is void. The
we do not apply the provisions of the
constitution mentioned to the matter of December 22, 1891, and uphold it, and What
followed, is that it was not a cause. There
was no suit or action, and no parties plaintiff
and defendant, but a mere ex parte surrender by the bank to the chancellor of its affairs, for which there is no authority in law;
and therefore the constitution does not apply, but relates to a civil cause, as properly
imderstood,
and not to all that a chancellor
or judge may do. The case of Hanover National Bank et al. v. Bank of Greenville is
a suit regularly begim by bill against a defendant, and regularly proceeded with to a
final decree; and, while we will not be understood to hold that there was even error
in the action of the chancellor, — which question is not before us for decision, — we are
sure his action cannot be held void or annulled, and that disposes of cases Nos. 7,749

of it,

reason

and 7,460.
The decree allowing $2,000 for damages in
the way of attorney's fees is complained of,
but, as the evidence on which the chancellor
decided this sum to be reasonable was not
put in the record, and is not before us, we
cannot disturb the decree for this. The result is that the decree in each of the three
cases hereinbefore mentioned must be affirmed.
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IXDEPEXDEXT DIST. TEL.
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SILVER BOW COUN-

STATE

ex rel.

CO.

al.

IX

ct

V.

et al.
(39 Pac.

316,

15 Mont.

Supreme Court of Montana.

324.)

Feb. 18, 1S95.

Certiorari by the state of Montana ex rel.
tlie Independent District Telegrapli ComMessenger &
pany, tlie Citizens' District
Burglar-Alarm Telegrapli Company, and G.
A. Lauzier against the Second judicial district court of the state of Montana in and
for the county of Silver Bow, and the judges
presiding, to review the action of such court
in appointing a receiver for the two corporations. Dismissed.
This is a writ of certiorari directed to the
district court to review its action in appointing a receiver of the properties of two of the
relators, viz. the Independent District Telegraph Company and the Citizens' District
Messenger & Burglar-Alarm Telegraph Company, it being claimed by the relators that
the district court acted in that matter without jurisdiction.
The receiver was appointed in an action entitled as follows: "H. L.
Haupt and E. A. Nichols, trustee, Plaintiffs, V. Independent District Telegraph Com& Burpany, Citizens' District Messenger
glar-Alarm Telegraph Company,
Fred B.
Puddington, H. Sommers, John O'Rourke,
Thomas D. Butterfield, G. A. Lauzier, Alex.
Johnston, and John Doe (whose true name
The appointis unknown). Defendants."
ment was made upon the complaint in that
case and upon affidavits filed. The following
facts appear from the complaint:
Each of the companies defendant in the
case in the district court (and who are relators here) is a corporation organized under the laws of this state. The plaintiff
Haupt is owner of 76 shares of the stock of
Independent Company.
The plaintiff
the
Nichols, as trustee, is also owner of 76
The Independent
shares of said company.
Company is the owner of a franchise from
the city of Butte permitting it to carry on
the district messenger business, and granting to the company the use of the streets
and alleys of the city for the purpose of
The Citizens' Company owns
said business.
a similar franchise. On May 1, 1892, the
said two companies entered into an agi-eement by which they should put their respective stocks, franchises, and property into a common business, to be carried on by
officers and agents to be appointed by the
This agreement
two corporations jointly.
was to run for 20 years. All moneys earned
should go Into a general fund, and be in
After
the hands of a general treasurer.
paying expenses, a reserve fund of $500
was to accumulate in the hands of the treasAfter paying expenses and the acurer.
cumulation of this reserve, the profits were
to be paid by the general treasurer to the

corporation treasurers In the proportion of five-ninths to the Independent
Company, and four-ninths to the Citizens'
Company, to be distributed by the said respective
companies
as dividends on their
Btock. Thereupon the general manager and
general treasurer were elected to carry on
The reserve fund of
this joint business.
The business was
$500 was accumulated.
carried on until June 1, 1893. At that date
the stockholders Sommers, Lauzier, Butterfield, and O'Rourke united together and obtained a majority of the stock of each company.
After obtaining this stock, those
stockholders united and conspired together
to manage and conduct the combined corporations for their individual benefit, and
profits,
to exclude from the management,
and benefits the plaintiffs Haupt and Nichols. Since that time said plaintiffs Haupt
and Nichols have been entirely excluded
from the profits, management, and benefits
of said corporations and the combination of
From the time said asthe corporations.
sociation of the two corporations was formed until said Sommers, Lauzier, Butterfield,
and O'Rourke obtained control of the said
business,
combined
there was paid to the
treasurers of the said corporations $500 a
month, to be distributed by them as dividends on the stock of the corporations.
That, when said Sommers and others obtained control of the said associated corporations, there was in the hands of the general treasurer said reserve fund of $500, and
also cash in the sum of $1,000, and also
interest on the reserve fund of $25. That
this total sum of $1,525 was turned over to
Lauzier, the general treasurer elected by his
friends Sommers, Butterfield, and O'Rourke.
That the current expenses which then remained unpaid did not exceed $300, and that
there was therefore $1,225 available as a
dividend to be paid to the stockholders.
That, ever since said Sommers and others
obtained control as aforesaid, they have refused to give the plaintiffs any account of
the profits of the association, and have refused to pay any dividends on the stock.
Plaintiffs allege, on Information and belief,
that, since the Sommers control obtained, —
that is, since June 1, 1893,— the net profits
corporations have been
of the associated
per month, and that said Sommers,
$500
O'Rourke, Butterfield, and Lauzier, instead
of paying those profits as dividends, have
converted the same to their own use.
On
February 9, 1894, the officers elected under
the Sommers management
executed to Fred
B. Puddington three promissory notes, payable each In nine months, for the sums, respectively, of $5,000, $2,000, and $2,000, bearing interest at the rate of 1% per cent, per
month.
That said Sommers management,
also as security for said notes, executed to
said Puddington a chattel mortgage upon
the franchises and all the property of said
corporations. That said notes purported to
respective
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be given for the purchase price of a certain
franchise granted by the city of Butte to
said Puddington,— a franchise to erect and
maintain a district messenger and burglaralarm telegraph system in the city of Butte.
That said franchise was granted by the city
subject to certain conditions precedent.
The
complaint then sets out those conditions, and
then alleges that none of those conditions
were fulfilled.
The complaint alleges that
said Puddington's franchise is forfeited and
void, and was forfeited and void at the time
of the pretended sale of the same to the two
said companies and the execution of said
notes and mortgage.
The complaint further
states that said Sommers and others, at the
time of said pretended sale, weU knew that
the Puddington franchise was forfeited and
void and was of no value whatever. It is
further alleged that said Sommers, Lauzier,
Butterfield, and O'Rourke conspired together to defraud the plaintiffs, and to obtain
possession of the plaintiffs' stock, and all interest in the Independent Company, and of
the said combination of the two companies;
and that in fact they executed said mortgage
and notes without any consideration, and for
the purpose of bringing about the sale of
said property and franchises of the said
companies, and of foreclosing all interest of
the plaintiffs therein.
The complaint further alleges that unless the negotiation of the
said notes is restrained, and the notes and
mortgage declared fraudultent and void, all
the property of the Independent Company
will be sold under the mortgage, and plaintiffs will be deprived of their interests in the
said corporation. The complaint prays for
several items of relief, among them that said
Fred B. Puddington, and all persons claiming under him, may be enjoined from negotiating said notes or mortgage, or from collecting or foreclosing the same, or from interfering in any manner with the properties or
franchises of the said companies, and that
said mortgage and notes be adjudged null
and void.
In addition to the allegations made in the
complaint, a number of affidavits were filed
and used on the hearing. One Le Clare deposes that he heard John O'Rourke and G.
A. Lauzier, two of the defendants in the district court, conversing about the business of
the said district messenger companies, and
that O'Rourke said "that if they [meaning
himself, Butterfield, Lauzier, and Sommers]
would stand together, they would do that
Dutch outfit up [referring to the Shultzes
and the other stockholders]." H. A. Neidenhofer deposes that from December, 1890,
to February, 1892, he was manager of the
Independent Company, and that all that
time monthly dividends were paid to its
stockholders amounting to $750 per month,
excepting during the time when there was
an opposition company, and that those diviThis affiant also
dends were net profits.
states that after the combination was made
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between the two companies they paid dividends of $500 a month.
Seth B. Smith, another affiant, stated that, prior to the time
when Sommers and his party obtained control of tlie combined corporations, he (affi-

He
ant) was treasurer of the combination.
testifies in his affidavit rather fully about

the formation of the combination between
the two companies.
He testified that the
reserve fund above mentioned,
of $500, accumulated in the hands of the treasurer;
that finally Sommers and his party bought
the affiant's stock, and he retired from the
management;
that he turned over to the
new management aU the funds in three different checks of $911.80, $107.94, and $14.25;
that at that time there were expenses outstanding and unpaid of only $400; that when
he retired he was just preparing and ready
to declare a dividend of $500, but he was instructed by the Sommers party not to pay
said dividend; that while affiant was treasurer of the company he paid dividends to
the stockholders of about $500 a month.
Carl Shultz and his wife, Mary Shultz, each
made an affidavit in which they testify as to
Lauzier's and Butterfield's negotiations for
the purchase of affiants' stock, and threats
that if they did not sell that they (Lauzier
and Butterfield) would freeze out said affiHaupt, one of the plaintiffs, also
ants.
makes an affidavit that for more than a
year after the combination of the two companies he received monthly dividends on his
stock of 50 cents per share.
This affiant
also alleges, on information and belief, that
the combined corporations keep two sets of
books, one of which sets of books shows the
actual receipts and disbursements and the
net profits of the association, and the other
set of books does not show the correct accounts of the said corporations, but is kept
for the purpose of deceiving and misleading
stockholders who have been excluded from
the management
and participation in the
management
of said business; that, since
the Sommers party obtained control of the
business, affiant has received no dividends
on his stock, although therj; have been large
profits.
This affiant then sets forth the execution of the Puddington notes and mortgage.
He also sets forth the facts showing
that the Puddington franchise which he (Puddington) purported to sell to the companies
for $9,000 was absolutely void and worthless.
One of the employes of the combined
corporations testifies to hearing Butterfield
say that the business was good and paying
as well as any business in town.
An answer was filed by the defendants,
and also some affidavits. It is not necessary to recite the contents of these papers,
for on the writ of certiorari in this court the
question of the discretion of the lower court
in appointing a receiver is not under review.
After hearing argument in the district court
as recited in its order, the court found that
the plaintiffs were entitled to the appoint-
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ment of a receiver pendente lite.
It was
tlierefore ordered that A. H. Barrett be appointed receiver pendente lite of the franchises, plants, business, books, and accounts,
and of all other property belongii^g to the
said two corporations, for the purpose of
managing and conducting said business;
and he was by the order authorized and directed to take possession of the said premises, franchises, plants, and aJl property,
books, and accounts, of any nature whatsoever, belonging to the said corporations, and
to manage and control the same during the
pendency of this action, and for that purpose to take care of and manage and control
the said property and business, and to pay
all debts and obligations, and collect all
moneys due to the said corporations. It was
ordered that the receiver give a bond, with
sureties, in the sum of $10,000.
Upon the
appointment of the receiver, the said G. A.
Lauzier made an application to this court
upon behalf of himself, and purporting to be
also on behalf of the two district telegraph
companies, asking for a writ of certiorari to
review the action of the district court in appointing a receiver.
The application, of
course, is made upon the ground that the
district court had no jurisdiction to make
That is the point disthe appointment.
cussed and decided in the opinion below.

Robinson & Wapleton and John W. Cotfor relatoss.
Geo. Haldorn and Oliver
JI. Hall, for respondents.

ter,

DE WITT, J. (after stating the facts). The
question in this case is simply whether under
the facts, as recited In the statement above,
the district court had jurisdiction to appoint
a receiver.
State v. Judge of Second Judicial
Dist. Ct,

10

Moat.

401,

25

Pac.

1053.

See,

also, French Bank Case, 53 Cal., at page 550.
There is here no question of the court's discretion under consideration. The relators in
this application rely very largely upon the
decision in the French Bank Case, but we
think that the case at bar is distinguishable
from that case in many respects, and, in order to make the distinction apparent, we
quote as follows from the California case:
"Irrespective of the efEect of the fifth subdivision of section 564 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which will be presently considered, there is no jurisdiction vested In courts
of equity to appoint a receiver of the property of a corporation In a suit prosecuted by
a private party. This Is only to say that
there is no jurisdiction vested In these courts
in such a case to dissolve a corporation; for
the power of a receiver, when put In motion,
of necessity supersedes the corporate power,
ft necessarily displaces the corporate management, and substitutes its own, and assumes,
In the language of the order imder review,
'to do all and everything necessary (in the
judgment of the receiver, under the advice of
the court) to protect the rights of the cred-

itors and depositors of said corporation.' This
precise question was brought directly under
consideration here in the case of Neall v.
Hill, 16 Cal. 145, where, in a suit brought by
a stockholder, a receiver had been appointed
by the district court to take possession of the
property of the Gold Hill & Bear River Water Company, a corporation existing under
the laws of this state. The opinion in that
case, rendered by Mr. Justice Cope, and concurred in by the whole court, after referring
to the adjudicated cases in England and in
this country, uses this language:
'This decree, if permitted to stand, must necessarily
result in the dissolution of the corporation;
and in that event the court will have accomplished, in an indirect mode, that which, in
this proceeding, it had no authority to do
directly. It is well settled that a court of
equity, as such, has no jurisdiction over corporate bodies for the purpose of restraining
their operations or winding up their concerns. We do not find that any such power
has ever been exercised in the absence of
a statute conferring
the jurisdiction.'
Of
course, it is not to be doubted that the trustees of a corporation,
the persons who constitute its direction, and from time to time
exercise the corporate authority in the management of its affairs, are subject to the control of courts of equity; or, as observed by
Chancellor Kent, 'that the persons who from
time to time exercise the corporate powers
may, in their character of trustees, be accountable to this court [the court of chancery]
for a fraudulent breach of trust; and,' he
adds, 'to this plain and ordinary head of
equity the jurisdiction of this court over corporations ought to be confined.'
Attorney
General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 388.
And in exercise of these admitted equity
powers of the court, referable to the wellknown grounds upon which its jurisdiction
ordinarily proceeds, embracing the cognizance of fraud, accident, trust, and the like,
the rights of natural persons, injured or put
at hazard through corporate proceedings unauthorized by law, will find ample protection and redress.
But, even in such a proceeding as that, the trustees must, of course,
be made parties defendant; and it will be
observed, upon looking at the complaint of
Gallagher in this view, that it is not substantially sufficient in its scope to put the
equity powers of the court in motion for
any purpose.
The corporation Itself being
the sole party defendant, the trustees—those
persons upon whom the management
of its
affairs Is devolved— are not parties, nor is
any relief sought against them personally.
That there is no inherent power In the district courts, as being courts of equity, to
appoint a receiver in such a case as that
presented
by the complaint of Gallagher,
is therefore apparent, both upon principle
and authority."
In the California case an important element in the decision, as it appears, was that
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the appointment of the receiver acted as a
dissolution of the corporation. In the case
at bar no such result is intended by the oror is accomder appointing the receiver,
plished by that order. It is true that the
complaint in the case in the district court
asks for a dissolution of the corporation, but
whether such relief may be granted in that
action is not now before us for review.
The complaint also asks another relief, as
set forth in the statement, namely, that the
negotiation of the notes described be restrained, that the foreclosure of the mortgage be prohibited, and that the notes and
mortgage be declared null and void. While
the determination of these matters is pending in the action, the receiver is to act. His
appointment is pendente lite only, and he
is authorized to do only those acts which
are peculiarly pendente lite.
Again, in the
French Bank Case, one ground of the decision was that the action was against the
corporation only (see page 546 of the decision), and not against the malfeasing trustees; that is, the "persons upon whom the
management
of its affairs is devolved" (at
page 551).
But in the case at bar the managing officers of the corporation are joined
as defendants, and their unlawful acts are
sought to be set aside, and their future
wrongful conduct enjoined.
The receiver is
not to wind up the corporation under his
appointment. He Is simply to manage the
affairs of the same while charges of the
most outrageous frauds by the managers
and controllers of the corporation are being
investigated in the trial of the action. We
are fully aware of the reluctance of courts
of equity to interfere by receivership in the
management of corporations, or to take that
management
from trustees elected by the
shareholders. It is said in Morawetz on
Private Corporations (section 281) as follows:
"A court of equity will grant all relief to a
shareholder which the nature of his case
may require.
But it has always been a settled principle that no interference with the
management
of a corporation can be justified, unless such interference is absolutely
necessary to the attainment of justice. The
reason of this rule is obvious.
The officers
of a corporation are generally elected by a
vote of the shareholders.
Every shareholder has a voice in their appointment, and may
insist that they shall represent the corporation when duly appointed. If an officer is
guilty of a breach of duty, he may in many
cases be removed by act of the corporation;
but no minority of the shareholders have
any authority to restrain his action, or remove him and appoint another officer in his
place.
Nor can a court of chancery interfere at the suit of a portion of the shareholders, and remove an offending officer, or
even enjoin him generally from acting for
the corporation, unless this be essential to
the protection of the corporate rights; as,
for example, where the directors have con-
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spired to defraud the corporation, or have
otherwise shown themselves to be totally
unfit to be intrusted any longer with the
of the company's affairs. The
management
court must ordinarily confine its remedy to
the redress of the specific wrongs which
have been charged."
But the case before us is not an ordinary
one, and perhaps it may be doubted that
many such histories of fraud will be found in
It is difficult
the conduct of human affairs.
to imagine a case more thoroughly saturated
with fraud than this which was presented
to the district court on the application for
Four sharethe appointment
of a receiver.
holders of two small corporations, which were
paying handsome dividends, obtained control of the majority of the stock, and elected
their own officers.
These four conspirators,
instead of paying $500 a month dividends
were earning, prowhich the corporations
ceeded to put that money into their own pockThey kept false books to deceive the
ets.
They pretended to buy for the
shareholders.
francorporations
an absolutely worthless
chise, when they already owned two good
which were more than
and valid franchises,
They gave the
ample for the same purpose.
corporations' notes for this worthless franchise, and mortgaged all of the property of
for the purpose of having
the corporations
the mortgage foreclosed, and the property of
It is needless to
the corporations wiped out.
They are all set
enlarge upon these facts.
forth in the statement preceding this opinion.
This is a story of wrecking and robbing that would make a pirate of the Spanish
main exclaim, in the language of Lord Clive,
"I am surprised at my own moderation."
Is not interference here absolutely necessary,
as Morawetz says, to the attainment of jusAgain Morawetz remarks, as quoted
tice?
above, the court of chancery will not interfere
unless this
at the suit of the shareholders
be essential to the protection of the corporate
rights. We can scarcely conceive of a case
where it would be more essential than it is
here, for the protection of the corporate
rights, for, if the interference is not had, the
corporate property will be swept away from
the corporations into the grasp of the conspii-ators; and, while the investigation into the
acts of the Sommers-O'Rourke party is being made by the covu't, should the court allow
this same band of marauders to remain in
possession of the corporations and their property, and continue to convert the assets to
their own use, and exercise their own pleasure as to the trusts imposed upon them?
To allow such a proceeding, it seems to us,
would shock the conscience of the most inthat
different
court.
statute provides
OtLT
"a receiver may be appointed by the court
in which an action is pending, or by the
*
*
*
judge thereof:
Sixth. In all other

cases

where

receivers

have

heretofore

appointed \>y the usages i.f courts of
We are of
equity." Code Civ. Proc. § 229.
been
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essence of this trust that It shall be so manopinion that the decisions of the courts susaged as to produce for each stockholder the
of the powers and the
tain the doctrine
The
best possible return for his investment.
usages of courts of equity in such a case as
trustee has so far attsorbed all returns. What
that which was made in the showing before
We note the following
is the outlook for the future? This court, In
the district court.
view of the past, can ^ve no assurances.
language from a very recent decision (JanuIt can make no order that can prevent some
ary, 1894) of the Kansas supreme court.
if
other method of bleeding this corporation,
Wuile the Kansas statute is broader than
Lorman be reit is allowed to continue.
ours, and the case of In re Lewis, 52 Kan.
He has
moved, who shall take his place?
660, 35 Pac. 287, is decided largely upon the
Once dethe absolute power to determine.
statute of that state, still the following reposed, he may elect a dummy to fill his place.
marks of the Kansas court are valuable, as
There are practically but thi-ee persons conis also the collection of authorities appended
to the decision.
We extract from the opinion
cerned. Miner, Lorman, and Lorissa Carpenter, and she has for seven years, in fraud
as follows: "By the averments of the petition, it would appear that all the officers of
of complainant's rights, been paid a dividend
Who has any
to secure her acquiescence.
the corporation
have conspired together to
right to complain if ample and complete jusdivert its business to another company, and
to absorb its earnings and assets, and aptice is awarded to Miner ? Who shall be perpropriate the same to their own uses. Unmitted to stand between him and an adeThis corporation has utterly
quate remedy?
der those circumstances, it would be useless
to apply to the officers to bring an action
failed of its purpose, not because of matters
against themselves, and in such cases the
beyond its control, but because of fraudulent
and misappropriation of its
mismanagement
law permits the appointment of a receiver
In most
at the instance of a stockholder.
funds. Complainant has a right to insist
cases of this character
no other adequate
that it shall not continue as a cloak for a
remedy exists.
The appointment
of a refraud upon him, and shall not longer retain
ceiver is not necessarily a proceeding to dishis capital, to be used for the sole advantage
solve a coi-poration, nor will it necessarily
of the owner of the majority of the stock,
result in its extinction. The property and
and a court of equity will not so far tolerate
assets of the corporation, which are being dissuch a manifest violation of the rules of natsipated and fraudulently absorbed, will be
ural justice as to deny him the relief to which
think a court
preserved and rightfully applieu under the
his situation entitles him.
supervision of the court, and may be restored
of this
of equity, under the circumstances
in the exercise of its general equity
case,
to the officers of the corporation
when there
jurisdiction, has the power to grant to this
has been a change of officers, or when it is
deemed prudent and safe to restore the prop- i complainant ample relief, even to the dissoComplainant
erty and affairs of the corporations to its ' lution of the trust relations.
duly-constituted officers.
A
See First Nat.
is therefore entitled to the relief prayed.
receiver will be appointed, and the affairs of
Bank v. United States Tile Co., 105 Ind. 227,
4 X. E. S46; Pike Co. v. Hammons,
129 Ind.
this corporation
wound up." In the Michigan case the decision went to the winding up
Order of Iron Hall v.
368, 27 X. B. 487;
of the corporation, but in the case before us
Baker (Ind. Sup.) 33 N. E. 1128; Haywood
the receiver is only to hold until the charges
V. Lumber Co., 04 Wis. 639, 26 N. W. 184;
Tank-Line Co. v. Kansas City
of fraud are investigated.
The Michigan deConsolidated
cision Is an able discussion of the powers of
Varnish Co., 43 Fed. 204; Mor. Priv. Corp.
the court of equity in this rospect, and a valPom. Eq. Jur. § 1334; High, Rec. §
§ 281;
20 Am. &
uable review of decisions.
313; Spel. Priv. Corp. § 1001;
It may be said
here, as was said in the Michigan case, that
Eng. Enc. Law, 272." We also find it stated
the corporations
have utterly failed of their
in High on Receivers as follows: "It has
purpose, not because of matters beyond their
ah'eady been shown that in most of the
control, but because of the fraudulent misstates of this country the general jurisdicmanagement
and misappropriation of their
tion of courts of equity over corporations has
funds.
An equal if not greater mismanagebeen enlarged to the extent of authorizing
of receivers in behalf of
ment and misappropriation has been done
the appointment
by the officers of the corporations who are
Section 313.
creditors and shareholders."
The supreme court of Michigan (October,
here made defendants,
and whose acts are
1892), in Miner v. Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.
sought to be restrained and set aside and
W. 218, after reviewing the history of a fraud
declared null and void.
We also find the
which perhaps is worthy to be ranked with that
in the folsame general subject mentioned
lowing language in Waterman on the Law
of the case at bar, says: "The present case
furnishes an instance of gross abuse of trust.
of Corporations (volume 2, § 356) : "The powMust the cestui que trust be committed to
er to appoint a receiver is necessarily inthe domination of a trustee who has for seven
herent in a court which possesses equitable
to violate the trust?
The
jurisdiction.
It is exercised when an estate
years continued
law requires of the majority the utmost good
or fund is in existence, and there is no comfaith in the control and management of the
petent person entitled to hold it; or the percorporation as to the minority. It is of the
son so entitled Is in the nature of a trustee,
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and is misusing or misapplying the trust; or
the property is about to be removed beyond
the reach of the court; and, generally, when it
is necessary to secure rights and prevent a
failure of justice. The property is thus placed
m tne hands of an otiicer of the law 1» oraer
that it may be under the protecting care and
control of the court, and be delivered unimpaired to the persons to whom it is legally
ascertained to belong." See, also, Ganger v.
Cotton-Press Co., 52 Fed. 611; Mor. Priv.
Corp.

§ 642.

Upon questions of equity jurisdiction, aid
is always found in the records
of the
courts of chancery of New Jersey, and from
a decision rendered in May, 1894, by that
learned court, we quote as follows: "The
power of this court to appoint a receiver of
a corporation, either because it has no properly constituted governing body, or because
there are such dissensions in its governing
body as to make it impossible for the corporation to carry on its business with advantage to its stockholders,
think must be regarded as settled;
but
think it is equally
well settled that this power is subject to certain limitations, namely, it must always be
exercised with great caution, and only for
such time and to such an extent as may be
necessary
to preserve
the property of the
corporation, and protect the rights and interests of its stockholders.
As soon as a lawfully constituted and competent governing
body comes into existence, whether it is
brought into existence by an adjustment of
the dissensions or by the election of a new
body, and such body is ready to take possession of the property of the coi-poration, and
proceed in the proper discharge of its duties,
the coiu*t must lift its hand and retire.
This
is the doctrine, as
understand it, which was
laid down by Vice Chancellor Malins in
Featherstone v. Cooke, L. R. 16 Eq. 298, and
Auxiliary Co. v. Vickers, Id. 303, and which
was approved by Chancellor Runyon in Einstein V. Rosenfeld, 38 N. J. Eq. 309, and by
Chancellor McGill in Archer v. Waterworks
Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 33, 24 AtL 508." Edison v.

I

I

I

845

It is true, of
Phonograph Co., 29 Atl. 197.
course, that the power must be exercised
with great caution, but we are of the opinion that the most scrupulous caution would
not cause a court to hesitate in the matter
which was before the district court. Furthermore, the district court did not go any further in the appointment than was necessary
to preserve the property of the corporations,
and protect the rights and interests of its
stockholders,
as was stated in the New Jersey case.
It does not seem necessary to go
The facts of this
further in this discussion.
case will not afford a precedent in the future for any imprudent or unauthorized appointment of a receiver for coriporatlons, or
the unwise withdrawal of the business of a
corporation from the management of its dulyThe
elected and lawfully acting trustees.
case is a precedent only as to its own facts.
Here the objects of the existence, and, initself, of the
deed, the practical existence
corporations, are being totally destroyed by
the unlawful (not to use a stronger term) acts
of its managers; and one object, at least, of
the action in the district court, is to set aside
and prevent such unlawful acts of such managers, and the action itself is against such
unlawfully acting persons.
If they are allowed to go on in their course which they
are pursuing, the corporations
are to be totally wrecked, their funds are to be embezzled, and their property is to be taken from
them by a fraudulent conspiracy of the managers, whose position is one of trust towards
the plaintiffs in the action in the district
court.
Under such a vigorous showing of
facts, we believe that the decisions
of the
courts of equity uphold the powers and
usages of those courts to interfere by a receivership.
See the cases cited in this opinion and the cases referred to in those citations.
We are therefore of the opinion that
the writ of certiorari must be dismissed, and
it is so ordered.
Dismissed.
PEMBERTON,
cur.

C.

J., and HUNT, J.,

con-
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MERCHAXTS' & MANUFACTURERS' NAT.
BANK OP DETROIT v. KENT
CIRCUIT JUDGE.
(5 N.

W.

627,

43 Mich.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

292.)

April

14, 1880.

Mandamus.

Morris & Uhl, for the writ. Jacob Ferris
& Kleinhaus, against.

and Blair, Kingsley

COOLEY, J. The application for a mandamus in this case brings under review questions of the validity and propriety of the order appointing a receiver.
The bill was filed
to foreclose a chattel mortgage.
The mortgage was by Hebbard & Graff, merchant
millers of Grand Rapids, to PMlip M. Graff,
and bore date March 17, 1880.
The purpose
was to secure the mortgagee for having become accommodation
indorser for the mortgagors on a large amount of commercial paper.
The mortgage covered "all the flour, wheat,
corn, oats, bran and feed owned by the parties of the first part, and situated in the city
of Grand Rapids, Michigan, whether on the
track, or in the mills or warehouses, or In
the elevator at Berlin, Ottawa county, Michigan; all the barrels, sacks, bags, tools and
office furniture and fixtures, including safes,
situated in and about and used in connection
with their two mills, being three large teams
and larries, two pairs of large sleighs and
one light delivery wagon, and the blankets
used with said teams.
Also the engine and
boiler used in the Valley City Mills, and put
in by Hebbard & Graff since their lease of
the same, and the shafting and pulleys used
by them in connecting the engine with the
mill and machinery.
Also all the wheat, corn
by the
and oats which may be purchased
parties of the first part and delivered to them
in the city of Grand Rapids, either on the
track, in store or in their mills, and all flour,
by them while
feed and bran manufactured
any portion of the debts secured by this mortgage remains unpaid."
The mortgage reserved to the mortgagor
the privilege of making sales in the ordinary
course of their business, and provided that
"in case of the non-payment of the said notes,
or any of them, at maturity, by the party of
the flrst part, or if the party of the second
part shall at any time deem himself insecure,
* * * whether the party of the second
he,
part shall have paid anything on said notes or
not, is hereby authorized to enter upon the
premises of said party of the first part, or any
place or places where the said goods and chattels, or any part or portion thereof, may be,
and take possession thereof, and sell and dispose of the same at private sale or public
*
*
* whether any of such notes
auction,
not, and apply the proceeds
or
have matured
thereof to the payment of said notes as fast
"
as they mature.
A bill to foreclose this mortgage was filed

the day after its date. It was alleged therein that one of the notes, the payment
of
which was secured by the mortgage, was long
past due, and that another became due March
17, 1880, and another March 18, the day the
bill was filed, and both remain unpaid, and
that by reason thereof the whole sum secured
by the mortgage, amounting
to $38,800, has
become due and payable immediately;
that
by reason of disastrous speculations the mortgagors
insolvent,
have become
and have
transferred to complainant the miU property
whereon they conducted their business;
that
the wheat and other unground grain described in the mortgage cannot be profitably sold
and converted into money except after being
ground;
that to manufacture said grain into
flour, and other proper products, will yield
larger returns, and be more for the interest
of all parties concerned, than to sell or dispose of the same in an unmanufactured
state;
that the total value of all the mortgaged property will not exceed $40,000, and if disposed
of at forced or auction sale will not yield
more than $30,000, or thereabouts.
The bill
prays for the appointment of a receiver, and
nominates the law partner of the solicitor for
complainant
as a suitable person to be appointed.
No persons were made parties defendant to
this bill except the mortgagors.
Late in the
evening of March 18th, and before the bill
had been filed, it was presented to the circuit judge, at his dweUing-house, and an application made for the appointment of a receiver as prayed.
The mortgagors appeared
at the same time, by a solicitor of the court,
and consented to the appointment.
The circuit judge, apparently looking upon the case
as an amicable proceeding. In which all parties concerned were working in harmony to
preserve and dispose of the property for the
benefit of all, made the appointment prayed
for.
The appointment
purports
to be one
made in open court, but the court was not in
session at the time, and the bill not being
then filed, there was no cause pending.
The
order of appointment
directed the receiver to
proceed to manufacture
the grain mortgaged
into flour and other proper products, and to
sell in the usual course of trade and on credit
It soon appeared that the proceeding was
far from being an amicable one, except so
far as the mortgagors and mortgagee were
concerned.
At the very time the mortgagee
was having his bill for foreclosure prepared
and obtaining his order for a receiver, other
parties were suing out writs of replevin for
some portions of the property.
One of these
parties was William B. Ledyard, by virtue
of whose writ the wheat in the Crescent
Mills, previously operated by the mortgagors,
was seized an hour or so before the order
appointing a receiver was made.
Another
was by Euphrasia Aldrich, who replevied a
quantity of wheat at or about the time when
the order was made.
Another was by the
Merchants'
& Manufacturers' Bank of De-
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The circuit court appears to liave come
to the conclusion that the writ of this plaintiff was not served until the receiver had become possessed of the property in dispute,
which could not have heen earlier than about
10 o'clock
on the night of March 18th, that
being the hour when his bond as received was
filed.
On March 19, 1880, the receiver petitioned
the circuit court in chancery
for an order
restraining the several plaintiffs in the replevin suits from proceeding further therein.
A hearing was had on this petition, and its
prayer was granted so far as the suit by the
bank was concerned, and denied as to the
The bank, however, was grantother suits.
ed leave to bring an action of trover to recover the value of the property described in
its writs. The receiver was, by the same order, required to deposit in bank the net proceeds of sales of the property made by him.
Both the receiver and the bank appealed from
this order.
of the receiver was from
1. The appeal
those parts of the order which refused an injunction against the Ledyard & Aldrich suits.
The order in that regard was not a "final order," and was therefore not appealable under
Wing v. Warner, 2 Doug. 288;
the statute.
Caswell V. Comstock, 6 Mich. 391; Boing v.
Coats, 17 Mich. 411; Spencer v. Steams, 28
Mich. 463.
These appeals must therefore be
dismissed.
2. The order, in so far as it enjoined
the
bank from interfering by suit with the possession of property to which the bank claimed title, inasmuch as it finally took from the
bank a legal right, was in the nature of a
final order, and was appealable.
Lewis v.
Campau, 14 Mich. 458; Barry v. Briggs, 22
Mich. 201.
appointing a receiver was
3. The order
void, for the reason that it was made when
It is perhaps
there was no suit pending.
fortunate for all parties interested that such
was the fact, inasmuch as, if it had been
legally valid, the appointment, though of a
but
person eminently fit for the position,
for the relations to the litigation through his
law partner, must necessarily at some time
have been set aside, and the longer it should
stand the greater must have been the probability of confusion in the rights of the parties growing out of his proceedings, and of

unnecessary costs and expenses to be borne
by some one or more of the claimants to the
In Ex parte Pinche, 2 Meriv. 452,
property.
the lord chancellor refused to appoint the
solicitor to the commission as receiver of a
lunatic's estate, though it was stated that
The
no one else would accept the office.
ground of the refusal was that it might become the duty of the solicitor himself to call
So in Stone v. Wishthe receiver to account.
art, 2 Madd. 63, where the parties united in
a request that the next friend of infant comreceiver,
the vice
plainants be appointed
chancellor said: "I cannot accede to this mo-
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tion, although it is consented to. It is the
duty of the next friend to these infants to
watch the accounts and conduct of the reThe two
ceiver;
to be control over him.
characters cannot be united, they are inconsistent."
AVe cannot shut our eyes to the fact that
the law partner of the solicitor is presumptively as much interested in the proceedings
as the solicitor himself, and it would be peculiarly objectionable that he should act in
a position requiring impartiality in a case
like this, where the parties to the suit are
manifestly acting in concert, and adversely
to the interests of other persons, who cannot
The practical result
watch their proceedings.
would be that the receiver would supervise
Garland v. Garland, 2
his own accounts.
Ves. 137.
The practice in equity does .not
even permit the receiver to employ a solicitor
in the case as his own counsel, lest it might
disarm his vigilance in watching the receivRyckman v. Parkins, 5
er's proceedings.
Paige, 548; Adams v. Woods, 8 Cal. 306.
This rule may, no doubt, be departed from
by consent of all parties concerned, but this
must mean by consent of all parties concerned in the results of the receivership, and one
not a party to the suit may be as much concerned in these as the persons who are parties.
The present suit is an illustration.
4. The order appealed from by the bank
was improper, in that it forbade a person not
a party to the suit from testing, in the customary common law method, the title which
is asserted to specific property, and in so doimproperly and
ing stretched unnecessarily,
oppressively the power of the court of equity
in abridgment of the jurisdiction of the court
of law. There may be cases in which it
would be proper for a court of equity, by
to draw to itself
means of a receivership,
the jurisdiction to try disputed titles to property; but the jurisdiction to do so is exceptional, and must be supported by circumstances which render the common law remedies
inadequate, or for some reason unfit and unsuitable in the particular case. No such circumstances appear or are suggested here. It
was proper and just that the bank be allowed to go on with the suit in replevin, if that
seemed most for its interest, and improper
and unjust that it should be restricted to a
suit in trover, which would be, in effect, for
net proceeds only, after the costs of a receivership, which the bank did not desire or assent to, had been deducted.
If the property
belonged to the bank the injustice of requiring the owner to submit to such management,
manufacture and sale of it as another person
might think expedient, and to recover the net
proceeds only after the costs of a receivership
in a suit between other parties had been
wholly or in part deducted, would be too
manifest to require more than mere mention.
5. It cannot
escape attention that the
whole scheme of giving a chattel mortgage
which would be immediately due, filing a bill
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in equity upon it at once, and obtaining the
appointment of a receiver, who should talie
possession of the property to the exclusion of
other creditors, and go on with the business
might have
as the mortgagors themselves
done, and as the order In this case contemplated, was an attempt, by means of the machinery of the law, to accomplish indirectly
what, without calling in the aid of the court,
could not be legally done at all.
We do not enlarge upon this aspect of the
case, as It is not necessary here; but It must

be manifest that the parties were creating
a trust by means of the mortgage and of a
consent order, which could not stand the
test of the law, if made by an assignment.
It resembles very closely an attempt, by circuitous methods, to avoid a legal principle.
The order which is appealed from by the
bank must be reversed, with costs against
the complainant in the suit. What has been
any award of
said will render unnecessary
the writ of mandamus.
The other justices
concurred.

RECEIVERS,
CO. OF NEW YORK
& T. RY. CO. et al.

MERCANTILE TRUST
V.

MISSOURI, K.

(36 Fed.

221.)

Circuit Court, D. Kansas.

Oct. 8, 1888.

In

equity.
Bill for foreclosure and appointment of a receiver.
Bill by the Mercantile Trust Company of
New York, trustee for certain bondholders secured by a mortgage on the property of the
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company,
against said company and the Missotu'i Pacific
Railway Company, to foreclose the mortgage,
and appoint a receiver.

Alexander & Green, Thos. H. Hubbard,
John J. McCook, and William N. Cromwell,
for complainant.
Simon Sterne, Charles F.
and L. B.
Beach, Jr., James O. Broadhead,
Wheat, for defendants.

BREWER, J. (orally). In this case, I have
had no opportunity to write out the conclusions
to which
have come, nor, for that matter,
to arrange my thoughts in any very orderly
I should have preand systematic manner.
ferred to take a little further time to put in
better shape what I have to say; yet, aware
of the fact that many of you gentlemen are
from a distance, and are anxious to return
home,
concluded to waive the matter of
form and order, and state, in a crude way, my
conclusions.
Nor are these conclusions reached simply from Information developed in these
few days. This bill was presented to me more
have had a copy of
than three months ago.
it in my possession since, and have taken frequent occasions to examine the stipulations of
Further than that, the newsthis mortgage.
papers have been full of many of the features
and the property itself,
of this controversy;
starting in my own state,
being a property
and growing up there, is, neither In itself nor
So that many of the
its history, a stranger.
facts which have been presented and discussed
are facts which were not new.
This bill was filed a few days after default
And
in the payment of interest, Jmie last.
the first question— a vital question— is whether
for, being
this suit was prematurely brought;
a suit to foreclose, and not one for the preservation of the property. If prematurely brought,
it would finally have to be dismissed, and a
receiver ought not to be appointed ad Interim.
The ground upon which the claim rests is the
fact that this mortgage or deed of trust requires a six-months delay after the default before certain proceedings— and foreclosure, it is
The second
claimed, is one— are permissible.
article provides for entry by the trustee, but
by its terms such entry cannot be till six
months after default and demand of payment.
The third article likewise authorizes sale by
At
advertisement,
and that is equally limited.
the close of that article follows this paragraph:
"This provision is cumulative to the ordinary
and
in the courts;
remedies by foreclosure
the trustee herein, or Its successor or success-
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ors in this trust, upon default being made as
aforesaid, may, at its discretion, and upon the
written request of the bondholders of a majority in value of said bonds then unpaid,

shall," etc.
Now, the contention

is that those words,
"upon default being made as aforesaid," being
in the last part of this article, by fair construction refer back to the entire provision in
the first part in respect to default, and include
both the happening and continuance of the default. The argument rests merely on the force
of the last two words, "as aforesaid," and is
forcibly put by counsel. That is the real question in the case, for, if this last paragraph
in article 3 were omitted, the decision of the
supreme court in the case of Railroad Co. v.
Posdick, 106 U. S. 47, 1 Sup. Ct. 10, would
In that case, as appears
leave no question.
from the statement, there were in the mortgage stipulations providing for entry and sale
by advertisement six months after default.
The validity of those provisions was recognizbut it held that,
ed by the supreme court;

notwithstanding this, if by other stipulations
in the mortgage it was a security for the payaccrued,
ment of interest as it semi-annually
as well as of the principal, the trustee, or, on
his failure to act, any bondholder, might, on
of interest, bring suit and
the non-payment
Turning to this mortgage, I find
foreclose.
the

same provision.

for the payment

It

is given

as security

of the interest as well as of

By article 2 possession is sethe principal.
cured to the railroad company,— the mortgagor,
—until default be made in the payment of
Unquestionably the
principal pr interest.
right of action at law on the coupon exists.
if articles 3 and 4 were omitUnquestionably,
ted, the mere fact that this property was by
the mortgage pledged as security for the payment of coupons would permit the couponholder to come into a court of equity and enforce that pledge.
It is insisted that these articles, not excluding the Jurisdiction of courts of law, not debarring a party from his right of action upon
the coupons, deprive him of a present right of
action upon the mortgage by a suit in equity
requiring
Language
to enforce that pledge.
such construction should be clear. If the parties—and it is to be assumed that they who
drafted this mortgage or deed of trust were
competent for that business— contemplated not
merely that no entry should be made, no sale
under the power until the lapse of six months
after default, but also that the coupon-holder,
having his right of action at law on the coupons, should not have a right of action in
equity, such purpose, it seems to me, would
naturally have been expressed in clear and unmistakable language, and not in that of doubtful interpretation.
In every other place that
have been able to find in this mortgage,
where a right rests upon the continuance
of
the default, and that appears in articles prior
and subsequent to this paragraph,
the lan"In case default shaU be
guage is express:
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These consideratection to the mortgagor.
tions, perhaps not very clearly expressed, are
the reasons which have led me to hold that
this case is within the rule laid down In 106
U. S. 47,
Sup. Ct. 10, supra, and that this
suit
not prematurely brought.
That only passes from one trouble to another.
The right to foreclose does not cari-y
with
the right to
receiver.
There are
many
considerations
that bear upon that
question.
Every ease, of course, stands on
its own merits.
It is difficult to formulate
any rule which, briefly stated, will control
in all cases. It should appear that there is
some danger to the property; that Its prothe interests of the
tection. Its preservation,
various holders, require possession by the
com't before
receiver should be appointed.
It does not go as matter of course; and yet
is not
matter that
court can refuse
If, looksimply because it is an annoyance.
ing at the situation of the litigating parties,
and of the property, with the prospects of
the future,
should appear to
court that
they would be benefited, that their interests
would be subserved by the appointment of a
matter
receiver, why, no court— although
resting, as it is said, in its discretion— could
refuse to make the appointment.
shall not go over all the matters that
want to suggest some
have been discussed.
things that have impressed me. Of course,
so far as the adequacy of this security, so
is
far as the solvency of the corporation,
concerned, so far as the question whether
temporary
embarrassment
or perthis is
manent, these facts stand out confessed, inat least.
It has ceased to pay
disputable
one, two, three,
interest on its mortgages;
The amount of
and four have defaulted.
milthat interest runs considerably over
lion; and the payment of interest on the
large mortgage comes due in two months.
The business of this year from the 1st of
June to the 1st of September, as shown by
decreasing;
from the 1st of
the statistics,
September to the 14th there was a slight
The road is not along the main
increase.
highway of travel eastward and westward.
It is one running north and south, along
which business to-day is, as we all in the
west know, comparatively in Its inception.
It crosses for two or three hundred miles
territory which is occupied by Indians, and
It hag been for
furnishes little business.
years the only road that traversed that territory.
Within the last year or two, two
more roads have crossed, and a third is
Competition between these
seeking to cross.
roads traversing that territory, and bringing
Texas and its commerce into relations with
Kansas, Missouri, and the north, as
matter
of necessity,
seems to me, must tend
against the increase of earnings.
The report of the committee — committee
appointed by the company— tends to shov^
that the payment of interest which has been
made prior to this year, has been largely at
^a
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made in payment of Interest, and shall conNow, if it was intendtinue for six months."
ed to limit the jurisdiction of a court of equity
until after the lapse of six months from the
time of the happening of the default, it seems
to me that the draughtsman would have placod the stipulation therefor in a separate article, and would have made its meaning so
plain that there would be no question.
We aU
know in the preparation of instruments how
common the expressions "said" or "as aforesaid" are used without any clear or definite
They are words which we use, not
intent.
thoughtlessly,
but carelessly;
and although
they are used here, yet as it is also found that
the continuance of the default is not mentioned, it seems to me it is giving to those
words an enlarged and unnecessary force to
hold that they broaden the expression "making default" into "making and continuing default," as expressed in the first part of the
article.
Nor is this a mere resting upon the
language of the paragraph.
It opens with the
distinct announcement that these special provisions in respect to entry and sale under a
power are cumulative to the ordinary remedies
by foreclosure;
contemplating, in its opening
words, a proceeding in a court of equity in
any case of default.
Nor is it strange that
there should be special limitations upon the
two matters provided in articles 2 and 3, and
none about proceedings In a court of equity.
An entry is a speedy remedy; It runs to the
corpus of the property;
it takes instant hold
away from the mortgagor.
of
and takes
The parties may well have contemplated that,
temporary default, there should
if there was
be no such speedy interference and summary
So
sale by adseizure by the mortgagee.
vertisement — in this case an advertisement of
and if,
eight weeks — is speedy and summary;
temporary default,
upon the happening of
single couponthe trustee at the instance of
holder should thus advertise and sell the property,
is obvious that great wrong might be
very natural
done; and six months' delay is
court of eqBut proceedings in
provision.
uity are not thus hasty. They are not within
the control of any coupon-holder or any trustee.
They stand advanced or delayed, as in the
judgment of the chancellor the best interests
appears in any
of the property require. If
coupon-holder, from improper mocase that
simple greed for his money,
tives, or from
and
is willing to wreck a large property,
court of equity upon the happencomes uito
default,
goes without
temporary
ing of
saying that the chancellor holds his hands unbecomes apparent that the property as
til
Inaswhole cannot be saved to its owners.
much as these proceedings stand upon the disis not strange
court of equity,
cretion of
that the parties were willing to leave to the
bondholders and coupon-holders an open door
They left an open door
court.
into such
court at law, and there is at least equal
into
not greater, that the freer motions
chance,
of a court of equity will afford as full pro-
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expense of the proper repairs and improvement of the road.
I do not mean to
say that all this is absolutely conclusive on
the question,
but these are matters which
have
forced themselves
upon
my
mind.
While it is true that— the road paying no interest since the 1st of June— the revenues
have diminished by four or five hundred
thousand, the amount which is due as claimed to the Missouri Pacific for advancements,
yet the earnings must increase largely before these back interests can be met, to say
nothing of future Interests speedily maturThat a road thus situated, some 1,600
ing.
miles in length, is burdened with a mortgage of $28,000 a mile, carries with it, to
my mind, very strong evidence that there is
no reasonable probability of its ever being
kept in proper condition when paying the
interest on such a debt. ITie only way in
which any mortgagee can get possession of
the rents and profits is through a receiver.
The law of Kansas forbids any other remin
edy upon a mortgage than a foreclosure
the court.
No possession could be had under
article 2. No sale could be made under the
power attempted to be given in article 3.
Unless
The sole remedy is by foreclosure.
a receiver is appointed, the rents and profits
pass into the possession of the mortgagor,
to be expended by it according to its best
judgment.
That is affirmed by the three
cases of Railroad Co. v. Cowdrey, 11 Wall.
463; Gilman v. Telegraph Co., 91 U. S. 603;
and Dow v. Railway Co., 124 U. S. 652,
Not merely that; suppose
8 Sup. Ct. 673.
the

should pass to
proceeding
foreclosure
appeal,
its
decree, and
the defendant
to
bond on appeal would be no protection
the mortgagee in respect to the rents and
profits.
That is settled in the case ot
Kountze v. Hotel Co., 107 U. S. 378, 2 Sup.
Ct. 911.
So that this litigation might profor a long time in this
ceed and continue
and in the supreme court, without ever giving the mortgagee a hold upon the profits,
This mortunless a receiver is appointed.
gage is a second mortgage on a large part
of the road. As such mortgagee it has, more
than any other party, an interest in reaching
after and securing those rents and profits.
The first mortgagee, having a limited amount
upon the part of the road upon which its
mortgage rests, may feel safe; for his principal and interest must be paid before the
So that the
second mortgagee can come in.
complainant has a special interest in reaching for, and as soon as possible obtaining
More
of, the surplus earnings.
jiossession
than that, it is perfectly obvious that the
real owners of this property are not in harmony.
The stock controls the road, but with
of bonded indebtedness— $28,000
.1:45,000,000
a mile — on the road, the real owners are the
bondholders,
and that they are not agreed In
respect to what shall be done with this propthink, confessed.
For years the
erty is,
property was in the management of a certhis
a

I
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tain interest.
That interest was removed
It was not
last spring from the control.
removed so long as the road was apparently
When
prosperous, and paying its coupons.
adversity threatened it, as was natural, those
who held interests to the road were not sat~
isfied with the management, and sought control.
If these gentlemen now in control
could make it a promptly paying road within a reasonable time, why, it might be expected, according to the laws of human nature, that they would remain in control; but
we all know how, when one fails and continues to fail, all who are interested are
prone to lay the responsibility upon him,
and to seek a change.
And there is no certainty that another year different interests
might not combine, and so the road be subject to different control.
At any rate, it is
very evident that there is no harmony— no
unity of purpose — between those who are the
Now, if it were a partnership,
real owners.
and it was apparent to a court that the partners had got into a quarrel, the very fact
of their quarrel would be a strong reason
why it should take possession of the property.
Of course that consideration
has not
so much force in respect to a corporation,
but it strengthens
other
considerations.
Those are the principal reasons that have
operated on my mind,— the default in interest, the fact that the rents and profits can
only be appropriated in this way, the decreasing revenues, the recent construction of
parallel roads, the fact that it passes through
such a portion of territory so unprofitable,
the condition of the road as developed by this
report of the committee, and the conflict between various parties having real and substantial interests.
Much as I should be glad
to be free from the annoyance of a receivership,— and I know something
about it,— it
seems to me I should be delinquent if I refused this application.
There are some minor
matters that I might refer to, yet, perhaps,
they would not strengthen
anything I have
said.

I

There is one matter, however,
must notice, — the suggestion of the Missouri Pacific
that it could defeat this application, and that
it was here in the attitude of a party to
consent upon the condition that the balance
due it was properly protected, and that no
order should be made in reference to the
by the receiver of the Internapossession
tional & Great Northern Railroad or its
If
stock.
understood
the situation to be
that this application depended on the con
sent of the lessee, the Missouri Pacific, and
its consent was tendered upon any such condition as that, there would be no receiver
appointed.
The rights of the lessee, as 1
look upon these two instruments, are subordinate to the rights of the mortgagee, and
it is the mortgagee whose application is sustained, and all parties having claims of any
kind must depend upon the inherent equity
of their claims. So far as the stock in the
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International & Great Northern is concerned,
as well as some other assets, they are, as
stated, now under pledge, and in the possession of this complainant; perhaps, also, attached by certain garnishment proceedings.
I thinli the interests of the mortgagor require
that there should go an order upon the complainant not to part with that possession,
except in obedience, of course, to the process
of the courts in New York, until the ultimate rights of the parties are determined.
As to the possession of the International . &
Great Northern, I doubt whether it is within the province of this court to determine
that question.
It is a separate road, whose
stock, I believe, in part has become the
property of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas
corporation;
but it is wholly situated in another circuit, and certainly at present
am
not prepared to say that this court would

I

have a right to determine whether a receiver
of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas should take
It may be
possession of that separate road.
that is a question which will have to be determined by the judge of that circuit. At
any rate, I should not at present, without
consultation
perhaps
further consideration,
with Judge Pardee, feel like making any order in respect to it. It is a matter in which
I shall be glad to hear counsel hereafter
try and arrange ^ath
upon, and perhaps
Judge Pardee jointly to hear them as soon as
practical. That, 1 think, is about all I have
to say in reference to this matter, except as
If parties agree upon a reto the receiver.
ceiver, of course I shall appoint whoever you

If not, I will hear any suggesagree upon.
tions from any of the parties in Interest, and
reasons for or against any person to be named by one side or the other.
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BELDING
(71 N.

et al. v.

W.

592,

MELOCHE
113

Mich.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

et al.

223.)

May

2S,

1897.

Appeal from circuit court, Ionia county, in
chancery; Frank D. M. Davis, Judge.
Suit by Alvah N. Balding and another
against Albert F. Meloche and others. From
a decree for complainants, defendants Meloche
appeal.
Affirmed.
R. A. Hawley, for appellants.
for appellees.

McGarry &

Nichols,

HOOKER, J. On May 2, 1892, the complainants sold to the Melodies (two of the defendants), upon contract, a business block in
the village of Belding, at an agreed price of
to be paid in 120 monthly install$36,000,
ments of $300, without Interest.
The contract
does not expressly state that the vendees shall
be entitled to possession, but does provide that,
in case of default, the vendors may "elect to
consider themselves released and discharged
of and from any and all liability in any of the
covenants specified to be done and performed
by tbem, and all improvements made by the
said parties of the second part shall be deemed forfeited as stipulated damages for the nonfulfillment of this contract; and said parties
of the first part, or their authorized agent,
may, without notice to quit or demand of possession, re-enter into and repossess the said
premises, and the said parties of the second
part, and each and every occupant hired by,
through, or under them, to remove and put
out; it being expressly understood that such
failure of said second parties shall forfeit all
claim, either in law or in equity, whicli might
otherwise exist on the provisions of this contract in favor of the said parties of the second
part." The vendees made default in the payments, and this bill of complaint was filed to
At
foreclose their rights under the contract.
this time portions of the building T^ere rented,
and the bill prayed the appointment of a receiver, to receive the rents and profits of said
premises, and such receiver was appointed,
and has received said rents. A decree of foreclosure and sale was made, and, after the
was
sale occurred, an order of confirmation
entered. No appeal was taken from any of the
Subsequently, the comproceedings thus far.
plainants filed their petition, alleging that on
March 9, 1896, a decree was entered for the
complainants for the sum of $6,172.44 and
costs, making a total of $6,648.30; that, at a
sale of the interest of the Meloches in said
the
the complainants purchased
premises,
same for $3,000, and that there was a deficiency of $3,648.30; that the final account
of the receiver, duly filed, shows a balance in
his hands at the date of the report of $2,349.36,
which, after the jdlowance of compensation to
by the receiver, wouI(}
and disbursements
leave $1,856.98, which the petition prays may
and that it be
be applied upon the deficiency,
declared that the remaining deficiency consti-
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tute a personal judgment, upon which execuA detion may issue against the Meloches.
cree was made in accordance with the prayer
of the petition, and the defendants Meloche appealed.
It is claimed— First, that the court had no
authority to appoint a receiver to take the
rents during the foreclosure, and that the moneys collected should not be turned over to the
second, that there should be no
complainants;
decree for a deficiency against the appellants,
because, upon tbe trial of the case, counsel for
complainant stated that they did not care to
ask a personal decree.
Counsel base their first contention upon a
class of cases which hold that, under How.
Ann. St. § 7847, the mortgagee is not entitled to
See
the profits of land during foreclosure.
Wagar v. Stone, 36 Mich. 366. In that case the
"The mortgagor is entitled to the
court said:
taken to
possession during the proceedings
foreclose the mortgage, and until a sale has
been made and the title of the purchaser has
become absolute ; and, until the title has become
absolute upon a foreclosure of the mortgage,
an action of ejectment cannot be maintained
by the mortgagee, his assigns or representatives, to recover possession of the mortgaged
Since the
2 Comp. Laws, § 6263.
premises.
passage of this act, which prevents the mortgagee from obtaining possession until he has
acquired an absolute title to the mortgaged
premises, the mortgage binds only the lands.
The rents and profits of the land do not enter
At the
into or form any part of the security.
time of giving the security, both parties unwill, and that
derstand that the mortgagor
the mortgagee will not, be entitled to the rents,
issues, or profits of the mortgaged premises
until the title shall have become absolute upUntil the
on a foreclosure of the mortgage.
happening of this event, the mortgagor has a
clear right to the possession and to the income
which he may derive therefrom; and the legislature, by the passage of this statute, contemplated that he should have such possession
and income to aid him in paying the debt. It
would be a novel doctrine to hold that the
mortgagee had a right to the profits incident to
ownership, and yet that he had neither a legal
title, nor right to possession.
The legislature,
in depriving him of the means of enforcing
possession, intended thereby also to cut off
and deprive him of all rights which he could
have acquired in case he obtained possession
To deprive
before acquiring an absolute title.
him of this particular remedy, and yet allow
him in some other proceedings to, in effect,
arrive at the same result, would be but a meaningless proceeding, and would not be securing
to the mortgagor those substantial rights
which it was the evident intent he should
have.
We do not overlook the fact that a
contrary doctrine has been held elsewhere under a similar statute. We cannot avoid thinking, however, that for us to so hold would be
but a mere evasion of our statute."
In Michigan Trust Co. V. Lansing Lumber Co., 103
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Mich. 393, 402, 61 N. W. 668, we recognized
the validity of a contract whereby possession
by the mortgagee may precede foreclosure;
and the case of Wagar v. Stone shows that in
other states possession may be given to receivers pending foreclosure of mortgages, and the
decision in that case is made to rest upon the
st.atute. The statute does not in terms apply
to equitable mortgages if we should hold this
to be one. In the Wagar Case the court said
that the object of the legislature was that the
mortgagor "should have possession to aid him
in paying the debt"; but in this case the vendee seeks to avoid the payment of the debt,
and to appropriate the fund In the hands of the

receiver, to the exclusion of the complainants'
just claim.
Again, it Is contended that the complainants
are not entitled to a personal decree for the
This claim seems to rest upon an
deficiency.
alleged waiver or estoppel, by what occurred
upon the hearing of the original case. It does
not appear to have been set up In the answer
to the petition, and Is said not to have been
claimed In the circuit court upon the hearing.
We do not discover that this statement Is disputed.
Under these circumstances, we thinlj
the order of the circuit court in chancery
should be aflirmed, with costs; and it is so ordered. The other justices concurred.
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MARSHALL
(77 N.

&

ILLSLET BANK
et al.

W.

831,

75

CADY

v.

Minn. 241.)
Jan. 9,

Supreme Court of Minnesota,

1899.

Appeal from district court, Ramsey county;
E. Otis, Judge.
Action by the Marshall & lUsley Bank
against Franls M. Cady and others.
Judgment for plaintiff.
Defendant Cady appeals.
Affirmed.

William

PER CURIAM. Assuming, without deciding, that an order appointing a receiver in foreclosure during the pendency of the action can
be reviewed on appeal from the final judgment
or decree, we are of opinion that, while the
plaintiff did not present a very strong case, yet
we could not hold that the court abused its
discretion in appointing a temporary receiver.
The affidavits presented would have justified
the court in finding that the mortgaged premises were inadequate security;
that the mortgagor was insolvent; that four years' taxes
were unpaid and delinquent, for three of which
the premises had been sold, and unredeemed;
that portions of the building on the premises
were somewhat out of repair, and that repairs
were necessary for the full preservation of the
property; and that the mortgagor was receiving rent for part of the premises, which he was
not applying to the payment of taxes or the
maliing of repairs.
There was some evidence
that the mortgagor was using a part of the
building as his sleeping apartments, and, hence,
that the premises were his homestead.
While
a court should ordinarily require a somewhat
stronger showing for the appointment of a receiver of the mortgagor's
homestead than in
the case of other property, yet, when a debtor
mortgages his homestead, he subjects the property to all the ordinary legal and equitable
rights of a mortgagee, among which is the
right to have a receiver appointed when necessary to prevent waste or to preserve the property.
The same facts which would justify the
court in appointing a receiver during the pendency of the action would justify it in providing
in the final judgment that the receivership
As there is neither a
should be continued.
the question
"case" nor bill of exceptions,
whether the evidence justified the findings is
The findings are presumed to
not presented.
have been based upon the evidence introduced
on the trial, and not upon the affidavits presented on the motion for the appointment of a
receiver during the pendency of the action.
The judgment is silent as to the duration of
No point is made on this by
the receivership.
the defendant; but we mention the fact In
order that it may not be inferred that we impliedly hold that a receivership could be consale, or that the
tinued after a foreclosure
rents and profits of the property could be applied towards paying the mortgage debt, or
used for any other purpose than to prevent

The judg-

waste and preserve the property.

So ordered.

ment should be affirmed.

Charles

Chas. J. Berryhill, for appellant.
G. White, for respondent.
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I

think that the eviBUCK, J.
dissent.
dence quite conclusively shows that the premises are Cady's homestead, and this is one of
the material facts that lead me to think that
the receiver should not. upon the evidence adduced, have been appointed.
When the trial
court appointed the receiver, it was done by
the court upon affidavits submitted by the respective parties.
The application therefor was
made in the month of July, 1897, but not
granted until October 29, 1897.
All of the
affidavits upon which the receiver was appointed appear in the record, and the sufficiency of
the plaintiff's affidavits are assailed and contradicted by the defendants' counter affidavit.
Not only was a receiver appointed by order of
the court, and therein directed to collect, all
and singular, the rents, profits, and income of
the premises, but by a subsequent order of the
court the defendant Cady was ordered, witliin
five days after the service upon him of the
order, to quit, surrender, and deliver up to the
receiver said premises, and vacate the same.
It is true that the judgment appealed from is
dated November 12, 1897, and the last order
directing the defendant Cady was not made
until November 20, 1897, and not appealed
from. But, as
regard this case, this is immaterial.
The gist of the controversy is over
the right to appoint a receiver at all. Probably, if there existed a sufficient cause to appoint a receiver in the first instance, and the
case appeared to be one where ordinarily the
right of a receiver to act at all was presented,
the appointment would carry with it the right
to the pcssession of the property.
It is the
right to invoke the aid of the court in the first
instance, upon the case being presented, which
in my opinion is one of more than serious
doubt.
Such a proceeding is an extraordinary
remedy, sometimes, and perhaps
might say
frequently, operating harshly, and the circumstances of peril which invoke the remedy
should be established with reasonable certainty.
Such appointment is not a matter of right,
and should not be used where its exercise will
produce injustice, and the fact should be clearly proved.
Beach, Rec. 65-68.
And this rule
is strictly applied in mortgage cases, where it
must clearly and fairly appear that the security is inadequate, or there is imminent danger
of waste, removal, or destruction of the property.
Id. 574.
Mere default in the payment
of the debt would not be sufficient ground for
the appointment of a receiver.
It is true that
power to make the appointment of a receiver
is generally
discretionary,
yet "the judicial
authority to deal with property by means of
a receiver is not unlimited or absolute."
Id.
2.
"It must be exercised in conformity to the
general
principles
of equity jurisprudence.
The petition should, therefore, state clearly the
facts upon which the application is made, and
also give proof of the same.
If this is not
done, the relief will be denied, and the burden

I

I

RECEIVERS.

856
of proof

is always upon the petitioner."

Id.

."IIT.

As I differ from my associates, it Is proper
tliat I should fully examine the evidence
which formed the basis for such appointThe only evidence presented was by
ment.
affidavits.
The plaintiff presented
three
which showed that the property was worth
and one that the house alone wa»
$3,500,
worth $1,500.
The defendants presented five
affidavits which showed that the value of
the property ranged from $5,800 to $4,400,
averaging $5,220, and the affidavit of another
person states the value of the house to be
The total average value of the
$2,500 alone.
property was $4,360. This is more than $500
over the entire judgment in foreclosure, including interest and costs up to the time of
the judgment. This was all the evidence
Introduced upon the question of the value of
the premises, and I thinli that the plaintiff's
evidence in this respect was clearly refuted
The only eviby that of the defendants.
dence of waste or act of omission of duty In
this respect on the part of Cady was that of
one witness for plaintiff, who gave details
tending to show that the dwelling house
needed repairs to the amount of $400; but
no other one of plaintiff's witnesses testified
is
to any such fact, and this testimony
squarely refuted by five of defendants' witI am not willing to talie his testinesses.
mony alone as outweighing that of all of the
It certainly does not, in my mind,
others.
justify the appointment of a receiver, where
the rule is, in such case, that the injury op
Impairment of the security must be immiUnion JIut. Life Ins. Co. v. Union
nent.
Mills Plaster Co., 37 Fed. 286.
I now come to the consideration of the
question that the premises were the homestead of the defendant, and which he was
as such, and whether a stricter
occupying
rule should not be applied in the appointment of a receiver to talie possession of such
and apply the income, rents, and
property,
profits thereof towards the payment of the
mortgage debt This question is one of great
and, if a receiver can thus be
importance,
appointed, it will greatly disturb, if not substantially destroy, the homesteads of thousands of people, especially in our cities and
villages, where the use of homesteads, and
rental therefrom, often constitute part of the
Income, and frequently the only income, for
As I have
the support of the family itself.
of a receiver is a
stated, the appointment
drastic measure, and to permit it to be used
to oust a man and his family from their
home, and sequester

the income,

rental,

and

profits thereof, is to deprive them of all the
benefits of a homestead in a most summary
It certainly is a most extraordimanner.
which authorizes such a
nary proceeding
Waples, in his worli on Homestead
step.
(page 720), says: "It is questionable whether
it is ever proper to take possession of a mortgagor's homestead while proceedings to fore-

Certainly It Is not propclose are pending.
An applicaer practice as a general rule.
tion for such appointment should always be
refused when the amount of the mortgage
debt is a subject of contention in the case."
Of course, I do not overlooli the doctrine laid
down in this court in the case of Lowell v.

Doe, 44 Minn. 144, 46 N. W. 297, where It
was held that the homestead rights of the
mortgagors are subject to the ordinary legal
and equitable rights of the mortgagees in respect to the mortgaged premises, which may
remedies; citbe enforced by the appropriate
ing Gen. St. 1878, c. 68, § 2 (Gen. St. 1894,
that the homestead
S 5522), which provides
exemption shall not extend to any mortgage
But the homethereon lawfully obtained.
stead law loolis with favor upon homesteads,
for the good of society and for the protection
of family life in all classes, and seeks to save
and
them from the rapacity of creditors,
from destruction, so far as it can without inThe reasons for this are
justice to others.
think that
To this end,
many and cogent
all steps to deprive the owner of a homestead
of the right of himself and family to occupy
and receive the benefits of it during foreclosure of a mortgage upon it should not be
permitted, or should be resorted to only in
extreme cases, and where justice would be
defeated by withholding it, and only in cases
reasonably clear and free from doubt. This
It is a notorious fact
is not such a case.
that in many instances the receiver, in the
performance of what he claims to be his
duty, incurs large expenses, greatly lessening the assets which should go to the payment of the debt itself, and this operates to
the detriment of both parties to the action.
In other words, the benefit to the owner of
the homestead and his family, as a home and
support, might be appropriated to the support of the receiver, by way of fees and expenses, with loss to both parties to the action.
Our statute provides that "a mortgage
of real estate is not to be deemed a conveyance so as to enable the owner of the mortgage to recover possession of the real estate
Gen. St. 1894, §
without a foreclosure."
This is an express statutory enact5861.
ment, so far as possession is concerned, and
the owner of the mortgage is prohibited from
taking possession of the property without
Of course, this means that no
foreclosure.
right of possession arises until the period of
redemption expires, viz. one year after foreIf possession of land is wrongfully
closure.
and after final
withheld after foreclosure,
decree, the court may then compel delivery
of possession to the party entitled thereto,
by order directing the sheriff to effect such
Thus, by clear and
delivery.
Id. § 6073.
express statutory provisions, means are provided for obtaining possession of lands upon
which mortgages are foreclosed.
But until
such time the mortgagee has no title, and no
right of possession.
It is trne that, notwithstanding the law expressly exempts a home-

I
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§ 5522, provides that
shall not extend to any
mortgage
thereon
lawfully obtained"; but
this provision does not operate to deprive the
owner of the right to the possession of the
homestead during the period of redemption
from foreclosure sale.
Now, the appointment of a receiver is one purely of an equitable origin; and whether it can, in the case of
a homestead, supersede the express statutory
which forbids possession by the
enactment
owner of the mortgage during foreclosure,
may well admit of serious doubt.
Equity is
not Intended to operate harshly, but a doctrine which permits a receiver, upon the commencement of a foreclosure action, to take
immediate possession of the homestead, oust
the family, and receive the rents and income

stead,

Gen.

St.

"such exemption

18&4,
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of the property, seems unjust and a harsh
measure.
Such a right is denied in Investment Oo. V. Farrar (Iowa) 54 N. W. 361,
upon the ground that it is a violation of the
statutory rights of the mortgagor, even in a
See,
case not involving homestead rights.
also, cases cited in 2 Jones, Mortg. § 1522.
But even if the power exists to appoint a receiver to oust the owner of a homestead and
his family, and take possession of the property, and deprive them of the use and benefits thereof, and thus cut short the statutory
right of redemption, I think the facts in thia
case fall far short of making this an extraordinary case which justifies such an extraordinary remedy, and that the receiver ought
not to have been appointed.
I think that the
judgment should be reversed.
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WIEDEMANN
(31

V.

Atl.

SANN

et al.

211.)

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Feb. 26,

189.5

Bill by Frank W. Wiedemann aginst Annie Sann and others to foreclose a mortgage,
and for an injunction, and for appointment
Receiver appointed.
of a receiver.
Atkinson,
for complainant H.
Gilbert &
Budd, for defendants.
The bill In this case is filed
C.
foreclose a mortgage of chattels given
by Annie Sann, asking for an injunction
against an attaching creditor, whose attachment issued against Charles Sann, and also
The chattel mortasking for a receiver.
gage bears date January 11, 1895, and was
It was
duly recorded on the same day.
given to secure the payment of $550, money
loaned to the mortgagor. The whole of the
said loan, together with interest, is claimed
to be due to the complainant. The biU states
that on the 9th day of January, being two
days before the execution and delivery of
aforesaid, one Sarah
the chattel mortgage
M. Hall procured to be issued a writ of attachment out of the circuit court of the
county of Burlington against one Charles
Sann on the demand for $650, under which
writ of attachment an auditor has been appointed, and that the said auditor has been
ordered by the said circuit court to sell all
of the said goods and chattels as perishable
property, and that the said auditor has advertised all of the said goods and chattels
for sale, in his advertisement or notice of
sale giving assurance to bidders that he will
sell the said goods and chattels free from
The complainall liens or incumbrances.
ant, having obtained an injunction restraining the auditor from selling, now asks for
with authe appointment of a receiver
thority to sell the said personal property.
This is resisted by the plaintiff in the atIt wiU be perceived that the
tachment.
complainant claims that these goods and
chattels were the goods and chattels of Annie Sann, and that the plaintiff in the attachment claims them as the goods and
Charles Sann is
chattels of Charles Sann.
the husband of Annie Sann. The complainant rests his case upon the rule laid down
by Chancellor Green in Smithurst v. EdThe case m hand
munds, 14 Nj. J. Eq. 408.
In that case the property
is not like that.
which execution creditors offered for sale
was not claimed by such creditors as the
property of another person than the mortAs to that there
gagor of the same goods.
Hence the question now
was no dispute.
before me is, can this court appoint a receiver in a foreclosure case to take charge
of and sell personal property for the purpose of preserving it, covered by the mortwhen that
gage sought to be foreclosed,

BIRD, V.

to

same property has been attached by the
creditor of another person, as the property
of that other person, and has been advertised to be offered for sale by an auditor appointed in said attachment proceedings? In
Moore v. Diament, 41 N. J. Eq. 612, 7 Atl.
a
509, in the court of errors and appeals,
question somewhat like the present was beIn that case Hammell confore the court.
fessed judgment to his creditors, who levied
Moore
upon certain goods and chattels.
filed a bill in this court, alleging that he had
been in partnership with Hammell, and that
'Hammell became indebted to him as partner, and that, to satisfy such indebtedness,
Hammell had made to him a bill of sale of
all his Interest in these goods and chattels,
and asked for and obtained an injunction
restraining the execution creditors of Hammell from proceeding to a sale. A receiver
was appointed in that case, and, upon
Moore's offering to give a bond to take care
of the property, and to return it or to pay
the value thereof, except in case of unavoidable accident,
was accepted.
such bond
From this brief statement it will appear
that execution creditors claimed a lien upon
the property as the property of one man, —
HammeU, their debtor,— while Moore claimed it as his own individual property aosolutely, by virtue of a bill of sale made to
him by Hammell, and that a receiver was
appointed.
The question involved In that
case was one of title to personal property;
Moore, the complainant, claiming the title
was in himself, while the creditors of Hammell claimed that the title was in Hammell,
and that they, as his creditors, by virtue of
their judgments and executions, had a right
to sell the same.
It is claimed in this case
that the question involved is purely a question of title to personal property, strictly
legal in its nature, and can be determined
by an action of replevin, and that consequently a court of equity has no jurisdiction.
The case cited seems to present the
same characteristics.
Moore filed his bill,
and claimed the property levied upon by
virtue of a bill of sale, praying an injunction against such sale under the executions
at law. Clearly, in such case, the principal
question to be decided was whether the title
was in Moore or Hammell.
In the case
now under consideration the question to be
determined is whether the title to the property named in the chattel mortgage was in
Annie Sann or in her husband, Charles Sann.
If that were all, it might well be said that
in neither case would this court be justified
in assuming jurisdiction.
But in the case
cited, if the property which Moore claimed
were to be sold by the execution creditors,
with the conflicting claims of title thereto, he
might, in a variety of ways, suffer great
loss; which view is, in every sense, applicable to the case before me. In that case It
was distinctly held in the court of errors and
appeals that this court had the right to pro-

RECEIVERS.
ceed to settle the rights of the parties by
of the bond given, notwithstanding
a decree dismissing the bill of complaint
In this case the complainant claims a lien
upon the goods and chattels by virtue of
her mortgage.
She undoubtedly has a right
to file her bill to foreclose such mortgage,
which beyond question gives the court juris-

virtue

diction.

But still the further question arises, can
this court, because it is the only tribunal
authorized to foreclose a mortgage upon
goods and chattels, appoint a receiver to
take charge of and sell such goods and chattels, when they are claimed by and under
attachment by the creditors of another person than the mortgagor, and ofCered for sale
by an auditor appointed in such attachment proceedings? There is a well-settled
rule that courts of equity have the right and
power to take possession of property about
which are conflicting claims, for the purpose
of preserving it until the rights of the respective parties thiereto have been settled.
May this rule be applied to the present case?
It is evident, if the auditor makes sale of
the goods and chattels because they are perishable, they will be likely to sell for a nominal price only, and wiU also be likely to go
into the possession of many different persons.
The fact that the complainant makes
claim in the manner in which he does will
cast such a shadow upon the title as to deter prudent men from bidding. The fact
that they will in all probability go into the
hands of many different persons
would
make it obligatory upon the complainant, if
it should turn out that the title thereto be
in him, to bring as many actions at law as
there are purchasers. High, Rec. § 192. "A
court of equity, appointing a receiver to
take possession of property pending a litigation concerning the rights of the parties
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Is vested with the power to sell
thereto.
the property in the receiver's hands, whenever such course becomes necessary to preId.;
serve the Interest of all the parties."
Crane v. Ford, Hopk. Ch. 114.
When a

court of equity properly acquires jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-matter
in a cause, and appoints a receiver therein,
and orders him to sell the property in controversy, such order, although irregular and
improvident, cannot be assailed or questioned in a collateral action, and such action
will not lie to set aside the order of sale
and proceedings thereunder. High, Rec. §
196; Libby v. Rosekrans, 55
Barb. 219;
Brande v. Bond, 63 Wis. 140, 23 N. W. 101.
It being evident that the auditor cannot
make sale of these goods except under great
disadvantage,
and that, if it should ultimately appear that the title is in the chattel
mortgagor,
and it also appearing that since
the mortgagee was justified in filing his bill
in this court, thereby acquiring jurisdiction
of the subject-matter, and the court unquestionably having the authority to appoint
a receiver, and it being the constant practice, when a receiver is appointed,
to take
possession of the perishable goods and chattels which are the subject of litigation, to
make sale thereof for the purpose of preserving the value of them for the parties
who may ultimately appear to be entitled
thereto, I conclude that it is my duty to
advise the appointment of a receiver in this
case, with authority to make sale of the
The degoods and chattels in question.
fendant, the attaching creditor, offered to
A
give bonds for the value of the goods.
bond was ofCered and accepted in the case
of Moore v. Diament, supra, but in that case
the person who gave the bond did not propose to sell them, as in this case the auditor
I will advise accordingly.
proposes to do.
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(70 N. W. 595, 101 Iowa, 435.)
April 7, 1897.
Supreme Court of Iowa.

Appeal from district court, Woodbury county; George W. Wakefield, Judge.
This appeal is by the plaintiff from an order and decree entered upon a motion to discharge the garnishees.
The issues and facts
appear in the opinion. Affirmed.

Joy,
ShuU & Parnsworth, for appellant.
Call & Joy and William Milchrlst, for appellees.

GIVEN, J. 1. Appellees moved to strike
the appellant's abstract, which motion was
overruled, and therefore we are to take the
facts to be as shown in the abstract, the material parts of which are as follows:
On
April 11, 1895, this plaintiff commenced three
separate actions to foreclose three mortgages
executed by the defendant company to him
to secure certain debts.
These mortgages
covered all of lots 4, 5, and 6, block 26, Middle Sioux City. Attachments were sued out
in each ease, and A. C. Baker and 16 others
were served as garnishees.
The answers of
these garnishees showed that they are tenants of the defendant company, occupying
premises other than that covered by plaintiff's mortgages, and that some of them occupied under verbal leases, and some under
written leases, extending to different periods
of the future. Their answers also showed
that some of them were indebted for rents
due, and that all would become indebted in
the future under said leases.
Plaintiffs
three actions were consolidated,
and formed
the present action.
On the 9th day of Jlay,
1895, T. A. Black, though not a party to this
action, filed his motion herein, supported by
his affidavit, for the discharge of all of said
garnishees
except W. Chaffee, and showing
as grounds therefor, in substance,
as follows: That on the 11th day of April, 1895,
in the case of Charles C. Harrison v. The
Northern Investment Co. et al., then pending
in said court for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon the real estate occupied by said
he was appointed and qualified
garnishees,
as receiver of all the property of said company involved in said action; also, that he
was appointed and qualified prior to the time
said garnishees were served with notice of
garnishment. Charles C. Harrison, though
not a party to this action, did on the 18th
day of May, 1895, file his motion joining with
said Black in asking the discharge of said
By the record in the Case of
garnishees.
Harrison, as It appears in the abstract, it
was alleged In the petition that the Northern
Investment Company was insolvent; that
the property covered was insufficient to pay
It was
and taxes thereon.
the mortgages
asked, for these and other reasons stated,
that a receiver be appointed; and Mr. Baker
was appointed and qualified as receiver for
all the property of the company described In

the mortgage to Mr. Harrison, and ordered
to collect all rentals, income, and profits
therefrom. It does not appear that any objections were made to the right of these persons to make such motions In this action.
The motions having been submitted, the
court says in the order complained of that

"the court is of opinion, and doth adjudge,

order, and decree, that as to all rentals payable or accruing on or before the 11th day
of April, 1895, the said motion be, and is
hereby, overruled, and as to all rentals accruing and payable after the 11th day of
April, 1895, the said motion of T. A. Black,
receiver, and C. C. Harrison is sustained."
Following this. It was ordered that the
amounts found to be due from the several
garnishees up to April 11, 1895, be paid to
the clerk of the court, and that upon payment the garnishees be discharged. It was
"And upon the
further ordered as follows:
motion of T. A. Black, receiver as aforesaid,
time is given him until the 20th day of August, 1895, to file his petition of intervention,
claiming the funds so ordered to be paid to
the clerk aforesaid."
2. Appellant presents
In argument three
contentions,
namely, that the court had no
authority to appoint a receiver under the

allegations of Harrison's petition; that Harrison and Black could not give the court
jurisdiction to discharge garnishees by simply filing motions in this cause; they not
being parties thereto and not filing petitions
of intervention; that the garnishment of the
tenants made them liable to appellant, in
case he Is successful in this case against the
company, for all rent accrued and to accrue.
That part of Harrison's petition asking a
receiver states numerous grounds, and at
such length as that we should not take space
to set them out.
It is sufficient to say that
the petition shows that the rents of the
mortgaged premises are pledged for ihe payment of the debt, that they are not being applied, that the company is a foreign corporation; that it is insolvent, that the property
is Insufficient to paj the mortgages and overdue taxes, and other facts showing that the
rents were in danger of being lost to the
mortgagees.
Conceding that the sufficiency
of that petition in this respect may be questioned in this case, we think it was sufficient
to warrant the appointment of a receiver.
3. Appellant does not question the right
of Mr. Black, as receiver, if duly appointed,
to intervene in this action to claim said
rents, but denies his right to do so by motion.
The record fails to disclose, except inferentially, that any such objection was
made in the lower court. The abstract was
prepared by other than the counsel now appearing, and with the view, no doubt, of not
incumbering the abstract with more than
was actually necessary to an understanding
of the questions to be presented.
Questionable as the record is as to this contention,
we will consider it. It will be observed that
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the order of the court Is not final, as between these parties, as to the rents due up
to April 11, 1895.
The court, having full
jurisdiction over that fund, ordered It to be
paid into court, to be held until the rights
of these parties thereto are determined.
There has been no final order or judgment
against appellant as to that fund, and he has
nothing of which to complain. The question
as to which of these parties is entitled to
that money is not before us, and we express
no opinion thereon.
appeared
than the
4. If nothing further
pendency of this action and the service and
answers of the garnishees, it might be said
that they are liable to appellant, in case he
is successful in this action against the company, for rents accrued and to accrue under
their leases. The mortgage from the Northern Investment Company to Charles C. Harrison contains the following:
"And it is further agreed that if default shall be made in
any of the conditions of this mortgage, or in

861

the bond which It is made and given to secure, that the right of possession of the mortgaged premises, with all the appurtenances
thereunto belonging, shall Immediately vest
In the party of the second part, his heirs or
assigns, and he may immediately take possession of the same, and collect all rents,
profits, and incomes therefrom, or, at his
option, may proceed by foreclosure, and shall
then be entitled to have a receiver appointed
Immediately, and in vacation, for all of the
property herein described and embraced, to
take charge of the said property, and collect
rents, incomes, and profits of the same, to
be applied upon the said mortgage
debt."
It seems to us entirely clear that under this
provision the rents accruing from said mortgaged property after the appointment of the
receiver are assets In his hands, and not
subject to garnishment by other creditors.
We do not think the court erred in either of
the respects claimed, and the order and
judgment are therefore affirmed.
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FIRST NAT. BANK OF JOLIET
ILLINOIS STEEL CO.
(51

N. E.

200,

v.

174 111. 140.)

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June

18, 1898.

Appeal from appellate court, Second district.
Creditors' bill by the First National Bank
of Joliet against the Ashley Wire Company
and others for the appointment of a receiver,
with which was consolidated a petition by
the Illinois Steel Company, also for the appointment of a receiver. From a decree of
the appellate court (72 111. App. 640) affirming a decree In favor of the Illinois Steel
Company, the First National Bank of Joliet
appeals.

Affirmed.

This was a bill In the nature of a creditbill, filed December 26, 1893, by the
First National Bank of Joliet, the appellant,
against the Ashley Wire Company, a corporation in Joliet, Will county, lU., which
for many years had been engaged in the
manufacture of barbed fence wire, wire
nails, etc. The bill alleged the recovery of
a judgment by said First National Bank of
Joliet on the 14th day of December, 1893,
against said Ashley Wire
for $12,657.77,
Company;
that execution was issued and
delivered to the sheriff the same day, which
execution was returned, after demand made,
"No property found." Alleged the recovery
of a Judgment on the 8th day of December,
1893, by John Y. Brooks against said Ashley Wire Company for $11,090, upon which
ors'

execution

had

been issued

and

levied

upon

all the tangible personal property of said
Ashley Wire Company, and that the value
of such property so levied upon would ilot
exceed ?5,000; that the sheriff had not sold
said property so levied upon, and It was not
sufficient to satisfy the said Brooks execution. Alleged the execution by said Ashley
Wire Company on the 19th day of July, 1893,
to the Illinois Steel Company, of a note for
payable on or before two years
$67,246.24,
after date, with interest at 5% per cent, per
annum, payable semiannually, and secured
by a mortgage on its manufacturing plant;
that said Ashley Wire Company is insolvent,
and for many months has suspended Its business, and its plant has remained Idle; that
It has not been able for the last year to
meet its trade obligations,
and has been
seriously embarrassed in its financial affairs;
that said wire corporation is and remains in
the possession of its real estate and manufacturing plant, and, while it is not worth
said mortgage indebtedness, is a valuable
property, and ought not to be allowed to deteriorate in value or be greatly hazarded by
that watchmen
neglect or want of care;
should be
should be in charge, insurance
kept up, and taxes paid; that all this should
be done in the interest of said corporation.
Its stockholders and creditors generally; that
said corporation is without means to protect

and preserve said property, and keep up Its
Insurance or taxes; that the tangible property levied upon is of a kind and character
so peculiar in its nature that it could not be
sold at ordinary execution sale, except at a
grievous sacrifice. Avers that the interests
of defendant and all its creditors demand
that a receiver should be appointed of Its assets, both equitable and tangible; that said
receiver should be directed to take possession of said manufacturing plant, its books
of account, and its equitable assets and
property. The Ashl«y Wire Company, John
Y. Brooks, and Thomas Hennebry, as sheriff,
Although the
were made parties defendant.
bill showed that the Illinois Steel Company,
of Chicago, held a first mortgage on the Ashley Wire Company plant, machinery, etc.,
and was the principal creditor, yet it was
not made a defendant to the bill. The appearance of the defendants was entered, and
on the 26th day of December, 1893, the defendants not objecting, the court appointed
George W. Bush receiver.
The order invests
him with all the authority and power usually
granted receivers of courts of chancery, and
directs that he at once take possession of the
real estate and manufacturing plant of said
Ashley Wire Company, together with all the
machinery, tools, implements, and appliances
connected therewith, and constituting real
estate, as part and parcel of said plant; that
he care for all such property, that it may
not be wasted or deteriorate
for want of
proper care; that he keep the buildings insured in responsible insurance companies in
amount;
a reasonable
and that he pay all
taxes legally levied upon such real estate.
It was further ordered that the said sheriff
turn over to the receiver all the personal
property levied upon by him under the execution in favor of John Y. Brooks, such
sheriff to retain the execution, and the lien
of such execution is preserved upon all such
property levied upon, and the proceeds thereof levied upon by said sheriff, and turned
over to said receiver.
The receiver presented a petition on February 19, 1894, as to the
payment of taxes, which states that there
was duly assessed against and levied upon
the personal property of the Ashley Wire
Company for the year 1893 $799.10 taxes,
and that he has no mongy with which to pay
said taxes, or the real estate taxes then due,
and prays that an ordej be entered authorizing him to pay such taxes, and that he may
be permitted to borrow money therefor. On
the 26th of February, 1894, an order was entered authorizing the receiver to pay the
taxes assessed upon the real estate, and authorizing the receiver to borrow money for
that purpose at such legal rate of interest
as he may be able, and to issue therefor his
receiver's certificate,
which was by the order of the court declared to be a first and
prior lien upon the real estate of sajd Ashley Wire Company.
The court denied the
prayer of the petition as to the payment of
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tax.

On

March

5,

the Illinois Steel Company asked leave
of the court to make George W. Bush, receiver, a party defendant to a chancery proceeding, which the court granted; and on
the 7th day of March, 1894, the steel company filed a hill to foreclose its mortgage
against the Ashley Wire Company plant,
1894,

making said Ashley Wire Company, the
First National Bank of Joliet, John Y.
Brooks, and George W. Bush, the receiver,
defendants.
On the 12th day of July, 1894,
after the commencement of the foreclosure
proceedings,
the receiver horrowed of the
Illinois Steel Company $2,037.82, in pursuance of the court's order, for the purpose
of paying taxes, and Issued a receiver's certificate therefor. The mortgage upon vs^hich
the foreclosure proceedings
were based,
against the Ashley Wire Company, was to
payable on
secure the note for $67,246.24,
or before two years after date, with Interest
at 5% per cent, per annum; and the mortgagor expressly covenanted to keep the buildings insured for $50,000, for the benefit of
the Illinois Steel Company, mortgagee.
It
also contained a clause authorizing the appointment of a receiver, with power to collect the rents, issues, and profits during the
period of redemption,
in case of a foreclosure of the mortgage, and that such rents
and profits should be applied towards the
payment of the indebtedness.
Answers
were filed by the Ashley Wire Company and
the First National Bank, defendants.
A
final decree of foreclosure was awarded the
Illinois Steel Company January 14, 1895, and
the property was sold to the said steel company for $70,000. The master reported an
unpaid balance, and a deficiency decree or
judgment under the statute was entered for
the deficit of $5,316.50,
with interest from
March, 1895, and execution was awarded
thereon.
On the 10th of April, 1895, the Illinois Steel Company filed Its petition in the
foreclosure case, setting up the decree of
foreclosure and the sale, the deficiency decree for $5,316.50,
and the foregoing provision in regard to the appointment of a receiver by the court to collect rents until the
time of redemption, and asking for the appointment of a receiver.
A hearing was had
June 20, 1895, and the court refused to appoint a new receiver, but extended the receivership of George M. Bush existing over
the property of the Ashley Wire Company
by virtue of an order in the case of the First
National Bank of Joliet, so that said receiver should stand as a receiver appointed
in the case of the Illinois Steel Company
against the Ashley Wire Company, and that
the receivership be extended to include the
property and effects of the Ashley Wire
Company; and the receiver was directed to
.receive the rents, and hold the same for all
persons who should be found entitled thereto. The receiver had previously, under the
order of the court, leased the Ashley wire

863

plant for one year from December 1, 1894,
for $6,000, with the privilege of another year,
at the option of the lessee, on the same
terms.
The receiver collected in all for rents
and after paying the taxes and ex$12,000,
penses there was left In his hands $4,373.48.
On March 3, 1897, the petition of the Illinois
Steel Company was, by agreement
of parties, consolidated with the cause of the First
National Bank of Joliet against the Ashley
Wire Co. et al., and was to be heard and disposed of as one case by decree to be entered in
the case of the First National Bank of Joliet
against Ashley Wire Co. et al. The principal
contention is over the distribution of the
balance of $4,373.48; the trial court decreeing this amount to be paid the Illinois Steel
Company out of the moneys in the receiver's
hands derived from rents, to be indorsed on
the deficiency
decree. From this decree of
the circuit appellant appealed
to the appellate court for the Second district, which
affirmed the decree of the circuit court; and
from the judgment of the appellate court
appellant has appealed to this court, and
asks for the reversal of the judgment of the
(appellate

court.

George S. House, for appellant.
Garnsey &
Knox (Elbert H. Gary, of counsel), for appellee.

CEAIG, J. (after stating the facts). It Is
first contended by appellant that the Illinois
Steel Company, the mortgagee, having obtained its decree of foreclosure and sale, and applied the proceeds, the mortgage has accomplished Its purpose, and Is functus ofilcio; that
no further rights or equities can be enforced
by the Illinois Steel Company.
The claim of
appellee is that the provision in the mortgage
authorized the appointment
of a receiver by
the court to collect the rents and profits during
the period of redemption, and, as the sale under the foreclosure decree did not pay the debt,
to apply them in payment
of the deficiency.
The agreement in the mortgage is as follows:
"Upon the filing of any bill to foreclose this
mortgage, in any court having jurisdiction
thereof, such court may appoint A. F. Knox,
or any proper person, receiver, with power
to collect the rents, issues, and profits arising
out of said premises during the pendency of
such foreclosure
suit, and until the time to
redeem the same from any sale that may be
made under any decree foreclosing this mort.
gage shall expire; and such rents, issues, and
profits, when collected, may be applied towards the payment of the indebtedness and
costs herein mentioned and described."
Under this clause In the mortgage a lien is given,
by express words, upon the rents and profits,
and such an equitable lien a court of equity
will enforce. Rents and profits are the subject of mortgage. Jones, in his work on Mortgages (volume 1, § 140), says; "A mortgage
may be made of rents under a lease, and, although a right of entry be given the mortgagee, the mortgage Is a mere security, like

864
any other mortgage

RECEIVERS.

of real estate, and the
mortgagor remains the real owner until foreIn section 771 he says: "A
closure and sale."
mortgagee has no specific lien upon the rents
and profits of the mortgaged land, unless he
has, in his mortgage, stipulated for a specific
pledge of them as part of his security."
This
was expressly stipulated in this mortgage given by the Ashley Wire Company to appellee.
Had there been no deficiency after the foreclosure sale of the Ashley Wire Company property and plant, the rents would have belonged
to the owner of the equity of redemption.
Under the express agreement in the mortgage,
there being a deficiency of $5,316.50 after the
sale, the Illinois Steel Company had an equitable right to have the rents and profits applied towards the payment of the deficiency
decree, from the time of the foreclosure sala
until the expiration of the time of redemption,
and this right might properly be enforced on
an application to the court to appoint a receiver.
The contention by appellant in this
case that the enforcement of this provision
rests entirely in the sound discretion of the
chancellor is not tenable.
The chancellor was
authorized
to act under this clause in the
mortgage, and appoint a receiver for the collection of the rents and profits during the period of redemption, to be applied on the deficiency decree.
In the case of Oaliford v.
Robinson, 48 111. App. 270, which is similar to
the one at bar, the mortgage contained a
clause authorizing the appointment
of a receiver, with power to talie possession of the
premises and collect the rents due and to become due thereon during the period allowed
for redemption, and to apply the same in payment of any deficit, should the premises prove
InsuflBcient to pay the amount secured by the
In the decision of the case the
mortgage.
court said: "The rents and profits of the land,
as well as the land, were pledged by the mortgage for the security and payment of the
This authorized the
amount due the appellee.
appointment of a receiver, in the discretion of
the court, without regard to the solvency of
2 Jones, Mortg. § 1516; 8
the mortgagor.
Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 234. And such appointment was lawfully made, though by a
Id.,
decree subsequent to the original decree.
By the appointment of the receiver
p. 239.
the appellants obtained an equitable lien on
the rents and profits of the land during the
statutory period allowed for redemption, it
necessary for the full payment of any defiIn support of this
ciency in the security.
view, see 1 Jones, Mortg. §§ 773-775; 2 Jones,
Mortg. § 1536; High, Rec. §^ 643, 644; Beach,
That a court of equity has powRec. § 532."
er to appoint a receiver and grant equitable
relief where there are no express words In
the mortgage giving a lien upon rents and
profits derived from the property is conceded.
In such a case, whether relief will be granted
is dependent upon the facts and circumstances
is made.
This
at the time the application
court said in Haas v. Society, 89 111. 498, at

502:
"We find the decided weight of
American authority to be in favor of the proposition that the court may, even when the
mortgage does not by express words give a
lien upon the income derived from such property, appoint a receiver to take charge of it
and collect the rents, issues, and profits arising

page

therefrom.
Such action will not be taken,
however, unless it be made to appear the mortgaged premises are an insuflicient security
for the debt, and the person liable personally
for the debt Is insolvent, or at least of very
A combination of
questionable responsibility.
these two things seems to be required in all
the cases we have examined, and in one or
more of the states it Is held necessary still
other elements should be conjoined to these
is justified." Tested
■before such procedure
even by this requirement, if the mortgage did
not give a lien by express words, or authorize
the appointment of a receiver, the facts in the
case at bar show that the court committed no
error.
The deficiency decree itself evidences
the fact that the Ashley Wire Company's property was insufficient security for the mortgage
debt, and the facts established the allegation
In the petition that the Ashley Wire Company,
Undoubtedly,
the mortgagor, was insolvent.
a court of equity exercises a certain discretion,
even where express words are used for the
purpose of giving a lien on the income of the
The court must determortgaged property.
mine whether the language used in the mortgage is Buflicient to give a lien on the income.
In the one case the authority arises from the
contract, the express words giving a lien on
the rents and profits; in the other, the court
exercises its equitable powers under the facts
and circumstances presented at the time the
appUcation to appoint a receiver is made.
Appellant also contends that the final decree foreclosing the mortgage ought to have
provided for a receiver to take possession of
the rents and profits of the Ashley Wire Company pending the redemption;
that a decree
of foreclosure and sale, as to all questions
that might have been adjudicated between the
parties. Is final.
It could not be ascertained
until after the sale whether there would be
a deficit requiring the appointment
of a receiver to collect the rents and profits during
the time of redemption.
Under the decree of
foreclosure
the property described in the
mortgage was sold. The rents and profits to
accrue during the period of redemption were
not sold, and no order could be entered until
It was ascertained at the foreclosure sale that
the mortgaged premises were insufficient to
pay the indebtedness evidenced by the mort;gage. In Haas v. Society, supra, it was said
(page 506) : "The necessity for the appropriation of the rents to the payment of the mortgage debt may frequently not api)ear until
after both decree and sale. The a;mount due
is often matter of dispute, and can only be
determined by the decree, and what the property will sell for can only be ascertained with
certainty from the result of the judicial sale.
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an appropriation of the rents on the indebtedness
is justified by the surrounding
facts before sale, we see no good reason why
the same and more weighty facts existing
after sale may not warrant a similar procedure.
The security, plainly, is not exhausted
by the sale, for there is a fund included in it
which is secondarily liable. It is true, the
mortgagee has elected to foreclose and sell;
but then he has pursued that remedy to the
end, and without getting satisfaction of his
debt, and he may avail himself of any just
and equitable means of collecting the residue,
—not that he may have such extraordinary
remedy in all cases of a deficit in the proceeds, but only where it is indispensably necessary for his protection, and just and equitable.
We hold, then, both upon the principles of equity that lie at the foundation of
the chancery court, and upon authority, a receiver may sometimes be allowed after decree
and sale, and that a mortgagee does not in
all cases exhaust his security by a foreclosure and sale.
It is, however, a power that
the chancellor will be slow to exercise, except
in an extreme case, and to prevent palpable
wrong and injustice." The cases of Seligman
V. Laubheimer, 58 111. 124, Ogle v. Koemer,
140 111. 170, 29 N. E. 563, and Davis v. Dale,
150 111. 239, 37 N. E. 215, cited by appellant
in support of its contention that a decree of
foreclosure and sale extinguishes the mortgage and renders the mortgage functus officio,
are decided on a state of facts entirely different from the facts in this case. In Seligman
V. Laubheimer, after a sale for less than the
debt a junior mortgagee redeemed, and a petition was filed to order a resale to pay the
balance due the first mortgagee.
It was held
that as to the property sold the mortgage
was not operative, and a resale could not
be had. No question of a mortgage of rents
accruing during the statutory period of redemption was involved. In Ogle v. Koemer
the facts were the same as to the mortgage,
the sale, and redemption by an assignee of a
second mortgage, who was a party, as in the
Seligman Case. The tenor of the case, as to
its application here, may be seen by the following quotation from the court's opinion
(page 179, 140 111., and page 565, 29 N. E.):
"A mortgage, or, as in this case, a deed of
trust in the nature of a mortgage, vests in
the party secured a hen upon the mortgaged
By virtue of that lien the mortpremises.
gagee is entitled to have the mortgaged property sold under a decree of foreclosure, and
the proceeds of the sale applied to the payment of the debt secured.
This is the mode
provided by law for the enforcement
of the
lien, and when the lien has been once enforced by the sale of the property It has, as
to such property, expended its force and accomplished
its purpose, and the property is
no longer subject to it." In Davis v. Dale a
Pending foreclomortgage was foreclosed.
The property
sure a receiver was appointed.
was sold for the full amount of the debt, in-
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terest, and costs; but the receiver was continued, as appears, unnecessarily. The court
said (page 243, 150 lU., and page 216, 37 N.
E.): "The only purpose of appointing a receiver at the instance of the mortgagee or
cestui que trust under or trustee in the trust
deed is to preserve the security of the mortgage or trust deed, and apply the rents, issues, and profits, when necessary,
in discharge of the indebtedness;
and it follows,
necessarily, that where the property is tnd off
at the foreclosure sale for the full amount of
the decree, interest, and costs, as was here
done, the necessity for continuing the receiver ceases, and he should be discharged, and
the possession restored to the owner of the
equity of redemption.
In any event, the possession of the receiver, and his receipt of the
rents and profits arising from the property,
would be for the benefit of the person entitled to the same, so that the parties acquired
no additional right because the fund is in the
hands of the receiver."
The question involved in this case, to wit, where the property
sold does not pay the mortgage debt, and
where the mortgage has a provision that the
rents and profits may be applied towards the
payment of the indebtedness and costs, was
not before the court in either of the cases
cited by appellant.
Here the receiver was
properly appointed after the foreclosure decree and sale, as the security of the steel
company
was not exhausted by the sale.
Moreover, the necessity for the appointment
of a receiver, and the collection of the rents
and profits, and their application to the payment of the deficiency, did not appear until
after the foreclosure decree and sale.
Appellant also contends that the court erred
In directing the receiver, in its several orders,
to pay the taxes on the property of the Ashley Wire Company out of the funds in his
hands derived from rents of the real estate.
Appellant filed its bill to have the equitable
assets of the Ashley Wire Company applied
to the satisfaction of its judgment, and also
to have these taxes paid by the receiver out
of moneys collected by him. The bill alleges
that said corporation defendant is and remains in the possession of its real estate and
manufacturing plant, and, while not worth
the said mortgage indebtedness, is a valuable
property, and ought not to be allowed to deteriorate in valne or be greatly hazarded by
neglect or want of care; that watchmen should
be in charge, insurance should be kept up, and
taxes paid; that all this should be done in the
interest of said corporation, its stockholders
and creditors generally; that said corporation
is without means to protect and preserve said
property, keep up Its insurance, or pay the taxes, and Is without means to preserve, care for,
and collect its equitable assets. The receiver
was appointed on appellant's motion, and its
own solicitor's name is recited in the order
of the court December 26, 1893, inter alia:
"That upon obtaining possession he properly
care for all such property, to the end that
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It may not be wasted or deteriorate for want
of proper care, that lie keep the buildings and
all improvements
insured In responsible Insurance companies in a reasonable amount,
and that he pay all taxes and assessments
legally levied upon snch real estate."
This
order of the court has never been rescinded,
so far as the record shows.
The order of
March 11, 1895, authorizing the receiver to
pay the taxes of 18SM, recites:
"It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the
court that the said George W. Bush, as receiver, out of the moneys in his hands pay to
the said township collector the personal property taxes assessed against the said Ashley
Wire Company for the year 1894, being the
sum of $669.12, taking proper receipt therefor, and that said receiver in the making of
said payment, all parties in interest in open
court consenting thereto," etc. On June 20,
1895, the receiver, by apjwllant's counsel, presented his petition, and in the order of the
court directing him to pay the taxes on the
real estate the same order of consent apIn Armstrong v. Cooper, 11 111. 540,
pears.
this court said: "A decree made by consent
cannot be appealed from, nor can error properly be assigned upon it Even a rehearing

be allowed In the suit, nor can the
be set aside by a bill of review.
1
Barb. Ch. Prac. 373." Smith v. Kimball, 128
Roby v. Trust Co., 166
111. 583, 21 N. E. 503;
111. 33G, 46 N. B. 1110.
These orders being
made at the request of appellant, and by consent. It cannot question their validity.
Objection is also made to the order of courS
directing the payment of the real and personal taxes for the year 1895 by the receiver.
The amount paid was $1,874.41.
The order
extending the receiver on the petition of the
Illinois Steel Company was made June 20,
1895, authorizing him to receive the rents and
profits, to be held by him subject to the order
of court. The redemption from the sale under the mortgage foreclosure
of the Illinois
Steel Company against the Ashley Wire Company expired June 9, 1896. This money derived from rents belonged to the Illinois
Steel Company by virtue of the specific lien
In the mortgage, and, the receiver having
paid these taxes from funds belonging to appellee, appellant cannot complain.
Finding
no reversible error in the record, and the
decree of the court appearing to be equitable,
the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

cannot
decree
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general tha
special term, in New York
order directing Joel B. Erappointed In the action of
Company against the New
York City & Northern Railroad Company, to
make provision for the payment of the taxes
levied on the corporate franchise of the railroad company.
From this order the receiver
appealed, and the general term (Daniels, J.,
delivering the opinion, Van Brunt, P. J., and
Brady, J., concurring)
reversed
the order.
i''rom the order of reversal the attorney general takes this appeal.

Charles F. Tahor, Atty. Gen., for appellant.
Artemas H. Holmes, for respondents.

PECKHAM,
J. The railroad company
above named was incorporated under the laws
of this state, and had its principal business
In May,
office in the city of New York.
1882, a receiver thereof was appointed in proceedings taken to sequestrate its property by
had
a judgment creditor whose execution
Such receiver opbeen returned unsatisfied.
erated the road from the time of his appointment to February 3, 1885, when another receiver was appointed in the action above entitled, which is brought to foreclose certain
mortgages executed by the company upon its
property.
The first receiver turned over the
property and the possession of the road to the
receiver appointed in the foreclosure proceedings, and from the time of the appointment
of the latter up to a time subsequent to the
year ending June 30, 1886, he has operated
the road by virtue of such appointment.
Taxes became due and payable under the corporation tax act of 1880, as amended by chapter 361 of the Laws of 1881, which amounted
at the time of the filing of his petition by the
attorney general, in February, 1887, to about
the sum of $8,000; being for taxes on the
gross earnings of the road as thus operated
for the years ending June 30, 1883, 1884,
No question is
1885, and 1886, respectively.
made as to the amount of the tax in each
year, or that there is a sum in the hands of
the receiver which may be applicable to their
payment;
but the counsel for the receiver insists that the corporation is alone answerable for the taxes, and that recourse must be
had to it for the payment of the same, or to
such funds as may remain in the receiver's
hands after the claims of the mortgagees
which in this case is but
have been satisfied;
another manner of stating that there is no
way of collecting these taxes, for, if their
pajTnent Is to be postponed to the payment
of the whole amount of the mortgage debt of
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the company, all of Its property will have
been wholly exhausted long before payment
in full of its mortgage indebtedness could be
made.
Various other objections were taken
to the granting of the petition of the attorney
general.
The taxes in question, having been levied
corporation
by virtue of the above-mentioned
tax law, were taxes upon the franchise, as distinguished from the property, of the corporation. People V. Insurance Co., 92 N. Y. 328.
Upon this assumption the counsel for the receiver claims that the taxes are not made a
lien upon property by the act creating them,
and cannot, therefore, be held to be a prior
or paramount charge upon the funds in the
receiver's hands, on the ground that they are
debts due to the state, or on the ground of
public policy.
The manner of proceeding to
collect these taxes has been designated in the
act which imposes them, and is to be found
in sections 7 and 9 of such act. By section 7
the tax "shall be collected for the use of the
state as other taxes are recoverable by law
from such corporation," etc.; and by section
9 the taxes "may be sued for in the name of
the people of the state, and recovered in any
court of competent jurisdiction in an action
to be brought by the attorney general at the
instance of the comptroller." Under section
to collect the taxes being
7, the proceedings
the same as other taxes are recovered by law,
(not relating to those imposed on real estate,)
those proceedings would be regulated by the
Revised Statutes, as amended by chapter 456
of the Laws of 1857.
It is argued that, as
proceedings to enforce the collection of taxes
thus imposed are provided for in the very act
which imposes them, such proceedings must
in all cases be taken, and that all other remeIt is upon this
dies are absolutely excluded.
ground that the learned judge who wrote the
opinion at the general term proceeded, the
result of which was to reverse these proceedings, because not undertaken pursuant to the
provision of the statute in question.
Generally speaking, the rule as thus laid down Is to
be followed,
and the remedy is confined in
But in such a case as
the manner stated.
this we think the rule is not to be applied.
When the property of a corporation is already
sequestrated, and a receiver appointed, and
where in addition thereto foreclosure proceedings are pending against It to foreclose mortgages to an amount in excess of all its property, and a receiver has also been appointed
under such proceedings, and where the corporation is largely and hopelessly insolvent,
and all of its property in the hands of the
receiver appointed by the court, and where
the money to pay the taxes has arisen from
the gross earnings, and an amount suflicient
to pay them is in the hands of the receiver,
we are of opinion that the proceedings to obtain payment of those taxes thus In the receiver's hands are not confined to those provided for by the act cited, but that a direct
application
for an order on the receiver for
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may be made to the court by
petition, as in this case, having made the
corporation
and the receiver a party tnereto.
If there are any disputed questions of fact to
be determined, the court may direct an action
to be brought, or may determine it in some
other and more summary way.
We feel more certain in regard to this
question by looking at the proceedings which
are provided to be taken under the general
laws. They are to be instituted by petition
upon which the court may sequestrate such
part of the property of the company as shall
be necessary for the purpose of satisfying
the taxes in aiTear with the costs, etc.; and
In its discretion the court may proceed further, and enjoin the company and its officers
from any further proceedings under the charter, in order to enforce the payment of the
But, in a case where the whole of
taxes.
the property has already been sequestrated
under other proceedings,
the sequestration
provided for would not be very efficient. Neither would an injunction which simply enjoined the company and its officers from further proceedings under the charter be in and
of itself very efficient as against a receiver
who was operating the railroad under the
In such case, if the inorder of the court.
junction were granted, it would only become
effective because the court would then order
its officer, the receiver, to pay the tax, and
But
go on with the operation of the road.
it would be a farce for the court to first issue the injunction against the receiver, restraining him from operating the road until
he paid the tax, and then ordering him to pay
it for the purpose of continuing its proper
operation.
The result would be that the receiver in the end would pay the tax, because he was ordered to do so by the court.
The order might just as well be issued in the
first instance, without this circuitous method.
The privilege granted by the other section of
tlie act of 1881, to sue for the taxes in the
name of the people, in an action brought by
the attorney general at the instance of the
would also result in the court
comptroller,
ordering the receiver to pay the tax, for in
no other way could the judgment for tne reIn all
covery of the tax become effectual.
cases, therefore, the payment by the receiver
would be made by order of the court, and in
all cases the order might just as well be made
in the first instance.
We do not think that these provisions of
the statute should, under such circumstances,
be held to restrict the general power of the
court to direct its officer to pay those claims
which exist in favor of the state for taxes
where tha
Imposed upon the corporation,
claim of the state for the payment of such
taxes is, as we think, a paramount one. An
insolvent corporation in the hands of and operated by a receiver was not in the minds of
the framers of the statute when providing
for the enforcement of payment of taxes from
what may be termed a "going corporation."

It

may be admitted that in a strict and technical sense these taxes, when first imposed,
are not a lien upon any specffic property of
the corporation.
But we are of the opinion
that the railroad, when in the receiver's
hands and operated by him. Is operated under
and by virtue of the franchise which has
been conferred upon the corporation by the
state; and that when he receives the gross
earnings arising from its operation, and has
in his hands money enough to pay these taxes, the state has a paramount right to collect
them before the moneys applicable to such
payment shall be paid away by the receiver.
Having such paramount right, the court may
in its discretion listen to the petition of the
state through its attorney general, and direct
its officer to make the payment asked for.
It is claimed, however, that when a receiver is appointed by the court, if he operates the railroad under its order, he does so
by virtue of the equity powers of the court
conferred by the constitution; and hence that
the receiver Is not bound to pay the taxes,
although he receives all the earnings of the
company.
But what does the receiver operate?
Under this order of the court he takes
possession of all the property of the corporation, and proceeds to operate, that is, to run,
its trains, and to do all that was formerly
done under the direction of the board of directors.
In this way he uses the franchise
which has been conferred by the state upon
the company, and he uses It as an officer of
the court which is administering the affairs
of the company, and through the court he
acts as the company to the same extent, pro
hac vice, as If the board of directors were operating the railroad. It is the franchise
which is being used in both cases, only in
one case It is used for the company, and substantially by it, by means of its board of directors;
while in the other case the same
franchise Is being used, and the road Is operated under it, by an officer of the court, until,
by virtue of the legal proceedings connected
with the receivership, the receiver is discharged, and the road returned to Its former possessors, or other proceedings taken under a
as provided by law.
reorganization,
The learned counsel for the receiver has cited the case of Com. v. Bank, 123 Mass. 493,
as authority for the proposition that after a
corporation
Is placed In the hands of a receiver no tax of this nature can be levied upon or collected from It. But the case Is not
in the least analogous to the one under disIn the case In Massachusetts
cussion.
the
tax was laid upon the amount of the average
of deposits in the bank for the preceding six
months, which was held to be a tax on the
value of the franchise thus ascertained;
and
it was further held that if on the day when
the tax was to be laid the bank was In the
hands of a receiver It was not liable to pay
any part of the tax, although it transacted
business during a part of the preceding six
months.
It will be seen, however, that the
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receiver was appointed under a decree of the
court perpetually enjoining the bank from doing any further business, and the receiver
■was appointed to wind up its affairs, and the
bank was at once and forever deprived of the
exBrclse or use of its franchise.
The court
held that as the tax was upon the franchise,
the value of which was to be ascertained on
the day the tax was imposed, by reference to
the amount of the average of deposits for the
past six months, if on that day the franchise
had ceased to exist, no tax could for that
reason be imposed;
and it was wholly iminaterlal that for a portion of the preceding six
months the franchise had been in existence
and was actually used. It thus appears that
of the receiver was one of
the appointment
the steps to wind up a corporation which was,
on the day set for the imposition of the tax,
to all intents and purposes dissolved, and was
no longer In existence, and hence the decision of the court was entirely unassailable.
No such fact exists in the case before us.
The corporation was not dissolved in form
nor in substance, so far as this question is
concerned.
The franchise was in existence
and was actually used, and no decree of disThe
solution had ever been pronounced.
agent who used the franchise was an officer
of the court, acting under its authority, instead of the board of directors;
but it was
the franchise of the company which was in
In Trust Co. v. Railroad
use at all times.
Co., 117 U. S. 434, 6 Sup. Ct. 809, the supreme
court of the United States, while declining to
give preference to receiver's certificates over
mortgage bondholders under the facts in that
case, did grant preference to the claims of
The taxes were, it is
the state for taxes.
true, upon property; but the case is not authority for the proposition that if the tax is
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not a technical Hen on specific property when
Imposed, then no preference can be granted
in a case like this. We reiterate the statement of Porter, J., in Re Columbian Ins. Co.,
3 Abb. Dee. 239, that there is great force in
the claim that "the state has succeeded to all
the prerogatives of the British crown, so
far as they are essential to the efficient exercise of powers inherent in the nature of civil
government, and that there is the same priority of right here, in respect to the payment of
taxes, which existed at common law in favor of the public treasury."
We certaiuly have no doubt that, in a case
like this, the court can make the order, (slightly modified as mentioned below,) which was
made herein at special term, and that the
statutory remedies for the collection of taxes
of the nature herein specified are not controlling In the case of an insolvent corporation and upon such facts as are herein proved.
The parties hereto both agree that, as
there is a fund applicable to the payment of
these taxes, there is no necessity for the insertion in the special term order of the provision for issuing certificates by the receiver to
Without disraise money to pay the taxes.
cussing or deciding the question, therefore,
in case the receiver had not the
whether,
money on hand with which to pay these taxes, the court would order him to issue and
and with the prosell receiver's certificates,
ceeds pay them, we shall modify the special
term order by striking out such a provision.
As thus modified, we think that order was
correct.
For these reasons the order of the general
term of the supreme court should be reversed, and that of the special term be modified,
as already stated, and as modified affirmed,
without costs. All concur.
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FARMERS' LOAN & TRUST CO.
CREEK COAL CO.

v.

GRAPE

(50 Fed. 481.)

Circuit Court, S. D. Illinois.

May

7, 1892.

lu Equity. Bill by the Farmers' Loan &
Trust Company against tbe Grape Creek Goal

A receiver
Company to foreclose a mortgage.
was appointed, and he now asks leave to issue receiver's certificates.

Runnells & Burry, for Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co.
AA'. J. Calhoun, for J. G. English, receiver.
Hess & Johnson, for Travellers' Ins. Co.
and other objecting bondholders.

GRESHAM, Circuit Judge.

The defendant,
corporation, whose chief business Is
mining and selling coal, conveyed to the complainant, in trust, lands and two coal mines
in Vermilion county. 111., to secure an issue
An installof bonds amounting to $500,000.
ment of Interest was allowed to remain due
for more than six months, and this bill was
filed to foreclose the trust deed. Joseph G.
English, who was appointed receiver, asks for
an order authorizing him to issue receiver's
in all $24,000,
exceeding
not
certificates
which shall be a first lien upon the trust
property, to enable him to pay taxes now due,
amounting to $3,428.04,
take up outstanding
certificates amounting to $6,400, which were
issued under an order of the Vermilion circuit
court, in a suit to foreclose the same trust
deed, and to continue the operation of the
mines.
The receiver represents that, with
additional working capital, he could operate
the mines profitably, and better protect them.
The holders of 75 per cent, of the bonds and
the corporation Join in the receiver's request.
The holders of the remaining 25 per cent, reThe corporation is insist the application.
solvent.
It is not claimed that the receiver
is without means to pay taxes, and it is chiefly to enable him to continue the operation of
the mines for anticipated profits that he desires authority to issue certificates.
When it becomes necessary for a court of
chancery to take possession of property which
is the subject of litigation, by placing it in
the hands of a receiver, all expenses incident
to its safe-keeping and preservation are properly chargeable against it; and, if there be
no income, such expenses will be paid out of
the proceeds of the corpus before distribution
It does not follow,
to lien or other creditors.
however, that because property of a private
corporation or a natural person may be thus
protected and preserved before sale, that, in
order to raise money to operate it for profit,
a court may place a charge upon it in adPending a suit to
vance of existing liens.
foreclose a mortgage executed by a railroad
corporation, the road may be operated by a
receiver, and debts contracted for labor, supplies, and other necessary purposes before as
well as after the appointment of a receiver,
a private

may be made a first lien upon income, and, if
that is not adequate, upon the corpus of the
In the exercise of this exceptional
property.
and extraordinary Jurisdiction, which Is of
comparatively
recent origin, courts have entered orders making receiver's certificates first
liens on the mortgaged property.
This has
been done, however, on grounds not applicable to mortgages executed by private corporaA railroad corporation Is a quasi pubtions.
lic institution, charged with the duty of operating Its road as a public highway. If the
company becomes embarrassed and unable to
perform that duty, the courts pending proceedings for the sale of the road will operate
it by a receiver, and make the expense inThis is done on
cident thereto a first lien.
account of the peculiar character of the property.
It Is generally mortgaged to secure
bonds, and persons who invest in such securities know that the mortgage rests upon property previously impressed with a public duty.
Private corporations owe no duty to the public, and their continued operation is not a
matter of public concern.
It is only against
railroad mortgages that the supreme court of
the United States has sustained orders giving
priority to receiver's certificates representing
particular indebtedness, and, as already stated, then only on principles having no application to a mortgage executed by a private corporation owing no duty to the public.
Fosdlck V. Schall, 99 U. S. 235; Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 126; Miltenberger v. Railroad
Co., 106 U. S. 286, 1 Sup. Ct. 140; Union
Trust Co. V. tllinois M. E. Co., 117 U. S. 434,
6 Sup. Ct. 800; Wood v. Trust Co., 128 U. S.
Kneeland v. Trust Co.,
421, 9 Sup. Ct. 131;
136 U. S. 89, 10 Sup. Ct. 950; Morgan's L. &
T. R. & S. S. Co. V. Texas Cent. Ry. Go., 187
U. S. 171, 11 Sup. Ct. 61.
In Wood V. Trust Co. the court said: i'The
doctrine of Fosdick v. Schall has never yet
been applied in any case except that of a
railroad. The case lays great emphasis on
the consideration that a railroad is a peculiar
property, of a public nature, and discharging
a great public work.
There is a broad distinction between such a case and that of a
purely private concern.
We do not undertake
to decide the question here, but only point it
out."
In Kneeland v. Trust Co., supra, in discussing the Jurisdiction of the chancellor to displace the lien of a railroad mortgage,
the
"Upon these facts we remark,
court said:
first, that the appointment of a receiver vests
in the court no absolute control over the property, and no general authority to displace
vested contract liens. Because, in a few specified and limited cases, this court has declared that unsecured
claims were entitled to
priority over mortgage debts, an idea seems
to have obtained that a court appointing a receiver acquires power to give such preference
to any general and unsecured claims.
It has
been assumed that a court appointing a receiver could rightfully burden the mortgaged
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property for the payment of any unsecured
indebtedness.
Indeed, we are advised that
some courts have made the appointment of a
receiver conditional upon the payment of all
unsecured indebtedness
In preference to the
mortgage

liens

sought

to be enforced.

Can

anything be conceived which more thoroughly
destroys the sacredness of contract obligations? One holding a mortgage debt upon a
railroad has the same right to demand and
expect of the court respect for his vested and
contracted priority as the holder of a mortgage on a farm or lot.
So, when a court appoints a receiver of railroad property, It has
no right to make that receivership
conditional on the payment of other than those few
unsecured claims which, by the rulings of
this court, have been declared to have an
equitable priority.
No one is bound to seU
to a railroad company,
or to work for it;
and whoever has dealings with a company
whose property Is mortgaged must be assumed to have dealt with it on the faith of its
personal responsibility,
and not in expectadisplacing the priority
tion of subsequently
of the mortgage liens.
It is the exception,
and not the rule, that such priority of liens
can be displaced.
We emphasize this fact of
the sacredness of contract liens for the reason
that there seems to be growing an idea that
the chancellor, in the exercise of his equitable
powers, has unlimited discretion In this matof vested liens."
ter of the displacement
And further on In the same opinion the court
said: "If, at the instance of any party rightfully entitled thereto, a court should appoint
a receiver of property, the same being rail-

871

road property, and therefore under an obligation to the public of continued operation, it,
in the administration of such receivership,
might rightfully contract debts necessary for
the operation of the road, either for labor,
supplies, or rentals, and make such expenses
a prior lien on the property itself."
In the language above quoted, there is a
plain implication that the limited power
which courts may exercise in displacing the
liens of railroad mortgages should not and
cannot be extended to mortgages executed by
private corporations.
The court is not asked
to subvert the lien of the mortgage on the
ground that the trustee or bondholders have
got possession of anything which, in equity,
It is to enable
belongs to general creditors.
him to operate the mines for the benefit of
against the wish of part of
bondholders,
them, that the receiver desires to be invested
with authority to issue certificates which shall
be a prior lien upon the property embraced in
the trust deed.
Extensive as are the powers
of courts of equity, they do not authorize a
chancellor to thus impair the force of solemn
Inobligations
and destroy vested rights.
stead of displacing mortgages and other liens
upon the property of private corporations and
natural persons, it is the duty of courts to
uphold and enforce them against all subsequent incumbrances.
It would be dangerous
to extend the power which has been recently
exercised over railroad mortgages, (sometimes
with unwarranted freedom,) on aocount of
The
their peculiar nature, to all mortgages.
power does not exist, and the application is
denied.
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HANNA

et al. v.

STATE TRUST

CO. et al.

(70 Fed. 2, 16 C. C. A. 586.)

Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Sept 23, 1895.
No. 593.

Appeal from the circuit court of the United
States for the district of Colorado.
On the 1st day of Isovember, 1889, the
Deuver-Arapahoe Land Company, a Colorado
corporation,
executed to the appellant John
R. Hanna its trust deed on 11,320 acres of
land in Arapahoe and Douglas counties,
Colo., to secure to the appellant Rufus Clark
the payment of its promissory notes aggregating the sum of $97,000.
On the same day
corporation
executed to the MerCompany
of New York, as
trustee, a deed of trust on 4,480 acres of
land in Arapahoe county, Colo., to secure an
issue of Its first mortgage bonds amounting
to $140,000.
On the 1st day of March, 1890,
the Denver Water-Storage Company, a Colorado corporation, executed to the State Trust
Company of New York, as trustee, a deed of
trust on about 1,100 acres of land in Douglas
county, Colo., together with the Castlewood
dam and reservoir, irrigating canals, ditches,
etc., to secure the payment of its first mortgage bonds amounting to the sum of $300,000.
Bach of these deeds of trust covers
different properties, and is the first and valid
lieu upon the property covered by it. On or
about the 1st day of May, 1891, the Denver
Land & Water-Storage Company rvas organized, pursuant to the laws of Colorado, by
the consolidation of the Denver-Arapahoe
Land Company and the Denver Water-Storage Company, and by virtue of such consolidation acquired, subject to the deeds of trust
above described, all of the property covered
Immediately after
by or embraced therein.
the Denver Land & Waterits organization
executed a deed of trust
Storage Company
upon the entire property acquired by the consolidation mentioned, subject to the several
deeds of trust executed by the constituent
companies, and above set forth, to the State
Trust Company of New York, as trustee, to
secure an issue of its general or consolidated
mortgage bonds to' the amoimt of $800,000.
On the 4th day of June, 1894, the State
Trust Company of New York, as trustee in
mortgage last above menthe consolidated
tioned, filed its bill of complaint in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Colorado against the Denver Land &
Water-Storage Company, alleging that it had
made default, and failed to pay the taxes on
its lands or interest upon its bonds, and that
it was insolvent, and prayed for the foreclosure of its mortgage and the appointment
This bill admitted the priority
of a receiver.
of the underlying deeds of trust executed by
the constituent companies, and that any relief granted In the suit, by foreclosure or
otherwise, must be subject to the rights and
equities existing under the prior mortgages.
the

same

cantile Trust

day the bill was filed the Denver
& Water-Storage Company appeared
and answered;
admitting its insolvency, and
confessing all the allegations
to the bill.
The court thereupon appointed a receiver.
On the 24th of July, 1894, the State Trust
On

the

Land

Company

filed

its amended

and

supplemen-

tal bill of complaint, to which the Mercantile
Trust Company of New York, and the appellants, John R. Hanna and Rufus Clark, were
made defendants.
This amended bill prayed
relief as follows: That the said Mercantile
Trust Company, John R. Hanna, and Rufus
Clark might be brought in as defendants in
the action, and required to set up their re
spective rights upon the real estate covered
by the deeds of trust executed by the Denver-Arapahoe
Land Company; that the respective rights of the trustees under the several mortgages or deeds of trust might be
judicially ascertained and determined by the
court; that the properties covered by the
respective deeds of trust might be marshaled, and judicially ascertained
and adjusted;
that the amounts due upon tne notes and
bonds issued under the several deeds of trust
might be adjudicated and determined;
that
the said deeds of trust might be foreclosed;
that the receiver theretofore appointed in the
action might be continued as receiver of all
the property covered by each and all of said
deeds of trust; that the said John R. Hanna,
Rufus Clark, and the Mercantile Trust Company, and the holders of any of the notes,
bonds, or securities issued under said deeds
of trust, might be enjoined and restrained
from commencing any action or proceeding
in the circuit court of the United States for
Colorado,
or any other court, for the foreclosure of the said deeds of trust, and from
enforcing their said notes and bonds, or for
against the Denver
the collection
thereof,
Land & Water-Storage Company, or its property and effects, except in this action.
On the 16th day of August, 1894, a special
master appointed in the cause made a report,
from which It appears that the company
was endeavoring to carry on a colonization
business, and was engaged in selling small
tracts of land, for fruit raising and garden
purposes, to settlers, or those who proposed
to become settlers, or coloni,sts; that in many
cases the company sold these tracts of land
(usually 10 acres), under executory contracts,
for small amounts of cash dovra, and deferred payments extending over a period of five
years, when the various purchasers were to
receive the deeds.
The company agreed to
plant these tracts with fruit trees, and cultivate and care for them during the five
years.
On the 16th of August the receiver
filed his petition, stating, substantially,
that
the property of the Denver Land & WaterStorage Company consists of 17,000 acres of
land in the counties of Arapahoe and Douglas, Colo., and an extensive dam or reservoir,
known as the "Castlewood Dam," and a system of canals and Irrigating ditches connect-
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ed therewith, and a large number of landpurchase contracts and land-purchase
notes,
referred to in the report of the special master; that the original plan of the Denver
Land & Water-Storage Company contemplated the
colonization of these lands; the
amount of the land-purchase contracts and
notes, as shown by the report of the special
master; the agreements made by the Denver
liand & Water-Storage Company
to plant
and cultivate the lands, already referred to,
and that in consideration tliereof the various
purchasers have- made large payments, and
have a right, in justice and equity, to deof the
maud performance of the contracts
Denver Land & Water-Storage Company,
and that otherwise the fruit trees upon the
tracts sold under the planting and cultivation
contracts will die, and the payments made
by the purchasers
will be absolutely lost;
and that, moreover, it is of vital importance
to the company
that it should collect the
balance due upon the land-sale notes and
contracts mentioned, which collection is entirely dependent upon the keeping up of the
tracts of land, and the performance by the
company of the contracts with the pm-chasers aforesaid.
The petition then presents a
number of reasons and arguments why, in
certificates
the judgment of the receiver,
should be issued, and calls attention to the
default in taxes upon the company's lands,
The paralleged to amount to about $4,000.
ticulars of the three underlying mortgages
and the consolidated mortgage are then given, and the receiver calls the court's attention to the opportunity which presents itself
for engaging in the colonization of the company's barren lands, if he is authorized to
to raise
issue certificates of indebtedness
funds with which to properly present the
of the Denver Land
merits' and advantages
On
& Water-Storage Company's property.
the 15th day of September, 1894, the court
made an order, upon the receiver's petition,
which authorized the issue of receiver's certificates to pay taxes due upon the lands, and
to redeem the same from tax sales, and making such certificates a first and paramount
lien upon the property upon which the taxes
The order also contained this
were paid.
adprovision:
"(5) It is further ordered,
judged, and decreed that in addition to the
amounts which may be necessary to pay the
taxes now in arrears upon the property set
forth and described in paragraphs 2, 3, and
4 of this order, the receiver shall have, and
is hereby granted, authority to borrow such
additional sum of money as shall, together
with said amounts for taxes, amount in the
to a sum not exceeding $10,000,
aggregate

and to issue therefor his certificates of indebtedness, which said certificates of indebtedness shall be first and paramount liens
upon all the property, rights, and franchises
now owned or controlled by the said the
Denver Land & Water-Storage Company, desituated,
and
fendant herein, wheresoever
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subject . to the jurisdiction of this court
And said additional sums of money shall be
used and applied by said receiver for the
the property of the
pui-pose of preserving
Denver Land & Water-Storage Company in
his possession and custody, and carrying out
and maintaining the contracts of the company now in existence, under and by which
sold tracts of
the company
has heretofore
land to various parties, which said contracts
are referred to in the report of said receiver,
and for such other purposes as are set out
in said petition, with reference to the maintenance, preservation,
and protection of the
property of the company, or as the court may
From this order,
from time to time direct"
John K. Hanna, trustee in the deed of trust
1, 1889, and Rufus Clark,
dated November
the beneficiary named therein, and the holder
of a large amount of the bonds secured
by the mortgage to the Mercantile Trust
.Company, appealed to this court.

John S. Macbeth (Enos Miles, on the
brief), for appellants.
A. C. Campbell (A. E. Pattison and Henry
W. Hobson, on the brief), for appellees.
Before

THAYER,

CALDWELL,

SANBORN,

and

Circuit Judges.

CALDWELL,

Circuit Judge, after stating

the case as above, delivered the opinion of
the court.
The precise question in this case is whether a court of chancery which has appointed
a receiver for an insolvent private corporation in a foreclosure suit brought by a second mortgagee may, against the objection of
the first mortgagee, authorize its receiver to
issue receiver's certificates to raise money to
carry on the business of the insolvent corporation and to improve its lands, and make
such certificates
a first and paramount lien
upon the lands covered by the first mortgage.
So far as we are advised, the power to do this
has been denied in every case in which the
question has arisen.
One of the first cases
in which the question arose was' Raht v. Attrill, 106 X. Y. 423, 13 N. E. 282. In that
case a hotel company mortgaged its property to raise funds to build a hotel. Before
the completion
of the hotel the corporation
became insolvent, and upon the application of
its principal stockholder a receiver was apand upon an application and shovrpointed;
ing that the wages of the men who worked on
and that
the hotel building were unpaid,
unless paid, to burn the
they threatened,
building, the court made an order authorizing
the receiver to issue certificates, which were
declared to be a lien prior to the trust mortgage, to raise funds to pay the wages due
A referee reported that, if the
the laborers.
money had not been raised to pay the wages
due the men, the hotel and other property of
the corporation "would, in all probability,
or seriously injured."
have been destroyed
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tlie progress of the case the mortgagee denied tliat the court had authority or power to
set aside the prior lien of the mortgage and
make the receiver's certificates, issued under
the circumstances mentioned, a first and prior
lien upon the property.
The court delivered
an exhaustive opinion, covering every aspect
of the question.
We quote some of its utterances.
The court said:
"The lien of the
mortgage attaches, not only to the land in
the condition in which it was at the time of
the execution of the mortgage, but as changed or improved by accretions
or by labor
expended upon it while the mortgage Is in
existence.
Creditors having debts created
for money, labor, or materials used in improving the mortgaged property acquire on
that account ncf legal or equitable claim to
displace or subordinate the lien of the mort* * • The act
gage, for their protection.
of the court in taliing charge of property
through a receiver is attended with certain
necessary expenses of its care and custody;
and it has become the settled rule that expenses of realization, and also certain expenses which are called 'expenses of preservation,'
may be incurred, under the order of the court,
on the credit of the property; and it follows,
from necessity, in order to the effectual administration of the trust assumed by the
court, that these expenses should be paid out
of the income, or, when necessary, out of the
corpus, of the property, before distribution, or
before the court passes over the property to
*
* * It
those adjudged to be entitled.
would be difficult to define, by a rule applicable in every case, what are expenses of preservation which may be incurred by a receiver
by authority of the court. It was said by
James, L. J., in Re Regent's Canal IronWorks Co., 3 Ch. Div. 411, 427, that 'the only
of the property
costs for the preservation
would be such things as the repairing of the
paying rates and taxes which
property,
would be necessary to prevent any forfeiture,
or putting a person in to take care of the
property.'
Wherever the true limit is, we
think it does not include the expenditure authorized by the order of August 17th, and
that such an expenditure is, and ought to be,
There must be
excluded from the definition.
something approaching a demonstrable necessity, to justify such an infringement of the
rights of the mortgagees as was attempted in
this case." After referring to the cases in
which the receivers of insolvent railroad corporations have been authorized to issue certificates which were declared to be a first lien
on the property of the corporations, the court
said: "It cannot be successfully denied that
the decisions In these cases vest in the courts
a very broad and comprehensive jurisdiction
over insolvent railroad corporations and their
It will be found, on examining
property.
these cases, that the jurisdiction asserted by
the court therein is largely based upon the
public character of railroad corporations, the
public interest in their continued and suc-

cessful operation, the peculiar character and
terms of railroad mortgages, and upon other
special grovmds, not applicable to ordinary
*
* * These cases
private corporations.
furnish, we think, no authority for upholding
the order of August 17 th, or for subverting
the priority of lien which, according to the
general rules of law, the bondholders acquired through the trust mortgage on the property of the company.
It would be unwise, we
think, to extend the power of the court in
dealing with property in the hands of receivers to the practical subversion or destruction
of vested interests, as would be the case in
this instance if the order of August 17th
should be sustained.
It is best for all that
the integrity of contracts should be strictly
and that a rigid,
guarded and maintained,
of the
rather than a liberal, construction
power of the court to subject property in the
hands of receivers to charges, to the prejudice of creditors, should be adopted."
We concur in the doctrine expressed in this
case.
See, to the same effect, Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co. V. Grape Creek Coal Co. (C. 0.) 50
Fed. 481; Laughlin v. RoUing^tock Co. (C.
C.) 64 Fed. 25; Fidelity Insurance Ti-ust &
Safe-Deposit
Co. v. Roanoke Iron Co. (C. C.)
68 Fed. 623; Snively v. Coal Co. (C. C.) 69
Fed. 204; and Hooper v. Trust Co. (Md.) 32
Atl. 505, 513.
The contention of the appellees is that the
order made by the circuit court finds sanction in the cases of Wallace v. Loomis, 97 U.
S. 146; Fosdick v. Schall, 99 V. S. 235; Barton V. Barbour, 104 U. S. 126; Miltenberger
V. Railroad Co., 106 U. S. 286, 1 Sup. Ot. 140;
Ti-ust Co. V. Souther, 107 U. S. 591, 2 Sup.
Ct. 295,— and other later cases of like character, in which receivers of insolvent railroad

corporations
were authorized to issue receivers' certificates
for various purposes, which
were made a first and paramount lien on the
property of the insolvent railroad company.
But the doctrine of these cases has no application to this case. They rest on the peculiar character of railroad property and of a
railroad corporation.
The distinction between
railroad corporations,
which are of a quasi
public character, and purely private corporations, has been often pointed out, and need
not be repeated here. It is enough to say
that the supreme court itself has said that
the doctrine of the cases cited has only been
applied in railroad cases. In Wood v. SafeDeposit Co., 128 U. S. 416, 9 Sup. Ct. 131, the
court said: "The doctrine of Fosdick v. Schall
has never yet been applied in any case except that of a railroad. The case lays great
emphasis upon the consideration that a railroad is a peculiar property, of a public nature,
and discharging a great public work. There
is a broad distinction between such a case
and that of a purely private concern.
We do
not undertake to decide the question here,
but only point It out."
The bill In this case is one to foreclose a
second mortgage.
To such a bill the prior
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mortgagees

are

not

even

necessary

parties.

Jerome v. McCarter, 94 U. S. 734.
The validity and priority of the liens of the mortgages under which the appellants claimed is
distinctly admitted in the original and amended bills. The pm-pose of filing the amended
bill making the prior mortgagees defendants
seems to have been to enjoin them from foreclosing then: mortgages, and subject the lands
covered by their mortgages to a prior lien for
money borrowed to carry on the business of
the corporation
and improve its lands.
It
prays that the receiver may be empowered to
manage and operate the property of the insolvent corporation, which consists In irrigating, improving,
and colonizing,
or settling,
arid lands; and, to the end that the receiver
may not be interfered with in the conduct of
the business, it prays that the holders of all
mortgages prior to the complainants'
may be
enjoined from foreclosing
the same.
The
amended bill would seem to be founded on the
theory that a private corporation
conducting
any kind of business may, when it becomes
insolvent, obtain immunity from the compulsory payment
of its debts by procuring a
junior mortgagee, or some other creditor, to
file a bill alleging the Insolvency of the corporation, and praying for the appointment of a
receiver with authority to manage and conduct
Upon the filing of such a bill,
its business.
it is supposed to be competent for the court,
in addition to appointing a receiver to carry
on the business of the corporation, to enjoin
its creditors, including the holders of the prior
liens on its property,
from collecting their
debts by due course of law, and to continue
such injunction in force so long as the court,
in its discretion, sees fit to carry on the business of the insolvent corporation.
When a receiver is appointed under such a bill, he usually makes haste, as the receiver did in this
case, to assure the court that, if he only had
some capital to start on, he could greatly benefit the estate by carrying on the business that
bankrupted the corporation.
In this case, the
company being insolvent, and Its property
mortgaged for more than It was worth, there
was no way of raising money to set the receiver up in business, except by the court giving its obligations, in the form of receiver's
certificates,
and making them a paramount
lien on all the property of the corporation, by
displacing the appellants' prior liens thereon.
As commonly happens in cases of this character, the receiver, the insolvent corporation,
and the junior mortgagee united in urging the
court to arm its receiver with the desired powThe corers. They ran no risk in so doing.
poration was insolvent, and a foreclosure
of
would leave the junior
the prior mortgage
so that it
mortgagee without any security;
had nothing to lose, and everything to gain.
In experiments to enhance the value of the
so long as the cost of
mortgaged property,
those experiments was made a prior lien thereon. The effect of the proceeding was to burden the prior mortgagee with the whole cost
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of the expenditures and experiments made for
the betterment of the property on the petition,
and for the benefit of the insolvent corporation
and the junior mortgagee.
The representation
is always made. In such cases, that the receiver can carry on the business much more
successfully
than was done by the Insolvent
corporation.
This commonly proves to be an
error.
Kaht v. Attrill, 106 N. Y. 430, 13 N.
E. 282. But, If it were true, it would afford
no ground of equitable jurisdiction, for it is
not a function of a court of equity to carry on
the business of private corporations,
whether
solvent or Insolvent.
It is obvious that it the
holders of the first mortgages and the other
creditors of the insolvent corporation were allowed to proceed, in the customary and lawful
mode, to collect their debts, it would put an
end to the business of the receiver, and they
are therefore enjoined from foreclosing their
mortgages or collecting their debts. The chancery court thus assumes, in effect, all the powers and jurisdiction of a court of bankruptcy
or Insolvency, but without any bankrupt or
insolvent law to guide or direct it in the administration of the estate. Its only guide is that
varying and unknown quantity called "judicial
discretion."
The powers claimed for a court
of equity in such cases are, indeed, much
greater than a court of bankruptcy can exercise. There never was a bankrupt court, under any bankrupt act, authorized, at its discretion, to displace or nullify valid liens on
the bankrupt's property,
or itself to create
liens paramount thereto.
The rights of the
citizen, lawfully acquired by contract, are under the protection of the constitution
of the
United States, and, like the absolute rights of
the citizen, are not dependent for their existupon the discretion
ence or continuance
of
any court whatever.
Constitutional rights and
obligations are no more dependent on the discretion of the chancellor than they are on the
"Rights," says
discretion of the legislatm'e.
the supreme court of the United States, "under our system of law and procedure, do not
rest in the discretionary authority of any oflicer, judicial or otherwise."
In re Parker, 131
U. S. 221, 9 Sup. Ct. 708. If junior lien creditors of an insolvent private corporation could
do what has been attempted in this case, every
private corporation operating a sawmill, gristmill, mine, factory, hotel, elevator, irrigating
ditches, or carrying on any other business pursuit, would speedily seek the protection of a
chancery court, and those courts would soon
be conducting the business of all the insolvent
private corporations in the country.
If it were
once settled that a chancery court, through a
receiver appointed on the petition of a junior
mortgagee, could carry on the business of such
Insolvent corporations at the risk and expense
of those holding the first or prior liens on the
property of the corporation, such liens would
It is no part of the
have little or no value.
duty of a court of equity to conduct the busiprivate corporations,
ness of Insolvent
any
more than it is to carry on the business of
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insolvent natiiral persons.
If it may take under its control the property of an Insolvent
private corporation, and authorize a receiver
to carry on its business, and malie the debts
incurred by the receiver in so doing paramount
liens on all the property of the corporation,
and enjoin its creditors in the meantime from
collecting their debts, it is not perceived why
it may not proceed in the same way with the
estate of an insolvent natural person.
Without pursuing the subject further, we refer to what is said, and to the cases cited, in
Scott V. Trust Co., 16 C. C. A. 358, 69 Fed.
17.
The order appealed from is void, whether
the suit in which it was made is treated as
one to foreclose a second mortgage, or as a
bill in equity to administer the estate of an
insolvent corporation.
It was open to the complainant to talce and execute a decree foreclosing its second mortgage, and it is good practice in such cases to require this to be done,
And if the
on pain of dismissing
the bill.
complainant desired that money be spent, beyond the income of the property, in carrying
on the business of the corporation or improving the mortgaged property, it was at liberty to furnish the means for that purpose;
but it had no equity to ask that the expense
and the hazards of doing so should be saddled
on the first mortgagee, and the court had no
jurisdiction or power to place it there.
Taxes are the first and paramount lien on
all property, and must be paid. When taxes
are due on property in the hands of a receiver,
and he has no funds to pay them, the court

will

authorize him to borrow money for that
purpose, and make the obligation given for the
money so borrowed a prior lien on the property on which the taxes were due. This is not
fixing a new or additional lien on the propIt is simerty, or displacing any prior lien.
ply changing the form of the lien from one
for taxes to one for money borrowed to pay
the taxes.
The order and decree of the circuit court
appealed from, which authorizes the receiver
to borrow money to "be used and applied by
said receiver for the purpose of preserving the
property of the Denver Land & Water-Storage Company in his possession and custody,
the conand carrying out and maintaining
tracts of the company, now in existence, under and by which the company has heretofore
sold tracts of land to various parties, which
said contracts are referred to in the report of
said receiver, and for such other purposes as
are set out in said petition with reference to
the maintenance, preservation, and protection
of the property of the company," and which
authorizes the receiver to issue his certificates
of indebtedness for the money borrowed for
these purposes, and makes such certificates of
indebtedness the first and paramount lien "upon all the property, rights, and franchises now
owned or controlled by the said the Denver
Land & Water-Storage Company," Is void. In
so far as it makes the certificates issued by
the receiver a first and paramount lien on the
lands embraced in the mortgages of the appellants, and is therefore reversed.
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Nos. 3,211-3,213.

At Law.

Tried by the court.

These actions are brought against the defendants who were stocltholders of the Traders' Bank of Tacoma, Wash., to enforce a liability created by the law of that state making them individually responsible equally and
ratably to the extent of their stock for all
debts of the bank while they remained stockholders.
The plaintiff is a citizen of Washington residing at Tacoma.
The defendants
are citizens of New York residing at Rochester. On the 19th day of May, 1894, the plaintiff was appointed receiver of the Traders'
Bank by an order of the superior court of
Washington made in an action commenced
against said bank by Henry Hewett, Jr., and
George Browne in which it was adjudged
that the bank had suspended business and
was insolvent.
The plaintiff duly qualified as
receiver and has since acted as such.
On the
12th of September, 1894, the court made an
order in said action permitting certain stockholders to intervene for the benefit of themselves and all other stockholders of the bank.
On the 20th of October all the defendants, except Chauncey B. Woodworth, were by order
of the court upon their own petition made
After applying all
parties to the said action.
the property of the bank to the payment of
its debts there remained a deficiency, which,
on March 17, 1897, was adjusted
and adjudged by the court to be the sum of $131,670.
The plaintiff was thereupon directed by the
court to levy upon the stockholders an assessment of 26.34 per cent, and bring suit against
those stockholders who, after demand, refused to pay. The amounts assessed against the
respectively
defendants
were duly demanded
and payment thereof refused.

P. M. French, for plaintiff.
M. Williams, for
Charles

defendant

Ell-

wanger.

M. H. McMath, for defendant Kent.
William F. Cogswell, for defendant Woodworth.

COXE, District Judge. It is not disputed
that the defendants were stockholders of the
Traders' Bank, that the bank became insolvent, that the plaintiff was appointed receiver, that a large deficiency was ascertained,
that an assessment was levied by the receiver upon the defendants and that all this was
done under and pursuant to the constitution
and laws of Washington and in conformity
to the orders and decrees of the superior court
of that state.
The first proposition argued by the defend-
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ants is that the plaintiff, as receiver. Is not
The constientitled to maintain the action.
tution and statutes of Washington (Const,
art. 12, § 11) provide: "That each stockholder
shall
of any banking * * * association
liable, equally
be invidually and personally
and ratably, and not one for another, for all
the contracts, debts and engagements of such
corporation
accruing
or association
while
they remain stoeliholders to the extent of the
amount of their stock therein, at the par value thereof, in addition to the amount invested
in such shares."
The courts of Washington have decided
that this liability can only be enforced by a
receiver under the direction
of the court.
Cole V. Railroad Co., 9 Wash. 487, 37 Pac.
700;
Wilson v. Book, 13 Wash. 676, 43 Pac.
939; Hardin v. Sweeney, 14 Wash. 129, 44
Pac. 138; Watterson v. Masterson, 15 Wash.
511, 40 Pac. 1041.
The practical effect of a
ruling that a receiver cannot maintain the
suit would be to render the law nugatory as
to all but resident stocuholders.
The Washington courts having ruled that a receiver
only can bring the suit, it is manifest, should
the federal courts and other state courts hold
that he cannot maintain the action, that the
defendants not only but all stockholders
beyond
the jurisdiction
of the Washington
courts will escape a liability intended to be
uniform and for the benefit of all the credThe precise question was involved in
itors.
Sheafe v. Larimer (0. C.) 79 Fed. 921, and
adversely to the defendants'
was answered
contention.
The case arose under the same
law, and, upon the facts, was almost identical
See, also, Schultz v.
with the case in hand.
Insurance Co. (C. C.) 77 Fed. 375, 387; Avery V. Trust Co. (C. C.) 72 Fed. 700; Failey v.
Talbee (C. C.) 55 Fed. 892.
Again it is argued that the orders and decrees of the Washington court were not binding upon the defendants, and in support of
this view various alleged defects in the proceedings are pointed out.
The defendants
Kent and Ellwanger were parties to the
Washington action and are therefore in no
position to attack the judgment of the court
in a collateral proceeding.
The defendant
Woodworth was not a party. But whether
parties or not the law seems clear that the
stockholders are bound by the order making
Hawkins v. Glenn, 131 U.
the assessment.
In Sheafe v. Larimer,
S. 319, 9 Sup. Ct. 739.
supra, the court says: "In this case it must
be held that it is not open to the defendant
to question the validity of the assessment order, on the ground that the stockholders were
not personally notified of the application for
the order, or for the reason that the stockholders should not have been assessed until
the other assets of the corporation
had been
wholly exhausted."
The actions are not barred by the statute
of limitations for the reason that the cause of
action did not accrue to the receiver prior to
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and that was not made until
The actions were commenMarch 17, 1897.
ced two months thereafter.
It follows that the plaintiff is entitled to
the assessment

judgment as demanded In the complaints, respectively, with interest at the rate of 6 per
cent, per annum from May 18, 1897, and
costs.
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Appeal from district court, Pottawattamie
county; Walter I. Smith, Judge.
As a statement of facts, we have taken the
following substantially from those made by
counsel:
This was an action brought by Albert U. Wyman, the receiver of the Nebraslia
Fire Insurance Company, to enforce against
the several defendants their constitutional liability under the Nebraska statute for their
unpaid subscriptions
to the capital stock of
This company was incorporatthe company.
ed on March 13, 1883, in conformity with the
laws of the state of Nebraska,
under the
name of the Nebraska & Iowa Insurance
Company,
its name being subsequently,
on
February 28, 1890, changed to the Nebraska
Fire Insurance Company, under which name
it transacted business until its insolvency, in
1891, when an application
for its dissolution
by W. G. Madden, one of its stockholders, resulted in the appointment
of the plaintiff,
first, as temporary,
and then as permanent,
receiver of the corporation, and a decree adjudging the dissolution thereof.
The testimony shows that one J. T. Hart, of Council
Bluffs, was largely Instrumental in the organization of the company;
that the subscribers
to its stock and the original stockholders were
citizens pronunent in Omaha and in Council
Bluffs; and that when this company, the Nebraska & Iowa Insurance Company, was organized, there was organized at the same time,
mainly through the instrumentality of Mr.
Hart, another insurance company, called the
Iowa & Nebraska Insurance Company, and
having its principal place of business at Council Bluffs, Iowa. The original intention oJ
the organizers, as gathered from the testimony of Mr. Hart, and the contract of subscription, was to consolidate the two companies
This, however, was
after their organization.
never done, the two corporations being operated separately
In each state, although the
stockholders
were at first the same.
The
Iowa corporation did business until about May
29, 1885, when it was merged into a company
known as the Western Home of Sioux City,
and went into the hands of a receiver.
The
capital of each company was $100,000, and
the certificates
of stock contemplated
subscriptions to both companies, and were signed, as appears, by officers of each company.
The stock was originally issued in this duplicate or combined form. These combined certificates were subsequently canceled, and were
separately
rewritten and issued. The contract of subscriptions of the several defendants to the stock of the two companies, and
upon which it is claimed that the defendants
herein are answerable for the unpaid 50 per
:ent. thereof, is as follows: "We, the underof
signed subscribers hereto, In consideration
to the capital stock
3ach other's subscription
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for an insurance company in the state of Iowa
and the state of Nebraska, to be organized in
both states separately, and after the organization to be consolidated, to be known as the
Iowa and Nebraska State Insurance Company,
for the purpose of carrying fire and lightning,
windstorm and tornado, insurance, business
to be done under the laws of both states, do
hereby subscribe and agree to pay and secure
as provided by the laws of said states the
several
sums
set opposite
our respective
names, if such an insurance organization
is
perfected, and on demand, to the secretary
thereof, on or before the 12th day of March,
shares of
1883." Under this subscription,
stock of $100 each were issued to the subscribing stockholders, one-half of such shares
being issued to them in the Iowa company,
and one-half in the Nebraska company.
The
defendants paid 50 per cent, of their several
subscriptions
upon the stock of the Nebraska
& Iowa Insurance Company at the time of its
as required by the laws of the
organization,
Nothing more was ever
state of Nebraska.
paid upon the stock except in the manner indicated hereafter.
The defendants in this action, who had been subscribers to the capital
stock of the consolidated
company, and to
whom had been issued the joint certificates of
stock in the Iowa and Nebraska companies,
had surrendered their stock, and new stock
had been issued to the parties purchasing
from them. These purchasers, as the record
shows, were in large part the original proUpon the organizamoters of the company.
tion of the company, one-half of the capital
stock subscribed being paid in cash, the promissory notes of the subscribers, payable on demand and secured, were given in payment of
the other one-half of the stock of the corporation.
Prior to 1887, these defendants had
transferred the stock Issued to them, by a surrender of their stock, and reissuance of other
the company
certificates
to the purchasers;
the
accepting the surrender, and recognizing
transfer, returning the stock notes of the defendants, and accepting the stock notes of the
transferee in lieu thereof.
This was done, as
shown by the record, at a time when the corporation was solvent, and the transfers were
made and new stock issued to solvent purchasers; all being done in good faith on the
part of the corporation, the transferror, and
Practically, the entire stock
the transferees.
passed into the hands of a syndicate composof the
ed in large part of original promoters
corporation,
consolidated
but not including
any of these defendants.
From the date of
ceased to
these transfers, these defendants
have any connection with or control over the
corporation.
The district court entered judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed.
Affirmed.

B. & A. C. Wakley and Flickinger Bros.,
for appellant
Harl & McCabe, Finley
Burke, Wright & Baldwin, Sanders & Stuart,
John T. Stone, and C. R. Marks, for appellees.
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GRANGER, J. It will be well to repeat
that this action is by a receiver appointed to
wind up the afifairs of the Nebraska Fire Insurance Company, on the application of one
of its stockholders,
to recover from the defendants on their subscriptions to the original
enterprise, wherein was contemplated the organization of two companies, — one in Nebraska, to be known as the Nebraska & Iowa Insurance Company, and one in Iowa, to be
known as the Iowa & Nebraska Insurance
Company;
the two companies to be thereafter consolidated.
The first-named company
was orgaaized under the laws of Nebraska,
and located at the city of Omaha, in that
state; and the latter under the laws of Iowa,
and located at the city of Council Bluffs, in
Iowa.
The consolidation
was never made,
and the latter company was changed to that
of the Western Home of Sioux City, and its
place of business
changed to Sioux City,
Iowa, about May, 1885.
The Nebraska &
Iowa Company was changed to the Nebraska
Fire Insurance Company, and continued to
operate until 1891, when the Insurance department of Nebraska withdrew its certificates authorizing the company to do business,
and, on the application of one of its stockholders, its insolvency was decreed; and the
plaintiff Is now engaged in winding up its
affairs, and this action is in aid of that
purpose.
The action has for a legal basis a provision
or the constitution
of Nebraska, as follows
(section 4, art. 11): "Liabilities of Subscribers
to Stock.
In all cases of claims against corporations and joint-stock associations, the exact amount due shall be first ascertained,
and after the corporate property shall have
original subscribers
exhausted,
been
the
thereof shall be individually liable to the exand the
tent of their unpaid subscriptions,
liability for unpaid subscriptions shall follow
the stock." Dismissing
for the moment the
effect of an arbitrary legal liability, which
must be respected and enforced when known,
there Is not, in view of the entire record in
this case, an equitable consideration favorable
The
to a recovery against these defendants.
present liabilities of the Nebraska corporation
cannot truthfully be said to have accrued in
consequence of, or with reliance upon, the
former connection of these defendants with
the enterprise from which sprang the present
These facts are Important as aidcompany.
ing in the solution of a legal proposition, urged by appellees, to the effect that this action
cannot be maintained in Iowa, because it is
brought by a receiver of a Nebraska corporation to enforce a provision of the law of that
state; the claim being that such a proceeding
can only be had as a result of comity between the states, and that the basis of such
an exercise is that the citizens of the state
granting it shall not be thereby prejudiced or
Admitting, for the sake of arguinjured.
ment, the rule that comity controls as to the
authority of plaintiff to sue in this state, and,

as we have in effect said, the record leaves us
without doubt that Its exercise should be deof
nied, because It would be in contravention
the rights of our citizens, and operate to their

injury.
Upon the question of the absolute right of
plaintiff to sue in this state, we are not without precedent in our own decisions; and while,
In announcing a rule, we have recognized the
fact of a conflict of authority, we are not persuaded by the argument In this case that a
change should be made, or the rule modified.
Stress is given in argument to the fact that
in Nebraska gives
the order of appointment
to the receiver authority to bring suits in
other states. That authority is valuable as an
aid to secure the right to do so in the state
where the privilege is sought, and is judiciously granted;
but it is without efficiency to
create such a right independent of sanction
within the state. The case of Booth v. Clark,
17 How. 321, contains a somewhat exhaustive
consideration of the question of the right of
a receiver appointed In one state to bring a
suit for the possession of property in another
state, and it is there said: "He has no extranone
territorial power of official action;
which the court appointing him can confer,
with authority to enable him to go into a foreign jurisdiction to take possession of the
none which can give, upon
debtor's property;
the principle of comity, a privilege to sue In a
foreign court or another jurisdiction, as the
judgment creditor himself might have done,
where

his

debtor

may

be

amenable

to the

An
tribunal which the creditor may seek."
underlying thought of the rule seems to be
that, within the jurisdiction of one's appointment as receiver, he is amenable in his official
capacity to the courts, and he may exercise
his authority under the law of the jurisdiction; while, in a foreign jurisdiction, the law
does no more than to make the person entering it amenable to its laws, and in no way
recognizee the official capacity.
As a citizen
in a jurisdiction foreign to his residence, he
has a legal status, and is amenable to, and
may invoke the protection of, the law. As an
officer of a court from a foreign jurisdiction.
Be has, and is entitled to, no legal recognition,
except as the courts may, in their discretion,
grant it, because he is without the official obligation that he assumed in his own jurisdiction, and which is essential to a proper
and safe exercise of such power.
In Ayres v.
Siebel, 82 Iowa, 347, 47 N. W. 989, we denied
the right of a trustee, appointed by the court
in Indiana, to sue and recover on a contract in
this state; and in Parker v. Lamb & Sons,
99 Iowa, 265, 68 N. W. 686, we denied such a
right to a receiver, and cited the Ayres-Siebel
In Parker v. Lamb & Sons, we quoted
Case.
approvingly from High, Rec. § 289, as fol"Upon the question of the territorial
lows:
extent of a receiver's jurisdiction and power
for the purpose of instituting actions connected with his receivership,
the prevailing doctrine established by the supreme court of the
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States, and sustained by the weight
of authority in various states, is that the receiver has no extraterritorial jurisdiction or
power of ofQcial action, and cannot go into a
foreign state or jurisdiction, and there institute a suit for the recovery of demands due

TJnitea

the person or estate subject to his receivership.
His functions and powers, for the purpose of litigation, are held to be limited to the
courts of the state in which he was appointed;
and the principles of comity between states
and nations which recognize the judicial decisions of one tribunal as conclusive on another do not apply to such a case, and will
not warrant a receiver in bringing an action
In a foreign court or jurisdiction."
These
authorities are broad and conclusive, and, unless we are to se them aside, are conclusive
of this ease. CoUi-sel have shown gpreat zeal
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and tact in presenting authorities more or less
In point, and' we aclsnowledge somewhat of
a conflict, as we have done in other eases ; but
the weight of authority we regard as in line
with our holdings, and we are not disposed to
Beach on Receivers (section
disturb them.
680) states the same rule, and cites Booth v.
Claris, supra, from which we have quoted,
"The rule thus laid down by
and then says:
the supreme court of the United States has
been followed by other courts with essential
unanimity, and can hardly be said to be seriously questioned."
In Fitzgerald v. Construction Co. (Neb.) 59 N. W. 838, these authorities are approvingly cited and applied.
It remains for us to state as a conclusion that the
plaintiff is not entitled to recover In the courts
of Iowa, and the judgment of the district
court will be affirmed.

RECEIVERS.

882

AMEUICAN

BISCUIT
KLOTZ

& MFG.
et al.

CO.

this hearing.
The recital thus given shows
that, in sin order inverted from what would

v.

be expected,

(44 Fed. 721.)

Circuit Court,

In Equity.
T.

J.

E. D. Louisiana.

January

1891.

and.
Semmes
Bayne, for complainant.
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PER CURIAM. This cause is submitted
upon au application for a receiver.
Some
time In May last, the defendant Klotz, and
Fitzpatrick, his partner, composing the firm
of B. Klotz & Co., sold to the complainant
manufactory
their biscuit and confectionery
for the price of $259,000, and an assumption
of the debts of B. Klotz & Co., amounting to
which it was understood and agreed
$42,000,
should be paid out of the income from the
future business.
The visible property was
estimated to be of the value of $101,000, and
the good-will of the business to be of the
value of $200,000.
The price was paid in
corporation,
stock of the complainant's
estimated to be of value at par; that is, to be
worth 100 cents on the face value. The purchase was completed, price paid, property delivered, the factory and good-will transferred
Klotz
by Klotz & Co. to the complainant.
leased his bakery premises to complainant
for the term of years, and contracted in writing to become, and did become, the agent of
per
at a salary of $
the complainant,
year.
Klotz continued to carry on the business as agent for the complainant down to
some time in November, when he repudiated
the sale and the lease, erased the name of
complainant from the bakery, as agent,
transferred the policies of insurance from the
complainant to himself, as an individual, then
to B. Klotz & Co., and, for and in the name
of the late firm, resumed the possession of
all the property he had sold to the complainant, and the conduct of the business of
establishthe bakery and the confectionery
He did this without resort to any
ment.
He thereafter held poslegal proceedings.
session adversely to the complainant, and exIn this state of
cluded it from the bakery.
things, the complainant filed its bill for an
and for an account and for a reinjunction,
ceiver, against Klotz and W. A. Schall, who
was alleged to be co-operating with him in
the possession adverse to the complainant.
Klotz has filed an answer, and he, together
with his former partner, Fitzpatrick, who
intervened by petition pro mteresse suo, have
of the
filed a cross-bill asking a rescission
entire transaction, i. e., the sale and the
the stock which had
lease, and tendering
been received by them as the consideration
of the sale. Numerous exhibits and affidavits have been adduced by each party upon

which

we have

before

us a cause

in

party who has sold and delivered a
business to another, and become his agent,
and, as such agent, was in possession of the
a

property sold, sets up a possession adverse
to his principal, asks for a cancellation of the
sale, and the purchaser and principal asks
that the agent shall account, shall be enjoined from asserting any claim hostile to his
principal,— in a word, for a confirmation of
its rights under the purchase.
The immediate question before us is, what
disposition shall be made of the res, the
business of the bakery and manufactory,
pending this contest?
The vendor and agent
asks that he be allowed to remain in adverse possession.
The purchaser and principal asks for a receiver.
It is clear that,
as to this provisional disposition of the res,
the defendant
Klotz cannot be allowed to
gain anything by his ouster of his vendee
and principal.
He must stand with those
equities, and none other, which existed before the ouster. The case as to the appointment of a receiver must be reviewed and
determined as if he (Klotz) had filed hia bill
averring possession as agent, which he asked to have changed by a decree into a possession as owner, through the cancellation
of the sale and the lease; that is, he must
aver a legal title in the American Biscuit iV:
Manufacturing Company, which he seeks to
If, as in this
have avoided and annulled.
case, he seeks to do all this by reason of
fraud, and he establishes the fraud, a court
of equity wUl not refuse to hear him.
He
would not be estopped, for fraud vitiates and
sets aside even estoppels.
Herm. Estop, par.
22, p. 244; Pendleton v. Richey, 32 Pa. 58,
But, while he is not estopped from pro63.
ceeding to set aside the sale and the lease
by reason of his agency and his obligations
as trustee, he comes into court assailing and
seeking to cancel a legal title; for until that
is done his possession is that of the complainant. Under these circumstances,
until
the hearing,
the practice in the courts of
chancery is not to disturb the possession under the legal title prior to the final decree,
wrong is estabunless a case of monstrous
lished.
Stllwell V. Wilkins, Jac. 280, reported in full in Edwards on Receivers,
p. 28,
Lord Eldon, when a similar question was
presented, observed:
"The point that struck
me was whether, on a bill to impeach a sale
for fraud, the court interposes so strongly
before the hearing as to take away the possession from persons holding it under the
effect of deeds not yet set aside by decree,"
—and he holds that "it was not the general
habit of the court"
There the case was so
monstrous, and the proof was so strong, that
"it was hardly possible that the transaction
could stand," and the legal title was inter-

fered with.
This is a leading

case, and gives what we
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find is the rule.
The possession under the
title is not disturbed unless the proof of
fraud is so strong as to lead the court to the
clear conviction that it will, on the final
hearing, he established.
The fraud set up
and relied upon by the defendant and intervenor is false and fraudulent representations by the agents of the complainant in
this: that they represented that the stock
was fully paid-up stock, whereas, in truth
and fact, it was none of it paid up in money,
and only paid up in part, and, to the extent
of that part, by transfer of plants or bakeries
and manufactories at an estimated value as
capital. The stock delivered to the defendant and Intervenor was not paid up until it
was issued to them, and was paid for by a
transfer of the bakery and good-will; and
then it became paid up, and they were discharged from all liability to be made to conThe testribute as shareholders therefor.
timony as to what was represented by complainant's agents about the stock being paid
up is conflicting; but, when viewed in conunder which
nection with the circumstances
the stock was received, fails to satisfy us,
upon this preliminary hearing, that any false
representations
are proved
to have been
made.
The case of the defendant and intervenor, set up in their cross-bill, whereby
they oppose the appointment of a receiver, is
that of parties who seek to rescind a deed
on the ground of fraud, which upon this
hearing they fail to establish.
So far we have considered the question of
appointing a receiver of the property in controversy inter partes, and mainly from the
by the defendant's
presented
stand-point
showing, and thereon such appointment seems
proper, and we should accord it, but for an
aspect of the case originally suggested by
the defendant, when the case was pending in
the state court, apparently abandoned here,
but sufficiently brought to our notice by the
We are not satisfied
exhibits of both parties.
that the complainant's business is legitimate.
While the nominal purpose of the complainant's corporation, as stated in its charter, is
the manufacture and sale of biscuit and confectionery, its real scope and purpose seems
to be to combine and pool the large competing bakeries throughout the country into
practically what is known and called a
"trust," the effect of which is to partially, if
not wholly, prevent competition, and enhance
prices of necessary articles of food, and secure, if not a monopoly, a large control, of the
supply and prices in leading articles of breadstuffs. The case shows that an insignificant
number of shares of complainant's stock was

unconditionally

subscribed

for,

apparently

enough to qualify directors; but the great
mass was taken and held by irresponsible
parties, to be used in parceling out as fullpaid stock to such leading and successful
bakeries throughout the country as could be
induced to come in on an agreed value of the
property and a large estimate of good-will.
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Each bakery when secured to be carried on
by its former managers, subject, however, as
of funds, ten'itory, prices, and
to control
all
competition, to the central management;
profits pooled, and of course division thereof
to be made on the basis of the stock assigned to each bakery. Under this arrangement
complainant has already secured the control,
and pooled the business, of 36 of the leading
bakeries in 12 different states of the West
and South, and is evidently seeking more constituents. The act of congress approved July
2, 1890, entitled "An act to protect trade and
commerce against unlawful restraints and
expressly prohibits, under semonopolies,"
vere penalties, "every contract, combination,
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
Ihe several states," and declares punishable
or at"every person who shall monopolize,
tempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons to monopolize, any part of the common trade or comThe enmerce among the several states."
forcement of this act is, by the statute, devolved upon the circuit courts of the United
States.
The first and third sections of an act
of the legislature of Louisiana, approved July
5, 1890, entitled "An act to protect trade and
commerce against unlawful restraints and
monopolies, and to provide penalties for the
violation of this act," declare:
"Section 1. That every contract, combination in the form of trust, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce, or to fix or limit the amount or quantity of any article,
commodity, or merchandise to be manufactured, mined, produced,
or sold in this state, is
hereby declared illegal."
"Sec. 3. That every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons to monopolize, any part of the trade
or commerce within the limits of this state,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one
year, or by both said punishments,
in the
discretion of the court."
In construing the federal and state statutes, we exclude from consideration all monopolies which exist by legislative grant; for
we think the word "monopolize"
cannot be
intended
to be used with reference to the
acquisition of exclusive rights under government concession, but that the law-maker has
used the word to mean "to aggregate"
or
"concentrate"
in the hands of few, practically, and, as a matter of fact, and according to
the known results of human action, to the
exclusion of others; to accomplish this end
by what, in popular language, is expressed in
the word "pooling," which may be defined
of property or capital
to be an aggregation
belonging to different persons, with a view to
The exprescommon liabilities and profits.
sion in each law "combination in the form
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of trust" would seem to point to just what,
in popular language, is meant by pooling.
Now it is to be observed that these statutes outline an offense, but require for its
complete commission no ulterior motive, such
as to defraud, etc.; and, further, that the
language is altogether
silent as to what
means must be used to constitute the offense.
The offense is defined to "combine in the
form of trust, or otherwise, in restraint of
trade or commerce," and "to monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, any of the trade or
commerce."
To compass
either
of these
things, with no other motive than to compass
them, and by any means, constitutes the offense.
One just and decisive test of the
meaning of the expression "to monopolize"
is obtained by getting at the evil which the
law-malier has endeavored to abolish and restrict. The statutes show that the evil was
the hindrance and oppression in trade and
commerce wrought by its absorption in the
hands of the few, so that the prices would be
in danger of being arbitrarily and exorbitantly fixed, because all competition would be
swallowed up, so that the man of small
means would find himself excluded from the
restrained or monopolized trade or commerce
as absolutely as if kept out by law or force.
If this is the meaning of the defining words,
thus glutted with
does not this corporation,
the 35 industries of 12 states, disclose an
"attempt to monopolize?"
So far, therefore,
business is a combinaas the complainant's
tion in restraint of trade, or is an "attempt
to monopolize, or combine, in the form of a
trust, or otherwise, any part of trade or commerce," as these words are properly defined,
the law stamps it as unlawful, and the courts
should not encourage it. Aside from tnis, the
complainant's business, even if lawful, being
of the kind shown above, is not of that meritorious kind that it should be encouraged by

a court of equity. The appointment of a receiver by a court of equity is not a matter
Fosof strict right, but of judicial discretion.
dick V. Schall, 99 U. S. 235. It falls within
that class of interlocutory remedies whicli
courts must grant or withhold, according to
exercised, upon a
conscientiously
a discretion
consideration
of all the facts which a cause
presents, involving the rights of the parties
and the interests of the public. The attempt
in the hands of a single orto accumulate
ganization the business of supplying bread
itself to so large a portion of the poor, as
well as the rich, people of the United States
should not be favored by a court of equity.
It carries with it too much of danger of excluding healthy competition, thereby increasing the diflSculty to the general public of
participating in a most useful business, as
well as adding to the possibility of multiat least,
tudes of citizens being temporarily,
compelled to pay an arbitrary and high price
for daily food.
Whatever we may feel compelled to do, on
the final hearing of this cause, towards recognizing the complainant's legal rights, and
compelling a faithless trustee to account, we
are clear tliat at this preliminary stage, with
our present impressions of the character and
general scope of complainant's business, the
court ought not, by the appointment of a reand
ceiver, to aid complainant to perfect,
perhaps to enlarge, his combination or trust;
and the refusal to appoint a receiver can result in no serious and lasting injury to complainant, because the shares of stock of complainant company, forming the entire consideration of complainant's purchase, have been
tendered In court, and may be impounded,
to be held as security for any damages susceptible of proof resulting from defendant's
of the property pending the
mismanagement
The motion for a receiver is denied.
suit.
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Appeal from circuit court, Lincoln county.
PuUings, Hoyt & Holway and D. S. Ordway, for appellants Murray Haywood and
SllYerthorn, Hurley & Ryan, for
another.
respondents Lincoln Lumber Co. and others.
ORTON, J. This is an action brought by
the appellants to foreclose a mortgage given
by the defendant lumber company, by its
president
and secretary,
to the said appellants and the defendant T. P. Matthews and
one George O. Smith, on the fourth day of
February, 1884, on all of the real property of
said corporation, to secure a bond in the penal
given at the same time by
sum of $100,000,
said company, to said mortgagees, conditioned to pay them certain indebtedness of the
company past due them, respectively, in the
The interest in
aggregate of over $50,000.
said mortgage of said George C. Smith was
The defendant
assigned to said plaintiffs.
Robert O. Parcher was appointed receiver in
April, 1884, in a suit of one .T. C. Clark
and said Parcher, as
against said company;
such receiver, in June, 1884, loaned of the" defendant the First National Bank of the City
of Wausau the sum of $10,000, to be used in
the management of the business and property
and, by the order
of said lumber company;
and leave of the court, executed, as such receiver, a mortgage upon the real property of
said company to said bank to secure the
The said defendant Parcher and the
same.
defendant the Lincoln Lumber Company answered the complaint, .alleging, substantially,
that the said mortgage sought to be foreclosed
was executed by the president and secretary
of said company, without authority; and
that, at the time, said corporation was insolvent, to the Icnowledge of said mortgagees,
and
and owed large indebtedness to others;
that said mortgage was given by said officers, and authorized, if at all, by the directors
of said company to be given to themselves,
to secure their own claims against the company, as an unlawful and fraudulent preferas the creditors of the
ence of themselves
in fraud and with Intent to decompany,
fraud the other creditors and the company,
and that said bond and mortgage were thereThe said defendant the National
fore void.
Bank answered, setting up its mortgage by
the receiver, and alleging its priority to the
in suit by the agreement of the
mortgage
in said mortgage, and prays a
mortgagees
The circuit court subthereof.
foreclosure
stantially held that said mortgage was given
because the majority of
without authority,
the quorum of the directors voting that said
bond and mortgage be given were interested
in the same, and that said company was then
insolvent; and that the directors held the

property in trust for the
execution of said mortgage
by the authority of the
to secure their
selves
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creditors,

and

the

by the officers and

to themdirectors
claims
antecedent
against the company was an unlawful preference, and was fraudulent and void; and that
the said mortgage to the bank has priority,
and was lawfully executed by said receiver.
The special findings are numerous, and the
but the above are believed
case voluminous;
to be substantially the findings, and upon th3
substantial issues in the case.
In this suit are
The principles
involved
really very simple, and almost elementary,
and we cannot
and not at all complicated;
but think they have been greatly magnified
and more earnestly contested on account of
The plaintiffs
the amount in controversy.
contest the power of the receiver, Parcher, to
give the mortgage to the bank on the ground
of the want of jurisdiction of the court to appoint him or any one receiver in the case of
These plaintiffs
Clark against the company.
were directors of the company, and one of them
the secretary, and both mortgagees, when the
such receiver,
said Parcher was appointed
and as directors and as mortgagees counseled
and consented
and advised his appointment,
thereto, and the directors over and over again
recognized and confirmed it by dealing with
him as such, and placing the property of the
company in his hands; and, after his appointment, the plaintiffs, together with the defendas said mortgagees, by writant Matthews,
ing under seal, authorized the said receiver to
and give a
borrow not exceeding $15,000,
mortgage on the property of the company in
his hands to secure it, for the purpose of carrying on the business in running the mills
and sawing up the logs, and released their
said mortgage so far as it would have preference of the mortgage so given by the receiver, and so as to give the same priority to
There is abundant evitheir said mortgage.
dence of the plaintiffs' estoppel to dispute the
authority of said receiver, both in pais and
by deed. But accepting the allegations of the
coinplaint in that case as true, the court notonly had I the power, but it was its duty, to
appoint a receiver. The directors and officers
had given the mortgage in suit alleged to be
in fraud of the creditors of the company,
nearly or quite insolvent af the time, and
threatened afterwards to sell out in gross all
the property of the company without notice,
and to bid the same off in their own names
and for their own benefit, in fraud of many
other creditors of the company, and in this
way to close up the business of the company.
These are some of the substantial allegations .
of the complaint of Clark, the plaintiff, who
was himself one of the stockholders of the
company.
Within the general powers of a
court of chancery, which are preserved in the
fifth subdivision of section 2787, Rev. St.,
this was a proper case for an injunction and
The property of the company
receiver both.
was being mismanaged, and was ia danger
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of being lost to the stockholders
tbiough the collusion and fraud
and directors.
The only place
the business and property of
was in the "hand" of the court

and creditors

of its officers
ot safety for

the company
through a reA stronger case for a
ceiver iiendente lite.
receiver could scarcely be made, and the numerous authorities cited in the able brief of
the learned counsel of the respondents, and
the facts stated in the complaint, abundantly
authorize and justify his appointment In that
case.
We think the circuit court properly
held that the court had jurisdiction to appoint
Parcher a receiver; and, upon the evidence,
properly found that the mortgage to the bank
■was not only valid, but has priority over the
Under repeated decisions
mortgage in suit.
of this court, the exceptions of the respondent cannot he considered, except to support
the judgment rendered, unless the respondent
Therefore this court cannot go
also appeal.
further than the circuit court in ordering a
foreclosure of the bank mortgage in this action.
But the matter of this bank mortgage is of
The
only incidental importance in this case.
main question is of the validity of the mortThere veas abundant evidence
gage in suit.
to justify the finding of the circuit court that
at the time it was given the company was inIn such case, the authorities seem to
solvent.
be uniform that the directors and officers of
are trustees of the creditors,
the corporation
and

must

manage

Its

property

and

assets

with strict regard to their interests; and. if
they are themselves creditors while the Inis under their managesolvent corporation
ment, they cannot secure to themselves any
preference or advantage over other creditors.
The directors are, then, trustees of all the
property of the corporation, for all of its creditors, and an equal distribution must be made,
and no preference to any one of the creditors,
and much less to the directors or trustees, as
I have carefully examined all the ausuch.
thorities cited on both sides touching this
principle, and find it recognized in every case.
Many of the authorities cited by the learned
counsel of the appellants as holding a contrary doctrine state this doctrine as fully estabUshed, and cite many of the authorities in
its favor cited here by the learned counsel of
the respondents, and cases are made an exception only because, in their facts, this prinIt is reiterated in
ciple has no application.
the text of elementary works, and numerous
cases are cited to sustain it. Mor. Priv. Corp.
A few only of the cases holding
579-581.
this principle will be cited here, but many
others may be found in the brief of counsel
for citation.
too numerous
and elsewhere
Marr v. Bank, 4 Cold. 471, 484; Koehler v.
Iron Co., 2 Black, 715; Curran v. ji.rkansas,
15 How. 306; Richards v. Insurance Co., 43
N. H. 263; Bradley v. Farwell, Holmes, 433;
Drury v. Cross, 7 Wall. 299; Paine v. Railroad Co., 31 Ind. 353; Gaa-light Co. v. Terhave been unable
rell, L. R. 10 Eq. 168.

I

to find a single case, which in Its facts is like
this, in which this doctrine is even questioned
and was not strictly applied.
But there is another principle equally unquestionable which renders the mortgage in
suit void.
The directors and officers made the
mortgage, or directly caused it to be made, to
They occupied a fiduciary relathemselves.
tion to the corporation, its stockholders,
and
its creditors, and they had no right to use
such relation and their official position for
their own benefit, to the injury of others in
equal right.
This principle was applied to
the taking of a mortgage by the directors on
the property of the corporation to secure their
liability as sureties, upon a note of the corporation, in Corbett v. Woodward, 5 Sawy.
403, Fed. Cas. No. 3,223, which is a strong
case, and very similar is the case of Koehler
See, also, Mor. Priv. Corp.
V. Iron Co., supra.
Hoyle v. Railroad Co., 54 N. Y. 314;
243;
Railway Co. v. Poor, 59 Me. 277; Butts v.
Wood, 38 Barb. 188; Railway Co. v. Huxon,
19 Eng. Law & Eq. 365;
Scott v. Depeyster,
1 Edw. Ch. 513;
and Verplanck v. Insurance
Co., Id. 85; Railway Co. v. Magnay, 25 Beav.
586; 1 Perry, Trusts, § 194, and cases cited.
But it is really unnecessary to cite cases from
abroad when the same principles have been
established in our own cases, as in Cook v.
Berlin Woolen Mills, 43 Wis. 434, and Pickett
25 Wis. 553.
V. School-district,
Directors,
officers, and agents, and other
like trustees, cannot mortgage or convey to
themselves any more than one can contract
The idea that the same perwith himself.
of themsons constitute different identities
selves by being called directors or officers of
so that, as directors or officers,
a corporation,
they can convey or mortgage to or contract
with themselves as private persons, is in violation of common sense. In re Taylor Orphan Asylum, 36 Wis. 552, and cases above
cited.
See 1 Perry, Trusts, § 207, and Mor.
Priv. Corp. § 245; Walworth County Bank v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 16 Wis. 629;
Coal Co. V. Sherman, 30 Barb. 553.
It is unnecessary to decide the question
whether there was a quorum of disinterested
directors that directed the mortgage to be
given.
The mortgage is an entirety, and it
makes no difference how many persons are
severally interested in it as mortgagees.
If
authorized it,
such mortgagees, as directors,
they authorized an act in which they were
They may not have
all jointly interested.
been joint creditors, but they are joint mortgagees, because the mortgage as a security
in this view, the
Whether,
is an entirety.
mortgage was never authorized to be given by
the president and secretary of the company,
by the company through its directors, it may
not be necessary to decide; but it seems to
me rather illogical to say that, because there
is a quorum of directors who are creditors
severally, a majority of them may authorize
their claims to be secured by one mortgage,
and do not act on their own claims, but each
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one acts In respect to the claims of the other.
If A., B., and C. are several creditors and a
quorum of directors, and A. and B. vote to
give C. an interest in the mortgage to secure
his claim, A. and 0. so vote as to the claim
of B., and B. and 0. as to the claim of A.,—
do they not vote for themselves in respect to
one mortgage?
This would be an ingenious
and convenient collusion to vote to themselves
all the property of the corporation at almost
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any time, on the ground that the majority so
voting is disinterested and impartial.
But it is very clear to us that the mortgage is void in view of the above principles,
and that disposes of the action of foreclosure.
Beyond that, the findings of the court are not
very important as to the rights of the defendants.

The judgment of the circuit court

firmed.

is

af-
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the general relief sought cannot be obtained,
S
the appoifitment ought not to be made.
Pom. Eq. Jut. (2d Ed.) § 1331; High, Rec.
110,
104
Ala.
South.
297.)
(16
(2d Ed.) § 8; Randle v. Carter, 62 Ala. 95.
It Is true, as a general rule, that, in making
Aug. 9, 1894.
Supreme Court of Alabama,
or refusing the appointment of a receiver,
Appeal from district court, Lauderdale
the court will not forestall or anticipate the
county; W. P. Chitwood, Judge.
decision which may be made on final hearSuit by the United States Savings & Loan
ing.
This is true when a case is presented
Company against the Bank of Florence and
probaupon which there is a reasonable
others.
Prom a decree appointing a receivbility the plaintiff may ultimately obtain
er, defendants appeal.
Reversed.
relief. In such cases the pleadings . may
In addition to the allegations of the bill,
not be drawn with technical accuracy.
The
which are stated in the opinion, and upon
bill may be subject to demurrer for the want
which is predicated the right to have the reof proper parties, or because of defects of
ceiver appointed,
the bill also averred that
form or the absence of substantial allegathe ofllcers of the bank had, wrongfully and
tions, — insufficiencies
curable by amendment.
without authority of Its stockholders, turned
These Insufficiencies,
of themselves, do not
over the assets of the bank to one S. S.
form an impediment to the appointment of a
Broadus, who had assumed complete control
receiver, if a case be made by a party havof the same, and that he was pursuing recking interests to be protected and preserved
less methods in disposing of the assets of
entitling him to the general relief which Is
said bank.
prayed.
Ex parte Walker, 25 Ala. 81.
The relation between the complainant and
Roulhac & N.athan and Emmet O'Neal,
the Bank of Florence was that of principal
for appellants.
Paul Hodges, for appellee.
and agent, created by their agreement,— a
legal relation sti-ictly, though, to attain the
BRICKELL, C. J. The material allegaends of justice, and preserve the confidence
tions of the original bill, on which is prediit involves, courts of equity, under some circated the right to the appointment
of a recumstances, deal with it as a fiduciary relaceiver, and the right to the ultimate equitable
tion.
The debt ci-eated by the breach of
relief which is prayed, are capable of being
duty of the agent is a mere simple contract
reduced to a narrow compass.
The comdebt, for the recovery of which legal remeplainant is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Minnedies are adequate.
Crothei-s v. Lee, 29 Ala.
337; Knotts v. Tarver, 8 Ala. 743.
sota, having a place of business rn the city
The demand being a simple contract debt, purely of
of Florence, in this state. The Bank of
a legal character, the complainant, in the abFlorence was engaged in a general banking
sence of some peculiar equity, is not entitled
business at Florence, and became the agent
of complainant for the collection of moneys | to the intervention of a court of equity to enReese v. Bradford, 13
there due and owing, and which were to ' force its payment.
Ala. 888; Sanders v. Watson, 14 Ala. 198.
become due, and was charged with the duty
principles are not conThese well-recognized
of remitting such moneys to the complainant
troverted.
The insistence is that as the agent
Neglecting the duty of remitas collected.
converted to his own use the money of the
tance of these moneys, the bank suffered the
principal, commingling it with his own monsum of $538.80 to accumulate
in its hands,
ey, or in some form with his other assets, so
Though insolvent,
and suspended payments.
that it cannot be identified or the specific
the bank made no transfer or assignment of
uses to which it was applied traced, it Is sufIts property and assets, but proceeded in
winding up its affairs, with the acquiescence
ficient to trace it into the general assets of
Judgments were being renthe agent to impress them with a trust for
of its creditors.
the payment of the money,— a trust which is
dered against it, and it was making prefercognizance.
peculiarly of equitable
ences In payment of its creditors.
These are
It is
of the bill, upon
the material allegations
true that a trustee or an agent or other perwhich is founded the right to the appointment
son standing in a fiduciary relation cannot
of a receiver; and the specific relief prayed
derive benefit from commingling with his
Is that, for the payment of the sum due, the
own the moneys of his cestui que trust or
complainant be decreed a lien on all the
principal; and it is equally true that, if he
of such moneys, a
makes an investment
assets of the bank, in priority of all general
liens, by which we supijose is Intended in
court of equity, so long as the moneys may
priority of all creditors not having a specific
be distinctly traced, will follow them, and
the trust to
impress upon the investment
lien.
When an application is made for the
appointment of a receiver, the primary inwhich the moneys were subject. The conquiry is whether there is shown a reasonable
version of the trust moneys, as distinguished
probability that the plaintiff asking the apfrom other moneys of the trustee or agent,
It is not sufflciept
pointment win ultimately succeed in obtainmust be clearly shown.
ing the general relief sought by the suit. If
to show that there has been a conversion of
trust funds, and the acquisition or possesultimate success is a matter of grave doubt,
or if, as in the present case, it be clear that
sion by the trustee or agent of property or
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assets, which may be supposed a substitute
for such funds. As is said by the supreme
court of Massachusetts: "The court will go
as far as it can in tracing and following
trust money; but when, as a matter of fact,
it cannot be traced, the equitable right of the
cestui aue trust to follow it fails. Under
such circumstances,
if the trustee has become bankrupt, the court cannot say that
the trust money is to be found somewhere in
the general estate of the trustee that still remained.
He may have lost it with property
®f his own, and in such case the cestui que
trust can only come in and share with the
general creditors." Little v. Chadwick, 151
Mass. 109, 23 N. E. 1005. There is no question of tracing or identifying the moneys of
the principal. The naked averment
of the
bill is that, in violation of duty, the agent
converted to his own use the moneys of the
principal, creating a mere simple contract
debt.
There is no averment that the assets
upon which it is sought to fasten the trust
had not been acquired by the agent before
the conversion; no averment that in any
form the moneys of the principal entered into their acquisition.
All that can be said is
that which may be said of any delinquent
trustee or agent,— that he had converted the
moneys of his cestui que trust or principal;
and from the business in which the agent
was engaged it may be presumed that,' in
the course of the business, they were commingled and used with the moneys of the
agent.
If a trust were raised to charge the
assets of the agent, a like trust would arise
and be fastened on the general assets of
every delinquent agent or trustee, — a trust
which would prevail against all others than
bona fide purchasers.
The moneys of the
principal are incapable of being identified
and traced into any of the assets of the bank,
and, this being true, the principal, we repeat, is a mere simple contract creditor of
the agent, not entitled to any preference or
priority of payment over other creditors.
Ellison V. Moses, 95 Ala. 223, 11 South. 347;
Association v. Austin (Ala.) 13 South. 908.
It is quite an error to suppose that the two
cases chiefly relied on by counsel for the appellee (National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104
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In re Hallett's Estate, 13 Ch. Div.
It is apsupport a contrary doctrine.
parent the original bill is without equity, the
complainant is not entitled to the general relief sought, and the appointment of the receiver was erroneous.
If the case was of equitable cognizance, entitling the complainant to relief, a fatal objection to the regularity of the order appointing the receiver Is that it was made
A receivwithout notice to the defendants.
er may be appointed
without notice to the
defendant who is to be dispossessed of his
property or assets, but the cases in which notice may be dispensed with are exceptional.
There must be shown a strong case of pressing emergency, rendering immediate interU. S. 54;
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necessary before there is time to give
or it must be shown that notice
would jeopardize the delivery of the property over which the receivership
is to be ex-

ference
notice;

tended.
Moritz V. Miller, 87 Ala. 331, 6
South. 269; Dollins v. Lindsey, 89 Ala. 217,
7 South. 234.
The averment of the bill on
which the court below proceeded to the appointment without notice is expressed in
these words: "And complainant alleges the
necessity exists for the appointment of a receiver, to prevent the fui'ther unauthorized
and illegal action by the said Eroadus, and
to prevent irreparable injury and total destruction of the assets of the said bank." It
is not on such vague and indefinite allegations, the opinions or conclusions
of the
pleader, not accompanied by a statement of
the facts on which they are founded, that notice of a judicial proceeding
can be dispensed with, and parties deprived of the possession or control of property. The particusupposed
to
lar facts and circumstances
apcreate the necessity for the immediate
pointment should have been stated, submitting to the judgment of the court whether
pressing
necessity— the
they
created
the
Veremergency — for judicial
interference.
plank V. Insurance Co., 2 Paige, 438. Upon
the bin alone, without affidavits or other evidence, the appointment was made. The order appointing the receiver must be vacated
and annulled, and the cause remanded.
Reversed, rendered, and remanded.
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BUILDING

v.
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(45 Atl. 23, 90 Md. 85.)
Nov. 24, 1S99.
Court of Aw)eal9 of Maryland.
Appeal from circuit court of Baltimore
city; Henry Stockbridge, Judge.
Exceptions by the Dover Perpetual Building & Loan Association of Baltimore to the
auditor's account distributing the assets of
the South Baltimore Banli, refusing to allow
said building association to set off a deposit
against a note executed by it, and held by
the bank.
From an order sustaining the exceptions, William Colton and Simon P. Schott,
Affirmed.
receivers of the bank, appeal.
Argued before McSHERRY, C. J., and
PAGE, PBARCE, FOWLER, BOYD, and

SCHMUCKER,

JJ.

Wm. S. Bryan, Jr., and Martin Lehmayer,
L. P. Henninghausen and P.
for appellants.
0. Henninghausen, for appellee.
BOYD, J. A bill was filed In the court be;
low against the South Baltimore Bank, a corporation of this state, on the 24th day of
February, 1898, asking for the appointment
of a receiver, and that the bank be declared
insolvent. An answer was filed the same
day, admitting that the bank was insolvent,
and consenting to the appointment of a reOne of the appellants was appointed
ceiver.
on that day, and afterwards the other was
On the 1st day of
appointed
co-receiver.
June, 1898, a decree was passed adjudicating the bank insolvent, and determining it
The rewas so when this bill was filed.
ceivers proceeded with the discharge of their
duties, and in due course the case was referred to the auditor to state an account distributing the assets of the bank. When the
bill was filed, the bank held a promissory
note of the appellee for $1,000, which became due on March 2, 1896, and the appellee
At
had a deposit with the bank of $3S7.25.
the maturity of the note the appellee tendered the receiver then in office the sum of
In payment of said note, claiming
$642.75
the amount of the deposit as a set-off, and
demanded the note, but the receiver refused
Subsequently that
to accept that amount.
sum was accepted, under an agi'eement that
it should be credited on the note, without
prejudice to the receiver's claim for the balance, and that no suit should be instituted
until it was determined whether the appellee
was entitled to set off the deposit against
The auditor
the balance due on the note.
refused to allow the set-off, but distributed
to the appellee its proportion dividend as a
creditor. Exceptions were filed to the audit,
which were sustained, and a decretal order
was passed directing the receivers to allow
as a set-ofC
the association the deposit
against the balance due on the note. B^-om
that order this appeal was taken by the receivers, with the permission of the court; it

that there were a number
claims that would be afifected by
the decision.
The question, therefore, to be
determined by us, is whether the appellee is
entitled to set off the amount of its deposit
with the bank at the time of Its failure
against the balance due on the note, under
the circumstances we have stated.
Several
reasons have been assigned by the appellants
in support of the position that the appellee
is only entitled to receive a distribution on
the amount of the deposit, as other creditors are.
1. One ground relied on i^t the argument
was that a depositor in a banlv cannot maintain a suit for his deposit unless he has previously made a demand for it, and that no
lemand was made in this case. "It Is now
perfectly well settled that the relation between banker and customer, who pays money
into the bank, or to whose credit money is
received there on deposit, is the ordinary
relation of debtor and creditor." Hardy v.
Bank, 51 Md. 585.
And it is equally well
settled that a depositor cannot, as a general
rule, maintain an action to recover his deposit until he has first made a demand for
its payment.
3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d
Ed.) 838. But, while that is true, there may
be circumstances
under which no demand is
prior to bringing suit; and, on
necessary
page 839 of the volume of the Encyclopedia
of Law above referred to, it is said that
"where the bank has suspended, or where
for any other reason it would be manifestly
futile to make demand, none need be made."
In the case of Planters' Bank v. Farmers' &
Bank, 8 Gill. & J. 449, it was
Mechanics'
held that the necessity for a demand would
^-o dispensed with by the suspension
of specie payments and discontinuance of banking
operations by the bank, provided those acts
were known to the plaintiff, and from the
time of such knowledge the statute of limitations would begin to run.
It would have
been "manifestly futile to make demand" on
the bank or the receiver for the amount of
and, if the appellee had sued, the
deposit;
fact that a demand was not previously made
would not have defeated the action.
If the
bank had not failed, and had sued the appellee for the amount of the note, it would not
have been necessary for the latter to have
proven a demand for the deposit prior to
the time suit was instituted by the bank.
A
defendant can set off against a plaintiff's
demand a note of the plaintiff which maof the actured after the commencement
tion. Clarke v. Magruder, 2 Har. & J. 77.
As early as Whittlngton v. Bank, 5 Har. &
J. 489, our predecessors held that the defendant in an action by a bank on a promissory
note against him may set off against the
claim of the bank any money he has in bank,
and it is not intimated that a previous demand was necessary in order to enable him
The bank being a debtor to the
to do so.
depositor, the right to set off such deposit is
Delng represented

of other
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within the very terms of our statute; and
in a suit by the bank the claim for
the deposit can be set off, although no pre^
vious demand for it has been made.
That
being so, it would seem to be clear that no
demand would be necessary in order to enable the defendant to set oft the amount of
the deposit against a claim made by the receiver of the banli, if there be no other reason for not allowing it.
In Morse, Banks,
"Where the bank itself
§ 338, it is said:
stops payment and becomes insolvent, the
customer may avail himself, in set-off
against his indebtedness to the bank, of any
indebtedness of the bank to himself, — as, for
example, the balance due him on his deposit
So, also, even though the debt to
account.
him has not matured at the time of the insolvency."
This may be done whether a
had or had not been previously
demand
made.
Fort v. McaUly, 59 Barb. 87; Seymour V. Dunham, 24 Hun, 98.
2. We come then to the main question in
the case.
It is argued that to allow the set-off
would be, in effect, to give the appellee a
preference
over the other creditors of the
bank, and that it is the duty of the receivers
to distribute the assets pro rata, and hot to
If the appellee
pay in full any one creditor.
was merely a creditor, that argument might
prevail, but that was not the relation that existed between the two. The appellee was not
only a creditor to the amount of its deposit,
but it was a debtor to the amount of the note
held by the bank.
Its debit was larger than
its credit, and, if the bank had not failed, it
hence

could only have recovered the difference between the two. Do the receivers occupy any
better position?
The general rule undoubtedly
is that a receiver takes subject to set-offs
which the defendant might have set up against
See 22 Am. & Eng. Enc.
the original owner.
Law, 308, and Merrill v. Granite Oo. (Mass.)
36 N. B. 797, 23 L. R. A. 313, note, where
are collected.
There are
many authorities
some exceptions to the rule, one of which may
be mentioned, although not directly involved
in the case, as some of the authorities cited by
the appellants are to that point; and that is
that a claim obtained after the commencement
of the proceedings which resulted in the appointment of a receiver should not be allowed
as a set-off unless there be some statute authorizing it to be done. In this case, however,
the debt was due by the bank to the appellee
before the proceedings under which the apAs
pellants were appointed were Instituted.
of debtor and
we have seen, the relation
creditor existed; and the question discussed
above, as to whether demand must be made
before suit can be brought, does not in any
wise reflect upon the question of indebtedness,
but only on the right to sue for the indebtedBut it is said on
ness before demand is made.
behalf of the appellants that, inasmuch as the
of the
note fell due after the appointment
first receiver, he took it free from all equities,
just as a bona fide purchaser for value would
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have done, and that a claim in favor of the
bank which did not mature until in the hands
of the receiver is not subject to a set-off by
a claim which existed against the bank before
in short, that
the receiver's rights accrued;
in one case the debt is due by the bank to
the customer, and In the other by the customer to the receiver.
If that were strictly correct there would be some ground for the contention; for if, for example, the appellee had
purchased some property from the receiver, it
would not be permitted to set off its claim
against such indebtedness to the receiver, for
it would thereby not only obtain an unwarranted preference over other creditors, but it
would prevent a proper settlement of the insolvent estate, and, moreover, they would not
be mutual claims.
But when the receiver
was appointed he took the assets of the bank,
and among those assets was this note. It was
a debt already incurred by the appellee, and
By reason
payable to the bank when due.
of the fact that it was payable to and held by
the bank, it was an asset that became vested
in the receiver, and he took it subject to the
equities existing between the appellee and
Although there are some authorithe bank.
ties to the contrary, the great weight of authority is to the effect that the fact that the
claim thus held by the receiver does not mature until after his appointment does not prevent a defendant from using his claim as a
Among other decisions are Berry v.
set-off.
Brett, 6 Bosw. 627; Scott v. Armstrong, 14G
U. S. 499, 13 Sup. Ct. 148, 36 L. Ed. 1059;
Piatt V. Bentley, 11 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.)
171; In re Hatch, 155 N. Y. 401, 50 N. E. 49,
40 L. R. A. 664;
Bank v. Balliet, 8 Watts &
S. 311; Aldrich v. Campbell, 4 Gray,
284;'
Smith V. Spengler, 83 Mo. 408; McCagg v.
Woodman, 28 111. 84; Armstrong v. Warner.
49 Ohio St. 376, 31 N. E. 877, 17 L. R. A. 466;
Yardley v. Caothier, 2 O. C. A. 349, 51 Fed.
506, 17 L. R. A. 462; Skiles v. Houston,
110
Pa. St. 254, 2 Atl. 30. See, also, Fera v. Wickham (N. Y. App.) 31 N. E. 1028, 17 L. R. A. 456,
note. Some of these cases make a distinction
between a technical set-off in suits at law, and
cross demands allowed by courts of equity,
but, as we are now considering a distribution
in a court of equity, all of the cases can properly be referred to here.
3. But it is contended by the appellants that
if it be conceded that the general rule is as
we have stated, about the rights of the receivers, they occupy a different position, by reason
of our statute.
Section 264a of article 23, c.
349, Acts 1896, provides that when a corooration has been determined or proven to be insolvent and dissolved, in accordance with section 264, "all of its property and assets of every description
to the
shall be distributed
creditors of said corporation in the s^me manner that the property and assets of an insolvent debtor are distributed under the provisions of article 47 of the Code. * * * And
the date of the filing of the bill against such
corporation, upon which it may be dissolved,

RECEIVERS.

a

a

a

it

3

a

it

if

Is

a

it

&

3

a

Clearly
deposit to the payment of the note?
not, as the assignee of the claim would have
taken it subject to equities existing between
the appellee and the bank, and a court of
equity would have protected the bank or Its
representatives,
Marshall v.
the receivers.
Cooper, 43 Md. 46. It would seem clear,- then,
that at least in equity the deposit should be
allowed as
counterclaim or set-ofC. But even
at law
should be allowed against the receivtrustee appointed under
ers. It is true that
our insolvent laws does not occupy precisely
the same position that an ordinary trustee under a conventional deed of trust does, as he
has greater powers, and represents the creditors. He can, for example, ijavp a deed made
by the insolvent in fraud of his creditors set
voluntary
aside, which an assignee under
deed of trust cannot do, because the latter can
But the inonly do what his assignor could.
solvent law does not vest him with such powers as would enable him to collect more than
actually due the Insolvent, and there was
only actually due the balance between the two
"All the property of every descripaccounts.
tion, rights and claims of the insolvent," vest
the insolvent has disin the trustee; and,
posed of any of his property in violation of
is void, and the trustee
the insolvent law,
It could not be successfully
can recover it.
contended that the creditors of an insolvent
could deprive one who owes the insolvent of
the right of set-off, and how can the trusrtee
who r^resents them do so? Nor can he avoir!
the right of setoff on the theory that he ocbona fide purchaser
cupies the position of
Wend. 13, refor value. Haxtun v. Bishop,
ferred to by the appellants, tends to sustain
that position, but that case has not met with
approval.
See (N. Y. App.) 31 N. B. 1028, 17
L. R. A. 458, note. In Dowler v. Cushwa, 27
Md. 354, this court quoted with approval from
Van Wagoner v. Gaslight Co., 23 N. J. Law,
291, that:
"The rule pervades both bankrupt
and insolvent laws, founded on general principles of equity, that all Cross demands, whether connected or independent, provided they be
mutual, as between the bankrupt or the insolvent and the creditor, shall be set off, and the
balance only shall be deemed the indebtedness
on one side or the other. The assignees take
bankrupt's property in the same condition,
as the
and subject to the same burthens,
bankrupt himself held it, on the principle that
they are not purchasers for
valuable consideration, but as voluntary assignees and i)erand are therefore dissonal representatives,
Altinguished
from particular assignees."
the distinction
bethough fully recognizing
tween the trustee of an insolvent and one appointed by the debtor in a deed of trust, as
made by this court in previous cases, we cannot adopt the view urged upon us, that the
fwmer
to be regarded as a bona flde purchaser for value of the assets that come into
his hands, and thereby permit him to deprive
a debtor of such a right as that to set off a
debt due by the insolvent prior to the instituis

it

it

it

is

it

3

it,

shall be taken and treated for the purpose of
determining
the validity of preferences and
for all other purposes as the date of the filing
of the petition in Insolvency by or against
ar natural person."
In short, receivers of corporations that are dissolved under that statute are placed on the same basis as trustees in
insolvency of natural persons, and the date of
filing the bill is the time fixed to determine
the status of the parties affected by it. But
section 11 of article 47 of the Code provides
that "the estates of the insolvent shall be
distributed
under the order of the court according to the principles of equity."
While
set-cfif in eoiiity is generally governed by the
same principles as at law, courts of equity
sometimes allow a set-ofC where for some technical reason it could not be allowed .it law.
The insolvency of the party against whom it
is claimed frequently affords equitable ground
for allowing it. A technical set-off is wholly
of statutory origin, but courts of equity exercise an original jurisdiction over the subject,
and will, when reason and justice require it,
enforce a counterclaim, though not within the
letter of the statute. Smith v. Donnell, 9 Gill,
84, and Manning v. Thruston,
59 Md. 218, are
It would
instances of such equitable relief.
sometimes work great injustice to customers
of banks if they should be required to pay in
full their indebtedness to the bank, and only
A cusreceive a dividend on their deposits.
tomer might from time to time make deposits
in bank with a view to meet his note held by
and
would manifestly be a great hardship, if, under those circumstances, he could
not apply his deposit towards the payment of
the note, because the bank had failed and a
A court of equireceiver had been appointed.
ty would certainly not permit such unjust results in the distiibution of funds before it, if
such facts were proven; and, although in this
no evidence that the deposit
case there
was made with special reference to the mabecame due a few
turity of the note, yet, as
might
days after the receiver was appointed,
well be inferred that the appellee had that
If the
fact in view in making the deposits.
could have applied the
bank had not faUed,
deposit of the appellee towards the payment of
Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.)
the note.
And
828, 835; Miller v. Bank, 30 Md. 392.
would be unreasonable to permit a receiver of
an insolvent bank to collect the note in full,
without allowing the set-off, particularly as
"The
lien on the deposits.
the bank had
bank holds a lien upon the deposits in its
hands to secure the repayment of the depositor's indebtedness, and may enforce that lieu
as the debts mature, by applying the debtor's
deposits upon them, thus setting the two off
Eng. Enc. Law
Am.
against each other."
If the
(2d Ed.) 835; MiUer v. Bank, supra.
appellee was not financially responsible, and
had attempted to assign its claim for deposits
against the bank to a third person, could there
have been any question about the right of the
receiver to insist upon the application of the
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tioB o( the Insolvent proceedings;
and we find
nothing in our statute, or in the authorities we
feel called upon to follow, to cause us to
reach a conclusion that in our opinion would
work such manifest injustice.
It is not claimed that a receiver appointed under the stat-
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ute referred to can occupy any better position than an insolvent trustee, and, for the
reasons we have given, we will affirm the orOrder afder of the court appealed from.
firmed; the costs to be paid out of the insolvent estate.
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PITTSBURGH
et

(21

Atl.

72,

al.
139

COAL R.

Pa. 213.)

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Jan.

Appeal from court of common
legheny

CO.

6, 1891.

pleas,

Al-

county.

Bill in equity for

the appointment of a reto collect unpaid stock subscriptions
from the stockholders of a company, for the
payment of a judgment creditor of said comJ. N. McCreery, an employ^ of the
pany.
Pittsburgh Coal Railroad Company, obtained
a judgment against it. The plaintiff, hia assignee, filed a bill against said company and
seven of the stockholders,
for the appointment of a receiver to collect sufficient unpaid
stock subscriptions to pay him his claim.
The said stockholders joined with said company aa defendants,
and filed demurrers
to
the bill, which were all overruled.
Defendants were ordered to plead in 15 days.
Said
stockholders
then filed a plea and answer,
but the company filed no plea or answer at
any time, and no decree was ever taken
against it. A general replication was filed,
and a master was appointed.
Subsequently,
Keams,
pending
the hearing before him,
Risher, and McClure, other creditors of said
company,
presented petitions for leave to
intervene, and were allowed to become plaintiffs. On the same day R. B. Brown, one of
the seven stockholders,
on behalf of himself
and his co-defendants,
presented a petition,
setting forth the names of the other stockholders than those made defendants originally, and the amount of stock held by each,
and prayed that the petitions
of Keams,
Risher, and McClure be granted only upon
condition that the said stockholders named
Keams, Risher,
by him be made defendants.
and McClure were joined as plaintiffs, and
the stockholders named by Brown were made
The pleadings remained as they
defendants.
were at the appointment of the master, who
proceeded to hear the case. He recommended a decree in favor of plaintiffs, in accordance with the prayer in the bill. The report
was referred back to him, for a supplemental
[■eport of the several sums due the respective
plaintiffs, the amount of the subscriptions of
and in pro rata
each of said defendants,
ceiver

share which each should be decreed to pay
Pending the
said plaintiffs, respectively.
hearing upon this second reference to the
master William Vankirk, one of the original
defendants,
petitioned
the court to grant
leave to said defendants
to pay Bailey's
claim, and the costs of the proceeding, and
to vacate the appointment
of the master,
alleging the want of an issue as to the creditors who had been permitted to become
plaintiffs with Bailey.
This was refused.
The master, under the court's order, filed his
a decree
supplemental
report recommending
against 14 of the 22 defendants, which was
made in accordance with the recommendation, whereupon 4 of them, to-wit, William
Vankirk, R. B. Brown, John F. Dravo, and
W. H. Aldred, appealed, assigning for error
(2) the appoint(1) the decree of the court;
ment of the master, and the confirmation of
his report, "where said case was not at issue
as against the Pittsburgh
Coal Railroad
defendant;" (3) the confirmation
Company,
of the report, and the making of the decree
as to the claims of Keams, Risher, and McClure, when "no issue was ever made up as
between them or any of them, and the said
defendants, or any of them."

John S. Ferguson, for appellants.
Fetterman, for appellees.

0. S.

PER CURIAM. This appeal is entitled as
though it had been taken by the Pittsburgh
Such is not the
Coal Railroad Company.
fact, however.
The appeal was entered by
William Vankirk, R. B. Brown, John F.
Dravo, and W. H. Aldred, four of the deLane's Appeal, 105 Pa. 49,
fendants below.
and Bell's Appeal, 115 Pa. 88, 8 Atl. 177, are
authority that such a bill can be maintained.
The record ia voluminous, and consists principally of questions of fact. We must assume that the learned master has decided
these correctly, inasmuch as he is sustained
by the court below, and no clear error has
been pointed out. The matters referred to in
the second and third assignments are purely
technical, and do not affect the merits.
We
find nothing in the record to justify us in
reversing the decree.
Decree aSirmed, and
the appeal dismissed, at the costs of the appellants.
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trust, 380.
executory contract to create trust, 385.
deposits in savings bank in trust for relatives, 386.
intent as distinguishing gift from trust, 389.
creation of voluntary trust, 393.

FRAUD— JURISDICTION

OF EQUITY,

adequate and complete remedy at law, 258.
cancellation of agreement and reinstatement
of contract, 261.
faith of fraudulent
deed executed upon
agreement, 264.

INJUNCTIONS,
railway company

agreeing not to transport
goods at rates fixed by law, 725.
trustees of church closing building against
duly appointed preacher, 729.
unlawful execution ground for injunction,
732.

vote by stockholder of shares at corporate
election, 734.
introduction
of electric lights in breach of
illuminating contract, 735.
breach of contract under a lease, 738.
landlord's right to prevent unauthorized use
of premises, 740.
agreement by physician
to refrain from
practice, 742.
right to restrain reliable company from securing services of employ^, 620.
violation of negative stipulation in contract,
605.

threatening
purchaser of goods witu suits
for infringements of patents, 744.
disclosure by servant of trade secrets, 746.
waste by life tenant, 751.
cutting and drawing" timber from land, 753.
continuing trespasses ground for injunction,
755.

by party declaring

conveyance of property in discharge of debt
reserving any surplus of proceeds, 359.
written statement of a trust in lands subscribed by the party to be charged there-

with,

INJUNOTIONS-Confd.

destruction
of fruit and ornamental trees
by city, 757.
diversion and obstruction of water course by
city, 758.
carrying and displaying banner for purpose
of boycotting, 761.
conspiracy to injure business, 764.
attempt to enforce employes to join strike,

■

770.

maintenance of house of III fame, 773.
adoption of trade-name, 774.

LIS PENDENS,
doctrine

MAXIMS

founded

on

notice,

97.

OF EQUITY,

no wrong without a remedy, 3.
equity follows the law, 5, 9.
equity aids the vigilant, 15.
equality is equity, 17.
he who seeks equity must do equity, 19, 27.
equal equities, the first in time prevails, 23.
equal equities, the law must prevail, 26.
he who comes into equity must come with
clean hands, 30, 31.
equity regards substance, rather than form,
38, 54.

equity looks on that as done
be done, 4S.
equity acts specifically and
compensation, 46.
equity imputes an intent to
tion, 48.
. equity acts in personam, 50,

which ought to
not by way of

fulfill an obliga52.

MISTAKE OF FACT,

materiality of mistake to warrant rescission
of contract, 210.
reinstatement
of insurance policy, 214.

mutual mistake, 218.
ignorance or mistake of fact extrinsic, and
not essential to contract, 220.
gross negligence as relief against party's
own acts, 223.
reformation of contract on parol evidence of
mutual mistake, 227.

MISTAKE OF LAW,
letter of attorney revoked on death of donor,
acts thereafter void, 170.

INDEX.

MISTAKE OF LAW— Cont'd,

RECEIVERS,

mistake arising from ignorance of law not
ground for reformation of written instrument, 175.
deeds In futuro given by mistake, 181.
contract corrected so as to express Intention
of parties, 184.
mutual mistake of parties to contract, 186.
bond from judgment executed under mutual
mistake, 190.
mistake as to words expressing intent of
parties to contract, 201.
discliarge of lien by refusal of tender, 205.
fraudulent representations to party ignorant
of law, 206.
voluntary payment of money unaffected by
fraud, 209.

MISTAKE— PAROL
RECT,

EVIDENCE

failure to have trust properly

TO

COR-

declared

In

231.

deed,

intention of parties to contract, 237.
deed conveying less land than orally bought
or paid for, 239.
discretion of court to correct mistake, 241.
involving specific enforcement
reformation
of oral agreement within statute of frauds,
247.

reformation of contract
land than therein

by including
specified, 255.

more

MORTGAGES,
right of mortgagor

to have rents and profits
applied to cancellation of debt, 547.
of mortgage,
proof of loss of assignment
549.

of mortgagee,

interest

554.

PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES,
for liquidated damages,
equity jurisdiction of enforcement
agreement

56.

of for-

feiture, 59.
penalty or liquidated damages, 60,
penalty or liquidated damages, 61.
penalty or liquidated damages, 67.
created by will, 399.

priority of mortgage

lien not lost by cancellation, 69.
insolvency proceedings set aside without notice, 71.
definition of active and constructive notice,
74.

of mort-

notice to purchaser
gage, 76.

of satisfaction

actual, constructive,
strued, 83.
notice
constructive

and implied

notice con-

as affecting

priority of

priority of right of bona fide purchaser,

79.

85.

unrecorded deed as constructive notice, 89.
record as notice to subsequent purchaser,
91.

notice
notice

to agent as notice to principal, 91.
to purchaser by recital in deed, 96.

HUTCH.& BUNK.EQ.— 57

814.

dissolution of mining partnership, 824.
right of creditor to ask for appointment

of,

828.

of
on payment
revocation of appointment
expenses, 835.
by creditor of bank,
ex parte application
836.

of corporation
misconduct
of shareholders
as ground for appointment, 840.
proper parties to be appointed, 846.
excessive mortgage and decrease of business
of railroad, 849.
disposition of rents collected, 853.
during pendency of action of
appointment
foreclosure, 855.
attaching creditor interfering with mortgage
foreclosure, 858.
collection of rents on property insufficient
to secure mortgage, 860.
validity of acts of receiver, 862.
funds in hand of receiver liable for taxation, 867.
right of receiver to issue certificates of indebtedness, 870.
right to issue certificates to pay taxes, 872.
action by receiver to enforce liability of
stockholders, 877.
suits in foreign jurisdiction, 879.
combinations
in restraint of trade, 882.
mismanagement
of property of insolvent
corporation, 885.
injury and destruction of insolvents' assets,
888.

PRIORITIES AND NOTICE,

right,

against foreign government, 788.
right to enjoin officers of state, 795.
service of notice on receiver, 806.
appointment of receiver resulting in destruction of business, 807.
protection of secret code, 808.
time when title vests in receiver, 811.
power of judges of trial courts to appoint,

authority of receiver

set-off by insolvent bank against note of depositor, 890.
enforcement of liability of corporate stockholder, 894.

POWERS IN TRUST,
general power

897

REFORMATION,
deed executed by party mentally weak, 779.
procured by fraud and mistake,
contract
781.

RESULTING

TRUSTS,

next of kin to take surplus of trust for his
own benefit, 434.
life estate of wife resulting to husband, 436.
deed from husband to wife, 438.
A. purchases estate with his money and
takes deed In name of B., a trust results
to A., 439.
legal estate taken jointly results to party
advancing purchase money, 444.
delivery of deed as affecting trust, 447.
trust,
evidence of intention of establishing
451.

INDEX.

8;»8

SPECIFIC

SATISFACTION,
legacy as satisfaction of bond debt, 133.
devise to satisfy debt, 135.
two bequests of the same sum of money to
tlie same legatee construed, 137.
intention of testator, 139.
ademption of legacies, 143.
ademption of legacies determined by parol
evidence, 145.
foundation of rule of ademption

of legacies,

148.

PERFORMANCE
SPECIFIC
TRACT,

OF

CON-

heir entitled to land held by tenure of horn,
oijT).

enforcement of promise for conveyance of
land, 566.
competency of party to contract, 567.
adjoining proprietor's right to compel building of party wall, 570.
sale of debts proved under commission of
bankrupt, 576.
sufficiency of description a defense to a contract for a conveyance of land, 577.
jurisdiction of decree for conveyance of
land, 579.
delivery of shares of stock loss of which
cannot be compensated, 580.
agreement between theater and stock company, 584.
in enforcement of
tender of performance
contract of sale, 587.
refusal to deliver coal on account of advance
in price, 590.
forfeiture of charter of railroad company for
failure to build and equip road, 593.
parties to action for enforcement of railroad
building contract, 595.
penalty or liquidated damages for breach of
contract, 598.
agreement to write and report cases determined, not mutual, 603.
affirmative stipulation not enforceable, 605.
actor to perform at certain theater, 613.
negative stipulation in contract for sale of
chat.tels,

618.

for
Injunction against rival manufacturers
use of stamp on goods, 620.
right to reserve ball player for subsequent
season, 622.
agreement to execute formal contract, 626.
return of personal chattels where detention
cannot be compensated, 628.
use of same tracks by street railway companies, 632.
covenant giving right to purchase premises
leased a continuing offer to sell, 635.
discretion of court governed by merits of
the case, 641.
damages for a refusal of perstipulated
formance, 643.
insolvency as a defense to conveyance of
real estate, 645.
lease with option to purchase chattels, 646.
effect of destruction by Are of property to
be conveyed, 166.

PERFORMANCE
TRACT— Cont'd.

OF

CON-

time of acceptance or acquiescence of proposal, 650.
destruction of property by Are as a defense
to contract, 652.
agreement to repair as defense to contract,
653.

deterioration of land caused by mismanagement, 654.
execution of contract for sale of real estate
with part paynitot equivalent to transfer,
658.

vendee taking possession of property liable
for its destruction, 660.
right of vendee to compel conveyance of
property destroyed, 662.
release of homestead affecting the right to
compel conveyance, 666.
refusal of a wife to join in conveyance, 668.
parol variation of contract as affecting conveyance, 670.
refusal of a wife to relinquish right of dower,

672.

uncertainty of description in contract, 673.
laches as a defense in action for performance of contract, 677.
payment and legal tender as ground for forfeiture, 686.
right of way granted to railroad in consideration of construction of road, 692.
removal of incumbrance
pending suit, 694.
incumbrances as defense to contract for conveyance, 697.
omission to affix stamp by United States
collector, 700.
jurisdiction to enforce agreement to give
note for purchase price and secure it by
mortgage, 702.
public policy as defense to enforcement of
agreement, 704.
stockholder's agreement to transfer shares to
company, 711.
construction of railroad stations in discretion
of court, 714.
mutuality as ground for specific performance, 715.
acceptance of optional contract, 717.
liquidated damages agreed upon by breach
of contract, 721.
damages awarded for breach of contract,
723.

SUBROGATION,
right of purchaser

of void municipal
bonds to recover value, 560.

TRUSTS—

aid

ACTIVE AND PASSIVE,

estate consistent with contention
creating trust, 397.

of party

TRUSTS— PUBLIC OR CHARITABLE,
construction of charitable trusts, 402.
intention of testator in a will creating trusts,
423.

uncertainty of beneficiaries as ground
invalidating charitable trust, 430.
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